1.9 - Krizan, Mojmir - Essentialism and the Ideological Legitimation of One-Party Rule (en)

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Essentialism and the Ideological Legitimation of one-Party Rule

Essentialism and the Ideological Legitimation of one-Party Rule

by Mojmir Krian

Source:

PRAXIS International (PRAXIS International), issue: 1 / 1986, pages: 95-110, on www.ceeol.com.
http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.ceeol.com/http://www.dibido.eu/bookdetails.aspx?bookID=c51d4ec3-66bd-4122-9449-de6dade71cc3http://www.ceeol.com/


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Praxis International 95

Praxis International 6:1 April 1986 0260-8448

ESSENTIALISM AND THE IDEOLOGICALLEGITIMATION OF ONE-PARTY RULE*

Mojmir Krizan

The concept of essence has undergone a change in meaning throughouthistory, and is still controversial. Before its dialectization by Hegel it referredas a rule to a more or less concealed dimension of reality, inaccessible tosensual perception, to which was nevertheless, or perhaps just because of that,ascribed a higher ontological and cognitional status. There were variousreasons for postulating such a hidden dimension: The pre-Socratic naturalphilosophers Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes searched for the primarymatter within objects. Plato sought behind the changing perceivable world theunchangeable world of ideas as archetypes of real things. Intending to find thekey for developing the only possible systematic classification of phenomena,Aristotle looked for the invariability, originality and independence of thesubstratum of objects. It was also he who developed the concept of substance,as the independently existing carrier of all changeable qualities the

accidentals. Scholastic thinking took over both concepts and interpreted themin a metaphysical way. In spite of the critique of these concepts from anominalist and, later on, a positivist standpoint, during the 19th century theessentialist way of thinking underwent a revival at the level of social theoryand the philosophy of history in the work of Hegel and Marx. The dogmatizedmarxism of the 20th century has assigned a practical-political function to thismode of thinking: the function of ideological legitimation of the communistone party rule. The aim of the following study is to reconstruct the forms andgenesis of an ideologized essentialism and of the political application of theessentialist way of thinking in the societies mentioned.

In the work of Kant, the problem of essence1

is inseparably connected withhis distinguishing the phenomenal from the noumenal world. He differenti-ated among appearances, sensual essences (Sinnenwesen, phaenomena), logicalessences, which can be recognised as the first Grundbegriff aller notwendigen

Merkmale eines Dinges (esse conceptus)2 by dissecting the concept whileabstracting from all its contents, essence of understanding (Verstandeswesen,Gedankenwesen, noumena), which a human being is unable to know anythingdefinite about because they refer solely to objects of possible experience andbeyond it have no meaning,3 and the real or natural essences of things (esse rei),for the cognition of which one would have to know those predicates on which

depends everything that belongs to their existence. Thus, essences ofunderstanding are products of attempts made by reason overestimating itsown capabilities, going beyond its limits, i.e., advancing into the world ofthings in themselves (Ding an sich); they are therefore hyperbolischeObjekte.4 By an inner motivation, reason is driven to ascertain the real


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Praxis International96

essences, but due to its inherent limitation it has to renounce this project: theworld of things in themselves remains closed to it.

Consequently, Kant banishes the traditional, rationalistically founded

essentialism into the sphere of speculation, yet within the frame and at theprice of its dualistic ontology. G. W. F. Hegels work on overcoming Kantsdualism leads to the necessity of once more discussing the concept of essence.5

He dialectizes the concept in order to show that it is not outside the totalityamenable for conceptualisation. The following elements from his theory onessence should be emphasized:

1. In his discussion of Kants philosophy, Hegel objects to transcendentalidealism in that it does not succeed in overcoming the limitation of the subjectby the objects, which contradicts the principle of freedom according to whichthe subject knows itself to be the indefinite and the general and lets thingshave manifold specifications.6 In order to prove the perceptibility of a thing initself, Hegel proceeds from existence itself, from the thing in itself assomething immediately existing. Such existing things exist in relation to eachother, they are the unity of reflexion-in-other-things and reflexion-in-themselves. The unessential external reflexions turn out to be propertieswhich are their definite relations to other things. The thing-in-itself is thefundament of these properties; through these properties it acquires itsidentity, it is conditioned by the external reflexion. That is, the qualities donot differ from their fundament; through them the fundament is reflected in

itself and identifies itself with them.7

2. Essence is related to existence as internal to external, which together forman object. They are specifications of reflexion (Reflexionsbestimmungen) whichrefer to each other: the internal as a form of reflexion-in-itself, of theessentiality, the external as the form of immediateness or inessentiality, whichis reflected in other things. As a result they constitute a totality, in which theyappear as identity: Das ussere ist daher frs erste derselbe Inhalt als dasInnere. Was innerlich ist, ist auch usserlich vorhanden und umgekehrt; dieErscheinung zeigt nichts, was nicht im Wesen ist, und im Wesen ist nichts, wasnicht manifestiert ist.8 The essence is the existence of the appearance,9 which

synthesise together, as the internal and the external, forming absolute reality:Die Wirklichkeit ist die Einheit des Wesens und der Existenz; in ihr hat dasgestaltlose Wesen und die haltlose Erscheinung oder das bestimmungslose Bestehenund die bestandlose Mannigfaltigkeit ihre Wahrheit.10

3 . This identity of essence and being, of internal and external, is valid alsofor humans: external acts cannot be opposed to internal intentions andconvictions.11

4. The essence mediates between being and concept.12 The latter can beseen as the third moment, the basis and truth of being and essence as momentsof becoming, as the identity in which they sink and in which they are

contained.13 Essence is the first negation of being, which becomes deception(Schein). The concept is the negation of the negation, also das wiederherges-tellte Sein, aber als die unendliche Vermittlung und Negativitt desselben in sichselbst.14 Being cannot be contrasted to the concept, it is only a specification ofthe concept which is mediating itself to itself, and is the whole and the totality.

aCEEOL NL Germany


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When the concept is different from being, it is subjective and thereforeinadequate. By objectivising itself through its activity, it engenders its ownexistence.15

In the process of the work of conceptualisation,, the concept developsunconditionally the truth, recognises it as such and understands its necessity.16With that the concept proves itself to be the truth of being and essence, whichgoes back to it as their fundament.17 This process of conceptualisation lets thething in itself finally disappear: . . . der Begriff, wozu auch das von ihmausgehende Urteil gehrt, ist das wahrhafte Ding-an-sich oder dasVernnftige. . . . 18

Thus, Hegelian dialectical philosophy succeeds in demonstrating theuntenability of the Kantian concept of the thing-in-itself. Being and essence,the external and the internal, are equally accessible to the concept movingthrough the mediations of its object. It is not possible to maintain theirdifferent accessibility in the context of the philosophy of identity, where theyare only moments of the concept. It is even less possible to put them incontradiction of one another, to consider as possible the knowledge of onewithout that of the other, or the knowledge of the essence as more valuablethan that of the being. Hegel avoids evaluating single moments of historicaldevelopment: he speaks about good and evil only in the sense of a morality atthe subjective level. The concept and reality, originally disunited in the idea ofknowledge and the good, are again identified through the activity of objective

conceptualisation, whereby external reality is changed, and is set asbeing-in-and-for-itself. Thus the necessity of realising the good throughsubjective activity is sublated (aufgehoben), because reality is determined asthe effected absolute purpose, as the objective world whose internalfoundation and existence is the concept.19

Karl Marx is, in contrast, a social-ontological dualist and an axiologicalmanichaean. He sees history as a struggle between the progressive suppressedclasses, and, at least at some stage in the development of society, the rulingclasses as inhibiting this progress. In other words, the Marxian social ontologyhas the structure of a philosophy of history, whose finality delivers the criteria

for the differentiation of the essential and unessential historical actors anddevelopmental tendencies, as well as for such an evaluation of these elements,which makes the class struggle, especially that between the proletariat and thebourgeois, appear as a manichaean struggle between good and evil.

The best known example of Marxs concept of the difference betweenappearance and essence is his argument in Das Kapital in the context of hiscritique of bourgeois political economy or Vulgroekonomie, as herepeatedly writes. The Vulgroekonomie stays on the surface, and puts upwith categories which depict the wesentlichen Verhltnisse in an incorrectmanner; it does not penetrate to the essence, which is perversely represented

in the appearance, but remains contemplative, undialectical and impractical.20Thus essence and appearance are opposites. The concept does not try toestablish their identity as moments of itself, but is primarily concerned withthe search for the essence hidden behind appearance, for the internal behindthe external. It furnishes only this essence with the attribute of truth. Essence


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is not, as with Hegel, the existence of appearance; the latter does notsynthesise essence to reality,, the objective dimension of the concept. On thecontrary, it remains hidden. The real relationship is invisible behind theappearance as its opposition, which is responsible for mystifications and illusionsof the Vulgroekonomie.21 In particular, the members of the capitalist classare unable to comprehend the internal essence and configuration of theprocess of reproduction of capitalist society.22 The function of science is tomake its way to the essence by breaking through the obliqueness of appearancesand thereby bridging the discrepancy between appearance and essence.

The described relationship between appearance and essence is characteristicnot only for capitalist society and the Vulgroekonomie, but is generallyvalid: Dass in der Erscheinung die Dinge sich oft verkehrt darstellen, ist ziemlichin allen Wissenschaften bekannt, ausser in der politischen Oekonomie.23

brigens gilt von der Erscheinungsform Wert und Preis der Arbeit oderArbeitslohn, im Unterschied zum wesentlichen Verhltnis, welches erscheint,dem Wert und Preis der Arbeitskraft, dasselbe, was von allen Erscheinungsformenund ihrem verborgnen Hintergrund. Die ersteren reproduzieren sich unmittelbarspontan, als gang und gbe Denkformen, der andre muss durch die Wissenschafterst entdeckt werden.24

A further example of Marxian essentialism is the anthropology developed inhis early writings. The common denominator of the five forms of alienationanalysed in these works25 is the alienation of man from himself as generic

being, his self-alienation. Only in relation to himself as living genus (Gattung),and to the genus of the remaining things, man behaves as a universal and freegeneric being.26 The alienated existence of man, as self-alienation, is thereforenothing else but his alienation from his essence. Since this existence is aphysical one, in order to maintain itself the whole activity of life must besubordinated to it.27

However, this essentialist anthropology is not founded on natural philoso-phy and is therefore not static in relation to the history of mankind. Rather, itis anchored in Marxs optimistically oriented philosophy of history: theessence of man consists of his practical participation in the process of his

liberation and universalisation through the realisation of communism, inwhich the universality and the creative character of bourgeois society becomethe forms of existence of the individual. Historical development results incertain social conditions, which are decisive for the formation of thepersonality structures of man brought up under them, and therefore also forhis historically relevant activity. So formed, mans essence can therefore berecognised only by examination of the results and potentialities of thisactivity, i.e., the laws of the development of history. In developed bourgeoissociety these laws indicate the possibility and the necessity of revolution forthe purpose of the development and realisation of human essence, recognised

as the anthropological dimension of this historical process. Alienation fromgeneric being is the philosophical-anthropological-aspect of the socialconditions of developed capitalism: the latter creates needs, abilities, require-ments and potentials in man, which cannot be wholly, or sufficiently, realisedin its framework. This internal discord of the individual is a manifestation of


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the historically formed discord of social relationships. The tendency ofhistorical development of these relationships is to universalise man on thelevel of the global society and to develop his individuality and autonomy inthis consists his generic being as postulated by the philosophy of history. As aconsequence of this, Marx understood by human essence vor allem jeneWesenszge der wirklichen Menschengeschichte (verstanden), die es ermglichen,die Geschichte als einheitlichen Prozess mit bestimmter Richtung undEntwicklungstendenzen aufzufassen, d. h. kognitiv zu rekonstruieren undaktiv-praktisch fortzubilden. Die Universalitt und ( . . . ) die Freiheit des

Menschen geben die allgemeine Richtung des menschlich historischenEntwicklungsprozesses an.28 Thus, the essence of man is in harmony with theessence of the law of historical development, which Marxs critique of politicaleconomy reveals behind Vulgroekonomie.

So Marxs essentialism, based on his philosophy of history, equates theconcept of essence with the elements of finality in his social ontology: theseessentials are bound up with his viewpoint of the ultimate goals of history. Hedeveloped this concept of essence early in his work by postulating theexistence of ultimate goals in the history of humanity. The evaluationscontained in his earlier work spurred his later sociological and economicalresearch, which aimed at an empirical confirmation of his theory of history andrevolution, arising from his philosophical viewpoint. Among the data andtheories accessible to him, he depicted those which confirmed his theories as

essential. The essentialism of the philosophy of history, resting on thesocial-ontological dichotomy of causality and finality, gradually becamethereby the essentialism of the theory of knowledge, based on the dichotomytrue-false, without Marx ever having clearly differentiated between them.This logical transformation of the character of Marxs essentialism corres-ponds to the temporal development of his writings. Both together made itpossible for him to declare his philosophy of history to be a science.

Although Marx never stated it explicitly, an axiological analysis of his workeasily proves that he gave the greatest importance to the essential dimension ofman and his social relationships, including their potential for development

towards communism, evaluating them higher than other potentials. Thisbecomes clear both from the value-content of his terminology, and from thewhole philosophical-historical construction of human history, viewed as aprocess of the search for freedom and the sublating (Aufhebung) of alienation.Marxist political practice also suggests the same conclusion. In other words,his philosophy of history, the essential potentialities of man and society, thesubjects of history as guarantors of the realisation of philosophical-historicalprojections of the future, the political activity contributing to this, as well asthe search for knowledge which advances to this essence, were valued by Marxmore highly than other philosophies of history, sociological and anthropolo-

gical analyses and political programs, which stay on the level of appearance.One must therefore attribute apetitio principii to Marx and Marxists, which

refers to the structure of their historical-philosophical reconstruction of worldhistory: Does the normative (regulative) or the cognitive element havepriority? Marx does not succeed in bridging the hiatus between a value-


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oriented praxis and a historical necessity, between essence and appearance,between reality and possibility. He does not try to clarify these differencestheoretically, to create a solid starting point for political praxis. The norm,

which is declared to be necessity, the essence which contradicts theappearance, both axiologically and descriptive-analytically, reveals a lack oftheoretical caution concerning possible deformations of the theory taking intoconsideration the political praxis which can be derived from it; the formertherefore contain a high potential for ideologisation.29 The optimistic essential-ist anthropology numbs the consciousness of the dangers and the possiblenegative developments on the level of appearances, i.e., the real historicalexistence of man, because it suggests the unavoidability of a certain directionof historical development. In concrete: Directly as a consequence thedevelopment of raw, thoughtless and despotic communism is made easier.This is the communism of which Marx speaks in his early writings,30 withoutbringing it in connection with the generic being of man, because he sees in itthe generalisation and most consequent expression of private property as ofthe alienated social relationship and of the existence of the bourgeoisindividual. The unclear differentiation between norm and necessity enablesthe followers of Marxs teaching to declare this political praxis to be historicallynecessary, and each historical-philosophical Utopian speculation to be science.The ballast of meaning of the concept of essence, which even Hegel could noteliminate, its antithesis to the level of appearance, makes easier the separation

of social theory from experience, its immunisation from the latter.31

Becauseessence is hidden behind appearance, its recognition is clouded withdifficulty, which must have a selective effect on the group which tries torecognise it. Because of this it becomes possible for an intellectual elite toappear on the political scene, which can claim to have recognised the essence,and therefore the whole historical-philosophical construction. Because thisrecognition has a higher cognitive value, so also the existence, the action andthe function of this elite has ahigher social value. Thereby, the claim of theelite to constitute a vanguard can be legitimized.

All of these potentials for ideologisation have been realised in the Eastern

European socialist movements, and have led to a social formation which callsitself real existing socialism. The first and most important step on this roadwas made by V. I. Lenin.

In his most important writing concerned with the theory of knowledge,Materialism and Empiriocriticism, Lenin analyses Kants concept of thething-in-itself. He implicitly identifies incorrectly the unknowable thing-in-itself with the unknown and concludes, that no thing in-itself can exist,or, in other words, it must be knowable.32 Thereby, the road is free for hisacceptance of Marxs essentialism. The dynamic character of advancingtowards essence and the relative character of the discovered essence (or

substance) are especially stressed in Lenins analysis of Hegels Wissenschaftder Logik; the task of dialectics is to advance to ever deeper levels of essence.Dialectics is an infinite process of deepening the knowledge of a thing, ofappearances, processes etc. by man, from the appearances towards the essenceand from a less deep towards a deeper essence. Human thinking plunges


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incessantly from appearance towards essence, from an essence, so to say, ofthe first order towards an essence of the second order, an so on, without end.

In the proper sense, dialectics is the examination of the contradiction in theessence of the things themselves . . . .33 In his search for essence, the dialecticianfinds laws: . . . the concept of law is one of the steps of the recognition byman of the unity and the interrelationships, the mutual dependence and thetotality of the world process. The law is the essential appearance. The lawis the reflection of the essential in the movement of the universe.34 Althoughin the context of his interpretation of Hegel, Lenin is unable to construct anunsurmountable opposition between essence and appearance, the thinker-dialectician using dialectical methods moves quasi per definitionem in thesphere of the essential and thereby comes across the law which reflects theessence of the world process, and this seems to me to be a legitimateconclusion also of the process of the history of mankind. Thereby, theessentialist dignity of the thinking of the dialectician Lenin is guaranteed.

The first consequence of this dignity is the reinterpretation of Marxstheory of class struggle in the sense of an elite theory: the adherents to thesocialist teaching and movement are not workers, it is the intelligentsia whosteps into their place as the historical subject, leads them towards socialismand prevents, thereby, that the spontaneous development of the workersmovement results in its subordination under the bourgeois ideology:35

The political class consciousness can be implanted into the worker only from

outside, that is from a region outside of the economic struggle, outside of thesphere of the relationships between the workers and the entrepreneurs.36Thereby, the leading role of intellectuals organized in the social-democraticparty is ideologically legitimized. The party leads, as avantgarde, theproletariat to revolution, which results in the overthrow of bourgeois rule andthereby frees the way for the political rule, the dictatorship of the proletariat.This dictatorship is . . . in a new way democratic (for the proletariat andgenerally for the unpropertied) and in a new way dictatorial (against thebourgeoisie).37 But what happens if the party fails to completely eliminatethe trade-unionistic consciousness of the workers, i.e., when it is impossible

to maintain that under the dictatorship of the proletariat only a minority issuppressed by the majority? To a similar question asked by the Germancommunists, Lenin apodictically answered: the party has the ability to binditself to the working masses and in fact, to a certain extent, to fuse with them,so that such a question becomes pointless.38 Where does Lenins theoreticalself-assurance and confidence, that the boundaries between the leadership,party, class and mass can be obliterated, or indeed are meaningless, comefrom? It is based on the conviction of knowing the essence of this relationship.The social reality and the backward trade-unionistic consciousness must makeway for the higher dignity, the higher truth content and therefore the higher

historical relevance of the dialectical recognition of essence: . . . because thetruth is on our side . . . , . . . because our propaganda always said and saysthe truth to workers and farmers in the whole world, whereas all otherpropaganda deceives them.39

Certainly the axiological dimension of the essentialism is, also implicitly,


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present in Lenin: the truth of his social theory and the political praxis of theparty derived from it are valued more highly than the theories of all other,socialist or non-socialist, parties; without a trace of relativism or self-doubt.Later on, what I shall call this essentialist intolerance is extended to includefactions inside the bolshevik party. From this intolerance follows the specialcharacter of the ethics of bolshevik forms and techniques of rule.

Similarly to Lenin, Trotzkys attempt to justify the leading role of the partyrelies on the conviction that the party is in possession of a privilegedknowledge; from which, in the name of the proletariat, it draws practicalconclusions: the party is the organised class-consciousness and the organisedclass-will40 of the proletariat. As early as 1904, he saw the danger of thedevelopment of a party-dictatorship and draws attention to it in theframework of his critique of the tendency to substitutional action within theparty: In the internal politics of the party these methods lead ... to thereplacement of the party by the party organisation, of the party organisationby the central committee and finally of the central committee by a dictator.41

Fifteen years later and at the peak of his power, he nevertheless claims theidentity of dictatorship of the party and of the class: The general leadership isconcentrated in the hands of the party. It doesnt rule directly, because itsapparatus is not suitable for this. But in all fundamental questions the decisiveword belongs to it. . . . The extraordinary role of the Communist Party in thevictorious proletarian revolution is completely understandable. As a matter of

fact, it is the dictatorship of class. . . . The revolutionary rule of theproletariat has as a precondition in the proletariat itself the political rule of aparty with a clear program of action and an invulnerable internal discipline.42

Somewhat later Trotzky is more explicit: In this substitution of the powerof the party in place of the power of the working class there is nothingaccidental, and essentially there is no substitution present at all. Thecommunists express the fundamental interests of the working class.43

Dictatorship of the proletariat means in its innermost essence the direct ruleof the revolutionary vanguard, who relies on the heavy masses and in the caseof necessity forces its end lagging behind to conform with the head.44 These

quotations indicate not only that Trotzkys style of thinking hardly differsfrom that of Lenin, but also illustrate his loose usage of the concept of essencein cases where reality clearly contradicts the ideological statement and can bebuilt into the ideological-theoretical construction only by declaring its exactopposite to its essence, and itself to an irrelevant appearance. With thegrowing need for legitimation of the rule of the communist party, as well aswith the lowering of the average educational level of the party membership,especially in the fields of philosophy and social theory, the use of thisessentialist trick is extended to a general unreflected praxis.

It is doubtless symptomatic that Lukcs, the theoretician who tried to argue

simultaneously on a high theoretical level and to further develop marxism inLenins sense, saw himself forced (in his studies of marxist dialectics whichcontain a philosophical foundation for the rule of the communist party)45 to goback to Marxs essentialism, although he also reflected upon Hegelsdialectics. Wenn also die Tatsachen richtig erfasst werden sollen, so muss vorerst


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dieser Unterschied zwischen ihrer realen Existenz und ihrer inneren Kerngestalt,zwischen den ber sie gebildeten Vorstellungen und ihren Begriffen klar und

genau erfasst werden. Diese Unterscheidung ist die erste Voraussetzung einerwirklich wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung, die nach Marxs Worten berflssigwre, wenn die Erscheinungsform und das Wesen der Dinge unmittelbarzusammenfielen. Es kommt deshalb darauf an, die Erscheinungen einerseits ausdieser ihrer unmittelbaren Gegebenheitsform herauszulsen, die Vermittlungen zu

finden, durch die sie auf ihren Kern, auf ihr Wesen bezogen und in ihm begriffenwerden knnen und andererseits das Verstndnis dieses ihres Erscheinungscharak-ters, ihres Scheins als ihrer notwendigen Erscheinungsform zu erlangen.46

The proletariat as a subject with the character of totality is the possessor of alatent class consciousness, which becomes effective only when the historicalprocess categorically requires the action of the proletariat. Therefore Lukcsspeaks of an imputed consciousness: Die rationell angemessene Reaktion nun,die auf diese Weise einer bestimmten typischen Lage im Produktionsprozesszugerechnet wird, ist das Klassenbewusstsein. Dieses Bewusstsein ist also weder dieSumme noch der Durchschnitt dessen, was die einzelnen Individuen, die die Klassebilden, denken, empfinden usw. Und doch wird das geschichtlich bedeutsameHandeln der Klasse als Totalitt letzthin von diesem Bewusstsein und nicht vomDenken usw. des Einzelnen bestimmt und ist nur aus diesem Bewusstseinerkennbar.47 The conclusion from such an argument can only be that duringthe phases of latency of its imputed political consciousness the proletariat

requires the party as the social carrier of this consciousness. The party has toplay an elevated role as: Trgerin des Klassenbewusstseins des Proletariats,Gewissen seiner geschichtlichen Sendung zu sein.48 Historical dialectics can beconsidered as an incessant struggle for truth, the result of which enableshuman beings to climb to progressively higher levels of self-knowledge. Inthis struggle the party has progressed the most. Since the (imputed)proletarian consciousness is able to reach the essence of the driving socialforces,49 the party is in possession of this deeper truth, and therefore thecarrier of the true action and the essential historical movement.

Although J. V. Stalin uses the concept of essence more often than Lenin,

his thinking is neither dialectical nor essentialist. He does not work out thedifference between the surface, the level of appearance, and the hiddenessence of the examined objects, not even in the form of the statement that theessence = truth beneath the surface of appearance which plainly contradictsexperience. The hiatus between social praxis and the content of ideology hadin the meantime become so great that attempts to approach and mediate them,in whatever form, would have delegitimising effects. Theory is here pureideology in the worst sense of the word, a doctrine about politically correctthinking independent from any experience. Stalins writings have, therefore,the form of a system of apodictical statements and definitions, which are

bound together in a more or less logical system and try to legitimizethemselves through a great number of quotations from Lenin (taken out ofcontext), as apodictic and interpreted as definitions. In other words: thehiatus from social experience is so large that Stalin can and must, on the onehand, simply define the truth about social conditions, the role of the party,


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the goals of social development, and the tasks of single social groupsdependent on this development etc., and, on the other, rule by means ofterror. Thereby, a stage of complete immunization of ideology and propaganda

from experience, is reached: ideology does not try to interpret reality but iscompletely resistant to it and, therefore, able to withdraw from it. Ideology canthen become a construction which is far removed from reality and which inforeign policy has a propagandistic function and in domestic policy that of acriterion of subjugation. One example of this relationship of theory and praxisis the Soviet Constitution of 5.12.1936, laid down in the middle of the periodof the Great Purge and praised by Stalin as the only through and throughdemocratic constitution in the world.50

It is characteristic here, that the distance of Stalins statements fromexperience frees him from distinguishing the cognitive and normativedimensions. The absolute truth emanating from his pen (or the pen of hisghostwriter) stands above such a differentiation, because it announces thenecessity before which reality has to retreat. This is valid both of his theory ofthe party51 and also for the laws of his economic theory, in which arereflected the laws of the processes of economic life independent of our will,52

which are, however, either so abstractly formulated that they are notoperationalizable or directly contradict experience.

A concrete example of the origin of the transcendence of experience byLeninist-Stalinist ideology can be offered which at the same time reveals the

political applicability of this ideology. Marxs procedure for the critique ofideology consists of two steps: first at the level of critique of knowledge, inwhich the scientific untenability of a theory has to be proven, and second, atthe level of social psychology, in which this untenability has to be explained interms of the social position and special interests of the group supporting it:science had priority over the sociology of knowledge. This binding of theknowledge of truth (founded in the sociology of knowledge) to a certain socialgroup facilitated the formation of a simple correspondence between theopposition, at the level of theory of knowledge, of appearance versus essence(i.e. truth), and the sociological opposition of the non-proletarian classes

versus the proletariat (i.e. its avantgarde). This correspondence and Stalinsnon-scientific and apodictic method of theory construction which removedtheory from the test of experience, made it easy for him to interchange thesequence of the two steps and form them into simple assertions. He decided(to be sure not on the base of sociology of knowledge, but according to actualpolitical needs), whether an ideal is bourgeois or proletarian, in order to drawconclusions about its falsehood or indeed truth, correctness, and progressive-ness.53

Although the earlier bolshevik theoreticians made only cautious use ofessentialistic terminology, essentialism nonetheless became a functionally

decisive element in the later development of the canonized ideology ofdialectical and historical materialism. Dialectical materialism sees in the laws ofthe motion of matter necessary relationships which result from its essence, theinternal nature of things, phenomena and processes. By essence weunderstand internal invariable relationships. Essence stands as the internal in


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opposition to the external, variable side of reality.54 The general and thenecessary are not immediately accessible to the senses. In the process of theprogressive cognition of essence one advances to deeper and deeper levels: theessence of the first, second and so on, order.55 Through this process,cognition does not remain imperfect in the sense of not sufficiently graspingthe essence of a given region of reality. However, the evolution of this realitycompels it to strive permanently for further development and greaterprecision.

Since materialism sees matter as the origin of things, it concludes on thelevel of social science that the way of production of material goodsdetermines an entire social and spiritual development. In accord with Marx,the former as base is contrasted to the latter as superstructure. Thesuperstructure is understood as a reflection of the base without regard to thecontradicting statements of Engels,56 and the claim of the party to a leadingrole in the economic sphere. Although the base-superstructure relationship isnot explicitly characterised as that of essence and appearance, but rathersubsumed under the dichotomy of content-form,57 the latter is invested withsimilar gnoseological and axiological connotations, as in the case of thedichotomy essence-appearance. This is a consequence of the ambigious use ofthe content-form dichotomy: it denotes both relationships of reflection and therelation of internal properties of the external form of a thing. That is to say, itsmeaning as the internal, content encompasses the essence of a thing, i.e.,

its fundamental and necessary properties.58

While Marx understands thebase-superstructure relationship as analogous to that between being andconsciousness,59 here it is transferred to the level of the dichotomy of essenceand appearance, and dedialectized in the sense of a mirroring determinationof the superstructure by the base.

All of this conjuring of materialism and the priority of production as base,does not motivate the Leninist-Stalinist ideology to reverse its tendency toimmunize and distance theory from an experiencable social reality. In therelation of this ideology to its own society, the essentialization of the base isnot taken as motive for an empirical examination of the real means of

production, because then conclusions could be drawn about the character ofthe superstructure which would question its avantgardistic elements. Theprocedure is exactly the opposite: ideology and institutions as elements of thesuperstructure built up by the party, are related (as a mirror image of a deeperlayer of the base) to its essential content, as to so speak, the essence of theessence. In exactly the same way as an essential consciousness is imputed tothe proletariat, the character of the way of production and the class position ofthe proletariat are defined a priori.

Exactly the opposite is the procedure of the critique of bourgeois society:class contradictions and exploitation in the sphere of production are declared

to be an essential definition of bourgeois institutions. Thereby, not only isbourgeois democracy reduced to a merely formal affair and the politicalfreedoms of citizens to mere deception, but a marxist immanent critique ofbourgeois society, proceeding from its own ideals and goals carried in itssuperstructure, is made impossible. It therefore belongs to the essence of the


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bourgeois state apparatus, that it represents the interests of the ruling class,the bourgeoisie, the monopoly capital. Thereby it is not essential, in whichform of government the bourgeoisie exercises its political power, whether inthe form of a constitutional monarchy, a republic etc., which of the bourgeoisparties happens to form the government, which persons happen to hold thehighest positions of power etc.60

Apart from these elements of the indirect legitimation of power, thisideology seeks to legitimize party rule both positively and directly. The mostimportant features of this rule which require legitimation are its exclusivitytowards other political forces and its temporal unlimitedness. Both can bederived from the principle of vanguard. The transcendence of experience asthe basis of legitimation for vanguard rule can be most easily understood ifseen as one of the last members in a chain of attempts at transcendentlegitimation. This chain has its origins in the mythological and theocraticfoundations of political power continues in the eschatological ideas of thefuture developed in the 18th and 19th century in the philosophies of history,eventually to take shape in the ideal conception of communist society in the

writings of Lenin and Trotzky.61 The philosophy of history and thephilosophers of history (revolutionaries) demand that mankind realise theseideals by revolutionising the world. For this purpose they need an historicalsubject; in our example, they declare the proletariat to be such a subject.However, although the working class can participate in the revolution, it

thereafter must resume its work, and cede the continuation of the revolutionto the party which led it. The absoluteness of the eschatological ideal offerssufficient reason for the exclusivity of rule by its adherents, the proletariat andits party. The same absoluteness explains its unrealisability, the permanentwithdrawal of communism into an always more distant future, which resultsin the temporal unlimitedness of party rule. Another reason for its unboundedduration is the economic competition of socialist and capitalist countries:communism cannot be reached or achieved before capitalism is overtaken.However, the crisis of capitalism is today no worse than the crisis of realexisting socialism.

Besides these basic elements, a whole series of single goals and methods ofrule must be legitimized. From the absoluteness of these revolutionary goals itis concluded that there exists a necessity for the universalisation of theirpursuit. Originally it was expected that the proletariat would become the largemajority of the population. From this the idea that its vanguard shouldeliminate all other political forces and initiate a program of industrialisation inorder to increase the number of proletarians could be justified. If this goalturned out to be only partly realisable in spite of extensive industrialisation,the whole population is simply declared to be working class, so that theexclusivity of the claims to leadership do not change. The absoluteness of the

ideal justifies also the dictatorial rule the dictatorship of the proletariat. Theessence of this dictatorship, hidden behind the claim of the unlimited use offorce,62 is the creative work on the construction and development of the newsocialist society.63 For this dictatorship is really the proletarian democracy,the historically highest type of democracy,64 and dictatorial measures are


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applied only against the non-proletarian classes, doomed to disappear anyway.Those parts of the proletariat, which, in the opinion of the party, are notsufficiently engaged in the rapid construction of socialism, can be simplyredefined to be such a class. The leadership of the party can even decimate itsown membership through purges, without thereby changing anything in theessence of its rule: So it belongs to the essence of socialism, that the workingclass exerts political power. The concrete forms of appearance of this essencereveal themselves in manifold ways: in the leading role of the party of theworking class, in the life of state and society . . .. 65

Certainly, ideological legitimation is not the only form of legitimation inreal existing socialism. In addition, industrialisation and increases in thestandard of living belong to forms of overt legitimation. The latter iscomplemented by many forms of covert legitimation,66 which are incompatiblewith the proclaimed ideal of the construction of socialism, but which, in spiteof this, contribute to the authority of the regime. Primarily, these forms ofcovert legitimation are based on institutions and forms of rule which are inharmony with traditional values, norms and expectations.67 In this case,essentialism is instrumentalised for the purpose of interpretation of thesetraditional elements into the official ideology.

Legitimizing itself in an essentialist-definitional manner, as well as theessentialist way of thinking, this form of rule is sedimented to the level ofeveryday usage. Seen in their social context, they contain the scarcely

avoidable dynamics of development in the direction of delegitimization. Heretwo different mechanisms of delegitimization can be distinguished. The firstconsists of the distortion of the relationship between ideology and reality,creating great difficulties for the former to keep its position vis a vis the latter.On the one hand, rulers are compelled to continue asserting the identity oftheir ideological consciousness with the consciousness of the working class,otherwise they would have to admit the illegitimity of their rule. This is an allor nothing alternative, the more pronounced, the more the ideology isremoved from experience. On the other hand, the possibility of ideologicalself-legitimation, resistant to experience, leads the party as the leading force to

more and more frequent use of it as justification for all the negativeconsequences of its rule. The essentialist thinking of party members, who as arule have a particularistic interest in accepting and internalising the ideologyof the party, leads to greater readiness to neglect or suppress their ownexperience; to fail to search for rational explanations, but to imagine occultpowers behind them. The consequence of this is both the degeneration ofrational thinking and the increasing loss of contact with reality. Thereby, theparty is decreasingly in the position to play an active, constructive and leadingrole in the society. There remains then only a negative function for ideology:to occupy the universe of socially and politically relevant speech and thereby

impede independent political thinking. This makes the development ofalternative political proposals and programs in times of crisis more difficultand, thereby, increases the probability that crisis will reach such dimensionsthat these programs will come too late.

The second mechanism of delegitimation consists in the damaging of forms


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of legitimation which are unofficial and not based on ideology, for instancethose which are built on economic expansion the quantitative increase ofconsumption, security in the autocratic socialist community, etc. The

unrealistic actions of the leadership (for instance in planning of the economy)results in the development of reality in neither a planned nor a desireddirection: illegality and corruption. Only through such means can social lifebe brought into harmony with the postulates of the plan and the ideology.Thereby, not only is it the case that actions in harmony with state norms aremade impossible, but also personal relationships as the origin of norms ofeveryday life are negatively influenced by their mercantilisation. This beingthe case, personal relationships as the basis of social security are reduced tothe level of the morality of do ut des. At the same time, economic rationalityand with it productivity are kept at a low level. The claim of the ideology todefine the horizons of perception is a guarantor of the rule of silence,half-truths and lies. This ideology also hampers the cognition processesindependent of ideology, thereby reducing the creativity of people andworsening the social crisis. The moral regression of the population leads to afatal trap: the weakening of social solidarity and the dissolution ofconventional morals makes the decentralising strategies of reform moredifficult, even impossible to implement, because they require a responsibleparticipation of the population in political and economic decision-making.

The essentialistic technique of legitimation proves to be inappropriate. It

turns out that also those who consider themselves the carriers and executors ofhistorical-philosophical laws are subject to the cunning of reason, whichbring ideology into an intractable situation: making it appear unreasonable.

NOTES

1 General definitions of the concepts of essence in Kant can be found in: MetaphysischeAnfangsgrnde der Naturwissensschaft, first remark of the Vorrede, in: Immanuel Kant:Werkausgabe in 12 Bnden, edited by Wilhelm Weischedel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M.

1980, vol. IX, p. 11, A III, as well as in: Logik, ibid., vol. VI, p. 489, A 90.2 Logik, ibid., vol. VI, p. 489, A 91.3 Prolegomena zu einer jeden knftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten knnen,

32 and 34, ibid., vol. V, p. 183ff, A 104-108.4 Prolegomana . . ., 45, ibid., vol. V, p. 203, A 133.5 In his writings Hegel defines the concept of essence in several places. See for example:

Texte zur Philosophischen Propdeutik, Philosophische Enzyklopdie fr die Oberklasse,33, in: G. W. F. Hegel, Theorie-Werkausgabe in 20 Bnden, vol. 4, p. 17; Logik fr die

Mittelklasse (1808-9), (43/75), ibid., vol. 4, p. 96; Logik fr die Mittelklasse (1810/11),33, ibid., vol. 4, p. 171; Wissenschaft der Logik, Die Lehre vom Wesen, ibid., vol. 6, p. 18;Enzyklopdie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, die Wissenschaft der Logik, 112, ibid.,

vol. 8, p. 231.6 Wissenschaft der Logik, Die Lehre von Wesen, section l, chapter 1. Ab, remark, ibid., vol. 6,

p. 133ff.7 See: Wiss. der Logik, Die Lehre vom Wesen, section 2, chapter 1. A, ibid., vol. 6, p.

129-139; Enzyklopdie . . ., Die Wiss. der Logik, 122-124, ibid., vol. 8, p. 252-255.


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8 Enzyklopdie . . ., Die Wiss. der Logik, 139, ibid., vol. 8, p. 274.9 Ibid., 131, p. 261f.

10 Wiss. der Logik, Die Lehre vom Wesen, section 3, Einfhrung, ibid., vol. 6, p. 186. For the

problem of the internal and external see also: Philosophische Enzyklopdie fr dieOberklasse, 46, 47, ibid., vol. 4, p. 20; Enzyklopdie . . ., Die Wiss. der Logik, 142,ibid., vol. 8, p. 279ff.

11 Enzyklopdie . . ., Die Wiss. der Logik, 140, ibid., vol. 8, p. 274-279.12 Wiss. der Logik, Die Lehre vom Wessen, Vorrede, ibid., vol. 6, p. 15f.13 Die Wiss. der Logik, Die Lehre vom Begriff, Vom Begriff im allgemeinen, ibid., vol. 6, p. 245.14 Wiss. der Logik, Die Lehre vom Begriff, Einleitung, ibid., vol. 6, p. 269.15 Vorlesungen eber die Philosophie der Religion, ibid., vol. 17, p. 524ff.; Enzyklopdie . . .,

Die Wiss. der Logik, 159, ibid., vol. 8, p. 304ff.16 Phnomenologie des Geistes, Einleitung, ibid., vol. 3, p. 76f; Vorlesungen ber die

Philosophie der Religion, ibid., vol. 17, p. 198 and 339.17 Enzyklopdie . . ., Die Wiss. der Logik, 159, ibid., vol. 8, p. 304ff.18 Wiss. der Logik, Die Lehre vom Begriff, chapter 2, Das negative Urteil, ibid., vol. 6, p. 320.19 Begriffslehre fr die Oberklasse, 70-83, ibid., vol. 4, p. 158ff.; Wiss. der Logik, Die Lehre

vom Begriff, section 3, chapter 2, B, ibid., vol. 6, p. 541-548.20 Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Werke, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 39 vols, (MEW), vol. 23, p.

559.21 MEW, vol. 23, p. 262; vol. 25, p. 219; vol. 26.2, pp. 63 and 162.22 MEW, vol. 25, p. 178.23 MEW, vol. 23, p. 559.24 MEW, vol. 23, p. 564.

25 MEW Ergnzungsband, part 1, p. 512-522.26 Ibid., p. 515.27 Ibid., p. 516.28 Gyrgy Markus: Anthropologie und Marxismus, VSA-Verlag, Hamburg 1981, p. 92.29 For the concept of potential for ideologisation and part of the related argumentation I

am indebted to Svetozar Stojanovi, especially his text Marxismus als Gesellschaftstheorieund Ideologie, berlegungen zur Krise des Marxismus, in: Ossip K. Flechtheim (ed.):

Marx heute, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg 1983, p. 253ff., as well as his lectureMarxismus, Leninismus, Stalinismus: Kontinuitt oder Diskontinuitt in the University ofGttingen, summer semester 1983.

30 MEW Ergnzungsband, part 1, p. 534f.

31 See: E. Topitsch: Machtkampf und Humanitt, in: Topitsch: Gottwerdung und Revolution,Verlag Dokumentation, Pullach 1973, p. 135-215, p. 173ff.

32 V. I. Lenin: Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1967, p. 91-97,195-199, 262.

33 V. I. Lenin: Werke, vol. 38, Philosophische Hefte, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1964, p. 213, 239f.*34 Ibid., p. 141f.*35 V. I Lenin: Was Tun? in: Lenin: Ausgewhlte Werke in 6 Bnden, Verlag Marxistische

Bltter, Frankfurt/M. 1982, vol. 1, p. 365f., quotation p. 376.36 Ibid., p. 418.*37 Staat und Revolution, ibid., vol. III, p. 497; Die proletarische Revolution und der Renegat

Kautsky, ibid., vol. IV, p. 556f.; ber Demokratie und Diktatur, ibid., vol. IV, p.667-672.*

38 Der linke Radikalismus, die Kinderkrankheit im Kommunismus, ibid., vol. V, p. 489ff.39 VIII. Gesamtrussischer Sowjetkongress, 22-29 December 1920, ibid., vol. VI, p. 24.*40 L. Trotzky: Unsere politischen Aufgaben, in: Trotzky: Schriften zur revolutionren

Organisation, Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1970, p. 47.*


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Redigitized 2004 by Central and Eastern European Online Library C.E.E.O.L.( www.ceeol.com )

41 Ibid., p. 73.*42 L. Trotzky: Terrorismus und Kommunismus (Anti-Kautsky), published by the West

European Secretariat of the Communist International, Hamburg 1920, p. 87.*

43 Ibid., p. 88f.*44 Ibid., p. 89.*45 Georg Lukcs: Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Luchterhand, Darmstadt and Neuwied

1968.46 Ibid., p. 68f.47 Ibid., p. 126f.48 Ibid., p. 114, see also p. 495f.49 Ibid., p. 152.50 J. V. Stalin: ber den Entwurf der Verfassung der UdSSR, in: Stalin: Ausgewhlte Werke,

Verlag Roter Morgen, Dortmund 1979, vol. 2, p. 195.*51 ber die Grundlagen des Leninismus, VIII: Die Partei, ibid., vol. 1, p. 258-273, see also p.

33 and 350.52 Oekonomische Probleme des Sozialismus in der UdSSR, ibid., vol. 2, p. 405-498, p. 412.*53 S. Stojanovi: Geschichte und Parteibewusstsein, Hanser, Mnchen 1978, p. 106f.54 Grundlagen der marxistiscken Philosophie, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1960, p. 216, quoted from:

Gustav A. Wetter: Sowjetideologie heute, I, Dialektischer und historischer Materialismus,Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1962, p. 77.*

55 G. Klaus, M. Buhr (eds.): Philosophisches Wrterbuch, VEB-Verlag, Leipzig 1974, p.1295-1298.

56 Engels to Joseph Bloch, MEW, vol. 37, p. 463.57 G. Klaus, M. Buhr, ibid., p. 409 and 574.58 Ibid., p. 574.

59 MEW, vol. 13, p. 9.60 G. Klaus, M. Buhr, ibid., p. 1297.*61 V. I. Lenin: Staat und Revolution, ibid., vol. III, p. 550-565; L. Trotzky: Literatur und

Revolution, Gerhard Verlag, Berlin 1968, p. 195f. and 209-215.62 Compare for instance V. L Lenin: Geschichtliches zur Frage der Diktatur, ibid., vol. V, p.

714f. and 717.63 G. Klaus, M. Buhr, ibid., p. 28Iff.64 Wolfgang Leonhard: Sowjetideologie heute, II, Fischer, Frankfurt/M. 1962, p. 166-169.65 G. Klaus, M. Buhr, ibid., p. 1297.*66 The differentiation between overt and covert legitimation is developed in: Maria Markus:

Overt and Covert Modes of Legitimation in East European Societies, in: T. H. Rigby, F.Fehr (eds.): Political Legitimation in Communist States, Macmillan Press, London andBasingstoke 1982, p. 82-93.

67 Stephen White: The USSR: Patterns of Autocracy and Industrialism, in: A. Brown, J.

Gray (eds.): Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States, Macmillan Press,London 1977, p. 25-65.

* Translated from the German by Gerry Shaw and M. Krizan.

1.9 - Krizan, Mojmir - Essentialism and the Ideological Legitimation of One-Party Rule (en)

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