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OligopolyOligopoly
Hall and Lieberman, 3rd edition, Thomson South-Western, Chapter 10
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OverviewOverview Oligopoly market characteristics
Measure of market structure
Barriers in oligopoly market
Game theory approach to duopoly
Cooperative collusion
Cheating
Future of oligopoly
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OligopolyOligopoly When just a few large firms dominate a
market
In such a market, each firm recognizes its strategicinterdependence with others
So that actions of each one have an important
impact on the others
An oligopoly is a market dominated by a smallnumber ofstrategically interdependentfirms
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Number of Fir
msNumber of Fir
ms
Oligopoly requires that a few firms dominate themarket
How few?
At some point, number of firms is large enoughand interdependence weak enoughthat oligopolybecomes a poor description
Monopolistic competition would fit better
No absolute number at which oligopoly ends and
monopolistic competition begins
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Market Do
mination
Market Do
mination
Strategic interdependence requires that afew firms dominate the market
Their share of market is large
As combined market share shrinks,strategic interdependence becomes weaker
Oligopoly is a matter of degree Not an absolute classification
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Econo
m
ies
of Sca
le:Na
tu
ra
l OligopoliesEc
onom
ies
of Sca
le:Na
tu
ra
l Oligopolies
When minimum efficient scale (MES) for a typical
firm is a relatively large percentage of market
only a few large firms survive since small firms cantcompete
Market becomes an (natural) oligopoly
Remember, MES is defined as the lowest level of
output at which it can achieve minimum cost per unit The output level at which the LRATC first hits
bottom
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Figure 1:
Natura
l OligopolyFigure 1:
Natura
l Oligopoly
E
H F
25,000
Units per Month
100,0000
80
$200
Dollars
DMarket
LRATCTypical Firm
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Repu
ta
tionas
a
Ba
rrierR
epu
ta
tionas
a
Ba
rrier Established oligopolists are likely to have
favorable reputations
Investors decision: enter or not? Critical thing: is it worthy to take the risk of being a
new firm in such market?
If expected profit is greater than the initial loss, enter
If initial loss is too great, stay out.
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Strategic BarriersStrategic Barriers
Strategies designed to keep out potentialcompetitors, for example:
Maintain excess production capacity as a signal
Make special deals with distributors to receive
best shelf space in retail stores
Spend large amounts on advertising to make it
difficult for a new entrant to differentiate itsproduct
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Legal Ba
rriers
Legal Ba
rriers
Patents and copyrightswhich can beresponsible for monopolycan also create
oligopolies Like monopolies, oligopolies are not shy
about lobbying government to preservetheir market domination
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Measu
res
ofMa
rket Structure
Measu
res
ofMa
rket Structure
Concentration ratios: Aggregated marketshare of the largest N firms in the industry
Range: 0-100% 4 Firm Concentration ratio: Market share
controlled by the largest 4 firms
Others reported by the U.S. Census: 8 Firm
20 Firm
50 Firm
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Measures ofMarket StructureMeasures ofMarket Structure
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: summed squares ofall firm market shares in the industry
Si = market share (in percent) of the ith firm
HHI = (Si )2
Range: 0 (perfect competition) to 10,000(monopoly)
i
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Data
on Firm
Numb
ersand SizeD
ata
on Firm
Numb
ersand Size
Compiled by the U.S. Bureau of the Census
Every 5 years
Surveys of domestic firms
Data monitored by Federal Government
Competitive environment Merger advisability
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Databased on the 2002 Economic Census.
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IBQTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=&-ds_name=EC0231SR13
Measured Industry Concentration in Manufacturing
D: Not disclosed
Second and third columns: Percentage in value added in the industry
Last column: Herfindahl index from the 50 largest firms
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Databased on the 2002 Economic Census.
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IBQTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=&-ds_name=EC0231SR13
Measured Industry Concentration in Manufacturing
D: Not disclosed
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Databased on the 2002 Economic Census.
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IBQTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=&-ds_name=EC0231SR13
Measured Industry Concentration in Manufacturing
D: Not disclosed
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Oligopoly vs. OtherMarket StructuresOligopoly vs. OtherMarket Structures
Oligopoly presents the greatest challenge toeconomists
essence of oligopoly is strategic interdependence economists have had to modify the tools used to
analyze other market structures and to developentirely new tools as well
One approachgame theoryhas yielded richinsights into oligopoly behavior
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The Game Theory ApproachThe Game Theory Approach
Game theory approach
An approach to modeling strategic interaction of
oligopolists in terms of moves and countermoves
Elements
Players
Strategies
Payoffs
Pay off matrix
Game tree
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Gam
eT
heory ApproachG
ameT
heory Approach
Some situations to which game theory canbe applied:
firms competing for business
political candidates competing for votes
animals fighting over prey
bidders competing in an auction
legislators' voting behavior under pressure
from interest groups
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Gam
eT
heoryGam
eT
heory Short HistoryShort History
John Von Neumann (1903-1957)
Theory of Games and EconomicBehavior with OskarMorgenstern
This book established gametheory as a field
An introduction to gametheoryby Martin J.Osborne. OxfordUniversity Press, 2002
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Gam
eT
heoryGam
eT
heory Short HistoryShort History
John F. Nash, Jr.(1928- )
One of the contributions is
the introduction of theequilibrium notion now
known as Nash equilibrium
1994 Nobel prize winner in
economics with the game
theorists John Harsanyi and
Reinhard SeltenAn introduction to game theory
by Martin J. Osborne. OxfordUniversity Press, 2002
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The Pri
soner
sDile
mmaThe Pri
soner
sDile
mma
Simple example to explain why a techniquefor obtaining confessions, commonly used by
police, is so often successful Payoff matrix
Players: Rose and Colin
Payoffs: number in the matrix Strategies: Confess (C) / not confess (NC) for
either of the players
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Figure 2: The Prisoners DilemmaFigure 2: The Prisoners Dilemma
How to read the matrix?
Players:{Rose, Colin}
Strategies:{C, NC} Payoffs
What will Rose do?
What will Colin do?
Rose
Colin
C NC
C -20, -20 -3, -30
NC -30, -3 -5, -5
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The Prisoners DilemmaThe Prisoners Dilemma
A dominant strategy: the players best strategy
regardless of the other players strategy
Roses dominant strategy is
confess
regardlessof Colins choice
So is Colin
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Nash Eq
uilibriumNas
h Equilibrium
Outcome of this game is an example of aNash equilibrium
Exists when each player is taking the bestactiongiven best actions taken by otherplayers
Under the Nash Equilibrium, no players wantto deviate
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Figure 3:Figure 3: Working on a joint project
Elements
Players:{you, your
friend} Strategies:{work hard,
Goof off}
Payoffs
What is the NashEquilibrium?
Friend
You
W G
W2, 2 0, 3
G 3, 0 1, 1
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Figure 4:Figure 4: Battle of Sex
Elements
Players:{Mr. R and
Mrs.