AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT October 28, 2015

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei conditionally approved the implementation of the nuclear deal, likely ending domestic debate over whether Iran should reject the deal before a violation by other parties.

2. Yemeni stakeholders agreed to resume talks under UN auspices, but the conflict on the ground continues unabated. There will be an initial, separated round of talks, held in Riyadh and Muscat, before the al Houthis and the Hadi government meet for negotiations.

3. An al Shabaab religious leader based in Puntland publicly pledged allegiance to ISIS, sparking a round of internal al Shabaab arrests as the group attempts to limit ISIS’s influence in Somalia.

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ASSESSMENT:

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al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, released the second issue of its English-language magazine, al Risalah (Dispatch), which focuses on preparing fighters physically, mentally, and spiritually. An Australian soldier who disappeared in 2001 revealed that he has been an al Qaeda member for 14 years and is working with al Qaeda central with Jabhat al Nusra.Al Qaeda groups continue to release statements contesting the legitimacy of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Abu Qatada, an al Qaeda-linked cleric deported to Jordan from the UK and then cleared of charges, wrote of Islam’s future dominance, destroying the “state of the Jews.” Abu Qatada also strongly condemned Shi’a Muslims. The release of al Risalah is similar to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) English-language magazine, Inspire. Both AQAP and Jabhat al Nusra are contesting the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s narrative.

Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to contest ISIS’s legitimacy based on ISIS’s actions and how it self-declared itself to be the Islamic Caliphate.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesMilitants targeted Shi’a Muslims during Muharram-related events in different parts of Pakistan. A suicide bomber killed at least 11 people during an attack on a Shi’a mosque in Balochistan on October 22, 2015. There has not been a claim of responsibility for the attack. Separately, a Lashkar-e-Jhangvi suicide bomber killed at least 22 people and wounded at least 40 others during an attack on a Muharram procession in Jacobabad, Sindh on October 23, 2015.

The Pakistani military continued its ground and air operations in the Shawal Valley area of North Waziristan. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the Pakistani military’s offensive in North Waziristan, is in its final phase.

Outlook: The Pakistani military will continue Operation Zarb-e-Azb to eliminate militancy in the tribal areas of North Waziristan.

AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalThe UN announced plans for multi-phase negotiations to resolve the Yemen conflict. Initial meetings will not include direct talks between President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthis due to the “deep lack of trust” between the parties. A spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition said that a ceasefire would be “premature” at this time. International pressure for a negotiated political solution in Yemen continues to rise as humanitarian conditions worsen.

Outlook: The Hadi government remains tied to the objectives of its coalition allies and is unlikely to abandon its redlines in negotiations. The Saudi-led coalition will continue to pursue a military solution on the ground.

SecurityThe frontlines in central Yemen remain fixed. The fight for Taiz governorate has stalled as anti-al Houthi forces attempt to retake Taiz city from the al Houthis, who are blockading the city. Coalition-backed forces shelled al Houthi positions in Ma’rib and advanced toward al Houthi positions in al Jawf. Coalition airstrikes continue to target al Houthi military sites in northern and central Yemen, and a coalition airstrike reportedly hit a Doctors Without Borders hospital in Sa’ada, an al Houthi stronghold.

Outlook: Coalition airstrikes will continue in an attempt to break the stalemate, incurring more civilian casualties. The humanitarian situation in central Yemen will continue to deteriorate.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP and ISIS continue to expand their operational capabilities throughout Yemen, especially in Aden. AQAP conducted seven operations against al Houthis in Sana’a and al Bayda. AQAP militants are visibly present in Aden’s Tawahi district. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan detonated a suicide bomb at an Aden checkpoint and distributed flyers at Aden University enforcing gender segregation and prayer.

Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to threaten the Yemeni government’s control over Aden. ISIS’s expanded presence in Aden may lead to direct competition with AQAP for territory and recruits.

YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF

ADEN

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1) OCT 22: Al Houthis clashed with Saudi border forces near Munabbih, Sa’ada.2) OCT 23-24: Ansar al Sharia attacked al Houthis in al Bayda.3) OCT 25: Anti-al Houthi forces attacked the presidential compound in Taiz.4) OCT 26: ISIS Wilayat Sana’a detonated an IED in Sana’a.5) OCT 26: ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan detonated a suicide bomb at a popular resistance checkpoint in Aden.

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Somalia Federal Government (SFG) announced that a new federal state would be formed in Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions in central Somalia before the end of the year. The federal state formation process has been controversial as Somali factions jostle for influence in new, federally recognized administrations. There is political unrest in the breakaway region of Somaliland, where the president named a new ruling party chair and pushed through a controversial fuel depot privatization act.

Outlook: Somaliland will likely face a short-term increase in violence and political instability.

Security Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces continue to combat al Shabaab militants throughout central and southern Somalia. Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) and Jubbaland State forces continue to focus on eradicating al Shabaab in the country’s south, with a goal of liberating the Baijuni Islands, as well as Jilib, al Shabaab’s stronghold in the Lower Shabelle region. Kenya is on alert after security forces received information suggesting al Shabaab is planning an attack in Nairobi. Security officials believe militant mobility, particularly across borders, is high as the East Africa region experiences heavy rainfall.

Outlook: Heavy rains in Southern Somalia will likely delay the advances of KDF and Jubbaland State forces as they are largely restricted to tarmacked roads, limiting their mobility and making their movements more predictable by al Shabaab.

Al ShabaabIdeological divisions within al Shabaab are becoming more visible as Abdul Qadir Mumin, one of al Shabaab’s religious leaders from a cell in Puntland, posted a video pledging allegiance to ISIS. Conservative estimates say that around 20 militants affiliated with Mumin pledged as well. Days later, two mid-level al Shabaab members were arrested by the group after reportedly communicating with Mumin. Al Shabaab’s core leadership has yet to comment on the recent developments.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely be forced to increase its crack downs on pro-ISIS members in the group.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

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1) 22-25 OCT: KDF and Jubbaland forces fought al Shabaab under Operation “Jubba Corridor” in Yantooy and the Bajuni Islands, Lower Jubba region.2) 25 OCT: Al Shabaab arrested two members in Middle Jubba region. 3) 24-25 OCT: SNA forces clashed with al Shabaab near Dinsor, Bay region.4) 20 OCT: SNA and AMISOM forces clashed with al Shabaab in El Gorof area, Galgudud region.

ASSESSMENT:

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PoliticalBoth the Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Tripoli-based Libyan General National Congress (GNC) are still open to negotiating terms for a national unity government, despite the HoR’s dismissal of the UN-proposed reconciliation accord. Early reports suggest that the HoR and GNC have opened official communication channels for the first time since July 2014.

Outlook: The GNC and the HoR will continue to seek a negotiated settlement, but representatives remain under pressure from commanders on the ground to maintain certain positions that have created an impasse.

SecurityGNC-aligned Libya Dawn forces launched a multi-pronged assault on HoR-aligned Libyan National Army (LNA) positions around Sabrata, Libya, and later seized several towns along the Western Libyan coast, reducing recent LNA gains. Libya Dawn’s offensive and the LNA’s retreat to Wattiya Air Force Base will ensure GNC regional control around Tripoli, Libya.

Outlook: Libya Dawn will consolidate its gains around Sabrata and will begin preparing to apply greater pressure on LNA positions near Wattiya Air Force Base in Western Libya in order to limit the LNA’s ability to reestablish its previous outposts.

Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in LibyaISIS’s newly instituted shari’a court has implemented a variety of changes that continue to develop local governance. These changes include mandatory weekly military service for students in high school, an expanding list of capital offenses, and property confiscation. ISIS conducted a mass execution of twenty men on October 25 based on shari’a court convictions.Ansar al Shari’a’s Benghazi Division announced the death of field commander Mansour al Shalali in the aftermath of a series of LNA airstrikes after October 23 mortar attacks that killed civilian protesters near Kish Square, Benghazi, Libya.

Outlook: Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi will attempt to roll back LNA gains in southern Benghazi, specifically in the neighborhood of Hawari, in response to the death of Ansar al Sharia commander Mansour al Shalali.

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST

AFRICA

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1) 21 OCT: GNC-aligned Libya Dawn militias seized numerous LNA positions around Sabrata, Libya.3) 23 OCT: Mortars struck demonstrators in Kish Square, Benghazi, Libya. 2) 23 OCT: Jets conducted several airstrikes on ISIS positions near Sirte, Libya.4) 25 OCT: ISIS publically executed an estimated 20 men in Sirte, Libya.

ASSESSMENT:

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AQIM The Algerian security forces continue to disrupt AQIM activities. A search operation killed three militants, including two who had been AQIM members since 2008. ISIS is also attempting to contest AQIM’s dominance in the Maghreb. An ISIS representative in Algeria praised current ISIS fighters and urged others to join. The statement is a shift in propaganda, from pledges of loyalty to ideological content.

Outlook: It remains unlikely that AQIM will lose a large amount of support to ISIS. AQIM will continue to unify its historic network of radical Islamist militant groups in the region.

Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)Tunisian troops had gathered near Jebel Mghila in central Tunisia to search for the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, an AQIM affiliate. No reports have surfaced regarding the operation or movements by Uqba Ibn Nafa’a. The lack of reporting indicates that it eluded the military’s efforts and has not confronted or stolen from civilians to replenish its food supply, as it did on 18 OCT.

Outlook: The Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade may deplete its resources soon, leaving it vulnerable to the military’s operations when it must search for food.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) AQIM-linked Ansar al Din leader Iyad ag Ghaly condemned the secular Tuareg Coordination of the Movements of Azawad (CMA) for its ongoing cooperation with the government and promised to increase attacks against French and Malian forces. The National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), now a component of CMA, was previously allied with Ansar al Din until the latter seized full control of territory during the 2012 uprising. Reports surfaced indicating CMA and AQIM-splinter group MUJAO clashed this week, a possible indicator of continued cooperation between MUJAO and Ansar al Din.

Outlook: Ansar al Din and affiliates will continue to attack MINUSMA, French security forces and civilian convoys in light of the government’s weak security presence in the north.

MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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MAGHREBWEST AFRICA

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11) 20 OCT: Algerian forces killed three militants in Baghlia, Boumerdes, Algeria.2) 21 OCT: Tunisian Marines and Border Guards increased security measures along the east coast and Libyan border.3) 23 OCT; 25 OCT: Algerian forces arrested 29 people suspected of aiding terrorists, as well as two militants, in Skikda, Algeria.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST

AFRICA1) 21 OCT: MINUSMA apprehended five individuals following an IED blast in Gao city, Gao, Mali.2) 22 OCT: CMA clashed with MUJAO in Anderamboukane, Gao region, Mali.3) 23 OCT: Gunmen wounded two soldiers at a military checkpoint northeast of Timbuktu, Mali. 4) 24 OCT: Two IED blasts killed three civilians and wounded two peacekeepers in Tessalit, Kidal region, Mali.

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ASSESSMENT:

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Domestic Politics and Reactions to the Nuclear DealSupreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei conditionally approved the implementation of the nuclear deal in a letter addressed to President Hassan Rouhani on October 21. Khamenei said that President Barack Obama and the European Union must guarantee in writing that all sanctions against Iran will be completely lifted. He also stated that “any action regarding” the Arak heavy water reactor and sending excess uranium stockpile abroad will begin only after the International Atomic Energy Agency closes the file on the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. Khamenei additionally called for the creation of a special committee in Iran to monitor implementation by “the other side.” On October 22, Rouhani announced that his administration will implement the nuclear deal according to Khamenei’s “considerations and requirements.”

Outlook: Khamenei’s approval will end domestic debate over whether Iran should reject the nuclear deal before a violation by other parties.

Regional Developments and DiplomacyIncreasing numbers of IRGC, Basij Organization, and Afghan Shi’a militia Fatimiyoun Brigade members have been killed in Syria in the last week. They include four junior officers of the Esfahan province-based IRGC 8th Najaf Ashraf Armored Division and a junior officer from a Saberin Brigade, a special operations unit connected with an IRGC Ground Forces provincial unit. Abdollah Bagheri Neyraki, a bodyguard for former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was also killed. IRGC Public Relations Head Brigadier General Second Class Ramezan Sharif acknowledged earlier this week that Iran will increase its advisory forces in Syria “following new developments… in different regions” of the country.

Outlook: The rise in death announcements of IRGC and Basij members explicitly linked to their ground forces units shows that the Iranian regime is at least more comfortable openly identifying its fallen soldiers and potentially indicates that Tehran is putting more of its own people in harm’s way in Syria.

IRAN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

OCT 20: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Head Ali Akbar Salehi said Iran will sell its excess stockpile of enriched uranium to Russia in exchange for natural uranium.

OCT 21: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei conditionally approved the implementation of the nuclear deal in a letter addressed to President Hassan Rouhani.

OCT 22: President Hassan Rouhani announced that his administration will implement the nuclear deal according to Khamenei’s “considerations and requirements.”

OCT 22: Basij Organization member Hadi Shojah was killed in Syria.OCT 22: Abdollah Bagheri Neyraki, who was reportedly a bodyguard for former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for “years,”

was killed in the vicinity of Aleppo city.OCT 22: National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi reiterated Khamenei’s assertion in

the October 21 letter that any imposition of sanctions during the JCPOA implementation period constitutes a violation of the nuclear agreement.

OCT 23: IRGC Public Relations Head Brigadier General Second Class Ramezan Sharif acknowledged that eight Iranian nationals were killed in Syria “in the last few days.”

OCT 23: Principlist parliamentarian Ali Reza Zakani said Iran is “prepared to accept the consequences” of rejecting the missile restrictions in Annex B of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231.

OCT 25: IRGC Public Relations Head Brigadier General Second Class Ramezan Sharif stated that Iran will increase its advisory forces in Syria.

OCT 26: Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned that Saudi Arabia’s execution of Sheikh Nimr al Nimr, a prominent Shiite cleric who led protests against the Saudi government, would come at a “heavy price.”

20 OCT – 26 OCT

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ACRONYMSAtomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Mehrdad MoarefianIran analystmehrdad.moarefian@aei.org(202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirectorfkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569