2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - July 1951 · prepared by a panel or officers nea.ded by...

Korean War

2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - July 1951

Headquarters

Korean War Project Record: USA-12

Folder: 050008a

Box: 05

File: 08a

National Archives and Records Administration

College Park, Maryland

Records: United States Army

Unit Name: Second Infantry Division

Record Group: RG407

Editor: Hal Barker

Korean War Project

P.O. Box 180190

Dallas, TX 75218-0190

http://www.koreanwar.org

Korean War Project 2ID-00100659


REF'RW'JCEO ... T11-1EHATIONALA"""'""" 1 1./I*I.IU"\vvu•._,.. j

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2nd

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......

ION

I . JULY to 31 JULY. . \951

(sEc R ET) C 0 PY . N 0 I


REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

HEADQUARTERS 2d Infantry Di v1s1on

0 24e e/o Postmaster an Francisco Oa.l1forn1a

0 M!-1AND REPORT

(CSHI6-5 (Rl))

Period

From: l July 1951 Tbrougb: 31 July 1951

A.ppro ved By: <~ h.~~..........,_JO

CLA.RK L RUFFN I~IaJ Gen U Commanding

s Copy Number __ _.1 ____ _


REI'\ftqDUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

'

1'51:ble of Contents

July 1951

Section I. Comme,nd Report

A. Na,rrati ve Summary

B. Personnel (G-1)

C. Intelligence (G-2)

D. Operations ( G-3)

E. Loc;?:istics (G-4)

F. Evaluation ~lnd Recommendattons

G. Staff e"nd RCT Commanders

H. Ma:ps and Overlays

Sect~on II. 9upportiUF Documents

A. Chief of Staff

1. :Jbief of Staff• s J::-u::~nal I ,

2. Sriefin,; Notes

:3. P ersonDel ( 1-1)

l. 3-l Journal

·f"l C.o Fersonj~l Periodic arts

3. Person~el Daily Sum~ary Report

Li- •

h a. -· 2eneral Crders 2d Inf D1v Numbers 246 tt-:lrou;zh 282

~·

b, G·enere.l Orders 8tt'1 US Army

c:. ---· . scellaneous

!"I ·I :1telligenc e · Ui-2) v.

, a. ,, "' Jcurns.l and ?il€ ( 1085-1114) J... .:r- c;

( 1-66) 1-3 Jul 51

bo ·(}-2 Jour·nal a.nd File (67-161) -4-6 Jul .51

c. •"'! "' '··.x-C:. Journa.l a':"l.d FilE (1'-0 "'h"") J .. _..-c._,~O 7--9 Jul 51

d. :c._? Journal and FilE; (257-355) 10-12 Jul ~.

e. G-2 Journal and File ( 356-442) 13-15 Jul

f. G-2 Journal " an ... File ( 44 3- 1:)78) 16-lb Ju.L

EC

51

51

:)l


REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES I Uti.JLf\\:)\:)Jrf[:U

:~I

SEC

g. Ci--2 Journe.l end File ( 579 ... 731) 19-2.1 Jul 51

h. G-2 Journal end File ( 732-916) 22-24 Jul 51

i. G-2 JournB.l i;J1d File ( 917-1107) 25-27 Jul 51

j. G-2 .. Journal end File (1108-1363) 28-31 Jul 51

... r. c. • Periodic Intelligence Reports

3. Intelligence Bulletins

D. Operations (G-3)

1 e .• G·-3 Journal end File 1-2 Jul 51

b. G--3 Journal and File 3-4 Jul 51

c. G-3 Journal end File 5-6 Jul 51

do G-) Journal e.nd File 7-8 Jul 51

e. ,... .... \7.-.? Journe.1 ana File 9-10 Jul 51

f. •1-3 ·-· Journa.l a,·od File 11-12 Jul 51

g. G-3 J.ournal and File 13-14 Jul'51

b. G-3 Journ.a.l s.nd File 15-16 -Jul 51

i. G-3 Journal and File 17-18 Jul 51

j. G-3 Journal and Fi.le 19-20 Jul 51

k. G-3 Journa1 e.nd Flle 21-22 Jul 51

1. G-3 Journal and File 23-24 Jul 51

. m. C~3 .. Tour::lal ana File 25-26 Jul 51

n. G-3 Journal a:nd File 27-28 Jul 51

o. ,... ... ~-:-;) Journal and File 29-31 Jul 51

2. Periodic Opera,tions Hep6rts

3. Operations Oraers

4. Operations Instructions

5. Le:tters of r·astruc~ton

6. •rreiDing Ler.1orenda

E. Logietics (G-4)

1 a. G-4 Jourt1al end File 1-15 J'ul 51

b. G-l!- Jour-eel enC: File 16-31 Jul 51

2. Periodic Logistics Reports

3. Armqr Status Reports


F.

G.

Sr.r, tt ..

Sta:rr Sect.ion Reports

1. Chemical

2. A.DE

3. Ordnance

4. . Quartermaster

5. Signal

6. SUrgeon

7. Finance

e. Inspector General

9. Public Information Officer

10. Provost Marshal

11. Staff Judge Advocate

12. Special Services

13. Chaplain

14. Civil Assistance Orf'icer

lviiecella.neous (Special Studies, Reports le.neous Material)

and lJ!l scel-

1. 2d Division Official Newspe;per uwarrior"

2. Critique of Tactics Employed In The First Encounter With The Enemy At Cbipyong-n1

3. Evaluation of Attack On Hill 1179 (DT1935)

4. Congratulatory Messages

Section III. Subordinate Unit Reports (Annexes)

A. 9th Infantry Regiment

B. 23d Infantry Regiment

c. 3eth Infantry Regiment

D. Headquarters Division Artillery

E. 15th Field Artillery Battalion

F. 37~b Field Artillery Battalion

G. 3Bth Field Artillery Be.ttalion

H. 503d Field Artillery Battalion

I. t52d AAA Ali Battalion (51?)

J. 72d Tank Batta.l.ion

K. 2d Engineer (C) Battalion


··. ' ~--. .. -· 'r- -;---' ' '' t .:., (.''.,. Iii ;.: )

NARRA TI v"E SUMli.ARY

July 1951

0478

The 2d Infantry Division hs.d spent most of the month of

June in rehabilitation, and trainincr o~ tbe smaller sized units.

As the month of July opened, e.ll of the infantry regiments were

concentrating on attack problems with unite ranginE in size

from platoons to battalions. Many scboola were in progress

which had been established witb the primary purpose of train

ing sufficient men· in communications, demolitions; weapons,

booby trs.pping, and otber military specialties to eliminate

tbe inadequacies uncovered during the previous combat action,

replace the many experienced men being rotated, and ensure a

bigh state o~ combat efficiency wben the 2d Division was once

age.in committed on the front lines (see Commend Report for

June 1951).

It was anticipated tbat many distinguished military of

ficis.ls would visit the 2d Division during the training time

which remained and, on 1 July, plans were being made for the

reception of the Under Secretary of the Army, Archibald Alex

ander, who wa.s making a study of the loe;istic problems in the

Korea.n Theater. The Division G-4, Lieutenant Colonel Frank C.

Sinsel, was instructed to prepare a s~udy end orientation which

could be presented to the Under secretary during the hour b~

· was to spend at Division Headquarters. 1

In preparation for the visit of the Under Secretary, a

supply conference was held et X Corps on 2 July, wbich was at

tended by representatives of Supply Sections from all units

down to and including separate battalions, e.t which inadequacies

in the supply picture were discussed and the latest information

1. APP A-1: C/S Journal, 1 Jul 51

-1-


1 OECLASSlrltu

Au~~ B~ NAPA CataWSJ!l

on logistical techniques was d1sseminatad. 1

0479

Although the e.cti v1 ties ot· tne Infa~try Regiments were

primarily restricted to training, the 23d Inrentry, tne 37th

end 503d Field Artillery Battalions, and Battery C or the ~2d

AAA Battalion actively supported the Mar1~es from positions

along the Kansas Line. The 2d Engineer (C) Battalion also con

tinued its road improvement program. The worK or this unit

bad always been superior a.nd its bigb standard was maintained

during the reserve period. Much of its work wae devoted to

widening the existing roads and eliminatin~ the dertles, caused

by tne ste~p rocky ridges, and to tbe construction of drainage

ditches to carry of~ the surface waters resulting from tbe in

creasingly neavy rains of the per1od. 2

All training exercises or the early July period stressed

the attack. However, when Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of

the North Korean People's Army not1~ied General Ridgway tnat

the Communists were willing to discuss a 11 Cease Fire", it became

evident that the next mission of the 2d Division might be tbe

construction and garrisoning or a defense line during an armi

stice period. Training 1n offensive tactics was continued, how

ever, until 9 July when units were instructed to place increas

ing strese on defense train1.ng and problems.3

In addition to tne intensive training of ~be early July

period, the time was also utilized to reward acts or valor or

merit i.n a manner impossible during commitment on tbe line.

Tfue-never 'POSsible, impressive ceremonies were beld, and General

Ruffner himself presented the awards.4

As tbe combat activities of the 2d Division were the

proving ground for much tactical theory developed after the end

1. APP A-2: 2. APP D-2: 3 • APP A-2: 4. App A-2:

Briefins Notes, 2 Jul 51 POR 65~, 2 Jul 51 Briefing Notes, 2 Jul 51 Briefing Notes, 3 Jul 51

-2-


REPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 1 Utllt.A::>::>Jru:u ,

~~~J . r··, ---

. 4'.:::. ~

0480

or World War II, General Ruffner directea t.net. tne. actions

snou~a·be studiea and conc~usions drawn as to tne combat worth

!or these principles. One of the _most. important of these stuaies

· was a paper on tanK warfare in the Korean ca,mpaign wt?icn was

prepared by a panel or officers nea.ded by tne Commander o!' the

72d Tank Battalion. This study includea.: (1) Tanks in General

SUpport, (2) TanKs in tne Derense, and (3) Tank-Infantry Teams.

The Inrantry Regiments also made a stuay or tn.e types ot combat

pecks which haa provea tne most err1c1ent. Tnis study included

pacKs ror botn winter and summ~r operat1ons. 1

Much training tlme was devoted to mtne aetection train-

1 ng ana Genera.l Rurrner dtrected that strength in mine detectors

be maintained at a peak as the area around_ Inje wnicb was to be

taken over.by the Division around the middle of tne montn was

litterea with unexploded mines or both Communist ana UN origin. 2

While the Infantry units in the Hongchon training area

concentrated on completion of both offensive and defensive ex

ercises, the 23d Infantry, in the Inje area also devoted much

time to the dest~uction of the m~ny Communist emplace~ents which

remained in their area.3

Troop strength was well above T/0 at the beg1n~1ng or

tne month and battle casualties were almost non-existent. &ll

of the eight battle casualties suffered by the Division durin8

tne first fifteen days were mtne casualties. The Communist

Forces used more and more mines as the conduct of the war cnanged. 4

An 1~portant mission of the 2d Engineer (C) Battalion during

tbi s period was the marking of mi nefields and the r'emoval and , '

destruction of enemy mines. Engineer orftcers also conducted

classes in tne rigging or mines and booby traps and the prepara-

1. 2. 3. 4.

A.pp A-2: App A-2: Ibid .A;pp B-2 J

Briefing Notes, 3 Jul 51 Br1er1ng Notes, 5 Jul 51

Personnel Periodic Report 27, 17 Jul 51

-3-


0481

. .


l OECLASS1F1ED t~!J~~I I ~~-NAl'A Cat•WSJn.J

Tb.e tioldiera ua::;i;. their

• •


0483

SECRET

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SECRET


REPROolJCED AT 1'HE NATIONAL AFICHM!B 1 Utl./l.A\:)\:)Irrr:u

~rNAAA~ 0~84

WO\lld take oftr trom the Marines on the Kansas Line. The 38tb.

Field '.Artillery Battalion reported expending its 200,000th

round or artiller7 atrmUn1 tion or tbe X:orean Campa1gn during

this training period.l

On the 8th or July, the G-3 announoed tbat tbe 2d D1 vi

sion bad been notified to prepare for relief of tb.e lst Marine

Division between the 15th and 17tb or July. The D1v1sion wu

also to initiate an i111Ded1ate surve7 of the Wichita Line. Tb.is

was a line running between 5,000 and 15,000 meters south or the

Kanaas IJ.ne. '!'be def'enae line :roUowed a ridge line t'rom the

eaatern shores of the Hwaoben Reservoir to the northeast to a

point at D!2225 and then southeast to a point near the Puckcuon

River at !)!3220. It was anticipated. that tbis line would be a

major derense line ab.ould the Oommtm.1sts launch another all-out

attack s1•ilar to the one stopped by tb.e 2d Division in Mq.2

The G-3 Section publisned Operations Instructions No. 85

on 9 July. The mission or tbe Division was given as tbe active

def'ense o:r th.e J:ansaa Line and tbe preparation aud orgaui.zaUon

o:r tb.e secondary Yicb.ita Defeuse Lille. 'rbe 2d Division waa to

be relieved trom X Corps·Reserve ef'fective on lb July at 1800

boura. However, movement into the line was to commence on the

15th. Initially, tb.e 38tb ItO! (with the 3d Battalion, 9tn In

fantry, att.acbed) and the 23d Inrantry were to be. tne o:ruy in

fantry elemev.ts on the line and. t.be 9tb. RCT (-) we.s to :rorm the

2d D1Tision reserTe while work.ing on the preparation of' def'euaea

of the lf1ch1ta Line. !be 1034 Korean Service D1v1s1on was to

be attacned to the Division, on the day 1t again assuaed re

sponsibill ty tor a sector of the line, t.o tle~p proVide the re

quired logistic support. Tb.e D1 v1 s1on was direet.ed to malta tb.e

m&XiiiiUII utilization of' indigenous labor and Koreau Service Troops.

1. APP A-2a 2. Jpp A-2:

Briefing Notes, 7 Jul 51 Br1ering Notes, 8 Jul 51

-5-


REPI'!ClOUCEO AT THe NATIONAL ARCHIVES

0485

Artillery strength was augmented by the attachment of the 300tb . Field Artillery Battalion. 1

On July lOth, in order to complete preparations for tbe

defensi~e assignment all units were notified to increase the

training time they were devoting to defensive tactics--includ

ing tbe construction of field fortifications, permanent com

munications linea, mine fields, gun emplacements, and other semi•

permanent in stallatione. 2

On 13 July, the 2d Engineers began to work on the roads

in the sector to be taken over on the following week. All units

commenced preparations for the move. Regimental Commanders were

notified that they would be visited by tbe X Corps Commander

while they were still in their reserve sector. At tbe morning

briefing on the 13th, General Ruffner announced that Lieutenant

General Edward M. Almond was leaving the X Corps and that b.e

was being replaced by Major General Clovis E. Byers. The change

over in command was to be effective on. 15 July .3

On 14 July, the 23d Infantry completed its preparations

tor movement to relieve the elements of the let Marine Division.

in the right zone of the defense sector on the following d~.

The 2d Engineer (C) Battalion completed grading the new 2d D1v1- .

sion Command Post area adjacent to and south of the Soyang River

at the Kwandae-ri bridgehead Df2306. Those Engineer units not

engaged in moving north, continued work on roads and bridges

in the new area. .All unite continued their preparations for

the new miss1on.4

By 1300 on 15 July, the 23d Infantry had oo~leted tbe

relief of tbe 5th Marine Regimen.t, had its 3d and French Bat

talions on line, and had its Command Post esta'blisbed near Yan.g

jichon on the banks of the SOyang River. After completing

1. APP D-4: 2. App .l-2: 3. .App A.-2: 4. A;pp D-2:

0 I 85, 9 Jul 51 Briefing Notes,lO Jul 51 Briefing Notes, 13 Jul 5;t. POR 670, 14 Jul 51

-6-


I Utt;LA~lt"ll:U

l:~NAP~j

:'::e ~~l.Ow:ltain streams o± ;rortl: Korea. are ae.sil:,r ~:ordablo one ' • • •

• •


relief of the 5th Marine Regiment, ~ne 23d Inr~~try wae placed

under t.be operational control of the let Marine D1 via1on. 1

Toe 3t$t.n Infantry spent the day 1'!JOV1ng to assembly po

s1t1oua rrom wn1cn it cou1a move quickly on the rollow1ng day

to the rel1er or tbe Korean Marines and t.be 1st ~ar1ne qeg1ment

in tbe western b&J.r or tne new sector on t.ne rollowins aay.

At 223U noura, arter completing its ~ove to the assembly areas, "'

toe reg1 .. nt was placea unaer the operat.lonai control or tne

lat. Marine D1 v1 sion. 2

On tbe morn1ng or lo Ju.LJ, the 2d Div1s1on Oommanct Poat

cJ.oseCl at. toe H&J:160tl,on 1oca't.1on 1 t had held between 4 April and

19 Xq and, aga1n,, trom 1 June UD:t11 16 Ju.Ly ana moved to 1ts

new location on toe Soreng R1ver a~ IJ1'25oo. Toe 23ct and 5tst.b

Inf"antrJ Reg1men,ts complete<~ reller or tbe elements or 'the lat

Marine D1v1s1on ctur1ng toe d83 and reverted to tbe control or

tne 2ct Inrantry Division at ltsoo ooure wnen tee 2d assumed re-

sponaib1l1t7 ror tne det'ens1 ve sector. Tne D1 vtsion Art1J..lery

Headqaartere aJ.~ aiap.Lace<t t'Ol"Ward, mov1ng into pos1 tion at

Ml:tJIJ a$ .a.ouu noura. 'I'tle 9~ Inrar:r~ey l- J r•a1nea 1n ponUou •

ou tt'le lbtn aDC1 completed prepara1i1one ror ita move on tbe fol

lowi'Dg d_,.. 'n!e 3d Battalion, 9tb Infantry, completed relief

or tbe lat Battalion, 7tb Marine Regiment 1n t.he viel.n1 ty or

0'1'1227 at 1245 bours and was ttlen attached to the 38th Inta:."itry

for oontrol.3

Tbe 72d 'ta.nk. Battalion moved l.nto an assembly area a.t

D'l2l05 • lfb. ere 1 t was to remain ae a D1 v 1 aion reserve fore e.

The 9tb Infantry {-) • tne other I:i1v1s1on reserve 1'oree wa.s or

~ered to commence its move forward at 0500 hours on the 17th

to positions in the v1o1n1ty of Yongh~;,-ri DTlol~.4

l. .&pp D-2: POR 671, 15 Jul 51 2. Ibid 3. APP D-2: POR 672, lb Jul 51 4. Ibid

-7-


REf'IIIODuCEO AT THE NATIONAL AFIQi!VES

Au~r~ B~ NARA OataWSJ!I

r· ..... ~.. !

.._, ~- v l ; · ... a

0188

As it was the desire or General Ruffner that every er

ror~ be made to capture prisoners, one platoon or the Ranger

Company was attached to the 38th Inran;try and one was at

tacbed. to the 23d .Inf'antr., w1 th the sole mission or patrolling

the forward areas until they picked up some enemy soldiers.

The D1 vision bad recei v.ed notification of tbe impend.ins de

activation or the Ranger Company (members were to be reass1sned

to tbe lts7tb .Airborne RO.T) ·and it was not anticipated that

there would be any maJor assignments for the Company prior to

its deact1vat1on.l

.A.J.tbougn the 3tSth and 2}d Infantry Regiments bad moved

into their .def'enae areas before nightrall on the 16th, they b.ad

not established contact. The 3dtb Inrantry bad, however. es-

tablisb.ed contact with the 7th ROK Division on its right. Tbe

enemy launcbed several light attacks ae;alnst the 2d and 3d Battal

ions early on tbe morning o:r tbe 17th which were quickly con

tained. One prisoner was captured who identified the 27th NX

Division as tbe enemy unit opoaing the 2d Division. 'rhis Com

~Dist soldier reported tbat the men of his unit had been noti

fied by their commanders o:r t.be ew1 tcb between the let Kariae

Division and the 2d Infantry Division. The 27th NK Division

had been in toe line for a sufficient t!me to construct exce1-

lent de:tens1 ve po si tiona on commanding terrain. It appeared

that enemy eb.ortages 1n personnel and supplies would preclude

any serious ot:teneive tnreat, but the enemy un1 t. bad an exce~

lent. defensive potential and artillery and air could do l1t.tle

damage until ths enemy forces were driven rrom tbei~ emplaoe-

t. 2 men e.

!he 23d and 3Btll were still not. tied in on the morning·

o:r tbe 17th, and General Ruf:rner told the command1q. -of"f'icers

1. jpp D-lh: J-21, 32, G-3 Journal, lb Jul 51 2. .App Q-2: PIR 261, 17 Jul 51

'-8-r.; ,_ .:- -· . ~i..\.Ji~:...:..


' 0490

of both unite that tb.eJ were to eatablisll contact before nie,Ut

tall or the 17t.b and tbat notification to G-3 was to be made

immediately attar contact was establ1shed. 1 Contact between

the 23_d s.nd 38th Infantry Regiments was effected at 1150 nour·a

in the vicinity or DT2132 on Hill 1148, the limiting po·int b.

tween the tvo unite. 2

Tbe elements of the let-Marine Division and or tne Kore~

Marine Oorps wh.iob h.ad been atta~hed to tb.e control of ttle 2d

D1via1on at 1800 hours on the 16-th, were releaaed to tb.e oper

at.ional.· control or tbe let Marines at ~300 hours and lett the

area for tbei.r assembly area 1n the vicinity or Hongcbon. - .

The 9th -Infantry Regiment (-) wbicb bad been gi v~n tbe

respons1b1l1ty tor the entire Wichita and Switch Linea in tne

Division aector, displaced f9rwarc1 in tb&· early ~ o:f 17

July_ and commenced ·a aurvey of tb.e W1ch1'ta Line, preparing

overlaJTS of the moat detenaible areas and commencing the con

struoUon ot emplao .. emen:ta.3

On tbe lf:Sth or July, tbe 9th Infaut.ry co11pleted its re

conna1aaance and survey of the W1cbit.a Line and submitted aa

oTflrlaJ de~n-.t.ing the exac.t line on wbicb. tb.e detens1 ve po

aitiona were to be constructed. The 23d and 38th In:rantry

Regiae~s continued adjustments and improvements or their ·de

fenaiTe positions on tbe Kansas L1ne. The limited. enemy ac•

tivit.J was eaailJ contained. 4

'rb.e D1Yis1on Euginee~e co-.nced the preparation of au

overlq abowing tbe status ot all roads 1n tbe area and indi

cating coutemp~ated construction, eapecially in the Regi11:ental

sectors.5 The Engineers also 1nt-ensifie4 their errorts in

_cleari11g the area ot mine& wtl.i~b. were seriously hampering the

1. jpp ._1: 0/ S Journal, 17 Jul· 51 2. jpp D-l: J-42, G-3 Journal. 17 Jul 51 3. .APP D-1: J-74, G-3 Jo1lrllal, 17 Jul. 51 4. jpp D-1: J-79, .G-3 Journal, lts Jul 51 5. Ibid., J-10

-9-,, ..

~L..t.....Oi~1


. ..

••• ca.r~r c e.r.


RePRQOUCED AT THI! NATIONAL ARCHIIII!S 1 o ECLA5~1 rtt u

:~~J -0492

reconnaissance patrols. The mines were of both friendly and

enemy origin. Two particularly troublesome fields bad been

planted in front of the positions of the 38th Infantry. No

pattern had been followed in laying the mine fields and the

Korean Marine elements which had planted them had not prepared

any diagr8.11la of their locations.1

The G-3 prepared and disseminated Operations Instructions

on the 18th which directed the 23d Infantry to send a strong

Infantry-Tank patrol to the Badger Line on the 20th of' July and

directed the 38th Infantry to patrol to Hill 1179--a prominent

terrain feature approximately midway between the Division limit

ing points and overlooking the Kansas Line. The Division Artil

lery was .directed to provide maximum -support to the patrols of

the two Infantry Regiments. All Infantry units were to commence

preparation of' patrol plans for the purpose of determining the

enemy strength, location, and dispositions. Patrols were to

make a maximum effort to destroy the enemy forces and materiel.

The patrols ware to be accompanied by both forward observers

and air control parties which ware to utilize air and artillery

support to the tulle.st po ss1ble extent. 2

Oombat activity along the Kansas Line on 19 July was

limited to tbe western sector. MOst of the enemy strength

seemed to be on the ridge anchored to Hill 983 DT1433. Four

· enem7 bUnkers were destroyed and artillery fire was used with

excellent results ag.ainat tbe enemy troops o"t>served. It was

est.imated that a total of 75 casualties was inflicted by the

artiller7 and that numerous enemy installations were neutralized.3

The platoons of the let Ranger Company, which bad been

engaged in several fire fights but bad not been successful in

their primary mission of capturing some enemy soldiers, ware

1. 2. 3.

Jpp D-1: App D-4: APP D-2:

J-621 G-3 Journal, 18 Ju1·51 0 I ~8, 18 Jul 51 POR 675, 19 Jul 51

-10-

~.:GHt.f


-, .~ _,...... t: "~I! ~J.

0493


REPRODUCED AT THE NAT10NAL ARCHIVES 1 Ut:I.IU\\:l\:llru;;u .

\:~~J 0494

released from the 23d and 3~th Infantry Regiments at lo3C hours

on the 19th and returned to the control or their parent organ-

1zation.

Patrolling on the 20~h was uncontested with the exception

of the Hill 1179 DT1935 and Hill 1100 DT1934 areas. Heavy auto-

matte weapons and small arms fires was directed against the

friendly patrols from enemy positions on·tnese prominent terrain

features. Although hea.vy artillery fire was directed against

the hill positions, the haze and fog made visibility limited

and the results or the artillery fire could not be assessed. 1

On tne following morning, General Ruffner stated at his

briefing that, although the 2d Division was on the· Kansas Line,

the line could not be considered secure until the enemy post-

tiona on Hill 1179 and Hill 1100 were in our hands and enemy

observation or our activities along the Kansas Line denied.

The General then directed that planning commence immediately

for en O?eration to eliminate these enemy strong points. 2

On 22 July, General Ruffner inrormed his starr that the

2d Division was to make every effort ~o -soften up and take the

two hills with a minimum of casualties. To accomplish this,

patrols were to maKe detailed studies of enemy defenses and

patrol leaders were urged to use great care 1n preparing their

patrol reports in great detail. To hide the intentions or the

.2d Division until the attack was actually launched, the General

directed that patrols would, as usual, be sent out along the

entire Kansas Line"within the 2d D1v1e1on Sector. The 23d In-

rantry was directed to intenel:ry its patrolling activity in the

Punch Bowl are.a--a large circular valley approx1ma tely o ,ooo

meters in length and 4,000 meters 1n width to the east. of the

ridge line used by the enemy in their approach to the Hill 1179

1. App D-2: 2. APP A-2:

POR 676, 20 Jul 51 3rier1ng Notes, 21 Jul 51

-11-r. . ... ' :

\... .-. '.__ ~ ~·~ ~ '


REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHM!S I Utl,;lA::S::SII"ItU .

I:~®~J ( -. U'-V··-·

. r

and Hill 1100 defensive )Os1tions. AS access to the Punch

Bowl area was ,by trail only, the 23d Infantry waa directed to

survey the area to find tbe best possible route of approa.cb

for the eggineers 'to w1den.and improve, eo ~bat tanks could

operate in the area. Logistic support in the rough terrain

was to. be provided by Korean bearers whenever the area was

not passable to wheeled or tracked vehicles and Quartermaster 1 obtained 600 A-frames for issue to the using agencies.

G-3 reported on tb~ 23d that a detailed survey of tlle

approaches to the Punch Bowl had disclosed that it would be

impossible to get tanks into the Bowl in time to support toe

.attacks which were to be launched on tbe 26th of' Ju~r. Tbe

numerous patrols wbicb were sent out along tne entire front

reported minimal enemy,activitr, altnougb some 75mm fire was

received from tne Hill 1179 are~. jll units were notifiea that

the main Division effort was to be e~ended in softening up the

Hill 1179 and Hill 1100 areas eo that casualties could be kept I

tQ a minimum durtng tbe attacks scbed1lled for a; Jul.J. A.rtil•

lery preparations and air aorties were to be primary weaPons

in the softeni.ng up process. 2

On the following day, 24 July, Operations Order No .. 33

was published. This order directed tbe seizure or Hill 1179

and the establishing or an advance patrol base on .its slopes.

Bet""ore discussing ·the order itself, a a.iscus.sion of the impor

tance of ttl1s terrain feat-ure and of tbe composition or its de

fensive elements is in order. The Hill was a h1gb. point on a

Nortb.-South ridgeline wh1cb bisected both the Kansas Line and

' t.be enemy MLR and was utilized by the enemy as a salient rrom

wbicb activities of the 2d Division along the Kansas Line could

be observed and from Which art1ller,y fire could be directed.

1. jpp A:-2: Briefing Notes, 22, 23 Jul 51 2. Ibid

-12-


. . .

. . . -~ '~-1""


REPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

)

The Hill was prominent enough to be given a name, Taeu-ean,

and the surrounding area was known as the Taeu- san terrain

complex. This Co'llplex was the primery d.eten.se responsibility

of the 27th NK Division of the II NK Corps. Intelligence au

thorities estimated the strength of the division to total ap

proximately 6,000 officers and men. It was believed tbat the

oorpe of the division consisted of fanatical communists, well

trained and capable of a well-planned and determined defense.

Many of ita replacements, however, were known to be qf poor

physical caliber, lacking in training, and. reluctant to fight

· for the communist cause. 1

The Hill itself was the direct responsibility of the 27th

NK Division and it was believed that tbe supporting weapons of

the reinforced battalion of the 7th Regiment, which occupied the

Hill, included numerous mortars, light and heavy machine guns, and

some artillery pieces. Reinforcements to tbe defending elements

were available from the 32d NK Regiment which had been badly maul

ed by elements of the ROK Marine Corps and been relieved by the

7th Regiment·on 15 July. (For rurtber information on the enemy

situation, see the Staff Section Report of the G-2 Sect1on.) 2

The Operations Orde~ directed that the 23d Infantry was

to take three objectives in the Punch Bowl area fro~ which they

could provide supporting fires to the 38th Infantry in its at

tacks on the Hill. The three objectives , Objective X, Y, and

z, consisted of bills and ridges from which fire could be

brought on the main ridge approach to Hills 1179, and 1100.

These supporting fires were to preven.t enemy escape or rein

forcement. The attack was to be launched -at 0600 on tbe 26th.3

Tbe let Battalion, 38th Infantry, was to launch an at

tack against the main objective, Hill 1179, striking from the

1. App D-3: Op 0 33, 24 Jul 51 2. Ibid 3. Ibid

-1'3-

SECRET


OECLASSI I" I tU

0498

east. The supporting weapons of "the 38t.h Infantry were to be

auemented by t.ne Heavy :Mortar Company of t.he 9th Infantry in

add1t.1on t.o t.ne 3d Battalion whicn was already a.tt.acheC1. Com

pany B, 9t.h Infantry, was to be att.acb.ed on"the 25tn but. was

to be committed only on 2d Division order. The Netberland's

Detachment was to take Objective V, Hill 1120, from tbe soutn

and then support the attack or the let Battalion to t.he maXi•

inum.1

The 2d Jngineer (C) Battalion was a1rect.ea to continue

maximum erro~t ~o completion or a road rrom the MSR at. DT3133

to the •ntrance to the.Punch Bowl at DT2b34.2

All un1 ts were directed to make a maximum errort to take

pri s.oners or war. .Priorities !or both air and artillery . went

to tne 38tn Infantry. Attacking elements were instructed to

utilize tanks to the m~DCimum.3

Act,i v1 ties on the 25tn of July were J.imi't.ea. t.o t.ne com

pletion or preparat.ions ror the attacks.to be launebed on tbe

follow1n8 morning. Although ttle weatner was clouay and rain'r,

~- a.1r sor't1es were flown 1n t.ne D1·ttsion sector and exce.l.len:t

results were reported t'rom the napa.Lm bomb.1ng or enemy- 1nat.al•

lations on H111 1179. The Division Artillery, wn1ch naa. expended

over. 1,500 rounds durlng preparat.ory fires on the nigtlt ot· 'tbe

24tn, increased tn1s total to over 4,~0 rounds on "the n1gnt or the 25tn. 4

\

G&naral Rur:rner l'le.d. d.1rectea t.l:l at. tne a:tta.c1t was to be . . launcbad. at t,ne scbeaulea. time, regardless of weather con.ct1Uons

' and Wbetber air support would be availa.D.l.e or not. 5 At Uol~

bours, t.ne lat. Batta11on, 38th Infantry, oega.n to move rorward,

altbougn v1s1b1.11t.y was 1n1t.1ally .l1m1ted to f'rom 2~ to 50

1. . 2. 3. 4. 5.

.App D-): Ibid Io1d .App :0.2: App A-2:

Op 0 33, 24 Jul ~l

.PORe ool, 682, 25,26 Jul 51 Briefing Notes, 25 Jul 51

-14-

•


REPROOUCEDATTHENAnQNALARCHNES

0499

' yards because of the ground fog. Company C initially led the

attack with Companies A and B fC!llowing. The early advance

we-nt forward w1 tbout opposition and General Ruffner st.ated at

the morning briefing tbat he was comple~ely confident of the

ability of the attacking elements to take the enemy strongpoint.

Tbe General had broken the, attack into four phases: (1) the .

attack itself to be preceeded by three days of artillery prepara

tion; (2) securing of tbe objective; (3) repelling of enemy

counter-attacks; and (4) use .of Hill 1179 as a. base for future

patrols and as an OP to neutralize enemy offensive plans.

Receiving notification that tbe Netherland's Detachment

was being pulled from tbe 2d Division a.nd sent to Pusan on the

let of August to permit rotation of the majority of its per-

sonnel and the integration of large numbers of replacements,

t-he D1 vi eion began making immediate plans to make such chanses

es would keep the strength of the attacking elements in proper

balance. .lt 0835 hours on the 26th, shortly attar the attack

was launched, X Corps was notified that the 2d Battalion of tb.e

9th Infantry was tp replace tbe 3d Battalion of the 38th In

fantry which could then replace the Netherland • a D•t.acb.ment.

The move was to take plaoe at 0530 hours on the 27th. The 9th

Infantry, wbich had been concentrating on the construction of

defenses along the Wichita Line, was to be given a sector on

the Kansas Line extending from tbe lett Limiting Point at DT1026

to a right Limiting Point at DT1530. All Regiments were then

to take over responsibility for the Wichita Line, as well as

the Kansas Line, in their sectors.2

Tbe 23d Infantry waited until 0700 to send out the di

versionary patrols from its 3d Battalion, but had control of

all of its objectives at 1025 hours. These positions were,

1. .App A-21 2. .App D-1:

Briefing Notes, 26 Jul 51 J-25, 26, G-3 Journal, 26 Jul 51

-15-


f 5 -, 0 u J

, ~- - .......... • •

• • • ::oro-2~~


REPROOIJCED AT THE NI<TlONAL ARCHIVeS

0501

however, quickly brought under enemy artillery fire. A platoon·

of Oomp&nJ K was moved to tb.e southeast slope or Hill 525 DT2337

as a reserve force and friendly counter-battery Tire soon silenced •

the ~nemy.artlllery and mortar fire.1

Company C and Company A., 38th Infantry, which bad. advanced

without opposition until 0930 hours, encountered an -entrenched

enemy force at 111'2035 which resisted stubbornly, utilizing aJlto

matic we$l)ons to a maximum extent. ·company· C disensaged and

attempted to flank the enemy atrongpoint by- slipping aro~d to . '?

the northweat. It had succeeded in ~aking positions on the

ridgeline, sllgbtly northeast of" 1 ts former pos1 t1on at 1530

hours but· waa forced to w1 thdraw to the reverse slope to escape

the heavy volum.e of enemy automatic weapons f1re.2 ·

It was contemplated that the let Battalion would bold

at the point of farthest advance but at'ter an incident in late

afternoon, when tb.e supporting air napalmed Company· C by mia-

take, the lat Battalion was -instructed to move back. The bat-,

'\ ~·

'· ,·.

t&lion co1111rander, however, was informed that be should :move it ,\ J

b-k onl.J so tar as heldHated neceasary.3 ~

The ••87 intention to ~ert a maxiaWD effort to hol.d

Hi.ll 11'79 was ev1den.ced by the prodigal uae of artillery and

automatic weapons fire. .t.t the ~d of tbe first dal' s attack.

it was apparent that a ring of mutually su.pportins ,defenses

had been oonstructed generally alon8 tb.e ll.OO contour line aad

it appeared ev1d·~nt that tbe atrent;tb G~ t.be deten41ng units

was or regimental size or l.arger. Nevertheless, General Ruf'fller

directed ttlat the tactics of tbe a~tack woul.d not be ohanged

on the tollolfins da1, out that air &l'ld artillery aupport were

.L: ·.If. l.Q be intensified.

l. .,p D-l.: 2. jpp D-2: 3. .App_ ·D-ls 4. .App A-2:

J-32, ,.. 40, G-3 Journal, 26 Jul 51 POR 6d2, 2e Jul ·51 J-58, 67, G-3 Journal, ~6 Jul 51 Brieftng !totes, 27 Jul 51

-16-

SECRET


Company B, 38th Infantry, spearb eaded the attack on tb.e

morning of 27 July. It was closely followed by Company B, 9th

Infantry, and Companies A and C {-) of.tbe 38tb Infantry. The

.1st Batte~ion advance encountered bitter opposition and advanced

less than 500 yards during the bard days fighting when they

finally stopped for the day in the saddle on the east slope of

Hill 1179 at DT2035. At this point, the attacking units. dug-in

for tbe night. Upon its relief by the 2d Batta.lion, 9tb Infan

try, the.3d Be:ttalion, 38th Infantry moved to an assembly area

at DT2032 and began pr~pa.rations for an a.cti ve role in tb e at

tack. The Netherland's Detachment did not advance during the

day but supported tbe attacking 1st Battalion by fire. 1

The 23d continued to support the attack by diversion.arr

actions in the Punch Bowl area. The. activities of the reginem

tal units in the bowl itself' were not contested but Company K

encountered violent opposition when it attempted to.move up Hill

1059 DT2036 "-'hich would have blocked the ridge used by the enem;r

to move troops and supplies to the Hill 1179 area. Arter ap

proaching to within 600 yards of the crest, Oompa.ny K was forced

to withdraw and took up positions in the vicinity of Hill 525

DT2337.2

Renewing the attack on the morning of the 28th, the let

Battalion was again halted by the en~my defenders on the eaatern

_approacbea to the Hill 1179 bastion. '.rbe Battalion launched re

peated assaults ., was unable to penetrate the enemy d.efense.

At 1600 hours, Companies I and K of the 3d Battalion moved from

their -assembly area at Hill 1001 tbrougb the let Battalion de

tenses and continued the attack. Then, as it was becoming dark,

the 3d Battalion was ordered to disengage and consolidate its

positions tor tbe night. The 1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, with

drew to the southern slopes of Hill 1001 and Company B, 9th

1. jpp D-2: POR 683, 27 Jul 51 2. Ibid

-17 ...


1 Ut\iLA~:>l rn:.u

A~~f~l B~ tw'.A Oata~J

0503

• •


Au~ 1lSl.9lr: B~ NARA OataW5.J!I

' ... F

~ ~ 'J ~ 'ii '- ~

Infantry, wae released to tbe control of its parent organ1za

t1on.1 • Visibility had been very poor throughout the day and 1t

had been impossible to register accura~e artillery fire. Never

theless, between three an.d five enemy machine guns had been si

lenced and it was believed that the enemy bad suffered heavy cas

ualties. General Ruffner directed that the maximum fire be de•

livered on the area from the attached 8 inch bow1tzers. 2

The 23d Infantry continued its diversionary activities

on the 28th and Company C and Company K launched a coordinated

limited assault on Hill 1059 at 0600 hours. Both companies con

tinued to press their attacks until 1800 hours when they broke

contact and returned to their base behind the Kansas Line.3

General Ruffner directed that Hill 1059 was to be placed under

a blanket of tank and artillery fire on the following day. 4

The ooservation of artillery was limited on the morni~g

of the 29th because or heavy ratns, a.nd the morning period w~s

devoted to preparations by the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, for

an all-out effort to take Hill 1100 ~2035, the key to the Hill

1179 positions. The attack was launched 'Qy Compa.nies I and K

at 1600 hours after an intensive artillery preparation and the

two companies successfully occupied the Hill at 1745 hours, roll

ing back a determined enemy counter•attack. The enemy broke

. contact shortly before dark and the 3d Battalion established a

perimeter ·defense on the Hill.s

With the fall of Hill 1100, the maln objective, Hill 1179

beca.me untenable. The enemy realizing that it would have to . '

retake Hill llOo·or give up ~ts positions on Hill 1179, launched

an abortive counter-attack on the morning.of 30 July. This was

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

APP G-3: APP A-1: APP D-2: · App A-1: App D-2:

Evaluation of Attack On Hill 1179 C/S Journal, 28 Jul 51 POR 6e4, 2~ Jul 51 C/ S Journa.l, 2~ Jul 51 POR 6~5, 29 Jul 51

-18-

\


• •

• •


REPROCUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 1 Ut:vu>.\l.:>lrn;u

:;mf~m~\ - - /'". ,. .... 11

) 1.~ ·J

'"' ~

• easily repulsed and, a.f'ter a heavy preparatory artillery fire,

Companies K. and I led off another attack on the final objective~

After taking high ground north or Hill 1100, tbe attacking com

panies completed their preparations-for the final attack. They

moved forward again at 1620 hours against enemy resistance which

had now become almost negligible and, by 1730 hours, they con

trolled the final objective, Hill 1179. 1

The Com1'DW'l1ste had. put up a stiff resistance and it had

taken longer than anticipated to take the Hill; however, in

tneir determination to bold the bill at whatever cost, ·the en-

emy had pel"'llitted the virtual annihilation o:r its 7th Regi11e11t

or the 27th n Division and of the elements of' the 14th Reg1•

ment which bad come to reinrorc~ 1t.2

Losses of' the 2d Division and attached Netherland• a Bat•

talion ror the operation to take Hill 1179 totalled 46 KIA, 328 '

WIA, and 12 MIA ror a grand total of' 395 compared to an estimated

total enemy losses of over 2 ,ooo. The great variance in casu

alty rates. was due, in great measure, to the volume and et:f'ec

tiveness of ~he supporting artillery ana a1r. Over 115 tons

or bombs were ctropped in tbe .area an~ a total of' 74,823 rounds

of art.illery -and 49,513 rounds of mortar were fired during tb.e

engagement.3

The capture of' Hill 1179 bad eliminated a. dangerous sa•

. lient f'rom tbe 2d D1 vi s1on Sector. Tbe mission had been per

formed. by a seasoned unit wt11ch knew its lim1tat.1ons and oapa-•

bili ties-and knew tbe number and quality of supporting arms .

on wt'Jiob to call for aid. The manner of performance had been

observed and reported and recognition ror the combat action

was prompt. At 1630 hours on the 31st of July, General Ruffner ·

1. 2. 3.

App D-2: App A-2: jpp G-3:

POR ot>o, 30 J'ul 51 Briefing Notes-, 31 Jul 51 Evaluation of Attack on Hill 1179

-19-


-----·

('l r n r-, --- ·--. ~ .. :.. ~: ·~.;· ; . ~ s: ~

appeared at tbe airstrip of the 38tb Infantry wbere, to tbe

accompaniment of tbe 2d D~vieion Band, be presented the awards

which were a tangible reminder of a job well done. 1

1. .App A-1: C/S Journal, 51 Jul 51

'

-20-""'· N.,. ~·~ ·:-. ~-- ,.,., ••

-- j ~·-~· c~ ~


RePRODUCED AT THE NAllONAL ARCHIVEs u tliLA~~ 1 r11: u

:ar:NAAA~

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONs*

UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERCATOR

Hoengeong DS1049

Hongchon DS0271

InJe DT2813

Kwe.ndae-r1 DT220e

:r<Iandae-r1 DT2435

Pusan EPOle3

Taeu-ean DT1935

1onju DS0734

Yangjichon DT3030 ·

Yongba-ri DT1517 .

0508

*All place naJDee are shown on the Korea 1:250,000 .AMS Map,Series L'52 (Sheet numbers NJ 52-10, NJ 52-14, and NJ 52-15). They also appear on the Korea 1:~,uoo L~7l Series or the same area.

( ·- :·) "'': ;: i ~,:_ ..... a ... a


SEC i

PERSONNEL

Sta.:t"!" Section Report of G-1, 2d Infantry Division

for

July 1951

During tbe first t1 a.l:t' of July 19~1, the 2d Infantry

Division, with the exception of tbe 23d Infantry Regiment and

t\1e 37th end 503d Field Artillery Battalions, remained in X

Corps reserve in the vicinity of Hongchon. On 15 July 195lt

the Division commenced relieving the 1st Marine Division in

line and ~he Division Command Post displaced forward to a po

sition a.pproxima.tely eight. miles south of Inje, on the south.

bank of the Soyang River, astride the 38th para.llel. The rear

adfninistrati ve center remained in the vicinity of Hoengsong

and tb e A:PO and Special Service R & R center rema,ined in po-

si tion south of Hongchon. ~'.Phe Replacement Company remained

in position at Wonju.

Notbwi th stand.ing an assault ma.de by elements of t.h. e

3tsth and 23d Infantry on 26 July 51, battle casualties ror

tb is period t-1ere comparatively light. Non-battle casualties

occurred. s.t the normal rate. The Division suf:t'ered a total

of 523 battle casual ties and 554 non-battle casual ties.

Administrative losses due to rotation totaled 133 of•

ficers and 302C$ enlisted men. Personnel gains for the month

totaled 2964 ror a net loss of' 1274 personnel for tbe month.

At the close of tbe month the strength of the Division was

e46 officers, 5j warrant or:ricers and 16 ,3b9 enlisted men for

a total strength of 17,290, viTb icb is 1023 understrengtho There

was a net loss of 37 ROK personnel during t.he month. There are

a total of 755 RCK soldiers (KATUSA). attached to the Division

wittl an e.dditions,l 292 attached to tbe French e;nd Nethe.rland

-1-

SECRET


B l~--: \

NARA Oat~~J·

Ba.ttalions. Rotation of combe,t personnel from Korea to the

Zone of the Interior continued during the month. Sin~e inau

guration or rotatio::~ on 15 April 1951, 45ts orricers and t1989

enlisted men have been returned to t.be United Sta.tes. At the

close ot· tbe month, appro~imately 417 ofticers and 4006 en

listed men, eligible t·or rotation as of 30 June 1951, rem¢ned

in tne Division. In a.ddition, 2148 enlisted reservists who

1rtere reca.lled to acttve duty itwoluntarily, remained in the

Division. These reservists must. be outsbipped 1·rom Korea, by

1:> November 1951 in order to be released 1·rom active d.uty by

31 December 195lo Continued rotation o1' combat personnel is

entir.aly dependent upon inflow of replacements.

Prisoners o:r War processed through Provost Marshal chan

nels totaled 125, of which 45 were North Korean soldiers e.nd

Bo ware Korean civilians.

lVIili ta;ry discipline was superior. :D-1ili tary orfenses

were negligible; however, one murder, rour rape, three larceny,

s,nd three ·assault cases were reported during ttl e montth

:Mora.le of the Division remains superior, rota.tion and

R & R leave being important contributing factors. One USO

show played to the front line troops and was well received.

Tb e Division Band continued touring the Division area playing

concerts and furnishing music tor ceremonies. Moving pictures

were shown to the troops whenever possible, d.epending on th.e

combat situation. so:rtball continues to be tb e most popular

gport and geroes were played nightly among the service troops.

Pay end postal services were superior. Arrival of

ma.11 slowed. down considerably. during the la.tter part of the

month, apparently because of the inclement weatner. However,

mail service to tne front line troops \4Tas superior, consider-

ing the distances involved and tne adverse weather of the pe-

rio d.

-2-

SECRET


B 1~-

NARAData~

SECR-ET

Awards and Decorations continued to be processed rap-...

idly. Tbe Commanding General approved !"or presenta.tion: 1

Legion or l.Jferi t, 196 Silver Stars, lts7 Bronze Stars t·or Valor,

215 Bronze Stars !·or Meritorious Service,. 4 Soldiers Medals,

15 Air Medals and 12e Commendation 'Ribbons. Twenty-two reo-

ommenda.tions :ror the award or the Dist~ngulsnea Service Cross

were forward to h igh.er b ea,dquarterso

Tn.e Civil Assistance Section continued to be very active

aurlng the montn. Act~vities or this section included the

evacuat.ion or 2u1 rerugees to the X Corps rEl'fugees collecting

point; obt.aining meaical treatment. for b90 refugees and local

inba.bitants; immuniza.tion ot· 20 refugees against. typhoid; dust

ing o~ tsOl refugees with DDT and evacuating 2 loca~ inbabi tants

to civilian hospitals.

Twent.y-eigbt f'ield grade ori·lcers were lost. during tn.e

mont.n as follows:

Colonel Gilbert N. Adams Hq Di v .Arty Reassigned ZI

Lt. Col Wilour N Dice Div Surg Rot.ai..ttu

Lt Col WaJ.lace llll Hanes 35th Inr Regt Rotated

Lt Col Lloyd K Jenson 23d Inf Regt Rotated

Lt Col Henry Kirkpatrick Hq 2d Inf Div Rotated

Lt Col Paul L Lea.by Hq 2d Inf Div Rotated

Lt Col Irvin L Luthi Div QJ4 Rotated

Lt Col Frank Neszar 23d Inf Regt Rota.ted

Lt Col James F Nabors 9th Inf Regt Rotated

Lt Col Milton C Norum 38th Inf Regt Rota.ted

Lt Col Donald M Zeis Div Artillery Rota.ted

:Me.jor Rizali to .A.banto 38th Inf' Regt Rotated

Ma.jor Jobn.nie C Brink 38th Inf Regt Rotated

Major Mich a.el T.rt C arigli a, 23d Inf Regt Rotated

Major Ralph K Disser 23d Inf Regt Rotated

lvlaj or La.wrenc e B Farnum 2d Engr C Bn Rotated

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• ''-' • ~ .................................. ' •• ''- ·~'"" ................... "''''-'' .. v .... .....

s c

r,~ajor ... __ . George Huffman Tr~:ms Off 2d Div Rotated, ·"\~

Major Job,n C Kepper 2d Ni:ed Bn Rota,ted

:tv1ajor Ted Ka,y 2d Big Co Rot.ated

Major George F McGuigan Hq 2d Inr Div Rotated

Kajar Norman L Neider Hq 2d Inf Div Rotated

Major Charles J Nilsson Hq 2d Inf Div Rotated

lVIajor Walter M Preston 15th FA Bn Rotated

Major Robert D Story 2d Ivied Bn Rotated

Major Victor E Strom Hq 2d Inr Div Rotated

],~ajor James A Touey Hq Co 2d, Inf Div Rotated

Major George Van Halban 72d Tank Bn Rotated

Ma.jor Ri cb ard Wak eb alD 2d Med Bn Rotated

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A~~~-:\ B~NARA Data~j

s c

INTELLIGEI~C:E:

Staff Section Report of G-2, 2d Infantry Di.vision

. for

July 1951

, ... •'

As tne period opened,, tbe 2d Infantry Division was in

X Corps Reserve in the vicinity of Hongcbon DS0373. Tbe Divi-'

sion CP moved to Kwa.ndae-ri DT2306 on 16 July to relieve the

lst Marine Division on the Ka~sas Line. 'Wh.ile the relief of . I

the let Marine Division by tne· 2d Infantry Division was being

effected on 15 July, the enemy was busily engaged in improving

his defensive positions astride every prominent terrain fea-

ture across the front. The key enemy stronghold was in the

Taeu-san DT1935 area where, on 15 July, the 7th Regim~nt of

the 27th Division, II NK Corps, replaced the 32d Regiment!of

thB same division. After its relief, the 32d Regiment, which

bad suffered hea.vily. from repeated atta.clts by the K1-1C Regiment

of the let Marine Di vi sian earlier in tne month, moved up the

·:ridgeline from Taeu-san a,nd took up positions along the north

west rim of the lVIa.ndae-ri 11 bowl11• The sector west of Taeu-san

was occupied by the 14th Regiment, also of the 27th Divis.ion;

and the de:renses of all three regiments were closely coordinated.

The. North Korean Army attached great importance to the

'raeu- sa.n area, as was attested by a P\4' vibo declared that Kim

Il Sung himself bad issued an order to at this vital terrain

complex was to be held at all cost. From the b eights of 'I'aeu.-I

san tne N"!C forces bad direct observation over tbe entir•e l'>Iandae-

ri ubowl 11 area. and over much of tb e 2d. Division sec1;-or.. Con

trol of tbe commanding terrain enabled the enemy to dispose

his artillery \'Tell forward and tbus subject friendly instal-

lations throughout a. wide area to his artillery fire.

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•'

The enemy did not fail to make use of bi s advantageous

positions to harass friendly forces 1'!1th observed mortar and

artillery fire; and, in conjunction with tnis, ·numerous patrols

were dispatcned to reconnoiter and probe friendly positions.

To counteract i'riend.ly pa,trol efforts the enemy set up a counter

reconnai ssa,nce screen that opera, ted during daylight hours. rrhe

27th Division was assisted in these operations by tne 6tb Divi-

sion, V NK Corps on its west flank e .. nd by the 2d Division,·II

NK Corps whicb occupied positions north t:md ea.st of tbe Nandae

ri "bowl". During t.ne period 15-25 July all of these enemy

units made contact v'fith the 2d Int'e.ntry Division, but the en

ge.gement s we!e generally limited to patrol actions involving

squad and platoon size units. The only heavy actio·ns during

this period occurred when rriendly forces attempted to probe

the main defensive positions of the 27th NK Di vi sian, and on

these occasions the enemy reacted shal'"'PlY and repulsed friendly

attacks.

The 2d Division attack V<rbich wa.s launched on 2(") July

and. bad Taeu-san as its objective found the 27tn Division, and

. the '(tb Regiment. in particular, well prep area. to· _c:tef'Ema. 'rh.e

7t.o Regimen~ was occupying well rort.iried posit.ions ast.rlae

tne prlncipa.l av~nues or a,pproaco t.o Ei:i.l .U.I9 DT1935, a.nd

lacked neither weapons nor· amc::uni tion. Firepower TN" as supplied

· by mor·e than 100 sub-machine guns, approximately 75 light and.

heavy ma.c\1ine guns, and an estimated 25 mortars; other defen-

si ve weapons included nmnerous mines and many thousands of

hand grenades. In addition, the 7th Regiment was supported by

the tires of an estimated 50 artillery pieces. The disposition

of tbe three infantry batteJlions was as follo:ws: The 2d Bat-

ta.lion v.Jas assigned tb e defense of· 1~h e sout'n ea,stern appPoacb es

to Te.eu-san along "!,V"hicb the main e.tte.cking force of the 2d Di\

vision were destined to mal::e their 'lt!e,Y, ttle 1st Ba:cta1ion vvas

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' well aug-in on toe spur extending south ana i4est .from Hill 1179,

• e.nd the 3rd Battalion was deployed along the ridgeline running

north from Taeu-san to Hill 1181 DT2038.

The 7t\: Regiment wi thetood three days of relentless at-

ta.Cl{S and uncea;l!ing bombardment before its combat effectiveness

wa.s reduceo. to the point where further resistance was imprac-

tical. It was on 29 July tha.t elements of the 14th Regiment

were sent to reinforce the Taeu- san garrison, and at dusk tt1 at

day the relief of the 7th Regiment was initiated. The mission

of the 14th Regiment in tbis operation was principally tn.at ·of

covering the withdrawal of elements of the 7th Regiment, be-.

' cau.se a.fter a. fruitless counter-atta.ck against tbe tJN fol"\Ces •

that bad gained control of Hill 1100 DT2035 on the afternoon

of 29 July, it was clear 'that Taeu-san bc:.d become untena.ble.

It wa.s ttl e 2d Batta.lion, 14th Regiment 1:1hicb conducted the final

def§Dse of Hill 1179 ol? 30 July and fought. a rear guard action

a.s the last of' the NK units withdrew from the area..

Enemy action during the month of July Tnas highlighted

by the defense of Ta.eu-ssn. There were no ma.jor shi:t'ts in the •

di spo sit. ion of enemy· torce s opposing the 2d Infantry Division

during the period, and the o-nly· significant cba.nge ~n the enemy

order of ba,ttle occurred on 25 July 1r1b-en tb e 12th Division re

lieved the 6th Division, both of the V NK Corps, on the Divi-

sian left fronto 1'h e 12th Di vi sian Cli splaYed more aggressive-

ness than the 6th Division in its pe,trolling activities; never-

tbeless, the 12th Division \vas equally careful to avoid becom-

ing heavily engaged with UN forces. .On tb e Division rigb t

front, enemy conta,ct was limited to patrol enga.ger.ae•nts vvi ttJ ele

ments of the 6th Regiment, 2d Division, II NK Corps in the

I E~emy casualties during the month of July resulting from

ground action involving units of the, 2d Infantry Division were

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estimated at 2,510, v.fith close air support accounting for a.n

a.ddi tional 1, 571 estimated enemy l·dlled or w·ounded. There

w~re 24 prisoners of war captured during tbe period, all were

Nort.h Koreans.

In early July, i•rhile the Division vra,s still in reserve, -

the PI team, under the direction o1· the G-2, continued t.o con-

duct a three hour course in photo interpretation for unit in-

telligence personnel within the Division. The course consisted

of a class on the organization, techniques and mission of the

photo interpreter team. This class was foll~wed oy practical

work in the ruoiments of photo interpretation empha.sizing metb

ods for maximum utllization of aerial photographs at regime·ntal

or battalion level.

In tb e earl.y part of tb e perlod, in preparation of tb e

Di vi sian I s mission to take over tb e Marine I 8 sector' tbe PI

team commenced to annotate and prepa.re for distribution basic

cover of the area of immediate interest.

The maximum utilization of ba.sic cover wa.s made during

this period. Tb e aerial pboto s, in addition to being plotted

on the 1:50,000 operational map and annota.ted with names of \ '

villages, promi-qent ls .. ndmarks and critical bigb ground .were

e.lso annotated with the principa,l ridge lines. This was a fur• - .

ther aid in orienting the photos to the operational map.

SUffici~nt sets were sent to the Di vi sian units to en-

aole exploitation of pbotography dovm to company level. For

example, in support of the operation t.o taKe Hill 1179 DT1935,

125 sets or a total of 500 annotated prints were distributed

of' the objective area a,."'1d vicinity on two days notice. This

photography was delivered to the 38th In:t·a.ntry, Division A.rtil• I

lery, and the 23d In fan try in proportion to th-eir needs to- ac-

complish the mission.

Arrnot!:tted ba.sic cover included. 3,054 prints and twelve

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES Ul:I,.,Lf\\:'J\:'Jiru:u

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:il~o saic s wn ich were distributed to Division units prior to the

start of and during operations. This exceeded in 10 days e;ny

total previously recorded for any 30 day period. '

In aadition, the 2d Divisio~ received a total of five

current sorties froni the Air Forc.e through cnannels. These

sorties were of :ra.ir quality due to haze and, clouds; nevertb e-

• less, ~bree pbo~o interpretation reports were accomplished by

tne team and disseminated within t.be Division. Moreover, a

total of tive photo mi·ssions were :rlown by Division Artillery

taken wi tn a K-20 ca:mera :rrom an Ll9 plane. Two of these mi s-

sions were considered highly satisra,ctory and reported on by

the Division PI t.eam.

The team also assumed tbe responsibility of distributing

photo interpretation reports ~nat. reached us from Corps and

Army. One copy of· a~l reports were immediately brought over

to FSCC ror evaluation i'or possible a.rtillery and air targets.

Concurrently, tne PI team also continued to keep up the

cover traces or Map Sheets of 1:50 ,ooo seal~ by plotting all·

sorties received and initiating photo reconnaissance requests

through cb ar! nels as directed oy tn e G- 2.

Dt,lring the !'irst half of Ju.ry, the IPW team continued

the ~re.ining of' replacements a.na the procurement o!' foUpplies

'and equipment, a,ctivities w1:11cn ba.d commenced in June. A pro-

posed T/0&:1 tor division IPW team wa.s prepared and submit ted

to tbe A.ssi stan~ Chi et· of Starr, G-2.

Since the resumption or operations against ~he enemy,

11:3-51 July, tb e 'IPW team has publ1 shed 11 :ru11 in.terroga~ion

reports, covering 22 prisoners of war.

In preparatiion for t.n.e att.e.ck on H1.~1 1179,. personnel

from tne division IPW team (one orficer, til:'lree 1ntierrogators,

t.hree 1ntierpreters) were sent -co -cne regiment maxing tine maiiJ.

eft'~_rt.

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES Utt.;LAtl::ill'"l r:u

· SECBE •

During the month, CIO activities within tne scope of

SR 380-10-1, 2"9 May 1950, increased due to tb e Di vi s1on return

. ing to a tacti caJ. situation on 16 July 1951. wring the month

excellent liaison was effected between the 2d CIC Deta.chment,

X Corps, 7th Division CIC, and ROK CIC Detachments attached to

the X Corpg.

·During tne month, this detachment had a tota.l of tnree

persons rotated to Japan. The vac-ancies created by rotation

have been filled ·tmd at tbe present time th.e detachment + s

operating with 17 CIC personnel including special agents and

clerks plus one clerk who is presently on DS to this detach

ment from G-2, 2d Infantry Division. A quo.ta oi' one· person

per Recuperation and Rest trip to Japan has been authorized

and is being utilized .• · During tbe month, three persons have

been recommended for awards, two ~or tne Bronze Star !Jiedal for

meritorious servicfi e.nd one for the Commendation 'Ribbon. -~

With tnE·recommitment of the 2d. Division to an active

sector on 1-6 J~ly 1951, CIC teams were sent out to each r-egi

ment in ,order tb a.t on-the- spot coverage migb t be ef:rected.

Results, a.s of this date, indicate that this is a more effec-'

tive 1~rey of utilizing CIC personnel within the Division. This

marl-c.s .a change in the deta.ebment~ operationa.l policy inasmuch

as during tbe past several months these teams had been based

at deta.chment headquarters and sent out to the regiments on cal~

Continued. emphasis was given to apprehending enemy ee-'

piona.fre agents and detecting tbose which migbt infiltrate divi

sion .indigenous employee groups. Seventy-o'ne agent reports

were written on espionage, sabatoge ,/ background investigations.,

security inspection,- and miscellaneous subj acts. Age.nts of·

tbi s detachment participated in :five se~uri ty training lectures

given in detection and prevention of espiona.geo I

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During the month, 790 persons of doubtful authenticity

were screened by this c1etacbment in tb e Division zone.

Otb er activities during tb e period are reflected in the

following figures:

Cases· pending (All types) •••••••••••••••• 4

Work completea:

Security Inspections ••••••••••••••••• 8 . Background Investigations •••••••••••• 7

Agents Reports:

Espionage • •••••.••.................•• 6 SS,bot~e •••••••... ..••..•..•..•....••• 2 Violation of AR 380-5 ••••••••••••••• 10 Hi scellaneou.s •••••••••••.••••••••••• 59

Spot Reports to G-2 ••••••••••••••••.••••• 6

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OPERATIONS

Staff Section R~port of G-3, 2d Infantry Division

for

July 1951

At :tbe close of the month· of June the Division was fol

lowing the extensive training progretm as was initiated during

tb at month.· Progress in tb e retraining phase was great, and

the new replacements and the newly e.ppointed small unit l·eaders

bad.this vital·oppor~unity to practice'tbe principles which bad

been previously developed.

A ~ontinua.tion of the training period followe.d during

the first he.lf of July, to include subjects which further al

lowed these basic principles to be firmly. fixed in the minds •

of the new personnel. Emphasis for this phase of training was

established to include attack exercises, graduated from squad

to battalion, to the extent of employing all individual a.nd sup-

porting weapons including close air support and artillery, in

re-alistic problems. Night attack demonstration problems u.p to

company level were also stressed. Further empb asi s was con tin-

ued to be placed in firing of the individual ~nd crew served

type weapons, tank-.inf:e,ntry tact.ics, communic~t.ions, and command

inspections.

At a divis.ion commander's meet.ing .the accent of tre.intng

was sh.ifted. from the offensive to the defensive type, and all

un.its established train.ing programs, to .include problems gradu

ated from squad to battalion s.ize. Pr.inciple·s stressed included ·

prepare,tion of posit.ions, construction of fortificatlons, bas.ic .

defensive tactics, fields of fire, demol.itions, preparation of

range cards·, cover, concealment and camouflage, tactical laying

of wire entanglements, procedure for laying and removing mines

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• and booby traps, barages, concentrations, forward observer

training, and firing of all w~a.pons of a final protective line.

Tra1ni ng memoranda, were publi sb ed to implement schools

in Photo Interpretation, Minefield s and Shelling Reports; a sec

ond session school for radio operators was instigated to be con•

ducted the early pe~rt of August. Regimental unit NCO schools

were.· also conducted in subjects ranging from lea.dersbip, to small '

unit tactics.

Letters of Instruction were published to include the ap-

pointing of a board of Armored Officers to conduct a study on

tbe tactical employment of tanks in Korea. The extent of this

study primstrily stressed tank infantry tactics, a,nd employment

of tanks in all, pha.ses of both the offensive and defensive ·type

missions encountered in Korea. Other letters were: 9hemical

D~fense School and Principles of Chemical ',V'e.rfare; Prepa.ration

9f Defensive Poei tions; Helicopter Landing Sites; taintenance

of Wire Lines a.nd Latera.l Liaison; a description, and operation

instructions for a i'·iultiple Grena.de Booby Trap; Bunker and Dug-'

• out Construction.

On 16 July, the 2d Infantry Division was relieved from

X Corps Reserve and was given the mission to relieve the 1st

IJiarine Division of their ·sector on the Kansas Line, organize,

occupy a.nd defend the line in a.ssigned sector, esta,b1ish strong,

. patrol bases along the Badger Line, a,nd survey and develop po

sitions for a secondary defense, alo·:1g Line Wichita. Relief

,,.,a,s effected and ext en si ve p a.trolling .and preparation of d.efen-

sive positions \'las accoroplisbed, on and forward of ·line Kansas.

Under the.se circumsta.nces thE' Division bad t~1e opportu-:

ni ty to put to use an accumulatton of the principles offensive

and defensive 1trhich were learned while ~onducting the retra.in-

ing phase in X Corps Reserve.

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An operation order was published, which ordered elements

of t.he Division to l.aunch .a co-ordinated limited attack to seize

an advance patrol base on HILL 1179, effective 24 July 51. Tbe

at.tack was launched and met by bitter enemy resistance, however.,.

on 30 July 51 tne objective was secured. A Letter of Instruc

tions wa.s pUblished at this time in the form of a;ri operation

direct.i ve. It was recognized that wi tb the seizure of the dom

inating terr~:.~.~u north of Line Kemsas tbe Division was afforded r

the opportunity to place empbas.is on training replacements; con

current with the reorganizati~ and re:-equiping of combat units;

correct deficiencies and. improve kno~,m combat techniques; con-

struct a. roa . .d net to permit close latera,l liaison and exp.edi te

supply;' continued effort to construct and improve defensive po

sitions; patrol to capture PWs,. reconnoiter area.s, a.nd engage

with the enemy, to learn enemy capabilities; a.nd hence, eontinue

to prepare for further com·bat operations.

Tbe weather during tne month of July was genera.lly warm

and cloudy .• For the first half of the month, this ha.d no adverse

affect on the status of );raining. However, it rained eight of

the fifteen days the later part of the month, whJ.ch greatly bam-

per·ed the use of:' close air support and observation of artillery

fires,. in the attacl{: operations o:e the Division.

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LOGISTICS

Staff Section Report of G-4; 2d Infantry Division

for

July 1951

The first two weeks of' July were devoted to combat

readiness and personnel and equipment status inspections.

The units were assisted in this preparation by teams of' every

Technical Service. These teams inspected ana repaired guns,

replaced worn out items, filled shortages that were found to

exist and were of immeasura.ble help to the combat elements of

the Division. The inspections conducted by the Commanding

General of the Division and his starr and likewise tbe repre

sentati vee or the Commanding General of X Corps revealed that

great effort had beeQ expended in raising the standards of the

inspection to a superior level.

Rations were improved a,nd the "An ration was s.vailable

during the greater part of the month much to the sat1sf.action

or the troops or the Division. The issue or toe crea.m was

likewise maintained.

Two Division ammunition surge points were esta.blished

with a two day supply ror two regiments at Yanggu and a two

d.ay supply for one regiment at + nj e.

The concentrated salvage drive was continued and tons

of salvage were reclaimed 'from tne highways and combed from

old. battle pos1 tiona in the D1 vision sector. Supply d1 sci-

pline ana economy cards were rurther issued to all new mem-

bers or the Division and through this media an enormous over

all improvement was noted. Sal va.ge ror ttl1 s period amounted

to 906 tons.

The Division received nine Civil Transport Companies

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during the first two weeks of July bringing the overall total

to thirteen companies. The Division being in reserve ror the

first two weeks period utilized and actively engaged the Civ

il Transport Companies in localized regimental field problems

and during the latter part of the montn the companies 't-rere used

principally in transporting supplies forward, building emplace

ments a.nd constructing end improving roads.

During this latter period two Korean Service Corps Regi-.

ments totaling 2,375 men were recel ved from tbe 1st Marine Di vi

sion upon their relief. The KSC troops were likewise used pri-

marily as cargo ca.rriers and moved supplies up to the :rront

lines.

During the montn ot· July a· Board or Office:r:-s conve~ed

e.t the direction of the Commanding General for tt;le purpose of

making a detailed study or tb e combat unlt'orm requirements

ror both winter a.nd summer seasons in .Korea.. IncHvidua.l equip

ment, organizational equipment, a.nd tra.nsportation requirements

:!:'or both seasons were also studied and recommenda.t.ions lfrere

included in the Board of Oft'icers report submitted to the Com

mending Geners.l. As a result or the 1'1ndings and recommen

dations of this Board, tne Commendlng General deemed it ap

propriate to have this valuable information disseminated to

all Divisional units and. further distributed to other agencies

. ana Depa.r·tments of the Army by means of a pamphlet. Arrange ... .

ments have been made to print such pamphlet complete w·it.h

pictures, in Japa11.

A Supply meeting i'las conducted by G-4, X Corps and at-

tended by all Battalion, Regimental c:;;1d Division Supply Of-

ficers. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss tbe dif

ficulties encountered in supply and transporta,tion during the

":May Nt:lssacre''. Results of the meeting disclosed tba.t the im-

petu s of supply wa.s not being carried far enough forward by

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the supportl ng Army a,nd Logistical Oomme.nds.

rrhe rniddle of July found tbe Division moving out of re

serve into forward a.reas and relieving elements o:f the 1st

Harine Division. Secondary defense lines were worked on and

finally an at~eclc i'las launched to secure Hill 1179. During

the period 25 July 1951 to 31 July 1951 the· 38th Regiment led

tbe offensive and was very successful in seizing and securing

tbeir objective. In 1;1Ccomplisbing tbis acb-ievement tbe use

of the Civil Transport Companies played e. very importa,nt part

in transporting food, water, e,mmuni tion, and medical supplies

to tbe troops in the front lines. This was accomplished over

very steep, rugged and mountainous terrain.

Two air drops 1>1ere successfully completed during the

period of 25 July 1951 to 31 July 1951. Approximately 1~5

tons of food, water, ammunition, :fortification material, .sig-

nal, e.nd medical supplies were included in tbe drops. Twenty-

eight planes participated and recovery was estimated to be

95% complete.

Air evacuBtion was accomplished and 100 patients were

flown to reerws.rd areas. 'J~bis eliminated long uncomforte.ble

rides by e,mbulance to Hongchon and a,lded in removal of shock

to pa.tients thus speeding recov,ery.

An air resupply point ws.s established on H tll 1304 and -f-, representa.t1 ves from both Q.uartermaster e.nd Ordne,nce were pres

ent together ,,ri tb recovery teams e.nd as air drops were s.ccom-

plished, recovery wa.s immediately .initiated complete with proper

segregation and stacking. Carrying parties from using agencies

picked up supplies required a;nd made deli very to consumers.

This operation proved very successful;. and aided in the resupply

of troops immensely, cutting down on long he.uls.

The month of July 1951 ended with the Division still

actively engaged in pursuing tbe enemy.

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EVALUATION AND RECOHT-iENDATIONS

When tne 2d. Division moved back into t.he Kansas Line

in the middle of July, all units were warned to check their

areas carefully ror mines. There were, nevertheless, heavy

casualties cau.sed by friendly mi nee which bad not been plotted

when sown or reported to the relieving units wben the 2d Divi

sion took over. It is extremely import.ant that units plant

ing minefields place them in pa.tterns and prepare detailed

and accurate maps of their locations. In· addition to these \

precautions, the fields sboulct be properly marked. All of

these are basic safety precautions but they have not been fol

lowed in the Korean Theater. Many booby traps placed by indi

viduals near their foxholes. were not deact.ivated. When units

were moved and these, too, were the basic cause ror many un-

necessary casualties. The enemy ba.ve developed and are usin.g

in great quantities a type of mine which is difficult. to de-

t.ect by our present electronic mine detector a.nd all lead .

elements should learn to investigate all suspicious areas.

One of the lessons. of the fighting in the Korean cam ...

paign which ce.nnot be over-emphasized is that there is no

!'1ner training for a combat soldier than actual combat experi

ence--there is no comparab.le su.bstitute. It would appear,

that tours in the combat units should be limited to enable

the greatest number of troops to benefit this training. This

would lower the peak combat effectiveness of the Div~sions in

the theater but would greatly increase the reservoir of com-

bat trained fighting men.

Troops in Korea are not getting the completely rounded

combat experience possible were the enemy using Air-and Artil-

lery to a greater degree. The 'lack of enemy air and tanks

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RE.PROOUCt;:O A I fHt NA IIUNAL AKCHIVt~

prevents the troops fighting in Korea from getting completely

rounded combat training. This would be reflected in tbe ini

tial casualty rates should tn e en~my t'orce suddenly commit a

sizeable air force.

In supportin.g ROK combat elements with A.mer1can artil-

lery fire, it was quickly lea.rned that tbe Korean Forwar,d

Observers lack the technique to direct American Artillery

fire. The Korean Observers lack both an appreciation of What

the artillery can do and the experience needed to properly

direct fires on specific targets. This criticism is also

valid wnen applied to tbe supporting French and Dutch Ba.ttal-

ions, although to a. lesser Clegree. 1Nbenever possible, trained

American Forward Observers should be attached to the foreign

units which tneir b.atte.lions are supporting.·

Tna.t the overall efficiency o.f the troops of tbe 2~ Di-

vision continues at a very high level is indicated by the me&

sage sent to General Ruffner by the Commanding General of X

Corps, Major General Clovis E. Byers, upon the completion of

the operation to take Hill 1179 (Taeu-san). It is quoted here

verbatim:

To CG 2d Inf Div:

Please express to the officers and men or tbe 3~tb Infantry Regiment and. to those otb"er divisional elements wbicb supported. them in their gallant, determined, and skillful seizure of Taeu- san my sincerest appreciation and admiration. The masterful reduction of this key terrain feature 1s in keeping with the brilliant record. of your c.U vision.

-2-

s/ Clovis E Byers t/ CLOVIS E BYERS Maj Gen USA Commanding


.... --~~ ..

•

·'

SECRET •

2d Infantry Division Steff

for Period

1 July 1951 - 31 July 1951

Commending Jeneral

Asst Division Commander

Artillery Officer

Chi~f of Staff

Asst Chief of Sta.ff, G-1

Asst Chief of Sta.ff", G-2

Asst Chief· of ' Staff, G-3

Asst Chief of Staff, G-4

Ad,jute.nt General

Actg Adjutant General

Aviation Of:t'iC'e:o

Ch aplei n

Chemical Offic~r

Enc:i neer Officer

Finance Officer

Headquarters Commandant

Historian

Inspector General

•

Naj Gen Clsrk L Ruffner Ul5966 USA

Brig Gen George C Stewart ~-015349 ·~ USA

Brig Gen Thomas E deShazo 016479 Arty

Colonel Rupert D Graves 015794 GSC

Major Neil Robinson 0~9019 GSC

1\1aj or Albert ~·l Aykroyd 035069 GE3C

Lt Col Ralph L Foster 022669 GSC

~t Col Fre.nk c Sinsel ·-· -~ ·Gsc

Lt Col David 3 Emmons 039979 AGO

Captain John F Burns .. Ol0l2433 AGO

T:J:ajor R .. obert L Hoffman 01176669 Arty

Colonel .ii:dvvard J DelJ,lars 029128 ChC

Lt Col Richard 0 Gordon 024440 CmlC

\

(1 Jul 51) (9-31 Ju1 51)

(2-8 Ju1 51)

Lt Col Edmond H Leavey Jr 024698 CE

I"la j or Norm8n B Bre.nch III ( l,t Col ., 033499~ FC 11 Jul 51)

Ca,ptain George E Staley 02006Li-Ul Inf

Cantain Fred J Meyer • 0463996 Inf

Lt Col Herman C Duvall 043b250. IGC

-1-

SECRET


SECRET , .

Staff Judge Advocate Lt Col Paul J Leahy (1-23 Jul 51) 04)267· J.AGC

Lt Col Gerard B Crook (24-31 Jul 51) 039713 JAGC

Ordn.ance Officer L"t Col Henry Kirkpatrick (1-23 Jul 51) o 157623ti Ord

Lt Col Gervase R Barnhill (24-31 Jui 51) 03ti7901 Ord

Provo at Marshal Major Samuel T Denton 0499731 CMP

Public Information Officer . 1st Lt Perry H Davis II 02019143 Arty

Quartermaster Lt Col Irvin L Luthi { 1-10 Jul 51) ·03$830 QMC

Lt Col Homer P Harris (11-31 Jul 51) 0311641 QMC

Signal Officer Major Robert c Masenga 054101 SigC

Special Service OfTicer Major Victor E Strom 01283163 , Inf

SUrgeon Lt Col Wilbur D Dice ( 1-6 Jul 51) 023671 MC

Major Lloyd. R Stropes (Lt Col lb J'ul _)31) 037629 MC ('f-31 Ju.l 51)

T I & E Capta.in Jerry L Peavy · Ol2e9617 GSC

1

Transportation Officer Major George H Huffman ( 1-6 Jul 51) 049431::50 GSC

·Captain :Martin J Will:l,ams ( 7 ... 31 Jul 51) 0 19466 40 · GSC

Civil Assistance Officer Captain Vincent W Bach 0132~389 AGO

Regimental, Combat Team c.omma.nders

9th Regimental Combat~ Team Lt Col Olinto M Barsanti (1-11 Jul 51) 034037 , Inf'

Colonel Jobn M Lynch 020377 Inf

( 12 .... 3:1; Jul 51)

23d Regimental Combat Team Lt.Col Frank Meszar (l-6 Jul 51) 0~3211. Inf

Colonel James Y Adams (7-31 Jul 51) 019755 Inf

38tb Regimental Combat Team Lt Col Frank T Mildren 021992 Inf

ECRET


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0522

RADIO HESSAGE

25 July 1951

FROM: CG 2D INF DIV

TO All Units and Attached Units

I ~~ve boen notified by hi~hor heo.dqua.rtors thnt the Distinz,uishod

trni t Ci ta.tion ha.s been a.warded b~r the President of tho United Sta.tos

to the 2d Infnntry Division a.nd units a.ttnchod durine tho period

of 16 Mc.y to 23 Uo.y 1951. Pnrn. It is with mixed emotions of pride,

joy a.nd humility, thnt I trn.nsmi t this historic mcssnc;o to you& pride

in your gent a.chievement in smnshinc; the ::1.ttack of 12 Comnunist

Divisions thrown neninst the 2d •iVision front and flanks; joy over

tho recoenition· eiven ·to your nccomplishrnents by tho nwnrd of tho

hie;host hdnor thnt cn.n be bestowed upon your Division bJr our nation;

humi1ityin the morrJ.ory of our en.llont COI'lrn.ds who e;uve their lives

for tho United nations cause. PQ.ra.. Hcmbors of tho Division who

have eone before us nre proud of you and we plnce in tho hnnds of

posterity for sa.fokeepine; tho Indic>.n Hen.d Dlvl-t'.lio.nr~ mot+.o_. "Snnol'!d.

Dist: A 252 Trans. Trk Co 300 FA Bn 937 FA Bn 196 FA Bn 17th FA Bn 92 Ener Searchlic;ht Co

&.


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2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - July 1951 · prepared by a panel or officers nea.ded by...

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Transcript of 2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - July 1951 · prepared by a panel or officers nea.ded by...