8/8/2019 1161213

1/21

'With a Little Bit of Luck...' Coping with Adjustment in Urban Ghana, 1975-90Author(s): Lynne BrydonSource: Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 69, No. 3 (1999), pp. 366-385Published by: Edinburgh University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1161213Accessed: 23/10/2010 23:43

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=eup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Edinburgh University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toAfrica:

Journal of the International African Institute.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=euphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1161213?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=euphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=euphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1161213?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=eup

8/8/2019 1161213

2/21

Africa69 (3), 1999

'WITH A LITTLEBIT OF LUCK...'COPING WITH ADJUSTMENT IN URBAN GHANA,1975-90Lynne Brydon

Since the late 1970s the majorityof the countriesof the so-called 'South'have adopted,with varyingdegreesof desperation,nthusiasm r success,the policy prescriptions f the InternationalMonetaryFund andthe WorldBank n returnor FundandBank oansand,moregenerally, nternationallyrecognised reditworthiness.hepolicy prescriptionsaveusually ncluded,amongotherthings,strict fiscal measures o restorebalancesof payments(theregularisationndliberalisation f publicsectorenterprises) s well aseffortsto liberalisebusiness, o encourage xportsand to attract nvestmentfrom overseas. Such prescriptions onstitute'stabilisation'and 'structuraladjustment olicies' (SAPs).Throughhe 1980sand ntothe 1990sboththeIMF and the WorldBankcontinued o lend to ThirdWorldstateson stricteror more lenient terms, over shorteror longer periods, dependingon acountry's performancein adhering to the imposed policies' terms.Departures rom predicted trajectoriesof developmentor improvementwereglossedas 'slippage' Mosleyet al., 1992)andattemptswere madetoaccount orproblemsn performancen termsof economicfactors.'But in addition, rom 1987, and afterpressure romUNICEFand non-governmental rganisations,he World Bank acceptedthat social factorsmightalsohavesomebearingonproblemsn thefailure o achieveexpectedperformance argetsand subsequentlymade some allowances for suchfactors n its assessmentsand evaluationsof countries'performances. heWorld Bank also createda 'Social Dimensionsof Adjustment'unit toinvestigatehe ramificationsf theeffects of its macro-economicoliciesonidentified'vulnerable'groups.But the late 1980s also saw pressure romdonor countries(the effective paymastersof the IMF and WorldBank)throughheIMFand WorldBankforThirdWorldstates o achievewhatthedonors could recogniseas 'good governance'.What this meant was thatdifferent and political,just as much as economic, conditions had to besatisfiedbeforeabeneficiary tatewasregarded screditworthy:tates n theThirdWorldhad to be seen to have (andrecognisedby the Northto have)democraticallylected civiliangovernmentswhichimplementedhe Bank'sand the Fund'spolicies.2While there is a dominantperception n WorldBank, IMF and otheragency reportson developingcountries'performancehat economic andsocial factors in additionto political legitimacy(as judged by the donor

1Mosley et al. (1992) is perhapsboth the most detailedand accessible accountof theprocesses nvolved.2 The freedomandfairnessof several elections in Africa has been questioned. See, forexample,Nugent, 1995, and Jeffriesand Thomas, 1993, for an accountof Ghana's 1992elections.)

8/8/2019 1161213

3/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANAstates)can be accounted or,measured revaluated,he actualperformanceof many Third World states in terms of adherence o the conditions ofstabilisationand SAPs has been erratic.Manypredictionshave not beenfulfilled and slippagehas persisted n the 1990s, in spite of takingintoaccountmitigating ocialor politicalfactors.In late 1993, however, the World Bank's punditscame up with yetanother,andseemingly mportant,et of factorswhichtheyurgedmightbetaken into account n evaluationsof performance nd whichwouldfinallyexplain deviations in countries' expected growth rates. The GuardiannewspaperUK),towards heend of thatyear,carried reporthat heWorldBank economists had produceda documentsuggestingthat it was verydifficult orprescribed itter iscal medicine o workwithouta considerableelement of 'luck'. On the subjectof recoveryin adjustingcountries, hearticle cites the Bank'srepresentativess stating:'There s a surprisinglylargevolatileelement... thathas a significanteffect on growthrates....This volatile element . . . can be described simply as luck' (30 December1993).What ollows is about hespaceoccupiedby 'luck' in the economicworldviews of someGhanaians ather hana disquisitionaboutthe economicsofadjustment. t is not really about 'economics'in the formal sense of itsversionsas a Westernacademicdiscipline,orthebodyof theoriesunderlyingpolicyprescriptionsn theWest,at all. Rathert is aboutGhanaians'opingwiththe vagariesof 'economic',definedmorebroadly,circumstancesromthe late 1960s onwards. tbeginswith a generaldiscussionof Ghana's oftenheld up as an exemplarof the successfulworkingout of stabilisation ndadjustmentpolicies) economic fate over the past thirty years.The articletraces,using argelyanecdotal vidence rommyfieldnotes,Ghana's ormaleconomicdeclinethroughhe 1970s.Perceptions f striving or bothsurvivalandsuccessare sketchedoutduring hisoverwhelmingly essimisticperiodin Ghana'shistory.They are followedby a descriptionof people's viewsabout survivaland 'the stateof play' in Ghana'seconomicprogress n thelate 1980s and early 1990s. These discursivecomments are followed bysomesimplequantitativematerial boutwork, heavailability fjobsand hestructure f the labourmarket tthetime.Whatbecomesobvious,giventhatGhanaians reactuallycontinuingheir ives much as theyhavein thepast,is that he IMF'sandWorldBank'spolicyprescriptionsndstrategiesorthedevelopmentof manufacturingndustry, or attractinghe 'worldmarketfactories'of the multinationals,re not beingachieved.Instead,Ghanaianshavefocused(as theyhavedone since long beforetheimpositionof SAPs)on strategiesornetworking ndgettinga break: trikingt 'lucky',in fact.The relatively newly discovered volatile element in the World Bank'scalculations aslongbeena, if notthe,core factor n thedevelopment lansof manysmall Ghanaian nterprises.n the meantimeGhanaianwomenandmen aretrying-hoping for some 'luck'-to surviveandeven prosperntothe nextmillennium.

ECONOMICSAND POLITICS N AN ERA OF DECLINE,1970-83Ghanafirst adoptedstabilisationand SAPs in 1983. WhereasmanyLatin

367

8/8/2019 1161213

4/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANAAmerican tateswere forced nto the clutchesof theIMFandWorldBankbyinabilityto meet their massive debt commitmentswith the decline in thesupplyof petro-dollars,Ghana's case (similarto, but more marked han,others n sub-Saharan frica) s different.For at least fifteenyearsbefore hegovernment ought MF/World ank inancing,heeconomyhadbeengoingsteadilydownhill.3Between 1970 and 1982 it becameapparentust howsevere theproblemswere. The ratioof exports o GDP fell from 21 percentto 4 percent,the ratio of investment o GDP fell from 14percent to 2 percent,the real valueof exportearningshadfallenby half,realwagesfell by80 percent andincomeperheadfell by 30 percent (WorldBank,citedinRimmer,1994).What hismeant n everydayermswasthat herealvalueof thecurrency,thecedi,fell. Industrial roduction windledas adverse xchangeratesmadeimportsof bothraw materialsandmachineryandsparepartsprohibitivelyexpensive.Imports in relativelysmallquantities,imitedby the amountoflegitimate foreign exchangeavailable)4were controlledby licences, andthese tended to be given out on a corruptbasis. Even if peoplehad cashthrough he 1970s, there was progressivelyess and less to buy: initiallyconsumergoods andimported ood, latersparepartsand medicines.Therewere no importsof sparepartsfor industrial quipmentand vehicles andthere was virtuallyno infrastructuralnvestment.Becauseof the growingdisparitybetweenthe official andrealvaluesof the cedi what tended o beimportedwere goods that could be sold easily and at an enormousprofit(clothing,musicproducts),ather han ndustrialoods.This was also the erawhen the basis forgivingoutgovernmentontractswas at its mostblatantlycorrupt.It was widely rumouredand believed that in order to secure acontractorworka bribehadto be givenand often the cost of the bribewassuch that the contract could not be fulfilled. Infrastructureroads andbridges, or example)andpublicservices crumbledduring he 1970s.While Ghana had a succession of more or less autocraticmilitarygovernmentsormuchof the 1970s,theattempto return o elected civiliangovernment between 1979 and 1981 saw no increase in domesticaccountabilityor any increase in the country's creditworthiness ninternationalerms. Minimal creditworthiness, owever, meant minimalborrowing, ndso, whenJerryRawlingsseizedpower n a militarycoupinDecember1981, not only did he inheritan almostbankrupttate,he alsoinheritedminimaldebts.WhileGhanahadrelatively ew debtsthen,it hadvirtuallyno capitalorrevenueeither.For thecountry o 'work', n thesenseof function, t neededmoney and skills. Consonantwith the initial expressed ideology of thePNDC5 egime,Ghana irst ookedforhelpto the Easternbloc, China,CubaandLibya.But thiswasthetime at which socialiststateswerebeginning o

3 See, for example, Chazan (1983), Frimpong-Ansah (1991), Loxley (1988), Rimmer(1992).4Legitimate foreign exchange, as distinct from foreign exchange in circulation in the blackmarket, the kalabule economy.5 Provisional National Defence Council.

368

8/8/2019 1161213

5/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANAfocus on their own troublesand little help was forthcoming(see, forexample, Ray, 1986; Frimpong-Ansah, 991; Rimmer,1992). Rawlings,however,provedto be a pragmatistand so, in spite of seeminglyovertpoliticalcontradictions,hePNDCwent to theIMFandWorldBank n 1982.In April 1983 the first budgetreflectingthe stabilisationand adjustmentpoliciesof the BrettonWoods nstitutionswas announced spartof Ghana'sfirstEconomicRecoveryProgramme.Ghana'spackageof stabilisation ndadjustmentmeasureswas similar oothers recommendedaround the world. However, Ghana's economicproblemswere so severe that its programmecame to be regardedassomethingof a test of the IMF and World Bank policies, providinga'baseline'case. In line with IMFand WorldBankprescriptions, tepsweretaken oregularise urrency nd mport/exportransactionso stifle the blackmarketandto rationalise he enormouspublicsector.Significantnumbers femployeesweredismissed, n thehope, ultimately,of privatisinghenewly'efficient' enterprises.Steps were also taken to increase governmentrevenue, n particularromcocoa, Ghana'smainexportcrop,the bulk ofwhich had been smuggledout of the country n the late 1970s andearly1980s for moreprofitable ale in Togo andC6te d'Ivoire(Nugent,1991).Afterthebudget,effectivelythe official announcementhatGhanawasnowin the IMF/WorldBankclub,thecivil servicewas detailed o drawup a listof requirementso be presentedo a meetingof theParisClub n November1983.The list includedsuch basic itemsas lightbulbs,screws andnails.6Not only hadmanyyearsof the effects of corruption nd decline takentheirtoll on theeconomyand infrastructureutalso,in early1983,Ghana'spoor condition was exacerbatedby both naturaland man-madedisasters.There was a prolongedand very severe dry season and majorbush firesravaged the south of the country.The resulting food shortageswereexacerbatedby the return o Ghanaof more than a million of its citizens(approximatelyne-twelfthof its thenpopulation), xpelledor fleeingfromNigeria after the Nigerian government'sdecree of late January Brydon,1985).Internationalid to helpwiththereturnees id notbeginto enterthecountryuntilMay at the earliest(ibid.).By July the main Accramarkets,usuallyburstingwiththe new maize harvestandother oodstuffsat that imeof year,werepractically mptyof fresh food andcustomershad to wait forfoodto arrivebeforequeuing obuyit. Inthevillageswomenbegan o speakaboutmakingandusing palmoil lamps(as theirgrandmothersad done)when the supplyanddistribution f kerosenewere severely disrupted.Forthe first time since I had been working n southernGhana(morethan tenyears),people spoke openlyaboutbeing hungryandtherewerejokes about

6 Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning official, personal communication. In July1983 the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Accra was surroundedby a sea ofvehicles, all bearing its logo. None of them had any tyres, all were up on blocks. For furtherinformation here see Brydon (n.d.).

369

8/8/2019 1161213

6/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANA'Rawlingschains':necklacesof prominentollarbones whichbecamemorevisibleas peoplelost weight.7

This section has outlinedin a very broadway Ghana'spolitical andeconomic characteristicshrough he 1970s and into the 1980s. We haveseen how economiccorruptionndmismanagement,ogetherwitheventualpolitical neffectualness, roughthecountry o thebrinkof bankruptcyndhow theconsequences f economicandpolitical eeblenesswere intensifiedby Nigeria'sexpulsionof Ghanaianmigrantworkers ndthe seriousdroughtand bushfires of early1983. The next section ooks atevidencedrawn rommy fieldwork n Ghana over the years since the mid-1970sto show theeffects of declineon Ghanaians nd,to some extent,how they coped.Asdeclineandcopingwere not the mainfocus of myworkat thetime,muchofthe materials anecdotaland drawn romincidental emarksn field notes,but some draws on interviews with Accra residents n the late 1970s. Isuggest hat1983can be seenas the nadirof Ghana'sdeclineandalsoas theend of one era (of corruption ndrecession)and the beginningof another(the impositionof differenteconomicand,ultimately,politicalconditionswhich were to impingeon people'slives in differentways).

DECLINEAND URBAN SURVIVALIN THE 1970SThe devaluation f thecurrencywas so spectacular uring he 1970s that norderto convey any sense of it and whatit has meantwe have to look atpurchasing ower.In termsof numbers, he exchangeable ate of the cedidroppedromtwo to thepound n 1971 to about200 to thepound n 1979onthe blackmarket.These dataare notofficial,ratherheyaredrawn romtheconvertible alue of themoneyI livedon in Ghanaat the relevant imes.In1983 puttingany exchangeable value' on the cedi was difficult:I did notattempt o changemoney. Any goods wantedby people I knew in Ghanawere availableonly in one or two designatedand government-controlled'hardcurrency' hops.I usedsterling o buywhatmy friendswanted n thehard-currencyhopsforthem andtheygaveme cedis at no particularateofexchangeto coverday-to-day xpenses,for exampletaxi fares,street ood.Therewereplentyof cedis in circulation,buttherewas little to buy in thelocal shops.By theearly1980s,too, thecedi's subdivision,hepesewa,hadceased to exist foranypracticalpurpose.My field notes record 1976:I, 4)thatbetweenAugust1974 and October1976prices n thevillagemarketsnthe mid-VoltaRegionrose fourfold. n anecdotal erms,at thebeginningofthe 1970s a bottleof beer cost about wo-thirds f theminimumdailywage;between 1979 and 1983 a bottle of beer cost more than four times theminimumdaily wage, if you could find the beer.While a primary choolteacher ould afford o buyhalf a pieceof cloth(sixyards,enough o makeacompleteoutfitfora woman)as well as foodforthe month n 1971,in 1979

7 Observations here are taken from field notes made during a short visit to Ghana in Juneand July 1983.

370

8/8/2019 1161213

7/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANAhalf a piece of cloth was about 10 times the monthly salary of the sameteacher, that is, if she could find cloth to buy.

In inland urban markets in the Volta Region in late July 1979 the onlyregularly available fish (the usual protein staple) was the fermentedmononie,usually used primarily as flavouring, and this in a region bordered on thesouthern side by the sea and on the west by the Volta river and lake. In Ho(the regional capital) the market had no yams or bread, both foods whichwere formerly in regular supply irrespective of season. Flour for bread has tobe imported,and what little flour was importedinto Ghana at the time tendedto be distributed to bakers, who could afford inflated prices to pay thedistributors the bribes necessary in order to get hold of an import licence.Baking thus seemed to be confined largely to Accra, where there were somelarger-scale bakerybusinesses and where consumers could afford to pay highprices. After Rawlings's 4 June coup, however, small bakers wereencouraged to form co-operatives and the system of flour distribution wasreorganised. By early August small-scale bakers in Ho were beginning tobake again (Field notes: I). The problem with ensuring the supply of yamsand other locally produced foodstuffs was essentially one of transportanddistribution. While fuel oil supplies had been erratic from the early 1970sonwards, after the 4 June coup, Nigeria, Ghana's major supplier, cut offsupplies and credit. Only Libya of the world's oil suppliers was willing toallow Rawlings's untried government credit. What it meant was that therewere vast queues-several hundred metres long and beginning to formperhapsthree or four days before petrol arrived at a petrol station-for petrolin the capital, and there was virtually no petrol or kerosene (paraffin forlamps and cooking) outside of the capital. In any case, because of theprevious decade's shortages and mismanagement, both vehicles and roadswere in an appalling state of repair.Shortages were also apparent in Accra. The range of goods for sale inmarkets and stores narrowed drastically with the decline of the cedi. Thegovernment subsidised the prices of a small range of 'essential commod-ities', including tinned milk, tinned fish, soap and detergent, ostensibly toprovide a cushion for low-income urban dwellers. But those with access towholesale supplies bought up the major part of these special imports atgovernment-controlled (low) prices and either sold them internally on theblack marketfor a significant profit or smuggled them to neighbouring stateswhere prices were higher and the currencywas negotiable internationally.8Ajunior civil servant in the Immigration Office in Accra said in June 1979:

Youspend200 cedis at market... yoursalary s notbig ... so youknowsomeoneandgo andget one carton of tinsof] milkandsell it one-one[bythe individualtin],which s more,so you get a little more.You need it in order o survive. Fieldnotes, 1979; I, 27 June]

8 The CFAfranc,at thattimepeggedto the French ranc.

371

8/8/2019 1161213

8/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANAThe samecivil servantpointed o profiteering ndrent-seeking s the causeof the country'sproblems.

The pricesof the few goods available n Ghanaian tores andmarkets,apart rom ocallyproducedoodstuffs,werehigh. By the endof the 1970s itwas obvious that workers n any field, not only the fixed-salarypublicservants,neededmore thanone sourceof income to survive.The wife of anelectricianworking or the state-ownedElectricityCorporationaid that heycould not have survived without her husband'sprivate jobs, and ininterviews n Accrain 1976-77 and 1979 over and over againI foundthatemployedartisansalso workedon their own account,while white-collarworkersn thepublicsector ookedforprivate-sectorpportunitiesminimalat that ime)or diversified ntotrading sthecivil servantn theImmigrationOffice had done. In spite of low monthlysalaries,the public sector stillattractedmany workers: t providedbasic rights(remuneratedeave, sickpay, pensionrightsand access to regularamounts f government-designated'essentialcommodities'at controlledprices) to all its workersand moresignificantperks(subsidisedhousing, ow-interest r interest-free arloans)to higher-levelworkers.Butby the endof the 1970sin additionormally oholdingthesejobs workershad to have othersourcesof income in order osurvive.A finaloptionwasmigration verseasand the late 1970sandearly1980sare theperiodduringwhichGhanaians eganto be foundeverywhere:n the'South' there were Ghanaianstaffinghospitals n SaudiArabia,Ghanaianteachers n South Africa's 'Bantustans', rtisansn Nigeria; n the 'North'Ghanaianmigration o Europe(Britain,Germanyand Holland)and theUnited States ncreased.Rawlings'sfirst governmenthandedover powerto the civiliangovern-mentof Dr Hilla Limann n September1979 andGhanaians xpectedthenewregime o bringprosperity nd nternationalnvestment.Therewas alsotheovertlyexpressedhope,stifledduring heyearsof military ule,that heymight protest efficaciouslyand without fear of reprisals f things wentwrong.Two years later the governmentwas in such a state of hopelessdisarray,with a weak leadershippulled in several directionsby variousfactions,that therewas, effectively,no one to protestto (Chazan,1983,1991). There had been no international nvestment,and rent-seekingbehaviourhad continued unabated.These events form the backdrop oRawlings's second coup and ultimatelythe announcementof the firstEconomicRecoveryProgrammeERPI) in 1983.Ghana,as exemplifiedbyits state apparatus,had a weak and probably corrupt governmentandpetrified public services with no resources-for example, a health caresystemwith no medicinesandan education ystem,once anexemplarortheregion, f not thecontinent,whose teachers penttheirtime absent rom theclassroomeither arming in ruralareas)or selling(in urbanareas) n orderto survive.In anycase, therewere no books,paperor pens.Even before the adoption of an Economic Recovery Programme,therefore, ife for ordinarypeople was difficultand 'abnormal'.By 1983,for example,workers n the National Archives arrivedat workusing theremnants f a crippled by lack of sparepartsand fuel shortages)ransportsystem.Theycame,perhaps,o work,butmainly,so theysaid,because hey

372

8/8/2019 1161213

9/21

ADJUSTMENTNURBANGHANAweregivena chitfor a free meal in theneighbouringYMCAcanteen.Tryingto workin the archivesafter 3.00 pm was useless,as workershadalreadybegun leavingto try to get home before dark.Restaurants till functionedwith skeletonmenus,but beer was almostunobtainable, s the brewerieswereworkingat about20 percent of capacity.Peoplemighthavecedis intheirpocketsbut therewere few goodstobuy.Since local factoriesandotherenterprises such as the breweries)were workingat a fraction of theircapacity,what t meantwasthattherewas locally producedood to buyandverylittle else. Seamstressesomplained otonlyof lack of cloth butalsooflack of thread: hildren's chooluniformsweresewnwithwhatever olouredthreada seamstresshad,regardless f thecolourof theuniform.Packagingandwrapping oods boughtwas also aproblem.Leaveswere n commonuseas wrapping n Accra markets9and there was a living to be made fromdealing n second-hand ewspapers,magazinesor anykindof paperwhichcouldbe sold on to shopkeepers nd traders:t was not uncommon,n thelate 1970sandearly 1980s to buy streetfood wrappedn what looked likeofficial documents: agesfromreceiptbooks,companyreports, ven pagesfrom the archives.

ECONOMICECOVERYNGHANANineteeneighty-foursaw plentifulrain and a recoveryof the country'ssubsistencebase.Inaddition,however, heinjectionof aid flowsin thewakeof the 1983 budgetand the NovemberParis Clubmeetingmeant that thegovernment ndindustry ouldbeginto workagain.Ghana's conomicrecoverypackage,as wasthecasewithothercountries,involved measures o strengthenhe balanceof paymentsand to emphasiseandencourageheproduction f goodswhich couldbe tradedabroad atherthangoodsfor the home market theproduction f 'tradables').Policiestocurbtheoperation f parallelcurrencymarketswerealsobroughtntoplay,largely n termsof lettingthe cedi float on themarkets,husfindinga morerealistic nternational alue.Inaddition,a series of majorreformsof public-sectorenterpriseswasbegun,with the aimof rationalisinghem andmakingthem moreefficient. The whole of thepublicsector-education,electricity,transport,public works, construction,purchasing, among others-wassubject o theseinfluences, esultingn majorprogrammesf 'redeployment'(redundancy).The redeploymentprogrammewas aimed at achievingnotonly labour,capitaland resource-efficientnterprisesn the public sector(whichmight subsequently e attractive o private-sectornvestors)butalsoat makinga skilled labourforce available o new enterprises.Financeforthese newenterpriseswas to come from ndigenous apitaland fromoutside

9 Litterand the cloggingof drainsandgutterswith non-biodegradableasteswere not aproblemat that time.

373

8/8/2019 1161213

10/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANAthecountry,attracted y reduced nflationandthe maintenance f economicandpolitical stability.'

At the sametimeasattemptswerebeingmade o make hesepublicbodiesmore efficient and cost-effective,measureswere put in place to removesubsidiesandalso to improve he efficacywithwhichtaxes,both local andnational,werecollected.Thusnotonlydid thepricesof water,electricityandfuel (petrol,diesel andkerosene) ise,but also therewas a strongprobability,rather hana vague possibility, hat ocalwaterratesandelectricityaccountswould be collected.Defaulterswerelikely to have theirsupplycut off andthose who hadtapped nto waterandelectricitysupplies llegallywould bedisconnectedand chargedfor their previoususe. However,while thesemeasuresprovidedsome revenuefor local and nationalcoffers,the majorsumsneededto rehabilitateGhana's ndustryandinfrastructureame fromaidand loans.Commercialnvestmentn themanufacturingectorhas beenminimal and the generationof income (for living and for taxes) is stilllargelydependent n small-scaleagriculturendwhatcanlooselybe termed'informal-sectornterprises'.Eventhougha reasonablykilledandeducatedlabour orce was 'available'becauseof redeploymentn the 1980s, t has notbeen mopped up by new industrialenterprises,whether externallyorinternallyinanced.Thus,while official statistics11ndicate hat GNP has risenin real termsovertheyearssince 1983,that nflationhasdeclined, hatexportshave risenand that ndustries reworking o a greater apacity, heyalso indicate hatrealincomesarejust aboutequivalento those of thelate 1960s,beforetheonsetof majordecline.Ghana till has a long wayto go before t can boastofexternal onfidence n its economyandrealgrowth n internal ncomesoverthe long term.

URBAN SURVIVALIN THE 1990sAs with the above section on decline, the evidence in this section isanecdotaland focusedon inflationand purchasingpower.When I beganfieldwork n mid-1990theexchangerate between he cedi andsterlingwasabout750 cedis to thepound.WhenI left, in thespringof 1991,it hadgoneup to over 800 cedis to the pound.On subsequent isits the exchangeratewas:

February 995 1,700cedis = ?1July 1996 2,500 cedis = ?1July 1997 3,000 cedis = ?1February 1998 3,400 cedis = ?1

10For discussion of the problems of small business trying to start up and flourish at thattime, whether using redundancypayments from state-owned enterprises to startup or whethertrying to get access to loan money coming into the country, see Brydon and Legge (1996),especiallychapters3 and4.1Forformalandmacro-economicetailsof Ghana's conomicprogress ince 1983see,forexample,Armstrong1996),OtiBoatenget al. (1990).

374

8/8/2019 1161213

11/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANAThepurchasing owerof thecedi is obviouslydeclining,andalthoughherehave beensalaryrises for thosein work,andrisesin the minimumwage,thepurchasingpower of the currencyand what a salarybuys has declined.Although he cedi buys less, however,there aregoods availableto buy, asignificantdifference rom both 1979 and 1983. In moreaccessibleterms,using the exampleof cloth quotedabove,while a primary chool teachercouldnotafford obuya halfpieceof cloth in 1979,evenif she could find ittobuy,in 1991thesameteachermightbe able to afford he cloth(onceagainreadilyavailable n marketsas well as in stores) f she had a farmon whichto growfood for herselfandherfamily,and schoolfees were not due. Localtextile factories(Akosombo,Juapong,Tema) which rarely operated andthen at very low capacity) n the late 1970s andearly 1980s,hadbeguntoworkregularly ndto muchgreater,f notfull, capacityagainaftersevenoreight yearsof adjustment.And, with the liberalisation f trade,wax printsfrom Holland and Britainhave begunto be importedagain,but they aremuchmoreexpensive.An innovation s that significantamountsof clothfromCOted'Ivoireand fromNigeriaarealso to be found n the markets.Perhapswe can summarise hese trendsin terms of relationsbetweenmeansandends.While ends andmeanshada definiterelation o one anotherin theearly1970s,by the end of thatdecade,and n theearly1980s,ends andmeanswerecompletelyout of kilter.In theearly1990s,however,aftereightyearsof adjustment,meanswere beginningto bear some relationto endsagain,even if the relativeproportionsndfactorshadchanged.

EMPIRICALDATA/REALFACTSThe data on which this section is based are drawn from empiricalworkcarried ut in 1990 and 1991in Nima,a low-incomearea n Accra.Until the1960s Nima was a majorfocus of immigrationor bothinternalmigrants(mainlyfrom the north of the countryand from the Volta Region) andexternalmigrants,mainlyfrom the SouthernTogo. Althougha significantproportionf Nima's inhabitantsriginateromthe statesof theSahel,theirmigrationsend to haveoccurredwell beforethe 1960s. Sahelian nhabitantsof Nima tendto be thirdand even fourth-generationccraresidents.Morerecently mmigrationo Nimaseems to have wanedandnewly settled sub-and peri-urban reassuch as Madina,Achimotaand Dansomanare nowattractingmigrants.The data includebasic demographic nd quantitativeinformation s well as qualitativenformation boutpeople's perceptions ftheir ives. Interviewswere carried utin fifty-onehouseholds12ut the basisof samplingwas not random,as there was no adequatesamplingframeavailable. Introductionso key people in the various ethnic communitieswithinNima were followed by further ntroductions, nd thus a rangeof

12 A householdwas regarded s a cookingunit for the mostpart.However,where,as wasthe case with some Muslimmen,marriageswerepolygynous, hehouseholdwas taken, romthe male perspective,to be the residentialunit. The household 'head' was the personacknowledgedo be in chargeby othermembersof thehousehold.

375

8/8/2019 1161213

12/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANApeoplewereinterviewed,anningout fromseveraloriginalpointsof entry.The resultsof the interviewsrevealboth differences romand continuitieswith the kinds of experiencepeoplewerehavingin 1979 and 1983,beforethe adventof stabilisation ndadjustment. irst,what kinds of workwerepeople doingin the early1990s?Information n occupationsdrawn romall those(over18) in the samplehouseholds(128 men and 146 women) shows that 'manufacturing'nd'factory'work,relatively arge-scaleproductionn formalenterprises,ustdoes notfeatureas anoccupational ategory. Factoryworker', n fact,wasnotincluded n the finalcodingscheme,althoughprovisionwas madefor itin theearlystagesof dataanalysis.13 he meninterviewednNimatended orely on small artisanand otherless well-defined business'enterprisesortheirincome, in addition o rent for those who owned theirown houses.Whilemostof the artisanal nterprises an be unequivocallyocatedin an'informal'sector,however we define it, what the other less well defined'businesses',headedby self-styled'entrepreneurs',ntailedshiftedthroughformal operationsto informal wheeling-and-dealing.These businessestended to be in the areas of trading,buying and selling ratherthan inproductionorexport.It was notpossibleto drawanydefinite inebetweenkinds of businessenterprises nd, in any case, a particular ntrepreneur'sdeals might vary in their 'formality':some might undergoaccountants'scrutinyand thus be classifiable as 'formal', while others might not.Women'ssourcesof income and whattheysaidtheydid for a livingtendedto be moreeasily categorised s 'informal': n the main the Nima women'sincomecame fromtrading andthenlargelyin cooked food and/ordrink)and secondarily from remittances from absentee children.14 Thosecategorisedas professional,echnicalor clericalwerein the service sectoras secretaries r teachers, or example,rather han n industry.In 1990-91, as in the late 1970s,copingthroughdiversifying ourcesofincome was crucial.Seventy-fivepercent of male andalmost80 percent offemale respondents twenty-oneout of twenty-eightand sixteen out oftwenty-one)said they had more than one source of income.15What ispotentially problematichere, in terms of the World Bank's policyprescriptions nd Ghana's ong-termplans for economicdevelopment, sthatthese sources of income, whetherregardedas primaryor secondary,were not drawn,in the main, from anythingthat could be glossed as a'formalsector', that is, from industriesand enterprisesestablished andexpandingas investmentopportunitiesn post-adjustmentGhana. This

13In 1976-77,when I firstworkedn the areaof workand abourmarkets, ut of a sampleof over 300interviewed, nlyoneworker, man,workedn a factory-which, at thetime,wasworkingat a tinyfractionof its capacity.Thesignificance f manufacturingroductionn theeconomydoes not seem to have increased ince then.14Detailsof thefiguresreferredo herecan be found nBrydonandLegge(1996),appendixII.15I suspect hat hesefiguresmayunder-representheproportions avingdiversesourcesofincome: n some caseswhatpeopleclaimedas theirmainoccupation iffered romtheirmainincomesource.

376

8/8/2019 1161213

13/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANAhardly its withpolicyoutlines.Theplansfor Ghana's conomicrecovery nthemedium o longterm('recoverywithgrowth', n theterminology f theWorld Bank) hinge upon the establishmentof formally accountingandaccountable nterprises roducing tradables'whichcan be sold abroad orhardcurrency.16The Nima respondents' ctualoccupationsand sources of income,withtheirfocuson informal-sectornterprises, oth artisanal ndtrade-oriented,is echoed by the rangeof jobs people felt were appropriateo men andwomen: what jobs were available and, more important,profitable.Inresponse o the question'Whatwork can womendo?', 52 percent of menand39 percent17 f womensaid thatwomencouldbe traders.Onlyabout20percent of men and 25 percent of womensuggested hat womenmightbeinvolved n clericalwork,white-collarobs or theprofessions.Responses othe question 'What work can men do?' showed a similar 'informal'emphasis.Men couldbe artisansaccordingo 55 percent of men and 81percent of women),farmers 38 per cent men and 24 per cent women)and'entrepreneurs'48 percent men and 19 percent women). (See below fordiscussionof 'entrepreneur'.)Onlytwo women(outof twenty-one)andno men at all (outof twenty-nine)mentionedactorywork n their nterviews,whether n relation o menor women. Neithermanufacturingr assemblingn 'modernm'18ettings,onthe one hand,norproductionortheexportmarket,on theother, eatures nthese Nimapeople's perceptions f the labourmarketas it is or as it mightbe.As we saw above,while the massive retrenchment f the publicsectorfrom the mid-1980s onwardswas meant to stimulatediversity in theeconomyandtoprovidea poolof skilled abour or newenterprisesaswellas to promoteefficiencyandaccountabilityn the state-owned nterprises),the resultantpoolof labour'has not been moppedup by locally groundedmanufacturingrby foreign-ownednterprises.norder o makeredundancypaymentsstretchor last in a still inflationaryclimate, and withoutanyexpansion n employmentopportunities,hose laid off fromthe mid-1980sonwardshave invested n theirown small-scaleenterprises:ither n buyingand selling or, if they had access to capital(eitherphysicalor human, ntermsof educatedchildren),have retreated nto the rentingor remittanceeconomy.This is whatmen andwomen n thesamples romNimahave doneand have deemedit appropriateo do. Men buy and sell a wide rangeofgoodswhile womentend to dealin raw or cooked food and drink.Thoseinthe Nimasurveyneitherworked n formal-sectorobs nor hadanyambitionto find formal-sectorwork. This findingis not in accordwith governmentpolicy,whichemphasisesnvestment n large-scaleproductive nterprises:

16Recent work s giving seriousreconsiderationo the scopeandevaluation f 'informal'sectorwork n Africa;see, for example,Meagher 1995).17 N = 29 and21, respectively, or theseand the succeeding igures.18 'Modem' in this context s used loosely to refer to enterprises sing motorisedand/orelectricallydriven ools andmachinery ndemploying ormallyqualifiedas well as unskilledpersonnel n terms n accordancewithprevailingabour egislationandon a regularbasis.

377

8/8/2019 1161213

14/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANAkey strategy n Ghana'sstructural djustment olicies is to promotewhatmaybe called 'systematicbusinessdevelopment' nd, n particular,o trytoattract nvestmentnto firmsfromboth the domesticand overseasmarkets.There s no successfulexportprocessingzone,19no mushroomingf worldmarket actories n Ghana.What new industrialdevelopment here has been since adjustment asbeen confinedto the rehabilitation f olderextractive ndustries gold andtimber in particular).For whateverreasons,major investors,local andoverseas,arefightingshyof putting heircapital ntoGhana,and theresult,since there is such limited domestic capital, is that people turn to theinformal ector, o whichtheycan have access withvery ittlecapitalorevenona creditbasis.Theinformal ector n turnhas becomeovercrowded,rofitmarginsarefalling/haveallen andpeoplehaveless income.Withtradeandcurrencyliberalisation, oo, some previously profitableinformal-sectoractivitieshave become redundant.One woman n the Nima survey samplehad made whatshe said was a significant ontributiono herincomeduringthe 1970sand 1980sby tradingn usednewspapers,magazinesandanyotherpaper, which she sold to traders to wrap their goods. Now, withliberalisation,polythene wrappersand bags are importedand ubiquitous,andpaper ends not to be used.

PERCEPTIONSOF ADJUSTMENTA generalquestionasked n the interviewsn 1990-91 was whatpeoplefeltthe differenceswerebetween henand1983(1983beingetchedon people'smemoriesas sucha badyear),but also before thebeginningof adjustmentandthepath o 'EconomicRecovery'.A common heme n thereplies o thisquestionwas the shortageof cash in the early 1990s. While this wasmentionedover and over again by both male and femalerespondents s aproblem, t was a situationwhich,on the whole,compared avourablywiththat n 1983:in 1983peoplemayhave hadmoneybut therewas nothing obuy-no localfoodstuffs,et aloneimportedoodor othergoods,as we sawabove.Typicalresponseswere the following:

That time hard,hungercame,butpeopletry andtightenbelt. Farmersry,noweverythings free ... borkor .. [MaleAlhaji n his 60s,prominentmember f hiscommunityandhouseowner]'Tightening belts' was a common metaphor for coping, often used bygovernment spokespeople, in the 1980s. Borkor is an Akan word in commonuse, meaning 'peaceful', 'calm', 'cool'.

19An EPZ was inauguratedin early 1996 but as yet it has not succeeded in attractinganylarge overseas investors in productive enterprises. There are tertiary enterprises (bottling,finishing, etc., for sale on the Ghanaian market), but there is no production for re-export orprofit-making.Ghana continues to rely on the productionand export of primary products (gold,timber, cocoa) for the bulk of its foreign earnings.

378

8/8/2019 1161213

15/21

ADJUSTMENTNURBANGHANA'Eighty-three,get money, not food. This time food there [but] no money.Governments trying,butthose whofollow themarespoiling t... [Male tinerantcobbler n his 30s, rentingandliving in one room]

And from a 52-year-oldwomanwho trades n maize and ownsa small bar:Now thingshave risenup: changeshave made t so that f today [something osts]fiftycedis, tomorrow, 00cedis. Pricesarerisingandthereare no sales.Drinkingis now scarce:[people]don't drinkas before.

Typically, those in a position of authorityand responsibilityin thecommunityendedto favour he government.People, they said,couldnowspeak their mind freely, with the implication hat under formerregimesfreedomof speechwascurtailed.20 owever,one local chief (of aBurkinabecommunitywithinNima),a painter nddecorator y trade,whohadrecentlybeenredeployed, aid:

Everybodyindseverythingdifficultbut thegovernment oesn'twantto saythat.Themoneyyoutaketo marketwon't reach.Theydon't wantus to talk that hingsare difficult. There's]no worknow ... theyarestoppingpeopleto work.Thievesdon't mindbeing caughtbecausetheyarehungry.Ingeneral, hese resultsreflectthefact thatpeople's perceptions f the stateof playin 1990-92 seem to dependon theirstatusandpersonal xperiences:the male community eader'sresponsewas positive (the first comment),while thecobbler,perhaps moretypicalNimaresident, awthat herewereproblemsbut wasunwilling-in public,anyway-to blamethegovernment.But the experienceof redeployment the last comment)outweighedthisreluctance o criticise.On the otherhand, an employee of the NationalCommission on Democracy gave a broaderoverview, but ended bypersonalisinghis answer,saying that the work of the NCD was vital to'conscientise'peoplebeforetheelections.Women'scomments ended o bemorepersonaland,while stressing he availability f food andgoodsin the1990s, consistentlyhighlightedshortagesof cash, tradeandjobs. As theinformal ectorbecomes morecrowded, o makinga living through radingbecomes more difficult. While male tradersmay have ambitionsto be'entrepreneurial'ndmetamorphosento 'businessmen',hoicesforwomenaremoreconstrained.Not onlyarewomenperceived argelyas 'traders' uttheyare alsoperceivedas tradersn a fairlyrestrictedangeof goods(raworcooked food and drink).Choices and opportunitiesor women to expandtheirenterprises re more restricted han thoseof men (BrydonandLegge,1996).

20 It wasonly oncethedecision o returno civilianrule had beenmade n theearly1990sthatcontrolof the news media was loosened and a plethoraof, usuallycritical, ndependentnewspapers ppeared n the streets.Theseempiricaldata were collectedbeforethe return ocivilian rule in 1992.

379

8/8/2019 1161213

16/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANATABLE . Percentage (n = 34) of people owning consumer durables

CommodityRefrigerator Television Radio

MenHave 47 (16) 68 (23) 91 (31)Have not 38 (13) 27 (9) 6 (2)Used to have 15 (5) 6 (2) 3 (1)WomenHave 44 (7) 44 (7) 69 (11)Have not 50 (8) 56 (9) 19 (3)Used to have 6 (1) 0 (0) 13 (2)

THE 'EFFECTS'OF ADJUSTMENTBut these statedperceptions of differences in life and living between the late1970s/early 1980s and the early 1990s are only partof the picture. Althoughthe Nima survey data indicate that male-headed households tend, overall, tobe relatively wealthier than female-headed households,21 there is someevidence that those in both male and female-headed households have beenadversely affected by adjustment, f we can take the incidence of those whoused to possess consumer goods such as refrigerators,televisions and radiosbut who now do not as an indication of 'economic decline' (Table 1).Although the figures are small, the stories explaining the 'decline' doindicate hardship.One man had sold his deep-freezer and refrigerator o payfor his children's education. Possession of refrigerators s interesting, sincethey seem to be the one consumer commodity that women possess in similarproportions to men. Elsewhere (Brydon and Legge, 1996) we have arguedthat this is probably because of the practical usefulness of refrigeratorstowomen in their businesses (most often selling, or preparingand selling, foodor drink).Three people, (two men and a woman) had once had a car but hadsold it to pay off debts when they ran into financial trouble. Five malerespondents still had functioning, but ageing, cars or commercial vehicles,and two had broken-down cars but could not afford to pay for repairs. Nowomen respondents currentlyowned a car.

21 If we takepossessionof arangeof utilitiesandconsumer oodsas an indicator f wealth.Basic utilities are morewidespreadn Accranow, but membersof male-headed ouseholdshavegreater ccess to them han hoseof female-headed ouseholds.However,hemajority fbothmaleandfemale-headedouseholdsn thesamplehadelectricityonly3 percent of maleand 13 percent of female-headed ouseholdsdid not),butonly one person n the sample,aman,hadtaps n the house.Fifty-twopercent of menand48 percent of womenhadstandpipesin theircompounds, ut 52 percent of womenandonly33 percent of men had to buywatereither romtankers r frompublicstandpipes.Concomitant ith this lackof watersupplies opeople'shouses,only 21 percent of men and10percentof womenhad accessto a workingw.c.: 57 percentof womenand31percent of menusedpublic pit) atrines, nd he remainderused bucket atrines.

380

8/8/2019 1161213

17/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANATheconstraints f the WorldBank have also meant hat socialsectors n

particularave felt the effects of adjustment,n thatcostrecoverymeasureshave been imposedin the health and educationsectors. With respecttohealth,otherauthorshave noted the declinein the use of medicalfacilitieswith the introductionof user charges for consultationsand medicines(Waddingtonand Enyimayew,1989). Respondentsn Nima in 1990-91pointedoutthatmedicineswere no longerfree andthathealthserviceswerenowexpensive.Buton theotherhand heyalsopointedout thatbothservicesand medicines were now available f they had the cash to pay for them.While in theoryhealthchargeswere absentor minimal n thelate 1970s andearly 1980s,therewereneithermedicinesnordressingswithwhich to treatpatients.Respondentsn Nima were asked aboutrecent illnesses amongthemselvesoramongmembers f theirhouseholds, ndtherewererelativelyfew responsesof 'No treatment'.nitiallywe assumed hatthiswasbecauseof the expense,but furtherquestioning evealed hat t wasbecauseof self-medication r anailment hatclearedup on its own account,rather hantheexpenserulingout treatment.What was morefrequently omplainedabout n Nimawas the way thathospitals unctioned,he 'culture'of hospitalcare.Whilepeople expected ohave to tip ('dash')hospitalstaff forbetterstandardsf care-this haslong,beforeadjustment,een a wayin whichhospitalworkers upplementedheirincomes-they complainedthat now they had to dash everyone, fromreceptionists, orters ndcleaners o nursesanddoctors, oranycareatall.22Nevertheless,wealthier and poorer members of the sample alike hadmanagedo havehospitalcare,onerelativelywell-offwomanby payingforherself(withher husband),andanother,poorer,womanthroughhavingawealthierbrother o pay for her. The ethos of extendedfamily supportsstrongand forms a continuitywith the past. It is common to note thathistorically,in West African contexts, 'wealth' was not necessarilyafunction of ownership of material goods, since differentiation andstratificationwere generallylimited, but was dependenton controloverpeople. The 'rich' were able to utilise the labour and services of a largekinship,affinalandclientagenetwork.Theconverse, henotion hatabsolutepoverty s tantamounto being withoutkin andwithoutpatronage,meant,transposedo those in the sample,that,althoughpeoplemightbe poor intermsof cash andmaterialgoods, if they hada wide networkof kin theywouldsomehowsurvive.23

22 This creative income earning does not cease with the care of the living. Mortuaryattendants make a steady living by charging relatives for adequate refrigeration of corpses.Funeralsareculturally extremely significant in southernGhana, and bodies tend to be stored inmortuaries until a suitably lavish funeral can be arranged. Occasionally, apparently, what iseventually buried bears little relation to the formerly living person if dashes to mortuarystaffare deemed inadequate.23 This reliance on kin differentiates sharply the material we collected from Nima (andelsewhere in Ghana) from the extremely detailed material on surviving adjustment fromEcuador presented by Moser (1992), for example.

381

8/8/2019 1161213

18/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANACONCLUSIONS: URVIVINGAND WINNING .. WITH ONLYA LITTLEBIT OF LUCK!

There is no doubt that people in Accra (Nima) are surviving adjustmentandhave developed or are developing strategies to cope with adjustment'seffects. Survival through the 1970s and into the 1980s provided a salientpractice ground, although the terms were different, for the economic shocksof adjustmentfrom 1983 onwards. But whether the stage is being set for thefuturedevelopment of the economy along lines reminiscent of an Asian tigereconomy in its heyday is a moot point.24 While people are somehowjuxtaposing means and ends in order to live amid the array of changingcircumstances adjustment has brought, a concerted strategy of developingthe production of primary (agriculturallybased) 'tradables' and a 'formal'manufacturing sector-key features in the World Bank's and the govern-ment's vision-is not apparent in Nima people's world views. People arestill opting for business andtrading, buying and selling on theirown account,as a tried and tested way of making their fortune. And strikingit lucky as anideal is still much in evidence: getting the break; clinching the deal.The dominant rhetoric from the purse-string holders of adjustment isphrased in strict econometric terms and has, as we have seen, made littleimpact at the grass-rootslevel. Nima visions, on the otherhand, accordbetterwith the emphasis on 'luck' singled out in the 1993 World Bank reportcitedearlier. Urban Ghanaians are hedging their bets, hoping for a break; goingafter economic success in ways that have been known to work in the past.And some voices in the World Bank seem to agree that this is more realistic.At any rate, it may be just as likely to promote economic growth as strictlyeconometric ploys.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSFieldwork n Ghanaover theyearssince 1973 hasbeen fundedby a seriesof generousgrantsfrom the followingbodies:the Wyse Fund(Universityof Cambridge),he SSRC(UK),theNuffieldFoundation,he BritishAcademy, heUniversity f Liverpool nd,mostrecently, heESRC(grantNo. R00023/1089). amextremelygrateful o all these bodies.

REFERENCESAdesina,Kola. 1996. 'A concerted nitiative or Africa',WestAfrica4120, 14-20October:1590-1.Armstrong, Robert. 1996. Ghana Country Assistance Review: a study indevelopment effectiveness. Washington DC: World Bank.Bromley, Ray, and Gerry, Chris (eds). 1979. Casual Work and Poverty in ThirdWorld Cities. Chichester: Wiley.Brydon,Lynne.1976. 'StatusAmbiguityn Amedzofe-Avatime: omenandmenina changing patrilineal society'. UnpublishedPh.D. thesis, University ofCambridge.-1977. Factors Affecting the Migration of Womenin Ghana. Report to the SSRC(in BritishLibrary).

24 Fordiscussionof Ghana's ecenteconomicprogressand futurepotential ee Armstrong(1996),also Adesina 1996).

382

8/8/2019 1161213

19/21

ADJUSTMENTNURBAN HANA-1979. 'Women at work: some changes in family structure n Amedzofe-Avatime',Africa49 (1), 97-111.-1985. 'Ghanaianesponses o theNigerianexpulsionsof 1983',AfricanAffairs84 (337), 561-85.-1987. 'Women in the family: cultural change in Avatime, 1900-80',Development and Change 18 (2), 251-70.- 1992. 'Ghanaianwomen in the migrationprocess', in Sylvia Chant (ed.),Womenand Migration in the ThirdWorld,pp. 91-108. London: Belhaven Press.- Unpublished. ieldnotes, 1973-74, 1976-77, 1979, 1983.-n.d. 'Disintegration nd Despair:Ghana, 1983'. Paper given at Centre ofAfricanStudiesseminar,Universityof Liverpool,November1983.Brydon,Lynne,andLegge, Karen.1994. 'Genderand Adjustment: ictures romGhana', in Gloria T. Emeagwali (ed.), Women Pay the Price: structuraladjustment in Africa and the Caribbean, pp. 63-87. Trenton NJ: Africa WorldPress.- 1996. Adjusting Society: the World Bank, the IMF and Ghana. London: I. B.Tauris.Chazan, Naomi. 1983. An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: managing politicalrecession.BoulderCO:WestviewPress.- 1991. 'The political transformation f Ghana underthe PNDC', in DonaldRothchild ed.), Ghana,pp. 21-48. BoulderCO and London:LynneRienner.Cornia,G. A., Jolly,Richard, ndStewart,Frances.1987.Adjustment itha HumanFace, two volumes.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Frimpong-Ansah,. H. 1991. TheVampireState in Africa.London:JamesCurrey.Ghana, Government of, 1987. Programme of Actions to Mitigate the Social Costs ofAdjustment.Accra: PAMSCAD.Ghana,Governmentof, and UNICEF. 1990. The Situation of Women and Children inGhana.Accra:UNICEF.Glewwe, Paul, and Twum-Baah, Kwaku A. 1991. The Distribution of Welfare inGhana,1987-88. LSMSWorkingPaper75. WashingtonDC:WorldBank.Guardian,The.1993. '"You've just got to be lucky,"sayWorldBankeconomists'(RuthKelly),30 December.Hutchful, Eboe (ed.). 1987. The IMF and Ghana: the confidential record. Londonand AtlanticHighlandsNJ:IFAA/ZedPress.Jeffries,Richard.1982.'Rawlingsand hepoliticaleconomyof underdevelopmentnGhana', African Affairs 81 (324), 4-22.Jeffries, Richard,and Thomas,Clare. 1993. 'The Ghanaianelections of 1992',

African Affairs 92 (368), 331-66.Loxley, John. 1988. Ghana: economic crisis and the long road to recovery. Ottawa:North-Southnstitute.Meagher,Kate. 1995. 'Crisis, nformalizationndthe urbannformal ector n sub-SaharanAfrica', Development and Change 26, 259-84.Moser, C. O. N. 1981. 'Surviving in the surburbios', Institute of DevelopmentalStudies Bulletin 12 (3), 19-25.- 1992. 'Adjustmentrombelow:low-incomewomen,time and thetriplerole inGuyaquil,Ecuador',n H. AfsharandC. Dennis(eds), Women ndAdjustmentPolicies in the Third World, pp. 87-116. Basingstoke: Macmillan.Mosley,Paul,Harrigan,ane,andToye,John eds). 1991.AidandPower:the WorldBank andpolicy-based lending, two volumes. London and New York:Routledge.Nugent,Paul. 1991. 'EducatingRawlings:the evolution of government trategytowardsmuggling', n Donald Rothchild ed.), Ghana,pp. 69-84. BoulderCOand London:LynneReinner.

383

8/8/2019 1161213

20/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANA-1995. Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: power, ideology and theburden of history, 1982-94. London and New York: Pinter.OtiBoateng,E., Ewusi,K., Kanbur,R., andMcKay,A. 1990. 'A PovertyProfile orGhana,1987-88'. SDA WorkingPaper5. WashingtonDC: WorldBank.Ray, Donald I. 1986. Ghana: politics, economics and society. London: Pinter;BoulderCO:LynneRienner.Rimmer, Douglas. 1992. Staying Poor: Ghana's political economy, 1950-90.Oxford:PergamonPress.- 1994. 'Backgroundo Structural djustment'.Unpublished aper,Symposiumon Ghana,Centreof West AfricanStudies,Universityof Birmingham, 3-14December.

Rothchild, Donald (ed.). 1991. Ghana: the political economy of recovery. BoulderCO andLondon:LynneRienner.Soto, Hernando de. 1989. The Other Path: the invisible revolution in the ThirdWorld.New York:Harper& Row.Toye,John. 1991. 'Ghana',n PaulMosley,JaneHarrigan ndJohnToye(eds),Aidand Power: the World Bank and policy-based lending, two volumes, pp.150-200. Londonand New York:Routledge.Waddington,C. J., andEnyimayew,K. A. 1989. 'A priceto pay:theimpactof usercharges in Ashanti-Akim District, Ghana', International Journal of HealthPlanning and Management 4, 17-47.

ABSTRACTUsing largelyanecdotal vidence romfieldnotes,thearticle racesGhana's ormaleconomicdeclinethroughhe 1970s.Perceptions f striving orsurvivaland successare sketchedout duringthis overwhelminglypessimisticperiod.Therefollows adescriptionof people's views aboutsurvivaland 'the state of play' in Ghana'seconomicprogressn the late 1980s andearly1990s.Thesediscursive omments refollowedby some simplequantitativematerialaboutwork,the availabilityof jobsandthe structuref thelabourmarket t the time. Whatbecomesobvious,giventhatGhanaians reactuallycontinuingheir ives much as theyhavein thepast,is thatthe IMF'sandWorldBank'spolicyprescriptionsndstrategiesor thedevelopmentof manufacturingndustry,for attracting he 'world market factories' of themultinationals, re not being achieved.Instead,Ghanaianshave focused(as theyalwayshave)on strategiesornetworking ndgettinga break: trikingt 'lucky', nfact. The relatively newly discovered volatile element in the World Bank'scalculationshas long been a (if not the) core factor in the plans of many smallenterprises.MeanwhileGhanaians retrying,hoping orsome 'luck',to surviveandeven prospernto the nextmillennium.

RI8SUMtCetarticle,quis'appuieprincipalementurdesobservations necdotiquesecueilliessur e terrain, etrace e declineconomiqueduGhanadans es annees70. Il decrit esperceptionsde luttepourla survieet le succes durant etteperiodeexcessivementpessimiste. Ipoursuit n decrivante pointde vue de certains ur a notionde survieet l'etatduprogreseconomiquedu Ghanavers la fin des annees80 et le debutdesannees 90. Ces commentairesdiscursifs font ensuite place a des donneesquantitativesimplesrelativesau travail,a l'acces a l'emploi et a la structure umarchedu travaila cetteepoque. Ien ressort, ompte enudu faitqueles Ghaneenscontinuent vivrecommedansle passe,que les recommandationst les strategiespolitiquesdu FMI et de la BanqueMondialeen faveur du developpementde

384

8/8/2019 1161213

21/21

ADJUSTMENT N URBAN GHANA 385l'industriemanufacturiere,isant a encourageres multinationales s'implanter,n'ontpas produites resultats scompt6s.Au lieu de cela, les Ghaneens nt favorise(commeils l'ont toujours ait) des strategiesbasees sur les contacts et la bonnefortune : miser sur la chance en somme. L'element volatile d6couvert assezrecemmentdans les calculs de la BanqueMondialeest depuis longtempsun desfacteurs fondamentauxvoire le seul) au sein des projetsde nombreusespetitesentreprises. endant e temps, es Ghaneens 'efforcentde survivrevoire meme deprosperer 1'aubedunouveaumillenaire, n esperantquela chanceva leur sourire.