Man and Society Humberto R. Maturana

Maturana, H.R. 1980. Man and society. (in) Autopoiesis, Communication and Society. Benseler, F., Hejl, P.M., Kock, W.K. eds. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt, pp. 11-31.

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Autopoiesis, Communication,and So'ciety .The Theory of Autopoietic Systems in .the Social Sciences

Edited byFrank Benseler, Peter M. Hejl, and Wolfram K. Kock

Campus VerlagFrankfurUNew York

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Autopoiesis, communication, and society : thetheory of autopoietic systems in the socialsciences I ed. by Frank Benseler ... -Frankfurt [Main] ; New York: Campus-Verlag, 1980.

ISBN 3-593-32797-X

NE: Benseler, Frank [Hrsg.]

Copyright. © 1980 Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt

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MAN AND SOCIETYHumberto R. Maturana

My purpose in this article is to show that an understanding of social phe­nomena as biological phenomena generated through the recurrent inter­actions of living systems that operate as autonomous individuals, leadsto an effective understanding of the participation of each human being inthe generation and change of the social relations that characterize thedifferent societies to which he belongs. Although in this endeavour 1 shallassume that the reader knows sorne of my previous works that are rele­vant to this subject (MATURANA 1975; 1978al, and that it is not necessarythat 1 define again sorne of the terms that 1 use, 1 have included at the enda glossary that can be used in case of doubt. This much said, let me statethe questions that 1 wish to consider and answer:

What is a social system?What takes place in the dynamics of social change in human societies?Does reason command in social phenomena?

1 shall proceed in this same order.

A. What is a social system

I propose to answer this question in a generative manner, that is, byproposing the organization that a system should have in order to be asystem that generates through its operation the same phenomena that anatural social system appears to generate in its operation. The courseof action that 1 propose to follow is not new; in fact. it is the verycourse of action that any scientist must follow in his attempt to explainany given phenomenon. If what 1 propose sounds peculiar (which may notbe the case), it is only due to the fact that this formulation makes expli­cit the usually implicit understanding that to characterize a system as asystem it is necessary and sufficient to state ·its organization.

In these circumstances, it i~ apparent that in order to do what 1claim that 1 shall do, 1 must be able to point to at least one social sy­stem that the reader will accept as a case. 1 see no difficulty in this orin the fact that there are many systems of human relations that the rea­der will accept as adequate examples of natural social systems. such asa family, a club or a religous community. Now, assuming that up to thispoint the reader is with me, my answer to the first question is the fol­lowing:

1 propose that 2 colIection oí interacting living systems that, in the

realization of their autopoiesis through the actual operation of their pro­perties as autopoietic unities, constitute a system that as a network ofinteractions and relations operates with respect to them as a medium inwhich they realize their autopoiesis while integrating it, is indistinguish­able, from a natural social system and is, in fact, one such system.That is, 1 propose that a system defined as a unity by the organizationthat 1 have just described, generates all the phenomena that we can ob­serve in natural social systems if the proper historical contingenciesare given. Or, in other words, 1 claim that what is common to all socialsystems, regardless of the particular features that may separate theminto different kinds, is the organization that 1 have proposed aboye andwhich 1 shall call the social organization.

Let us now examine sorne cases of natural systems that embody thisorganization, and then consider the characteristics that a social systemhas as a consequence of its organization.

1. Cases. There are many natural systems that can be easily seen torealize the social organization when distinguished as composite unitiesin the proper manner: i) A multicellular organismo To the extent that itis defined as a unity, as a collection of cells that interact with eachother in a manner such that the system that they constitute through theirinteractions, while realizing their autopoiesis, is a medium in which theyrealize their autopoiesis, a multicellular organism is a social system.ii) A family. To the extent that as a system constituted by interactinghuman beings it is a medium for the realization of the autopoiesis of thehuman beings that, constitute it in the process of realizing their autopoiesis.a family is a social system. Obviously, according to my thesis, this isonly the case as long as the effective membership in the unity called fa­mily entails the 'realization of the autopoiesis of the individuals that inte­grate it. lf in a given culture a particular set of rules of kinship leads anethnologist to define a family as an entity whose realization does not in­volve the autopoiesis of its members, then the entity that the ethnologistcalls a family is not a social system. iii) A club. To the extent that aclub is constituted as a unity by those behaviours of its members that,arising while they realize their autopoiesis, realize the relations betweenmembers that make it a particular club, a club is a social system. AI­though this description of a club as a social system 'appears complex, itonly makes explicit that which entails the realization of a system constitu­ted by human beings which, as we all know, demands both that the per-sons that integrate it comply with certain rules, and that only those per­sons that comply with those rules integrate it. iv) A community. Thepeople travelling together in a bus do not necessarely constitute a socialsystem. Yet, they may come to constitute one if they become a communi­'ty,; that is, if certain contingencies are given that force them to surviveby integrating through their behaviour a network of interactions that be­comes a medium for the realization of their individual autopoiesis.

lt is apparent that when 1 speak of multicellular organisms, families,clubs or communities as social systems, 1 re-define them in a particularway by inviting the reader to see them in a particular manner. To do sois legitimate because 1 am trying to speak of social phenomena in a novel

manner. and 1 claim that in doing this 1 do not violate our experiencebecause in our culture, whenever we speak of social phenomena whilereferring to what takes place in a group of interacting organisms, we infact speak of what takes place in a system already defined by the socialorganization or in the process of becoming so, regardless oí whether weare conscious of this or noto

2. The social system: Assuming that we accept that a social system isdefined by the social organization as 1 have proposed, let us now considerthe consequences that this has íor the dynamics oí states of a socialsystem and for the dynamics oí states oí its components:

i) lt is constitutive oí a social system that its components should beautopoietic and that they should integrate it and realize it through therealization of their autopoiesis. As a result, a social system can onlybe integrated by living systems, and the relations and interactions be­tween living systems that do not involve their autopoiesis do not partici­pate in its constitution.

ii) An organism can participate in several different social systemssimultaneously, in parallel, or in succession, to the extent that it canrealize its autopoiesis simultaneously <ir successively in several diífe­rent parallel, intersecting, or successive, networks oí interactions withother organisms. When this is the case, the organism necessarily parti­cipates in each social system operationally as though it were a difíerentone, even though in its own dynamics oí states it is obviously not, andall the social systems in which it participates intersect in it as the struc­tural substratum that makes them possible. Thus, a man can be a mem­ber oí a family, a club, a political party, or a religious brotherhood,however dissimilar or antagonistic these social systems may be, and ineach of them realize his autopoiesis through different ihteractions as ifhe were in each case a different person, and do so apparently withoutcontradiction even if he eventually shows internal structural conflict inthe íorm oí disease.

iii) Different social systems are different to the extent that they arecharacterized by different networks oí interactions between their consti­tutive autopoietic members. Since the interactions of the members oí asocial system are realized through the operation of their properties asindividuals, and since these depend on their respective structures, thecharacteristics oí a particular social system (henceíorth called asocie­!l) will change when the properties oí its components change as a resultoí their structural alteration. lf the properties of the members oí asociety change but the organization of the system that they integrateremains the social organization, the interactions in which they partici­pate will change and the society will be realized in a different manner.Social change would have taken place.

iv) To the extent that a social system is a medium in which its componentsrealize their autopoiesis while constituting it, a social system necessarilyoperates as a recursive positive selector of those properties oí its compo­nents that confirm it, and as a negative selector oí those which negate it. Thereasons íor this are to be found in the biological nature oí the social system.ln fact, to the extent that the realization of a social system entail s the auto-

poiesis of its components, a social system is a biological system (MATURA­NA 1975), and its dynamics of states is a function of the dynamics of states ofits autopoietic components. Furthermore, since an autopoietic system is asystem with a changing structure that follows a course of change that iscontinuously being selected through its interactions in the medium in which itrealizes its autopoiesis, it always follows that an autopoietic system is eitherin continuous structural coupling with its medium or disintegrates. Thus, if aparticular autopoietic system integrates a social system. its structural changeis necessarily under continuous selection by the social system, and iteither remains in structural coupling with it, confirming it through itsdynamics of states, or drops out of it. Therefore, every society is neces­sarily conservative, and as a social system every society operates as anhomeostatic system that maintains invariant the relations that define it.lf this does not.take place, the society either changes and becomes asociety of a different kind, or it disintegrates as a social system.

v) An autopoietic system is a member of a particular society only aslong as it operates as a node in the network of interactions that definethe society as a particular social system. Or, in other words, for anautopoietic system its membership in a particular society is a dynamicprocess that lasts only as long as its changing structure allows it to ful­fil the role of a member of the society by participating in the network ofinteractions that constitutes it.

vi) The stability of a particular society depends on a particular har­mony'between the dynamics of structural change of its constitutive mem­bers and its continuous recursive selection in them of the structuresthat ~ealize the properties that they must have üi order to realize thesociety. 'Therefore, the stability of a society as a particular system is,in fact, a function of the stability of the relation of recursive selectionby the operation of the society of the path oi structural change of itsmembers that leads them to continuously regenerate the same networkof interactions, and not of the simple stability of the properties of itsmembers.

Let us now con~ider the second question.

B. What takes place in the dynamics of social change in human societies?

From the perspective of what I have said it is apparent that all that canbe peculiar to human societies must derive from the peculiar manner inwhich human beings realize their autopoiesis and undergo changes in theirproperties as interacting beings. Therefore, let us first see what ispeculiar to the human kind and then what is peculiar to human societies.

1'. Human kind: Without attempting to enter into a broad analysis of allthat is peculiar to human beings, it is possible to assert that there arethree features of human behaviour that mark in a manner typically humanall the phenomena in which human beings participate. These are language,love or preference, and dislike or rejection; let us consider them one by"Dne.

i) A linguistic domain is a consensual domain (MA TURANA 197 8a); that

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is, a linguistic domain is a domain of coordinated behaviours that appearsto an observer as a domain of indications and distinctions that results asa particular form of reciprocal adaption between organisms which under­go recurrent interactions during their ontogenies. Operation in a lingu­istic domain is, therefore, operation in a domain of ontogenetic structuralcoupling that has been established through the recurrent mutual structuralselection of the participating organisms and that reveals their presentoperationally congruent structures. When the linguistic domain as a do­main of distinctions and indications, that is, as a domain of descriptions,is large enough to allow for recurrent distinctions and indications uponthe consensual distinctions and indications that constitute it, it becomesa language (MATURANA 197 8a).

ii) Language, as a domain of consensual interactions, is a sufficientlylarge and complex domain of descriptions that permits human beings,through recurrent self-descriptions, to operate as self-conscious obser-vers that, by standing descriptively as if external to their circumstances,look at themselves and others in it. In doing this, and by effectively accep­ting or rejecting with their behaviour what they see through language, humanbeings define an ethics, validating a domain of social existence in which itis legitimate for other human beings to existo

iii) Linguistic interactions constitute, for human beings, a fundamen­tal mode of recursive interaction in the social domain. Yet, although foran observer linguistic interactions seem to take place in an abstractsemantic domain only, they effectively consist in structural interactions.In fact, for the interacting organisms, linguistic interactions are opera­tions in a domain of structural coupling which entail, through the reci­procal triggering of changes of state, the reciprocal selection by theparticipating organisms of their respective paths of structural changesin the concrete structural substratum that determines the properties ofthe organisms as social beings. In these circumstances, therefore, lingu­istic interactions in general, and language in particular, operate in a hu­man social system as fundamental recursive selectors of the paths ofstructural changes of its members, in the continuous conservation ofontogenetic adaptation that takes place within them while constituting andgenerating it.

iv) Love, in any domain of interactions, and in any one of its forms,be it friendship, sympathy, liking, maternal love, or love between acouple, has one single biological characteristic in man: it constitutes apreference for recurrent interactions that result in sorne dimension ofcare by the lover for the loved one in a manner that restricts aggression.In other words, love, as a mechanism that generates recurrence of in­teractions is, biologically, a basic source of socialization, and the formthat it adopts depends on the domain in which it takes place. One wouldnot feel inclined to call love or preference the biochemical "stickiness"between cells that makes them remain together during embryogenesis inthe development of a multicellular organismo Yet, without this "inter­cellular stickiness" there would be no recurrence of the cellular inter­actions that result in the generation of the multicellular organism as asocial system. In modern human beings, due to their living mostly in alinguistic domain, love is generally understood through its linguistic

characterization, but this does not alter its nature as a biological pheno­menon of preference for recurrent interactions, this only gives it sorneof its human peculiarities.

v) In human beings love always results in an enlargement of the worldof vision of the lover who beholds the loved one in a particular context insuch a manner as to specify a reference that leads him to make distinc­tions that he would not have made otherwise. In other words, love in hu­man beings leads to care for the circumstances in which th~ loved oneappears, and, hence, to the ability to perceive them. Love is not blind,love is visionary, but since it is a preference, the lover from his widerperspective may accept what a non-lover may reject from his narrowerone.

vi) Love as a biological preference for recurrent interactions has norational fundament, not even when we seem to be able to propose one inthe linguistic domain. In this sense love is only an expression of a par­ticular congruence in the dynamic structures of the lover and the loved,rooted in their biology as modern terrestrialliving systems. Love, there­fore, is not an organic state. Love is a dynamic social phenomenon thatarise·s, following the relevant structural changes that the organisms un­dergo in their ontogenies during their dynamic conservation of autopoiesisand adaptation.

vii) Dislike, in any domain of interactions, and in many one of itsforms, be it simple dislike, revulsion, or hate, has a single biologicalcharacteristic in man: it generates, through rejection, an attitude ofavoidance, or of aggression that leads to avoidance. In other words, dis­like, as· a mechanism of interference with the recurrence of interactionsis. biologically, a basic source of disruption or negation of socializationin·man.

viii) Dislike in man always results in a reduction of the world of visionof the one who dislikes, and in a lack of care for the well-being of theothers which are not seen. Or, in other words, the blindness generatedthrough dislike, in the particular domain in which it takes place, leadsa human being to treat the other as a non-other for the social dynamics,that is, as an alien with whom it is not possible to establish a social do­main.

ix) Dislike, like love, is not rational even if one .can propose a reas­oned justification in the linguistic domain. In this sense dislike is only anexpression of a particular incongruence in the dynamic structures of therejected and the rejector. Dislike, like love, is not an organic statealthough it depends on the state of the involved organisms. Dislike andlove, therefore, are phenomena that arise or disappear in the domainof interactions of an organism as a function of the particular path fol­lowed by its structural changes during its ontogeny, selected through itsint'eractions inside and outside the social systems that it may integrate.

Ol;>viously, I do not pretend that these are the only biologically-rootedfactors that participate in shaping social phenomena in human societies.What I think is that these are the fundamental biologically-rooted factorsthat determine the basic characteristics of stability and change in humansocial systems.

2. Human societies: Let us now consider human societies in particular.Human societies are linguistically centered; this means that most socialhuman interactions are linguistic (consensual) and that, as I have alreadymentioned, linguistic interactions are the main selectors of the pathsof ontogenetic structural change of the members of a human social sys­temo This makes human societies in general ideological societies.Or, in other words, this makes human societies societies defined in sornedomain of semantic relations that can be religious, political, mythical,or any others that human beings may specify, but ideological in the sensethat the system of relations that their members must realize through theirinteractions are systems of consensual, semantic, relations, that an ob­server can best describe as systems of ideas. That human societies shouldbe basically ideological, however, does not reduce the concreteness of theinteractions through which human beings as living systems realize them.This is so because linguistic interactions take place in a domain of onto­genetic structural coupling, and as such they reveal the concreteness ofthe ontogenetically-established dynamic structural congruence of the par­ticipants in such a domain.

3. Membership: Although I shall repeat to sorne extent what I have saidin sections Al ii) and v), let me state what is peculiar to human socialmembership. Membership in a particular society is determined for anindividual human being by his participation, through the constitutive in­volvement of his autopoiesis, in the network of social relations that spe­cifies the society as a particular social system. That is:

i) An individual human being that participates through his interactionswith other human beings in a manner that constitutively involves his auto­poiesis, in the network of interactions with which these constitute a par­ticular society, operates as a member of that society. Example: When­ever we realize our living through the realization of the rules that definea club, we are members of that club and we are treated as such by othermembers of it. In other words, the only operational requirement for mem­bership in a human society is the involvement of the autopoiesis of the hu­man participants in the realization of the explicit and implicit rules of be­haviour that define it.

ii) To the extent that all that is necessary for membership in a humansociety is to fulfil the requirements stated above, a human being can, inprincipIe, operate without contradiction as a member of several societiesin parallel or in succession, permanently or transitorily. Example: A per­son can be a member of a family, a polítical party and a club, in parallelor in succession, and participate in the consÚtution of these three societiesthrough parallel or successive behaviours that involve his autopoiesis indifferent manners.

iii) A member of a social system A can interact with the members ofa social system B without being a member of social system B, even if themembers of socfal system B are also members of social system A. Ingeneral, an individual humañ being that in his interactions with other hu­roan beings interacts with these in a network of interactions different fromthe network of interactions through which these constitute a particularsociety, and participates in this manner in its realization, does not

operate as a member of this society and, regardless of the involvementof his autopoiesis in his interactions, only works for it. Example: Thecaddy that carries the golf clubs of a golf player is not a member of thegolf club, he only works for it.

iv) A person who works for a given society and who cannot stop work­ing for it without risking the loss of his autopoiesis because he has noother means of survival outside this work-relation, is under social abuse.Example: In a capitalistic economic system a worker is not a member ofthe productive society through which he earns his living and, therefore,only works for it. If, under these circumstances, there is no employ­ment with respect to his abilities, and if he has no other independentmeans of survival, he is under social abuse. Such a person cannot enterinto a work-agreement on terms generated by the fundamental equalitythat permits cobperation, and must surrender his autonomy as a humanbeing in order to survive.

v) Human beings, through their linguistic behaviour, can operate asobservers of their social involvements, and thus be conscious of theirdifferent social memberships and of the conditions under which they workfor a .particular society, or are under social abuse. Yet, social con­sciousness is not an automatic result of the possession of a language, anda person can be unaware of his membership in a given society, of hisworking for another one, of his being under social abuse, or of hismembership in a society that abuses other human beings. Social con­sciousness arises in a human being when he, as a result of sorne ex­perience that forces him onto a meta-descriptive domain, begins tooperate as an observer of his social circumstances by adopting a per­spective that allows him. to look at himself and the media in which heexists. Examples: Social consciousness of sorne kind usua11y occurs inthe transition from adolescense to adulthood, whether in the naturalcourse of social experiences, or as a result of initiation ceremonieswhich, by forcing the young to stand as individuals in the main socialdomain, lead them to a perspective from which they can be observersof their social circumstances. Yet, this also occurs in many other circ­umstances in life when sorne unexpected experience triggers a change ofstate in a person that forces him to behold his social medium. Love inany one of its forms is one of these experiences, but.not the only one.

vi) In general, social membership is a dynamic condition that can begained, lost, or regained by a human being. This dynamic condition entailsthat the necessarily continuous structural change under which a humanbeing realizes his autopoiesis, should fo11ow a course selected, throughhis interactions, by the medium in which he interacts, and which hecontribute:;; to select with his conducto Therefore, social consciousnessnecessarily operates recursively on the social dynamics of the personthat has attained it through its participation in the selection of his pathof str~ctural change. Examples: We a11 know, by experience or by under­standing, that the discovery by a person that he belongs to an unwantedsociety may lead him not only into depression, anger, or despair, butalso to behavioural changes that may result in changes of his social mem­bership.

4. Change and stability in human societies: Althou gh I sha11 repeat to sorneextent what I have said in sections Al iii), iv) and vi), let me state whatis peculiar to change and stability in human societies. Since behaviour isthe manner of interactions of an organism that an observer beholds as itoperates as a unity in a medium, and since the manner of interactions ofan organism is a function of the manner of realization of its autopoiesisthrough the operation in the present of its dynamic structure, the conductof each human being, whichever the context in which he operates as anautopoietic unity, is always a function of the operation in the present ofhis dynamic structure, and changes as this dynamic structure changes.Also, since a social system is constitutively realized only through theoperation of its components, a social system is necessarily constitutedand specified as a system through the behaviour of each and every one ofthe organisms that integrate it. Human societies as ideological sy stemsare no exception to this, and as social systems they are also necessarilyconstituted and specified by and through the behaviour of each humanbeing that integrates them. From a11 this fo11ows that social change andsocial stability in a human social system are necessarily functions of themanner of structural change of a11 the human beings that integrate it, aswe11 as of the incorporations and losses 'of members that take place in itduring its history. This deserves the fo11owing comments:

i) As has been said, living systems as autopoietic systems necessarilyoperate in continuous structural coupling with the medium in which theyexist, otherwise t.hey disintegrate. Furthermore, the condition of conser­vation of structural coupling in the ontogeny of a living system is the par­ticular continuous existential coincidence of the living system with itsdomain of existence which, a110wing it to remain in autopoiesis, appearsto an observer as revealing a continuous selection by the medium, froma domain of many potential ones, of a particular path in the course ofstructural change fo11owed by the living system. In these circumstances,what is peculiar to a human social system is that the medium that appearsto select in its members the actual paths fo11owed by the continuous changeof their dynamic structures of social entities, is ideological. In otherwords, what is peculiar to human social systems is that the dynamic struc­tures of their members are recursive functions of the ideologies that de­fine them, a phenornenon that can be expressed in more common termsby saying that the members of a human social system recursively select,through their ideological behaviour in the social system, the ideologicalbehaviour of the members of the social system that they integrate. Inhuman societies, this constitutive mechanism of ideological conservationis the main source of their ideological stabilÚY or resistance to ideologi­cal change, and operates regarclless of the degree of social consciousnessof their members. This is so because if social consciousness is incorpora­ted as a mode of social behaviour in a given human society, it also becomesa feature of the ideological network that defines that society.

ii) Since behaviour in a human being, as behaviour in living systems ingeneral, is a function of the manner of realization of his autopoiesis as heoperates as a unity in a medium, any change in the manner of realizationof the autopoiesis of a human being as a result of his dynamics of struc­tural change may lead to a change in several of the domains of interactions

in which he may existo For this reason, the existence of a human being inmany domains of interactions may lead to the result that while he con­serves his structural coupling in one of them he loses it in another, andappears, lit el' ally, to stop existing in it. In other words, although a hu­man being may exist in several different social domains as if he wereseveral different persons, due to his structural and organizational unity,his participation in those different social domains may not be fully inde­pendent at the structural level, and a path of structural change selectedin one social domain may effect another, either directly through struc­tural interference, 01' indirectly through its complementary ideologicalconsequences. In more common terms, the experiences that a humanmember of a particular society may have outside the domain of inter­actions specified by the operation in this society, may result in behaviou­ral changes in' him that leads to modes of behaviour which do not belongto that society 01' may even negate it. When this happens the human beinginvolved becomes anti-social. Totalitarian societies avoid this by restric­ting the possible experiences that their members may have outside thosespecified by them. The extension of such a restriction, maximal in asocial system such as a multicellular organism, finds a fundamentaldifficulty in the linguistic human societies due to the ability that humanbeings have of operating as observers of their circumstances through thegeneration of meta-descriptive domains. When a human being operatesas an observer, he beholds his condition through a descriptive operationas if he were external to it, and he may like 01' dislike it according to hisaffective state in.a non-ideological domain, and act in agreement with hisprefere.nce. In fact, like and dislike, love and hate, are the main extra­ideological experiences that lead human beings to become observers, andas long as human societies continue to be human, that is, linguisticallycentered, they will continue doing so, and no totalitarian system will re­main indefinitely unshaken.

iii) EVery human being participates in the constitution and specificationof ail the societies that he, al' she, integrates, and every society includesall the human beings that participate in its specification. This makes everyhuman being indispensable in the Sense that the loss of a single one neces­sarily results in a change in the relations that specified the particular so­cial systems that he integrated, 01' in their disintegration. This is so,not only because of the constitutive features of a social system that makeit a unity through the participation of all its members, but also becausethe dynamic structure ofa human being is a function of his history of in­teractions as well as of his genetic constitution, so that no two humanbeings can strictly be interchanged because no two individual historiescan be the same, and thus no human being can be effectively replaced..In fact, when a human being disappears, a unique domain of actual andpóssible social relations disappears together with the domain of irre­placeable knowledge embodied in his lost dynamic structure. Thissituation remains frequently unrecognized for at least three reasons:a) An observer usually cannot see (01' does not want to see) a society inits full extension, and mostly infers its definitory features from a parti­cular social system. This means that an observer usually does not seethe changes that take place in the many social systems of which the mis-

sing person was a member, and in his blindness denies them. b) We hu­man beings are usually interested in productive activities of various kindsthat are realized through work-relations and not through social member­ship. Since, in these cases, our attention is centered on the roles thatthe workers must satisfy and not an them as social beings, and since theworkers can satisfy these roles in an impersonal manner and can be re­placed with no detriment to the productive process because the roles havespecifications that are independent of any social dynamics, and since weusually confuse work-relations with social relations, it appears to us thathuman beings can be replaced and dispensed with as members of a socialsystem without changing it. c) We frequently delude ourselves with notionsof historical determinism claiming that social processes follow a caursedetermined by relations of production independent of the individual humanbeings that generate them, 01' with notions claiming that a society is moreimportant than the dispensable individual living systems that integrate itbecause it may persist for a longer span of historical time than these. lfwe accept such notions we become blind with respect to the participationof the individual human beings in the generation of human social pheno­mena, we do not see the reciprocal interdependence between a humansocial system and the human beings that constitute it, and we do notrecognize the legitimacy of the boundary conditions that peculiarly humanfeatures impose upon characteristics of the social relations that humanbeings may generate.

iv) From the perspective of the dynamics of social processes, stabil­ity in a particular human society depends on the extent to which the socialdynamics of the society restrict the domains of experience of its membersto those that select in them only confirmatory social behaviour, andchange in the society depends on the extent to which the members of thesociety experience existential circumstances which. by being independentof it. may select in them ways of social behaviour that do not confirmit. Yet, from the perspective of the actual network of social relationsthat constitute a social system, social stability and social change in aparticular human society occur only to the extent that the recurrent pat­terns of conduct that define it are re-enacted 01' changed by the behaviourof the individuals that integrate it, regardless of the manner throughwhich these acquire the dynamic structures that lead them to behave inone way 01' another, and regardless of whether these dynamic structuresare permanent 01' transitory. This is why coercion through threat oftorture may result in conservation 01' in change of social relations in aparticular human society as long as its members act in the manner de­manded regardless of their secret convictions. However, the conser­vation 01' change of social relations thus obtained is intrinsically unstableand will last only as long as thé coercian lasts, unless the proper pathsof structural changes are selected in the members of the social systemby any of the mechanisms mentioned, and the new patterns of social be­haviour are enactéd in the absence of pressure as novel modes of indi­vidual behaviour.

v) It seems that all that is constant in man is that which cannat bechanged in him without negating his humanity: the biology of the obser­ver in which man as an animal moves in the polarity between like and

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dislike, desire and rejection, love and hate, and man' s existence in alinguistic domain that permits him to generate meta-domains of des­criptions, and through these a domain of self -consciousness. Althoughman as a biological being is necessarily an operationally absolute re­ference for the dynamics of social change or s tability , man as a socialbeing is necessarily an operationally relative reference because the hu­manity of man is a social phenomenon, and, hence, relative to the ideo­logy that he defines as a social being.

C. Does reason command in social phenomena

A social ideology that is centered on the stability of the society that em­bodies it will necessarily operate by expanding the control of the possibleexperiences 01 the human beings that realize it, so that they may onlyhave experiences that lead to social stability. The main difficulty for therealization of such a society as a stable system rests on the recursivepossibilities of human language allowing human beings to become obser­ver s of their circumstances and dislike them.

A social ideology that is centered on the unity of men, admitting thelegitimacy of their equality and their diversity, will necessarily admitinstitutional change, and by promoting and validating social conscious­ness will minimize social abuse. The main difficulties for the realizationof su'ch a society lie in the human desire for perfection and in the ever­present temptation of certainty that leads aman to impose himself uponothers.

A perfect crime-free human society conceived of as a stable societyin which all human behaviour only follows specified accepted norms is atotalitarian society because it negates human diversity and human onto­genetic variability. Such a society, by being necessarily centered oninstitutions, stabilizes relations of human hierarchical subordination oíone kind or another, transforming inter-human relations that could other­wise have been social relations into work-relations that put many humanbeings under social abuse. A society that respects human beings in theireffective human features and promotes the continuous negation of socialabuse, is not a perfect society with stable institutions, but on the contrary,is a society with plastic institutions, involving crime, abuse and mistakesas accidental transitory phenomena that are continuously recognized andcorrected as contingent deviations from a fundamental ethical reference.Both types of societies have existed and in different degrees exist todaybecause they constitute the extreme oscillation points of the cultural ethosbetween vision and blindness with respect to others, as well as betweenequal or unequal individual access to the means of survival. What is ofparticular interest to us now, however, is that we, as modern occidentalhuman beings, belong to a culture inspired by uni-directional notions ofprogr!,!ss and perfection that negate the oscillatory dynamics of socialprocesses around man as a relative operational reference, and which.openly or in disguise, validates discrimination and abuse for the sake of,these notions as if they were absolute values. These notions blind usabout the interconnectedness and cyclical, or recursive, operation of

biological phenomena, leading us to pretend that they are uni -directional,going from the Alpha to the Omega, from a beginning to a culmination,however far away it may seem. Such notions lead us to look at our do­mains of existence as independent from us, as objects placed there forour use and abuse as challenges to be overcome, as circumstantial op­positions to our d~signs of progress and perfection that we as 'Lords ofCreation' must subdue, and to the belief that we have power over nature,not seeing that our success in any particular endeavour arises only fromour staying in the flow and creating new consensual domains in it, andnot from any apparent domination of it. Whenever we attempt ,to do ,other­wise we blunder and claim that our failure is due to our transltory 19no­rance of the objective world, without recognizing that it is due to thenegatíon of our unity with nature. Yet, however clear it, may be to ourreason that the uni-directionality imposed on our behavlOur as soclalbeings by the notions of progress and perfection run against the cyclicalor recursive character of all biological phenomena, this knowledge byitself cannot compel us to corrective action. This is because within our­selves, as ideological social beings, the push for action necessarily comesfrom our animal nature and depends on our passions, on our likes or dis­likes and not on our reason, It is not the rational which moves us, evenif it :Uay seem so sometimes. It is our desires. Reason explains, but likeand dislike command. It is not the knowledge of the consequences of ouractions which determines them, but rather whether we do or do not wantthose consequences. This is why our problems as social human beingsare not technological, they are ethical. This, 1 am sure, most peopleknow but do not want to accept, because to accept this means to stopseeing oneself as the center of the world and to seriouly see and respectothers.

D. An ethical remark

All cultures, to the extent that they are closed networks of ideologicaland non-ideological behaviour that permit the human beings that belongto them to realize their autopoiesis in a manner coherent with theirrespective cultures in the media in which they occur, are biologicallylegitimate. No culture is intrinsically better than another, nor can wecompare cultures without specifying, from a meta-domain of descriptionswhich permits us to behold them in perspective, an external system ofreferences that has its coherence iri another culture. It is true that fromthe perspective of our meta-domain and in the referential context we de­fine, we may prefer certain behaviours to others, but by doing so we des­troy the original coherent network in which they were embedded, and welook at them in an assumed isolation as though they were removable ob­jects. We delude ourselves into believing in the objective goodness orbadness of the particular behaviour under consideration, exalting orcondemning the culture to which it belongs, not seeing that we evaluateit from the perspective of another closed cultural domain, equally validand equally relative to its own circumstances as the one we were obser­ving. The stuff of human life is life in a context that gives coherence to

all human actions in a cultural domain, not succes in any particular ope­ration as it may be defined in a technological process. Therefore, prefe­rence or rejection depends on us, not on supposedly objective features ofthat which is preferred. To the extent that we as human beings exist onlyin sorne social domain that we create with others, all our actions as hu­man beings are political, because with them we define a social domain inwhich they are legitimate and give them ethical significance because theyinvolve the lives of other human beings. Whether we like it or not, whetherwe are aware of this or not, this is wherein our existential involvementas human beings and the source of our inner harmony or neurosis lies.

E. Conclusions.The aim has been attained. The considerations that I have made revealthe way in which each individual participates in the constitution of the so­cial systems that he integrates. Man is not an accident in the constitutionof a human society. Abstract relations of property and production, rela­tions supposedly grasped by economic notions of national or per-capitaincome, or notions of class struggle, do not reveal what a social systemis, nor the processes that make it a dynamic system, nor the partici­pation of the human beings that integrate it. Such notions at most charac­terize sorne relations proper to sorne particular society, or sorne pro­jection in sorne domain of obversation of the network of social relationsthat is established whenever a collection of human beings interact andform sorne kind oi unity. The individual is the center and motor of socialphenomena; no society exists beyond the individuals that integrate it, andevery society includes aH the individuals that constitute it. Social classeshavé identity only as collections of individual human beings of comparableexperiences that behave in comparable ways and may, if socially conscious,see each other as social brothers with comparable social aims. Other-wise the class does not exist as a social unity, and to speak of classstruggle when trying to characterize social phenomena is a descriptiveartífice that does not reveal the mechanisms involved in the dynamics ofsocial processes. This i's why social consciousness is necessarily thecentral point for any concerted social action if the aim is to dismantlesocial abuse and social discrimination. In other words, the characteri­zation of social systems that I have given here clearly indicates that so­cial stability and social change go through each and every indvidual thatintegrates a society as a necessary, not as a contingent, condition.

Finally, I wish to add that although every social system is operationallywell defined as a dynamic unity, for an observer a society may appear asa system with fuzzy boundaries because these are not only defined withinth'e space of their component living systems which may be under continuousrepl~cement, but also within the space of their relations and interactions.If there are living systems that satisfy the relations and interactions thatdefine a particular society, this society can be distinguished as a unityor, in other words, as a particular network of social relations, andtherefore it exists and is necessarily well defined. Otherwise it does notexisto That human beings should move from one social system to another,

or that they should integrate many in parallel, introducing an apparentfuzziness into the social boundaries, does not alter this fact, it only indi­cates that the understanding of human societies requires the commensu­rate understanding of the human beings that integrate them, and thatsociology should become humanismo

Appendix: Glossary

A. Basic notions

We cannot escape the fact that everything we say we sayas observers,and that what we do when we attempt an explanation for any given pheno­menon, is to describe the conditions under which elements that we dis­tinguish as pertaining to a domain other than that of the phenomenon it­self, would generate this phenomenon. In these circumstances, all theterms that we use must be operationally defined so that we may use themin the generation of the phenomenon to be explained with fuH understan­ding of their domain of validity as referring to entities distinct from it.Accordingly, in this section I wish to make clear what the basic termsthat I shall use mean operationally.

Unity: An entity, distinguished from a background by an observer throughan operation of distinction that by specifying it as a whole specifies thebackground from which it is distinguished, constitutes a unity. The ope­ration of distinction, by specifying the conditions of distinction, speci­fies the properties of the entity distinguished as a unity. An entity inwhich an observer does not or cannot distinguish components, is asimple unity. An entity in which an observer describes parts, that he

,names components, by distinguishing them in reference to the entity thatthey conjointly integrate as a simple unity, is a composite unity. Thecomponents of a composite unity, therefore, are components only in re­lation to the simple unity (whole) that they integrate, and are distingu­ishable as such only in reference to that whole as the background fromwhich they are distinguished.

Examples: A book treated as a whole without reference to its pages,covers, or binding parts as components, is a simple unity. A personconsidered without reference to the cells or órgans that may be seen tointegrate it, is also a simple utlity. A person treated as a multicellularsystem, however, is a composite unity in which the cells are its compo­ne~ts; .similarly, a person treated as an organism is a composite unity inwhich lts organs are its components. It follows that a person as a multi­cellular system, and a person as an organism, are two different kinds ofcomposite unities because they are defined through different operationsof distinction that imply, as wiH be seen below, different organizationsfor the composite unities distinguished. In fact, a simple unity is onlycharacterized by the properties assigned to it by the operation of distinc-

tion through which an observer distinguishes it from a background. Acomposite unity, however, is characterized by the organization that in­tegrates its components into a whole, determining its class identity as acomposite unity of a particular kind and its properties as a simple unitywhen distinguished as such.

Organization: The relations between components, whether static or dyna­mic, that make a composite unity a unity of a particular kind, are its or­ganization. Or, in other words, the relations between components thatmust remain invariant in a composite unity for it not to change its classidentity and become something else, constitute its organization.

Structure: The actual components and the actual relations between themthat at any instance realize a particular composite unity as a concretestatic or dynamic entity in the space which its components define, consti­tute its structure. In these circumstances, the relations between com­ponents that constitute the organization of a composite unity are a subsetof the relations included in its structure. lt follows from this that thestructure of a composite unity may change without it changing its classidentity as long as the relations proper to its organization remain inva­riant. lí, as a result of its structural changes, the relations of the orga­nization of a particular composite unity change, the composite unityliterally disintegrates losing its class identity.

Examples: The particular disposition that the legs and the board mustsatisfy in order to realize a table as a composite unity, constitute theorganization of the ·table. The particular legs and the particular boardthat actually realize a table as a particular composite unity, constituteits structure. To the extent that one can cut the legs of atable or scratchits board within the limits set by its organization the table can undergostructural changes without loss of class identity. When a living systemdies what takes place within it is a change of structure with loss of orga­nization. The living system disintegrates, and what remains as the corpseis a composite unity of a different kind which is defined as a whole by adifferent organization. When a living system grows what takes place with­in it is a change of structure without loss of organization, and, hence,without change of class identity.

Whenever one distinguishes an entity as a composite unity one impli­citly assigns to it, with the operation of distinction, an organization thatdefines it as a composite unity with a particular class identity. Thus,statements such as "1 saw an animal" or "1 saw a flying saucer", arecases in point. With frequently encountered unities for which there issocial consensus with respect to their class identity, one is rarely foundat fault it one attempts to identify their class identity through the diag­nostic recognition of sorne features of their structure. The statement,"1 think that we are dealing with a plant because 1 can recognize cWoro­plasts'in the sample", is an example of such a case. Yet, as we all know,this procedure is fully inadequate for the classification (class identifi­cation) of a system that belongs to a class with which one does not havethe previous experience that provides the historical basis for the diagnos­tic recognition of its structures. Furthermore, the fact that we can class

,/

frequently-encountered systems in accepted categories does not meanthat we can identify or describe their organization; this requires an en­tirely different procedure. The nature of this problem was revealed bythe inconclusive first attempt to determine the presence of living sys­tems on Mars through the recognition in Martian systems of structuralfeatures (processes) proper to living systems on Earth. The experimentfailed because any given structure can participate in the realization ofmany different organizations. The determination of the class identity ofan unknown system can only be done through the actual identification ofits organization, otherwise, the best that one can do is to make a guess.

Existence: A simple unity exists in a space defined by its properties;that is, a simple unity exists in a space defined by the operation of dis­tinction through which an observer, or its operational equivalent, dis­tinguishes it and specifies its properties. Or, in other words, the dis­tinction of a simple unity determines its existence by defining it throughthe specification of its properties. lt follows that a simple unity can inter­act with other unities only through the actual play (operation) of itsproperties, and that it can do so only iI'\ its space of existence.

A composite unity treated as a simple unity exists, as any simpleunity, in the space defined by its properties as a simple unity. Other­wise, a composite unity distinguished as a composite unity realizedthrough a concrete structure, exists as a concrete composite unity in thespace that its components define through their properties as simple uni­ties. This is so because it is only through the distinction of concretesimple unities as components of an entity otherwise distinguished by anobserver as a simple unity in another domain, that such an observer dis­tinguishes a whole as a composite unity. lt follows that an observer cans ee a composite unity interact as a composite unity with other unities,composite or simple, only through the actual operation of the propertiesof its components.

In general, then, existence is always the result of an operation ofdistinction performed by an observer, or its operational equivalent, andit is senseless to speak of existence without specifying the operation thatdistinguishes the phenomenon for which one asserts existence. Thus itis also the case that for an observer there are as many domains of exis­tence as there are domains of distinctions that he can specify operationally,

Examples: If 1 distinguish a table as a simple unity by putting thingson it as one usually does with tables, then the entity thus distinguishedexists in a space in which one of the dimensions is defined by the proper­ty of supporting things, under circumstances' in which the property ofsupporting is fully defined operationally. If 1 do otherwise, and distinguishthe table as a composite unity made of molecules disposed according toits organization as a molecular system, then the table, as a compositeunity thus distinguished, exists in a space that the molecules (themselvesspecified operationally) define, which means, in a first approximation,in the physical space.

1nteraction: Whenever two or more entities change their relative positionsin their space of existence as the result of the interplay of their properties,

there is an interaction. This is obvious in the case of simple unities. Intbe case of composite unities the situation is less obvious but it is es sen­tially the same. In fact, operationally a composite unity could only inter­act through the operation of the properties of its components, but sincethese are de"fined with respect to the simple unity that they integrate, theproperties assigned to the composite unity in its distinction as a simpleunity are seen by the observer, who distinguishes it simultaneously asboth, to be concretely realized through the properties of the componentsthat he distinguishes in it. This cannot but be so because the observer,himself a composite unity, can only perform his distinctions through in­teractions realized by him through the play of the properties of his com­ponents. In other words, since the two domains of existence that an ob­server assigns to a composite unity, the domain in which he distinguishesit as a simple nnity and the domain in which he distinguishes its compo­nents, are distinct and non-intersecting phenomenal domains, the relationof complementarity between them that the observer asserts by saying thatthe components integrate a composite unity as a whole, takes place with­in his domain of observation where he beholds simultaneously componentsand unity, and relates them (MATURANA 1978). Therefore, when the ob­server describes the interactions of a composite unity as a simple unityas resulting from the operation of the properties of its components, heestabHshes a relation operationally val id in his domain of descriptionsbetween phenomena taking place in two non-intersecting but observation­ally complementary domains.

Examples: A fiy seen walking on a painting by Rembrandt does notinteract" with the painting by Rembrandt. The painting by Rembrandtexists only in a cultural space of human aesthetics, and its properties,as" they define this cultural space, cannot interplay with the propertiesof the walking fiy that define a space of chemical distinctions. In otherwords, wesee the fiy to be blind to the painting by Rembrandt becausethe painting does not exist in the domain of the fiy' s distinctions (see.Jakob von UEXKÜLL 1909). In general, then, entities that define throughtheir properties non-intersecting phenomenal domains, cannot interact.This is why the specification of the space of existence of a unity throughthe operations that distinguish it, is central to the determination of thedomains of the interactions in which it may participate.

Wholeness: The components of a composite unity define a phenomenaldomain which does not intersect with the phenomenal domain definedthrough the distinction of the composite unity as a simple unity. There­fore, the organization of a composite unity is realized only through rela­tions of contiguity (neighbourhood) between its components in the inter­play of their properties, and the resulting whole (simple unity) cannotparticipate as a component in this interplay. Accordingly, notions suchas function, control, regulation, or feedback, refer to relations that anobser'ver establishes between the description of the whole and the des­cription of its components in a meta-descriptive domain that contain both,but do not refer to any phenomenon actually taking place in the phenomenaldomain in which the composite unity is realized through the neighbourhoodrelations of its components. In these circumstances, in order to concretely

realize a composite unity of a particular class in a particular space it isnecessary and sufficient to implement a structure with components thatrealize the organization of the class through their neighbourhood relations.All other relations that the concrete components may actually realize inthe structure are, as has already been said, irrelevant with respect tothe constitution of the class identity of the whole that they integrate, butdetermine the features that make such a unity a particular whole of itsclass.

B. The organization of the living

If the attempt is to understand living systems as self-contained autonomouscomposite unities, it is apparent from all that has been said that the firsttask must be to point to the organization that makes living systems suchkinds of unities. That is, the first task must be to point to the organizationthat makes a living system a system that actively determines its invariantclass identity. In 1973 Francisco VARELA and I proposed that this organ­ization of living systems is one of stric~ self-production (as had alreadybeen suggested by Claude BERNARD 1864), and, after making it fully ex­plicit, we called it the autopoietic organization, choosing a word withouta history, that could be used exclusively to refer to the definitory organi­zation of living systems (MATURANA and VARELA 1973; VARELA, MA­TURANA and URIBE 1974; MATURANA 1975).

Autopoiesis (d..ih::ó,= self; andílO(EL,v= to produce): Our proposition is asfollows: A dynamic system that is defined as a composite unity as a net­work of productions of components that, al through their interactionsrecursively regenerate the network of productions that produced them,and b) realize this network as a unity in the space in which they exist byconstituting and specifying its boundaries as surfaces of cleavage fromthe background through their preferential interactions within the network,is an autopoietic system.

This organization that defines an autopoietic system as a compositeunity is the autopoietic organization, and we claim that an autopoieticsystem in the physical space, that is, an autopoietic system realized asa composite unity by components that define the physical space by satis­fying the thermodynamic requirements of physical phenomena, is a livingsystem (MATURANA and VARELA 1973; MATURANA 1975). It is apparentthat present-day knowledge of cellular chemistry indicates that all cellularmetabolic processes constitute a network of productions (metabolism andanabolism) integrated in a manner that makes the cell an autopoietic unity.In fact, if aboye we were to replace "components" for "molecules", and"in the space in which they exist" for "in the physical space", we wouldhave the characterization of a cell as it is revealed by present-day bio­chemical knowledge.

Whether all multicellular systems are or are not autopoietic systemsin their own right, is to sorne extent an open question. I think that animal sas multicellular organisms are autopoietic systems of second order, inte­grated in sorne dimension by first-order autopoietic systems (cells) that

may not be the components that realize them as autopoietic networks. Inother words, 1 think that there are living systems that are higher-orderautopoietic systems whose components are molecular entities producedthrough the autopoiesis of lower-order autopoietic unities, but withoutthese as such being components in the realization of their autopoietic net­work. Furthermore, 1 also think that there are other multicellular sys­tems that are only colonies, and that as such are not autopoietic systemsof second order eben though they are integrated by first-order autopoieticunities. However, this is a matter that requires further inquiry. Never­theless, this does not constitute a problem for our present endeavourbecause, as we shall see, the phenomena of reproduction, heredityand'evolution in living systems without exception go through an uninterruptedlineage of sequentially reproduced autopoietic unities of first order.Therefore, 1 ahall develop my argument by speaking of living systemsin general.

Implications: To the extent that the autopoietic organization is the definito­ry feature of living systems, autopoiesis in them is necessarily an invar­iant. In other words, a living system is a closed system with respect toits organization in the sense that all its states (structural configurations)are states in autopoiesis, and all its state transitions (structural chan­ges) take place in its autopoiesis, otherwise it disintegrates undergoinga change in class identity (death). Structurally, however, living systemsas a{¡topoietic systems in the physical space must satisfy the thermo­dynamic legality of physical processes that demands of them that theyshould operate as ,materially and energetically open systems in continuousmaterial and energetic interchange with their medium. In this context,the physical boundariesof a living system, as they are realized by itscomponents through their preferential interactions within the autopoieticnetwork, become apparent as surfaces of thermodynamic cleavage. Thus,substances that, coming from the medium, penetrate the boundaries ofa living system (~ay a cell) and participate in its autopoietic network,become its components, and substances produced through the autopoieticnetwork, that do not recursively participate in it, leave it and do notbecome components. In this latter case these substances either pass in­to the medium, or remain trapped in the mesh of the autopoietic networkwithout participating in it, as inclusions. '

The dynamic nature of the autopoietic organization as a network ofproductions of components results in the fact that the structure of a livingsystem is necessarily under continuous change. Furthermore, the factthat all that must remain invariant in an autopoietic system for it to re­tain its class identity is its autopoietic organization, results in the factthat the path of structural changes that a living system must follow whileliving is necessarily open-ended and in principIe endless with recurrentand/or non-recurrent configurations.

In- any particular autopoietic unity its structure determines, at everyinstant, the manner in which it realizes its autopoiesis along its path ofstructural changes, as well as which path of structural changes it mayfollow as a result of its internal transformations or the structure -selec­tive effect of its external interactions. In this sense, any particular auto-

poietic unity operates as a whole, as every composite unity does, and allthe elements of its structure, components and relations, continuouslyparticipate in determining its characteristics, both as an autopoietic unityof a particular kind (class, species) and as an individual. Thus, althoughby resection one can eliminate part of the structure of an autopoietic unity(living system} without destroying its autopoiesis, this does not negatethe participation that the eliminated parts necessarily had in the realiza­tion of the autopoiesis of the untouched unity. No part can be deemed tobe superfiuous in the realization of a whole as a particular unity, even ifit can be eliminated without destroying its class identity; if the latteroccurs, what is left is a whole with the same class identity but with adifferent structure and, hence, with different properties as a unity. Asa result of this there are many different possible classes of autopoieticunities, many of which are actually realized by living systems, eachcharacterized by the particular structural configuration that all its mem­bers must have, regardless of any additional structural feature that maydistinguish them as different members of the same class. Furthermore,and according to this, it should be apparent that different structures indifferent classes and in different members of the same class of actuallyoperating autopoietic systems, represent different requirements of struc­tural complementarity with the medium in which they exist that must besatisfied for them to be realized as individual autopoietic unities. And itshould also be apparent that this is the case regardless of whether theindividual autopoietic unities are cells or autopoietic systems of higher~dR. '

In an operational sense no probabilistic process takes place in thespace where the structure of a composite unity is defined and describedand, accordingly, everything occurs within the confines of the realizationof an autopoietic system following a strict structural determinismo Thisis a general statement valid for every structure-determined system; thatis, this is a statement that 1 deem valid for every system that we proposeas a model for the generation of the phenomenon that we may want to ex­plain in scientific terms. In fact, any observable indeterminacy whoseoccurrence an observer may describe in probabilistic terms, must beassumed by him to arise from his observation of a phenomenon that re­sults from interactions between recognized, or unrecognized, independentand unrelated entities that he, due to his operational position, cannotencompass in a description that unites them in a single structure-deter­rnined process. Otherwise he cannot even attempt a scientific explanation.This is a constitutive condition because the components define the space ofeXistence of a composite unity, and these can only be defined in a determi­nistic manner by an operation ordistinction, even when we resort to aprobabilistic description, and because we also operate in the generationof our cognitive statements as composite unities, interacting through ourcomponents in a space that these define according to how we distinguishthem (MATURANA 1978a).

1 shall not dwell any longer on this subject under the assumption that,for the moment, what 1 have said permits us both to recognize an auto­poietic system in a modern cell, and to accept that most multicellularsystems are tbemselves second-order autopoietic systems.

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