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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SUB-COMMITTEE ONFUTURE SECURITY AND DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

(DSCFC)

MISSION REPORT

LITHUANIA, LATVIA AND ESTONIA

9-13 MAY 2016

www.nato-pa.int 19 August 2016

This Mission Report is presented for information only and does not represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Ethan Corbin, Director of the Defence and Security Committee.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Members of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s Defence and Security Committee (DSC) visited Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in a pre-Summit demonstration of solidarity with their colleagues in the region. The parliamentary mission included visits to all three capitals as well as military installations representing the distinct air, sea, and land challenges facing the region. Xavier Pintat, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities (DSCFC), led the delegation of parliamentarians representing eight different Allied countries through the Alliance’s entire Baltic region from 9-13 May 2016.

2. The Baltics are often cited as an area of strategic weakness for the NATO Alliance. Much attention has been paid to the region at the military, political, and academic levels since Russia’s brazen seizure and annexation of Crimea in the winter of 2014. To gain a better understanding of the unique threat landscape in the Baltics the delegation visited NATO’s air-policing mission in Siauliai, Lithuania, the Latvian naval port of Liepaja, and attended the VIP ceremony for the Estonian-led Allied ground exercise Spring Storm in Voru, Estonia.

3. Baltic State parliamentarians and other high-level officials recognised the importance of the increased Alliance presence in the region and stressed the need for more. Unanimously, Baltic State Defence Ministers called for a permanent NATO presence in the region, at the very least in the form of prepositioned heavy weaponry and continuously rotating Allied forces in the region.

4. NATO Heads of State met for their bi-annual summit from 8-9 July in Warsaw, Poland. As expected, reinforcement of the Alliance’s eastern flank played a significant role in the two-day meeting. This report will discuss the NATO Parliamentary Assembly DSC mission to the region just prior to the Warsaw Summit; the regional threat perception; the Baltic States’ efforts to meet the Wales summit commitments to strengthen their roles as Allies at home and abroad; and concrete Alliance reassurance measures in the region. It will also offer a digest of the outcomes of the summit as related to new measures taken toward Baltic state and regional security.

II. CONTEXT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY MISSION TO THE BALTICS

5. Since 2014 there has been a general Alliance-wide perception of seemingly ever increasing Russian brinkmanship in and around the Baltics. A range of incidents have drawn attention on the region and its vulnerabilities; from reported border abductions, to fishing vessel intimidation, increased penetration of NATO air space by the Russian air force, to jittering harassment of NATO air, land, and sea forces during exercises of on patrol in the region.

6. Not long before the DSCFC visit, a RAND report noted the high level of exposure the Baltics have to a form of lightning strike by Russian forces. The RAND report noted that, in the Allied forces’ current posture in the region, it would be almost impossible to repel this form of quick strike attack by Russian forces. The results of the RAND study’s series of war games on the question of Baltic vulnerability to Russian incursion made the issue of securing the region among the most-discussed in NATO circles.

7. In light of the above, the Defence and Security Committee decided to focus attention on the region throughout 2016 and to have a delegation visit all three states to give the NATO PA a first-hand understanding of the air, land, and sea challenges facing the region. As Xavier Pintat, Chairman of the DSCFC, stressed: “This is a mission to show not only solidarity with our peers in this region, but to also understand the unique security challenges they face along the eastern flank of the Alliance.”

8. As DSC Chairwoman Nicole Ameline (France) noted during the visit: “Our parliamentary colleagues in the region gave us real in-depth understanding of the range of challenges facing the

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region. We are looking forward to the Warsaw Summit, as we are confident the Alliance will be able to bolster its reassurance package to the region and strengthen its deterrence posture. In an era of wide-ranging threats facing the Alliance, particularly in Europe, member state solidarity will be the key to success.”

Perception of the Russian Threat

9. Over the course of the week, the delegation heard from Baltic interlocutors, from parliamentarians to defence ministers, about the real and proximate threat Russia poses to the region. As Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius noted in the delegation’s first meeting of the parliamentary mission: “Let’s not be naïve about Russia’s actions – trying to find a way back to dialogue is correct, but we should not be trying to find a way back to business as usual with Russia.” As Janis Garisons from the State Secretary of Defence in Riga told the delegation: “Western Europe judges Russia by Western standards, which clouds an understanding of Russia’s true motives.” He continued by noting that Russia uses an aggressive foreign policy to achieve its domestic goals, “Moscow views NATO as a direct threat, and the expansion of the Euro-Atlantic community has the potential of unleashing new ‘colour’ revolutions inside of Russia.” Garisons also noted there is a current trend in Russia to, “renew propaganda glorifying war and, thereby, de-emphasising the suffering that goes along with war.”

10. Many Baltic interlocutors noted that too many variables were aligning in favour of further Russian aggression against the Alliance – particularly one that would exploit any perceived weakness. Among the variables highlighted, several noted the domestic pressures the Russian government is under due to the international sanctions regime imposed in the wake of Crimea, as well as a significant desire to demonstrate the utility and effectiveness of the new Russian military forces, which have consumed a disproportionate amount of domestic resources over the last five years.

11. During their discussions with the delegation, members of the Lithuanian Parliament reminded their counterparts of the statements Vladimir Putin made after the 2008 war with Georgia; "When Putin was asked if he would try to go into Crimea, he responded angrily by saying even questions of that kind were provoking, stating ‘how dare you ask such questions?’”. They continued by warning, that "it came to pass all the same, so we are not naïve here in Lithuania to think that Russia has no interest in retaking the Baltics. Putin has a clear fondness for the Soviet era, and seeks to position Russia in a similar place regionally and globally in terms of power and influence."

12. Parliamentarian interlocutors from all three Baltic States supported the idea that Russian propaganda is preparing the home audience for the potential invasion of the Baltics. Added to this, they reminded the delegation of the suite of exercises taking place within close proximity to the region, and often with scenarios where the Russian military exercises a potential invasion of a Baltic country. As Raimonds Bergmanis emphasised: "There is an essential difference here: Russia demonstrates offensive capabilities, rather than NATO’s tendency to demonstrate defensive capabilities. This is destabilising." Lithuanian parliamentary interlocutors stressed: “There are S-400 and Iskander missiles right on our border, and air manoeuvres by the Russians in the Baltics are increasing. They are clearly trying to demonstrate their power.”

13. Lithuanian Defence Minister, Juozas Olekas, also noted Russia’s more subtle attempts to use hybrid tactics to destabilise the Euro-Atlantic community in the region and beyond. Regarding propaganda, he continued, "This is a very tough instrument to counter. Essentially, we do two things: In extreme cases, we block the transmission, but in most cases, we work to counter the information with facts. Particularly, we try to pay attention to the sensitivities and interests of our Russophone community. We participate actively in the NATO Communication Centre of Excellence for StratComm in Riga."

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14. Regarding cyber menaces, there was a range of responses. Defence Minister Olekas stated that Lithuania works to unite both civilian and military capacities to secure the cyber domain, and this was echoed in both Riga and Tallinn. In January, Vilnius established a national centre of cyber security under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence due to the rising number of cyber-attacks across an array of targets. Estonian Defence Minister, Hannes Hanso, stated: “Cyber is a clear priority for us in Estonia, we feel as though we are at the vanguard of understanding and countering cyber tactics.” He continued by noting, “The cyber-attack we had here in Estonia only made us stronger.”

15. Estonian interlocutors noted strong support of cyber being considered a separate domain, covered by Article 5. Throughout the visit, Baltic interlocutors noted they felt the pressures of mounting cyber intimidation and intrusion. A focus on honing Alliance capabilities to defend against cyber aggression was a clear message to the delegation across the Baltics.

III. BALTIC STATE DEFENCE INVESTMENTS AND BURDEN SHARING

16. As has been reported thoroughly by this committee, the 2014 NATO summit in Wales saw all member states pledge to move toward investing 2% of their GDP in their defence institutions. In addition, Allies pledged to allocate at least 20% of this spending toward new equipment purchases and research and development. Concerns about waning defence investments throughout the Alliance have driven significant debate about the future of the Alliance in the absence of a more equitable distribution of total Alliance costs, investments, and, as a result, contribution and Alliance capabilities.

17. This committee has reported the shifting momentum across the Alliance that has led to an almost Alliance-wide halt in defence-spending cuts and even a modest rebound in investment. Driving the new focus on defence investment is the clear and shared sentiment the international security environment is increasingly volatile, threatening, and complex – particularly along the eastern and southern flanks of the Alliance’s European territories.

18. The DSCFC delegation to the Baltics learned from all three states renewed defence investment is happening at a fervent pace, adding to the understanding that geographic proximity is playing a key role not only to threat perception in the region, but also to action. Regional Defence Investment

19. In the face of the massive investments Russia has made in its Western Military District, placing vast amounts of equipment and personnel in close proximity to both Baltic states, all three Baltic Defence Ministers and parliamentary interlocutors noted their focus on significantly increased defence sector investment. Not only are these measures taken as a means of revamping, and even creating in some cases, all areas of the Baltic states’ defence institutions.

20. Lithuanian Defence Minister Juozas Olekas told the delegation the Lithuanian parliament had reached the necessary compromise to increase defence spending to 2% GDP by 2020. Dr Olekas noted it was possible for the country to reach the benchmark by 2018. He told the delegation: “By increasing our defence investment, we are not only increasing our own capabilities, but also our ability to work more closely with our allies, here in Lithuania and abroad.”

21. Latvian interlocutors told the NATO PA delegation upon their arrival that a recent vote in parliament to raise defence spending to 2% GDP had passed with 100% of Latvian parliamentarians voting in favour. Latvian Defence Minister Raimonds Bergmanis also noted that personnel costs in the Latvian military are now below 50% of the defence budget, while 27% is invested in new equipment; a number that will grow to 30% by 2018. The delegation also learned

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from its interlocutors in the Latvian Defence Ministry that defence investments would grow from 367 million Euros in 2016, representing 1.4% GDP to 589.8 million Euros, or 2% GDP, by 2018.

22. Estonian Defence Minister, Hannes Hanso, noted Estonian sentiments aligned across party lines in terms of defence investment. He told the delegation Estonia will maintain its current allocation of at least 2% GDP toward defence institutions. He stated: "Estonia spent the last 20 years building its defence institutions from scratch and they are increasingly competent and well-equipped. By 2020 we will have 3,300 professional forces with an equal number of reserves. In an emergency, however, we have the capacity to call up approximately 22,000."

23. Across the board, defence officials noted a focus on early warning, detection, and situational awareness and cross-sector investments to increase combat readiness. For example, Latvian officials noted the existence of ongoing projects to bolster air surveillance capacities and to develop Communications, Command, and Control capabilities, and future plans to have competent ISTAR1 capabilities in place.

24. In addition to a renewed focus on intelligence gathering technologies, Baltic state Defence Ministers noted a higher level of combat readiness would be achieved by focusing on several lines of effort. In particular, investment in modern, linked air defence systems, highly capable Special Forces, modern mechanised infantry brigades, and a larger pool of capable military engineers.

25. All three countries noted a parallel investment in larger and more effective national guards. Key advantages of a strong National Guard are clear, the force provides: a close link with the broader domestic population, a general regional presence throughout the territory, support to emergency operations, an effective additional observational layer to counter hybrid warfare tactics, and, a means of assisting interagency cooperation. All three states noted they were working to invest in better equipment, training, and infrastructure to support larger National Guard forces.

26. Still, it is clear the Baltic States benefit from Alliance reassurance measures designed to plug capacity gaps, such as air forces, and to build a credible deterrence posture in the Baltics. The following sections will outline some of the Alliance efforts in the region in terms of missions, infrastructure and personnel, and will conclude with a short summary of the agreed-upon enhanced forward presence NATO allies will build up in the Baltics in 2017.

Allied Contributions

27. Allies already focus attention on the Baltic States and work along diligently to provide several reassurance measures. The most apparent of these measures is the air policing mission conducted by rotating Allied forces.

28. Latvian parliamentarians noted the great success of the NATO Centre of Excellence for Strategic Communications, which Defence Minister Bergmanis noted was not solely focused on eastern flank threats, but also the asymmetrical threats posed by armed groups such as Daesh.

Visit to the NATO NFIU in Lithuania

29. A concrete example of the new Alliance footprint in the Baltics as a result of the Wales summit is the build-up of the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) to help bolster regional situational awareness, support regional exercising and training, and, to assist with the command and control of the VJTF and NRF should they have to be deployed in the region. By way of example, the commander cited the Dragoon Ride II exercise, in which the NFIU was involved in preparation during the delegation’s visit. The exercise rehearsed moving thousands of soldiers and air, land, and sea vessels throughout the region from Poland up to Talinn as a means of testing the Alliance’s logistical capabilities to deter and defend the north-eastern flank.

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30. The commander briefing the delegation noted that the Lithuanian NFIU is fully manned and operational, in accordance with its orders to be so prior to the Warsaw summit. By the time the delegation visited Lithuania, only the Hungarian and Slovakian NFIUs were still in the developmental phase, meaning the four along the north-eastern European flank were fully operational.

31. A key challenge for the NFIU personnel, the commander noted, was managing the escalation dynamics with Russia in an era of increasing regional tensions. In a time of crisis, he continued, the ability to overcome Russia’s regional air, land, and sea A2/AI infrastructure is essential. He noted that a key challenge of developing NATO’s rapid deployment capabilities (in part assigned to the NFIUs) is finding ways of maintaining Alliance freedom of movement in the region without appearing escalatory. A focus, therefore, is on purely defensive exercising to demonstrate the credibility of Article 5.

NATO Air Policing Mission – Siauliai, Lithuania

32. The delegation also paid a short visit to the NATO air policing mission at the air base in Siauliai, Lithuania. At the time of the visit, the mission was being manned by a contingent from the Portuguese Air Force. France will take over the mission in Siauliai on August 31. A parallel air policing mission is run out of Amari, Estonia.

33. NATO began its air policing mission in the Baltics in 2004 solely out of the air base in Siauliai, which oversees and controls the Baltic States’ airspace 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The mission is purely defensive, as the briefing officer noted to the delegation: “the mission keeps the civilian air traffic space safe, and has the same Rules of Engagement as any other Allied military activity during peace time.” The Amari Air Base in Estonia was added in 2014, multiplying the amount of Alliance air assets assuring the mission.

34. The Portuguese contingent in Siauliai has four F-16 (supported by 90 personnel) for BAP16 (Baltic Air Policing Mission – 2016). France will be sending four Mirage 2000-5 at the end of August. When asked about the tempo of their duties over the last two years, the briefing commander noted the mission has been forced to scrambled jets to identify air space incursions at a consistently higher rate in recent years – "in parallel with the mounting international tensions between Russia and NATO."

Visit to Liepaja Port, Latvia

35. The Latvian delegation to the NATO PA took the visiting DSCFC delegation to Baltic coast to visit the Liepaja port facilities. Liepaja port was a vast port facility for the Soviet Union’s navy during the Cold War. The port was already in disrepair by the end of the Cold War and has generally suffered further from lack of attention in the ensuing decades. As Ojars Eriks Kalnins, Head of the Latvian delegation to the NATO PA, noted: “We are very interested in having this area become a strategic asset for NATO. We believe that with Allied funding, it can and will be an essential port facility in the Baltic Sea.” There is no doubt simple geography indicates the necessity of having modern deep-water port facilities for Allies in the region should they desire to maintain their freedom of action in the area.

36. While in Liepaja, the delegation received a briefing at the Latvian Naval Training Centre. Founded in 1991 and Latvia’s oldest military education facility, the centre is used in part for training and for doctrine creation. The centre has a divers and sappers school, which works to train divers capable of identifying and dismantling Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EODs) as well as working on mine countermeasures tactics. In addition, the school trains seamen for activities relevant to the Latvian navy’s capabilities, principally SAR, radar training, as well as helmsman and lookout duties.

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37. The delegation was also taken to visit a Latvian ship currently slated to be in NATO SNF-SNMG1 next year. While aboard the ship, the delegation received a briefing on the Area of Responsibility (AOR) and general objectives of the Latvian Naval Forces. The Latvian Navy, like many other navies is responsible for: general force readiness to the limits of their capabilities, contribution to international operations, particularly in coordination with NATO or the EU, regional ordnance disposal (a surprising amount of material from as far back of WWII remains in the Baltic, according to briefers), conducting normal coast guard duties, general surveillance for ongoing situational awareness, and security of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).

38. Latvian naval commanders briefing the delegation noted the specific commitments to NATO and the EU recently. Among them, they stated the ongoing dedication of a vessel to the SNMCMG1 - one Mine Counter Measure Vessel (MCMV) in 2015 and another in 2016. They also stated the Latvian navy’s participation in the EU’s Operations Atalanta and Sophia. They also noted their support of and participation in a number of regional NATO exercises, including BALTOPS and Open Spirit.

Spring Storm Exercise – Voru, Estonia

39. En route up to Talinn for their final day of meetings with the Estonian Minister of Defence and their Estonian parliamentary peers, the delegation was invited to stop by Voru to participate in the VIP day for the annual Spring Storm Exercise. Spring Strom is an Estonian military exercise, which also invites international participation. For the Estonian military, the exercise serves as a final exam of sorts after their 11-month training programme for national conscripts.

40. The exercise started in 2003 and began international participation in 2007. Today it averages about 5,500 participants. Spring Storm is a two-level exercise (operational and tactical), involving training on new weaponry and equipment with the aim of evaluating battalion combat readiness. While land forces are the main focus of the exercise, there is an element of air support added as well.

41. The delegation was also able to circulate through a large static display of the equipment being used in the exercise and speak with soldiers participating in the exercise.

Baltic States’ Contributions to International Security

42. Baltic interlocutors were quick to note their states’ efforts to be security exporters when given the opportunity. Each state is working to not only meet the Wales summit pledges to invest in their home defence institutions, as well as meet their Article 3 obligations under the Washington Treaty, but they are also striving to meet the Alliance-wide goal of being a capable contributor to international security.

43. To get there, all three defence ministers highlighted their respective state’s efforts in ongoing external operations, as well as their contributions to broader efforts to meet the range of security challenges outside of their own immediate concerns vis-à-vis Russia. As Hannes Hanso, the Estonian Defence Minister, noted quite clearly, summing up a shared thought throughout the halls of the other Baltic defence ministries: “We understand that we must also play our role in international security if we expect the Allies to help us reinforce our own.” Hanso continued by noting Estonia was contributing to UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, assisting with international security efforts to stabilise Mali, working with the anti-Daesh campaign, and helping with the counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Latvian Defence Minister Bergmanis also noted Lativa’s efforts to work with French soldiers in Mali and their contributions to the anti-Daesh campaign.

44. Lithuanian Defence Minister Olekas echoed his counterparts by noting: “Lithuania is doing its part abroad as well. We are working in Afghanistan, accepting our quota of refugees, helping the

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French in Mali, and contributing to Operation Atalanta.” Lithuanian Air Force 2003 briefers at the Siauliai air base noted more specifically their personnel have participated in KFOR/SFOR from 2001-3, Provincial Reconstruct Teams (PRT) Airfield Management Group in Ghor, Afghanistan as well as sending an air Advisory team in Afghanistan from 2005-2013, and to supporting France in Operation Sangaris (Central Africa).

IV. THE NATO WARSAW SUMMIT – BALTIC OUTCOMES

45. Much anticipation surrounded the outcomes of the July 8-9 NATO summit in Warsaw. NATO clearly faces a distinct dual-flank threat from the east and south, but the clear focus for the Baltic States has been the resurgence of a revisionist, aggressive Russia. As a steady deterioration in the NATO-Russia relationship in the wake of Russia’s intervention in the Ukrainian civil war and annexation of Crimea has brought the Alliance’s focus back to the European security environment, particular attention has been paid to the potential strategic and tactical vulnerability of the Baltic States.

46. As this committee noted in its general report on the Baltic States, the ability to bring a new, credible deterrence posture to the eastern flank is an essential test for NATO in today’s challenged European security environment. All Baltic States’ interlocutors believed this would be achieved by a more substantial forward presence in the region.

47. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius summarised the general feeling about the need for a more robust Alliance forward presence in the region to help bolster the region’s readiness in all domains – air, land, sea, and cyber. He stated: "Installing a persistent presence in the region is key – of course, using the term ‘rotational’ is fine – while the VJTF is not impressive by size, the idea behind it is correct. The installation of significantly more prepositioned heavy weaponry is also important, as this will help mitigate Russian efforts for regional A2/AD dominance." He continued by noting that "the Alliance must also think about its political decision-making processes; clearly there is room for improvement. For example, we should be asking ourselves, ‘can we give more authority to SACEUR?’ and thinking more broadly about improving the general responsiveness of the NAC."

48. Several interlocutors noted that a return to (or at least a modern variant of) the Cold War ‘tripwire deterrence’ posture was essential to guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the region. A modern form of the Alliance Cold War ‘tripwire deterrence’ adapted to the more flexible, dynamic, and mobile forces would lend the credibility to NATO’s posture along the north-eastern flank, which many interlocutors still felt eluded the Alliance. As Estonian Defence Minister Hannes Hanso said quite bluntly: "Creating a credible enhanced forward presence in this region is not just about defence of the Baltics, it is about defence of the geographic and political realities of NATO as it stands today." He continued by stating, "A larger NATO force presence, in personnel and materiel, is essential as the current posture is not credible, particularly due to Russia’s ability to block the reinforcement of any contingent in the region by closing off the Suwalki Gap."

49. Fears of the vulnerability of reinforcing NATO’s presence in the area were often repeated, particularly in the face of the Russian investment in regional A2/AD, its forward presence in its Western Military District from the Arctic Sea down to close proximity of Poland. As such, not only did Allies in the Baltic region note their keen desire to see all of the reassurance measures pledged at Wales fulfilled, but to move further with more concrete deterrence measures.

Warsaw Deterrence Deliverables

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50. At Warsaw, Allies pledged four new multinational battalion-sized battle groups to be deployed to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 2017. This will, therefore, increase the number of Allied troops in the region by approximately 4,000. These battalions will be stationed on a continuous rotational basis beginning in 2017, and Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have volunteered as framework nations to lead a battalion each. While the four battalions alone will not significantly alter the military balance in the region between NATO members and Russia, the decision reaffirms NATO’s commitment to its eastern flank by demonstrating solidarity by stationing multinational forces closer to a zone of potential conflict, and by changing Russia’s strategic calculus toward the region.

51. The addition of the new multinational battle groups comes on the tail of the announcement by the United States in early 2016 to quadruple its investments in the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), a pledge by the Obama administration in the wake of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. A critical element of the ERI is the addition of new prepositioned equipment in NATO’s eastern European territories. In 2017 heavy artillery, tanks, Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) and other weapons will flow into Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. The significant increase represents a major shift from the previous, more limited, improvement of weapons storages, prepositioning of air equipment in Eastern Europe, and providing infrastructure for presence of an armoured brigade.

52. The new enhanced forward presence announced at the Warsaw summit will come on top of a planned expansion of US force deployment to Europe. A key element to this is the additional armoured brigade combat team (ABCT), bringing the total up to three rotating US ABCTs in Europe at all times (technically four during times of handover). A standard ABCT is composed of about 4,700 troops. As the Office of the Undersecretary of Defence (Comptroller) notes: USD 507.2 million will be dedicated to supporting the “ABCT presence, including heel-to-toe rotations of armoured forces coupled with light and Stryker forces” guaranteeing a continuous presence in the Baltic States and Poland, and a periodic presence in Romania and Bulgaria.

53. As NATO parliamentarians learned through their visit to the Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the addition of the enhanced forward presence announcement at the Warsaw summit is necessary to increase the credibility of NATO’s deterrence posture today. This committee will remain focused on the implementation of the Warsaw summit declarations in the context of the Baltics as well as broader eastern flank deterrence.

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