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Designing Financial Services for Rural Poor: Retooling Rural Financial Institutions?Author(s): K. KaladharSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31, No. 39 (Sep. 28, 1996), pp. A117-A122Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4404624.
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esigning
Financial
Services
o r R u r a l
o o r
RetoolingRuralFinancial
nstitutions?
K Kaladhar
Requirementsoffinancial
services
for
poor rural households encompass
consumption smoothening, human capital
formation, production
and investmentcredit
ano4nsurance,
in
addition
to
savings facilities.
While the
informal
sector
provides most of
the
services,
the
formal
rural
financial
institutions have inappropriate
tools and
perspectives in
delivering
the services. Unless
institutions retool themselves
by focusing
on a rural household's
economy
rather
than
limiting themselves
to
activity
linked
lending, they
cannot
be
successful
in
delivery of financial services.
IN
the
recent
past,
hedebateon
rural inancial
institutions
(RFI)
has been
focusing
on
analysing
reasons for 'successful'
performance
f such institutionsmore
from
operational perspectives
and
away
from
macro-economic
variables
Yaron
1992].
In
the 1960s, 1970s
and
1980sanalysis
centred
around
problems temming
rom
ow interest
rates
or
subsidised credit, supply leading
finance, government
owned and
expanded
financial institutions
[Adams
et al 1984].
However, now,
the
emerging
research
on
rural financial institutions
shows some of
the operational elements that
have been
relevantto successful
performance
such as
organisational culture, removing
informational
asymmetry,
etc. In this
paper
it is proposed o examine the developments
thathavetaken
place, synthesise
the
learning
and
develop
an
operational
framework
for
implementation
n
the
Indian
context with
respect to formal rural financial institution
system.
The rural
poor, especially women,
commonlyhaverestricted ccess to financial
services expected
to
be
given by
the formal
rural
financial
institutions. The Indian
perception
has
been
that
due
to lack of
adequate
network of such
institutions, the
inaccessibility
has
been
further
trengthened.
As
a
remedial measure the national
government
assisted
by
donors have
envisaged,
ubstantially
n
large-scale,
orinal
regulated programmes emphasising
more
credit to
poor
in
rural areas.
In
the
process
huge bureaucracy
has
been
built-up
for the
purpose
of
purveying
credit to rural
poor.
The
financial
programmes
aunched
by the
formal institutions had other assumptions
such as a low
rate
of
interest,purpose inked
credit,
formal
project appraisal,etc, with a
view to
reaching the benefits via income
generating activities,
to the rural
poor.
PROJECr PPROACHo LENDING
One of the central
pivots
on
which the
credit
institutions
were
built was the World
Bank's approach o
developing rural poor,
viz, projectapproach.The projectapproach
was layered into
definite sequences with
identification
of the
activity(ies) in the first
phase, followed by formulation,appraisal,
implementation,monitoring
and
evaluation
phases.
This
was called
projectcycle
[Baum
1978]. Projectapproach nvisaged
a detailed
project
appraisal involving calculation of
rates of returnand financing
the best of the
projects
for the
purpose
of
generating
adequate ncome tothe ruralpoor.The focus
under he approachwas more
on the
purpose/
activity thatwas expected
to 'help' the poor
rather han on
the poor themselves.
In the
process,
during the 1960s and 1970s very
many rural
development projects
in terms
of sectors
such as plantation, horticulture,
irrigationdevelopment, animal husbandry
development projects
were
appraised
and
sanctioned
by
the
World
Bank
for
implementation
through
formal rural
financial nstitutions. n
addition,
unctional
areas such
as
extension, credit, etc, also
received
widespread importance.
Among
these
projects,primacywas accorded o rural
credit
projectsunderwhich
the
elements of
projectappraisal
were
subjected
o
analytical
rigour and rates of returnwere calculated
both under
economic analysis as well
as
financial
analysis.
Credit
was to
be
purveyed
undersuch projects o ruralpoor for various'
activities
such as
minor
irrigation, animal
husbandry,plantation
and
horticulture,
tc.
Each
of the
activities was analysed
n
detail
in terms of
costs
and
benefits and
the
rates
of
return
wce
calculated
accordingly.
If the
rates of
return'were bove the given cut-off
point,
then the
projects
were
accepted
for
the purpose
of
financing
under
the
project.
Under the
system, production-oriented
lending
had taken roots with elaborate
sequentially designed procedures being
observed by rural bankers. Some bf the
characteristics that were developed and
stabilised
over
the
years
were
activity/
purpose
centred.
Technically
feasible sizes
were
determined e g, twomilchanimal
unit,
one hectare
plantationof oranges) with the
objective
of
achieving
financial
viability.
Farm
budgets were designed along with
farm
models
containing extensive analysis
on financial
and economic
aspects.
Repayment
would
be fixed in suitable
instalments ver
theeconomic ife of
activity,
after accounting for
grace/gestation
period,
out of the income
generated
because of
the
activity. Thus,
rural financial
institutions
were to
identify activities
keeping
in
view
the
potential of the area, formulate and
appraise
arm
budgets
andfarm
models
(unit
costs),
implement (advance loans)
monitor
and then evaluate.
An
activitywise
area-
wise (villagewise) credit
plan would be
prepared
or the
purpose under
the
dispen-
sation
presently
called 'Service AreaCredit
Plan'. The Service Area
Approachempha-
sised the
projectapproach
at the micro-level
(branch
evel)
with branch
manager
as the
focal
point
for
credit based
development
of
rural
poorresiding
in
the service area com-
prising on an average about 15-25
villages.
Coinciding
with
the
project approach
o
lending, another approach developed
focusing on the role of finance in economic
development,
whereunder the
concept
of
fungibility
of
money
was
propagated
which
theorised that
money
makes
it
difficult
to
pinpointexactly which borrowershadspent
for what. For
example,
a borrowerwho
has
been financed
for.
purchase of
livestock,
perhaps ould
haveused, actually,
he
savings
which he/she has and used the loans taken
under
he
project
or
the
purpose
of
financing
a
wedding
or
any
such
social
ceremony.
Anotheruse for which loan
could
have been
put
to
may
have been immediate debt
payment
or
meeting
consumption
needs.
This was
expected to happen
nspite
of
post-
loan sanction and disbursement
upervision
with a view to ensuring
'end-use' of loans.
The
borrower,accordingly, would perceive
the
loan funds
as
an
additionality o
his
total
budget
and it
would be difficult to
attribute
the benefits to investment in a production
activity
as
envisaged
under he
project
o
the
loan funds
alone.
In
other
words,
as
long
as a rural
household's financial
budget
permitted
epayment, iven
its
priorities,
he
repayment
would occur
irrespective
of
the
success
of
the
investment oan.
In
addition,
it also
pinpoints
the
futility
of
focusing on
income
generation exclusively out
of
the
investment
and
repaymentas a proportion
to the
income
generated.
In
other words, by
concentrating
and
analysing the purposeor
the
activity alone,
the
repayment
need not
occur
[Pischke
and
Adams 1980].
Economic and
Political Weekly
September 28,
1996
A-I 17
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We will first examine the
impact of such
thinking
at the
macro-level,
i e, at the
level
of World
Bank
which has been
in the
centre
stage
in
propagating
he
projectapproach
o
lending.
The issue of current practices
in
project appraisal
was examined and the
conclusionthat
was arrivedat was we
have
found that the
extent to which (social cost
benefit analysis is)
used
and
(has)
real
influence
is not
great,
even
in the
World
Bank [Little
and
Mirrlees
1991].
This
observation
by
Little and
Mirrlees,
considered hefathers f
the
project
appraisal,
comes
as a
shocking
statementand leads us
to raise two broad questions
[Shantayanan
et al 1995]. (1) What
is
the
proper
role for
project valuation
n today's world? 2) How
can we make the
project appraisal
ensure
high quality
projects?
WhenLittle
and
Mirrlees
wrote heManual
of IndustrialProject Analysis
in
1969,
the
governments
were expanding public
investments
rapidly and
much of that
investment was in industry and related
sectors. During
those decades
there
were
major
distortions
arising
from trade
policy
and exchange
rate
policy
amongst
the most
developing
economies
and
for the
purpose
of
removing
his distortion
he
focus
was on
techniques
such as border prices and
conversion factors.
Another
factor that had
sustained
project
appraisal
n
those decades
was the calculation
of the rate of return or
a
public sector project.
The same technique
also
was
sought
to be
applied
to rural
development projects.
Today,
in the latter 1990s, governments
of the developing
countries
are
reducing
theirrole, going ahead with privatisationof
public
enterprises
followed
by gradual
removalof
distortion
n the trade
policy
and
exchange
rate
systems.
In
addition,
the
concern
now is
focused
on whether
a
project
ought
to be
in the
public
sector
at all or not.
This has ed
to the
posing
of a
counterfactual:
whatwould
he world ook like
in
the absence
of
a
project.
In
other words
wherever there
is a
private
sector alternative to
public
provision, encouragement
should be
accorded to the
private
sector
alternative.
The
World
Bank, thus,
over the
years
is
gradually shifting
from
activity specific
projectappraisalo thatof sectoralandpublic
expenditure
analyses
or what is called
structural
djustment ending.
For
example,
the
agricultural
xpenditure
review of
India
carried
out
by
the World
Bank in
1993
[Pradhan
and Pillai-Essex 1993] examined
several
agricultural
rogrammes
as
projects
and calculated heirminimumrateof
return.
It concluded
that two
programmes
-
a
fertiliser
subsidy
and a
crop production
scheme
-
had
a zero
rate of returnbecause
therewas no ustification or publicprovision
of these goods. Yet the bulk
of the Indian
government' expenditurewas going
to these
two schemes. Interestingly, the study also
pointed to the high rates of return n ground
water irrigation and extension services
recommending a reorientation of public
expenditure n thatdirection.This approach
actually goes beyond setting a good
foundation
or
subsequentappraisal.
t
also
improves the overall qualityof the sectoral
investment programmes.
Concurrent
with the
shift
of
focus
of
the
WorldBankto structural djustment ending
from
project-basedending,
within he
project
cycle therehave been qualitativechanges in
variousphasesemergingwith the expericnce
into 'new' project cycle. The Bank's
evaluation
uggested
hatwhen
development
projectsperformpoorly
it is
usually
for one
or more of
the
following
reasons:
(i)
Beneficiariesdo not
participate ufficiently;
(ii)
borrowersare not committed to
project
goals; (iii)
risks
are inadequately assessed
and
managed;
or
(iv) capacity building
was
separately pursued through technical
assistance programmes,etc. The proposed
new project cycle [Picciotto
and
Weaving
1994]
now has
(1) listening (2) piloting (3)
demonstrating
and
(4) mainstreaming
as
different
phases.
Under
the first
phase, viz, listening,
the
central
role of the borrower and
the
participation
f
potentialbeneficiaries,right
from the start, symbolises the learning
dimension
of
projects
as
against
'identification'
-
a
term suggests
a
visual
selection of
physical goals
or
focusing
on
specific
activities such
as
minor
irrigation,
animal
husbandry,
etc. The second
phase,
piloting,
is
geared to exploring alternatives
identified at the learning phase and
objectively assessing
risks
through
participatorymethodology.
The third
phase
is
demonstrating,e, providingopportunities
to fine tune and
adapt project concepts
to
ensure
a
satisfactory development impact.
The
fourth phase, mainstreaming,
aims at
achieving
the overall
goal
of credit-based
assistance,viz,
institutional
earning
anden-
suring
a
lasting mpact
on the
country'spoli-
cies, practices,technologies
and skills. The
new
cycle
thus
comes to fruition
with
large-
scale
adoption,mainstreaming,
f
methods,
techniques
nd
programmes ioneered uring
the pilot and demonstrationphases.
Another critical
view on
the
traditional
cost benefit
analysis
s seen from ts
inability
in
developing capabilities
of rural
poor
and
building
the same
into
cost
benefit
analysis
as
presently practised [Clements
1995].
The
existing
literature
on
economic cost
benefit
analysis
seeks
to
exclude
the main
factors
that affect the rural
poor
in
terms
of
improvements
n
nutrition, ealth, ducation,
etc.
Under
the
approach
itled
'capabilities
approach to project analysis' (CAPA)
capability is looked at not on the income or
public services, a person has access to, nor
on
the particular
choice,
plans and the
strategies a
person makes but
ratheron the
range of choices
that are
available to the
individual [Sen 1993].
Undernutrition
nd
poor health
restrict this
range of
choices in
a direct,
physiological
manner.Three
kinds
of
information
should be
consideredunder
CAPAfor
indicatingbenefit
evels. The first
is
quantitative
nformation
collected by and
for the
project,
normally on
project inputs
and on
changes
in the
beneficiary
population's capability
standards.Second,
benefit estimates
may
be
assisted
by
outside
studies
bearing
on
the connection
between
project inputs
and population
capabilities.
Third,
here
shouldbe some
scope
for
project
staffand
agency representatives
o
contribute
to
benefit
estimates based on
their
observations and
opinions.
This
suggested
approach,viz, CAPA has
several
problems for
operating bankers
at
the field level.
They
neither
have
time nor
skills for
incorporating
hese
threeelements
into
assessing the credit
demands
and
thereafter taking a
decision
in the
matter.
While
conceptually
the
approach
s
sound,
operationally
t
is
very
difficult o
implement
at the field
level.
The abovedebate
eadsus to the
conclusion
that the World
Bank, from a
commodity/
sector-based
project
lending
approachhas
gradually shifted to structural
adjustment
lending
underwhich
the
macro-economy
as
a
whole is taken
into account for
assessing
the
effectivenessof investment.
Thedifferent
phases
under
the traditional
project
cycle
have
also given
way
to
the
new
projectcycle
with
shifting of
focus from
activity to the
ruralpoorortheparticipantnadevelopment
project.
This
debategives risetothe
question
whether the
shifting
of
focus in
policy
perspective
can be
applied
at the
beneficiary
level
or
at the level
of
the
rural
poor
n
terms
of
looking
at
the
economy
of the
beneficiary.
This means that
instead
of
focusing
on
the
financing
of the
activity
alone and deter-
mining
the cost and
benefits
thereunder,
we
have
to look at a rural
household's
economy
at
the
family
level
and then determinewhat
kind of credit
packages
need
to be devised.
This calls for
having
a fresh look at the
way
the
credit is
seen
from
the
perspective
of
ruralpoor and tailoring financial services
delivery
accordingly.
FINANCIALSERVICES
FROMPERSPEcnvE
OFRuRAL
OOR
In traditional
approach
to rural
finance,
the
production
ide of
rural arm
households
is
generally
seen as
providing
the
logic
for
rural
credit. What is
forgotten
n the
whole
process
is the
poor
household's
demand
or
financial services
relating
to
consumption
smoothening,
human
capitalformation,off-
farm ncome generating
activities,
nsurance
and savings
services [Zeller 1995;
Zeller,
A-1 18
Economic and
Political
Weekly
September
28,
1996
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4/7
Von Braun, Johm and
Puetz 1994]. In
a
study conducted
for
the World
Bank,
the
natureof demand
for financial
services
by
rural
poor
in
India
was
assessed
through
a
client suirvey Mahajan
and Ramola
1995].
It was found
that in terms of current
usage,
thepriority cross
different
ypes
of financial
services among
the rural
poor
was
consumption credit,
savings, production
credit and insurance. Consumptionconsti-
tutedtwo-thirds
of the credit usage, the rest
being for production
credit. Consumption
included
llness,
householdexpenses during
the
lean
season. Informal
sector
met con-
sumption requirements
at a
high
rate
of
interest,
with
formal
rural
financial
institutionsmeeting
wo-thirds f
production
credit requirements.
The usage
of financial savings is low by
rural financial
institutions with rural
poor
themselves assessing
a
large gap between
their current
savings
and
potential savings.
In
all, savings
accounted for 5
per
cent
of
the
income and about 10
per
cent of annual
creditusage.
The
usage
of
insurance ervices
was very low.
Under
production
credit, many
had
received oans
inked o
government
poverty
alleviation
programmes
uch
as
IRDP
after
accounting
oroutof
pocketcosts, payments
to
middlemen, price
difference of
assets
received as loan
in kind vs
the cash
price
in the
market, wage loss,
etc.
In the
delivery
of financial
services,
the
borrowers
had
opined
in
another
study,
that
the
attitude of
the
banking
officials was
indifferent
o them
[Rajasekhar
nd
Vyasulu
1991
.
That
obtaining
a
loan
is a
complicated
and lengthy process was evident from the
study,
n
addition o the
finding
that he time
taken
o
get
a loan sanctioned
was
inversely
related to the
size
of land
holding.
Added
to
that,
the loan amounts were
inadequate.
It was also
felt,
as a
widespread problem,
that it
was better to obtain
a
loan from
a
moneylender
hanto
go
through
the ordeal
of
bank
procedures Gupta
and
Shroff 19Q0].
In the Indian
context,
provision
of credit
to the
poor
and
marginal
farmers was
constrained
by
lack of
access
in view
of
collaterals,
low interest
rates, leading
to
rationing
of
credit
o wealthy ruralclientele,
followedbyvarioussystemsand procedures
that were
inappropriate
or the rural poor.
The creditneeds of the
poor
as
seen by
them
[MYRADA
1992] indicate
that they require
small but
regular
and
urgent
loans for
consumption
whereas
their
options
were
restricted to IRDP or similar
programmes
designed
and
approved
by
the
government.
Small
loans for
consumption
were
readily
available from
money lenders who also
placed
the
poor on the track of increasing
debt and
bondage
which went rapidly
downhill. On the otherhand,banks were not
willing to lend small amounts
nor would
they entertain oans for consumption, even
though t was obvious that he argestnumber
of loans was taken for
this purpose. The
formalrural inancial
nstitutionsalso could
not give any loans
quickly when needed.
Another practice was adoption of
standardised ost and estimatesoften on the
grounds of feasibility; these amounts were
generally arger
han
requiredby the people.
For example, when farmers in one area,
where the water table was high, needed
approximately Rs 3,000
to
sink an open
well, the bank insisted on providing the
standardrate of Rs
9,000. There
are
other
exampleswhere herequirements erehigher
than the
standardised ost
or
what
is known
in
the banking system as 'unit cost'. There
was, thus,no mechanism o fine tune he size
of
projects and estimates to the micro
situation. This is
relevant
to the
context of
rural household's economy mentioned
earlier. In several
cases
the
schedule
of
recoverydesign by
the
bankdid not conform
to actual
trends
in returns. An
interesting
case of
difference in
recovery
schedules
concerned milch
animals. It
is well known
that
in
the summer the milk
yield falls, yet
the
recovery
instalments
required by
the
bank remain
constant, instead of adjusting
to the
actual trends
n milk
yields.
Another
example
of
inappropriateecovery
chedules
was the
practice
of
linking
recovery
with
harvest imeon
agricultural
oansto
marginal
dry
landfarmers the core of
the
rural
poor.
The
majorityof them consume over 80
per
cent of
theirproduceand could not
possibly
repay
oans from sales of the remainder.
The
scheduleof recoveriescould notbedisturbed
due tochangingsituationsas inoneexample
a memberof
group
tood for
village
elections
who
had borrowed
for
purchase
of a
cow
from the
group;
he
group suspected
that he
would sell the cow to raise funds
for
the
election so
they
seized it
till
the elections
were over.
The rural financial
institutions
were
pre-occupied
with
viability.
For
example providing
a
poor
woman
with
10
ewes
and one ram which
usually
failed
to
earn
adequate
eturns
ccording
o schedules
since
it
pre-supposed
hat the woman was
doing nothingpriorto
his
project.Managing
a 10+1
unit
s
almosta full
timejob requiring
her of giving up other wage opportunities
which
provided
her
daily
needs in order
to
manage
the
sheep
unit.
Thus,
the rural
financial nstitutions
gnoredmanageability
in the
process
of
determiningviability.
The
above illustrations indicate the
inappro-
priateness
of
the strategy
and systems
and
procedures followed by the formal rural
financial
institutions.
APPRoAcH
o
DELIVERY
F
FINANCIAL
SERVICESBY INFORMAL ECrOR
Given the paradigm of rural
poor
perceptions and the inadequacy
of formal
rural
inancial ystems
nmeetingthedemand
with
all its structural
equirements,how the
informal sector,
including the self-help
groups, is catering to the rural
poor is dealt
with below. The
evidence withregard o the
approachor 'how' the
financialservices are
delivered is linked
directly to the
methodology of credit
rationingemployed
by the
informal sector.
The determinants f creditrationing entre
around
informational
asymmetry between
lender and borrower [Stiglitz
and Weiss
198 1 leading o lenders
demanding ollateral
orcharginghigherrates
f interest.
Collateral
requirements ave been identifiedas a
major
determinant f
the enders'decision
to ration
loan
demand
[Binswanger et
al
1989].
Informal
enders
on
the other
hand,
often
use
collateralsubstitute.Third
partyguarantees,
trade contracts and
threat
of
loss of future
access to credit are
common
devices
in
informal
contacts
[Adams
andFitchett
1992,
Binswangeret
al
1989].
In a
study
conducted
in
Madagascar
on
determinants of credit
rationing y
both
nformal endersand
ormal
credit
groups [Zeller
1995]
several
findings
are of
relevance to the Indian context. The
credit
rationing by
informal
lenders was
determined
by age
with older individuals
more likely
to
apply
for
credit,
with
higher
age leading
to
decline
in
credit obtention.
Secondly,
the numberof
years of
schooling
has a
positive effect
on loan
application
since it
augments,
other
things
being equal,
returns on
capital
and
therefore credit
demand.
Thirdly,
the
poor, proxied by
occurrence for
wage income, significantly
rely
on informal credit for
consumption
smootheningwith a durationof two months
which
is
easily obtained
with little
waiting
time.
Fourthly,
t
is
the head
of
the
household
who is more
likely among
the members to
ask for a loan. The fifth determinant elates
to
sickness
leading
to
the
demand
for
credit
for
financing
medical
care. In
contrast to
these determinants which
trigger seeking
credit from informal
lenders,
the
decision
taken
by
the
formal
groups
is
to
approve
a
loan
request
based
on the
health of
the
applicant
household
(which
is
an
indicator
of
repaymentability)
in
addition o
existing
indebtedness
n
the informal ectorwhile
the
outstanding ebt aken rom heformal ector
does
not
impinge
on
the
rationingprocess.
The
pilot project
on
developing linkages
with
self-help
groups currently
under
implementation
in
India
also
gives
useful
insights
into the
rationing process
or
the
methodology
of
appraisalbeing
followed
by
the
self-help groups [NABARD 19951.
The
groups'
initial
source
of
fund
was
savings
supplementedaterby
creditand
he
activities
financed were need
based even
while self-
help groups adopted
a
flexible
approach.
Interest rates charged were varying
and
market-related; shorter repayments
were
Economic
and Political
Weekly September
28, 1996
A-I
19
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fixed, as against
the
procedural equirement
of allowing longer repayment period by
formal rural
financial
institutions, keeping
in view all available ources
of income
nstead
of limiting to
income
generated
out
of the
financed activity
alone. This
facilitated
members aking more
than
one
loan during
a year. Flexibility
in
norms of lending
was
observed
on case to case basis
with
less
importance attached
to documentation. In
case of
emergency/situations
of
distress,
a
second loan was also allowed
while the first
loan was yet to be repaid.Penal interest for
delays
n
repayment
f instalmentwas
applied
flexibly. Meetings
of
groups
were conducted
regularlywhich served as a formal base for
exchanging information,
completing
documentation,
etc.
In the context of
the
above it
is useful to
look into the
totally
new dimensions thrown
up
in
respectof Bangladesh
Grameen
Bank,
a
formal
rural
financial institution,
in
managing credit for the rural poor and the
reasons for its success [Jain 1996]. The
study,startlingly,
ndicates hat he Grameen
Bank
in
practice
does not enforce
its
acclaimed
policy
of
making
five-member
groups ointly responsible
for
repaymentof
loans.Contrarily, he success of theGrameen
Bank
was posited
o a combinationof several
organisational olicies
which
were
designed
to steer the behaviour
of its large number
of functionariesndborrowers
long
a credit
responsive
mode . The elements of credit
responsive
mode
centred around
various
organisational
levels and
at
each level
different credit
responsivepaths'
have been
taken
ensuring
in
an overall
context,
the
success of the bank.Atthelocal village level
the
banks credit
policies provided
a set of
neoclassical dis)incentives
to
align
the
self-
seeking
behaviour f borrowers
long
a
credit
responsive path.
The
important
activity
of
group/centre
was meant o
develop
a culture
wherein both members and the bank
functionaries followed the bank norms
implicitly
and
as a
matter of
routine. The
main
purpose
and function of
the
groups
andcentres
was to foster this culture
by
enabling
routine
repetition
of
ideological
behaviour
by
all
the
members
week
after
week,
52
times a
year
which made it a
'culturalhabit' for each individual o follow
bank norms.
In
respect
of branch
operations
as
well as
at the level
of area
office
the characteristics
that
were observed related to
routineness,
reliability
n service
delivery,
demonstrable
honesty
and error-free
performance
in
additionto
repeatedsupervision
and cross-
checks.In
summary,
n
developmentbanking
not
only
do the determinants of borrower
members'behaviourhave to be in
place,
but
the determinants/stimulants of bank
functionariesperformancealso have to
be
properly ligned.The GrameenBank hrough
its staff incentive policies could
broadly
align
its staffs'
self-seeking
behaviour
with
the bank's norms.
SUCCESSFUL
FIS
FROM NDONESIA
The relative success in the
provision
of
financialservices to the ruralpoor, ndicated
by Indonesian experience (Chaves
and
Gonzalves-Vega 1996],
is also
noteworthy
fortheIndian ontext.Thevarious ndonesian
RFIs have
fostered
ntensive inter-action
of
two types of agents, viz, those who
have the
information and those
who
have
the
resources, in the provision of financial
services to the ruralpoor.Such inter-action
has
been
at the
foundationof the
success of
the
Indonesian rural financial institutions.
The individualised
approach
nstead
of
the
group approach
n the context of Indonesia
proves that joint liability or peer pressure
wouldresultinextracosts,andmoral
hazards
forthe
groupmembers, eading
o
borrowing
on individual basis. This was also
proved
in the
case
of
GrameenBank example cited
above.
All the
steps necessary
to
complete
the
financial
ransaction
re undertaken
ocally.
In most cases
the
client
does not have to
leave his/hervillage. Further,ocal decision-
making
and
character-based ending
(when
no collateral s required)allow for the
rapid
disbursement
of
loans. Most of the time
funds are
available
when
needed,
with no
particular restrictions on end use. Most
importantly,
oans are
granted
on individual
basis.
To
overcome information
asymmetry
which is the heart of the rural financial
market
problem,
he Indonesian
xperiment
resolved
through
a
system
of
incentives
(performance-based
remuneration and
efficiency wages
as
compatible
incentives)
that has
induced a
behaviour
on
the part
of
RFI
managers
consistent with the financial
health
of the unit.
The role of credit and credit
institutions
in augmenting
productionandproductivity
is
well recognised.This approach
asresulted
in an
impressive growth of rural
banking n
India over the last four and a half
decades
in
terms of outreach, credit
disbursement
and
support
to the
poverty alleviation
programmes.
However,
the
emphasis
throughout
has
been on
achieving
certain
quantitative
argets eading to
loan
defaults
and
virtualerosion of
repayment
thics. The
end result was the
disturbing growth
in
overdues
which
not
only hampered the
recycling
of scarce resources of banks but
also affected
the
profitability
and
viability
of
the
financial institutions.
Outof the 369 districtcentral
co-operative
banks, only
171 were
operating
n
profit
as
on March
31,
1994. The
overdues
atRs
3,874
crore
constituted
33
per
cent of
the
demand.
As
regards
primary agricultural
credit
societies
(PACS),
out of
90,783 units, only
52,211
(58 per cent)
had been identified as
being
viableas on March
31,
1994. Overdues
of PACS at
Rs
3,875
crore constituted
38
per
cent of their
outstanding
loans. The
picture as
regards
the
regional rural banks
(RRBs)
was no better.
During
1994-95,
32
RRBs had made
profit
while
164
RRBs
showed a loss
aggregating
Rs 423.21 crore.
The annual loss increased from Rs
94.05
crore in
1991 to Rs 425.65 crore in 1994-
95 while the accumulated osses of
RRBs
aggregated
Rs
1,686.61
crore as on
March
31, 1995
(C Rangarajan
First Ravi Mathai
Memorial Lecture
1996). Similar data for
ruralbusiness of commercial banks is not
available.
The characteristics
n
terms of internal
practices
and
attitudes
among
rural
inancial
institutions ndicate that
they
are not
suited,
structurally,
or the
delivery
of
the financial
New
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Vol 2,
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ISBN81-7533-018-X
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A- 120 Economic and Political
Weekly September
28,
1996
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services to
the rural
poor
[Mahajan
et al
1995].
Few
products
suit rural
people's
special needs
on the dimension
of
urgency,
informality, seasonality, illiteracy
and
diversity
n
ivelihood.
No
consumption
oans
are
given
while
lending
is
security-based
with the insistence
on collaterals.
Largely,
one time loans are given
with the
poor
seen
as a social obligation
and
intrinsically
unworthy of credit.
The financial ectorreform
hat s
currently
underway ncompasses
he
nstitutional
ural
credit
delivery system.
As
part
of the
measures ecapitalisation
s
being
undertaken
alongwith
other measures
such as
development
action
plans, coupled
with
memoranda
f
understanding
orthe
purpose
of chalkingout action-oriented trategies
or'
revitalising the institutions.
However, little attentionhas been paid to
the
rigid
frameworks
that
have
permeated
the rural financial institutions.
This
is
evidenced
from
the
perspectives
of rural
poor
with
regard
to
credit.
One
point,
a
central one at that, of importance in the
reforms
process
in
respect
of
rural
inancial
institutions
s
that unless
the rural
poor are
responded to properly
the rural financial
institutionswill notbe ableto
trigger equired
impulses
and
maintain
hemselves as vibrant
and healthy institutions.Time
has
come
to
recognise
limits of credit as
against
credit
limits
[Dandekar
1995]. Based on the
experiences
outlined
above
what
is
required
is
retooling
of the rural inancial nstitutions
rather
han
tinkering
at the
periphery
n the
name of
reforms.
In addition to the above the Indian rural
credit ystem scharacterised ycertainrigid
frameworks which are
inhibiting perfor-
mance
compared
o that of informal sector.
Theelements
hat
characterise
he framework
and
simultaneously
nhibit the
performance
are: unit
costs, repayment periods, grace
period
and/moratorium
period, looking
at
the
activity,
and
confining
one-self to
the
income
generation and
unit cost from
the
point
of view of
activity
alone.
If
one has to learn the lessons from the
practices being
followed in the credit
management roups
or nformal
enders
what
kind of
procedural hanges
can be made
so
as tobring nthe elements of GrameenBank
as
already
discussed
coupled
with
the
effectiveness of
the
informal sector? It
appears
that
the
present activity-based
financial
relationships
need
to
be
given
a
go-
by
so
as to overcome the structural
igidities
in
approach
o
rural
inance. In the
informal
sector the lenders
always
look to
the
individual
and
take
a
holistic
view of the
cash flows
that are
being generated by the
invidual. In
this
context, it is useful to recall
what was alreadydiscussed here with regard
to changes in the learning pattern of the
World Bank from that of specific
project
activity to
that of structural
adjustments
lending. It is also useful to recall the present
rethinking hat s occurring n respect of
the
project cycle approach rom the traditional
phases of identification, formulation,
appraisal implementation, monitoring.
and
evaluation,
to
give importance
to
the
'process' by focusing
on
(a) listening, (b)
piloting, (c) demonstrating
and
(d)
mainstreaming.
Under
this
process
the core focus is
on
developing
and enduring relationship
between the lender and
the borroweron a
long-term
basis rather han
seeking
it as a
one shot
lending approach.
In
the
light
of
the
above
the rural bankers should now
realign approach to rural financing
whereunder the rural family or the rural
household
is
taken as a unit for
the
purpose
of holistic
analysis
of its
micro-economy.
A rural household or a rural individual
will be the
focus for delivering financial
services.Financial erviceswouldencompass
different requirements
as
seen
from the
householdperspectiventermsof investment
credit, production credit, consumption
smoothenilig, human capital formation,
insurance nd astbutnot he eastappropriate
savings products.
The nformational symmetrybetween he
financial nstitutionand the ruralhousehold
can be overcome
by developing long-term
and
enduringrelationships.
For
the
purpose
the present
methodology
of
doing banking
from the branch
premises
need to be
reoriented.The
branchmanagerassisted by
his
staff shall haveto visit each of the
villages
under
his service
area
regularly
and deliver
financial services at the village itself. The
visits may be such that each
of
the
villages
are
visited at least once
in 10
days during
which
time
he must mobilise both
savings
as well
as disburse credit.
In
the
initial
stages, say
first
six
months
or
one
year
he branch
manager
hall
dentify
about 100-200
families
in
a
village
and
develop
documentation
on
each of the
families
with
regard
o the
familyeconomics,
the assets and liabilities
position including
debts
owed to informal sector. This is
to
be
done
simultaneouslyalong
with
mobilising
savings
from the rural households.
After the bond is establishedbetween the
branch
manager
and the
family,
credit
requirements on an overall
basis
can be
ascertained and
revolving
credit
facilities
can
be
grantedkeepingin view
the
quantum
of
requirements.
While
granting revolving
credit
facilities the
distinction between
production
reditand
nvestment reditshall
be
dispensed
with.
The activities that the
borrower
roposes o take
up
shallbe
assessed
by
the
borroweror the rural
household
tself
and
amountsof loans
arrivedat
taking
into
account consumption smoothening,
human
capital
formation, etc. No unit cost for
investment reditor scale of
finance n respect
of production redit shall be
applicable.The
repayment chedule shall be drawnup with
weekly instalments and
each of the
instalments
shall be collected during the
visits by
the branchmanager o the village.
The family credit
plan under
implementation under IRDP
needs to be
distinguished
from the
approach
uggested
above. The
emphasisunder he family credit
plan
continues to be 'lending' for two or
more
activities expectedly bringing the
family above poverty line without
looking
into the compulsions of a rural
household's
economy.
The
approach
n
other
wordswould
be in consonance with
the clientele
requirements
with the
rural
householdsbeing
the central
focus.
With a view to
operationalising he rural
household approach
o financial services
a
beginning
can
be made by
selecting
4-5
districts in India
involving
the
rural and
semi-urbanbranchesof commercial
banks,
the branchesof
RRBs
as well
as
the
ground
level units of the co-operative banking
system. For
the last
50 years we have been
in the
first phase
of
the
new
project cycle,
viz,
listening. Having done that, it is rather
overdue for
getting
into
the
second
phase
of the new
project cycle, viz, piloting. It
would be
appropriate hat at the earliest,
action is
initiated
by
the
government
and
other connected
actors
and
pilot stage
is
launched without any further
delay..
TOWARDS CONCLUSION
In the
context
of
the
problemsbeing
faced
by the rural financial institutions, both
endogenous
and
exogenous,
andwith a view
to
improving
he
delivery
of financial
ervices
to the rural
poor,
several measuresare
being
taken for
improving
the
system.
In
addition
to financial sector reformsat the
operational
level
linkages
with
informal sector in the
form
of
self-helpgroups
hasbeen
established.
The
developing
of
linkages
with
self-help
groups
which started on a
pilot
basis
sometime
ago
has now been extended all
over
India
[RBI
96] in terms of the
recommendations
of
the
working group
set
up
to examine the issues on the
subject.
The
mandate to extend the linkage project has
however,
been seen from
the
point
of view
of
including
he
lendings
to
self-help groups
under
'priority
sector' and
building up
a
database
on
the
lendings
through
a format.
Unfortunately,
one of the indicators hat is
missing
n
the format elates
o
data
regarding
savings
mobilisation which is
the basis for
linking with
self-help groups.
Several
proposals
have been made elsewhere
for
expanding
the
linking process
in terms
of
improving
the
resource base
of
self-help
groups, operational
takeovers'and making
the
self-helpgroupsagentsof formalbanking
Economic and
Political
Weekly
September
28, 1996
A-121
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system [Kaladhar1995]. Coterminous
with
such efforts there is
a
need for change from
within in respect of rural financial institu-
tions and the changes if not in terms
of
attitudes,have to come
by taking the rural
household as the central
point for delivery
of financialservices. By moving away from
activity-based lending
approach to
rural
household-based continuous financial
relationship oundation
he strengthening f
rural financial institutions is expected to
happen on a more qualitative footing.
References
Adams, D W,
D H
Graham
and
J
D
Von
Pischke
(eds) (1984): Undermining Rural
Development
with
Cheap Credit,
Westview
Press, Boulder Co.
Adams, D
W
and D A Fitchett (eds) (1992):
Informal
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CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN SOCIAL
SCIENCES,
CALCUTTA
CULTURAL STUDIES
WORKSHOP
The Centre for
Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, will hold its
annual
All
India
Cultural Studies Workshop on
1-5
February 1997
in Gwalior. The
theme
for
this year's workshop is Culture and
Democracy in which the focus will be on
contestations over identity,
autonomy and
equality
in
the fields of cultural production in India.
The
workshop is intended to give young
researchers the opportunity
of intensive
discussion of their work
with
senior scholars. The faculty
will include distinguished scholars from India
and abroad.The CSSSC
will bear the expenses of travel within India
for all participants and
will
extend full
hospitality
to
them
in
Gwalior.
Post-doctoral
scholars
or
those
in
advanced stages of doctoral work
and
preferably
under the
age
of 35 who
wish
to
join
the
workshop
may apply
with
c.v. and
a
description
of
their
current
research.
Applications are to be sent by November 30,
1996 to the Registrar,
Centre
for Studies in
Social
Sciences,
Calcutta,
10 Lake
Terrace,
Calcutta
700029.
A- 122
Economic and
Political Weekly
September
28, 1996
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