2610113_RolinceMFR

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event:

Type of Event: Interview of Michael Rolince (acting Assistant Director in Charge, Washington Field Office)

Date: August 7, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Michael Jacobson

Team number: 6

Location: FBI, Washington Field Office

Participants Non-Commission: Assistant General Counsel Bob Sinton, Assistant Special Agent in Charge Bob Blecksmith

Participants - Commission: Peter Rundlet, Barbara Grewe, and Michael Jacobson

Background

Rolince took over the International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS) in August 1998. Prior to that, he was working drugs/organized crime in Boston. He turned on the TV on August 7, 1998 and saw the coverage of the Embassy bombings. He then worked for 2 V2 months without a day off. The FBI dispatched 1,000 agents to Africa to work on the investigation. As an aside, Rolince mentioned that he is a big fan of Louis Freeh, and thinks that he did a great job at the FBI, with the exception of how technology matters were handled. As an example, 4 years into the Khobar Towers investigation, the FBI still did not have the names of the individuals the Saudis had in custody. Due to Freeh's efforts, they were able to get these names and eventually indict the perpetrators.

International Terrorism Operations Section

The FBI had a hiring freeze in 1999 and 2000. They were also losing agents during this time period, at the rate of about 500 a year. Before 9/11, they only had 89 agents in ITOS, and 630 working terrorism matters in the field. In ITOS, they went from one crisis to another. First, there was the Embassy bombings, then the deployment to Kosovo, then Egypt Air, then the attacks in Jordan. After the Embassy bombing, he had to cancel everyone's holiday leave. Despite the pace and volume of the work, they received no additional personnel or help. They were also heavily involved in the pre-Millenium activities. When Ressam was arrested, they looked at him as the terrorist of the future. However, he didn't cooperate with them for a long time, which made this

q is twe4. fry.

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investigation more difficult. ITOSs' role prior to 9/11 was to coordinate the response to these various incidents. New York was the Office of Origin on Al-Qa'ida matters. At HQ, they managed the laboratory response and involvement, the deployment of personnel, and other administrative matters. New York was in charge of the substantive investigation. As a side note, Rolince mentioned that when he was at ITOS, he wanted to split RFU and UBLU (to not have them physically collocated). They said no.

Role of FBIHQ, pre 9/11 and post 9/11

When Freeh came on board he reduced the size of HQ by 30%. He also gave more authority to the SACs. He had the mindset of a field person. Rolince contrasted this with Mueller's approach. When 9/11 occurred, Mary Jo White called Mueller to try and get control of the investigation. She wanted New York to continue as the office of origin for al -Qa'ida. Mueller listened and then said that it was not going to happen. From Rolince's perspective, they still need to have an office of origin. WFO invested $1 million in a command post. The thought was that any type an FBI team deploys, WFO would go overseas. When the Riyadh bombing occurred in May 2003, he thought that WFO would be involved and have their command post operational. The Director said no, and that the command post would be at HQ. He also said that WFO could not have direct contact with the on scene commanders in Riyadh, without including HQ in the loop. HQ is the entity that is coordinating with the Saudis, the State Department, etc. Rolince said that this new approach is a way of life and that people have to get used to it. He understands what the Director is trying to do. Accountability is one issue that the Director is very big on. When a number of different field offices have personnel involved and no one is really in charge, it's hard to figure out who is really accountable. Mueller wanted to be able to hold one person accountable. Rolince doesn't think that HQ has the authority to run cases directly aside from emergency FISAs. This is the only time that HQ is directly involved in that manner in directing an investigation.

He understands the reason for some of the centralization, since IT is a different type of investigation. I

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Rolince has found that the amount of criticism of HQ is inversely proportional to the amount of time the person has spent at HQ. For example, there was a point when none of the SSAs working CT in NY had ever been to HQ. Rolince also thinks that it is a mistake to send any Legat personnel out for assignments who haven't served at HQ.

Rolince stated that the new EAD Maureen Baginski gives the most cogent and articulate presentation he has seen on intelligence matters. If this is done correctly, her office at HQ can be fairly small. Another reason for centralization is that HQ is the only component which sees all of the information. There is a lot of information that Field

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figure out what collection targets should be.


I As information comes in, then HQ can

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'Everything that WFO does which is of importance goes into an urgent report to HQ. In the old days, these used to be called "Judge Notes." It used to take about 2 1/2 weeks for them to reach the Director. Now, these urgent notes can be about any subject, including arrests, major indictments, or death of an employee. WFO will put this information in an email and send it directly to the Director. Director Mueller also has SAC conference 4 times a year, while Freeh only had it once. Rolince thinks that the high levels of HQ are now overly aware of what's occurring at airports. One of HQ's mandates was that they be kept apprised of all developments at airports. Rolince notes that he probably could have used this to justify having additional personnel at Dulles.

FBI and WFO Priorities

In the last inspection report for WFO, it said that CI was the #1 priority. It is easy to know the number of I0s. He sat down with the supervisors not too long ago and asked them how many more agents they needed to address the unaddressed work. He told them that they would not actually receive these agents, but that he wanted to know. Almost every squad said that they needed more.

Rolince mentioned that before 9/11, he recalls seeing a memo from Ashcroft saying that guns, drugs, and civil rights were priorities. Dale Watson brought him the memo, complaining that terrorism was not even mentioned on it.

Rolince agreed that crime surveys are not the best way to figure out how many resources to devote to CT. These work from criminal programs. They do the best they can to figure out CT, but they don't really know. Al-Qa'ida is a very difficult target.

9/11 Classified Information IA1-Qa'ida cases, on the other hand, are all over the map. They are not in groups. They are opening al-Qa'ida cases all over the country, based on the efforts of DocEX (the HQ document exploitation section).

The Director has told them that he will not set resources levels based on TURK burn rates. They shouldn't feel pressure to work certain programs to ensure that they don't lose spots. Violent crime, for example, was being overburned in every city.

Representative Frank Wolf is very concerned about the gang MS-13 in Northern Virginia. Wolf is also one of the FBI's major appropriators. No other office has to deal with as many other competing interests as WFO. WFO also has to deal with the number of people being promoted to HQ positions. In the last year, 44 people left WFO to go to

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HQ. This doesn't happen as much with other offices. Rolince mentioned as an aside, that 9/11 Classified Information 'because the FBI does it so well.

The cost of dramatically increasing the size of the CT side of the house is that the criminal investigations suffer as a result. There used to be 4-5 drug and organized crime squads at WFO, and now there is just 1. White collar, which has 100 assigned to it, is now working with 48 agents. There is only one drugs/organized crime squad now instead of 4. In the nation's capitol, the FBI is not doing everything it can about crime. He's actually more worried about violent criminals than about terrorists.


The criminal issues are not necessarily being adequately addressed by other agencies. For example, the DEA has a small office in DC. The MPD has lost 1/3 of its officers in the last five years.

WFO Diversion of Investigative resources

The Amerithrax investigation is taking its toll on WFO. There are 45 WFO agents working on a non-WFO case. They are supposed to have 5 agents doing applicants, but due to the volume, they are using 29. This has to come out of other programs. Between the Amerithrax and applicant investigations, this consumes 8 'A squads worth of resources.


Relations with the Muslim community and and understanding of the CT threat in their territory

At WFO, they've been working on improving relations with the Arab community. This should be a field driven effort, not HQ, in Rolince's opinion. This is an important effort. Before 9/11, the FBI did not even know what was in their own backyard. Maybe if WFO had had more sources in the community, the hijackers would have turned up. However, he noted that they have yet to find a single person in the U.S. who assisted the hijackers wittingly. If the hijackers did something suspicious, he is not convinced that WFO had assets/informants positioned before 9/11 to report on activities in these communities.

The FBI knows 1000% more about Northern Virp -inia today than they did on 9/11


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that. The Director's vision is that they should take people out as soon as they can. They are no longer going to wait and build a case. For example, if Mihdhar was here in this country and could be picked up on a visa violation, the FBI would do it. Rolince would argue that this is postponing the attacks, not preventing them. Rolince has the autonomy to make the argument to the Director, but it's not his final call. There were a lot of arguments as to what to do about the Lakawana individuals, for example. Rolince is an advocate of long-term investigations. He understands the concept of catching the • individuals and throwing them out. But these people may be able to get back in. There is a long undefended border with Canada, for example. Under the absconder program, there were 5,000 people who had exhausted all appeals and were back here.


WFO only has a small number of CT cases in the district. Almost all are in Northern Virginia. He is surprised by this because he would think that there would be CT suspects in the student bodies at some of the colleges in DC.

It is essential that WFO understand the radical Islamic community in Northern

I This will allow an area police-officer to call

Virginia. They know 10 times more about this area now than they did before 9/11. On a scale of 1 to a 100, they are now at about a 20. This is one reason why they've I I

in and be able to access all law enforcement and intelligence database on whomever he is interested. Rolince would like to SCIF the RIC. As a bottom line, he FBI needs to chan e its approach of thinking that their role is to wait for the bomb to go off and then to

IRolince agrees that they'are not there yet, in terms of react. 9/11 Classified Information

what e'd like to see from these squads. The agents there Came primarily from the criminal/reactive world, so this is a change for them.

In some ways they are making progress; The agents' (came primarily from the CI world. It's amazing-What they now know about this issue, They are involved in investigations for questions they would not have been allowed to ask prior to 9/11.


In terms of the FBI overall, Rolince mentioned that there were 630 agents working/CT as of August 1998, and only 530 on 9/11. Rolince thinks that it is an unfair criticism of the FBI to say that they did not understand UBL's capability. He thinks that

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it is easier for UBL to strike overseas, but no one ever thought that he couldn't attack us within the U.S.

Training Issues

In Rolince's opinion, the vast number of FBI agents are not trained in CT. The FBI is setting itself up for disaster if they try to convince people that at this point they are "not their father's chevy" anymore. Before 9/11, there was only 4 hours of CT training for new agents, out of 16 weeks. Rolince does not want the American people to think that because the FBI now has 1500 agents working CT instead of 530 that the problem is solved.

The College of Analytic Studies at HQ has been involved in developing trainin . CIA personnel have been involved in this effort.' 9/11 Classified Information


(Rolince has mandated that people working CT attend these training sessions. Rolince thinks that training is essential to getting FBI personnel in the mode of intelligence gathering. The FBI is capable of doing this, and they do this type of work in their CI cases.

Source development and handling


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With regard to the San Diego informant, Rolince-iS'not,sUre that the case agent 'should have known with whom his informant was living. Rolince has run about 15-20 sources and he didn't know with whom any of thein wereliVing. On the other hand, Rolince does think that the San Diego informant should'have been aware of the type of people that the FBI was interested in. Where this might be lacking is if the source was reporting he should have,been asked what he knew /about al-Qa'ida as well. TheTBI has been too focused on-What that squad is doing. They need to ask their `"sources broader questions. Rolince also commented on the assistance that people in these communities provide. Iii--late 1999,77Calledi land told him to take Ressam somewhere. I 'flew across the country to do this without knowing anything more about this:',,This is not unusuaL

RolinO's relationship with important players in the CT arena

In his position at WFO, he has tried to Jeverage some of his past relationships. For example, he knows Townsend who is at theNSC, Jim Baker from OMR, and others. Rolince h4 also broUght in attorneys from HQ to 'provide training.

Post 0/11 Investi2ative techniques: Interview initiative and detentions

Rolince'does not think that the post 9/11 detentions and-interview initiatives have made it more difficult for them in the Arab community. He put together a conference for the Arab community leaders and told them that the FBI would investigate any type of hate crimes. On the Iraqi interview initiative, the leaders of the community initially complained that ththe were targeting their community. The FBI let them know that they were just looking for help. All of the FBI agents involved in these interviews 'at,WFO

ed with sensitivity trainingbefore they started. An FBI Muslim agent ave a lecture on the best way to go about these interviews. This was a WFO

idea, but he would be surprised if other offices didn't do similar things. In the end, WFO did 400 interviews and received no complaints. They only arrested one person. These interviews generated intelligence, including force protection information for DoD. In general, the interviewees were very hospitable•to the agents. He doesn't believe that agents were harassing people during these interviews. Rolince thinks that prosecuting people and putting them in jail is one aspect of prevention.

Structure of WFO ' , .

As far as the structure of WFO, he decided to keep) within the IT branch. Rolince said that he brought in Pat Cook to head the IT branch to take the Holy Land Foundation down. The HLF was going down even if 9/11 hadn't happened. When 9/11 occurred, it just expedited the process. When they passed the '96 legislation, Rolince thought that it represented the end..ofHLF. One of the best things they have done at WFO is to split CI and CT since 9/1'.1. CI has traditionally been the "big dog" at WFO. The CI executives at WFO have beenj types (like Bereznay and

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Horan). When When he left WFO in 1985, they had 10 CI squads and 1 CT. Now they have 19 CI squads and 10 CT.

Phoenix EC and information sharing with other agencies

One of Rolince's frustrations about the.Phoenix EC is that in the EC Williams talks about visas, etc, and in that same unit there are DSS, INS, and other agency representatives. His only complaint to the analyst was why they didn't give it to the personnel from those other agencies. He thinks that this was atypical and that normally this type of information would have been disseminated.

Jack Salatta, the FAA Representative at FBIHQ, used to come to him every time he found out that he hadn't been provided with relevant information in a timely fashion. He can recall about 5 times when Salatta came to him with these kind of complaints. Rolince thinks that this requires a mentality switch on the part of the FBI personnel. They have to keep these other agencies in mind to consider whether they have information that might be relevant for them.

Technology

The Director has acknowledged that the FBI does not have the technological tools to do the job. At this point, they still don't have better tools. For example, he still can't email the Department of Justice from his desk. That has not changed. WFO is the 2 nd

largest Field Office in the country and they only have one Internet terminal on each floor. As far as why, Rolince thinks that it is a combination of money, prioritization, and technical considerations (such as wiring). With the volume of intelligence, the USIC needs to be connected. Eventually, it will only be possible to access) land Intelink through TTIC. Right now, it's 2 years after the attacks, and people are going to wonder why they haven't made better progress.

You can't say, in Rolince's view, that if the FBI"had more people and technology that 9/11 would have been prevented. But, regardlesS, the FBI still needs these things. The FBI also needs the capability to get CIA information for themselves. This won't happen at WFO until they are all "SCIF'd up." They also need the TS Lan. Rolince does not want to let the American public thirktliat things are all fixed.

Access to Intelligence Community Information and databases

Rolince said that the,y'also need more SCIFs at WFO. He is getting beaten up by David Szady (the Assistant Director for FCI) for not producing enough II:Rs. They need computer access to Intelink and! I These are only available in SCIFs where the

9/11 Classified Information 'He thinks that WFO should have SCIFs for all CI and CT squads.

,As far "as information sharing, Rolince addressed why detailees haven't completely -solved that problem. He said that the primary reason is the volume of

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4111 information. I are detailees cannot handle this.

9/11 Classified Information 'the few people who

Watchlist Issue: Midhar and Hazmi

Rolince thinks that the Watchlist issue has been overstated in importance. If Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar had been denied, they would have been replaced. They were just "speed bumps." If the FBI had known that they were traveling to the US, the FBI would not have decided to let them in so that they could follow them. For example, there was some discussion about Jose Padilla when he was traveling to the U.S. They decided not to let him in. The risk of losing him and something bad happening is too great, and people don't want to live with that.

This is the kind of attitude that is leading to "overwarning" right now. Noone wants to be the one not to release information and then have something happen. This is regardless of how bogus the information might be. In the same vein, no one wants to be the one approving letting someone in and then having something happen. For al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, had the discussion arisen it would have been a "raging debate" as to whether to let them in.

If, hypothetically, they had let them in and followed them, perhaps they could have identified the others. However, then they would have run traces on the other 17 and come up with nothing. The FBI would have had a hard time getting beyond a preliminary inquiry. What the FBI would need would be incriminating conversation on tape.

One of the great mysteries with regard to the hijackers that remains is why they went to Portland. It was not for security reasons. The FBI has listened to their message in the hotel room and you still couldn't tell that there was anything going on. Had the FBI been following them, they would have called the city where the flight was going to. In traditional hijackings, if there was an agent with a weapon on board, the agent would generally let it play out. The thinking is that the plane will land and then the hijackers will begin negotiation.

Regarding the phone number in Yemen, Rolince said that it would have been critical if the Yemenis had gotten on board earlier.

Relationship with the CIA

Rolince said that with regard to other Federal Agencies, there are cases where information is not being shared. For example, in! lipase and some others, the CIA has not shared information with the FBI. In some cases, there is still the mentality at the CIA that they don't need the FBI. I 9/11 Classified Information I particularly sensitive about operational security. I 9/11 Classified Information

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Rolince said that he has worked very closely with the CIA. He is there all of the time, and thinks that he understands it better than most at the FBI. The typical bank robbery agent or police officer isg to have a hard time relating[


Relationship with State/Local

Rolince also mentioned Ed Flynn, the former Chief of Arlington Police. He complains about the FBI not sharing information, but he is unwilling to get a security clearance. Rolince said to him that he would not provide him with information until he received a clearance.

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Operation Greenquest is broken beyond belief. This is despite the fact that the MOU is crystal clear. The FBI is sitting and waiting to get into the investigation. It's 2 years into the investigation and no one is in jail.

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Warning

In the spring of 2001, there was a great deal of "chatter." He recalls that Kevin Giblin's unit would make the determination as to whether or not to warn. Giblin used to say that if you warn on everything, you warn on nothing. When there was specific information, they would push it out. Just because there is "chatter," however, does not necessitate a warning. As far as tasking collection, they did not do that then, but are clearly doing that now. There are 80 cases which are driven by connections to prior attacks. Their mentality is stopping people who continue to come after the U.S. They will look at whether these individuals are facilitating terrorist activity. But just because the FBI is investigating someone, does not mean it's easy to figure out what they are doing. For example, the FBI had all types of coverage on Wadi El-Rage and All Mohammed. Nothing that they did during this period is relevant to why they are currently in prison. It seems to him like they were operational overseas, and getting R&R here. This is similar to the IRA. The FBI does engage in more of a forward look today than they used to.

Effects of the Patriot Act

The Patriot Act did have some important effects. Under the Patriot Act, SACs can now sign National Security Letters (in the past only HQ executives could sign these). In addition, they now have 1 year instead of 120 days. Rolince did mention that to pass information from a FISA to a criminal case that they need to have Attorney General authority. He thinks that this should be changed and that they ought to have the authority in the field to pass the information and just notify that they did. The wall, in his view, was very confusing. There were different people serving as the wall in different places. They do now have authority to pass telephone numbers to an AUSA for administrative subpoena purposes. AUSAs can sign administrative subpoenas. In the old days, it would take 4-5 months to get an NSL.

Authority to target individuals at religious institutions

The FBI has always had the authority to go into mosques. Rolince recalled three cases prior to 9/11 when] 9/11 Classified Information all all three cases, the Director and the Attorney Genera said no. this attitude has changed. Now though, whatever conversations used to take place at mosques are now taking place elsewhere (such as parking lots).

Policy Changes

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The FBI is going to have only one classification for terrorism investigations, a "315." This will make more sense. This will be an intelligence classification, as they came to the conclusion that it will be intelligence that will drive these investigations. The fact that these are intelligence investigations does not mean that they will not be able to prosecute these people.

Current strategy of fully investigating all leads

The FBI's current strategy is that no lead is left undone. When he was an SSA in Boston, he had the authority and discretion to decide how to handle leads. Oklahoma City changed that. Information began to filter to HQ much quicker after that attack. One of the problems now is that information is passed to HQ so quickly now. Information is passed to HQ executives, before the field has even had a chance to sort it out.

1 9/11 Classified Information (remain on the list until they have been disposed of. In the last SAC conference, they were told that every single threat gets resolved. Period. But his question is, how do they know whether something is actually suspicious until they've done a little investigation? He would like more leeway to make judgments about the threats at the Field Office level. He's willing to take accountability if he's wrong. They are averaging 10-12 calls a day at WFO, and it spikes to 20-30 when the threat level is up. There is the concern that an uncovered lead could turn out to be the big one. People don't want to take that risk. In addition, people on the hill have told him that the MI-5 legislation is already written, and that the next time there's a major attack in the U.S., that the legislation will be passed. As a side note Rolince mentioned that the DocEX program is a great piece of prevention.

With regard to al-Qa'ida, al-Qa'ida members have authority to go after any target that has been previously approved. They don't need to seek additional approval to proceed. In many countries where al-Qa'ida exists, the governments can't do "roundups." These include England and Canada. They were able to stop the Heathrow attack. That was going to happen. He thinks that the Saudis now get it. They've had more cooperation in the 5 days after the Riyadh attacks than they did in the 5 years after Khobar Towers.

Analysis

WFO has no analysts currently dedicated tol land they have only a ".200 hitter" working' IWFO created an intelligence squad.before the director even mandated it. They changed .the mission of the squad from a criminal to an intelligence one. The squad will service,the whole office. He thinks that the best analysts at WFO have to be working IT. The next best should be working CI. This wouldn't happen if the analysts were all staying-on the operational sqiiads. He is impressed with the CIA's "surge" capability. At the-FBI they had 4 UBL analysts on 9/11/01 and the same number a year later. I

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soon after. , He thinks that the FBI should have the same type of surge capability. His plan for the newly created Joint Intelligence Task Force (JITF) is to make the operational squads justify their need for analytic personnel. He thinks that the JITF has to get every piece of intelligence, including every 302, every surveillance log, and every complaint call. In the old system, for example, the ASAC would see the complaints and then just divvy them up. Harrington has to "own" the analysts.

Rolince was totally against Bear Bryant's idea to create the Investigative Services Division. The result wai,that when he wanted something, he now has to go through another chain of command., He lost the ability to directly task the analysts. There were analysts like Matt Levitt and! [who continued to visit the operations units regularly and make this work though.

Rolince is concerned by the growing number of entities involved in threat analysis. There is a threat analysis unit at HQ, an analysis threat unit at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), one at the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), and now the state governors are creating these types of entities, with no ownership in Washington. Mike Byrne at DHS only has a staff of 2. The District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) also has its own intelligence unit. He wonders whether information coming in there will be available to the MPD person at the Regional Intelligence Center. Rolince just wants to make sure that all of these entities are coordinating. Rolince gave another example of a 1-800-terrorism line that he saw advertised on a billboard. He called the number and found out that it was run by local authorities. He is concerned that there are so many entities collecting information separately. In his view, why would they want a local police department with no CT mission to have their own entity without the FBI? The FBI has the resources, training, etc. How would the state/local police even know what terrorism was?

Rolince hopes that by putting the analysts on a separate squad this may change their taskings. When they are on an operational squad, they might be asked to make a coffee run, etc. If they are on a pure intelligence squad which is driven by priorities, this hopefully will no longer occur. He would like the analysts to be doing strategic analysis. They have to get away from just doing things like telephone analysis. He will be putting people into supervisory analytic spots.

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The FBI now has a 1:75 ratio of analysts to agents! There is a dearth of analysts at the FBI.

WFO JTTF mission and responsibility

The JTTF at WFO eVolyed,from DT matters. It is unique in that regard. file is in the process of doing away with the IT'and DT distinction. He's not that worried about DT, and thinks that they have a good hpdle,on the DT elements in their territory. He would like to have it so that the JTTF members have their own case loads, bur the problems are that they have so many threats here:•::The no lead uncovered strategy forces them into this structure. The JTTF here is different because Washington indifferent.

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The police chiefs are very powerful here. He'd like the JTTFs to do more, but if he does, he's not sure how to make sure that all of the leads are covered. They are not allowed to leave even the lowest CT matter unaddressed. The JTTFs at WFO will become part of IT. Right now, they can't make the change, but they will. Gaye Harrington's squad was very controversial. IT-6 and IT-7 the goal is to find criminal activity in Northern Virginia.

Rolince thinks that the most important jobs in the office are those of the squad supervisors. Rolince may not know of everything that is going on in this office, but the SSAs should know. They are the oversight mechanism. He thinks that they should be looking at the squad's assets to determine their credibility and to evaluate how good the sources are. He's not sure what the best way is to do asset validation. Maybe the JITF should do it. EAD Baginski certainly has ideas about this. He thinks that asset validation will be taken over by HQ. He doesn't know exactly how this will be handled, but it will be taken out of the supervisors' hands.

Role of Chief Division Counsels

Rolince thinks that the CDCs should be more involved in CT matters. Watson brought in all of the CDCs in 1994, and gave them a full week of CT and CI training. Where are they now? The legal representatives are crucial. This has always been a problem at the Field Offices. The CDCs cannot just support the criminal side of the house, and kick all of the national security questions to NSLU. Rolince thinks that Colleen Rowley is a classic example of a CDC without CT experience. As a side note, with regard to the Moussaoui case, he can't understand why Minneapolis didn't raise the FISA issue with higher level people. There has to be a dialogue for things like this to be worked out. He's in the Assistant Director's office pushing for FISAs all of the time.

MI-5 Question

With regard to the MI-5 question, he would want to know what new authorities they would plan to give a domestic intelligence agency. Would they have authority to do indefinite detentions? Warrantless entries?

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