PO377 ETHNIC CONFLICT AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE Week 13 Seminar: Sexual Violence in Ethnic Conflict.
1162382657 Theories of Ethnic Conflict Management
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Theories and Practice ofTheories and Practice ofTheories and Practice ofTheories and Practice of
Ethnic Conflict Management in NigeriaEthnic Conflict Management in NigeriaEthnic Conflict Management in NigeriaEthnic Conflict Management in Nigeria
Orji NkwachukwuOrji NkwachukwuOrji NkwachukwuOrji Nkwachukwu****
Introduction
Like many multi-ethnic societies, one major hurdle which Nigeria has had to overcome
in its attempts to build a democratic and communal polity is the fact that competitive
politics in the country encourage recourse to divisive ethnic identities (Joseph 1987:43).
Mobilization of ethnic identities has become an important aspect of Nigerian politics
due to the mutual distrust that has grown over time among various ethnic groups in the
country. As van den Burghe (1973:222) observed:
people expect members of ethnic groups other than their own to be tribalists, i.e., to be
biased in favour of their fellow ethnics and against strangersMost people assume that all
others except those in the same circle of intimates (fellow kinsmen/tribesmen) will behave in
ways which further the other persons interests at the expense of oneself
Broadly speaking, ethnicity is in itself not a dangerous feature of plural societies.
However, it turns out to be problematic when it becomes, or is perceived as object
around which discriminatory practices and unjustified use of violence are organized
(Otite 1990). When ethnic identities are politicized it can result in inter-ethnic conflicts.
Inter-ethnic conflicts also occur when ethnic interests are challenged, identities
threatened, and/or communication sufficiently poor that differences cannot be
effectively addressed (Ross 2000:28). Ethnic conflicts tend to emerge at moments when
groups perceive that they are being excluded from access to what they consider to be
their right; be it linguistic, political, economic, administrative, commercial, religious etc
(Ibrahim 2003:45).
*Lectures at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ebonyi State University,
Abakaliki-Nigeria. Currently a Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Political Science, Central EuropeanUniversity, Budapest-Hungary.
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One can therefore argue, that violent inter-ethnic conflicts are inextricably linked to
perceptions of group domination (Osaghae 1992:219). A combination of two powerful
elements can be visibly seen to be at work in generating ethnic conflicts. One is identity:
the mobilization of people in communal identity groups based on race, religion, culture,
language. The other is resource distribution: the means of sharing the economic, social
and political resources within a society (Harris and Reilly 1998:9). Where perceived
imbalance in resource distribution coincides with ethnic identity differences, as in the
case of Nigeria, then the tendency for recurrence of inter-ethnic conflicts tends to be
very high.
In Nigeria, ethnic conflict is a highly significant social phenomena because of it
complexity and the social and political threats it pose to the society. The complexity of
ethnic conflict in Nigeria reflects on its mode of occurrence. In Nigeria, ethnic conflicts
occur along a tri-dimensional trajectory (Osaghae 2002, Nnoli 1978). The first is the
conflicts among the majority ethnic groups; the second is the conflicts between the
majority and the minority groups; while the third is the conflicts among the minority
groups.
The positive and constructive handling of ethnic conflicts can be regarded as ethnic
conflict management. This occurs when institutions and processes are created to deal
with ethnic differences better than the way it had been done in the past and in a way that
is likely to lead to continuous improvement. Ethnic conflict management involves a
developmental and transformative processes that entail changes in both the disputants
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expressed interests and their interpretation of the conflict. Ethnic conflict management
is characterized by many small steps that alter the relationship among the disputing
parties and improve how they deal with each other in the future; these steps can be slow,
but they generate measures that lower the intensity of conflict (Ross 2000).
The main logic of conflict management is therefore, that conflict cannot be eliminated,
but that they can be reduced or controlled more readily, by acknowledging and
institutionalizing differences rather than suppressing them. Institutionalization of ethnic
conflicts entails entrenching ethnic differences within a set of rules agreeable to
competing groups. This legal-constitutional strategy requires a constitutional democratic
form of governance to thrive. In Nigeria, constitutional democracy could not be
entrenched because the military dominated and controlled the reins of government for
almost three out of Nigerias four decades of independence. The subsequent section
briefly examines the nature of ethnic conflict management under the military.
Ethnic Conflict Management in Authoritarian Nigeria
Many scholars see a strong link between despotism, militarism and violent ethnic
conflicts in Nigeria (Horowitz 1985, Joseph 1999). They point to the fact that a common
strategy of conflict management in Nigeria during military rule was that the state
generally intervenes in ethnic conflict, adopting a violent, repressive, and non-
participatory approach (Mayowa 2001). These scholars associate this strategy with the
protracted military rule in Nigeria and the subsequent weakening or rather collapse of
the legal-institutional means of conflict management.
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Therefore, much of the violent ethnic clashes that occurred during the period of military
rule is seen as being generated by the state through militarism (Ibeanu 2000). Because
the military disregards clearly stipulated conditions laid down by the state for access to
resources, the contest for these resources turns out to be intense; leading to frosty
relations among competing ethnic groups. This state of affairs demonstrably worsened
the landscape of inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria by increasing inter-group
fear/suspicion among the ethnic communities, eroding the confidence of various ethnic
groups in the arbitration and mediation capacity of the state as well as by heightening
the stakes of inter-group struggles (Ibeanu 1999, 2000; Human Rights Watch 1995).
The outcome of the above development was increasing breakdown of ethnic conflict
management system in Nigeria. This manifested visibly in the open suppression of
group agitation, at times through state violence; disturbing inter-group clashes; as well
as challenge to state/regime legitimacy by ethnic groups (Gunther and Mughan 1993).
Based on the foregoing, it has been suggested that it is only a return to democracy that
will create opportunities for a carefully planned and constructive approach to ethnic
conflict management and improve the atmosphere for inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria
(Osaghae 2002, Harris and Reilly 1998).
In a democracy, it is expected that the existence of varied and conflicting interests in the
society will be acknowledged by democratic institutions set up to create a balance
between competition and consensus among groups. Thus, democracy is seen as a form
of government, which can directly channel ethnic conflicts into proper institutional
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outlet for peaceful resolution, ensuring that conflicts are expressed in accord with a
commonly accepted set of rules.
Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria since 1999
The success of democratic management of ethnic conflict depends on the extent to
which multi-ethnic democracies create specific institutional arrangements and practices
that would regulate interethnic conflicts. In Nigeria, for instance, the May 1999
transition from military to civilian rule, was accompanied by the democratic
legitimization of a number of inherited legal and institutional frameworks for ethnic
conflict management, and the enactment of some new ones. This section discusses the
institutional arrangements for ethnic conflict management inherited or enacted in
Nigeria since the emergence of democratic rule in 1999. These institutional
arrangements can be classified into three: the human rights, the multicultural, and the
power-sharing approaches.
The human rights approach
The most classical approach to ethnic conflict management in Nigeria since 1999 is the
human rights approach. The human rights approach to ethnic conflict management was
first introduced to Nigeria by the Willink Commission (Akinyele 1996). This approach
sees the enactment of a bill of rights, with its guarantee of equality, liberty and non-
discrimination in the constitution as a major way of allaying the fears of the minorities
and reducing the scope of discrimination against them. Since 1960, all Nigerian
Constitutions are embedded with the bill of rights. In the 1999 Constitution, the bill of
rights is contained in Chapter Three (sections 41-54) of the constitution. The human
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rights approach conceives Nigerian society in liberal terms. A liberal society is one
where all citizens are members of a common civic nation and where the state
endeavours to treat them in equal terms (Stanovcic 1992).
Although the human rights approach appears necessary for managing ethnic tensions in
democratic Nigeria, some scholars insist that it is not sufficient (Osaghae 1996). They
claim that the human rights approach as it is being practiced in Nigeria at the present,
concentrate solely on individual rights. These scholars therefore, argue for the need to
complement individual rights with group rights. Group rights regard ethnic and other
social groups in the society as deserving special attention, protection and justice in the
process of democratic competition. Proponents of group rights defend their argument by
claiming that ethnic conflicts arise from inequalities, discrimination, domination,
exclusion and injustices that attend inter-group competition for scarce social, economic
and political resources. As such, they maintain that ethnic conflicts can only be
effectively managed through the removal or at least toning-down of inequality,
discrimination and domination by protecting both individual and group rights.
The multicultural approach
The human rights approach can be regarded as a minimalist institutional measure for
ethnic conflict regulation. Contrary to the human rights approach, there are more robust
approaches, which hope to institutionalize ethnicity (Bieber 2004). Institutionalization
of ethnicity entails the official recognition of ethnic groups in the democratic political
competition and representation of ethnic groups as ethnic groups in formal democratic
institutions such as the executive and legislative systems.
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The institutionalization of ethnicity became popular following the fundamental changes
that the classical model of liberal democracy experienced, especially since the 1970s.
Nation-states and ruling majorities in these democracies were pressurized, and they
became increasingly prepared, to respect the desire for special recognition and
separateness of small indigenous minorities, immigrants and foreign workers (Kymlicka
1995). This shift away from full assimilation, gave rise to a form of democracy
popularly known as multicultural democracy.
In Nigeria, certain aspects of multiculturalism has been has adopted into the ethnic
conflict management system (Onu 2004). These multicultural mechanisms address
ethnic tensions by attempting to separate the state from the stronghold of a particular
ethnic nationality, and also by recognizing the cultural rights of minorities (Van Den
Berghe 2002). Multicultural aspects of ethnic conflict management in Nigeria have
reflected mainly in language and educational policies (Oyetade 2003, Garuba nd, and
Aguolu 1979). Meanwhile, it important to note that the multicultural approach to ethnic
conflict management has not been strongly rooted in Nigeria. This is perhaps, because
more than the cultural issues, distributive questions are the fundamental sources of
ethnic tensions in Nigeria (Nnoli 1978 & 1994).
The power-sharing approach
Because distributional issues are at the root of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria, power-sharing
has come to constitute the core approach to ethnic conflict management in Nigeria. In
one of the constitutional conferences held in Nigeria, it was noted that:
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in a country like Nigeria with its diverse peoples and their corresponding diverse political,
cultural and economic endowments, true federalism must reflect a genuine attempt to regulate
relationship among the groups, as well as a reflection of these identifiable divergences within a
framework of national unityThe particular complexion which a countrys federal system takes
reflects its diversities, historical experiences and the disposition of its peoples at a particular
point in time, and each federating unit within a true federal system should have its powers and
functions demarcated and guaranteed in such a way as to strike a compromise between local
particularism and national integrationWe in Nigeria must evolve our own power-sharing
formula, take our own decisions and develop our own institutions anchored on our historical
experiences, since the problem of power-sharing had been responsible for much of the tensions,
emotions, conflicts, stresses and strains in most countries (Federal Republic of Nigeria1995:3).
Power-sharing is a set of principles that when carried out through practices and
institutions, provide every significant identity group or segment in a society
representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of
autonomy over issues of importance to the group (Sisk 1996:5). These principles
ensure a balance of power among competing ethnic groups by specifying not only how
the groups are to share power within the polity, but also by allocating power in such a
way as to make it exceedingly difficult for any group to dominate the others (Lijphart
1977, Nordlinger 1972).
Power-sharing can occur at three dimensions depending on whether the intention of
the political elites is to share power along political, territorial, or economic dimension
(Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). The political dimension stipulates the distribution of
political and bureaucratic offices among ethnic groups. The territorial dimension
defines the exercise of autonomy by the various levels of government on the basis of
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federalism or regional autonomy arrangements. While rules regarding the distribution of
economic resources controlled or mandated by the state among ethnic groups constitute
the economic dimension.
In the past two decades, a greater number of scholars have acknowledged the efficacy of
power-sharing as a positive instrument of ethnic conflict management (Binningsbo
2005, Bogaards 2002, Daftary 2001, Akinyele 2000, Hudson 1997, Koelble and
Reynolds 1996, Sisk 1996, MacDonald 1992, Steiner 1991, McRae 1991, Lijphart 1991
1985). In fact, one prominent Nigerian scholar eloquently states:
power-sharing arrangements, in which all groups are represented in government, has the
advantage of ensuring stability and of getting the parties that would otherwise be locked in
conflict to understand each others interests and develop a system of trust in governing the
country. Such arrangements have the additional advantage of establishing a basic level of
consensus in the management of the instruments of violence as all parties may be represented in
the key institutions that deal with security (cited in Abubakar 1998:170).
Despite the wide acceptance the idea of power-sharing enjoys, yet, a major debate rages
among political scientists on what constitutes the best approach to power-sharing in
divided societies. In the debate, two contending approaches - consociationalism and
incentivism battle for analytical and prescriptive supremacy.
Consociationalism
Consociational approach to power-sharing was developed by Arend Lijphart in his
ground-breaking work: The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in
the Netherlands (1968) and elaborated in his later works (1969, 1977, 1985, 1991, 1996,
2002). Lijphart (1977) argues that democracy and inter-ethnic harmony can be achieved
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in deeply divided societies only if their type of government is consociational. He stress
the need for institutional designers to recognize the importance of ethnicity in the
political process and to make ethnic groups the building blocks of politics by
accommodating them in some sort of grand coalition or power-sharing government.
Consociational governance is characterized by two elements: executivepower-sharing
(which means the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in
political decision-making, especially at the executive level) andgroup autonomy (which
means that groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas
of education and culture) (Lijphart 1996:859). The effectiveness of the principles of
executive power-sharing and group autonomy is guaranteed by two ingredients: the use
ofproportionality in political representation and mutual veto.
Incentivism
Donald Horowitz offers an alternative approach to power-sharing. He argues that if
really inter-ethnic tension arises from competition for the control and ownership of the
state, for group superiority, and for group prosperity, all measured in relative terms,
then the resolution of the tension will be more difficult to achieve than the
consociationalists envisaged. For him, progress in the area of ethnic conflict
management depends on the ability of institutional designers to create and maximize
incentives for moderate and cooperative behaviour.
Horowitz (2002:23) insists that the incentives for moderation and cooperation comes
mainly from the electoral system. For him, it is nature of the electoral reward system
that can motivate inter-group conflict or cooperation. Electoral system can promote
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inter-group cooperation through vote-pooling arrangements and the political
engineering of political parties.
While political engineering of political parties entails conscious creation of pan-ethnic
political parties by legislation, vote-pooling makes the parties to be marginally
dependent on the votes of groups other than their own for electoral success. It requires
the parties to attract votes from various groups in the society in order to win national
elections. Therefore, to secure across-group votes, politicians are compelled to behave
moderately (Horowitz 2002:23). Vote-pooling rule promotes inter-group pre-electoral
coalitions; coalitions that need to be forged in order to attract voters across group lines.
In theory, consociationalism and incentivism may appear mutually exclusive, but in
practice the two approaches compliment rather than contradict each other. Thus, while
the incentive approach call attention to the need to make political institutions lean
towards national integration, the consociational approach highlight the need to create
institutions that would ensure ethnic accommodation.
Power-sharing in Nigeria
The notion of power-sharing has been on the discourse of Nigerian politics since the
colonial era. The root of power-sharing in Nigeria lie in the administrative federalism,
implied in the gradual division of the country into two administrative units the
Northern and Southern Protectorates, between 1900 and 1914, by the British colonial
administration (Jinadu 2004). The dual administrative system in the Northern and
Southern Nigeria, together with the increasing intensity of nationalist agitation for
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independence, created a dynamic logic in Nigerian politics, in the form of ethno-
regional federal structure. Leaders of the various ethnic groups in Nigeria, saw in
federalism the strategic advantage of preserving some form of home-rule within their
respective homelands in the Nigerian State, while remaining in the federation.
The emergent federal system based on ethnic diversity, with its initial tri-polar
constituent units East, North and West, coinciding with the 3 dominant ethnic group
(namely the Igbo in the East, Hausa/Fulani in the North, and the Yoruba in the West),
provides the basis for the minority ethnic groups being dominated by these 3 major
groups, to mobilize and advocate for home-rule within the regions of Nigerian
Federation. The ethnic power-sharing structure of Nigerian federalism provided and
continues to provide a constitutional and political platform, within which ethnic groups
in the country articulate and present their demands (Jinadu 2004, Suberu and Diamond
2002). These demands have gone beyond issues of territorial autonomy to include the
quest for resource control as well as rotation and zoning of political offices.
Power-sharing in Nigeria during the late colonial and early independence period was
largely informed by insights from consociationalism. The core elements of power-
sharing during this period include the group autonomy strategy of federalism in the
form of regionalism; strong desire for the application of proportionality principle in
representation; as well as a bicameral legislature, rigid constitution and the judicial
review of the constitutionality of legislations, all of which serve as mutual vote
mechanisms. However, after the civil war, power-sharing in Nigeria incorporated
several incentivist mechanisms. Prominent among these incentivist instruments are
vote-pooling and political engineering of political parties; federalism and states creation
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exercise that aims at splitting the homogenous majority groups and crosscutting the
countrys ethnic groups; and an increased centralization of the revenue allocation
system that intends to weaken the states and make them less attractive or viable as
prospective independent states (see Orji 2006, Suberu and Diamond 2002, Amuwo et.al
1998, Diamond 1982).
Power-sharing in Nigeria is anchored on the belief that under the unfavourable
circumstances of ethnic cleavages, a majoritarian system is highly inapplicable in
Nigeria, because the country cannot afford a winner takes all politics and the consequent
danger of creating a permanent minority. Joseph (1991:32) notes that:
the capacity for democratic politics in Nigeria appears to be rooted in the subtle awareness of the
danger represented by unchecked power, since that power in common thinking has to be used
for someones benefits and to anothers disadvantage, and there is a reasonable and even
probable chance that one will fall on the wrong side of that equation.
The strict application of majority rule, it is believed, will place a serious strain on unity
and peace in Nigeria.
Beginning in 1954, when the first really federal constitution was introduced in Nigeria,
the federal structure ensured that two or more ethnic-based political organizations share
political power at the center. This state of affairs contrasts with the situation in countries
like Ghana and Tanzania, where one nationalist party was able to achieve clear
predominance. In the 1954 cabinet, in which Nigerians were subordinate to colonial
representatives, the NCNC held six of the nine positions and the NPC the remaining
three. The portfolios were allocated on the basis of the parties performance in the
federal elections conducted in the three regions that year. After the subsequent 1957
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elections, the NPC became the dominant partner in the federal government, and its
deputy leader, Abubakar Tafawa Belewa, the first Prime Minister of Nigeria. This
government was the first case of a real grand coalition in Nigeria (Sklar 1963,
Mackintosh 1966).
Drawing on their experience in the all-party 1957-9 cabinet, some Nigerian politicians
began to call for a more robust power-sharing arrangement that would allow each of the
major parties unimpeded control of its region of strength, with an all-embracing or
whatLijphartians would label an overwhelming coalition at the centre (Mackintosh
1966:442). Although many prominent political figures in Nigerias first republic
favoured a less competitive system (if only for a transitional or probationary period),
such arrangement could not be well entrenched in the pre-civil war and immediate post-
civil war years due to the fact that they were not institutionalized. The Nigerian political
elites of those years gave priority to struggles to achieve decisive political advantage
over the need for inter-ethnic accommodation. However, subsequent generations of
Nigerian political elite began to take measures geared toward institutionalizing politics
of accommodation in the country.
The first major attempt to constitutionalize ethnic power-sharing in Nigeria came in
1979. Since 1979, Nigerian Constitutions have made special and specific provisions for
power-sharing. For instance, in the 1999 Constitution, elements of power-sharing can be
found in the following provisions:
1. The relationship between the government and the people Section 222. Political and economic objectives of the federation Sections 23 and 24
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3. The rights of citizens to freedom of movement and from discrimination Section 49 and Section 50.
4. Election of the president Section 141 and 1425. Appointment to specific public offices Sections 154, 178, 223 and 2256. Formation, constitution and rules of political parties Sections 228 and 229
The most elaborate and formal power-sharing arrangement contained in the Nigerian
Constitution is the federal character principle. The purpose of the federal character
principle is laudable. According to its framers, the federal character principle is
anchored on the:
distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty
and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation notwithstanding the
diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion which may exist and which it is their
desire to nourish, harness to the enrichment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Afigbo 1989:4).
The federal character clauses guarantee the representation of major ethnic groups in
specified political positions, in public service appointments, and in the allocation of
national resources and projects at the federal level to each of the state and local
governments.
The federal character principle was inscribed in Section 14(3) of the 1979 Nigerian
Constitution and repeated with appropriate modifications in other sections dealing with
the executive and legislative functions of the state governments. The federal character
clauses stipulates that:
The composition of the federal government or any of its agencies and the conduct of their affairs
shall be carried out in such a manner as to recognize the federal character of Nigeria and the
need to promote national unity and to command national loyalty. Accordingly, the predominance
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in that government or its agencies of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other
sectional groups shall be avoided.
Under section 157(3), section 197, and section 197(2) of the 1979 Nigerian
Constitution, the proportionality or quota principle, inherent in the federal character
clauses was extended to the appointments and promotions in the public services,
appointments of Chairpersons and members of the Boards of Directors of parastatals,
appointments and promotions in the armed forces, allocation of public revenue and
distribution of public projects, composition of a number of federal executive bodies, and
admission to federal secondary schools and federal universities.
Section 153 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution established the Federal Character
Commission, as a federal executive body, empowered in section 8(1) of the Third
Schedule of the Constitution to oversee and monitor the implementation of the federal
character clauses, as follows:
1. work out an equitable formula subject to the approval of the National Assemblyfor the distribution of all cadres of posts in the public service of the Federation and of
the States, the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigerian Police Force and other
security agencies, government-owned companies and parastatals of the States;
2. promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the principle of proportionalsharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of
government;
3. take such legal measures, including prosecution of the head or staff of anyministry or government body or agency which fails to comply with any federal
character principle or formula prescribed by the Commission, and as provided for in
section 8(3) of the Schedule,
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4. Notwithstanding any provisions in any other law or enactment, the Commissionshall ensure that every public company or corporation reflects the federal character in
the appointment of its directors and senior management staff.
The application of the federal character principle in Nigeria has encountered several
difficulties. First, the federal character principle has led the political elites to place too
much emphasis on inter-state relationships without a corresponding attention to tensions
among ethnic groups within the states (Ikime 2002:67). Secondly, because the federal
character principle strives to give equal treatment to unequals, many people perceive the
policy as being discriminatory (Ayoade 1998:116). Thirdly, the interpretation of federal
character, which is based on state and ethnicity is seen by many as inadequate. Of
course, social divisions in Nigeria are not limited to ethnic and state; there are also
class, confessional, temporal and ideological divisions (Ayoade 1998:116). Finally, the
operation of the federal character principle in Nigeria tends to give more powers to the
politically dominant groups; creating wider power disparity between the stronger and
weaker groups, and thereby, subjecting the politically weaker groups to what Ayoade
(1998:117) calls double jeopardy.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to survey the ways in which Nigerian political leaders have
responded to the problem of ethnic conflict in the country. The paper discovered that
those charged with easing ethnic conflicts in Nigeria have relied greatly on the major
theories of ethnic conflict management. The paper has shown that Nigeria have
experimented with various forms ethnic conflict management strategies such as vote-
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pooling electoral system, autonomy deals with outlaying regions/ethnic groups, and the
parceling out of top political and bureaucratic posts with a view to accommodating
various groups which, if not brought more fully into the tent of national life, could bring
it down from outside.
One can therefore, say that Nigeria has provided a rich ground for scholars and
practitioners concerned with ethnic conflict management, to try out some of their
solutions. In many cases, the application of these palliatives to ethnic conflicts have led
to improvements, but in other cases, as in the case of federal character, it rather
complicates the entire situation. However, what one needs to understand is that ethnic
conflict management is usually a slow, but incremental process, which records modest,
yet steady progress. Therefore, intermittent occurrence of ethnic tensions in Nigeria
should not be construed as the failure of ethnic conflict management arrangements. This
is because, it is almost impossible to completely eliminate ethnic conflicts in a multi-
ethnic society like Nigeria.
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