2014_Frege_Varieties of Capitalism and Job Quality.pdf

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American Sociological Review2014, Vol. 79(5) 942–965© American SociologicalAssociation 2014DOI: 10.1177/0003122414548194http://asr.sagepub.com

A significant research tradition in sociology

and now economics addresses the implica-

tions of work and employment for well-being(e.g., Helliwell and Huang 2010; Hodson

2001; Kalleberg 1977, 2011; Kohn and

Schooler 1983). National differences in job

quality (Clark 2005), and how to develop

indicators of job quality (Bustillo et al. 2011),

have received increased attention in this lit-

erature, and recent comparative research

explores the implications of selected labor

market institutions for specific job quality

outcomes (Esser and Olsen 2011; Olsen, Kal-leberg, and Nesheim 2010). Little research,

however, systematically addresses the attain-

ment at work of broader “civic principles”

(e.g., dignity and justice) long considered

core ideals of Western societies, or how this

attainment varies in accordance with national

institutional differences. Attempts to establishthe specific mechanisms through which insti-

tutional differences may matter to job quality

are also limited.

The case for exploring these questions is

especially strong at the present point in his-

tory. Social outcomes now enjoy heightened

ASR XXX10.1177/0003122414548194AmericanSociological ReviewFregeand Godard

aLondon School of Economics b

University of Manitoba

Corresponding Author: John Godard, School of Business, University ofManitoba, Winnipeg, Canada R3T 5V4E-mail: [email protected]

Varieties of Capitalism andJob Quality: The Attainment

of Civic Principles at Work inthe United States and Germany

Carola Fregea and John Godard b

AbstractThis article explores how institutional differences matter to the quality of a nation’s jobs; jobquality is conceived as a dimension of a national economy’s social performance and thus definedin accordance with civic principles. Focus is on the two archetypical varieties of capitalism, theUnited States and Germany. Using data from a 2009 telephone survey of U.S. and German workers,we find that the overall attainment of civic principles, as perceived by workers, is no different inGermany than in the United States, even though the German institutional environment should bemore conducive to them. This is due to higher worker expectations in Germany and a tendencyfor employer practices to compensate for the weaker (liberal) institutional environment in theUnited States. Once these are controlled, German workers report substantially more positiveoutcomes. We find that institutional differences also matter in how various employer practices

are adopted and hence have indirect as well as direct implications.

Keywords

job quality, institutional theory, employment systems, human resource management, Germany

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Frege and Godard 943

status for judging the performance of national

economies (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009).

Yet the future of institutions long associated

with them is in question (Streeck 2009), and

research into how this may matter is limited.This is especially true for job quality. Accord-

ingly, this article addresses how, and the extent

to which, institutional differences matter to

the quality of a nation’s jobs. We conceptual-

ize job quality as the attainment of civic prin-

ciples at work; we believe this attainment to

be fundamental to the quality of a society and

hence to the social performance of an econ-

omy. In turn, we adopt an “institutional envi-

ronments” perspective to identify possiblemechanisms through which institutional dif-

ferences may matter to these principles, devel-

oping this perspective with reference to the

two archetypical varieties of developed capi-

talism, Germany and the United States.

Finally, we draw on data from telephone sur-

veys of 2,000 U.S. and German employees to

explore U.S.–German differences in the

attainment of our civic principles.

We intend to provide three main contribu-tions. First, we seek to contribute to the devel-

opment of a more explicitly macro, societal

approach to job quality, oriented to the social

performance of economies rather than individ-

ual outcomes. Second, we hope to enhance our

understanding of the mechanisms by which

institutional differences shape job quality (as

we define it). Third, we aim to shed light on the

extent to which these differences really matter,

at least with respect to the United States and

Germany at the time of our surveys.

CIVIC PRINCIPLESAND INSTITUTIONALDIFFERENCES

We focus on the civic principles of freedom,

equality, fraternity, fairness, justice, security,

dignity, fulfillment, and democracy (i.e.,

democratic empowerment). These principles

require little introduction; most figure promi-

nently in political philosophy (e.g., in Aristo-

tle, Arendt, and Rawls). Some (especially

dignity and security) emerged largely in

response to human suffering and figure prom-

inently in major political speeches (e.g., Roo-

sevelt’s 1941 “Four Freedoms” State of the

Union address) and human rights declara-tions. A number have even inspired revolu-

tions and served as the founding principles of

nations (e.g., in the United States and France).

We do not claim that these principles are

necessarily exhaustive of Western ideals or

pretend that full justice can be done them here.

We also recognize that there is precedent for a

number of them in the literature on job quality

(Gallie 2007; Godard 2010). Moreover, we

consider these principles from workers’ pointof view, so their attainment may be condi-

tioned by subjective biases. This could con-

found the “objective” implications of

institutional differences. But we believe our

principles provide a reasonably comprehensive

representation of those applicable to the work

experience. We also believe ours is the first

attempt to operationalize job quality in this

way, ideally helping to shift how job quality is

conceptualized by moving toward a less indi-vidualistic and more societal orientation than

has been the case so far. Finally, we believe the

use of subjective definitions (and measures)

represents the most effective and straight-for-

ward means for systematically addressing the

attainment of these principles. This is espe-

cially so if efforts are made to account for the

role of subjective biases, as we do here.

In turn, we adopt an institutional environ-

ments perspective to address how national

differences matter to the attainment of these

principles in Germany and the United States.

This perspective is grounded in both the vari-

eties of capitalism and the new institutional-

ism literature (Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen

1999) but is developed here with specific

reference to the employment relation (Godard

2008).1 Under this perspective, nations are

characterized not only by dominant legal/

institutional arrangements, but also by domi-

nant “logics of appropriateness” as to the

behavior of actors (March 1994:57–58).

Dominant logics both reflect and are reflected

in institutional complementarities and







944 American Sociological Review 79(5)

interactions. These logics also, however,

embody more deeply ingrained norms that

help shape and define the nature, functioning,

and legitimacy of institutions. Institutional

environments thus consist of dominant insti-tutions, the logic of appropriateness associ-

ated with them, and the institutional norms

that underpin both. We use the term “institu-

tional differences” to refer to differences in

these environments.

Under this perspective, institutional envi-

ronments have important a priori implications

for the attainment of civic principles, because

dominant institutions and logics of appropri-

ateness combine to shape employment sys-tems and ultimately the orientations and power

resources of actors within these systems.

However, three additional mechanisms may

either offset or condition these implications.

First, where institutional environments are

weak or otherwise unfavorable to workers,

employer practices can compensate for and

hence offset their a priori implications. Sec-

ond, institutional environments can have spe-

cific implications for the functioning andcharacteristics of workplace-level representa-

tion systems and employment practices, or

what we call “workplace regimes.” These

have added implications for job quality. Third,

the implications of institutional environments

for the attainment of our principles can depend

on cross-national differences in worker sub-

jectivities, which shape how workers evaluate

their employment. These mechanisms are all

associated with institutional differences, but

each can have distinctive implications for the

attainment of civic principles at work.

THE CASE OF GERMANY ANDTHE UNITED STATESIn this section, we apply our perspective and

the mechanisms we identified to the analysis

of institutional differences in the attainment of

our civic principles in Germany and the

United States. We refrain from developing

specific hypotheses, as we are less interested

in specific relationships than we are in whether

our arguments are supported in general.

Institutional Differences and the U.S.and German Employment Systems

The legal/institutional characteristics of the

U.S. and German employment systems differin at least three ways. First, Germany has a

highly developed system of vocational train-

ing and hence a highly skilled labor force

(Thelen 2004). In the United States, formal

skill training is limited and often inadequate

(O’Toole and Lawler 2006). Second, the Ger-

man system provides for strong representa-

tion rights through works councils, trade

unions, and supervisory boards (Behrens

2013). It also provides significant statutory protections, especially against dismissal

(Emmenegger and Marx 2011). The U.S. sys-

tem provides workers with only weak repre-

sentation rights (Godard 2009a) and limited

statutory protections. Third, German firms

rely extensively on bank financing, cross-

holdings, and relational coordination, which

allow for a longer-term, higher value-added

orientation (Hall and Soskice 2001). In the

United States, firms rely extensively on stockmarket financing and operate in more com-

petitive markets, requiring a short-term, low-

cost orientation (Blair 1995; Hall and Soskice

2001).

The German employment system both fos-

ters and is sustained by Germany’s high-

quality production system (Streeck 1992),

something the United States generally lacks.

It is also reinforced by strong norms and cor-

responding logics of appropriateness that are

generally consistent with a partnership ideol-

ogy, rather than the liberal ideology of the

United States (Frege and Godard 2010).

Largely because of these differences, the Ger-

man system is widely associated with high-

trust, collaborative relations (Jackson 2003;

Vitols 2001), compared to the predominantly

low-trust, calculative relations associated

with the U.S. system (Cappelli et al. 1997).

Workers and their representatives therefore

have a higher degree of involvement in the

design of their work and the determination of

the terms of their employment in Germany

than in the United States (Doellgast 2010).








Not only are employers more favorably dis-

posed to such involvement in Germany, but

German workers have stronger power

resources with which to advance their inter-

ests when needed.Based on these general differences, we can

expect greater attainment of our civic princi-

ples in Germany than in the United States.

Higher skill levels combine with stronger

workplace representation to ensure higher

levels of task discretion (and hence freedom)

and more fulfilling work in Germany (Esser

and Olsen 2011). Higher formal vocational

skills generally also translate into a sense of

professionalization within the German work-force and status levels equal to those of man-

agers (Maurice and Sellier 1979). This creates

the conditions for higher levels of trust and

hence fraternity. In turn, strong works council

and union representation provides for higher

levels of democratic empowerment and

ensures that German workers are more likely

to be treated fairly and with dignity. Coupled

with relatively strong employment laws, this

representation also ensures higher levels of job security and justice than in the United

States, especially with regard to due process.

Reinforcing these differences is employers’

greater willingness to accommodate worker

interests and to create high-skill, high-quality

jobs, both of which are conducive to high-

quality production.

We acknowledge that these characteriza-

tions may be too stylized. On the one hand,

Germany has seen a growth in lower-paying,

lower-skilled service sector jobs and a corre-

sponding decline in manufacturing jobs. This

has weakened the German system and, some

argue, may have resulted in some dualization

(Hassel 2014; Lehndorff et al. 2009). More-

over, German firms increasingly rely on stock-

market financing and are subject to stronger

international competitive pressures than in the

past (Jackson and Sorge 2012; Streeck 2009).

Germany has also had significant declines in

bargaining and works council coverage (Beh-

rens 2013). On the other hand, the United

States is characterized by comparatively high

levels of university education. This may

translate into higher general skill levels (Hall

and Soskice 2001) and facilitate more collabo-

rative, knowledge-intensive work, with posi-

tive implications for autonomy, fulfillment,

and fraternity. The United States has also seensome strengthening of employment regula-

tions over the years (Estlund 2010; Piore and

Safford 2006), with potentially positive impli-

cations for fairness and justice.

Nonetheless, differences between the

United States and Germany remain substan-

tial. In Germany, 65 percent of workers con-

tinue to hold a vocational skill or community

college qualification, and an additional 15

percent a university degree, compared to 5 percent and 34 percent in the United States,

respectively (OECD 2008). Close to 60 per-

cent of German workers are still formally

covered by a union agreement (Behrens

2013), and another 20 percent informally cov-

ered, as their employers follow settlements

voluntarily (Addison et al. 2012). This com-

pares to a total of 14 percent in the United

States. Close to half of German workers

remain covered by a formal works council(Behrens 2013), which has no legal equiva-

lent in the United States, and most German

employers with more than 500 employees

continue to have extensive worker representa-

tion on supervisory boards, which is virtually

unheard of in the United States. Employment

protection laws are still, according to OECD

(2013) computations, three times stronger in

Germany than in the United States. As of

2008 (the year before our survey), high and

high-to-medium technology manufacturing

comprised 13 percent of value added in Ger-

many compared to 5 percent in the United

States (OECD 2013), and manufacturing

comprised 21 percent of employment, com-

pared to 11 percent in the United States

(OECD 2013). The ideology of partnership

also remains pervasive among German

employers (Höpner and Waclawczyk 2012),

whereas in the United States it is still largely

a foreign concept despite some well-

publicized exceptions (Kochan et al. 2009).

German workers even appear to do better in

areas of the service sector otherwise associated








with the weakening of the German system

(Doellgast 2010, 2012).

Moreover, from our institutional environ-

ments perspective, differences in job quality

reflect not just specific legal/institutional dif-ferences, but also deeply held norms and

understandings that underpin actors’ behavior

as well as the design of institutions and how

they are understood. No doubt, there is now

considerable variation within both economies

(Katz and Darbishire 2000; Lane and Wood

2009). But these norms and understandings,

coupled with the major institutional differ-

ences identified earlier, should continue to

play an important (if possibly weakened oruneven) role throughout both countries. Com-

bined, they foster dominant logics of appropri-

ateness and, ultimately, what organizational

theorists call isomorphism (DiMaggio and

Powell 1983). In Germany, these norms are

reinforced by the continuing dominance of the

manufacturing sector, which forms the core of

the economy (Eichhorst forthcoming).

Institutional environments do not deter-

mine work or employment relations at theworkplace level. Nor do they negate the

implications of workplace-level variation.

But they do dampen and even condition the

effects of variation at this level (Doellgast,

Holtgrewe, and Deery 2009), especially

where institutional constraints and norms are

strong. To the extent this is the case, as in

Germany, we would expect to observe not

only higher levels of attainment of our civic

principles, but also less variation and hence

less inequality in these levels.

Institutional Differences andCompensatory Practices

These a priori differences between the Ger-

man and U.S. systems should drive differ-

ences in the attainment of civic principles. Yet

they may be at least partly offset by compen-

satory employer practices in the United States.

One function of a comparatively strong insti-

tutional environment, as found in Germany, is

that it achieves a balance of power and a con-

sensus that is conducive to stable employment

relations. In a comparatively weak institu-

tional environment, as found in the United

States, employers are more likely to face

problems of trust, legitimacy, and ultimately

control (Godard 2004). In response, employ-ers may adopt practices that enhance job qual-

ity. This, in turn, may lessen overall differences

in the attainment of our principles. In this

regard, the United States has a long history of

workplace control problems and employer

strategies to address them (Bendix 1956;

Braverman 1974; Edwards 1979). Two sets of

practices may be of particular importance

here: bureaucratic practices and new work

and human resources (HRM) practices.For present purposes, bureaucratic prac-

tices encompass practices emergent in the

1950s and 1960s and closely associated with

internal labor markets (Cappelli 1995; Doer-

inger and Piore 1971). They include extensive

internal hiring (job ladders), seniority rules,

internal justice systems, objective job classi-

fications, and pay grades, all of which have

traditionally been associated with labor

unionism but have also been widespread innon-union workplaces and, it would seem,

continue to be so (Brown et al. 2010) despite

some possible decline (Kalleberg 2011).

Although they may be spurred, in part, by

efficiency considerations (Williamson 1975)

and civil rights mandates (Piore and Safford

2006), scholars argue that these practices

serve a control function (Edwards 1979) and

substitute for unions and other legal protec-

tions (Kochan 1980). Such practices may be

especially important for fairness and justice

(Godard and Frege 2013), yet they also

rationalize, and hence legitimate, authority

structures (Bendix 1956; Edwards 1979;

Kalleberg 2011). Thus, they may also improve

other aspects of perceived job quality.

New work and HRM practices became

popular in the 1980s and 1990s and are often

associated with “high performance” work

systems. These practices include extensive

teamwork, team autonomy, social skills train-

ing, workplace participation, and perfor-

mance appraisal (Lawler 1992). They may

also be seen as means of control (Burawoy








1979, 1985). Although often adopted in con-

junction with bureaucratic practices, in theory

they replace the more calculative, contractu-

alist culture associated with these practices

with a more cooperativist, mutual gains cul-ture (Kochan and Osterman 1994). These

practices are widely argued to have positive

effects on job quality (Appelbaum et al. 2000;

Estlund 2010; Kalleberg 2011), with potential

implications for a number of our principles

(especially freedom, fulfillment, fraternity,

dignity, and democratic empowerment).

Both bureaucratic and new work and HRM

practices may also be accompanied by a non-

union representation system, in theory to pro-vide workers a voice and create a more

consensual work environment. These systems

are often viewed as illegitimate substitutes for

unions and thus have generally been illegal

under U.S. law. However, prior analysis of

our dataset finds that one-in-three non-union

workers may now be subject to such a system

(Godard and Frege 2013). This analysis also

finds that, where established, workers tend to

view these systems positively (Godard andFrege 2014). Therefore, they may have posi-

tive implications for job quality. This may be

especially true for democratic empowerment

(voice) and fraternity (consensus).

The extent to which these practices close

the gap between the United States and Ger-

many depends on the extent to which their

actual adoption and implications for job qual-

ity are substantially greater in the United

States than in Germany. How they are adopted

and how they affect job quality may also dif-

fer across these two countries due to institu-

tional differences. Yet to the extent that they

are more fully adopted and are effective at

improving job quality in the United States,

the gap in attainment of our civic principles

may be lower than our initial thesis suggests.

Institutional Differences and

Workplace RegimesIn addition to their a priori implications, insti-

tutional environments may also matter to job

quality through more specific implications for

the functioning of workplace regimes (Godard

2004). This may be especially so with regard

to new work and HRM practices. Germany has

important constraints (e.g., works councils,

employment laws, and logics of appropriate-ness) on how these practices are implemented.

These practices may thus be more beneficial to

workers in Germany than workers in the

United States, where they are ultimately imple-

mented to serve managerial goals (Doellgast

2012; Godard 2012; Weitbrecht 2003). These

constraints may also, however, matter for

bureaucratic practices. The protections these

practices provide U.S. workers may be less

important in Germany due to stronger employ-ment laws and rights. Their adoption and

implications may also differ due to the German

skill structure, which should require less reli-

ance on internal job ladders and seniority.

The implications of union representation

may also differ. In the United States, unions

provide workers with collective voice and pro-

tections against arbitrary treatment. In so doing,

they likely enhance some aspects of job quality,

especially democratic empowerment, fairness,and justice. Yet this may be offset by the adver-

sarial, low-trust relations that tend to character-

ize union workplaces in the United States

(Godard and Frege 2013). U.S. unions have

also become substantially weakened in recent

decades (Milkman 2013), potentially lessening

their effectiveness. In contrast, German unions

play a broader and more cooperative role

(Thelen 1991). At the workplace level, German

works councils are primarily responsible for

job quality. German unions, however, may

assist works councils in this role. They also

may ensure that works councils do not sacrifice

workers’ rights in the interest of cooperation,

and hence that fairness and justice are pro-

tected. In this respect, their main independent

implications for job quality may be similar to,

but stronger than, those of U.S. unions.

Subjective Differences and WorkerExpectations

Worker identities, values, and beliefs, or what

we call “subjectivities,” may also condition








and even offset the “objective” implications

of institutional environments. For example,

Senik (2013) finds that national mentalities

(e.g., values, beliefs, and interpretive schema)

have important implications for cross-nationaldifferences in happiness. A similar problem

likely applies to job quality, possibly helping

to explain unexpected findings in prior

research (e.g., Olsen et al. 2010).

In particular, the extent to which workers

believe specific principles have been attained

may depend on subjectivities as much as on

objective circumstances (O’Doherty and Wil-

mott 2001). Although a number of factors may

shape subjectivities, institutional norms likely play an important role with regard to the

attainment of our civic principles. The United

States has a long history of employer domina-

tion, reflecting deeply held norms favoring

strong property rights (and hence weak worker

rights), freedom to contract, minimal state

intrusion, and collective self-help (Godard

2009a), coupled with a tendency to attribute

inequality in work outcomes, and ultimately

life circumstances, to differences in volitionand worth (Osberg and Smeeding 2006).

Thus, not only may expectations be lower, but

so may beliefs as to the extent to which vari-

ous principles should even be attained at work.

In Germany, the opposite has pretty much

been the case. Germany has a strong tradition

of workplace democracy, and this tradition

both reflects and reinforces norms and ulti-

mately expectations as to rights and freedoms

at work (Frege and Godard 2010).

These differences may help explain differ-

ences in national institutional choices, while

at the same time being reinforced by these

choices. More important, they are likely

reflected in different evaluative criteria for

job quality. Indeed, a long history of research

suggests that U.S. workers have lower expec-

tations than do workers from other nations

(Lincoln and Kalleberg 1985; Przeworski and

Teune 1970). We expect this to be the case

here. Even if the German system is in some

sense objectively better, this may not be

reflected in subjective outcomes. This would,

in turn, raise the question of how much, in the

end, institutional differences actually matter.

In summary, national-level effects of dif-

ferences in the German and U.S. systems may

either be offset by workplace regime varia-

bles or operate in interaction with these vari-

ables, thereby conditioning their effects. Theextent to which they are reflected in our civic

principles may also be conditioned by sys-

tematic differences in subjectivities. In the

analysis here, we are primarily interested in

the objective implications of institutional

environments, and our dataset does not, in

any case, allow us to fully explore the role of

subjectivities (which would require qualita-

tive research). However, our dataset does

allow us to shed light on this role. Doing soalso helps address possible selection biases

when exploring the implications of workplace

regime variables, particularly HRM practices

(Godard 2010).

DATA COLLECTION

We drew our dataset from a nation-wide sur-

vey of 1,000 employed Americans and 1,000

employed Germans age 17 years or older,conducted at the end of 2009. The survey aver-

aged about 23 minutes in duration. It was

conducted simultaneously by professional

polling firms (Eastern Research Services in the

United States, FORSA in Germany), using

random-digit dialing and computer-assisted

telephone interviewing (CATI) with up to three

call-backs per household. We defined worker

broadly, to include a full range of occupations.

We excluded individuals working 15 hours or

less per week, or who were with their current

employer for six months or less, to ensure

respondents would be sufficiently familiar

with their workplace conditions.2

Although exclusion of segments of the

labor force makes it difficult to establish rep-

resentativeness within each country, these

data appear to be reasonably representative of

the populations sampled. In the U.S. sample,

51 percent of respondents were female, com-

pared to 47 percent of the U.S. labor force in

2009 (OECD 2013). Seventeen percent

reported coverage by a union agreement,

which is slightly higher than the U.S. Bureau

of Labor Statistics estimate for 2009 (14








percent), but this is largely explained by our

exclusion of low-hours and short-term

employees, both of which are less likely to be

unionized in the United States. In the German

sample, 48 percent were female, compared to46 percent of the German labor force. Twenty-

four percent were union members, and 67

percent reported they were covered by a col-

lective agreement; these are slightly higher

than estimates we obtained from OECD and

from Statistisches Bundesamt data (19 and 58

percent, respectively), again likely due to our

sampling strategy.

SAMPLE COMPOSITIONS ANDSUBJECTIVITIESTable 1 reports descriptive statistics compar-

ing respondent characteristics and subjectivi-

ties. In comparison to their U.S. counterparts,

German respondents were slightly younger

on average, and were, as expected, far more

likely to report a vocational qualification and

somewhat less likely to report a university

degree. They also worked fewer hours perweek, received somewhat higher hourly pay,

and were more likely to be employed in tradi-

tional (non-service) industries, all of which

are consistent with available labor force sta-

tistics (Meyerson 2011; OECD 2013).3

German respondents were also more

likely to be employed in large workplaces

(more than 500 employees) and less likely to

be employed in small ones (fewer than 25

employees; there was little difference in two

middle categories), and they were less likely

to report that their employer had a parent

company. German workers also perceived

their employers to be in worse financial situ-

ations than did their U.S. counterparts, even

though Germany’s economy was stronger as

of 2009. This supports the stereotype that

Germans tend to worry even in good times.

It may also reflect governments’ or employ-

ers’ use of the economic crisis to create

insecurity and hence to implement various

reforms.

Table 1 also shows that, with regard to

subjectivities, German respondents viewed

themselves as more ideologically left-leaning

and were much more likely to worry about

issues of fairness and justice and to believe in

unions. They were also more likely to view

work as central to who they are, and muchless likely to believe that employees should

always follow management instructions or to

report that they tend “to get involved in

things.” These findings are consistent with

other studies4 and suggest that U.S. and Ger-

man workers are indeed likely to evaluate

their treatment at work through somewhat

different lenses, with Germans, in effect, pos-

sessing higher expectations.

CORE MEASURES

Table 2 presents the core variables (in addi-

tion to our Germany/United States distinc-

tion) in our model (for inter-correlations, see

Table A1 in the Appendix): (1) civic princi-

ples and (2) workplace regimes. We derived a

number (as designated by crosses after their

names) from prior research by Godard (2001,

2009b, 2010). However, to avoid respondentfatigue we used a reduced number of items.

We selected these on the basis of their relative

contributions to scale reliability (Cronbach’s

α) in the earlier research and sensitivity anal-

yses addressing whether their deletion made a

difference to the observed associations in that

research.

Civic Principles

Following from our analysis so far, we include

eight measures of civic principle attainment:

freedom, fulfillment, security, fraternity, dig-

nity, empowerment (short for democratic

empowerment), fairness, and justice. As

Table 2 shows, each consists of multiple

Likert-type item scales, with the items aver-

aged so the measures range from 1.0 to 4.0.

Freedom consists of two items developed for

this study;5 fulfillment consists of three items

adapted from the job design literature (Hack-

man and Oldham 1980). Security consists of

three items intended to address not just per-

ceived security from layoffs, but also how








Table 1. Sample Compositions and Subjectivities

United States GermanyDifferencesin Meansa

Compositional Variables

Gender: percent male 49 52 – Age: years (average) 47 44 **

Weekly hours worked (average) 42 38 **

One or more university degrees: percent 28 13 **

Skilled vocational certification: percent 13 70 **

Supervisory responsibility (1 = none,2 = moderate, 3 = high)

1.9 1.9 –

Hourly pay (average, US$, purchasingpower parities)

24.67 26.43 **

Percent in government administration 13 15 –

Percent in educational sector 16 12 *

Percent in social services 18 14 **

Percent in traditional industry (utilities,manufacturing, telecom., construc-tion, resource based, transportation)

24 30 **

Percent in personal services 16 15 –

Percent in financial and economic ser-vices (incl. finance, insurance, realestate, professional, business)

4 12 **

Percent in other sectors (i.e., none ofthe above sectors)

8 4 **

Workplace size:percent with under 25 employeespercent with over 500 employees

2725

2031

**

**

If parent firm/employer (percent) 67 56 **

Percent perceiving employer financialsituation as “somewhat bad” or “very

bad”

18 29 **

Subjectivities

Ideology (percent self-identifying asleft-of-center)

49 74 **

If somewhat or very religious (percent) 65 32 **

% Agreeing % Agreeing

Has always, by nature, tended to: Somewhat Strongly Somewhat Strongly

Worry about issues of fairness andjustice

38 44 10 90 **

View work as central to who you are 34 46 34 58 **

Believe employees should alwaysfollow management instructionswithout questioning them

32 15 12 3 **

Believe unions are needed to lookout for workers

25 21 40 45 **

Get involved in things, such aspolitical, cultural, or religious

activities

39 24 25 21 **

Trust others 45 35 48 30 –

Be happy 29 61 36 58 –

aStatistically significant differences in mean values: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed tests).









Table 2. Core Dependent Variables

U.S. SampleMean(s.d.)

GermanSample Mean

(s.d.)

Civic Principles (Likert scaled items: 1 = strongly disagree, 4 = stronglyagree)

Freedom (two-item scale, divided by 2, α = .46) “You are free to choosehow you do your work.” “You are free to alter times at which youwork.”

2.9(.920)

2.9(.822)**

Fulfillment + (three-item scale, divided by 3, α = .68) “There is a lot ofvariety in your job.” “Your job makes you keep learning new things.”“Your job is fulfilling.”

3.5(.660)

3.4**

(.638)

Security (three-item scale, divided by 3, α = .63) “You feel that your jobis secure.” “You can trust your manager.” “You get all the support andtraining you need.”

3.2(.775)

3.2(.654)**

Fraternity (six-item scale, divided by 6, α = .82) “You can trust yourco-workers.” “In general, you consider your co-workers to be friends.”“Everybody where you work is proud to be associated with youremployer.” “Where you work, everyone is made to feel they belong.”“Where you work, everyone strives for highest possible quality.”“Overall, your workplace is well run.”

3.2(.658)

3.1**

(.538)**

Dignity (three-item scale, divided by 3, α = .69) “The person for whomyou work treats you with respect.” “Management consults workerson major work-related decisions.” “You feel free to openly question amanager’s decision if you disagree with it.”

3.2(.776)

2.9**

(.667)*

Empowerment + (three-item scale, divided by 3, items reverse coded,α = .68) “You and your co-workers are expected to do what they aretold, whether they like it or not.” “What happens to your co-workersis pretty much beyond your control.” “It does little good for you andyour co-workers to speak up about things.”

2.4(.798)

2.5**

(.736)*

Fairness (four-item scale, divided by 4, α = .77) “The way in which workis assigned is fair.” “The way in which pay levels are decided is fair.”“The way in which promotions are decided is fair.” “Employees aretreated fairly when they do something wrong.”

3.2(.747)

3.1(.612)**

Justice + (four-item scale, divided by 4, α = .75) “If a co-worker wasunjustly dismissed, it is likely that something could be done tomake things right.” “If a female co-worker was denied a promotiondue to her gender, it is likely that something could be done to makethings right.” “If a co-worker was bullied by manager, it is likely that

something could be done to make things right.” “ If a co-worker wasdenied pay or bonus money to which she was entitled, it is likely thatsomething could be done to make things right.”

3.1(.751)

3.3**

(.653)**

Job quality (composite scale, averaging all of the above, α = .85) 3.1(.560)

3.0(.444)**

Workplace Regimes

Works council (Germany only): “Do you have a works council?” (0 = no,1 = yes)

– .68

Non-union rep. (United States only): “Is there a non-union, managementestablished system, where worker representatives meet withmanagement?” (0 = no, 1 = yes)

.30 –

Union (single binary item): “Are you covered by a union agreement?”

(0 = no, 1 = yes)

.16 .67**

(continued)









secure respondents feel in the performance of

their actual job and how much they might fear

being demoted or dismissed. Fraternity is a

six-item scale intended to measure the extent

to which workers experience a sense of com-

munity and belonging at work; it essentially

picks up perceived organizational culture.

Dignity consists of three items designed for

this study. Despite some literature on this

construct (Hodson 2001), we were unable to

find any precedents for how to actually mea-

sure it. The concept of dignity ultimately,

however, has to do with whether management

treats employees as if they are equals, includ-

ing managers’ willingness to consult with

employees, whether they treat them with

respect, and whether managers allow employ-

ees to question decisions. The items designed

for this measure address these three ques-

tions.6 Empowerment contains three items

developed by Godard (2001, 2010) to address

the extent to which workers can collectively

influence their work conditions. Fairness

consists of four items addressing perceived

fairness in the exercise of authority. Justice

contains four items developed by Godard

(2010) to measure perceptions of rights at

work and, in particular, whether “something

could be done to make things right” in the

event these rights are violated.

U.S. SampleMean(s.d.)

GermanSample Mean

(s.d.)

New practices + (10-item additive index, divided by 10, α = .70) (a)When you were first hired by your current employer, were youasked to participate in any team building, communication, or similarexercises? (b) Before you were hired, were you given a test askingabout your attitudes, preferences, or general personality? (c) Overthe past 12 months, how many days have you spent in employer-sponsored training or development sessions? (d) Are you and your co-workers subject to a system for measuring your performance? (e) Howoften do managers hold formal meetings with you and your co-workerswith the primary purpose of keeping you informed about things?Such meetings might be held on a team, departmental, workplace,or even company-wide basis. (f) To what extent does management

encourage employees to engage in continuous learning or long-termdevelopment? (g) To what extent are you and your co-workers subjectto a continuous quality improvement system? (h) How about a group-or team-based system, in which people do their work as members offormally designated teams? (i) To what extent are these teams self-managed, with no direct supervision? (j) To what extent does your paydepend on incentives or bonuses? (items a, b, and d are binary, 0 = no,1 = yes; item c is continuous, 0 to 100 or more; item e is categorical,0 = 0/yr., to 4 = over 52/yr; items f to j are five-point Likert scales; forindex creation, all items are standardized).

.07(.496)

–.08**

(.449)**

Bureaucratic practices + (four-item additive index, divided by 4, α =.67) (a) When a job opens up, current employees are given priority

over external applicants. (b) When a job opens up, employees withthe most seniority are given priority, provided they are qualified. (c)

Job security policies or protections make it unlikely that permanentemployees will ever be laid off. (d) Workers who believe they have

been unfairly treated are able to get a formal hearing, with some formof representation. (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree, all itemsare standardized)

–.01(.725)

.01(.570)**

Note: α = Cronbach’s alpha. + = based on Godard 2010, but with reduced items (see text).* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed t -tests of mean differences; variance ratio tests of s.d. differences).

Table 2. (continued)









In addition to these individual measures,

we created a composite index, job quality,

which is simply the average score on these

eight variables. This measure enables us to

determine whether differences in institutionalenvironments and workplace regimes matter

to the overall attainment of civic principles,

which is a key question underlying our analy-

sis. In turn, the component measures enable

us to conduct a more nuanced analysis,

exploring differentiation across our two

nations and the possibility that neither is “bet-

ter” overall, but rather that each is better on

some principles and weaker on others.

As Table 2 shows, there is indeed notmuch overall difference between the two

samples in the mean scores for these varia-

bles. German workers score higher, on aver-

age, on the justice and empowerment indices,

but U.S. workers score higher, on average, on

the fulfillment, fraternity, and dignity indices.

There are no statistically significant differ-

ences for the remaining indices. These results

suggest that different principles tend to be

more fully attained in each country. They alsosuggest that we may need to account for the

additional mechanisms we identified if we are

to establish whether and how institutional

environments matter.

Finally, Table 2 does not include one of our

principles—equality. This is because we treat

equality as a potential secondary effect of

institutional differences. As argued earlier,

strong institutional constraints, as seen in Ger-

many, should be associated with lower levels

of variation and hence greater equality in job

quality. The standard deviations reported in

Table 2 lend support to this argument. In all

cases, standard deviations are smaller in the

German sample. T-tests also reveal these dif-

ferences to be statistically significant in all

cases except fulfillment. This suggests Ger-

man workers do experience greater equality in

the attainment of our civic principles.

Workplace Regimes

We include two sets of workplace regime vari-

ables (see Table 2). The first set addresses

representation and consists of binary items

addressing whether a respondent is represented

by a union, by a works council (Germany

only), or by a non-union system (United States

only). As noted earlier, 67 percent of Germanrespondents were covered by a collective

agreement, compared to 17 percent of U.S.

respondents. Two thirds were also represented

by a works council, for which there is no legal

equivalent in the United States. However, 3-in-

10 U.S. respondents reported being subject to

some form of employer-established non-union

representation system. These may serve a com-

pensatory function, thereby helping to explain

why differences in the attainment of civic principles are smaller than expected.

The second set of variables addresses HRM

practices, for which we include two indices.

The first, new practices, is an additive index

of 10 items associated with new work and

HRM practices in the literature. The second,

bureaucratic practices, is an additive index of

four items associated with the bureaucratic/

internal labor market practices discussed ear-

lier. As Table 2 shows, there is no significantdifference in how U.S. and German respond-

ents score on the bureaucratic HRM practices

index, although the latter score significantly

lower on the new practices index. To the

extent that the latter practices are associated

with a more positive workplace culture, this

difference may also help explain why differ-

ences in the attainment of civic principles are

smaller than expected. However, the finding

of lower adoption in Germany is also consist-

ent with our earlier argument as to the impor-

tance of institutional constraints.

An examination of the differences in these

indices (see Table S1 in the online supple-

ment [http://asr.sagepub.com/supplemental])

revealed that, for the bureaucratic practices

items, U.S. workers scored higher on internal

hiring and seniority in promotion, yet lower

on job security, job classifications, and access

to a grievance system (the former were also

far more important in the U.S. sample; see

note 10). For the new work and HRM practice

items, German workers scored higher on

teamwork training, the extent of teamwork,








and team autonomy, but lower on continuous

learning, training, performance measurement,

and contingent pay. These results are consist-

ent with general understandings as to the Ger-

man and U.S. workplace regimes. In effect,German workers are treated more as profes-

sionals (which is how they tend to view them-

selves) who have sufficient competencies and

intrinsic motivation by virtue of the German

occupational training system. They are thus

more suited to new work practices, yet there is

less need for most other practices. The oppo-

site is generally the case in the United States,

so workers must be developed and controlled

within the employment relation. This isreflected in stronger internal labor markets

(i.e., seniority in promotion), lower adoption

of new work practices, and higher employer

investments in new HRM practices.

MULTIVARIATE RESULTS

Our descriptive results suggest that, although

differences in the reported attainment of civic

principles by U.S. and German respondentsare limited, this may reflect corresponding

differences in subjectivities and workplace

regimes. It is also possible that differences in

sample compositions could be playing some

role. Accordingly, we begin our multivariate

analysis by exploring these possibilities, in

effect establishing the mechanisms through

which differences in the German and U.S.

institutional environments appear to matter.

How Do Institutional EnvironmentsMatter?

To explore the importance of these mecha-

nisms, we first ran full-sample regressions

with the civic principles indices (see Table 2)

as our dependent variables. We began by run-

ning bivariate regressions with a dummy vari-

able, if German, for whether a respondent

was in the U.S. or the German sample, as our

sole independent variable. We then entered

our compositional controls (Table 1) to

explore if the coefficients for if German in

our bivariate regressions could reflect and

hence be biased by sample differences. We

next entered the subjectivity variables (Table

1) to determine whether subjectivities matter

to the observed differences (discussed ear-

lier). Finally, we entered the workplaceregime variables (Table 2), which allow us to

determine if institutional differences matter

after accounting for these variables, and

hence whether employer practices may have a

compensatory function (also discussed ear-

lier). The full regression results appear in

Table S2 of the online supplement. Here we

are concerned only with the coefficients for if

German at each stage, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3 also reports statistical significancelevels for the if German coefficients and for

changes in these coefficients at each step

(Clogg, Perkova, and Haritou 1995).

The bivariate results in column 2 of Table

3 mirror the descriptive findings discussed

earlier, revealing significant negative associa-

tions for if German with fulfillment, frater-

nity, and dignity, and significant positive

associations with empowerment and justice.

Introduction of the compositional variables(column 3) does not appreciably alter these

results. Doing so makes a statistically signifi-

cant difference to the if German coefficient in

the regressions for fulfillment, security, dig-

nity, and job quality,7 but the only meaningful

change is an increase in its magnitude and

statistical significance in the security regres-

sion. Thus, the limited differences between

our two samples in the attainment of civic

principles do not appear to be caused by dif-

ferences in sample composition.

In contrast, introduction of the subjectivity

items (column 4, Table 3) does alter the pat-

tern of results. This leads to a statistically

significant change to the coefficients for if

German in the regressions for fulfillment,

secure, fraternity, dignity, fairness, and job

quality. The negative coefficients in the

regressions for fulfillment and fraternity also

become statistically insignificant, and the

magnitude of the negative coefficient in the

regression for dignity is reduced by almost

half. In turn, the positive coefficient in the

regression for secure is doubled, and both the








magnitude and significance levels of the coef-

ficients for fairness and job quality are sub-stantially increased. Exploratory analysis

revealed that union support was the subjectiv-

ity variable most responsible for these

changes (see Table S4 in the online supple-

ment). It in any case appears that subjectivi-

ties are indeed of considerable importance,

for they suggest that, in an objective sense,

attainment of most of our civic principles is

much higher in Germany, but this is offset by

more critical subjectivities or evaluativestandards among German workers. Indeed,

once subjectivities are entered, the United

States is still “better” on only one principle,

dignity.

Introduction of the workplace regime vari-

ables (column 5, Table 3) further alters the

pattern of results.8 If German is now positive

and statistically significant in all the regres-

sions except those for fraternity and dignity,

where in both cases it declines in magnitude tovirtually zero. Moreover, the change in the

value of the if German coefficient is both posi-

tive and significant in all the regressions

except the one for justice. In the regression for

justice, the change is significant but the coef-

ficient declines in size, likely because Germanworks councils are more widespread and have

stronger workplace-level effects on justice

than do their U.S. counterparts (see below).

Overall, these results generally support

expectations. The coefficients for if German

generally become more favorable to Germany

at each stage. By the final stage, they are

especially strong for empowerment and

secure, both of which likely reflect the strong

rights and protections deriving from the Ger-man institutional environment.9 However,

they are also strong in the regressions for fair-

ness and for the composite index, job quality.

Thus, the attainment of civic principles in

Germany appears to be objectively higher.

However, this is partly offset by more nega-

tive subjectivities in Germany and by work-

place regime variables, which in the United

States tend to compensate for a less favorable

institutional environment. This is why differ-ences in the overall attainment of civic princi-

ples, as viewed by workers, are minimal in

our initial bivariate findings and our descrip-

tive results.

Table 3. Full Sample Regressions: U.S.–German Differences in the Attainment of CivicPrinciples

Standardized Coefficients for if German

Dependent Variables

2.Bivariate

Regressions

3.Add CompositionalVariables

to Column 2Regressions

4.Add SubjectivityVariables


5.Add WorkplaceRegime Variables


Freedom .014 .004 .034 .114*++

Fulfillment –.079** –.044+ .001++ .078*++

Secure .021 .098**++ .189**++ .219**+

Fraternity –.141** –.114** –.035++ –.001+

Dignity –.216** –.169**++ –.094**++ –.026++

Empowerment .083** .100** .131** .174**++

Fairness .004 .020 .089**++ .123**++

Justice .120** .145** .168** .072*++

Job quality (global index) –.030 .011++ .088**++ .138**++

Note: N = 2,000. See Table 1 for the compositional and subjectivity variables added in columns 3 and 4,respectively, and Table 2 for the workplace regime variables added in column 5.Significance levels of coefficients for if German: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed tests).Significance levels of changes in coefficients for if German: + p ≤ .05; ++ p ≤ .01 (see Clogg et al. 1995).









How Do Individual WorkplaceRegime Variables Matter?

Because the workplace regime variables are

central to our analysis, Table 4 reports theircoefficients from the full regressions (Table

3, column 5). As this table reveals, these find-

ings are as expected for new practices,

bureaucratic practices, and non-union repre-

sentation, suggesting these practices may

indeed help compensate for the “weak” insti-

tutional environment within which U.S.

workers find themselves. However, the coef-

ficient for non-union representation is signifi-

cant only in the empowerment and job quality regressions. It is in both cases small, espe-

cially compared to those for new practices

and bureaucratic practices. This suggests that

non-union systems in themselves matter

much less than the actual practices adopted

by management.

The findings for works council are more

confounding, because although this variable

bears a positive association with justice, it

bears negative associations with fulfillment and fairness. However, works council is

highly correlated with both bureaucratic

practices (r 2 = .42) and new practices (r 2 =

.24). Subsequent analysis revealed that, when

these variables are deleted from the regres-

sions, works council no longer bears statisti-

cally significant negative associations and,

indeed, bears statistically significant positive

associations in the secure, dignity, justice, and

job quality regressions (see Table S6 in the

online supplement). This suggests that works

councils have positive indirect effects,

through their implications for management

practices. Yet these are insufficient to offset

unobserved negative characteristics of work-

places with works councils.

Finally, union is statistically significant

only in the regressions for freedom and dig-

nity, where it reveals negative associations.

This likely reflects a tendency for U.S. unions

to be organized in workplaces with higher

levels of discontent and distrust (see the next

section).

How Institutional EnvironmentsShape Workplace Regimes

As suggested earlier, one problem with the

Table 4 results is that Germany and theUnited States are not only characterized by

different institutional environments, but these

differences likely have important implica-

tions for how various workplace regime vari-

ables operate. Failure to address this

possibility may lead one not only to under-

state the role of these environments, but also

to draw misleading inferences as to the effects

of specific workplace regime variables.

Accordingly, we ran exploratory regressionsusing interaction terms between each of the

workplace regime variables and if German.

These results revealed strong interaction

effects (see Table S7 in the online supple-

ment). They did not, however, provide a very

clear picture of the associations for the work-

place regime variables in each of our two

institutional environments or of how they

differ across these environments. Thus, we

also ran separate regressions on the U.S. andGerman samples.

As Table 5 shows, the results for non-

union representation are largely unchanged

from the full sample results (as we would

expect). The coefficients for works council

are, however, larger and statistically signifi-

cant in the freedom, secure, dignity, fairness,

and job quality regressions in the German

sample, and are in all cases negative. As for

the Table 4 results, these coefficients become

statistically insignificant when bureaucratic

practices and new practices are removed. Yet

the only significant positive coefficient is in

the justice regression (see Table S6 in the

online supplement). This finding is much

weaker than for the combined U.S.-German

sample. It suggests that workers with works

councils are not as much better off when com-

pared to German workers without works

councils as they are when compared to U.S.

workers. This likely reflects the more favora-

ble institutional environment and correspond-

ing logic of appropriateness within Germany,







957

T a b l e 4 . F u l l

S a m p l e R e g r e s s i o n s : W o r k p l a c e R e g i m e V a r i a b l e s a n d A t t a i n m e n t o f C i v i c P r i n c i p l e s

F r e e d o m

F u l f i l l m e n t

S e c u r e

F r a t e r n i t y

D i g n i t y

E m p o w e r

m e n t

F a i r n e s s

J u s t i c e

J o b Q u a l i t y

( g l o b a l i n d e x )

U n i o n

– . 1 1 5 * *

– . 0 4 1

– . 0 2 5

– . 0 0 6

– . 0 6 2 *

. 0 0 1

. 0 2 8

. 0 4 0

– . 0 3 7

N o n - u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

. 0 4 8

. 0 1 9

. 0 0 6

. 0 0 8

. 0 4 5

. 0 4 9 *

. 0 1 2

. 0 3 5

. 0 4 1 *

W o r k s c o u n c i l

– . 0 2 6

– . 0 7 2 *

– . 0 3

– . 0 6 5

– . 0 5 0

– . 0 3 0

– . 1 0 1 * *

. 0 9 5 * *

– . 0 5 0

N e w p r a c t i c e s

. 0 8 3 * *

. 2 3 3 * *

. 2 4 7 * *

. 2 0 3 * *

. 2 3 6 * *

. 2 2 3 * *

. 1 6 2 * *

. 1 2 4 * *

. 2 6 5 * *

B u r . p r a c t i c e s

. 1 8 0 * *

. 1 6 3 * *

. 3 6 2 * *

. 3 6 5 * *

. 3 3 9 * *

. 1 4 7 * *

. 4 6 2 * *

. 3 9 2 * *

. 4 2 2 * *

R 2

. 1 7

. 2 9

. 3 8

. 3 7

. 3 5

. 2 1

. 3 7

. 3 2

. 4 7

N o

t e :

N = 2 , 0 0

0 . T h i s t a b l e r e p o r t s s t a n d a r d i z e d c o e f fi c i e n t s f o r w o r k p l a c e r e g i m

e v a r i a b l e s c o n t r o l l i n g f o r

I f G e r m

a n , a l l c o m p o s i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s ,

a n d a l l

s u b j e c t i v i t y v a r i a b l e s ( s e e T a b l e 1 ) . T h e

i f G e r m

a n c o e f fi c i e n t s i n r o w 5 o f T a b l e 3 a r e a l s o f r o m t h i s s p e c i fi c a t i o n .

* p ≤ . 0 5 ; * * p ≤

. 0 1 . ( t w o - t a i l e d t e s t s )








958

T a b l e 5 . S p l i

t S a m p l e R e g r e s s i o n s : W o r k p l a c e R e g i m e V a r i a b l e s a n d A t t a i n m e n t o f C i v i c P r i n c i p l e s

F r e e d o m

F u l f i l l m e n t

S e c u r e

F r a t e r n i t y

D i g n i t y

E m p o w e r m e n t

F a i r n e s s

J u s t i c e

J o b Q u a l i t y

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

G e r m a n y

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

G e r m a

n y

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

G e r m a n y

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

G e r m a n y

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

G e r m a n y

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

G e r m a n

y U n i t e d

S t a t e s

G e r m a n y

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

G e r m a n y

U n i t e d

S t a t e s

G e r m a n y

U n i o n

– . 1 1 8 * *

– . 0 7 5 *

– . 0 6 1 * *

. 0 1 2

– . 0 9 4 * *

. 0 4 2

– . 0 9 5 * *

. 0 4 7

– . 1 9 3 * *

– . 0 1 9

– . 0 3 0

. 0 1 1

– . 0 7 5 * *

. 0 8 1 * *

. 0 1 1

. 0 4 6

– . 0 9 5 * *

. 0 2 1

N o n - u n i o n r e p .

. 0 5 7

. 0 1 7

– . 0 0 4

– . 0 1 2

. 0 4 4

. 0 6 5 *

– . 0 1 7

. 0 4 5

. 0 3 6

W o r k s c o u n c i l

– . 0 8 2 *

– . 0 3 9

– . 0 9 4 * *

– . 0 4 8

– . 0 8 7 *

– . 0 5 0

– . 0 8 7 *

. 1 1 4 *

– . 0 7 1 *

N e w p r a c t i c e s

– . 0 4 4

. 2 5 0 * *

. 1 6 5 * *

. 3 0 1

* *

. 1 2 5 * *

. 3 8 4 * *

. 1 3 6 * *

. 3 0 9 * *

. 1 3 7 * *

. 3 6 4 * *

. 1 0 6 * *

. 3 5 2 * * *

. 0 5 6 *

. 3 0 4 * *

. 0 2 3

. 2 3 5 * *

. 1 1 3 * *

. 4 6 6 *

B u r . p r a c t i c e s

. 2 5 3 * *

. 0 6 9 *

. 2 5 2 * *

. 0 5 8

. 4 7 9 * *

. 1 7 5 * *

. 4 8 0 * *

. 2 0 2 * *

. 4 4 7 * *

. 2 0 4 * *

. 2 1 5 * *

. 0 6 0

. 5 8 0 * *

. 2 9 5 * *

. 4 9 1 * *

. 2 5 5 * *

. 5 3 8 * *

. 2 3 8 * *

R 2

. 2 0

. 3 1

. 2 2

. 3 1

. 4 4

. 3 7

. 4 4

. 3 1

. 4 0

. 2 9

. 2 4

. 2 5

. 4 7

. 3 1

. 3 5

. 3 1

. 5 3

. 4 8

N o

t e :

N = 1 , 0 0

0 i n e a c h s a m p l e . T h i s t a b l e r e p o

r t s s t a n d a r d i z e d c o e f fi c i e n t s f o r w o r k p l a c e r e g i m e v a r i a b l e s c o n t r o l l i n g f o r a l l c o m p o s i t i o n a l a n d s u b j e c t i v i t y

v a r i a b l e s ( s e e

T a b l e 1 ) w h e n t h e s a m p l e i s s p l i t

b y c o u n t r y .

* p ≤ . 0 5 ; * * p ≤

. 0 1 ( t w o - t a i l e d t e s t s ) .









and hence the more favorable treatment

afforded workers regardless of whether they

have a works council.

The results for union differ across the two

samples. In the U.S. sample, union bears sta-tistically significant negative associations

with all of our civic principles except empow-

erment and justice, for which there is no sig-

nificant association. This contrasts with results

in the German sample, where union bears a

significant negative association with freedom

and a significant positive association with

fairness, but no other significant associations.

Additional analysis revealed, however, that

the negative effects for union in the U.S. sample disappear once a variable measuring trust

in management is controlled (Godard and

Frege 2013:161). Thus, the observed effects of

union in Table 5 are negatively biased by

lower trust relations. Additional analysis also

revealed that, as for works councils in Ger-

many, U.S. unions appear to have positive

effects, through their implications for manage-

ment practices (Godard and Frege 2013:161).

We found little evidence of similar associa-tions in the German sample or of meaningful

interactions between the presence of a union

and that of a works council. The latter finding

is contrary to the belief that unions enhance

the effectiveness of works councils.

The findings for HRM practices are, how-

ever, of particular note. Both sets of practices

are statistically significant and positive in vir-

tually all the regressions. The only exceptions

are for new practices in the U.S. regressions

for freedom and justice, and for bureaucratic

practices in the German regressions for fulfill-

ment and empowerment . However, the coeffi-

cients for bureaucratic practices are in all

cases in the U.S. regressions at least double

the magnitude of those in the German regres-

sions. The reverse is the case with regard to

new practices. T-tests revealed all of these

differences to be statistically significant. As

expected, the different institutional environ-

ments of our two varieties of capitalism clearly

make a substantive and statistically significant

difference in how various employer practices

are implemented and ultimately in how they

affect the attainment of our civic principles.

Bureaucratic practices matter much more in

the United States, because they fill the gap left

by a weak institutional environment;10 new

work and HRM practices matter much more in

Germany, where beneficial constraints andstrong vocational skills help ensure their adop-

tion is more conducive to a positive work

experience.

CONCLUSIONS

This article had three intended contributions:

(1) to propose a more macro, societal approach

to the study of job quality, (2) to establish

how institutional environments are associatedwith job quality, and (3) to establish the

extent to which institutional differences

between the two archetypical varieties of

capitalism, Germany and the United States,

continue to matter overall. To serve these

purposes, we began by defining job quality in

accordance with broad, civic principles. We

then adopted an “institutional environments”

perspective to establish how (and whether)

institutional differences matter. We arguedthat differences in these environments should

have significant a priori implications for the

attainment of civic principles. However, we

also identified three additional mechanisms

that could matter: (1) compensatory employer

practices, (2) worker subjectivities, and (3)

the functioning and characteristics of work-

place regimes. We developed these arguments

with reference to differences between Ger-

many and the United States. Our general

expectation was that the German institutional

environment should give rise to higher levels

of, and lower inequality in, civic principle

attainment at work. This difference would,

however, be offset to the extent that U.S.

employers adopt compensatory practices.

Moreover, more critical subjectivities in Ger-

many would lessen the extent to which this

difference was actually reflected in workers’

experiences. Finally, in addition to their a

priori implications, institutional environments

should have implications for workplace

regime characteristics, further shaping

observed differences in the attainment of

civic principles at work.









We drew on data from a random telephone

survey of 2,000 U.S. and German workers to

establish the level of support for these argu-

ments. We found significantly lower variation

in the attainment of our principles in the Ger-man sample, suggesting that the strong German

institutional environment does indeed reduce

inequality in the attainment of these principles

at work. However, descriptive comparisons

between our two samples revealed only small

differences in the mean levels of their attain-

ment, with U.S. workers actually reporting

more favorable outcomes on three principles,

and German workers reporting more favorable

outcomes on only two. This suggested that thea priori effects of the German system might

indeed be offset by more critical subjectivities

in Germany and by compensatory employer

policies in the United States.

Multivariate analysis confirmed this to be

the case. First, when subjectivities (and hence

expectations) were controlled, we found Ger-

man workers did substantially better than

their U.S. counterparts. This suggests German

workers are, in an objective sense, better-off, but this tends to be masked by their more

critical evaluative standards. Second, when

employer practices were controlled, German

workers appeared to do even better than their

U.S. counterparts. This suggests that employer

practices do indeed compensate for the weak

institutional environment in the United States,

thereby lessening the gap between the United

States and Germany. In other words, the

“objective” effects of the German system

appear to be even stronger once the offsetting

effects of employer practices in the United

States are taken into account.

We also found support for our argument

that, in addition to their a priori effects,

national institutional environments matter

through their implications for the specific

characteristics and functioning of workplace

regimes. New work and HRM practices

appear to have more positive implications for

the realization of our civic principles in Ger-

many than in the United States, even though

these practices are more widely adopted in

the United States. Bureaucratic practices

appear to have far more positive implications

for the attainment of civic principles in the

United States, not necessarily because they

are implemented differently (which is the

case), but rather because they offer (extra-

legal) rights and protections that Germanworkers are more likely to already have or do

not need due to their skill levels.

Various forms of representation appear to

be much less important in the attainment of

civic principles. In the case of unions in the

United States, this may be in considerable

measure because they operate indirectly,

through their implications for the adoption of

bureaucratic practices. In Germany, it is likely

that unions and works councils duplicate theeffects of the national institutional environ-

ment and the logics associated with it, thereby

lessening the implications of their coverage at

the workplace level.

It follows that, if we are interested in under-

standing the importance of institutional envi-

ronments to job quality—at least as measured

by the attainment of civic principles at work—

it is indeed important to go beyond assumed

system effects to address the specific mecha-nisms by which these environments do (or do

not) matter. In this study, we made an initial

inroad into establishing what these mecha-

nisms are and how they operate, which was

one of our three intended contributions. By

focusing on civic principles, we also provided

a basis for reframing the literature on job qual-

ity, another of our intended contributions.

How much institutional differences

between Germany and the United States

really matter to the attainment of civic prin-

ciples at this point in history, which was to be

our third intended contribution, is not as

clear. Our results do suggest that national

institutional environments have both a priori

effects and conditioning effects, through

their implications for the functioning of

workplace regimes. Yet in the case of Ger-

many and the United States, their a priori

effects tend to be offset by compensatory

employer practices and by differences in

subjectivities, so that, in the end, the main

difference between German and U.S. work-

ers is not in the overall level of attainment of

civic principles, but rather in the relative








attainment of individual principles. Even

though U.S. workers may have weaker insti-

tutional environments, they tend to evaluate

their overall job quality as favorably as do

their German counterparts.These results could reflect an erosion of the

strength of the German institutional environ-

ment, and hence a weakening of its a priori

effects. They could also, however, reveal that

workers tend to “get what they want.” Where

national institutional environments are weak

and seem to be unfavorable to workers, this not

only reflects worker preferences, but also tends

to be compensated for at the workplace level

so that, in effect, workers are subjectively noworse off, on average, than their counterparts

in strong institutional environments. Indeed,

if one extends the varieties of capitalism

approach, one could argue that complementari-

ties are different between the two nations, with

the result that different institutional environ-

ments may yield equally satisfactory if some-

what different outcomes—at least in the case

of the two archetypical varieties of capitalism.

The main difference is that, where Germanworkers rely on national institutions and have

relatively critical evaluative standards for job

quality, U.S. workers rely on employer prac-

tices and have relatively acritical standards.

This, in turn, may reflect differences in more

deeply held institutional norms about the roleof the state, the role of employers, and ulti-

mately the role of employment in society.

Such an interpretation would, however,

leave out the role of broader power relations

within nations. The United States, in particu-

lar, may be characterized by a strong “mobili-

zation of bias” (Bachrach and Baratz

1962:949), in which employer interests have

had greater success at shaping not only the

reality to which workers are subject, but alsothe norms workers draw on to assess that real-

ity (Fligstein and Byrkeflot 1996). This would

provide a further explanation for why U.S.

workers evaluate the attainment of civic prin-

ciples as favorably as do their German coun-

terparts. Clearly, the question of institutional

norms and how they are shaped represents an

important area for future analysis, one that

does not seem to be well addressed in the

varieties of capitalism and much of the newinstitutionalist literature.

APPENDIXTable A1. Inter-correlations: Core (Table 2) Variables

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Work Experience

1. freedom

2. fulfillment .34

3. secure .33 .43

4. fraternity .32 .45 .63

5. dignity .37 .43 .60 .60

6. empowerment .32 .34 .44 .41 .47

7. fairness .31 .38 .62 .66 .58 .42

8. justice .22 .28 .45 .37 .37 .32 .50

9. job quality .60 .64 .79 .77 .79 .67 .78 .63

Workplace Regime

10. union –.11 –.06 .02 –.08 –.14 .00 .02 .17 –.03

11. works council –.02 .00 .05 –.01 –.01 –.01 .01 .30 .06 .40

12. non-union rep. .14 .14 .13 .12 .18 .15 .12 .31 .19 –.32 –– 13. new HRM practices .15 .33 .35 .28 .31 .28 .27 .28 .39 .05 .24 .22

14. bur. HRM practices .20 .26 .43 .41 .39 .18 .48 .47 .49 .16 .48 .12 .30

Note: Correlations above .05 are significant at the .05 level or better (two-tailed tests). N = 2,000,except for works council and non-union representation, which are in the German or U.S. sample only,respectively, N s = 1,000.









Funding and Data

The research for this article was funded by the Social

Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Copies of the survey instrument, data, programs, and

results are available on request, but for replication pur-

poses only unless otherwise permitted by the authors.

Notes

1. Our approach is similar to that of Fligstein and

Byrkjeflot (1996). They identify ideal-typical

employment system logics, attributing these ulti-

mately to political compromises during the origins

of industrialization. These logics become embed-

ded in cultural practices and meanings, the latter

serving as conceptions of control used to maintain

stable (power) relationships within organizational

fields. However, we focus more on broader institu-

tional environments and norms and do not assume

the former to be purposively designed by elites or to

serve a functional imperative.

2. It was not possible to compute reliable response

rates due to hang-ups prior to determining eligibil-

ity and households without a land-line or on do-not-

call lists. We estimated a 39 percent response rate

for our U.S. sample, but our German survey firm

could not provide equivalent data, instead report-

ing an “incident rate” of 59 percent, which did not

include hang-ups and do-not-call lists; we estimated

the equivalent rate for our U.S. sample to be compa-rable (51 percent).

3. Although our categories do not exactly match up,

other sectoral differences are largely consistent with

International Labour Organization (ILO) statistics

(http://www.ilo.org/ilostat), with the exception of

economic and financial services in the U.S. sample;

this may reflect under-reporting due to the unpopu-

lar image of this sector in the United States in the

aftermath of 2008.

4. For example, in the 1999 to 2002 World Values Sur-

vey (Inglehart et al. 2004), 52 percent of Germans

reported work to be very important in their life,compared to 33 percent of Americans; 32 percent of

Germans agreed that workers should defer to man-

agement authority without question, compared to

65 percent of Americans.

5. This is a formative (rather than reflective) index, as it

includes two distinct sources of freedom, the sum of

which may be an acceptable measure of total freedom

regardless of whether they correlate—much as two

distinct and poorly correlated sources of income might

be added to compute total income. These items can

thus be said to form (rather than reflect) the construct,

rendering alpha less appropriate (Macky and Boxall2007; Williams, Edwards, and Vandenberg 2003).

6. Factor analysis suggested a slightly different item

composition for this variable and for security and

fraternity, but the reliability scores (Cronbach’s

alpha) were weaker, and the item compositions less

consistent with our intended constructs.

7. As Table S3 in the online supplement shows, for

the latter three of these variables, this difference

is almost entirely accounted for by the higher per-

cent of Germans concerned about their employer’sfinancial health, which is statistically significant in

these regressions. For the first ( fulfillment ), it is

most accounted for by “hours worked,” which is

lower in the German sample yet positively corre-

lated with it (r = .16).

8. For Table 3, we entered the subjectivity variables

prior to employer practices because we wanted to

observe whether Germans are objectively better

off in general, that is, before controlling for work-

place regimes (and especially employer practices).

As Table S5 in the online supplement shows, the

changes in the if German coefficients when thesubjectivity variables are introduced after the

workplace regime variables are somewhat smaller

but still meaningful. If the changes in the if Ger-

man coefficients for each set are averaged across

the alternative orderings, the average effects of the

workplace regime variables are greater than those

for the subjectivity variables.

9. The initially weak results for security reflect higher

levels of training in the U.S. sample. We get some-

what stronger results (B = .09*, .17**, .23**,

.25**) when we drop this item from our measure

of security, and even stronger results (B = .12**,

.18**, .28**, .35**) when we use only the item

asking about job security; this could reflect slightly

lower unemployment in Germany as of 2009 (7.6

versus 9 percent) due to its short-time work scheme.

10. Regressions with individual items in this measure

revealed stronger effects for all items in the U.S.

sample than in the German sample (see Table S8 in

the online supplement); the greatest differences were

for internal hiring and seniority in promotion, which,

as expected, make little difference in Germany due to

its skill structure. These also loaded poorly in factor

analysis in the German sample; however, a measure of

bureaucratic practices without them (α = .42) yielded

only very slightly stronger results—for example, the

coefficient in the job quality regression increased only

to .27. It does not appear, therefore, that measurement

issues account for the smaller coefficient sizes for

bureaucratic practices in the German sample.

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Carola Frege is a Professor of Employment Relations at

the London School of Economics. Frege’s research hasfocused on the social science traditions within employ-

ment research, union revitalization strategies, and the

transformation and workings of employee representation

(social partnership and labor unions) in Western and

Eastern Europe as well as in the United States. She is the

author of Employment Research and State Traditions: A

Comparative History of Britain, Germany and the United

States (Oxford University Press 2007) and Social Part-

nership at Work (Routledge 1999). Frege co-edited Vari-

eties of Unionism: Comparative Strategies for Union

Renewal (Oxford University Press 2004) and Compara-

tive Employment Relations in the Global Political Econ-omy (Routledge 2013), both with John Kelly.

John Godard is a Professor of Industrial Relations and

Management at the University of Manitoba and Chief

Editor of the British Journal of Industrial Relations. His

work focuses on the nature of, and relationships between,

national institutional environments (especially state

policies, labor law, labor unions, and firm governance/

representation structures), employer practices, and the

experience and outcomes of work. It has appeared most

often in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review, the

British Journal of Industrial Relations, and Industrial

Relations.

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