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Nature of Class Struggle in BangladeshAuthor(s): B. K. JahangirSource: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 50 (Dec. 10, 1977), pp. 2063-2066Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4366181

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N a t u r e o f C l a s s Struggle in Bangladesh

B K jahangir

While the forces of production in post-colonial Bangladesh have continued to remain relatively

stagnant, there has been a constanit struggle to transform the existing relationis of production to the

advantage of this or that contending group. During the regime of Sheikh Mujib, the rural rich contended

successfully for political power; and even though this class lost political power at the national levelfollowvingthe political changes in the later part of 1975, it continues to be dominant in the rural areas.

This article examines the nature and significance of these changing production relations in

Bangladesh.

THE process of capital accumulation

in Bangladesh has generated class

differentiations within the economy of

small peasant producers (Sobban, 1968,

Alamgir, 1976). The pressure of the

of the market, various agricultural and

economic policies of the government

and the nature of the State have all

affected the forms of landed property

and the labour system (Abdullah, et al1976, Abdullab, 1976). The changes

in the land-property system and in the

forms of labour-power transformed

land and labour into commodities. The

differentiation process that developed

led to the stabilisation of a rich pea-

sant layer on the one hand, and a

depressed layer of impoverished mid-

dle and poor peasants on the other. In

such a process, the landless peasant

and the poor peasant not only become

labourers, but also become consumers

of foodstuffs purchased at local shop,

etc. Their main source of livelihoodconsists of wages; and along with

other peasants, they buy in the market

goods which previously did not go

through the market system. The latter

is controlled by the rural rich and by

the urban investors and, is affected by

the government's agricultural and

economic policies (Jahangir, 1976).

All this has resulted in a social

polarisation in the rural agriculture

sector of the national economy. Capital

accumulation, generated by the natio-

nal economy, has had a differential

repercussion on agriculture: much of

this capital has accumulated in the

hands of the rural rich and the urban

businessmen, and even the rich pea-

sants invest some parts of their

profits outside agriculture (Jahangir,

1976). Galeski (1975) pinpoints the

problem: "Many of the social effects

of the process of capital accumulation

occurring in the village - and quite

often its basic effects - have repercus-

sions not so much in the countryside

as in the towns". Thus, sapital accu-

mulation in rural areas cannot be

analysed as an isolated phenomenon,

for it is an integral part of the natio-

nal economy. Capitalistic development

in the post-colonial period (Alavi, 1975)

in Bangladesh is uneven and has

produced two interlinked but contra-

dictory effects in the rural areas.

Firstly, it has generated class differ-

entiations within the peasantry and has

shaped the polarisation process;

secondly, it has determined the placing

of the different peasant classes withinthe wider social structure and has

defined the role of agriculture within

the national economy.

The agricultural, commercial and

economic policies pursued by the

State, both in the colonial and the

post-colonial periods (Alamgir, 1975,

Abdullah, 1976, Sobhan and Ahmad,

1976) produced muitually interlinked

and contradictory structures in the

rural areas. All these structures are

interlinked through the process of

change in the system of ownership and

control of the means of production andthrough the concentration of capital

accumnulation. In a peasant society

like Bangladesh, where private owner-

ship of means of production is consti-

tuitionally guaranteed, the poorer

peasants have little access to the means

of production. As a social class it is

the r-ich peasants who control the

means of production. The latter are

the main decision makers in the rural

areas (Rashiduzzaman, 1968, Jahan,

1972). They also control the sources

of economic and political power.

However, the government is the

principal agency of development in

Bangladesh. The State is the major

owner of the means of production

through the nationalisation of banks,

insurance companies, transportation

and large industries (Sobban and

Ahmad, 1976), and thus, those social

groups that control political powei

also control an important sector of the

means of production by formulating

economic policies and taking deci-

sions concerning investments, credits,

purchases, duties and taxes. Seen in

this light, political power is crucial in

the analysis of socials inequality and

social conflict. Ownership of land is

one form of control over the means

of production in the rural areas; but

that control is reinforced by control

over the means of production natio-

nally, which itself rests upon political

power. Hence in the Bangladesh

rural situation we find that class

differentiation is shaped both by access

to the means of production and byaccess to political power.

From this perspective, all rural

development programmes and agrarian

reform initiated by the government are

likely to generate social conflict. In

both the colonial and post-colonial

periods, land reform and agricultural

policies did not lead to the destruction

of rural privileged groups and to the

creation of a new social and political

order (Abdullab, 1976). Rather, they

helped to strengthen an expanding rich

peasant category and were primarily

designed to induce the growth ofagricultural output needed to, comple-

ment industrial development, Thus,

land reform and agricultural strategies,

instead of destroying the power-base

of the rural elite, enlarged their

social base and linked them with the

national power structure. Economic

policies initiated by the post-colonial

State affected productive forces directly

and influenced the other elements in-

directly. At present, in Bangladesh,

land, agricultural, trade and economic

policies are intended to increase the

existing productive means. Thesemeans in the rural areas are controlled

by the rich peasants, and consequently,

their position becomes more entrenched

in the socio-economic and political

structures. Peasants are now mainly

exploited through a private property

system which curbs the effective use of

labour power, tools and draught

animals, and fails to stimulate enthu-

siasm for work or increase peasant's

co-operation and solidarity.

While capitalism develops the forces

of production on a national scale in

the post-colonial situation of Bangla-

desh, the nation state guarantees the

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December 10, 1977 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

existing relations of production. This

situation produces and intensifies un-

even development and combines already

established patterns of exploitation and

modern forms of economic activity.

The State in the post-colonial situation

is linked to factional competition be-

cause resources are distributed un-

equally among the peasantry as part

of the process of 'intervention' or

'penetration' by the State. The com-

petition that occurs within the rich

peasant class is an instance of this.

As the State is associated with one

pattern of distribution and not another,

the institutions of the State generate

factionalism in their allocative deci-

sions. Thus competition within the

rich peasant class and allocative deci-

sions by the State reinforce the

factional mode of operation. This link

between the rich peasant class and the

State institutions contributes to the

strength and solidarity of the dominant

classes both in rural and urban areas.

Competition among the rich peasants

is another name for entering into new

alliances. - These are necessary to

provide a secure environment for pro-

ductive investments. In this way, the

factionat struggles of the rich peasants

and the rural entrepreneurs develop

into a class alliance which extend into

the towns and administration. This

alliance is composed of rich peasants,

rural entrepreneurs and urban investors

in agriculture. These, in turn, are

clpsely aligned with the bureaucracy,

the dominant political parties and the

larger urban financiers.

But how far has this alliance of the

dominant classes hindered the emerg-

ence of class solidarity among the poor

peasants and the landless labourers?

The formation of capital in the post-

colonial situation has eroded loyalties

previously structured by kinship and

has, for example, undermined certain

vertical relationships of interdepend-

ence (Jahangir, 1976). This is reflectedin the growing ' importance of wage

labour. The rapid rise in the prices

of agricultural commodities and' the

expansion of the cultivated area and

improved crop yields have increased

the seasonal demand for labour at

harvest time. What then would be the

outcome if, for example, the poor

peasants and the landless labourers

demanded an increase in the wage

rate ? The rich peasant could do two

things. Either he could use his con-

tacts to obtain labour-displacing

machines (tractors, etc) or hecould

activate his network to get political

backing in order to confront the poor

peasants and the landless labourers

forcefully. In such a situation the poor

peasants and the landless labourers

must also have their own organisation

to confront the rich peasant (Wood,

1974). This highlights the objective

interests of respective 'classes. In the

one case, factional conflict among the

rich peasant category turns into class

alliance; and in the other, vertical

interdependence gives way to class

solidarity. Thus a class struggle

emerges involving cleavages within the

village.

We may further explore the prob-

lems of class solidarity and class

conflict in relation to development

programmes. The existing conflicts

between the privileged and under-

privileged peasants influence attitudes

towards programmes of develop-

ment. Differentclasses in the rural

area will evaluate the programmes of

development from their own perspec-

tives, assessing whether the program-

me will strengthen their power, and

enlarge their social base, or alternatively

whether it will weaken the ruling

group and introduce new forces into

the political terrain. These conflicting

outlooks affect class solidarity and the

nature of the class struggle. In the

case of the rich peasants, class soli-

darity at the village level is rathei

loose, and their factional fights do not

directly threatentheir overall class

interests. They compete among them-

selves for control over the existing

resources, but at the same time impose

their domination over the rest of the

peasant population. In the case of

the underprivileged peasants, class

solidarity is forged locally and is rein-

forced by their links with the left-

wvingpolitical parties, but is rather

loose regionally or nationally.

Thus, the pace of class solidarity and

class struggle has depended on three

factors: (a) the state of the national

economy, (b)the mediating role of the

political parties and the political elite,

and (c) the characteristics of the speci-

fic local situation. The slow growth of

capitalism has affected the social for-

mation and deforned the emergence

of a national economy with an elabo-

rate division of labour on a national

scale. It has kept the class struggle

fragmented and has debarred the

possibility of an alliance of the poorer

peasantry across regions.

It is necessary now to discuss the

mediating role of the political parties

and politicalelite in relation to the

political economy of pre- and post-

colonial Bangladesh. The national

elite group of the British colonial

period was composed of surplus peas-

ants and an urban professional class

(Abdull-ah 1976; Mukerjee, 1957; Bell,

1942). The more immediate objective

of political movements during this

period was to achieve national libera-

tion from colonial domination on the

one hand, and from Hindu dominationon the other. For these reasons, issues

relating to rural development or radical

agrarian reform were never focused

sharply. After the partition of India

in 1947, the Act of 1950 was promul-

gated which abolished the Permanent

Settlement systemn.This Act effectively

eliminated Hindu domination. It also

set an upper ceiling on land-holding at

33 acres. The historical and cumula-

tive polarisation process intensified

rural stratification. This gained momen-

tum because of the flow of surplus

extracted from rural Bangladesh andthe steady expansion of a capitalist

mode of production within the one-

state structure of Pakistan. In the

second colonial setting, the character

of political movements was marked by

the struggle to establish the legitimate

position of the Bengalis in the politico-

administrative decision-making process

and to put an end to the exploitation

of Bangladesh by the West Pakistan

capitalists (Alavi, 1971; Jahan, 1972).

The political parties in power or in

opposition in Bangladesh during the

second colonial imposition seldom came

face to face with the people in the

rural areas or confronted the issues of

social and economic development. At

the same time, no significant challenge

to the leadership came from the

peasants. The attitude of the Bengali

bourgeoisie towards the policies of

Bengali nationalismwas one of guarded

support. They gained greatly from

the policies of nationalism but at the

same ti'me were afraid of its leftward

gravitation. These pressures of colo-

nial and class exploitation during the

second colonial period brought about

the extreme polarisation between the

two wings of Pakistan regionally as

well as between rural classes national-

ly. From this double polarisation sprang

up a unique alliance between the

politics of Bengali nationalism and the

different classes, which culminated in

liberation.

However, after the establishment of

Bangladesh, the clash between the

two types of politics became more

pronounced. The ruling party, the

Awami League, introduced land reforms

limiting o}wnership o .33 acres (which

had been upgraded to 125 acres during,

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY December 10, 1977

Avub's regime) and eliminated tax on

landcupto 8.3 acres. But the Awami

Leagtue refrained from introducing

fundlamental structural changes in the

rural areas. A new era of patronage

started. All these together produced

an inflationary pressure which tended

to reinforce the polarisation process inthe rural areas during the post-colonial

period. The climax w,as reached in

the floods and famine of 1974 with the

dleaths of many peasants, the aliena-

tion of many from the land and the

enrichment of others (Alamgir 1976:

Yunus, 1976).

It is necessary, in this context, to

examine Bangladesh land legislation

policies and the actual effect of the

land legislation programme upon the

agrarian structure and upon the

marketed surplus.

Sheikh Mujib's government strength-

ened the rich peasants by abolishing

agricultural taxation and by subsidising

agricultural inputs. In the post-

liberation period cereal prices were six

to eight times higher from pre-libera-

tion prices, and in certain cases, they

were even higher than the prices of

some manufactured goods. Though

agriculture's taxable capacity was

increased and the marketed surpluis

exhibited a definite upward tendency,

Sheikh Mujib's government was re-

luctant to tax agriculture, and evenw thdrew certain measures which

faced stiff opposition from the agri-

cultural bloc in Parliament. The go-

vernment at this juncture prepared itA

first plan document (Planning Com-

mission: The First Five-Year Plan,

1973) which gave emphasis to rapid

industrialisation. This was a someewhat

paradoxical situation, because the

government, on the one hand, supported

the rural sector, and on the other, laid

a plan for all-out industrialisation, thus

failing to exploit agricultures' taxable

capacity. In this battle between ruraland urban bias, during Mujib's period,

rural interest gained. As rural bias

operated in favour of rich peasant, it

was this class that benefited from

favourable terms of trade, subsidies at

the expense of other social groups,

and exemption from an associated set

of taxes. Land legislation, govern-

ment agricultural and trade policies

thus changed the agrarian structure

and tilted it in favour of the rich

peasant and paved the Nwayfor the

development of capitalist agriculture.

With it a powerful pressure groupemerged wvhichhelped the growth of

agricultural output and a steady rise

in imiarketed urplus and at the same

time pressed for terms of trade evenmore favourable to agriculture.

The Awami League was foundedupon an alliance between urban and

Kulak interests (Ali, 1975; Alavi, 1971;Forum, March 13, 1971). An important

featture of this alliance was that thel)ourgeois forces were less dominant,

since the Kulak sought to legitimiseand secure their own interests by pene-trating the opposition parties as aprecaution against the advent of non-

Awami League ministries. This pene-

tration had its impact on the policy

formulation of the pro-Moscow Com-munist party (Khan, 1972) and of theNational Socialist Party (Gonokontho,197.3, January 10). They- all opted forthe present land ceiling and gaveguarded support for land distribution.

In Bangladesh, where peasants consti-tute a majority of the population, asecure, rural power hase is indispens-able if constitutional politics is to be

preserved. In this way, both the rulingand the opposition parties sanctionedthe ascendancy of the Kulaks, andwithin the system the Kulaks and the

bourgeoisie continued their battle for

power.

Duiring Sheikh Mujib's regime, thecountry was livirng on a knife edge.Politically, there was no open challenge

to the regime. But this was achievedby an authoritarian rule so severe that

opposition could come only from the

liberal mniddleclass element alarmedby the kind of State being created intheir name. The economic policiescreated deeper divisions betweenclasses and regions. These latter cir-

cumstances did not outweigh the

attraction of personal affluence to most

middle class citizens, who seemed . to

be caught up in a vortex of instant

constumption tintouched by efforts to

tuirn prosperity to national advantage.

The country's consumer boom wasfinanced not hy domestic productionb,luthv foreign money and aid. How-

ever, the government failed to reduce

economic and social polarisation; nor

did it control inflation. Instead, govern-

ment began by experimenting with

draconian measures to restrict wages

and to encourage exports. But these

measures were unsuccessful, largely

because oL the composition of the

ruling party, the trade union and the

bureauicracy (Sobhan and Ahmad,

1976). The Budgets of 1974 and 1975

became unbalanced; reserves weredepleted and inflation ran riot, withthe cost of living index rising by somei

3(}0 per cent. Eventually, internal

security became a problem of both

economic and political imnportance,

given the governmenit's clear inability

to control the numerous pro-govern-

ment paramilitary forces (Mujibbahini,

Lalbahani, etc) and the left-wing gueril-

la groups.Thus, Sheikh Mujib's regime failed

to incorporate the largely populist

masses into a representative democracy.

It could not satisfy the rural rich

without losing urban middle class sup-

port and risking a military reaction. It

was this dilemma that influenced Sheikh

Mujib's decision to form one 'national'party. He hoped that this would beeither an opportunity for political ac-commodation, or at least serve as a

manoeuvre to defuse the situation. Itwas neither. BAKSAL (Bangladesh

Krisak Sramik AwaamiLeague) revital-ised the political base, and at the sametime rejected any compromise withthe military. On the other hand, the

government policies were enough tocreate military and middle class cons-ternation (YuLnus, 976).

The country becamnea case study in

economic stagnation, social tensions

and political violence. Price inflation

accelerated; wage inflation, despitecontrols, followed; and with these, in

1975, there was devaluation. As aresult, the middle class found its

prosperity crumbling and its goals

receding, though, a few people, includ-

ing some close to the government,

continued to do well. The military

was reacting increasingly and madle a

decisive entry into politics by staginga series of coups (August 15, 1975;November 3, 1975; November 7, 1975).

The n-ew rulers are basically suppor-ters of urban interests and are deter-

mriinedo release reserves from agri-culture for industrialisation. Towards

that end they have withdrawn subsidies

from agricultural inputs and haveintroduced miieasures to extract sur-

pluses from agriculture. These mea-

sures, which mostly affect the poor and

a section of the middle peasants, are

manoeuvres aimed at siphoning off

capital fiom agricultural production for

investment in urban industrial growthand at more effectively controlling the

powerful class of rich peasants and-

limiting their political power (jahan.

1976).

Thus, we find in post-colonial

Bangladeshthe

powerelites striving

to increase production by shifting the

emphasis within the existing produlc-

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December 10, 1977 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

tioIi relations. During Sheikh Mujib's

period the agricultural power bloc

l)ecame a contender for national powei

hut in the changed context, their

position has lecome subordinate to

the urban power l)Ioc. But though

their position is subordinate now na-

tionally, in the rural areas theycontinue

to be dominant. Against this domina-

tion is fragmented resistance. Although

agrarian struiggles are spearheaded bx

the different left-wing parties, the

ideological differences among them are

sbarp and attempts to link their

separate mnovement into one have so

far been unsuccessful. This suggests

that, in this context, fiagmentation of

the class struggle rather than primnor-

dial loyalties (Alavi, 197:3), makes the

peasants sometimes passive and indif-

ferent. Since fragmentation results

f'rom thecombination of the slow

growth of the economy, the ideological

differences within the left and the

localised nature of political confronta-

tion, these factors account for the

piecemeal, temporary, and defensive

nature of class struggles in rural

Bangladesh. Nevertheless, it is true

that certain new forms of conscious-

ness are revealed by peasant action.

They are most marked in the relations

between peasant and the local agents

of the State bureaucracy. Whereas

the rural rich are structurally aligned

with the bureaucracy and the domi-

nant political parties, the poor peasants,

organised by the left-wing, operate

mainly in the local areas. The latteiL

attempts to challenge the existing

national power structure from a class

position, which, because of increasing

economic differentiation and polarisa-

tion, is becoming more clearly defined.

In this way, the process of differenti-

ation expands the potential area of

tension and dissatisfaction, and gives

shape to the forms and intensity of

po)litical confrontation at both village

and national levels.

References

Abduliah, A (1976): 'Land Reform and

Agrarian Change in Bangladesh',

The BanglaideshDevelopment Studies,

Volume IV, Number 1.

Abdullah, A Mosharaff,H and Nations,

R (1976): 'Agrarian Structure and

the IRDP-Preliminary Considera-

tions', The Bangladesh Development

Review, Volume IV, Number 2.

Alamgir, M (1975): "Diagnosis of Agri-

culture Sector and Evaluation of

Politics: A Case Study of Bangla-

desh" (mimeo).Alamgir, M (1976): "Bangladesh: A

Case of Below Poverty Level Equili-brium Trap" (miimeo).

Alavi, H (1971): 'Bangladesh and the

Crises of Pakistan', The SocialistRegister, (ed) Ralph MilibanviandJohn Saville.

Alavi, H (1973): 'Peasant Classes andPrimodial Loyalties', The Journal of

Peasant Studies, Volume I, NumberI.

Alavi, H (1975): 'India and the Colo-nial Mode of Production', The Socia-

list Register, (ed) Ralph Miliband andJohn Saville.

Ali, T (1975): 'Pakistan and Bangla-desh: Results and Prospects', "Ex-plosion in Subcontinent: India,Pakistan, Bangladesh and Cevlon",(ed) Robin Blackburn.

Bell, F 0 (1942): Final Report on the

Suirveql and Settlemient Operation inthe District of Dinaipur, 1939-40

Government of Bengal, Alipore,Bengal Government Press.

Forum, Dacca, (1971 March 13).Caleski, B (1975): "Basic Concept of

Rural Sociology".Gon,okontho, Dacca, (1973 January 10).

Jahan, R (1972): "Pakistan: Failurein National Integration".

Jahan, R (1976): "Members of Parlia-

ment in Bangladesh", LegislativeStudies Quarterly.

Jahangir, B K (1976): "Differentiation,Polarisation and Confrontation in

Rural Bangladesh", unpublished PhD

Thesis, University of Durham.

Durham.

Khan, A R (1972): "The Economy of

Bang-ladesh".

Mukerjee, R (1957): "The Dynamicsof Rural Society".

Rashiduzzaman, M (1968): "Politicsand Administration in the Local

Councils: A Study of Union and

District Coumcils in East Pakistan".

Soblhan,R (1968): "Basic Democracies,Works Programme and Rural Deve-

lopment in East Pakistan".

Sobhb,n, R and Abmad, Muzaffer

(1976): "Public Enterprise in an

Intermediate Regime".Wood, G (1974): "The Political Pro-

cess in Rural Bangladesh- A Re-search Note" (mimeo).

Yunus, S (1976): 'The Bureaucratic

and Military Elites in Bangladesh',

Bangladesh: Past and Pr sent, Vol-Itine I, Number 2.

GOKHALE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS & ECONOMICS

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