1 2015 REMINDERS for POLITICAL LAW Carlo L. Cruz SEPARATIONOFPOWERS-UnlesstheConstitutionprovidesotherwise,theExecutivedepartmentshould exclusivelyexerciseallroles andprerogativeswhichgointotheimplementationofthenationalbudgetasprovided undertheGAAaswellas anyother appropriationlaw.Clearly,thesepost-enactmentmeasures whichgovernthe areasofprojectidentification,fundreleaseandfundrealignmentarenotrelatedtofunctionsofcongressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities"andthe"regulationandreleaseoffunds"inviolationoftheseparationofpowersprinciple.[Belgicav. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] WHEREFORE,theCourtPARTIALLYGRANTSthepetitionsforcertiorariandprohibition;andDECLARESthe followingactsandpracticesundertheDisbursementAccelerationProgram,NationalBudgetCircularNo.541and relatedexecutiveissuancesUNCONSTITUTIONALforbeinginviolationofSection25(5),ArticleVIofthe1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely: (a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in theGeneralAppropriationsActs;and(b)Thecross-bordertransfersofthesavingsoftheExecutivetoaugmentthe appropriations of other offices outside the Executive. The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed fundsdespitetheabsenceofacertificationbytheNationalTreasurerthattherevenuecollectionsexceededthe revenuetargetsfornon-compliancewiththeconditionsprovidedintherelevantGeneralAppropriationsActs. [Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015] Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose ofa program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only vetotheitemtowhichthatexpensecategorybelongstoNonetheless,thismodifiedinterpretationdoesnottake away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. [Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015] Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whetherornottoespousepetitioners'claimagainsttheGovernmentofJapanislefttotheexclusivedetermination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreignrelationsbytheExecutiveDepartment.Accordingly,wecannotdirecttheExecutiveDepartment,eitherby writofcertiorariorinjunction,toconductourforeignrelationswithJapaninacertainmanner.[Vinuyav.Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014] Checks and Balances The Presidents disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. [Bengzonv.SecretaryofJusticeandInsularAuditor,62Phil.912,citedinBelgicav.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.208566, November 19, 2013] DELEGATION OF POWERS the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individuallegislators,violatestheprincipleofnon-delegabilitysincesaidlegislatorsareeffectivelyallowedto individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] The 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individuallegislatorstoappropriateinviolationofthenon-delegabilityprincipleasafore-discussed.[Belgicav. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Finally,itmaynotbeamisstostatethatsucharrangementalsoraisesnon-delegabilityissuesconsideringthatthe implementing authoritywouldstillhave todetermine,again,boththeactual amounttobeexpendedandthe actual purposeoftheappropriation.Sincetheforegoingdeterminationsconstitutetheintegralaspectsofthepowerto appropriate,theimplementingauthoritywould,ineffect,beexercisinglegislativeprerogativesinviolationofthe principle of non-delegability. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Presidential Pork Barrel - the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section8ofPD 910constitutesanunduedelegationoflegislativepowerinsofarasitdoesnotlaydownasufficient standardtoadequatelydeterminethelimitsofthePresidentsauthoritywithrespecttothepurposeforwhichthe Malampaya Funds may be used This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projectsofthegovernment,"remainslegallyeffectiveandsubsistingthedeclaredunconstitutionalityofthe 2 aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used as it should be used only in accordancewiththeavowedpurposeandintentionofPD910.[Belgicav.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.208566, November 19, 2013] Section12ofPD1869,asamendedbyPD1993,indicatesthatthePresidentialSocialFundmaybeused"tofirst, financethepriorityinfrastructuredevelopmentprojectsandsecond,tofinancetherestorationofdamagedor destroyedfacilitiesduetocalamities,asmaybedirectedandauthorizedbytheOfficeofthePresidentofthe Philippines."TheCourtfindsthatwhilethesecondindicatedpurposeadequatelycurtailstheauthorityofthe PresidenttospendthePresidentialSocialFundonlyforrestorationpurposeswhicharisefromcalamities,thefirst indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blancheauthority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority infrastructure development projects"andhence,leavesthePresidentwithoutanyguidelinetoconstruethesame.[Belgicav.ExecutiveSecretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] The proviso under Section 9 of the RH Law which states that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" is empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] TheissuanceofaBarangayProtectionOrderbythePunongBarangayor,inhisunavailability,byanyavailable Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and(2)threateningtocausethewomanorherchildphysicalharm.SuchfunctionofthePunongBarangayis,thus, purelyexecutiveinnature,inpursuanceofhisdutyundertheLocalGovernmentCodeto"enforcealllawsand ordinances,"andto"maintainpublicorderinthebarangay.Notviolativeoftheprincipleofdelegation.[Garciav. Drilon, G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352; Tua v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014] ArticleITheArchipelagoDoctrine-teachesthattheoutermostpointsofourterrestrialdomainaretobeconnected with straight baselines and all waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as our internal waters. As internal waters, theyaresubjecttotheexclusivejurisdictionofthePhilippines.Archipelagicsealanesaretobelaidonthesewaters over which foreign ships will have the right of passage as if they were open seas.UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines andsetsthedeadlineforthefilingofapplicationfortheextendedcontinentalshelf.Complyingwiththese requirements,RA9522shortenedonebaseline,optimizedthelocationofsomebasepointsaroundthePhilippine archipelago andclassified adjacentterritories,namely,theKalayaanIslandGroup(KIG) andtheScarboroughShoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continentalshelves.Inturn,thisgivesnoticetotherestof theinternationalcommunity ofthescopeofthemaritime spaceandsubmarineareaswithinwhichStatespartiesexercisetreaty-basedrights,namely,theexerciseof sovereigntyoverterritorialwaters(Article2),the jurisdictiontoenforcecustoms,fiscal,immigration,andsanitation lawsin thecontiguous zone(Article33), andtherighttoexploitthelivingandnon-livingresources intheexclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).[Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - Territorial Sea - provides for a uniform breadth of 12 miles from the low-water markofthecoast.ContiguousZone-12milesfromtheouterlimitsoftheterritorialseaexerciseofprotective jurisdictioninazoneofthehighseascontiguoustoitsterritorialsea,thecoastalstatemayexercisethecontrol necessarytopreventandpunishinfringementofitscustoms,fiscal,immigrationorsanitaryregulationswithinits territoryorterritorialsea.EconomicZoneorPatrimonialSea-extending200milesfromthelowwatermarkofthe coastal state all living and non-living resources found therein belong exclusively to the coastal state. The Continental Shelfrefers to [a] the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside of the territorial sea,toadepthof200meters,orbeyondthatlimit,towherethedepthofthesubjacentwatersadmitsofthe exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas, and [b] to the seabed and subsoil of similar areas adjacent to the coastsoftheislands.ThecostalstatehastheEXCLUSIVEsovereignrighttoexplorethecontinentalshelfandto exploititsnaturalresources,andnooneelsemaydosowithoutitsconsent.[Magallonav.Ermita,G.RNo.187167, August 16, 2011] WhetherreferredtoasPhilippineinternalwatersunderArticleIoftheConstitutionorasarchipelagicwaters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath The imposition of these passage rights [rightofinnocentpassageandtherightoftransit passagethroughinternationalstraits]througharchipelagicwaters underUNCLOSIIIwasaconcessionbyarchipelagicStates,inexchangefortheirrighttoclaimallthewaters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] 3 Petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippinescontinued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS):a)TheKalayaanIslandGroupasconstitutedunderPresidentialDecreeNo.1596andb)Bajode Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] Intheabsenceofmunicipallegislation,internationallawnorms,nowcodifiedinUNCLOSIII,operatetogrant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions fortheirexercise.Significantly,therightofinnocentpassageisacustomaryinternationallaw,thusautomatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocentpassagethatisexercisedinaccordancewithcustomaryinternationallawwithoutriskingretaliatory measures from the international community. The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage throughinternationalstraits.Theimpositionof thesepassagerights througharchipelagicwatersunderUNCLOSIII was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly,therecognitionofarchipelagicStatesarchipelagoandthewatersenclosedbytheirbaselinesasone cohesiveentitypreventsthetreatmentoftheirislandsasseparateislandsunderUNCLOSIII.Separateislands generatetheirownmaritimezones,placingthewatersbetweenislandsseparatedbymorethan24nauticalmiles beyondtheStatesterritorialsovereignty,subjectingthesewaterstotherightsofotherStatesunderUNCLOSIII. [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] The Open Seas res communes but a state may exercise jurisdiction on the open seas over its vessels, over pirates, in the exercise of the right to visit and search and under the doctrine of hot pursuit. Outer space, like the open seas, is res communes and NOT susceptible to discovery and occupation; it is not subject to nationalappropriationbyclaimofsovereignty.Astateisresponsibleforwhateverinjuryordamageanyobjectit sends to outer space may cause. TheBangsamoroJuridicalEntity[BJE]isnotmerelyanexpandedversionoftheARMM,thestatusofitsrelationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.Indeed, the BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in theMontevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a definedterritory,agovernment,andacapacitytoenterintorelationswithotherstates.Evenassumingarguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayeditselfbyitsuseoftheconceptofassociationrunscountertothenationalsovereigntyandterritorial integrity of the Republic.[The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008] ARTICLEII-generallynotasourceofenforceablerightsEXCEPTtheIncorporationClauseandSection28onthe policy of public disclosure duty to disclose [which presents a SPLENDID SYMMETRY to Article III, Section 7 on the RighttoInformation]. Section16onecologyhasbeenimplementedbylaw;which,togetherwithSection14 right to health need not even be written.[Oposa v. Factoran] The Constitution now describes the Philippines as not only a republican but also a democratic State.NOTE provisions on initiative on national legislation [Article VI (32)] and initiative on amendment of the Constitution. [Article VII (2)]. - Besides,the1987Constitutionaccordstothecitizensagreaterparticipationintheaffairsofgovernment.Indeed,it provides for people's initiative, the right to information on matters of public concern (including the right to know the state of health of their President), as well as the right to file cases questioning the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.These provisions enlarge the peoples right in the political as well as the judicial field. It grants them the right to interfere in the affairs of government and challenge any act tending to prejudice their interest. [Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012]-SEEalsoArticleII[23]TheStateshallencouragenon-governmental,communitybased,orsectoral organizationsthatprovidethewelfareofthenation.ArticleX[14]ThePresidentshallprovideforregional developmentcouncilsxxxcomposedoflocalgovernmentofficials,andrepresentativesfromnon-governmental organizationsxxxArticleX[18]TheCongressshallenactanorganicactforeachautonomousregionwiththe assistanceandparticipationoftheregionalconsultativecommissioncomposedofrepresentativesappointedbythe Presidentfromalistofnomineesfrommultisectoralbodies.xxx.ArticleXII[9]TheCongressmayestablishan independenteconomicandplanningagencyheadedbythePresident,whichshall,afterconsultationswiththexxx variousprivatesectorsxxxArticleXIII[15]TheStateshallrespecttheroleofindependentpeoplesorganizations. Article XIII [16] The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels 4 of social, political and economic decision-making shall not be abridged.Article XVI [12] The Congress may create a consultativebodytoadvisethePresidentonpoliciesaffectingindigenousculturalcommunities,themajorityofthe members of which shall come from the communities. Whatever good is done by the government is attributed to the State but every harm inflicted on the people is imputed nottotheStatebuttothegovernmentalone.Suchinjurymayjustifythereplacementofthegovernmentby revolution, theoretically at the behest of the State, in a development known as direct State action. Parens Patriae guardian of the rights of the people Offensive language (low value expressions) in television may be regulatedorevenbannedforthesakeofthechildren.Justificationparenspatriae.[Sorianov.Laguardia,G.R.No. 164785, April 29, 2009]Abelligerentoccupationwouldhavenoeffectonthecontinuedeffectivityofthelawontreason.Accordingly, politicallaws,liketheConstitution,weremerelysuspended,subjecttorevivalunderthejuspostliminiumuponthe end of the occupation. Suspension of political laws affects only the civilians, and not the soldiers or enemies in arms. [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff]Also does not apply to treason [Laurel v. Misa]. Non-political laws, like the Civil Code, remain effective,unlesschangedbythebelligerentoccupant.Judicialdecisions,suchasaconvictionfordefamation,shall remain valid even after a belligerent occupation, except those of a political complexion.Right to Self-Determination right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and culturaldevelopment.Internalself-determinationapeoplespursuitofitspolitical,economic,socialandcultural development withintheframeworkof an existingstate.External self-determination-theestablishmentof asovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other politicalstatusfreelydeterminedbyapeople.Thepeoplesrighttoself-determinationshouldnot,however,be understoodasextendingtoaunilateralrightofsecession.[TheProvinceofNorthCotabatov.TheGovernmentofthe Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008] DistinguishtheIncorporationClause orDoctrineofIncorporationfromtheDoctrineofTransformation acceptedrulesof international law must first be enacted into legislation. [Note both doctrines are applicable in our jurisdiction.There is transformation when the Senate gives its concurrence to treaties.] Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties and, in turn, help the taxpayer avoidsimultaneoustaxationsintwodifferentjurisdictions." Thus,lawsandissuancesmustensurethat the reliefsgrantedundertaxtreatiesareaccordedtothepartiesentitledthereto.TheBIRmustnotimposeadditional requirementsthatwouldnegatetheavailmentofthereliefsprovidedforunderinternationalagreements.[Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013] Azygoteisahumanorganismandthatthelifeofanewhumanbeingcommencesatascientificallywell-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] Thus, the word primarily in Section 3.0I(a and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void.To uphold the validity of Section3.0I(aandG)oftheRH-IRRandprohibitonlythosecontraceptivesthathavetheprimaryeffectofbeingan abortive would effectively open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of theunbornfromconception/fertilizationinviolationofArticleII,Section12oftheConstitution.Torepeatand emphasize, in all cases, the principle of no abortion embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] Education-theacademicfreedomaccordedtoinstitutionsofhigherlearninggivesthemtherighttodecidefor themselves their aims and objectives and how best to attain them. They are given the exclusive discretion to determine whocanandcannotstudyinthem,aswellastowhomtheycanconferthehonoranddistinctionofbeingtheir graduates. This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such as the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their students. The courts may not interfere with theirexerciseofdiscretionunlessthereisaclearshowingthattheyhave arbitrarilyandcapriciouslyexercisedtheir judgment. [Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas, G.R. No. 207412, August 7, 2013] PoliticalDynasties Section26(ofArticleII)isnotself-executingduetothequalifyingphrase"asmaybedefinedby law." since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]ARTICLEVIThecommencementofthe terms andtheregular electionoflegislatorsmaybechangedbylaw.An increase in their salaries shall take effect after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. 5 Qualifications - Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 requiring candidates for senator to be certified illegal-drug free unconstitutional list of constitutional qualifications exclusive, may not be enlarged by Congress. [SocialJustice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008] Indeed,thereisnodoubtthatSection40(d)oftheLocalGovernmentCodedisqualifiesthosewithdualcitizenship from running for local elective positions. There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national. It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, orthatheacquiredAmericancitizenshipbynaturalization.ThereisnodoubtthathereacquiredhisFilipino citizenshipbytakinghisOathofAllegiancetothePhilippinesandthatherenouncedhisAmericancitizenship.Itis alsoindubitablethatafterrenouncinghisAmericancitizenship,ArnadousedhisU.S.passportatleastsixtimes.If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country". On the contrary,thisCourthas,infact,foundArnadotohavemorethanone.Nowhereinthedecisiondoesitsaythat ArnadoisnotaFilipinocitizen.Whatthedecisionmerelypoints outisthathealsopossessedanothercitizenshipat the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. [Macquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013] To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased meansthatshehasnotyetestablishedactualandphysicalresidenceinthebarangayxxxAtemporarystayina strangershousecannotamounttoresidenceApprovalofvoterregistrationdoesnotpresupposesix-month residency in the place prior to registration. [Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013] Thecriticalissue,however,pertainstoOsmeas bodilypresenceinToledoCity andthedeclarationhemadeinhis COC on this point. The petitioners claim that Osmea was only seen in Toledo City in the month of September 2012 to conductpoliticalmeetings.TheyalsostressthatthedilapidatedpropertyinIbo,ToledoCityisnotevenownedby Osmea, and is not in keeping with the latters stature a former Senator and a member of a political clan The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.InFernandezv.HouseElectoralTribunal,weruledthatthe"factthatafewbarangayhealthworkers attestedthattheyhadfailedtoseepetitionerwhenevertheyallegedlymadetheroundsinVilladeToledoisofno moment,especiallyconsideringthattherewerewitnesses(includingpetitioner'sneighborsinVilladeToledo)that wereinturnpresentedbypetitionertoprovethathewasactuallyaresidentofVilladeToledo,intheaddresshe stated in his COC. x x x It may be that whenever these health workers do their rounds petitioner was out of the house to attend to his own employment or business." Similarly, the fact that Osmea has no registered property under his namedoesnotbeliehisactualresidenceinToledoCitybecausepropertyownershipisnot amongthequalifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that ofafriendorrelative.Touseownershipofpropertyinthedistrictasthedeterminativeindiciumofpermanenceof domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. In Perez v. COMELEC, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence tending to establish a candidates domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the position of governor Osmeas actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the presence of aplace(Ibo,ToledoCity,houseandlot)hecanactuallylivein,butalsotheaffidavitsofvariouspersonsinToledo City.OsmeassubstantialandrealinterestinestablishinghisdomicileofchoiceinToledoCityisalsosufficiently shownnotonlybytheacquisitionofadditionalpropertyintheareaandthetransferofhisvoterregistrationand headquarters,butalsohisparticipationinthecommunityssocio-civicandpoliticalactivities.Osmeahasbeen proclaimedwinnerintheelectoralcontestandhasthereforethemandateoftheelectorateBeforehistransferof residence,OsmeaalreadyhadintimateknowledgeofToledoCity,particularlyofthewhole3rdlegislativedistrict that he represented for one term. Thus, he manifests a significant level of knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of thesaidcommunity.Moreover,OsmeawonthemayoraltypositionasthechoiceofthepeopleofToledoCity. [Jalover v. de la Pena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014] TheprescriptiveperiodundertheHRETRules[fortheinstitutionofelectioncontests]doesnotapplyto disqualification cases based on citizenship. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the prescriptive period notwithstanding. BUT it is the State, through itsrepresentativesdesignatedbystatutethatmayquestiontheillegallyorinvalidlyprocuredcertificateof naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings.It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private personsinanelectioncaseinvolvingthenaturalizedcitizensdescendant.[Limkaichongv.COMELEC,G.R.Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009] Party-List Representatives - The COMELEC cannot issue implementing rules and regulations that provide an additional ground - when the nomination is withdrawn by the party - for the substitution of a party-list nominee. RA 7941 lists only 3 grounds death, disability and withdrawal by the nominee himself. [Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180443, June 22, 2010] 6 Aparty-listnomineewhochangeshissectoralaffiliationwithinthesamepartywillonlybeeligiblefornomination underthenewsectoralaffiliationifthechangehasbeeneffectedatleastsixmonthsbeforetheelections.[Amoresv. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010] For every four district representatives, there shall be one party-list representative.There is no need for legislation to createanadditionalparty-listseatwheneverfouradditionallegislativedistrictsarecreatedbylaw. Section5(2), ArticleVIofthe1987Constitutionautomaticallycreatessuchadditionalparty-listseat. [BANATv.COMELEC,G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009] Thefilling-upofallavailableparty-listseatsisnotmandatory. FourparametersinaPhilippine-styleparty-list electionsystem: [1]TwentypercentofthetotalnumberofthemembershipoftheHouseofRepresentativesisthe maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for everyfourexistinglegislativedistricts. [2]Garneringtwopercentofthetotalvotescastintheparty-listelections guaranteesaparty-listorganizationoneseat. Theguaranteedseatsshallbedistributedinafirstroundofseat allocationtopartiesreceivingatleasttwopercentofthetotalparty-listvotes.[3]Theadditionalseats,thatis,the remainingseatsafterallocationoftheguaranteed seats,shallbedistributedtotheparty-listorganizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it appliestotheallocationoftheadditionalseatsisnowunconstitutionalbecausethisthresholdmathematicallyand physicallypreventsthefillingupoftheavailableparty-listseats. Theadditionalseatsshallbedistributedtothe parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009asclarifiedinthisResolution. (Two-StepProcedure-Thepercentageofvotesgarneredbyeachparty-list candidateisarrivedatbydividingthenumberofvotesgarneredbyeachpartyby15,950,900,thetotalnumberof votes cast for party-list candidates.There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under theParty-ListSystemandthe17guaranteedseatsofthetwo-percenters. Thewholeintegeroftheproductofthe percentageandoftheremainingavailableseatscorrespondstoapartysshareintheremainingavailableseats.Second,weassignoneparty-listseattoeachofthepartiesnextinrankuntilallavailableseatsarecompletely distributed.We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.) [4] The three-seat cap is constitutional.The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system.[BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009]Parametersforparty-listregistration:1.Threedifferentgroupsmayparticipateintheparty-listsystem:(1)national partiesororganizations,(2)regionalpartiesororganizations,and(3)sectoralpartiesororganizations.2.National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not needtorepresentanymarginalizedandunderrepresentedsector.3.Politicalpartiescanparticipateinparty-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing isbyitselfanindependentsectoralparty,andislinkedtoapoliticalpartythroughacoalition.4.Sectoralpartiesor organizationsmayeitherbemarginalizedandunderrepresentedorlackinginwell-definedpolitical constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous culturalcommunities,handicapped,veterans,andoverseasworkers.Thesectorsthatlackwell-definedpolitical constituenciesincludeprofessionals,theelderly,women,andtheyouth.5.Amajorityofthemembersofsectoral partiesororganizationsthatrepresentthemarginalizedandunderrepresentedmustbelongtothemarginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties ororganizations thatlackwell-definedpoliticalconstituenciesmustbelongtothesectortheyrepresent.Thenomineesofsectoral partiesororganizationsthatrepresentthemarginalizedandunderrepresented,orthatrepresentthosewholack well-definedpoliticalconstituencies,eithermustbelongtotheirrespectivesectors,ormusthave atrackrecordof advocacyfortheirrespectivesectors.Thenomineesofnationalandregionalpartiesororganizationsmustbebona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualifiedifsomeoftheirnomineesaredisqualified,providedthattheyhaveatleastonenomineewhoremains qualified. [Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013]ThereisnoarguingthattheCOMELECResolutiondatedJanuary5,2010grantingLPGMAsregistrationhassince become final. Such finality, however, pertains only to the Resolution itself and not to the accreditationof LPGMA as a party-listorganizationTheResolutiondidnotcreateinLPGMAsfavoraperpetualandindefeasiblerighttoits accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEConthequalificationsofthegroup.Boththeaccreditationandthefactssubstantiatingthesamecanbe reviewed and revoked at any time by the COMELEC, motu propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for cancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. [Dayao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193643] 7 There are two kinds of congressmen elected from legislative districts and those elected through the party-list system. Onceelected,theparty-listrepresentativehasthesamerights,privilegesanddutiesasthedistrictrepresentative. Theyarealsosubjecttothesametermlimitationofthreeyearsforamaximumofthreeconsecutiveterms.The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office. [Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010] Noonehasavestedrighttoanypublic office,muchlessavestedright to anexpectancy ofholdingapublic office." UnderSection2(5),ArticleIX-CoftheConstitution,theCOMELECisentrustedwiththefunctionto"register,after sufficientpublication,politicalparties,organizations,orcoalitionswhich,inadditiontootherrequirements,must present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the COMELEC is duty-bound to review thegrantofregistrationtoparties,organizations,orcoalitionsalreadyregisteredinordertoensurethelatters continuousadherencetotherequirementsprescribedbylawandtherelevantrulingsofthisCourtrelativetotheir qualificationsandeligibilitytoparticipateinparty-listelections.TheArquizaGroupcannot,therefore,objecttothe retroactiveapplicationofCOMELECResolutionNo.9366onthegroundoftheimpairmentofSENIORCITIZENS vestedright.Bethatasitmay,evenifCOMELECResolutionNo.9366expresslyprovidedforitsretroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS. The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreementamongthenomineesofSENIORCITIZENS,wasnotimplementedIndubitably,iftheterm-sharing agreementwasnotactuallyimplementedbythepartiesthereto,itappearsthatSENIORCITIZENS,asaparty-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELECEn Banc. [Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013] Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list group already registered "need not register anew" for purposes of every subsequent election, but only needs to file a manifestation of intent to participate with the COMELEC. [COCOFED v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013; Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013] ThefactthatCOCOFEDdidnotobtainsufficientnumberofvotesintheelectionsdoesnotaffecttheissueofthe validity of the COMELECs registration. [COCOFED v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013] Apartyisnotallowedtosimplyrefusetosubmitalistcontaining"notlessthanfivenominees"andconsiderthe deficiency as a waiver on its part. [COCOFED v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013; Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013] Sectoralpartiesororganizations,suchasABANGLINGKOD,arenolongerrequiredtoadduceevidenceshowing theirtrackrecord,i.e.proofofactivitiesthattheyhaveundertakentofurtherthecauseofthesectortheyrepresent. Indeed,itisenoughthattheirprincipaladvocacypertainstothespecialinterestandconcernsoftheirsector evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only required from nomineesofsectoralpartiesororganizationsthatrepresentthemarginalizedandunderrepresentedwhodonot factuallybelongtothesectorrepresentedbytheirpartyororganization.[AbangLingkodParty-Listv.Commissionon Elections, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013] Legislative Districts Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrivedastogiveanunfairadvantagetothepartyinpower.TheConstitutionproscribesgerrymandering,asit mandateseachlegislativedistricttocomprise,asfaraspracticable,acontiguous,compactandadjacentterritory.[Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010]The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. [Herrera v. COMELEC ]Each additional legislative district in a city need not have250,000inhabitantsprovidedthattheinitialororiginaldistrictformedinsaidcityhad,atthetimeofits establishment,apopulationof250,000.[Marianov.COMELEC]CongressmaynotauthorizetheARMMtocreate provincesandcitiesbecausethepowertocreatetheminherentlyinvolvesthepowertocreatealegislativedistrict, whichonlyCongresspossesses.TheARMMmay,however,beauthorizedbylawtocreatemunicipalitiesand barangays. [Sema v. COMELEC , G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008] A proposed province composed of one or more islands need not comply with the 2,000 square meter contiguous territory requirement under the Local Government Code, as provided for under the exemptions in the IRR of the LGC. [Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011] Section 5(3) of theConstitutionrequires a 250,000 minimumpopulation onlyforacity tobeentitledtoarepresentative,but notsoforaprovince.The250,000inhabitantsrequirementdoesnotapplytocreationofadditionallegislative districtsforaprovince.[Aquinov.COMELEC,G.R.No.189793,April7,2010]AlawispasseddividingCagayande OroCityintotwolegislativedistricts.NoneedforaplebisciteunderArticleX,Section10,becausetheterritory remains a single unit. [Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008]Inhibitions - allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before another office ofgovernmentrenders themsusceptibletotakingundueadvantageoftheirownofficeinsofar asitspost-8 enactmentfeaturesdilutecongressionaloversightandviolateSection14,ArticleVIofthe1987Constitution,thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Legislative power - appropriation, taxation, expropriation- not exclusive to Congress initiative and referendum may be exercised directly by the people RA 6735 includes the power to amend or repeal laws. Theactsdoneby Congresspurportedlyinthe exerciseofitsoversightpowersmaybedividedintothreecategories, namely:scrutiny-todetermineeconomyandefficiencyoftheoperationofgovernmentactivities;investigation underSection21;andsupervision(orlegislativeveto)whichconnotesacontinuingandinformedawarenessonthe partofacongressionalcommitteeregardingexecutiveoperationsinagivenadministrativearea.Whileboth congressionalscrutinyandinvestigationinvolveinquiryintopastexecutivebranchactionsinordertoinfluence futureexecutivebranchperformance,congressionalsupervisionallowsCongresstoscrutinizetheexerciseof delegatedlaw-makingauthority,andpermitsCongresstoretainpartofthatdelegatedauthority.xxx.The requirementthattheimplementingrulesofalawbesubjectedtoapprovalbyCongressasaconditionfortheir effectivityviolatesthecardinalconstitutionalprinciplesofbicameralismandtheruleonpresentment.Everybill passedbyCongressmustbepresentedtothePresidentforapprovalorveto.Intheabsenceofpresentmenttothe President,nobillpassedbyCongresscanbecomealaw.(Theso-calledruleonpresentmentpertainstothe submission of a bill to the President for his appropriate action. [VI, 27 (1)) [Abakada Guro Party List V. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008; Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. 157013, July 10, 2003]The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative springs from its authority to defineandprescribepunishmentforcrimes. [Quartov.theHonorableOmbudsmanSimeonMarcelo,G.R.No.169042, October 5, 2011]The supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.9054provides:ConsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheConstitution,thisOrganicActmaybere-amendedor revisedbytheCongressofthePhilippinesuponavoteoftwo-thirds(2/3)oftheMembersoftheHouseof RepresentativesandoftheSenatevotingseparately.]isunconstitutionalforviolatingtheprinciplethatCongress cannot pass irrepealable laws. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012] We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM duringthe2008-2011termasanoptionthatCongresscouldhavechosenbecauseaholdoverviolatesSection8, Article X of the Constitution the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the ConstitutionandcannotbeextendedbyholdoverbyCongressIfitwillbeclaimedthattheholdoverperiodis effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupantforthenewterm.Thisviewliketheextensionoftheelectivetermisconstitutionallyinfirmbecause Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbentsCongress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the newterm.ThisiseffectivelyanactofappointmentbyCongressandanunconstitutionalintrusionintothe constitutional appointment power of the President. [Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005; Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines,G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011] ThePresident,CongressandtheCourtcannotcreatedirectlyfranchisesfortheoperationofapublicutilitythatare exclusive in character. [Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution]Non-legislativepowersofCongresscanvassofpresidentialelections[VII,5];declarationof existence ofastate ofwar [VII,23(2)];resolutionofconflictsbetweenthePresidentandamajorityofhisCabinetregardinghisabilityto dischargehisfunctions[VII,11]confirmationofamnesties[VII,19],andofpresidentialappointments[VII,16]; amendment or revision of the Constitution [XVII]; and impeachment [XI]. Nature of Congress - Congress is not a continuing body.[League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008] The Senate as an institution is continuing, as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members.However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it.Accordingly, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress areconsideredterminatedupontheexpirationofthatCongressanditismerelyoptionalontheSenateofthe succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time.[Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008] BUT NOTE Arnault v. Nazareno the Senate is a continuing body for purposes of its power of contempt. ElectoralTribunals-TheresolutionofelectoralcontestsasessentiallyanexerciseofjudicialpowerAtthehigher levelscity,provincial,andregional,aswellascongressionalandsenatorialexclusiveandoriginaljurisdictionis lodgedinthe COMELECandintheHouseofRepresentatives andSenateElectoralTribunals,whicharenot,strictly 9 and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals)oftheConstitution.Besides,whentheCOMELEC,theHRET,andtheSETdecideelectioncontests,their decisionsarestillsubjecttojudicialreviewviaapetitionforcertiorarifiledbytheproperpartyifthereisa showingthatthedecisionwasrenderedwithgraveabuseofdiscretiontantamounttolackorexcessofjurisdiction.[Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011] ElectoralTribunalsshallbethesolejudgesofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returnsandqualificationsoftheir respective Members. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) a valid proclamation, (b) a proper oath, and (c) assumption of office. A proper oath isonetakenbefore theSpeakerof theHouse ofRepresentatives inopensession,consistentwith theprovisionsof Section 6 of Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives.[Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013] Considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives, as she has in facttakenheroathandassumedofficepastnoontimeofJune30,2013,theCourtisnowwithoutjurisdictionto resolve the case at bar the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina ashereindiscussedarematterswhichfallunderthescopeoftheterms"election"and"returns"asabove-statedand hence,properlyfallundertheHRETssolejurisdiction.[Tanadav.CommissiononElections,G.R.Nos.207199-200, October 22, 2013] Theterm"election"referstotheconductofthepolls,includingthelistingofvoters,theholdingoftheelectoral campaign,andthecastingandcountingofthevotes;"returns"referstothecanvassofthereturnsandthe proclamationofthewinners,includingquestionsconcerningthecompositionoftheboardofcanvassersandthe authenticityoftheelectionreturns;and"qualifications"referstomattersthatcouldberaisedinaquowarranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC. [Barbers v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165691, June 22, 2005, 460 SCRA 569]CommissiononAppointments-shallrulebyamajorityofallitsMembersThePresidentmaynotbecompelledto submithisactingappointmentstotheCAforconfirmation.[Pimentelv.Ermita]Adinterimappointments,which arepermanentappointments[Matibagv.Benipayo],shallremaineffectiveonlyuntildisapprovalbytheCommission on Appointments or until the adjournment of the next special or regular session of Congress. [Guevarra v. Inocentes] In aspecialsession,theCongressmayconsidergenerallegislationoronlysuchsubjectsasthePresidentmay designate.Inaregularsession,thepoweroftheCongressisnotcircumscribedexceptbylimitationsimposedby organic law. [Araneta v. Dinglasan] LegislativeInquiries-Section 21 relates tothepowertoconductinquiriesinaidoflegislation.Itsaimistoelicit informationthatmaybeusedforlegislation.Ontheotherhand,Section22pertainstothepowertoconducta questionhour,theobjectiveofwhichistoobtaininformationinpursuitofCongressoversightfunction.Simply stated,whilebothpowersallowCongressoranyofitscommitteestoconductinquiry,theirobjectivesare different.[Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008] TheSenatecannotbeallowedtocontinuewiththeconductofthequestionedlegislativeinquirywithoutduly publishedrulesofprocedure.Newsessionrequiresanewpublicationofrule,unlesssaidruleswouldprovidethat theyshallcontinuetobeeffectiveunlesschangedbyasubsequentCongress. [Garcillanov.HouseofRepresentatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008] Executiveprivilegewithrespect to theprivilegefor diplomaticnegotiationsmaybeinvokednotonly againstcitizens demands for information, but also in the context of legislative investigations. [AKBAYAN v. Aquino,G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008] The subject of a legislative inquiry is a political question. [De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009]Appropriations - an item of appropriation as "an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose."An "item" is indivisible because the amount cannot be dividedfor any purpose other than the specific purpose stated in the item. [Footnote 211,Belgicav.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No.208566,November19,2013]Anitemofan appropriationbill obviouslymeansanitemwhich,initself,isaspecificappropriationofmoney,notsomegeneralprovisionoflaw which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.A General Appropriations Act contains an estimate of revenues and funding sources, which are usually (1) taxes, (2) capitalrevenues(likeproceedsfromthesalesofassets),(3)grants,(4)extraordinaryincome(likedividendsof governmentcorporations)and(5)borrowings.Unprogrammedfundsariseorexistwhentheestimatedrevenuesare exceededbyactualreceipts,e.g.,unexpectedlargedividendsfromgovernmentinstitutionsliketheSocialSecurity System and Government Service Insurance System. Savings occur when estimated expenditures are not spent, e.g. (a) 10 thePAPs(projects,activitiesorprograms)forwhichtheappropriationhadbeenauthorizedwascompleted,finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; or (c) the required orplannedtargets,programsandserviceswererealizedatalessercostbecauseoftheimplementationofmeasures resultinginimprovedsystemsandefficiencies.Theactorpracticeoftransferringfundspriortotheendofthe fiscal year, which did not meet any of those three instances, is unconstitutional.[Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014] AnappropriationmadebylawunderthecontemplationofSection29(1),ArticleVIofthe1987Constitutionexists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutionalprovisionpreciselybecauseitcontainspost-enactmentmeasureswhicheffectivelycreateasystemof intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement andsincetheyaremadebyindividuallegislatorsaftertheGAAispassed,theyoccuroutsidethelawthereal appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. ..the2013PDAFArticledoesnotconstitutean"appropriationmadebylaw"sinceit,initstruestsense,only authorizesindividuallegislatorstoappropriateinviolationofthenon-delegabilityprinciple.[Belgicav.Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Enrolled Bills - That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill doesnotdetractfromitsvalidity ThisCourthassubscribedtotheconclusivenessofanenrolledbilltorefuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and wasmerelyinsertedbythebicameralconferencecommitteeofbothHouses.[CentralBankEmployeesAssociationv. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004] Log-rollinglegislation-referstotheprocessinwhichseveralprovisionssupportedbyanindividuallegislatoror minority of legislators are combined into a single piece of legislation supported by a majority of legislators on a quid proquobasis:nooneprovisionmaycommandmajoritysupport,butthetotalpackagewill.[Belgicav.Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] Instances when vote needs to be recorded at the request of 1/5 [16, 4], vote on third reading [26, 2], overriding vote in case of veto [27, 1], HR impeachment vote [XI, 3, 3]. Presidential certification [economic emergency] does away with the requirements of three readings on separate days and distribution of final copies three days before enactment. [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] NoteArticleVII,Section10simultaneousvacanciesintheofficesofthePresidentandtheVice-President- Thebill callingsuchspecialelectionshallbedeemedcertifiedunderparagraph2,Section26,ArticleV1ofthisConstitution andshallbecomelawuponitsapprovalonthirdreadingbytheCongress.Nospecialelectionshallbecalledifthe vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.TheRHLawdoesnotviolatetheonesubject/onebillruleatextualanalysisofthevariousprovisionsofthelaw showsthatboth"reproductivehealth"and"responsibleparenthood"areinterrelatedandgermanetotheoverriding objectivetocontrolthepopulationgrowthConsideringthecloseintimacybetween"reproductivehealth"and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014] AlthoughnotprovidedforintheConstitution,Congresshasestablishedtheso-calledConferenceCommittee, composedofrepresentativesfromtheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentatives,whichisamechanismfor compromising differences between their respective versions of a bill or joint resolution. It has been ruled that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill and whatever changes may be agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not undergo another three readings in the Senate and the House of Representatives. [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] Partial veto general rule approve entirely or disapprove in toto, except with respect to appropriations bills. Incontrast,what beckonsconstitutionalinfirmity areappropriations whichmerelyprovidefor asingularlump-sum amounttobetappedasasourceoffundingformultiplepurposes.Sincesuchappropriationtypenecessitatesthe furtherdeterminationofboththeactualamounttobeexpendedandtheactualpurposeoftheappropriationwhich must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto.As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if 11 he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be theobjectoftheveto.Anitem,asdefinedinthefieldofappropriations,pertainsto"theparticulars,thedetails,the distinctandseverablepartsoftheappropriationorofthebill."Further,itissignificanttopointoutthatanitemof appropriationmustbeanitemcharacterizedbysingularcorrespondencemeaninganallocationofaspecified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] PowerofTaxation-Sincebuildingpermitfeesarenotchargesonproperty,theyarenotimpositionsfromwhich petitioner is exempt.[Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles, G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012]Double taxation - petitioner should not have been subjected to taxes under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code for the fourth quarter of 2001, considering that it had already been paying local business tax under Section 14 of the same ordinance. [Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of Manila, G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013] InititativesAnyproposaltoenactlawsorapproveorrejectanyactorlaworpartthereofpassedbytheCongress shall be valid only if ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than forty-five daysbutnotlaterthanninetydaysafterthecertificationbytheCommissiononElectionsofthesufficiencyofthe petition. ARTICLEVIIThePresidentisgrantedOrdinancePowersunderChapter2,BookIIIofExecutiveOrderNo.292 (AdministrativeCodeof1987)andmayissueanyofthefollowing:xxxSec.2. ExecutiveOrders.Actsofthe President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutorypowersshallbepromulgatedinexecutiveorders.Sec.3. AdministrativeOrders.ActsofthePresident which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4.Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is madetodepend,shallbepromulgatedinproclamationswhichshallhavetheforceofanexecutiveorder.Sec.5.MemorandumOrders.ActsofthePresidentonmattersofadministrativedetailorofsubordinateortemporary interestwhichonlyconcernaparticularofficerorofficeoftheGovernmentshallbeembodiedinmemorandum orders.Sec.6. MemorandumCirculars.ActsofthePresidentonmattersrelatingtointernaladministration,which thePresidentdesirestobringtotheattentionofallorsomeofthedepartments,agencies,bureausorofficesofthe Government,forinformationorcompliance,shallbeembodiedinmemorandumcirculars.Sec.7. GeneralorSpecial Orders.ActsandcommandsofthePresidentinhiscapacityasCommander-in-ChiefoftheArmedForcesofthe Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders. ThePresidentmaynotinvokeSection17ofArticleXII,whichwouldauthorizeherduringtheemergencyto temporarilytakeoverordirecttheoperationofanyprivatelyownedpublicutilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublic interestwithoutauthorityfromCongress. BUTthePresidentalonecandeclareastateofnationalemergency; however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. [David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006] A verbal pronouncement to the effect that E.O. No. 304 is suspended should not have been given weight. An executive orderisvalidwhenitisnotcontrarytothelaworConstitution.[CivilCode,Article7][RepublicofthePhilippinesv. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013] Wehaveheldthatanadministrativeregulationadoptedpursuanttolawhastheforceandeffectoflaw.(Spouses Almedav.CourtofAppeals,326Phil.309)Thus,therules,guidelinesandpoliciesregardingtheOrderofNational ArtistsjointlyissuedbytheCCPBoardofTrusteesandtheNCCApursuanttotheirrespectivestatutorymandates havetheforceandeffectoflaw.Untilsetaside,theyarebindinguponexecutiveandadministrativeagencies, including the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws. [Almario v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013] ExecutivePower-Clearly,theabolitionofthePAGCandthetransferofitsfunctionstoadivisionspeciallycreated withintheODESLAisproperlywithintheprerogativeofthePresidentunderhiscontinuing"delegatedlegislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292. [Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012] As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence While the President does not possess constituent powers as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the peoplethroughinitiativeandreferendumshemaysubmitproposalsforconstitutionalchangetoCongressina 12 mannerthatdoesnotinvolvethearrogationofconstituentpowers.ItwillbeobservedthatthePresidenthas authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution.Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. [TheProvinceofNorthCotabatov.TheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesPeacePanelonAncestral Domain, GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008] ExecutivePrivilege-ThePresidentsexecutiveprivilegecoversallpresidentialcommunications.[AKBAYANv. Aquino,G.R.No.170516,July16,2008]However,theprivilegeaccordedtopresidentialcommunicationsisnot absolute,onesignificantqualificationbeingthattheExecutivecannot,anymorethantheotherbranchesof government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the propergovernmentalinstitutionsintopossiblecriminalwrongdoing. Thisqualificationapplieswhetherthe privilegeisbeinginvokedinthecontextofajudicialtrialoracongressionalinvestigationconductedinaidof legislation. Executiveprivilege,whichincludesconversationsandcorrespondencebetweenthePresidentandthepublicofficial covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9. 002); military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998); information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusionoftreatiesandexecutiveagreements(Chavezv.PresidentialCommissiononGoodGovernment,G.R.No. 130716,December9,1998);discussioninclose-doorCabinetmeetings(Chavezv.PresidentialCommissiononGood Government,G.R.No.130716, December9,1998); andmattersaffectingnationalsecurityandpublicorder(Chavez v. PublicEstatesAuthority,G.R.No.133250,July9,2002),MAYBEINVOKEDagainstthislegislativepower.BUTnote thatexecutiveofficialsarenotexemptbythemerefactthattheyaredepartmentheads. Onlyoneexecutiveofficial maybeexemptedfromthispowerthePresidenton whom executivepowerisvested,hence,beyondthereach of Congressexceptthroughthepowerofimpeachment.Aclaimofprivilege,beingaclaimofexemptionfroman obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted, and not merely implied.In light of this highly exceptionalnatureoftheprivilege,theCourtfindsitessentialtolimittothePresidentthepowertoinvokethe privilege.She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the ExecutiveSecretarymuststatethattheauthorityisByorderofthePresident,whichmeansthathepersonally consulted with her.The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executivehierarchy. Inotherwords,thePresidentmaynotauthorizehersubordinatestoexercisesuchpower. [3] Thatatypeofinformationisrecognizedasprivilegeddoesnot,however,necessarilymeanthatitwouldbe considered privileged in all instances.For indetermining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.[Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public[1] Secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or ofthepressnorofthefreedomofaccesstoinformation. [PeoplesMovement forPressFreedom(PMPF)v.Manglapus] Informationoninter-governmentexchangespriortotheconclusionoftreatiesandexecutiveagreementsmaybe subjecttoreasonablesafeguardsforthesakeofnationalinterest.[Chavezv.PCGG]Diplomaticnegotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception.It bears emphasis; however, that such privilege is only presumptive.[2] Informers Privilege - the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with theenforcementofthatlaw. [3]Privilegeaccordedtopresidentialcommunications,whicharepresumedprivileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,LegislativeandJudicialpower.Itbearsemphasis,however,thattheprivilegeaccordedtopresidential communicationsisnotabsolute,onesignificantqualificationbeingthattheExecutivecannot,anymorethanthe otherbranchesofgovernment,invokeageneralconfidentialityprivilegetoshielditsofficialsandemployeesfrom investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. This qualification applies whethertheprivilegeis beinginvokedinthecontextofa judicialtrialoracongressionalinvestigationconductedin aidoflegislation.[4]DeliberativeProcessPrivilege-coversdocumentsreflectingadvisoryopinions,recommendations anddeliberationscomprisingpartofaprocessbywhichgovernmentaldecisionsandpoliciesareformulated.Notably,theprivilegedstatusofsuchdocumentsrests,notontheneedtoprotectnationalsecuritybut,onthe obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news, the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions. The so-calleddeliberativeprocessprivilegereferstothedecision-makingofexecutiveofficials.[AKBAYANv.Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008] Presidential Communications Privilege applies to decision-making of the President; rooted in the constitutional principle of separationofpowerandthePresidentsuniqueconstitutionalrole.Theelementsofpresidentialcommunications 13 privilegeare-1)Theprotectedcommunicationmustrelatetoaquintessential andnon-delegablepresidential power. 2)The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the Presidenthimself. ThejudicialtestisthatanadvisormustbeinoperationalproximitywiththePresident.The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,suchthattheinformationsoughtlikelycontainsimportantevidenceandbytheunavailabilityofthe information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.Deliberative Process Privilege applies to decision-making of executive officials; based on common law privilege.Unlikethedeliberativeprocessprivilege,thepresidentialcommunicationsprivilegeappliestodocumentsintheir entirety,andcoversfinalandpost-decisionalmaterialsaswellaspre-deliberativeones Asaconsequence, congressionalorjudicialnegationofthepresidentialcommunicationsprivilegeisalwayssubjecttogreaterscrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege.[Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officer, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008] Power of Appointment - In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317] this Court explained that the prohibition contained in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary function of said official's office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or tobeinpossessionandadministration,whichimpliesnothinglessthantheactualdischargeofthefunctionsand duties of the office. [Funa v. Ermita, G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010] The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutionalandvoidforbeinginviolationoftheconstitutionalprohibitionunderSection13,ArticleVIIofthe 1987 Constitution It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was notin anexofficiocapacity,by whichhe wouldhavebeenvalidlyauthorizedtoconcurrentlyholdthetwopositions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other. [Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013] A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointiveoffice,andwhoseappointmentisvalidonitsface.Hemayalsobe onewhoisinpossessionofan office, andisdischargingitsdutiesundercolorofauthority,bywhichismeantauthorityderivedfromanappointment, howeverirregularorinformal,sothattheincumbentisnotamerevolunteer.Consequently,the actsofthedefacto officerarejustasvalidforallpurposesasthoseofadejureofficer,insofarasthepublicorthirdpersonswhoare interested therein are concerned. In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as ade facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect thesanctityofthedealingsbythepublicwithpersonswhoseostensibleauthorityemanatesfromtheState.Agras officialactionscoveredbythisclarificationextendtobutarenotlimitedtothepromulgationofresolutionson petitionsforreviewfiledintheDepartmentofJustice,andtheissuanceofdepartmentorders,memorandaand circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal cases. [Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013] AssumingthatGaitewasadefactoofficeroftheOfficeofthePresidentafterhisappointmenttotheSecuritiesand ExchangeCommission,anydecisionherendersduringthistimeispresumedtobevalid,binding,andeffective. [Espiritu v. del Rosario, G.R. No. 204964, October 15, 2014] Section15[ofArticleVII,onprohibitedormidnightappointments]doesnotapplytotheJudiciary.Underthe Constitution,itismandatoryfortheJBCtosubmittothePresidentthelistofnomineestofillavacancyinthe Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. [De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010] Confirmationisrequiredonlyfortheheadsoftheexecutivedepartments,ambassadors,otherpublicministersand consuls,orofficersofthearmedforcesfromtherankofcolonelornavalcaptain,andotherofficerswhose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. [Sarmiento v. Mison] Commissioner of Human Rights not subject toconfirmation;notincludedinthefirstsentence.[Bautistav.Salonga]NLRCcommissionersdonotrequire confirmation. [Calderon v. Carale] Constitutional Commissioners require confirmation. Members of the Judiciary do not requireconfirmation,onlyJBCnomination.JudicialandBarCouncil[regularmembers]requireconfirmation. Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmendo not require confirmation, just JBC nomination.The Vice-President, when appointed to the Cabinet, requires no confirmation. 14 NowthatthePhilippineCoastGuardisundertheDOTCandnolongerpartofthePhilippineNavyortheArmed ForcesofthePhilippines,thepromotionsandappointmentsofrespondentofficersofthePCG,oranyPCGofficer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. [Soriano III v. Lista, G.R. 153881, March 24, 2003] GiventhatthePresidentderiveshispowertoappointOICsintheARMMregionalgovernmentfromlaw,itfalls undertheclassificationofpresidential appointmentscoveredby thesecondsentenceofSection 16, ArticleVIIofthe Constitution;thePresidentsappointmentpowerthusrestsonclearconstitutionalbasis. [DatuMichaelAbasKida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012] The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions,violatesSection16,ArticleXoftheConstitution,whichmerelygrantsthePresidentthepowerof supervisionoverautonomousregionsThereisnoincompatibilitybetweenthePresidentspowerofsupervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President hasthepowertorecalltheappointmentshealreadymade.Clearly,thepetitionersfearsinthisregardaremore apparent than real. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012] Thepowergrantedto thePresident,viaRANo.10153,to appointmembersoftheRegionalLegislativeAssemblyis comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook). [Section 35. Filling ofvacancy. - Pending an election to fill a vacancy arising from any cause in the Sangguniang Pampook, the vacancy shall be filled by the President, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Pampook: Provided, That the appointee shall come from the same province or sector of the member being replaced.] [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012] Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. [Cabiling v. Pabualan, G.R. Nos. L-21764 and L-21765, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 274] Generally,thepurposeforstaggeringthetermofofficeistominimizetheappointingauthoritysopportunityto appointamajorityofthemembersofacollegialbody.Italsointendedtoensurethecontinuityofthebodyandits policies. A staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants. [General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011] ThePresidentiswithoutanypowertoremoveelectedofficials,sincethepowerisexclusivelyvestedintheproper courtsasexpresslyprovidedforinthelastparagraphofSection60oftheLocalGovernmentCode.[Salalimav. Guingona, Jr.]; Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez, G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008] The authorityoftheCSCis onlytodetermine whetherornottheappointeespossess thelegalqualifications andthe appropriate eligibility, nothing else. [Lopez v. Civil Service Commission] TheCSCmaynot approveas temporaryan appointmentdesignated aspermanentbytheappointingauthority. [Luego v. Civil Service Commission] TheCSCclassifiedthepositionofGraftInvestigationOfficerIIIasbelongingtotheCareerExecutiveService; appointeetothepositionrequiredtoacquireCESeligibility[CESofficers,undertheAdministrativeCode,are appointedbythePresident].Ombudsmanchallengestheclassification,sayingthatitimpairshisappointment prerogative as guaranteed under the Constitution.SC:classification would result in absurdity [a] it would vest in the President the power to appoint an employee of the Ombudsman, in violation of the Constitution, or [b] it would include in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. The CSC may not classify a position [Graft Investigation Officer III of the Office of the Ombudsman] as belonging to the Career ExecutiveServiceandrequire anappointee theretoto acquireCESeligibility,becauseCESofficers are appointedby thePresident.ThisderogatestheappointingpoweroftheOmbudsman.ACESappointmentnoteffectedbythe PresidentiscontrarytotheprovisionsoftheAdministrativeCode.[OfficeoftheOmbudsmanv.CivilService Commission, 451 SCRA 570]An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term.[Fetalino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012] 15 InthevotingheldonJanuary28,2014,byavote of8-7,theCourt resolvedtoreverseitsSeptember 4,2012Decision insofaraspetitionerGonzalesisconcerned(G.R.No.196231).WedeclaredSection8(2)ofRANo.6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the validityofSection8(2)ofRANo.6770insofarasSulitisconcerned.TheCourtdidnotconsidertheOfficeofthe SpecialProsecutortobeconstitutionallywithintheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanandis,hence,notentitledtothe independencethelatterenjoysundertheConstitution.WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theCourtresolvesto declareSection8(2)UNCONSTITUTIONAL.ThisrulingrendersanyfurtherrulingonthedismissalofDeputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an administrativeinvestigation,ifwarranted,intothepossibleadministrativeliabilityofDeputyOmbudsmanEmilio GonzalesIIIunderpertinentCivilServicelaws,rulesandregulations.[Gonzalesv.OfficeofthePresident,G.R.No. 196231, January 28, 2014, Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration] Power of control - if a certain power or authority is vested by law upon the Department Secretary, then such power or authoritymaybeexerciseddirectlybythePresident,whoexercisessupervisionandcontroloverthedepartments. [Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328] MemorandumCircularNo.58,whichprovidesthatnoappealfromorpetitionforreviewof decisions/orders/resolutionsoftheSecretaryofJusticeonpreliminaryinvestigationsofcriminalcasesshallbe entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death,is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency.[Angeles v. Gaite, G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009] But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointmenttotheBoardbythePresident.Evidently,itwasthelaw,notthePresident,thatsatthemintheBoard. [Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo] Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may beeffectivelylimitedbytheConstitution,bylaw,orbyjudicialdecisions.Allthemoreinthematterofappellate procedureasintheinstantcase.Appealsareremedialinnature;hence,constitutionallysubjecttothisCourts rulemakingpower.TheRulesofProcedurewasissuedbytheCourtpursuanttoSection5,ArticleVIIIofthe Constitution,whichexpresslyempowerstheSupremeCourttopromulgaterulesconcerningtheprocedureinall courts. Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal totheOfficeofthePresidentfromthedecisionsofexecutivedepartmentsandagencies.UnderSection1thereof,a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No.226,explicitlyallowsforimmediatejudicialrelieffromthedecisionofrespondentBOIinvolvingpetitioners applicationforanITH.E.O.No.226isalawofspecialnatureandshouldprevailoverA.O.No.18.Inthiscase,a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filingapetitionforcertiorariwiththe"propercourt."Hence,privaterespondentshouldhaveelevatedthecase directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari. [Moran v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 192957, September 29, 2014] FaithfulExecutionofLaws-ThePresidentsdiscretionintheconfermentoftheOrderofNationalArtistsshouldbe exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. [Almario v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013] ThecreationofthePTCfindsjustificationunderSection17,ArticleVIIoftheConstitution,imposinguponthe Presidentthedutytoensurethatthelawsarefaithfullyexecuted.[Section17,ArticleVII][Biraogov.ThePhilippine Truth Commission of 2010,G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010] Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. [Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005] Commander-in-Chief-Pursuanttothedoctrineofcommandresponsibility,thePresident, astheCommander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioners rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidenceexisttoshowthatheorshehadexhibitedinvolvementinorcanbeimputedwithknowledgeofthe violations,orhadfailedtoexercisenecessaryandreasonablediligenceinconductingthenecessaryinvestigations requiredundertherules.TheCourtalsostressesthatrulethatthepresidentialimmunityfromsuitexistsonlyin concurrencewiththepresidentsincumbency.[Rodriguezv.MacapagalArroyo,G.R.No.191805,November15,2011, citing Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452] 16 It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaimmartiallaworsuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.Theyexercisethepower,notonly sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congresscanmaintainthesamebasedonitsownevaluationofthesituationontheground,apowerthatthe President does not have.Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allowCongresstoexerciseitsownreviewpowers,whichisautomaticratherthaninitiated.OnlywhenCongress defaultsinitsexpressdutytodefendtheConstitutionthroughsuchreviewshouldtheSupreme Courtstepin asits final rampart.The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. [Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012] In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines[89 Phil, 246 (1951)], this Court ruled that a court-martial case isacriminalcaseandtheGeneralCourtMartialisa"court"akintoanyothercourts.InthecaseofRamonRuffyvs. ChiefofStaffofthePhilippineArmy,43Off.Gaz.,855,wedidnotholdthattheword"court"ingeneralusedinour ConstitutiondoesnotincludeaCourt-Martial;whatweheldisthatthewords"inferiorcourts"usedinconnection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or lifeimprisonment,"asprovidedforinsection2,ArticleVIII,oftheConstitution,donotrefertoCourts-Martialor Military Courts. The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved bythereviewing authoritybeforeitcanbeexecuted(Article ofWar 46),doesnotchange or affectthecharacterofa court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed. [Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012]ThepowertoconfirmasentenceofthePresident,asCommander-in-Chief,includesthepowertoapproveor disapprovetheentireoranypartofthesentencegivenbythecourtmartial.[Garciav.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R.No. 198554, July 30, 2012] Pardoning Power - criminal and administrative remedies for violation of conditional pardon are not mutually exclusive andmaybesuccessivelyavailedofbythePresidentforthepunishmentoftheconditionalpardon. recommitment/criminalprosecutionforviolationofconditionalpardon/criminalprosecutionfornewoffenseif violation of the condition constitutes a separate criminal offense. [Culanag v. Director of Prisons] Aconditionalpardoneecommittedusurpationofpublicfunctions.Newcasedismissedforlackofwitnesses. President ordered his commitment. SC sustained saying mere commission, not conviction required for recommitment.[Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol , affirmed in Sumulong v. Gonzales] The Pardon included a preambular clause which read: WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to nolongerseekanyelectivepositionoroffice.FormerPresidentEstradawasgrantedanabsolutepardonthatfully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversyThe pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty ofreclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to formerPresidentEstradawhowasconvictedbytheSandiganbayanofplunderandimposedapenaltyofreclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, whichstatesthat"(h)eisherebyrestoredtohiscivilandpoliticalrights,"expresslyremittedtheaccessorypenalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolutedisqualificationwereexpresslyremittedtogetherwiththeprincipalpenaltyofreclusionperpetuaThe thirdpreambularclauseofthepardondidnotoperatetomakethepardonconditionalContrarytoRisos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed tonolongerseekanyelectivepositionoroffice,"neithermakesthepardonconditional,normilitateagainstthe conclusionthatformerPresidentEstradasrightstosuffrageandtoseekpublicelectiveofficehavebeenrestored Thisisespeciallytrueasthepardonitselfdoesnotexplicitlyimposeaconditionorlimitation,consideringthe unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not anessentialpartofanactasitisanintroductoryorpreparatoryclausethatexplainsthereasonsfortheenactment, usuallyintroducedbytheword"whereas."Whereasclausesdonotformpart ofastatutebecause,strictlyspeaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon. [Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015]17 Amnestycommonlydenotesageneralpardontorebelsfortheirtreasonorotherhighpoliticaloffenses,orthe forgivenesswhichonesovereigngrantstothesubjectsofanother,whohaveoffended,bysomebreach,thelawof nations.Amnestylooksbackward,andabolishesandputsintooblivion,t