15-15996 #16 Maricopa County Opp to Motion to Dismiss

8/20/2019 15-15996 #16 Maricopa County Opp to Motion to Dismiss

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/15-15996-16-maricopa-county-opp-to-motion-to-dismiss 1/180

i

No. 15-15996

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL DE JESUS ORTEGA MELENDRES; et al.,

Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.

MARICOPA COUNTY,

Defendants/Appellants,

andJOSEPH M. ARPAIO,Defendant.

On Appeal from The United States District Court

For the District of ArizonaG. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

U.S. Arizona District Court

No.: 2:07-CV-02513-GMS ___________________________________________

DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS RESPONSE TO

PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL

___________________________________________

Richard K. Walker, SBN 004159

WALKER & PESKIND, PLLC

16100 N. 71st Street, Suite 140

Scottsdale, Arizona [email protected] Phone: (480) 483-6336

Facsimile: (480) 483-6337Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Maricopa County, Arizona

Case: 15-15996, 09/03/2015, ID: 9672248, DktEntry: 16-1, of 19

(1 of 1

mailto:[email protected]





ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….1

STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURALBACKGROUND…………………………………………………………………...1

ARGUMENT………………………………………………………………………4

A.

The County was not a Party to Proceedings in This Case After Claims

Against it Were Dismissed in October 2009 Until the Melendres II

Decision Issued More Than Five Years Later, and Had No Right ToAppeal the District Court’s Judgment or Other Rulings at the Time They

Were

Entered……………………………..…………………………………….4

B. Under Arizona Law, the Sheriff and the County are Distinct Legal

Entities with Divergent Interests…………………………………………7

C.

Plaintiffs’ Assertion That The County Seeks to Appeal Again Issues

Addressed in Previous Decisions Of This Court is Grounded in PureSpeculation and Is, In Any Event, Premature……….………………….12

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………...13

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE……………………………………………...14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING……15


(2 of 1



iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Associated Dairy Products Co. v. Page, 68 Ariz. 393 (1949)……………………...9

Campbell v. State of Iowa, 702 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 2013)………………………….6

Ctr. For Bio- Ethical Reform, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t , 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008)…………………………………………………………………………...4

Hounshell v. White, 220 Ariz. 1 (App. 2008)…………………………………10, 11

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985)…………………………………….4, 12

Marino v. Ortiz , 484 U.S. 301 (1988)…………………………………………...…5

Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F. 3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012)…………………………..……2

Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015)…………………………...…..3

Mohave v. Mohave-Kingman Estates, Inc., 120 Ariz. 417…………………….…..9

U.S. v. Siegel , 168 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1948)………………………………..…….5

CONSTITUTION

Arizona Constitution, Art. 12, §3……………………………....…..………………8

STATUTES

A.R.S. §11-201………………………………………………………..…………..9

A.R.S. §11-201(A)(6)…………………………………………………….……….9

A.R.S. §11-251………………………………………………..………….………..9

A.R.S. §11-441………………………………………………..…………..……….9


(3 of 1



iv

A.R.S. §11-444(A)…………………………………….………………………..7, 9

A.R.S. §11-459……………………………………………………………………9

A.R.S. §38-341…………………………………………………………..……….11

A.R.S. §38-342………………………………………………………..………….11

A.R.S. §38-343………………………………….………………………………..11

Fed.R.App.P. 43(a)………………………………………………………………..6

Fed.R.App.P. 43(b)………………………………………..………….……………6

Fed.R.Civ.P. 21……………………………………………..………….…………..4

Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)…………………………………………….…….……………...6

Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(b)………………………………………..…………..…………….6

TREATISES

JOHN S. GOFF, THE R ECORDS OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

1910 at 504-505……………………………………..………………….…………..8

JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION 327-28 (2013)….…………..8


(4 of 1



1

INTRODUCTION

Defendant/Appellant Maricopa County, Arizona (“the County”)1 hereby submits

its Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’/Appellees’ (“Plaintiffs”) Motion to Dismiss the

County’s appeal herein. Plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied in its entirety.

I.

STATEMENT OF PERTINENT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL

BACKGROUND

The County was named as a Defendant by Plaintiffs, along with Sheriff Joseph M.

Arpaio (“the Sheriff”), in the original Complaint by which Plaintiffs commenced this

litigation below in December of 2007, seeking an award of damages and declaratory and

injunctive relief. Dkt. 1.2 The County was also named as a Defendant in Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint filed September 5, 2008, in which they added the Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) as a named party and dropped their claim for damages,

making this an action seeking solely declaratory and injunctive relief. Dkt. 26.

Just slightly over a year after amending their Complaint, Plaintiffs joined the

County in filing Joint Motion and Stipulation to Dismiss the County without prejudice.

1 “Maricopa County” and “the County,” as used herein, are intended to refer to that

portion of the government of Maricopa County embodied in the Maricopa County Board

of Supervisors, the Maricopa County Manager, and those appointed officials and

employees of the County who serve under the supervision and direction of the foregoing.

The phrase is not intended, and should not be construed, to refer to any other Maricopa

County officer whose office is filled by the electoral process as provided in the Arizona

Constitution (Constitutional Officers), or to any of the officials and other employees of

the County who serve under the supervision and direction of such Constitutional Officers. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, docket citations in this Response are to D.C. No. 2:07-cv-

02513-GMS.


(5 of 1



2

Dkt. 178. In this Joint Motion, Plaintiffs stated explicitly that the County “is not a

necessary party at this juncture for obtaining the complete relief sought . . . .” Id . at 3.

The Joint Motion was unopposed by any other party, and it was granted by the district

court on October 13, 2009, dismissing all claims against the County without prejudice.

Dkt. 193.

A little over two years later, on December 23, 2011, the district court granted

Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, granting certain preliminary injunctive

relief. Dkt. 494. The preliminary injunction, unsurprisingly in light of the fact that it had

been two years since the County had participated in the case as a party, was directed only

at the Sheriff and MCSO, and it did not purport to impose any prohibitions or mandates

on the County. See Dkt. 494. The Sheriff and MCSO appealed from the district court’s

issuance of the preliminary injunction, and that appeal was denied. Melendres v. Arpaio,

695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012) (“ Melendres I ”). The County was not a party to, and did not

participate in, that appeal.

The district court conducted a bench trial in this matter in July and August of

2012, almost three years after the claims against the County had been dismissed. See

Dkt. 529. Again, the County did not participate as a party. Accordingly, district court’s

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, issued in May of 2014, contained no findings

adverse to the County, as distinguished from Sheriff Arpaio and MCSO whose policies

and practices were found to have violated in some respects the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Dkt. 579.


(6 of 1



3

On October 2, 2013, the district court issued a Supplemental Permanent

Injunction/Judgment Order, appointing a monitor and providing for certain other

remedies. Dkt. 606. The County did not participate as a party during the remedial phase

of the proceedings below. Consequently, as had been the case with the district court’s

preliminary injunction, no relief was ordered against the County (again, as distinguished

from the Sheriff and MCSO) in the district court’s permanent injunc tion.

The Sheriff and MCSO timely appealed the district court’s Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and its Supplemental Permanent Injunction to this Court on October

32, 2013. Dkt. 616. One of the issues appealed to the Ninth Circuit by the Sheriff and

MCSO was the question of whether MCSO was a non-jural entity and, as such, not a

proper party to this action. The issues of whether, in the event of a dismissal of MCSO, it

would be necessary for another party to be joined and, if so, who that party might be,

were neither briefed nor argued by any party to the appeal. See excerpts from Melendres

II Defendants/Appellants Opening Brief, pp. 2, 13, 16-17; Melendres II Brief for

Plaintiffs-Appellees, pp. 2, 14, 57-59; Melendres II Defendants/Appellants Reply Brief,

pp. 2-5, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, respectively. After

finding that MCSO is a non-jural entity and, therefore, had “improperly been named as a

party in this action,” a panel of this Court, acting sua sponte and without explaining its

reasoning for doing so, ordered the substitution of the County for MCSO. Melendres v.

Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2015) (“ Melendres II ”). The entirety of the portion

of the panel’s discussion of this point is as follows:


(7 of 1



4

We therefore order that Maricopa County be substituted as a party in

lieu of MCSO. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 21 (“Misjoinder of parties is not a ground

for dismissing an action. On . . . its own, the court may at any time, on just

terms, add or drop a party”). On remand, the district court may consider

dismissal of Sheriff Arpaio in his official capacity because “an official-

capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suitagainst the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct.

3099, 87 L.Ed. 2d 114 (1985); see also Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.

L.A. Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t , 533 F.3d 780, 799 (9th Cir. 2008) (dismissing a

duplicative official-capacity defendant).

Id .

The County, having theretofore not participated as a party to the appeal from the

district court’s rulings, timely filed a Petition for Panel Rehearing and Petition for En

Banc Consideration solely addressed to the question of whether the panel’s late joinder of

the County had been proper. Dkt. 1116. On June 26, 2015, the Court of Appeals

summarily denied the County’s Petitions, offering no substantive explanation for the

basis of its ruling. Dkt. 1163.

The County filed its Notice of Appeal to commence this appellate proceeding on

May 15, 2015, 2015. Dkt. 1104. In addition to the fact that the County did not

participate as a party in the proceedings below, or in the appellate proceedings that

emanated therefrom, from its dismissal on October 13, 2009 to the issuance of the panel’s

April 15, 2015 decision in Melendres II , there is no evidence, and Plaintiffs do not

contend, that the County controlled the proceedings after having been dismissed from the

case.

II. ARGUMENT

A. The County Was Not A Party To Proceedings In This Case After

Claims Against It Were Dismissed In October 2009 To The Melendres


(8 of 1



5

I I Decision Issued More Than Five Years Later, And Had No Right To

Appeal The District Court’s Judgment Or Other Rulings At The Time

They Were Entered.

“The rule that only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties may

appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled.” Marino v. Ortiz , 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988)

(per curiam) (citations omitted); U.S. v. Siegel , 168 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1948)

(rejecting notion that a non-party, even if the real party in interest, could bring a case to

the U.S. Court of Appeals “simply by noting an appeal” because “[w]e can see nothing

but chaos resulting . . . .”). The County’s right to appeal the judgment and other rulings

below simply did not accrue until it was involuntarily joined by the decision in Melendres

II .

Plaintiffs seek to circumvent this formidable hurdle by asserting that the County

might have gained the right to appeal by intervening, and suggesting that it was somehow

obligated to do so. There is no authority, however, and Plaintiffs have cited to none,

supporting the notion that a non-party, any non-party, who may have a right to seek

intervention is required to do so.

It should also be remembered that the County’s early dismissal from the action in

the district court was, as Plaintiffs point out, “without prejudice to later re-joining if

necessary.” Motion at 2. Yet neither Plaintiffs nor any other party suggested, prior to

the decision in Melendres II , that rejoinder of the County was necessary, sought, or even


(9 of 1



6

desired.3 Clearly, Plaintiffs themselves saw no need for the County to be dragged back

into the litigation. Nevertheless, they now claim that the County should have recognized

that need and jumped back into the fray of its own accord and, having failed to do so, it

should now be penalized by having its appellate rights extinguished.

Moreover, in this case, none of the district court’s decisions reflect any findings

adverse to the County, as distinguished from the Sheriff and MCSO. None of those

decisions purports to bind the County by their terms, and none of them grants Plaintiffs

any relief against the County. Given this, one must wonder what Plaintiffs think would

have moved the County to spend the money to take an appeal from decisions in a case

from which it had long before been excused as a party with the consent of all other

parties and the district court, that imposed no requirements on the County as such, and in

which its ability to obtain post-judgment intervention (and therefore be in a position to

assert any appellate rights) was anything but assured. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and

(b) (motions for both intervention as of right and permissive intervention must be timely

filed).

To be sure, the County is required by Arizona law to provide funding for the

“actual and necessary expenses incurred by the sheriff in pursuit of criminals, for

3 Nor did any party move, pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 43(a) and (b) for substitution of the

County for MCSO. This makes the panel’s involuntary joinder of the County sua sponte

highly questionable. See Campbell v. State of Iowa, 702 F.3D 1140, 1142 (8th Cir. 2013)

(in absence of motion to substitute under FRAP 43, court of appeals “has no authority to

substitute a proper party”).


(10 of 1



7

transacting all civil and criminal business and for service all process and notices . . . .”

A.R.S. § 11-444(A). Thus, most or all of the expenses incurred by the Sheriff in the

effort to comply with the district court’s mandates have been, and will continue to be,

paid out of the County’s funds. But this indirect effect on matters over which the County

has authority and responsibility hardly presents a compelling reason for the County to

take on the uncertain prospects of a late intervention and an appeal in which it might try

to modify the results of proceedings in which it had not participated for several years.

In any event, the fact that the County was not a party to this action for a

considerable period of time before the district court’s judgment and other rulings at issue

means it had no right to appeal at the time that judgment and those rulings were entered.

The fact that there is no evidence that the County controlled the litigation after the

dismissal of the claims against it, and the further fact that there is no authority for the

notion that non-parties who may have the possibility of intervening are compelled to seek

it, lead inexorably to the conclusion that any right the County may have to appeal from

the decisions below matured only upon the issuance of the decision in Melendres II , at

the earliest.

B. Under Arizona Law, the Sheriff and the County Are Distinct Legal

Entities With Divergent Interests.

Plaintiffs also urge that the County is necessarily bound by, and precluded from

“relitigating” issues determined in the prior trial court and appellate litigation in this case,

even though it was not a party and did not participate in that litigation for the most part,

because there is “‘substantial identity’ between parties [the County, on the one hand, and


(11 of 1



8

the Sheriff and MCSO, on the other], i.e., a ‘sufficient commonality of interest.’” Motion

at 10 (citation omitted). This contention overlooks, however, peculiar aspects of the

structure of government at the county level in Arizona, and the divergent interests among

governmental institutions to which it gives rise.

The structure of governmental institutions at the county level in Arizona is

unusual. Rather than the more common hierarchical, vertically integrated, unitary

structures one finds among municipal and many county governments, authority and

responsibility at the county level is dispersed among various officers who operate with

considerable independence within their respective spheres.4 Arizona’s founders created

in its Constitution co-equal Constitutional Officers, all of whom are elected to office

directly by the electorate,5 and among whom are county sheriffs and members of county

boards of supervisors. See Arizona Constitution, Art. 12, § 3. The Arizona Constitution

further provides that the “duties, powers, and qualifications of such officers shall be as

prescribed by law.” Id ., § 4.

4 The voters of Maricopa County rejected in 1996 a proposal to convert the County to a

charter government form, which would have changed its governmental structure more

closely resembling the hierarchical structure commonly encountered elsewhere. See

JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION 327-28 (2013).5 There is clear evidence to be found in the records of the debates that took place during

Arizona’s Constitutional Convention that the provision for direct election of

Constitutional Officers was intended by the founders to ensure that such officers would

not be subject to control by the boards of supervisors. See JOHN S. GOFF, THE R ECORDS

OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1910 at 504-505 (discussion of why

Assessor should be elected to avoid his being controlled by Board of Supervisors).


(12 of 1



9

Consequently, the dispersion and allocation of authority and responsibility among

the various county Constitutional Officers is effected by statutes enacted by the Arizona

Legislature. Thus, the county sheriffs are assigned responsibility for, inter alia, law

enforcement and running the county jails, and they are granted the power necessary to

carry out those functions. See A.R.S. §§ 11-441 and 11-459. Arizona boards of

supervisors, on the other hand, are assigned no responsibility or authority over the

enforcement of general law, or over administration of the jails. See A.R.S. §§ 11-201 and

11-251. Arizona boards of supervisors are empowered to “determine” the budgets of

both elected and appointed county officers. A.R.S. § 11-201(A)(6). Where the budgets

of Arizona sheriffs are concerned, however, this power is significantly circumscribed by

a statutory obligation requiring the boards of supervisors to provide “actual and necessary

expenses incurred by the sheriff in pursuit of criminals, for transacting all civil and

criminal business and for service of all process and notices . . . .” A.R.S. § 11-444(A).

It is firmly established in Arizona jurisprudence that county boards of supervisors

have only the powers assigned to them by the Legislature:

The boards of supervisors of the various counties of the state have

only such powers as have been expressly or by necessary implication,

delegated to them by the state legislature. Implied powers do not exist

independently of the grant of express powers and the only function of an

implied power is the aid in carrying into effect a power expressly granted.

Associated Dairy Products Co. v. Page, 68 Ariz. 393, 395, 206 P.2d 1041, 1043 (1949);

see also Mohave County v. Mohave-Kingman Estates, Inc., 120 Ariz. 417, 420, 586 P.2d

978, 981 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“Actions of the Board [of


(13 of 1



10

Supervisors] accomplished by a method unrecognized by statute have been described as

without jurisdiction and wholly void.”).

This principle was applied in a context that demonstrates how the interests of

Arizona sheriffs, along with those who work under their supervision, can diverge from

those of their corresponding boards of supervisors in ways highly pertinent to the issues

in this case in Hounshell v. White, 220 Ariz. 1, 202 P. 3d 466 (App. 2008). In that case,

the Apache County Board of Supervisors imposed disciplinary action against an

employee of the Apache County Sheriff’s Office (“ACSO”). The Sheriff filed suit,

asserting that only he, not the Board of Supervisors or the County Manager, had authority

to mete out discipline to classified employees in the ACSO.

This position was sustained by the Arizona Court of Appeals, holding that,

inasmuch as the Sheriff was the appointing authority with respect to his own deputies and

employees, only he had the power to discipline them for misconduct. 220 Ariz. at 4, 202

P.3d at 469. In response to a Board of Supervisors argument that this conclusion could

result in the failure of a Constitutional Officer to exert appropriate control over a “rogue”

employee because of favoritism or collusion, the Hounshell court held:

Moreover, while a county officer may not be accountable to the Board

itself, he or she is accountable to the voting public. Thus, a county officer

choosing to overlook egregious employee misconduct may not be reelected,

may be subject to a recall election, or may be impeached to the extent the

officer’s inaction amounts to willful or corrupt misconduct in office.


(14 of 1



11

220 Ariz. at 6, 202 P.3d at 471 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).6

Clearly, a board of supervisors that lacks the authority to discipline the employees

of a sheriff who engage in “egregious employee misconduct,” also is powerless to

prevent such misconduct or effectively to require the sheriff to comply with corrective

measures calculated to remedy it. More to the present point, however, is the fact that

Hounshell demonstrates quite dramatically the fact that Arizona sheriffs and boards of

supervisors are separate and independent entities fully capable of having diverging

interests with respect to matters of the sort that have been the subjects of this litigation.

Plaintiffs’ contention that there is “substantial identity” between parties and a “sufficient

commonality of interest” between or among the Defendants in this case ignores the

realities of county-level governmental structure under the Arizona Constitution and

statutes, and the differing interests that structure nurtures.

There is a further, more fundamental reason why the County’s rights cannot be

circumscribed by MCSO’s involvement in the litigation up to this point. Melendres II

held that MCSO was not, and could not be, a proper party. Accordingly, it cannot be

bound by any district court or Court of Appeals rulings issued prior to the panel’s

decision in Melendres II . If MCSO was not a proper party and, therefore, not subject to

the jurisdiction of the federal courts, any rulings purporting to bind it are necessarily

6 The impeachment of county officers entails an accusation of willful or corrupt

misconduct presented by a grand jury, and the accusation is then served on the accused

and adjudicated in the Superior Court. A.R.S. §§ 38-341, 38-342, and 38-343.


(15 of 1



12

void. That being the case, those rulings cannot be made, by some sort of derivative ipse

dixit , into something binding on a non-party that played no substantial role in forming the

record in this case.

C.

Plaintiffs’ Assertion That The County Seeks To Appeal Again Issues

Addressed In Previous Decisions Of This Court Is Grounded In Pure

Speculation And Is, In Any Event, Premature.

Plaintiffs argue that “the County must be barred from appealing these matters

again.” Motion at 10. This presumes that the issues the County intends to raise in its

appeal will be the same as those raised in the earlier appeals prosecuted by the Sheriff

and MCSO. What issues are to be raised in this appeal, however, remains to be seen, and

Plaintiffs’ presumption is nothing more than sheer speculation. For reasons discussed

above, the fact that issues have been litigated and adjudicated in the County’s absence

certainly raised serious questions as to whether prior rulings can legitimately be found to

be binding on the County. But there is also at least one issue not previously raised by any

party and not previously considered by either the district court or this Court that is likely

to be among the questions the County will seek to have reviewed in this appeal. That

question is whether, in an action seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief against

allegedly unconstitutional policing practices, a governmental body that has no authority

over those practices and no effective way to regulate them can properly be found to be

liable for them. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) (in official-capacity

action, governmental entity can be found liable on it if is the “moving force” behind a

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).


(16 of 1



13

III. CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss the County’s appeal in

this matter should be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of September, 2015.

WALKER & PESKIND, PLLC

By: /s/ Richard K. Walker, #004159Richard K. Walker, Esquire16100 N. 71st Street, Suite 140Scottsdale, AZ 85254Counsel for Defendant/Appellant


(17 of 1



14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that pursuant to Fed.R.App. P. 27-1, the attached response brief is in

compliance with Fed.R.App.P. 27(d) and does not exceed 20 pages.

Dated this 3rd day of September, 2015.

/s/ Richard K. WalkerRichard K. Walker

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant


(18 of 1



15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING

I hereby certify that on September 3, 2015, I electronically filed

Defendants/Appellants Maricopa County’s Response to Plaintiff’s/Appellee’s

Motion to Dismiss Appeal, with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Courtof Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and

that services will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ Michelle Giordano


(19 of 1



Case: 15-15996, 09/03/2015, ID: 9672248, DktEntry: 16-2, Page 1 of 161

(20 of 1




(21 of 1




(22 of 1




(23 of 1




(24 of 1




(25 of 1




(26 of 1




(27 of 1




(28 of 1




(29 of 1




(30 of 1




(31 of 1




(32 of 1




(33 of 1




(34 of 1




(35 of 1




(36 of 1




(37 of 1




(38 of 1




(39 of 1




(40 of 1




(41 of 1




(42 of 1




(43 of 1




(44 of 1




(45 of 1




(46 of 1




(47 of 1




(48 of 1




(49 of 1




(50 of 1




(51 of 1




(52 of 1




(53 of 1




(54 of 1




(55 of 1




(56 of 1




(57 of 1




(58 of 1




(59 of 1




(60 of 1




(61 of 1




(62 of 1




(63 of 1




(64 of 1




(65 of 1




(66 of 1




(67 of 1




(68 of 1




(69 of 1




(70 of 1




(71 of 1




(72 of 1




(73 of 1




(74 of 1




(75 of 1




(76 of 1




(77 of 1




(78 of 1




(79 of 1




(80 of 1




(81 of 1




(82 of 1




(83 of 1




(84 of 1




(85 of 1




(86 of 1




(87 of 1




(88 of 1




(89 of 1




(90 of 1




(91 of 1




(92 of 1




(93 of 1




(94 of 1




(95 of 1




(96 of 1




(97 of 1




(98 of 1




(99 of 1




(100 of 1




(101 of 1




(102 of 1




(103 of 1




(104 of 1




(105 of 1




(106 of 1




(107 of 1




(108 of 1




(109 of 1




(110 of 1




(111 of 1




(112 of 1




(113 of 1




(114 of 1




(115 of 1




(116 of 1




(117 of 1




(118 of 1




(119 of 1




(120 of 1




(121 of 1




(122 of 1




(123 of 1




(124 of 1




(125 of 1




(126 of 1




(127 of 1




(128 of 1




(129 of 1




(130 of 1




(131 of 1




(132 of 1




(133 of 1




(134 of 1




(135 of 1




(136 of 1




(137 of 1




(138 of 1




(139 of 1




(140 of 1




(141 of 1




(142 of 1




(143 of 1




(144 of 1




(145 of 1




(146 of 1




(147 of 1




(148 of 1




(149 of 1




(150 of 1




(151 of 1




(152 of 1




(153 of 1




(154 of 1




(155 of 1




(156 of 1




(157 of 1




(158 of 1




(159 of 1




(160 of 1




(161 of 1




(162 of 1




(163 of 1




(164 of 1




(165 of 1




(166 of 1




(167 of 1




(168 of 1




(169 of 1




(170 of 1




(171 of 1




(172 of 1




(173 of 1




(174 of 1




(175 of 1




(176 of 1




(177 of 1




(178 of 1




(179 of 1




(180 of 1

15-15996 #16 Maricopa County Opp to Motion to Dismiss

Documents

Transcript of 15-15996 #16 Maricopa County Opp to Motion to Dismiss