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Public Policy and Administration

DOI: 10.1177/0952076708097907 2009; 24; 23 Public Policy and Administration

Bram Verschuere versus Reality

The Role of Public Agencies in the Policy Making Process: Rhetoric

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The Role of Public Agencies inthe Policy Making ProcessRhetoric versus Reality

Bram VerschuereUniversity College Ghent, Belgium

Abstract This article focuses on the role public agencies play in the policy makingprocess. Based on a single embedded case-study of one Flemish publicagency and two policy-programmes in which this agency is involved, thenormative practitioner model of the policy/operations divide is tested. Thismodel assumes (or prescribes) that policy making is a political prerogative,while public agencies as administrative actors should stick to implementingpolicy. The evidence shows that reality is more complex than the rhetoric ofthe practitioner model. Agencies may be more involved in policy preparationand policy decision-making than assumed, and political actors may in somecases have a large say in policy implementation. The evidence from my case-study shows that in reality the policy/operations divide might not be thatclear-cut, and that this normative model should be revised on some points.Next to that, the findings may be discussed in the light of the currentadministrative reform projects in various countries that propagate a strictlabour division between the political sphere (policy) and the administrativesphere (implementing policy). This discussion is particularly relevant for theFlemish public sector that is currently facing a major reform of that kind.

Keywords administrative reform, Flemish public sector, policy/operations divide, publicagencies

Introduction

The focus of this article is the task division between political actors and adminis-trative actors in the policy cycle. As I will show, the normative practitioner doc-trine of the ‘policy/operations divide’ assumes that politicians decide on policies,while administrative agencies should implement these policies. This philosophy is

DOI: 10.1177/0952076708097907Bram Verschuere, Dept. Handelswetenschappen en Bestuurskunde, Hogeschool Gent, Voskenslaan 270, 9000 Gent, Belgium. [email: [email protected]] 23

© Public Policy and AdministrationSAGE Publications LtdLos Angeles, London, New Delhiand Singapore

0952-0767200901 24(1) 23–46



also one of the cornerstones of the current administrative reform that is transform-ing the structure of the public sector in Flanders (BBB: Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid,or Better Governmental Policy [author translation]). The aim of this article istherefore to investigate empirically the extent to which this model is also found inreality. Many authors have questioned the empirical validity of a strict task divi-sion between politics and administration (e.g. Aberbach et al., 1981; Jacobsen,2006; Pollitt et al., 2004; Svara, 1998, 2001). In this article, I will first discuss therhetoric of the model and how this model has been an inspiration for the ongoingFlemish public sector reform. Second, I will empirically test the prevalence of thepolicy/operations divide in the real world, via a single embedded case study of one Flemish public agency. Third, I will discuss the research findings and theirrelevance for the theoretical and practitioner debates.

Rhetoric: The Policy/Operations Divide

The discussion about the task division in the policy process between political andadministrative actors is not new. Already more than one century ago, WoodrowWilson (1887) discussed the dichotomy between politics and administration.Since the rise of the new public management (NPM), this discussion has beenrenewed and intensified again. NPM can be defined as a set of ideas that combinesseveral intellectual and ideological dimensions (Aucoin, 1990). According toAucoin (1990), the administrative reform processes observed under the umbrellaof NPM have been inputed by two sets of ideas. First, and emanating from theschool of public choice, there was the idea to re-establish the primacy of govern-ment over bureaucracy. Second, and emanating from managerial thinking, therewas the perceived need to re-establish the primacy of managerial practices overbureaucracy (e.g. fighting ‘red-tape’). One important vehicle that has been intro-duced in many reform processes is the executive agency at arm’s length of the coreof government (Pollitt et al., 2001; Schick, 2002). Practitioners and decisionmakers in large parts of the western world engaged in large agencification pro-grammes (Pollitt et al., 2001). Reformers have often argued that the specializationof public functions in agencies will lead to better management and better service-delivery, and that distancing public services in agencies will lead to a professionalmanagement and greater transparency by bringing services closer to the citizenand by ‘making managers manage and letting managers manage’. Not only largeagencification-programmes were initiated from the 1980s on in some countries(e.g. in the UK and the Netherlands), but also in countries with a longer traditionof having arm’s length agencies for delivering public services, reforms of andwithin agencies were observed. One practice has been, for example, the intro-duction of performance control via management contracts as a new managementpractice within existing agencies. As Pollitt et al. (2004) state:

Public Policy and Administration 24(1)

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the agency form of organizing government activities has become the subject of reformprograms in dozens of countries in the past decade and a half . . . these initiatives can begrouped under diverse labels, from reforming pre-existing agencies (in countries such asthe USA, Sweden, and Finland), through creating new and only moderately autonomousagencies (in the UK and the Netherlands), to a fairly radical separating out of a class oforganizations with extensive autonomy (New Zealand e.g.). (Pollitt et al., 2004: 31)

Inspired and spread by NPM-rhetoric, an ‘ideal-type’ agency-form emerged that isstructurally disaggregated from the core government, has extended managerialdecision-making authority, and is subject to performance contracting (Pollitt et al.,2001, 2004). Another feature that has been applied in many reforms, is the policy/operations divide between politicians and executive agencies (Bach, 2006;Christensen and Laegreid, 2001; Schick, 2002). It is often observed that in manycountries that have implemented NPM reforms, increased horizontal specializa-tion of administrative functions were often coupled with a clearer separation ofpolitical and administrative functions, aiming at a sharper structural separation oftasks related to policy advice, regulation and control, ownership, purchase andprovision and so on (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001). A clear case is for exampleNew Zealand where reforms established single-purpose agencies, and adopted theprinciple of divided responsibility (Boston et al. cited in Christensen and Laegreid,2001). Also the Next Steps programme in the UK has some features of the policy/operations divide (Hood, 1990). Derek Lewis points out that ‘the aim of NextSteps was to describe more precisely the respective jobs of ministers and civilservants . . . ministers being responsible for setting policy . . . civil servants incharge of making it happen, having the autonomy to get on’ (cited in Schick, 2002:16). Recently however, as Gregory (2003: 41) observes in New Zealand, thegovernmental policy is to reverse the negative effects of agencification processesthat fragmented the public sector: ‘(coordination efforts) are to reverse in someinstances the policy operational split that was imposed by the reforms, and seeksto achieve better integration between operational outputs and policy outcomes’.The latter observation also shows that in pioneering NPM-countries such as NewZealand, the policy/operations divide was a substantial part of the agencificationreforms. If agencies are ‘vehicles of NPM’ and the policy/operations divide is partof the NPM-doctrine (Gruening, 1998), then there is also a ‘doctrinal’ justificationto consider this feature as a part of the ideal type agency. In a sense, NPM is areaction to the ‘old bureaucracies’ that combined policy work and implementationin the same often very large administrations (Schick, 2002). In terms of Aucoin(1990) the policy/operations divide can be justified by NPM-advocates by refer-ring to two ‘major sets’ of ideas: the primacy of politics that urges for a politicaldomination over policy making; and the managerialist school that urges for abetter specialization of tasks (single-purpose agencies, closer to citizens,efficiency, etc.). To put it in a very simple manner, normative practitioner theoriesand reform-rhetoric thus suggest that administrative actors such as arm’s lengthagencies should focus on policy implementation, rather than on being involved in

Verschuere: Public Agencies and Policy Making Process

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the policy/decision-making process. Figure 1 shows this hypothetical task divi-sion in the policy cycle between arm’s length agencies (agents, full line) and theiroversight authorities (principals, dotted line) in a simplified manner.

On the horizontal axis, the stages in the policy cycle are represented in a simpli-fied manner. The vertical axis shows the influence of agents and principals inpolicy decisions made in the different stages of the policy cycle. The preparation ofpolicies (PREP) and the determination of policies (DET) are tasks that are theresponsibilty of the oversight authorities of the agencies (administrative and politi-cal). The key task of arm’s length agencies is implementing these policies (IMP).The figure thus represents in a simple way the so-called ‘policy/operations divide’,which suggests that there is a gap between administrative tasks (implementingpolicies) and political tasks (preparing and deciding on policies): agencies areprimarily involved in decisions made during the implementation stages of thepolicy, while principals make most significant decisions during the preparation anddecision making stages of the policy. If these assumptions by the normative practi-tioner theories are correct, then one can expect that the involvement of agencies inthe policy making process is low in the preparation and determination stages of thepolicy cycle. In these phases, the important policy decisions will be made by thepolitical and administrative principals of the agency. In the implementation phase,on the other hand, one can expect that agencies will have higher levels of involve-


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Figure 1 Hypothetical task division in the policy cycle between arm’s lengthagencies and their oversight authorities in a simplified manner

PREP DET IMP

Influence in policy related decision

Principal

Agency



ment (resulting from the agency’s larger role in the implementation of the policy).However, some authors do not consider the policy/operations divide as a key

feature of the NPM ideal type agency. They observe a discrepancy between offi-cial rhetoric and empirical reality. For example Pollitt et al. (2004: 41ff.) do notinclude the policy/operations divide in their normative ‘tripod-model’ of agencifi-cation. Although the same authors declare that ‘in many accounts of the agencymovement it is suggested that this includes a split between policy-making andpolicy implementation’, they doubt this feature is fundamentally part of theagency idea as there are both doctrinal and empirical examples of where thepolicy–operations divide does not form a part of the agency movement. Pollitt etal. (2004: 41–2) give an overview of agency-practices in which a strictpolicy/operations divide seems absent. In Sweden for example agencies and min-isters both play important roles in policy making historically. Carpenter (2001)found that many agencies in the USA seem to have a great deal of policy makingcompetences (policy autonomy). Talbot (2004) observed that in the UK a consid-erable number of large agencies not only provide services, but also are involved inpolicy. As a final example, some authors claim that service provision itself (anassumed task of agencies) includes not only services or products, but also mayinclude policy advice (Boston et al., 1996; Kemp, 1993).

In the remainder of this article I take a look at the Flemish situation. First Idescribe the rhetorics at work by looking at how the policy/operations divide isnormatively conceived in the public sector reform in Flanders. Next, I take a lookat the empirical reality, in order to check whether agency practice matches withnormative rhetorics.

Rhetorics at Work: The Flemish Public Sector Reform

The discussion about the role of agencies in the policy decision making process isparticularly relevant within the context of the current reform project of the Flemishpublic sector (cf. Introduction, hereafter BBB). Essentially, the major goal of thisorganizational reform is to create a public sector that is organized along someguiding principles that can to a certain extent be discussed with reference to thecharacteristics of the normative ideal-type agency presented earlier. In theMemorandum of Understanding of the decree ‘Bestuurlijk Beleid’ it is explicitlyrecognized that by this reform ‘recent OECD trends’ are followed. Next to thefeature of structural disaggregation (‘splitting up the public sector’), which resultsin the establishment of autonomous agencies, BBB also relies on principles thatcan be linked to the three other features of the ideal-type agency. More specific-ally, the restoration of the ‘primacy of politics’ is a key principle of BBB. It isexplicitly recognized in the preparatory work of the decree that parliament andgovernment should decide on policy, that policy preparation and evaluation is atask for the core departmental organizations such as central ministries, and thatagencies at arm’s length need to implement the policy with a large degree of


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managerial autonomy. As a result, implementation of the policy is the core task ofagencies according to the principles of the BBB reform project. In the same runhowever, it is recognized by the decree that there is not such a thing as anunbridgeable wall between departments and agencies. Both interact as communi-cating vessels. Agencies can for example provide implementation checks to assessthe level of realism of the policy proposals, and as such their role in giving ‘policysupport’ is recognized. This interaction takes place at a very operational level,however, as the big strategic policy preparations for the long term are to be doneby the departments. In the Memorandum of Understanding of the decree (Vl.Parl.Stuk 1612 Nr.1: 22 [author translation]) we read that:

The new organizational model departs from the clear and consistent division of tasksbetween departments (policy preparation) and autonomous agencies (policy implemen-tation). This is built on the principle of the primacy of politics . . . this article in the decreeis about the division of tasks between the various parts of the Flemish administration:departments, and internally and externally autonomous agencies, regarding policy sup-port and policy implementation . . . the point of departure is the policy determination,which is the task of the minister and the government: choosing policy goals, effects,instruments and initiatives to take . . .

According to BBB, the minister and the government are vested with extensivepolicy determination competences that range from setting the goals to choosingthe policy-instruments. The administrative actors’ role in the policy decision-making process is restricted to advice and implementation. Ministries advise onpolicy, arm’s length agencies implement these policies.

Empirical Scope

For answering my research question (‘to what extent do we observe the model ofthe policy/operations divide in reality in Flanders?’), I have performed a singleembedded case study. I have selected one executive Flemish public agency, andtwo policy programmes in which this agency is involved. The case organization(the agency) is the Flemish Public Transport Company (hereafter VVM). VVM isan agency with an implementing role. It has not many regulative or other policy-related tasks. Its main goal is to provide public transport, hence driving publicbuses and tramways. This is a crucial organizational feature on which I rely forselecting this agency, as I need to be able to test the assumption that agencies witha large implementation role are not involved in policy related matters. Hence, Ichoose for an agency that has a large role in policy implementation (or servicedelivery). The VVM is organized via the principle of territorial decentralisation.Beside the central management and the staff functions in the central headquarters,it has five provincial entities that are responsible for delivering public transport inthe province for which the entity is responsible (Flanders has 5 provinces). Next tothat, it is a so-called arm’s length agency, structurally disaggregated from the core


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department, with its own public law legal personality. This is also an importantcriterion for choosing the VVM as my case organisation, as I want to test the taskdivision in the policy between politicians and arm’s length agencies (which areassumed to be policy implementing vehicles according to normative assump-tions). Moreover, the VVM seems to be more or less representative for the groupof arm’s length public agencies in Flanders in terms of observed autonomy andcontrol practice by the oversight authorities (Verschuere, 2006). Another impor-tant point is that the organization is not too much affected by changes resultingfrom the reform process that is currently taking place in Flanders (BBB). It isimportant that the managerial and organizational structure of my case organizationremains more or less the same before and after BBB, because the data-collectiontook place in the middle of the reform process. Additionally, the organization mustbe accessible for collecting data. Practical reasons urge for choosing an organiza-tion that is accessible and has sufficient critical mass to enable participation in astudy. A final important criterion is that the organization I have selected allows fora valid data collection and analysis strategy. This means that it needs to beinvolved in policy initiatives that are accessible and comparable, and that containpolicy implementation initiatives that are also accessible and traceable. For morefeatures of the case organization I refer to Appendix 1 (derived from Verschuere2006).

After a first round of discussions with people closely related to the selectedagency I have chosen two policy initiatives in which the VVM is involved: ‘basicmobility’ and ‘Pegasus’. The policy programme of basic mobility aims at increas-ing the supply of public transport in the Flemish region. Via a decree that wasvoted in parliament in 2001, the norms for public transport delivery in Flanderswere set. Essentially, the decree sees public transport as a social right for every-body. This social right applies to all citizens, in all regions of Flanders, notwith-standing special attention is given to certain groups that are considered risk-groupsand are vulnerable for suffering from traffic-poverty (disabled people, elderly peo-ple, people living in rural areas, etc.). Therefore, the decree arranges basic mobil-ity by specifying explicit output norms for the public transport services. Publictransport services are to be delivered within acceptable time-limits and distancelimits, and therefore norms and criteria have been developed (frequency of serv-ice, number of bus stops, amplitude of service, etc.).

The policy programme of Pegasus was launched when societal consensusstarted to grow that one of the key policy issues for the future was the preservationof the accessibility of the ‘Flemish Diamond’, the economic heart of Flanders(region between Antwerp, Ghent, Brussels and Leuven). One of the measurestaken to fight ever growing traffic jams and traffic congestion, was the continuousdevelopment of a high quality public transport net. The choices are made explicitand determined in the Pegasus-plan, an overall plan for the Flemish Diamond, thatwas taken up in the governmental agreement of the current Flemish government.In this plan the policy goals and the desired policy output have been made


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concrete. The plan contains mainly tactical choices about how public transportservice delivery may help to reach the policy goals expressed. The aim is to reachextra travelers for public transport and to decrease traffic jams in the region. Thisgoal is operationalized in explicit figures and goals (80m extra travelers for publictransport by 2025), to be achieved by ameliorating the bus and tram net in theregion. One of the first concrete projects under Pegasus was the implementation ofmeasures that had to decrease the negative mobility effects during the restoration-works of the Antwerp ringroad in 2004. This very busy highway lost a consider-able part of its automobility-capacity during these works. A large part of themeasure was to replace lost automobility-capacity by extended public transport(buses, trams), the inspiration for which was taken from the general Pegasuspolicy plan.

There are some important resemblances between both policy programmes. First,both policy programmes have a relatively high impact and visibility. Basic mobil-ity is the restructuring of the supply of public transport in the whole Flemish region,and in every single local authority. This policy affects virtually every citizen, andespecially the users of public transport. Pegasus mainly affects the region of theFlemish Diamond and the people who live there (57% of total population inFlanders). But it also affects a lot of home-work travellers, as the region hosts manyemployers (more than 60% of the workforce is located in the Flemish Diamond). Inboth programmes, the VVM is the implementer of the policy, by delivering publictransport services. VVM has to implement basic mobility projects in the field, andVVM has to implement parts of the policy of Pegasus in the field. Furthermore,both policy programmes stem from policy needs that are politically and societallyrecognized. This can be illustrated by the fact that both programmes addressproblems that are related to two of the key-pillars of the Mobility Plan Flanders: (1) guaranteeing access to mobility for every citizen in Flanders and (2) guarantee-ing the accessibility to the Flemish economic centres. As such, basic mobility ispart of the social policy component of public transport, whereas Pegasus is to beconsidered as part of the societal component of public transport.

Notwithstanding these similarities, there is one crucial difference between bothpolicy programmes. The level to which the policy programme of basic mobility isformalized and detailed is much larger than the level to which the policy pro-gramme of Pegasus is formalized. In terms of Huber and Shipan (2002), thismeans that the policy of basic mobility is spelled out with a much larger level ofdetail compared to the policy of Pegasus. The bottom line is that basic mobility isarranged via a decree that was voted in Parliament, and via accompanyinggovernmental decisions. These regulations arrange the way basic mobility is to beimplemented in the field with a large level of detail. On the other hand, the policyof Pegasus is only formalized to a small extent. Its formal status is a policy planthat has been taken up in the governmental agreement implying a commitment bythe government to take initiatives that start the implementation of the Pegasus-plan. Such a commitment has less direct consequences than a decree, as it is not


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implying a right that has to be fulfilled by law. Next to that, the way the imple-mentation projects that are under the Pegasus-umbrella are to be implemented isspecified in a less detailed way as is the case for basic mobility.

Data and Analysis

In order to be able to measure the influence of the various actors in the policyprocess, I use data from a written questionnaire addressed in 2006 to 41 respon-dents (24 of whom responded). These respondents were selected for expertise withmobility policy in general, and with the policy programmes under scrutiny inspecific (ministerial advisers, MP’s, experts, people from the administration,people from the VVM, etc.). In the questionnaire I asked to which extent thedifferent actors in the policy process had exerted input in the key decisions madein the different phases (preparation, determination, implementation) of the policyof basic mobility and Pegasus. The actors in the policy process whose influencehad to be rated were (1) the central management of the agency (VVM central ser-vices), (2) the territorially decentralized implementing units of the agency (VVMprovincial entities), (3) the political oversight authorities (cabinet of the ministerof mobility), and (4) the administrative oversight unit of the agency (Ministry ofMobility and Public Transport).

The respondents were asked to rate the input of these actors in the policy-decisions that were taken on a scale ranging from 1 (very small) to 10 (very large).For identifying the key decisions that were made during the different stages of thepolicy process, I have performed an extensive document analysis. In Appendix 2the major policy decisions are briefly outlined in the questions of the question-naire. These key policy decisions I identified were then presented to the respon-dents, whose job it was to rate the different actors influence in the decisions made.

The data received from these questionnaires were analysed in a quantitativeway. I calculated the mean score of N respondents per policy phase and per actorin the policy process. These mean scores give an indication of the influence of theactors in the policy process. The scores of the individual respondents were notweighted, for two reasons: all the respondents were selected for their expertise andknowledge about the policy programme; and the respondents were asked not toanswer questions about issues (policy phases) they are unfamiliar with. I thus pre-sume to have control over at least (1) the respondents interrogated (all are key-respondents, familiar with the topic) and (2) the validity of their answers(respondents themselves selected topics to answer, based on the level of familiar-ity with, for example, a programme, or a certain policy-phase). To a certain extentI rely on the notion of ‘intersubjectivity’ here. In Appendix 3, tables are presentedthat show the distribution of the scores of the individual respondents, per policyphase of both policy programmes. Moreover, the empirical results presentedhereafter have been triangulated with complementary evidence from documentanalysis. Although for reasons of parsimony only the results of the quantitative


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questionnaire data are presented here, the additional documentary evidence hasshown to be in support of the data presented (Verschuere, 2006).

The Real World: Empirical Evidence

Figure 2 shows the results of the analysis for the policy programme of ‘basicmobility’. On the vertical axis the stages of the policy cycle can be found (prepa-ration, determination, implementation). On the vertical axis the mean score of theactors in the policy process can be found (agency management and provincialentities, political and administrative principals).

As the figure shows, the key decision maker in the preparation and determina-tion phases of the policy is the minister of mobility and his cabinet (dotted line:average score of approx. 9 in the PREP and DET phases of the policy cycle). Otheractors such as the agency or the administrative oversight authorities are consider-ably less involved in the decisions made concerning the policy during the prep-aration and determination phases of the policy of basic mobility. In theimplementation phase however, we can observe that both the agency (manage-ment, and provincial entities) and the oversight authorities are equally involved inthe decision making process. Table 1 shows the results of the Wilcoxon test(SPSS). This test assesses whether the differences between the mean scores of the


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Figure 2 Analysis for the policy programme of ‘basic mobility’

10.00

9.00

8.00

7.00

6.00

5.00

4.00

3.00

PREP DET IMPPhase

AG MAN

AG ENT

PR POL

PR ADM



actors in the policy process are statistically significant. One can read the table hor-izontally (mean scores of the actors, per policy phase, and N of respondents). In thelast column the results of the Wilcoxon test for comparing means are shown. Thistest looks for statistically significant differences in the means of two related sam-ples, showing for example that in the preparation phase, the mean scores of thedifferent actors are significantly different, except between the agency manage-ment (mean: 4.9) and the administrative principal (mean: 5.1).

We can also read the table vertically (scores of 1 actor over the different policyphases). Also here, the significance of differences between mean scores has beentested statistically. The results thus show that the agency seems to be moreinvolved in the implementation phase than in the preparation and determinationphases, which is consistent with the normative model (compare figure 1 on page 5


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Table 1 Results of the Wilcoxon test (SPSS)

Wilcoxon test (paired) AG_MAN AG_ENT PR_POL PR_ADM + significance of

(mean + N) (mean + N) (mean + N) (mean + N) differences

BM_PREP 4,9 (18) 3,2 (17) 9,2 (19) 5,1 (19) AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.00)AG_MAN * PR_POL (.00)AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.80)AG_ENT * PR_POL (.00)AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.01)PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)

BM_DET 6,1 (20) 3,6 (18) 9,5 (20) 6,7 (19) AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.00)AG_MAN * PR_POL (.00)AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.12)AG_ENT * PR_POL (.00)AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.00)PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)

BM_IMP 7,5 (20) 8,4 (20) 7,6 (20) 6,7 (18) AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.10)AG_MAN * PR_POL (.87)AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.42)AG_ENT * PR_POL (.14)AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.00)PR_POL * PR_ADM (.12)

Wilcoxon PREP*DET (.03) PREP*DET (.32) PREP*DET (.25) PREP*DET (.00)test (paired) PREP*IMP (.00) PREP*IMP (.00) PREP*IMP (.02) PREP*IMP (.02)+ sig. of DET*IMP (.01) DET*IMP (.00) DET*IMP (.00) DET*IMP (.65)differences



with figure 2). The provincial entities of the agency seem to have a large role in theimplementation phase. These findings are also statistically significant. Moreover,we can see that during the first two policy phases, the political principal seems tohave a significantly larger influence than any other actor in the policy process,which is also consistent with the normative model. On the other hand, the largeinfluence of the political and administrative oversight authorities in the imple-mentation phase (no significant differences with other actors) is not in line withthe assumptions of the policy/operations divide model.

A similar analysis can be done for the policy process of Pegasus. Figure 3 showsthat the key decision maker in the preparation phase of the policy is the minister ofmobility and his cabinet.

Actors in the agency and actors from the administrative oversight authoritieswere involved to a lesser extent in the preparation phase. During the determinationphase however – when the policy vision is translated into a politically approvedpolicy plan – the actors in the agency also start to play a role. The agency man-agement and the agency provincial entities, together with the minister of mobility(PR POL) seem to play an equal and large role in the decision making processduring the determination of the policy of Pegasus. In the implementation phasethis is also the case: the political oversight actors and the agency simultaneouslyplay a considerable role in the decision making process. Table 2 is similar to thetable presented above for the policy of basic mobility, and shows to what extent


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Figure 3 Policy process of Pegasus

10.00

9.00

8.00

7.00

6.00

5.00

4.00

3.00

PREP DET IMPPhase

AG MAN

AG ENT

PR POL

PR ADM



the differences between the mean scores of the actors per policy phase (horizon-tally), and of the same actor over different policy phases (vertical) are statisticallysignificant.

Contrary to the policy programme of basic mobility, the findings for the policyprogramme of Pegasus seem to contradict the normative model to a large extent(compare Figure 1 with Figure 3). In the preparation phase of the policy, theinfluence of the political principal is significantly higher than any other actor’sinfluence, but in the determination and implementation phases this is not the case.The influence of the agency in both phases is equal to the political principal’sinfluence (and high). The influence of the administrative is low throughout thepolicy cycle.


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Table 2 Mean scores of the actors per policy phase and over different policy phases

Wilcoxon test (paired) AG_MAN AG_ENT PR_POL PR_ADM + significance of

(mean + N) (mean + N) (mean + N) (mean + N) differences

PEG_PREP 6,5 (17) 5,2 (17) 8,4 (18) 5,6 (16) AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.02)AG_MAN * PR_POL (.01)AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.35)AG_ENT * PR_POL (.00)AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.62)PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)

PEG_DET 7,9 (18) 8,1 (18) 7,4 (17) 3,5 (15) AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.80)AG_MAN * PR_POL (.41)AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.00)AG_ENT * PR_POL (.48)AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.00)PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)

PEG_IMP 7,3 (19) 8,4 (20) 8,4 (20) 4,1 (16) AG_MAN * AG_ENT (.02)AG_MAN * PR_POL (.05)AG_MAN * PR_ADM (.01)AG_ENT * PR_POL (.95)AG_ENT * PR_ADM (.00)PR_POL * PR_ADM (.00)

Wilcoxon PREP*DET (.01) PREP*DET (.00) PREP*DET (.04) PREP*DET (.01)test (paired) PREP*IMP (.09) PREP*IMP (.00) PREP*IMP (.56) PREP*IMP (.17)+ sig. of DET*IMP (.13) DET*IMP (.44) DET*IMP (.02) DET*IMP (.17)differences



Discussion

The results of my case study shed an interesting light on the policy/operationsdivide. It seems that the strict policy/operations divide is absent in the case of theVVM, and that this agency cannot be simply positioned in one or other positionalong the divide. The political oversight authorities, and to a lesser extent theadministrative oversight authorities, have a substantial input during the imple-mentation phase. Meanwhile, and especially for the case of Pegasus, the agencyhas a considerable influence in the preparation and determination of the policy.Based on these observations, we can conclude that there is no clear ‘gap’ between‘policy’ (task of democratically elected politicians and their staff, political and/orministerial) and ‘operations’ (implementation as the exclusive task of the arm’slength agency) as some practitioner theories would suggest (and sometimes advo-cate). This finding is in line with a growing number of empirical studies (e.g.Pollitt et al., 2004). The case study shows that the level to which the agency isinvolved in policy decisions may vary between different policy programmes, andbetween different policy phases. The conclusion that the policy/operations divideis rare among Flemish agencies, is also reflected in earlier research on Flemishagencies by Verhoest et al. (2003). This suggests that many agencies perceivethemselves to be able to make significant policy choices. Next to that, and basedon data from the same survey, the majority (approx. 75%) of Flemish publicagencies seem to declare to have ‘policy implementation’ as a primary task. In thesame survey however, there is also a considerable number of agencies that see‘policy preparation’ as their primary task (20%), or even ‘decision-making’ (5%).Furthermore, research by Rommel (2006) of five Flemish public agencies alsoconcludes that the separation between policy and execution is unrealistic andnormatively disputed, and that agencies may be involved in the preparation andthe formulation of policy simultaneously.

Also, other authors have concluded that as far as the policy/operations divide isconcerned, the reality seems to be more complex than the normative model wouldsuggest. The dichotomy between politics and administration, which is rooted inthe belief that politicians and administrators should not interfere in each others‘domain’, has repeatedly been proven false by various scholars who suggest amodel of complementarity between political and administrative actors. Accordingto Jacobsen (2006) there has been much research (e.g. Aberbach et al., 1981;Aberbach and Rockman, 1988; Kingdon, 1995; Svara, 1998, 2001) that shows an‘extensive, though varying, intermeshing of the two spheres [political and admin-istrative]’. This view is best formulated by Svara (1998, 2001), who claims that the‘politics-administration dichotomy is an aberration’. The dichotomy modelremains important as a normative standard for practitioners, but it ‘is not what itseems’. Based on research, Svara (1998) proposes an alternative model ofcomplementarity with shifting boundaries between the policy and the administra-tive arenas, implying changes in the behaviour of both politicians and bureaucrats.


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Complementarity entails ‘ongoing interaction, reciprocal input, and mutual defer-ence between elected officials and administrators. Administrators help to shapepolicy and give it specific content and meaning in the process of implementation.Elected officials oversee implementation, probe specific complaints about poorperformance and try to fine tune in performance problems’ (Svara, 2001: 180).Other authors also come to similar conclusions, based on empirical research indifferent contexts. Jacobsen (2006), for example, shows that the border betweenthe political and administrative sphere is not absolute. His research in 30Norwegian municipalities (Jacobsen, 2006: 303) shows that this border is a vari-able ‘opening up for the possibility that it may vary among contexts, structures,demographics and over time’. Fedele et al. (2005) point at a similar phenomenonbased on research on Italian agencies:

the experience in many countries highlights examples of minister’s involvement inagency managerial and operational matters . . . [on the other hand, also] the study of twoagencies in Italy seems to indicate an influential role of the executive agencies in thepolicy formulation process, with a potentially ‘political’ role. (Fedele et al., 2005: 9)

A second point for discussion is an issue for further research. Given the observa-tion that in some cases the agency (as an administrative actor) is involved in policymaking processes, and in other cases not, it might be interesting to investigate thecircumstances under which agencies have a considerable say in the policy process,or not. Earlier research may provide us with some answers. A first factor that maybe influencing the involvement of administrative actors in the policy process is‘capacity’. Carpenter (2001) found that organizational capacity and expertise,resulting from strong leadership, talented officers that are coherent, and offices inwhich turnover is minimized (stability, experience), are important factors forestablishing the reputation and legitimacy of the agency upon which it can rely to‘forge’ decision making autonomy. Similar claims about the importance of orga-nizational capacity and expertise were advanced by Hammond and Knott (1999),who argued that specific leadership and skills of the management may be aprerequisite to advance the preferred policy of the agency. Krause (2003) arguedthat organizational stability is important for the agency to be able ‘to handle’ dis-cretion, and Hawkins and Jacoby (2004) have argued that agency/expertise andknowledge may be important resources to enable the agency to have discretion orautonomy in (implementing) policy. Other factors may be related to the policyprogramme, for example the political salience around the policy. One might arguethat in highly significant policy issues the agency will tend to be steered morestrictly (Pollitt et al., 2004; ‘t Hart, 2002) or will have the incentive to demand lessdiscretion (Krause, 2003), hence having fewer opportunities to be involved inpolicy making. On the other hand, one could also reason the other way around. Itcould be the case that in times of high political turbulence around policy, the politi-cal oversight will tend to pass the ‘hot potato’ to the agency, and give them thediscretion to taken policy related decision (Verschuere, 2006). Another factor may


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be the attitude of the agency towards the programme. This factor is likely to berelated to cultural-institutional theories, which would explain decision makingbehavior of agencies as being largely culturally determined and based on ‘inter-nalized’ normative and value frameworks (Laegreid et al., 2005, 2006; Thoenig,2003). The attitude of the agency towards the policy programme can be induced bya ‘normative’ belief of the agency about whether the proposed policy seems todeal with some urgent societal problems or needs, and whether the issues withwhich the proposed policy deals are the right issues to be addressed as a policypriority (according to the agency’s perception). Still other factors may be internalto the actors in the policy process, such as the rather normative role perception ofthe agency. The role perception of agencies may be defined as the belief of howactors are supposed to behave (or what behavior is ‘appropriate’). The assessmentof appropriateness will be done by the actor via comparing actual behavior to thenormative value frameworks, roles, and routines that apply and are internal to the organization. Role perceptions of the agency may determine whether it isappropriate to be involved in the decision making process (‘are we an agency witha policy role?’). Gains (1999, 2004) showed that customs and traditions derivedfrom the past such as existing formal and informal constitutional and institutionalarrangements in governmental departments to a large extent determine thefeatures of the minister-agency relations that are at work today in Next Steps agen-cies (via mechanisms of path dependence). Moynihan and Pandey (2006) foundthat features of organizational cultures may help to explain the level of (manage-rial) autonomy in public agencies. According to the latter authors, agencies with astrong managerial and entrepreneurial culture tend to demand and receive moremanagerial autonomy (contrary to agencies with a bureaucratic culture). Finally,the relationship between political principal and administrative actor may influencethe extent to which administrative actors are involved in the policy makingprocess. According to Laegreid et al. (2005, 2006), high levels of mutual trust andsupport between the agency and the oversight authorities may be assumed todecrease levels of cultural collusion between agency and minister, increasing thelevels of leeway that is left to agency, because the agency is trusted to make the‘right’ decisions. Also, other authors found that large political support for theagency may lead to greater autonomy of the agency. Moynihan and Pandey (2006)claim that politicians are likely to provide autonomy to an organization they trust,has a strong track record and is unlikely to use autonomy in an undesirable way.Carpenter (2001) found that agencies with a good reputation, a strong legitimacyand embedded in strong political networks may be able to ‘forge’ their policyautonomy. Verhoest (2003) found that agencies showing an open and consistentattitude towards the political principals may enjoy larger levels of autonomy (orlower oversight control).

The empirical evidence is too narrow for being able to test the existing explana-tions for policy autonomy or policy influence of administrative agencies. Thisdiscussion is beyond the scope of the article. At most, the article can feedback


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single case study results to this literature, and develop a refined hypotheticalmodel based on this evidence (see Verschuere, 2006). It might be worthwile how-ever in future research to test existing explanations based on large-N or multiplecase study research. In relation to the case study, some initial statements about thereasons for agencies’ involvement in the policy decision-making process can bemade. The fact that in Pegasus the influence in the policy making process by theVVM was substantially larger than in the policy of basic mobility, can be relatedto some of the factors discussed above (Verschuere, 2006). First, the fact that theVVM has evolved over time into an agency with extended policy making capaci-ties, and the subsequent normative shift in the agency that started to see itself as anagency with a policy role, may be related to the fact that in the ‘older’ policy pro-gramme (basic mobility, preparation started in 1995) the input by the VVM wassmaller than in the ‘younger’ policy programme (Pegasus, preparation started in2000). Second, the attitude of the VVM towards the policy programme of basicmobility was less positive than their attitude towards the policy of Pegasus.Extending service delivery and developing high quality transport nets in thedensely populated region of the Flemish Diamond has been priority number onefor the agency. The VVM had a firm belief that the policy of Pegasus was address-ing the right policy problems in the field (fighting congestion in the FlemishDiamond via extended public transport). Hence when the debate about theaccessibility of the Flemish Diamond is launched politically (e.g. parliamentarydebates around the Mobility Plan Flanders), the VVM has an incentive to beclosely involved in preparing public transport policies that address this issue. Tothe contrary, the VVM was not that much in support of public transport policy/programmes as proposed with basic mobility. They believed that basic mobilitywas the wrong policy in the field of public transport. The VVM has always beenused to demand related work (delivering where the needs are highest) and in anefficient and economical way (a heritage from the past when the resources forpublic transport were poor). Basic mobility to the contrary stood for a supplymodel of public transport, and induced the perception in the VVM of ‘spendingmoney’ (delivering services where the demand is low is very costly, ‘empty busesalso have to be paid’).

As a final point for discussion, it is interesting to compare the Flemish govern-mental intention to create agencies in the ‘pure’ form as suggested by the norma-tive models, with the results of the empirical analysis. As found in the case, thereis no clear cut policy/operations divide between agencies and oversight authoritiestoday. This might lead to a paradoxical situation between the ‘real world’ (inter-play between agency and oversight authorities throughout the policy cycle), andthe ‘formal world’ (the strict policy/operations divide as proposed by BeterBestuurlijk Beleid). Not only in this case organization, but also in other Flemishpublic agencies a similar observation can be made, as is argued by De Rynck(2004 [author translation]):


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In many instances, all the policy capacity is within the agency itself [by referring to theexample of the VDAB, Flemish Employment Agency] . . . such agencies deliver theknowledge to the cabinet to steer and control themselves . . . BBB makes an explicitchoice for the policy/operations divide whereby politics steer and administrations imple-ment . . . I believe that we need more interwovenness between both spheres instead ofstrict divisions for dealing with complex policy problems. (De Rynck, 2004)

Besides the fact that the involvement of agencies in the policy decision makingprocess is commonplace in many cases, this practice also seems to be defended bythe agencies because they want to keep close ties with their policy domain, theirclients, in other words ‘the field demands participation’ (Rommel, 2006). Theformal world of the strict policy/operations divide is thus to a certain extent alsoperceived as a threat by many agencies (e.g. year report 2005 of MOVI, therepresentative organization of Flemish agencies). A quote from an interview isexemplary for that:

We are against a strict policy/operations divide, because (today) in reality we performtasks of policy preparation, management and implementation . . . next to that, it is a threatfor our company and we also think that this will not improve policy: we have built up the knowledge, and it would not be good to take this knowledge away, secondly, thedepartment will have to built up this knowledge, but their knowledge will inevitably be‘theoretical’. (interview with author [author translation], 16 May 2006)

Knowing that agencies today are to a large extent involved in the decisions madeduring the policy process, and that this is a role they are aware of, and to a certainextent even claim, the future will have to show to what extent the rhetoric of BBB(a reform programme of which the implementation has only started recently) willmatch with the practice in the field.

Conclusion

In this article I have shown for the Flemish case that the rhetoric of thepolicy/operations divide does not always match with the practice of how differentactors are involved in the policy process. The results of the case study are to acertain extent in line with a growing range of evidence provided on this issue byother research in diverse settings. In the case of basic mobility, the agency washardly involved in the preparation and the determination of the policy, while onthe contrary this was the case for the policy of Pegasus. Whether the agency isinvolved in policy matters or not seems to vary largely with policy programmes,or with features of the agency (that may change over time, e.g. policy makingcapacity). One important direction for further research will therefore be to investi-gate the circumstances under which administrative actors such as agencies areinvolved in the policy process, or not. Earlier research may provide us with somepotential hypotheses to address this question.


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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the colleagues at the Public Management Institute at K.U. Leuven(especially Geert Bouckaert and Koen Verhoest), for the support and inspiration duringthe research that resulted in this article. Also I would like to thank the anonymousreviewers of PPA for their valuable comments and suggestions.

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Bram Verschuere is lecturer in public management and third sector policies at theUniversity College Ghent (part of the Association of the Ghent University) in Belgium. Heholds a PhD in social sciences, and his main research interests are organization of the publicsector, organization of public service delivery, welfare policy and third sector organization.Part of his work has been published in Governance, Public Management Review, PublicAdministration and Development, and Management International.

Appendix 1: Features of the case organization VVM

ORIGIN Established in 1991, as a merger of 3 regional public transportcompanies. The VVM is an ‘externally autonomous agency with publiclaw legal personality’.

STRUCTURE One central headquarter for the total region of Flanders, whichcomprises a CEO, and five directors that are functionally decentralizedwithin these central headquarters: Finance, Personnel, Marketing &strategy, Services, ResearchAnother central actor is the Board, and the General Council ofstakeholders (Flemish Community as majority stakeholder). Fivedirectors are territorially decentralized, one per province of Flanders.

SIZE Personnel: Over 7000 employees, increase in personnel numbers with33% over 5 years (1999–2004). 80% of the employees are blue collar(mainly bus drivers and technical personnel). This makes the VVM thelargest agency in Flanders, in terms of personnel numbers.Budget: 580 million euros of governmental transfers, and 111 million


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euros of own revenue in 2004, makes the VVM one of the largestagencies in Flanders, in terms of budget. The governmental transfershave increased dramatically over the last five years, while the ownrevenues decreased in the period 1999-2004.Clients/travellers: There is a constant and impressive growth in numberof travellers over the last 10 years (from 215 million in 1996, to 413million in 2004).

TASK VVM was established as an agency that has to deliver public transportby buses and trams. However since 2000 the mission of the VVM hasbeen expanded from pure operational (implementing tasks) to morestrategic tasks, like policy preparation, developing new products,although the core business remains ‘driving buses’.

PERFORMANCE – The number of travellers increases dramatically since 2000: 90% in 5years, whereas in the period 1991–1999 the number of travellers wasconstant.– Client surveys commissioned by the VVM show a positive evolution –resulting in very high appreciation – for nearly all indicators in the period1998–2004 (safety, quality, comfort, fees, information, services deliveredetc.). These findings are supported by the trust and satisfaction researchby Van de Walle et al. (2003) and Kampen et al. (2003)– But these good results have a cost. Since 1996 the governmentalbudget transfer to the VVM has increased from 240 (1996) to 580 millioneuro (2004). This, combined with a decreased own income for the VVM,leads to a decreasing efficiency of public means (governmental subsidy /N of travellers): 1,1 euro per traveler in 1996 versus 1,6 euro per travelerin 2004.

ENVIRONMENT Political environment:Cabinet of the minister responsible for Mobility (political oversight)Cabinet of the minister responsible for Budget (political-financialoversight)Unit of Persons Traffic and Airports (administrative, part of the Ministryof the Flemish Community)’Salience’ of the VVM:Compared to some peer-organizations (type 4) the VVM has a lot ofattention in the press, and this attention is still growing. This makes theVVM a highly visible agency. The VVM represents also a ‘brand’ that iswell-known and is highly visible in the streets (people literally see thebuses in the street).Competitive environment: VVM has the monopoly on the organization of public transport on theroad in Flanders.


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Appendix 2: Questions from the questionnaire (translated from Dutch)

Basic Mobility

PREP: In the period 1995–2000 the principles of basic mobility were developed: desirablesocietal effects, goals, target groups, etc. What has been, according to your opinion, theactual input/influence of following actors, in the development of these principles? Pleasetick a number from 1–10 for each actor.

DET: In the period 1999–2003 the principles of basic mobility were formalized in a decretal(legal) framework: the decree and the governmental decisions. What has been, accordingto your opinion, the actual input/influence of following actors, in the development of thecontent (norms for service delivery etc.) of the decretal framework? Please tick a numberfrom 1–10 for each actor.

IMP: Since 2000 basic mobility is being implemented via implementation projects in thefield. The norms are fixed in the decree, but what is, according to your opinion, the actualinput/influence of following actors in the decision of how the implementation is achieved(choice of vehicles of transport, implementing structures, processes, ...)? Please tick anumber from 1–10 for each actor.

Pegasus

PREP: Since the nineties mobility issues were on top of the policy agenda. One crucialtheme from (amongst other) the Mobility Plan Flanders is the issue of accessibility of theFlemish Diamond. What has been according to you the actual input/influence of followingactors in the development of the vision about accessibility (desirable effects, goals), andabout the role of public transport in this? Please tick a number from 1–10 for each actor.

DET: In 2003 the Pegasus-plan was presented as the answer for the problem ofaccessibility of the Flemish Diamond. What has been according to you the actualinput/influence of following actors in the development of this plan? Please tick a numberfrom 1–10 for each actor.

IMP: The works of the Antwerp ringroad needed a plan to decrease the negative(auto)mobility effects. A large part of the solution lay in increased public transport servicedelivery. What has been according to you the actual input/influence of following actors inthe decisions about the content of these plans? Please tick a number from 1–10 for eachactor.


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Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics questionnaire analysis

Basic Mobility

N Minimum Maximum Mean SD

PREP: AG_MAN 18 1,00 9,00 4,8889 2,44682PREP: AG_ENT 17 1,00 9,00 3,2353 2,22288PREP: PR_POL 19 7,00 10,00 9,2105 ,91766PREP: PR_ADM 19 1,00 8,00 5,0526 2,17239DET: AG_MAN 20 1,00 9,00 6,1500 2,20705DET: AG_ENT 18 1,00 8,00 3,6667 2,24918DET: PR_POL 20 8,00 10,00 9,4500 ,68633DET: PR_ADM 19 1,00 10,00 6,7368 2,25689IMP: AG_MAN 20 3,00 10,00 7,5000 1,93309IMP: AG_ENT 20 5,00 10,00 8,4500 1,35627IMP: PR_POL 20 4,00 10,00 7,6000 1,87504IMP: PR_ADM 18 1,00 10,00 6,7222 2,13667

Pegasus

N Minimum Maximum Mean SD

PREP: AG_MAN 17 3,00 10,00 6,5294 2,03463PREP: AG_ENT 17 1,00 10,00 5,1765 2,72110PREP: PR_POL 18 6,00 10,00 8,4444 1,09664PREP: PR_ADM 16 1,00 9,00 5,6250 2,41868DET: AG_MAN 18 5,00 10,00 7,8889 1,67644DET: AG_ENT 18 6,00 10,00 8,0556 1,34917DET: PR_POL 17 3,00 10,00 7,4118 2,12305DET: PR_ADM 15 1,00 8,00 3,4667 2,47463IMP: AG_MAN 19 4,00 10,00 7,3158 1,88717IMP: AG_ENT 20 4,00 10,00 8,4000 1,72901IMP: PR_POL 20 5,00 10,00 8,4000 1,27321IMP: PR_ADM 16 1,00 9,00 4,1250 2,72947


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