10. FREDERKING, Brian. Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security.pdf

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Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security

Author(s): Brian FrederkingReviewed work(s):Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 363-378Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117614 .

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AmericanPolitical cienceReview Vol.97,No. 3 August2003

Constructing P o s t - C o l d W a r C o l l e c t i v e S e c u r i t yBRIAN FREDERKING McKendree Collegeeptember11 did not fundamentally hangeworldpolitics.Instead, t exacerbated lreadyex-isting tensions about how to implementpost-cold war collectivesecurityrules. Using a rule-oriented constructivist heory of global security,I argue that the dominantpost-cold warglobal securitytrendis the gradualconstructionof collectivesecurityrules, includingrulespun-ishinghumanrightsabuses, terrorism,and proliferationof weaponsof mass destruction.Usinganinterpretivemethod called dialogicalanalysis,I analyze the debateabout intervention n Kosovoand argue that the recentconflictover interventionn Iraq revolves around similarclaims abouthow to implementcollectivesecurityrules. This analysis challengesarguments hat September11usheredin a new era of worldpolitics that necessarily ustifiesmore aggressive,preemptive U.S.policies.

id September1fundamentallyhangeworldpolitics?1Theglobalriftover the United Statesinvasion of Iraqhinges on this question.TheUnited States' "waron terrorism" resumes hatnewthreats from terroristgroups and weapons of massdestructionhave transformed he internationalsys-tem. Advocates of militaryinterventionin Iraq ar-gue that this fundamentallychangedworldjustifiesmore aggressive,even preemptivepolicies.Criticsofthe United States invasion of Iraq, however, arguethat existing collective securityrules are still appli-cable even after the events of September11. Theypreferan international ystemwhere the use of forceis justified only by explicit SecurityCouncil autho-rization or traditionalstandardsof self-defense,nei-ther of which applies to the U.S. intervention inIraq.Healingthis riftwithin he international ommu-nity willrequireeventualagreementabout the extentto which September11 changedthe rules of globalsecurity.I argue that September11 did not fundamentallychangeworldpolitics.Using a rule-oriented onstruc-tivist approach,I argue that the dominanttrend ofthe post-coldwar world is the gradual nstitutional-ization of global collective securityrules.As in ear-lier strugglesto punishstates violatinghumanrightsrules, the internationalcommunity s now strugglingto punish both states and ruthless nonstate actorsthat violate terrorism ndweaponsproliferation ules.The pre-September11 debate about intervening nYugoslaviaover human rights abuses in Kosovo isstunninglysimilarto the post-September11 debatesabout the use of militaryforce in Iraq. This analy-sis suggeststhatSeptember11 did not fundamentallychangethe rulesgoverningglobalsecurity;nstead,itexacerbated lreadyexisting ensionsabouttheappro-priateimplementationof fledglingcollective securityrules.

To analyzethe Kosovo debate I use an interpretivemethodcalleddialogicalanalysis(Duffy, Frederking,and Tucker1998;Frederking2000). Dialogical anal-ysis builds on approaches hat take the constitutivenatureof languageseriously, ncludingWittgenstein's(1968) latter philosophy of language, Habermas'(1984,1987)notionof communicative ationality, ndthe speech act theories of Austin (1962) and Searle(1969). Dialogical analysis models a linguisticcon-ception of social interactioncapable of illustratingconstructivistarguments. t assumesthe existenceofconstitutive ocialrulesandcommunicativelyationalagentsconstructinghose socialrulesthrough heper-formanceof speechacts.Thedevelopmentof interpre-tive methods ikedialogicalanalysis s importantf weare to move beyondepistemologicaldebatesbetweenadvocatesof Science and advocatesof Anti-Science.Interpretivemethodscapableof yieldingtheoreticaland practicalinsights can show both the positivistdefenders of Science and the postmoderndefendersof Anti-Science that one can accept the philosophi-cal critiquesof positivismand still engage in rigor-ous, replicableempiricalresearch in the pursuitofknowledge.I buildon Onuf'srule-oriented onstructivismo of-fer a tentativerule-orientedconstructivist heory ofglobal security.Onuf(1989)argues hatagentsareem-bedded in "social arrangements" f intersubjectiverules.I positfoursocialarrangementsonstitutinghesecurity tructures fworldpolitics:war,rivalry, ollec-tive security,andsecuritycommunities.Thedominantpost-coldwar rend smovementaway romcold warri-valryrulesand(slowly) oward ollectivesecurity ules.This trendis complicatedbecause some rules in thesesocial arrangements verlap.Forexample,the use offorceis acceptable n war,rivalry, ndcollectivesecu-rityarrangements. ow others nterpretheuse offorcewilldependon a dialogicconsensusaboutwhichsocialarrangement overnsthe interaction.If others inter-pretforceto invoke rulesof war, hentheywill dismissclaimsthatcollectivesecurityrulesapply. arguethata rule-orientedconstructivistemphasison languageand rulesshows the debatesover Kosovo andIraqtohave tremendoussimilarities, astingdoubt on argu-ments hatSeptember11fundamentally hangedworldpolitics.

Brian Frederking is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Sci-ence, McKendree College, 701 College Road, Lebanon, IL 62254-1299 ([email protected]).I would like to thank Karin Fierke, Yale Ferguson, Gavan Duffy,and David Ahola for comments on earlier drafts, as well as MaximoSanchez Pagano for research assistance. Any errors are my own.1 The final draft of this paper was written in April during the begin-ning of the war in Iraq.

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ConstructingPost-ColdWarCollective Security August2003

CONSTRUCTIVISMConstructivism2 merged in the 1990s as interna-tionalrelations cholars ealized hat thedominantap-proachesof neorealism and neoliberalismcould notexplaintransformative vents like the end of the coldwar. Constructivismasserts the existence of socialstructures-includingnorms,beliefs,and identities--constitutingworldpolitics.All constructivistsn somewayassertthe importanceof whatSearle calls"socialfacts": acts that exist becauseall the relevantactorsagree theyexist. Social acts ikesovereignty, roperty,humanrights,andcollectivesecurityareforconstruc-tivists the stuff of worldpolitics,and humanagencyconstructs hose social facts (Berger and Luckmann1966;Searle1995).Within internationalrelations, constructivismre-semblesEnglishschool arguments hat the state sys-tem is embeddedin a larger society in whichstatesagreeto certainrules andinstitutions e.g.,Bull 1977).However, eadingconstructivists ite many nfluences.Wendt (1999) cites Mead's symbolic interactionismand Bhaskar's scientific realism. Onuf (1989) citesWittgenstein'satterphilosophyoflanguage,Giddens'sstructurationism,Habermas'theory of communica-tive action,and Searle'sspeech act theory. Campbell(1992)citesthepostmodern rguments f FoucaultandDerrida. Ruggie (1998) cites Durkheim's studies ofthe collective conscience and Weber's methods ofverstehen.All emphasize he constitutivenatureof lan-guage.Languagenot only represents he world but inmanywayscreates the worldby makingactionpossi-ble. Languages not a neutralmedium hroughwhichwe studytheworld; anguages itself action.Construc-tivismis thus part of the postpositivist"sociologicalturn" Guzzini2000)or "linguisticurn" Palan2000)in the social sciences.Constructivistsssert hree commonontologicalpo-sitions(FinnemoreandSikkink2001;Kubalkova 001;Wendt1999).First,social factorsprimarilynfluencehuman nteraction.Constructivism pposesmaterial-ist ontologyassertingmaterial tructures,ike the bal-anceof powerin neorealismor markets n neoliberal-ism.Constructivistsrgue hatmaterial tructures avemeaning or humanagents only withinthe context ofsocial rules. Forexample,a state'smilitarycapabilityhas differentmeaningsdependingon whether it be-longsto an allyor an enemy.Second,social structureshelpconstitute he interestsand dentitiesof purposiveactors. Constructivismopposes individualistontologiesthat explain social outcomes as the aggregate resultof individual decisions. Human agency is enmeshed ina web of social rules that both constitute and regu-late agency.Third,agents and structures construct eachother. Rules make agents and agents make rules. The(social) world is made by people, who in turn are madeby that (social) world.Most categorizations of constructivist argumentsare epistemological. For example, Hopf (1998) distin-

guishes between conventionaland critical construc-tivists.Conventional onstructivists dhere o standardpositivistcausaltheorizing,usingnorms and ideas asindependentvariables hatcauseaction(Katzenstein1996;Wendt1999). Criticalconstructivists, owever,rejectpositivist pistemologyandmethodsandthepos-sibilityof objectiveknowledge Campbell1992).Theirgoalis to demystify hediscursive ractices hatconsti-tute socialrules n orderto fosterchange.Manyconstructivists o not considerthemselves neither of thesecamps.Adler(1997)andRuggie(1998)arguethat constructivism ffers an importantmiddlegroundbetween positivismand postmodernism. n-deed,Onuf(2002,126) ntroduced onstructivismoin-ternational elations o stakeoutsuchamiddleground:This hirdwayholds hatontology s thekey.... Construct-ivismchallengeshepositivist iewthat anguageervesonly to represent he world as it is. Languagealso servesa constitutiveunction. yspeaking, e make he worldwhat tis .... Nevertheless,onstructivismsnotpostmod-ernbecause t accepts,asapracticalmatter, heEnlighten-ment belief in the possibilityof sharedknowledgeabouttheworldwelive n.Manyconstructivists orkwithin hismiddleground,usinga wide varietyof methodsto analyzethe socialworld (Fierke2001). Crawford 2002) uses linguisticmethodssimilarto the dialogical analysispresentedhere to analyze the ethical arguments challengingcolonialism.Hopf (2002) uses a phenomenologicalapproachof inductively analyzingtexts to recoveridentities nfluencing ovietandRussian oreignpolicy.Mattern 2001) analyzes"friendship"arrative trate-gies in the Western ecuritycommunity.Fierke(2000)conceptualizes ocial interactionas a dialogueto an-alyze the interaction between Iraq and the UnitedNations (UN) in the 1990s.Doty (1993) uses a "dis-cursivepractices" pproach o analyzeU.S.counterin-surgencypolicy n thePhilippines.Othersnotexplicitlywithinconstructivismlso build suchmethods, nclud-ingconversationanalysis Fetzer2000)and eventdataanalysis Duffy 1994). Dialogical analysis, he methodused in this article, s also intendedto be withinthismiddleground.Anotherway to categorizeconstructivisms to fo-cuson ontology,emphasizinghe typeof socialrule-beliefs, norms,or identities-constructivistsarguein-fluences worldpolitics.Beliefs, norms,and identities

are all types of rules that constitute the social struc-ture of world politics. This categorization is consistentwith Habermas' arguments (discussed in more detailbelow) for the existence of three fundamental validityclaims: truth, appropriateness,and sincerity.Each typeof constructivistargument emphasizes one of those fun-damental validity claims. Beliefs are social rules thatprimarilymake truth claims about the world. To criti-cize a belief is to say that it is untrue. Norms are socialrules that primarilymake appropriatenessclaims aboutrelationships. To criticize a norm is to say that it is in-appropriate. Identities are social rules that primarilymake sincerity claims about agents. To criticize a con-veyed identity is to say that it is insincere.2 For more comprehensive surveys see Checkel 1998, Farrell 2002,Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, and Hopf 1998.

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AmericanPolitical cienceReview Vol.97,No.3One type of constructivistargument emphasizestruth validityclaims by studyingthe importanceofbeliefs, or ideas, in world politics. Beliefs are sharedunderstandingsof the world. For example, Adler(1992) argues that "epistemiccommunities"createshared nterpretationshat frameandstructurehumanpractices.Bukovansky 2001) analyzeshow the ideaschampionedby the Americanand Frenchrevolutionsinfluenceworldpolitics.Otherexamples ncludehoweconomic ideas influence economic policy making(Jacobsen1995)andThirdWorlddevelopmentpolicies(Sikkink1991).A second ypeofconstructivistrgument mphasizesthe appropriateness alidityclaimby studying he im-portanceof norms n worldpolitics.Norms aresharedunderstandingsf appropriate ction.Normsguideac-tion and makeactionpossible,enablingagentsto crit-icize assertionsandjustifyactions.Finnemore(1996)argues hatstates often follow a "logicof appropriate-ness"and adhereto existingnorms.Kratochwil1989)demonstratedhow normsarisein rationalistenviron-

ments to enable and guide action. Keck and Sikkink(1998)andRisse,Ropp,andSikkink 1999)show theconditionsunderwhich "transnational dvocacynet-works"diffusehumanrightsandenvironmental ormsand nfluencedomestic nstitutional hanges.Otherex-amples nclude he role of norms n the collapseof thecold war (Kratochwiland Koslowski1994)and sanc-tionsagainstSouthAfrica(Klotz 1995).A thirdtype of constructivist rgumentemphasizesthe sincerityvalidityclaimbystudying he importanceof identityin worldpolitics.Identities ell agentswhothey are and who others are; they enable agents tomake the actions of themselvesand others intelligi-ble. Constructivists rgue that interests stem from aparticular, onstructedrepresentation f the relation-shipbetween self andother.Wendt(1995) argues hat500 Britishnuclearweaponsareless threateningo theUnited States han iveNorthKoreannuclearweapons.A social conceptof structureexplainsthis,but a ma-terial concept of structure cannot. Other examplesinclude the role of a liberal democraticidentity inthe NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganizationRisse-Kappen1997), the role of Arab nationalism n Middle Eastalliances (Barnett 1995), and the role of a friend-ship identity duringthe Suez Canal Crisis(Mattern2001).Manyconstructivistsocus on the interconnectionsamong ideas, norms,and/or identities. For example,Price andTannewald 1996)arguethatthe reproduc-tion of norms is inseparable romthe constructionofidentity:"Civilized" tatesadhereto chemicaland nu-clearweaponsnormsbecauseonly"barbaric"tatesvi-olate thosenorms.Crawford2002) explicitlyanalyzesall three validityclaims in her analysisof how ethi-cal argumentationnfluenceddecolonization.Weldes(1999)also analyzesall threevalidityclaims and howthey influenced U.S. national interests in the CubanMissile Crisis.Viewed throughHabermas,construc-tivistsillustratehow agentsconveying validityclaimsof truth,appropriateness, nd sincerityconstruct herulesgoverningworldpolitics.

The rule-oriented onstructivist pproachpresentedhere also includes all three constructivist rguments.Social arrangementsncludeall three types of rules:beliefs,norms,and identities.Globalsecurityarrange-ments include beliefs about the world (e.g., the na-tureof security),normsaboutsocialrelationships e.g.,the appropriateness f the use of force), and identi-ties about self and other (e.g., enemy,rival, citizen,or friend). Finally,dialogicalanalysis llustrates hesethree argumentsby analyzing he validityclaimsandcounterclaimsof the speech acts performedby com-municatively ationalagents.

RULE-ORIENTEDONSTRUCTIVISMRule-orientedconstructivistsmake two fundamentalclaims (Kubalkova2001;Onuf 1989,1998).First,so-cialarrangements,r stablepatternsof rules,makeupthe structuresof world politics.Social arrangementsare constitutive theytell us whatis possible)andreg-ulative (they tell us what to do). Worldpolitics is acomplexset of interdependent ndoverlapping ocialarrangements. ulesconstituteandregulateallaspectsof worldpolitics-even "anarchy"s a constitutive o-cial arrangement.Rules makeit possiblefor agentstoact:Theytell us how theworldworks,Theytell uswhoweareandwho othersare, heytell us which ocialgoalsare appropriate, nd they tell us what we shoulddo.Rules,likelanguage, re not reducible o themeaningsthatindividuals ttach o them; heyexistin thesharedmeaningsof their users and are reproduced hroughtheir practices(Guzzini2000). And, as Onuf (1989)argues,rulescreate ruleby inherentlyprovidingmorebenefitsandprivileges o somemore thanothers.Beliefs,norms,and dentitiesaretypesof socialrulesthat constitute andregulateworldpolitics.For exam-ple,beliefsaboutwhethersecurity s basedon militarycapabilityorpoliticalrelationships elp constitute herangeof possiblearmscontrolpracticesandinfluenceparticular rms ontrolnegotiations Frederking000).Normsabout the appropriatenessf weaponsof massdestructionhelp constitutethe rangeof possiblewar-fightinganddeterrencepracticesandinfluencepartic-ularwaranddeterrencepolicies(PriceandTannewald1996).Identitiesaboutracial uperiority elpconstitutethe rangeof possiblecolonialpracticesandinfluenceparticular ecolonizationpoliciesand evenhumanitar-ian interventions Crawford2002). For rule-orientedconstructivistshese rulesexplainworldpolitics.Onuf'sconcept of rules is based on Wittgenstein's(1968)critiqueof the mirror heoryof language,whichholds thatlanguage s meaningful o the extent that itaccuratelyrepresents he real world.Wittgensteinar-guedthat hemeaningof aterm s connected o itsuseinspeech,not whether t corresponds xactlyto things nthe realworld.Meaningresides n the everydayuse oflanguageas a "formof life";thatis,by context and/orconvention.Sharedbackgroundknowledgeis neces-sary to interpretlanguage.Wittgensteinargues thatlearninga languages likelearning he rules of a game;theyhelpyou"goon"byacting nways hatmakesense

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giventhe rules of the game.Forexample, he rulesofchessenableonetoparticipaten or to interpret chessgame.This also appliesto the rulesof globalsecurity.HollisandSmith 1991,179)putWittgenstein'sositionthisway:"Socialaction can occuronly whenthere s arulefollowed,thus identifyingwhat is going on" (myemphasis).The task for rule-orientedconstructivists,then,is to explicatea rangeof socialarrangementsndshow how the rules within these socialarrangementsmakeaction ntelligible.Thesecondrule-oriented onstructivist laim s thatcommunicativelyationalagentsusespeechacts ocon-struct ocial rules.Thisclaimbuildson bothspeechacttheoryand Habermas'notion of communicativeatio-nality.Speechact theory beginswith Austin's(1962)demonstrationhatmanyverbalstatementsconstitutesocial action. For example, saying "I do" in a mar-riageceremony s a meaningful ocial act because t in-vokessocialrulesof the institutionofmarriage. peechact theory arguesthat language s action;speechacts(promising, eclaring, pologizing, tc.)are bothplen-tifuland central o social ife. Searle(1995) argues hata touchdowncreatessix pointsand a promisecreatesanobligationbecauseboth are"social acts"based onthe constitutiverulesof footballandpromising.Onufuses speechact theoryto buildhis rule-oriented on-structivism.Kubalkova2001,64) argues,

Onuf'smostmportantontributiono constructivismshissystematic ffort o show thatrulesderive rom,work ike,anddependon speechacts,andthat languageand rulestogether(they can never be separated)are the mediumthroughwhichagentsandstructuresmaybe saidto consti-tuteeachother.... Tostudy nternationalelations, ranyotheraspectof humanexistence, s tostudy anguageandrules.myemphasis)Onufusesthreetypesofspeechactstoanalyzeworldpolitics:assertions, irectives, ndcommitments. hesespeech acts invoke and/orchallengesocial rules thathave the form of speech acts. For example,assertionrulesconveyknowledgeaboutthe world.Liberalism,neoclassicaleconomics,andneorealism, or example,all includeassertionsabout worldpolitics.Repeatedandunchallengedassertions ike "democratic overn-mentsdo not go to war with one another,""freetrademaximizes conomicefficiency,"nd"unipolar ystemsare less stable thanbipolarsystems"both enableandjustifydemocratization olicies, radeagreements, ndarms shipments. Directive rules tell us what we mustor should do and often include consequences for dis-regarding them. Examples of speech acts invoking di-rective rules include the use of force, trade sanctions,and International Monetary Fund structural adjust-ment programs. Commitmentrules are promises to actin a particular way. Examples of speech acts invokingcommitment rules are treaties, contracts, and interna-tional trade.Habermas' notion of communicative rationalitybuildson speech act theory.Habermas arguesthat com-municatively rational agents perform speech acts, con-vey validity claims, interpret and evaluate the claimsof others, and act on the basis of mutually recognized

validityclaims.Rationalityrefers to linguisticcompe-tence;a rationalacteffectivelyconveysvalidityclaimsand invokessocial rules so that otherscorrectly nter-pretthespeechact. Thisdialogicprocessof agentscon-veyingandevaluatinghevalidity laimsof eachother'sspeech acts constructsand reconstructs ocial rules.Rule-oriented constructivists ely on Habermas be-causeonlycommunicativelyationalactors an achievethe interpretiveaccomplishmentsscribed o thembyconstructivist rguments.Habermas argues that communicativelyrationalspeechactsconvey implicitvalidityclaimsof truth,ap-propriateness, ndsincerity.3Consider he threetypesof speechactsemphasizedby Onuf.An assertion X)conveysa truth claim(X is true),an appropriatenessclaim(It is rightthatI assertX), and a sincerityclaim(I believeX istrue).A directive Youmust do X) con-veysa truthclaim(Youcan do X), anappropriatenessclaim(It is rightthatI directyou to do X), and a sin-cerityclaim(I wantyou to do X). And a commitment(I promise o doX) conveysa truthclaim(I candoX),anappropriatenesslaim Itisright hatIpromise o doX), and a sincerity laim(I wantto do X). Othersmayacceptor challengethe validityclaimson the basisofreasons,requiring "momentof insight" o justify heclaim that goes beyond strategicrationality.All com-petent speakers ntuitivelyknowhowto test claimsandjudgewhethercertainclaimsare warranted.The bind-ingforceof languagecomes from others'ability o say"yes"or "no" o the validityclaims.Whenactorsagreeto thevalidityclaimsof a speechact,thebindingeffectof languagemotivates hem to coordinatesubsequentactionswith the speaker.4Focusingon the validityclaimsof speech acts en-ables constructivists o analyze the process throughwhich speech acts construct and/orchallengesocialrules. When one performsa speech act and conveysthe threevalidityclaims,anothercan eitheracceptallthree claimsorchallengeone (orall) of the claims.Forexample,supposethata teacher assertsthe followingto her class:"TheUnited StatesCivilWaroccurred nthe 1900s."Theclassmaynot challenge he speechactandadd tto theirnotes(!).Or theclasscouldchallengethe sincerityclaim:The teacherwanted to see if theywerepayingattention.Or theclasscouldchallenge hetruthclaim:The CivilWarwasnotfought n the 1900s.Or theclasscouldchallenge heappropriatenesslaim:3 A fourth validity claim of speech acts studied by linguists, but lessuseful for dialogic analysis, is "grammaticality."4 Rule-oriented constructivism does not assume that Habermas' no-tion of communicative action within an ideal speech situation charac-terizes world politics. For Habermas, communicative action is actionoriented toward mutual understandingand coordinated by a consen-sus on all validity claims. Risse (2000) analyzes whether Habermas'conditions for communicative action (lack of power relations, non-coerced consensus, etc.) resemble interactions in world politics.I do not assert the existence of communicative action in this sense.The Kosovo debate does not illustrate communicative action; theclaims about whether intervention is consistent with existing securityrules are constantly disputed. What is important, though, is that theagents invoke collective securityrulesto justify their acts.Their actionis meaningful only within the context of (albeit disputed) collectivesecurity rules.

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AmericanPolitical cienceReview Vol.97,No.3Teachers hould not lie to their students. n each casethestudentsconstructand/orchallenge he rulesof thestudent-teacher ocialarrangement.The samepossibilities tructurepolitical nteraction.Supposethat one countrydirectsanother to destroyitsweaponsof massdestructionwithinsix months.Theothercountry ouldaccept hevalidityclaimsandcom-ply,challenge hesincerity laim(youwantapretext oinvade),challengethe normativerightnessclaim(it isnotappropriateoryouto determineourmilitary apa-bilities),or challengethe truthclaim(we cannotcom-pletelydisarmwithinsixmonths).This view of agencyputs languageat the heartof social ife by emphasizingargumentation, search for reasonedconsensus,andthe constitutiveeffects of an argumentativeonsensuson agents.Using speech act theory and communicative atio-nalityto inform a conceptionof social interaction n-ables analyststo treat physical,nonverbal acts as iftheywerespeechacts.Ofcourse,somethingunspokenis not literallya speech act. However,nonverbalactsare oftencommunicatively ational-they make valid-ity claims and invoke and/orchallengesocialrules--and are thus analyzableas speech acts. The use offorceisanextremely mportant xampleof such a non-verbal,yet communicatively ational,act. How com-municativelyrationalagents justifyand interpret heuse of force is centralto the ongoingconstructionofglobalsecurityrules.As theanalysisbelowshows,howthe worldinterpreted he NATO bombing campaignin Kosovo is centralto that interaction,as is how theworld nterprets he use of forcein Iraq.Treatingnon-verbalbutcommunicative cts as speechactsmakesawidevarietyof social nteraction menable odialogicalanalysis.For example,duringthe cold warthe superpowersunderstood ach other'smissiledeploymentso invokethe deterrencerulesconstituting he cold warrivalry(Frederking 000).Missiledeployments reintelligibleonlyif they operatedasspeechacts withina particularsocialarrangement.Missiledeploymentsdo not neces-sarily nvokedeterrencerules; heycould, orexample,alter the strategicbalance or expanda sphereof in-fluence.Indeed,the superpowers riticizedall missiledeployments nterpreted o invoke these latter rules.A missile deploymentis understood as a deterrentonly when all agreethat a certainset of linguisticallyconstructed ulesgoverntheir interaction. n thiswayspeechacts,bothverbalandnonverbal, reconstitutiveelementsof socialreality,and inguisticallyonstructedrules provide meaningto both verbal and nonverbalspeechacts.Rule-orientedconstructivism akes the constitutivenature of languageand communicativeagency seri-ously.Rule-oriented onstructivists nalyze he sharedcontext that makessocial actionpossibleandmeaning-ful. Wemake sense of actionwhen there is coherencebetween the actions of agents (speech acts) and themeaningof their situation(existingsocial rules). In-terpretiveapproaches ike dialogical analysisexplainin terms of intelligibility, ot "expectability" Dessler1999). Toexplain an act is to specify the rule(s) an agent

isfollowing.Rule-oriented onstructivism oes not as-sume,aspositivistcausalargumentsdo, thatlanguageis a mirrorand we compareour statementsabouttheworld with the world to see whethertheycorrespond.As KratochwilandRuggie(1986)argue, n construc-tivistontology anguageconstitutes ocialinteractions,while in positivistepistemology anguageis indepen-dent of social nteractions.Constructivists hoespousepositivism gnore the epistemological mplicationsoftheirontologicalarguments Kratochwil 000).

A RULE-ORIENTEDONSTRUCTIVISTTHEORYOF GLOBALSECURITYConstructivisms an ontologyasserting he existenceof social rules;it cannot tell us the content of thoserules. This is an empiricalquestion, and construc-tivists must demonstrate hat their theoreticalasser-tions about socialrulescoherewiththe speechactsofreal-worldagents.This section is a firstcut at a rule-orientedconstructivistheoryof globalsecurity.Manyimportant ocialarrangements lsoconstitutingworldpolitics-capitalism,globalization, ostcolonialism,n-ternationalaw,andso on-fall outside hescopeof thistheorybut are amenable to a rule-orientedconstruc-tivist analysis.The influence of other social arrange-ments (e.g.,the positionof Russia n the internationaleconomy,domesticpolitics) nthedisputeoverKosovoalsofalls outside the scopeof thisanalysis.Wars, ivalries, ollectivesecurity, ndsecuritycom-munitiesare the "formof life"(Wittgenstein)or "life-world" Habermas)or "social acts" Searle)of globalsecurity.These social arrangements onstituteglobalsecurityin the way that the rules of chess constitutechess; participantsuse them to "go on" and act inintelligibleways.Sometimes one social arrangementis more institutionalized han the others;sometimesthe social arrangements re contested and fluid;andsometimes social arrangements re more institution-alized in differentgeographicareas (e.g., war in theMiddleEast, rivalry n South Asia, securitycommu-nity in Europe).The operationof overlapping ocialarrangementsonstitutingglobal security s similar oFierke's(n.d.) argument hat opposing"logics"maycoexist withinahistorical ontext.Whatconstitutes a-tional actiondependson whichlogic is governing heparticularnteraction.

A firstcut atstating deal-typical ules n thesesocialarrangementss in Table1. Each social arrangementhassix fundamental ules that constituteandregulateaction: 1) identity, 2) autonomy, 3) the natureof se-curity, 4) deterrence, 5) enforcement,and(6) the useof force.Theidentityrule establishesagent dentitiesasenemies,rivals, itizens,or friends.Theautonomyruleestablishes he extent to which the autonomyof bothstate and nonstateagentsis either threatenedby oth-ers or limitedbymutualobligations.Thesecurityruleestablishes he belief thatsecurity s acquiredbyeitherrelativemilitary apability rfriendlypolitical elation-ships.The deterrencerule establishesa dominantnor-mativeexpectationeitherto recognizethe autonomy367


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ConstructingPost-Cold WarCollective Security August2003

TABLE . GlobalSecuritySocial ArrangementsWar Rivalry CollectiveSecurity SecurityCommunityRule1-Identity We are enemies We are rivals Weare fellowcitizens Weare friendsRule2-Autonomy Wedo notrecognize Werecognizethe Autonomys limitedby Autonomys limitedbythe autonomyof autonomyof obligations o follow obligations o followothers others andenforce the the community'scommunity'sules rulesRule3-Security Survival s based on Security s based Security s based on Security s basedrelative alliance) on relative a multilateral on politicalmilitaryapability (alliance)military commitment o use relationshipscapability military apabilityRule4-Deterrence Youmustsurrender Do notattackme Do notbreak he rules Do notbreak he rulesof ourcommunity of ourcommunityRule5-Enforcement Wewillattackuntil We willretaliate f We willretaliate fyou We willresolveyou surrender youviolateour break he rules of conflictspeacefullysovereignty ourcommunityRule 6-Use of force The use of forceis The use of forceis The use of force is The use of force is notalways necessary sometimes sometimes acceptableto resolve conflicts necessary necessary

of others or to follow the rules of the community. Theenforcement rule establishes the ultimate method ofresolving conflict. The use of force rule establishes theextent to which force is required to resolve conflict.Variations of these rules constitute the ideal-typical so-cial arrangementsof war,rivalry,collective security andsecurity communities.These rules are not intended to be a priori asser-tions of social reality. They comprise a tentative rule-oriented constructivist theory of global security. Theymay not cohere with future empirical research andhave to be abandoned. But they are a recognizable,plausible place to start. The contents of the rules areculled from major scholars of international politics, in-cluding Alker's (1996, 370) work on security systems,Onuf's (1989) "mutual insecurity system," Schelling's(1960) theories of deterrence and arms agreements,and Deutsch's (1957) work on security communi-ties. Wendt's (1999) three cultures of world politics-Hobbesian war, Lockean rivalry,and Kantian securitycommunities-heavily influence these rules. Wendt'scharacterization of Kantian culture, however, includesboth collective security (in which the use of force isacceptable) and security communities (in which the useof force is not acceptable). I argue that this distinctionwarrantsseparate social arrangements;moreover, as Iargue below, this distinction is essential to understandthe construction of post-cold war collective security.In war,agents identify each other as enemies (rule 1),perhaps even an enemy that threatens their existence.Agents do not recognize the autonomy of others orper-haps even the right of others to exist (rule 2). Survivaldemands a militarycapability greater than one's imme-diate enemies (rule 3) because the military capabilitiesof others are interpreted as a threat to one's existence.The directive rule in war is to surrender (rule 4), sup-ported by the commitment to attack until the otherdoes surrender (rule 5). Because others are enemieswith the militarycapability to threaten one's existence,the use of force is considered inevitable, necessary,andappropriate (rule 6). War orients agents to act with

greatmistrust and hostility towardsothers, includingin-teractions like traditional nation-state warfare,Israeli-Palestinian relations, imperialism, and (perhaps) theongoing "war" on terrorism.In rivalries, agents identify each other as rivals(rule 1). They attempt to increase their security throughjoining alliances (rule 3) and performing classic deter-rence threats (rules 4 and 5). Agents do recognize theautonomy of others (rule 2), but the rivalry constitut-ing the system sometimes leads to violence to settledisputes (rule 6). War is thus an accepted but limitedpractice to end an attempt by any state to dominateworld politics. Rivalry orients agents to act with mis-trust and caution toward others, including interactionslike power balancing, alliance systems, security dilem-mas, arms races, and spheres of influence regimes. Thecold war was a prototypical rivalrysocial arrangement.In collective security arrangements, agents identifyeach other as citizens (rule 1) who are obliged to up-hold agreed-upon rules of behavior (rule 2) and actcollectively to punish those who do not uphold thoserules (rule 3). There is no presumption that actors willuniversally agree to the directive rules (rule 4); an en-forcement mechanism that includes military force isthus needed to punish any transgressors of the rules(rule 5). A collective security arrangementmay enforceonly the rule of state sovereignty, or it could enforcerules regarding weapons proliferation, terrorism, hu-man rights, and so on. The use of force is consideredto be sometimes necessary and acceptable to enforcecommunity rules (rule 6). Collective security orientsagents to act with a sense of duty to generate rulesof peaceful behavior and punish those who break therules.Throughthe explosion of multilateral treaties,Se-curity Council resolutions, UN peacekeeping missions,and nongovernmental organizations, agents have beenslowly institutionalizing a global collective security ar-rangement in the post-cold war world.Insecuritycommunities, agents identify each other asfriends committed to the peaceful resolution of conflict(rule 1). Agents in security communities have a strong

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AmericanPolitical cienceReview Vol.97,No.3consensusabout the obligationto follow the rules oftheircommunity rule2), andthey engage npeaceful,multilateral ecisionmaking o ensure ecurity hroughpoliticalrelationships rule 3). The directive rule tofollow the rules of communitydoes exist in securitycommunitiesrule4),but enforcementdoes not includethepossibilityof force(rules5 and6). Giventhe lowerlevel of threat in these social arrangements,ecurityoften refers to alternativesecurity ssueslike the en-vironmentand the economy (Adlerand Barnett1998,Deutsch1957).Securitycommunitiesorientagentstoact with great trust and "we-ness" owardothers,asin the relations between membersof the EuropeanUnion.The first threerules-regarding the nature of iden-tity, autonomy,and security in the world-are dis-tinctacrosssocialarrangements. hese rulesconstitutethe core differencesamongthe social arrangements.Agentsestablishwhich ocialarrangementsgoverningtheir nteractionhrough peechacts mplicitly onvey-ingthevalidityoftheserules. nwar,agentsareenemiesthatdonotrecognize heautonomyof othersand mustsurviveby acquiring reater elativemilitary apability.In rivalries,agentsare rivalsthatrecognizeautonomybut act to ensuresecurityby acquiring,unilaterally rthroughalliances,greaterrelativemilitarycapability.In collectivesecurityarrangements, gentsarecitizenswhose sovereignty s limitedby obligationsto followcommunity ulesand to usemultilateralmilitary orceto ensurecompliancewiththoserules.Insecurity om-munities,agentsare friendswhosesovereignty s lim-itedby obligations o peacefully ollow therulesof thecommunity.However,rules4-6--regardingdeterrence, nforce-ment, and the use of force-overlap acrosssocial ar-rangements,and this overlapcan lead to conflict be-tween agentsover the applicable ocial arrangement.For example, rule 4 is identical in collective secu-rityarrangements ndsecuritycommunities "Do notbreak he rulesof ourcommunity").Rule 5 issimilar-though not identical-in collective security arrange-ments and rivalries. n rivalries, he only agreed-uponrule of thecommunitys statesovereignty, ndalliancemechanismsenforce that rule. Collectivesecurityar-rangements epresentan alternativemechanism o en-forceagreed-upon ulesthatoftenextendbeyondstatesovereignty o include humanrights,etc. Most impor-tantly,rule6justifies he use of forcein war,collectivesecurityarrangements,ndrivalries.Theuseof force nand of itself does not tellagentswhetherwar,rivalry, rcollectivesecurity ulesgovern heir nteraction; gentsmustjustifyandinterpretwhich rules the use of forceinvokes at any particular ime. Conflictsmay developif agentsdisputewhich rulesthe use of force invokes.I arguethat thisoverlap n the use of forcerulehelpsexplain he disputesover Kosovo andIraq.

DIALOGICALANALYSISDialogical analysispositsthe existenceof socialrules,communicatively ationalagents,andthe argumenta-

tion of validityclaims. It is one method to illustrateconstructivist rgumentsaboutthe role of norms,be-liefs, and identityin worldpolitics.Dialogicalanaly-sis is an interpretiveapproach,explainingaction byspecifying he rulesagentsfollow;that is, by showingthe coherencebetweenspeechacts and rules withinaparticularocialarrangement.Dialogicalanalysispro-ceeds n foursteps(Duffy,Frederking,ndTucker 998;Frederking 000).First,one specifiesthe backgroundknowledge necessaryto understand he interaction.Second,one accumulates xplicitspeechacts thatcon-veyedmeaningduring he interaction.Third,one con-ducts a pragmatic nalysisof the speechacts,derivingtheimplicitly onveyedpropositionsduringhe interac-tion.Fourth,one constructs formalargument nalysisfromtheinventoryofpragmatic ropositions o isolateconsensualanddisputedclaimsduring he interaction.The analystfirst specifiesbackgroundknowledge,most importantly set of rulesgoverning he interac-tion. These rulesare thetheoryassertedbytheanalyst;dialogicalanalysis s a methodological ool to provideempirical vidence orthe existenceof theserules.Thesocialarrangements f war,rivalry, ollectivesecurity,andsecurity ommunities sserted nthe section aboveare thebackground nowledge orthedialogicanalysisof the veto power disputeover Kosovo.Otherback-groundknowledgeusedto support nterpretive nfer-ences is also in thenarrativebelow.The analystnext accumulatesexplicit speech actsduringthe interaction, ncludingnonverbal acts thatconveymeaning, ustifying hespeechactschosen withdefensible selection criteria. The speech acts in theanalysisarenot, in thestatistical ense,a random am-ple of all possiblespeech acts duringthe interaction.Thisstepoftenrequires reconstructionf thedialoguefrompublicsources.No algorithmic odingrules existto transformextual datainto analyzable peechacts.Perhaps uchrulesareevenimpossible o develop.Theanalystsimplygenerates he mostrelevantspeechactswith the same interpretiveabilityof all communica-tivelyrationalagents.Thebulk of dialogicalanalysis s thepragmatic nal-ysis.Pragmaticss thefieldof linguisticshatrelates hemeaningof languageto the context of its use. In thepragmaticanalysis,one specifies the implicitpropo-sitionsconveyed by speech acts given the context ofthe interaction.5Speakersconvey and hearers infermorethanutteredsentences; heymakepragmaticn-ferences thatenable them to understandone anotherand coordinateaction. For example,Grice (1957) ar-guesthatspeakersuse rationalprinciplesof conversa-tion in all exchanges, ncluding he followingmaxims.65 Pragmatically conveyed propositions include reflexive intentions,implicatures, presuppositions, and logical entailments. For reasonsof space, the analysis presented here includes only implicatures. SeeDuffy, Frederking, and Tucker (1998) and Frederking (2000) for adiscussion of how to generate a full-fledged pragmatic analysis.6 Future work on this method will explore whether these maxims ap-ply to all political rhetoric. More generally constructivists must dealwith rationalist critics who emphasize "cheap talk" and realist criticswho emphasize "uncertainty" as reasons not to rely on a linguisticconception of social interaction.

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(1) The maxim ofquality-Do not say what you believeto be false, and do not say anything for which you lackadequate evidence. (2) The maxim of quantity-Makeyour contribution as informative as is required for thecurrent purposes of the exchange. (3) The maxim ofrelevance-Make your contributions relevant. (4) Themaxim of manner-Avoid obscurity, avoid ambiguity,be brief and be orderly.Actors infer conversational im-plicatures, or the implicit contents of speech acts, byassuming that speakers adhere to these maxims.The propositions generated by the pragmatic anal-ysis convey validity claims of truth, appropriateness,and sincerity. When one agrees to a speech act, oneconcedes all three validity claims. When one disputes aspeech act, one disputes (at least) one of these claims.As the interaction continues, the pragmatic analysisspecifies all validity claims and counterclaims. For ex-ample, consider the following exchange between theUnited States and Afghanistan.UnitedStates: Extradite heresponsibleparties mmedi-ately.Afghanistan: We willtrythem underIslamicaw.

The pragmatic analysis specifies truth,appropriateness,and sincerity claims conveyed by the speech acts. TheUnited States directive toward Afghanistan conveysimplicit claims of sincerity (The United States sincerelydirects Afghanistan to extradite the responsible par-ties), normative rightness (It is appropriate that theUnited States direct Afghanistan to extradite the re-sponsible parties), and truth (It is true that Afghanistancan extradite the responsible parties). The directiveis coherent with collective security rules: The UnitedStates is directing Afghanistan to follow the commu-nity's rules against terrorism.When Afghanistan refuses the directive, it disputesthe United States' appropriateness claim and thus re-jects the applicability of collective security rules. In-stead, its claims of sincerity (Afghanistan sincerely in-tends to try them under Islamic law), appropriateness(It is appropriate that Afghanistan try them under Is-lamic law), and truth (It is true that Afghanistan cantry them under Islamic law) are most coherent withina rivalry social arrangement. Afghanistan invokes thestronger sovereignty norms coherent in rivalries ratherthan the more limited sovereignty coherent with obli-gations to enforce collective security rules. Differentunderstandings about which social arrangement is rel-evant generate the competing propositions in this dis-pute. Dialogical analysis is particularly appropriate toillustrate conflicts such as this in which agents invokedifferent social arrangements to justify their action.The final step is an argument analysis that isolatesand formalizes the disputed propositions and thusdisputed social rules generated in the pragmatic anal-ysis. The argument analysis extends Alker's (1988) ap-proach in his dialectical analysis of the Melian Dia-logue, which in turn builds on Rescher's (1977) modelof argumentation. In Rescher's model, a proponent de-fends and an opponent challenges the truth of a the-sis, and the argumentative stance is oriented towardwinning the debate. In the argument analysis, agents

insteadnegotiatethe truth,appropriateness,nd sin-cerity claimsof speech acts,and the communicativestance is oriented towardconstructinga valid socialarrangement. achclaim ntheargument nalysis pec-ifies (at least) one proposition n thepragmatic naly-sis.When one challenges hevalidityclaimof another,thepragmatic nalysis hows the disputeascontradic-torypropositions.Whenand f one "cancels" n earlierclaimandends apragmatic ispute, heanalystupdatesthe set of contestedvalidityclaims.Dialogicalanalysiscanthusaccount or thechanging onstruction fsocialrules both withinand acrosssocialarrangements.Constructivists an use dialogical analysisto illus-trate theirargumentsaboutthe importanceof beliefs,norms,and identitiesin worldpolitics.In the aboveexample,constructivistsnterested n beliefswould fo-cus on disputedtruthclaims about whethersecurityis based on military capabilityor political commit-ments.Constructivistsnterested nnormswould focuson thedisputedappropriatenesslaimsabout whetherAfghanistansobligated ofollowthe rulesof the inter-nationalcommunity.Constructivistsnterested niden-titywouldfocus on the disputed incerity laimsaboutwhether the United Statesand Afghanistanare citi-zens or rivals.Dialogicalanalysis llustratesconstruc-tivistontologyby showinghowcommunicativelyatio-nal agentsconveyvalidityclaims hatconstructand/orchallengesocialrules.Dialogicalanalysis akesthelinguisticurnseriously.It is based onlinguistics, ndlanguage liketheworld)is ambiguous.Otheranalystscould use thismethodtoanalyzethe Kosovo debate and assert differentglobalsecurityrules,select differentspeech acts, infer dif-ferentpragmatic ropositions, ndreachcontradictoryconclusions.But dialogicalanalysis s rigorousenoughthatsuchdisputesaretransparent ndexplicit:We canthen argueaboutthe greatercoherenceof competingtheory(background nowledge)and evidence(speechacts andpragmatic ropositions).Dialogicalanalysissdeductive, s capableof replication,andrelies on logicandempirical videncefor its conclusions. t is consis-tent with the notionthat a communityof interpreterscan agree to the most coherentexplanationand thatthose explanationscan help us "go on"in thatworldand act in intelligibleways.INTERPRETING OSOVO:A DIALOGICALANALYSISOFTHEVETOPOWERDISPUTEBackground KnowledgeThe background knowledge for this analysis is thefour ideal-typical global security social arrangementsdiscussed above and more particularlya slow transitionfrom a cold war rivalry arrangement to a post-coldwar collective security arrangement. Many indicatorsof "global governance"-such as multilateral treaties,international organizations, Security Council resolu-tions, UN peacekeeping operations, nongovernmentalorganizations, and diffusion of human rights norms-have dramatically increased in number since the endof the cold war. Within this context, the international

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community has struggled to agree on the appropriateimplementation of the fledgling collective securityrules: Under what conditions should the internationalcommunity use force to punish those who violate therules?When widespread evidence arose of human rightsabuses by Serbs against Albanian Muslims in theSerbian province of Kosovo, many in the West advo-cated the punishment of Milosevic and the Serbs forviolating the human rights rules of the internationalcommunity. Russia and China, however, promised toveto any Security Council resolution that authorizedthe use of force. The dispute between the veto pow-ers was whether the collective security rules emergingsince the end of the cold war, together with emerg-ing rules obligating states to limit human rights abuses,were sufficient to authorize NATO action. Critics ofthe use of force on the right (Waller, Drezov, andGokay 2001), critics on the left (Chomsky 1999), andsupporters (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000) all recog-nized the precedent-setting implications of Kosovoon the post-cold war construction of global securityrules.

Speech ActsThe six speech acts in the analysis, as well as the narra-tive information in this section, are reconstructed fromaccounts of the dispute in the New York Times. Thespeech acts below were included because they repre-sent official positions (all were conveyed by either thepresident or the top diplomat in each country) and fo-cus on the relevant issue of how to implement collectivesecurity rules appropriately.

1. UnitedStates: If Yugoslaviacontinues to violate thehumanrightsof the KosovoAlbanians,NATO will use militaryforce againstYugoslavia.72. Russia/China:TheSecurityCouncilhasnotauthorizedthe use of force.83. UnitedStates: Humanitarian oncernsjustify NATOuse of force.94. Russia/China:AnyNATOuse of force would hreateninternational rder.105. UnitedStates: NATO nitiatesa bombingcampaignnYugoslavia.6. Russia/China:NATO is engaging n unprovokedag-gressionagainsta sovereign tate."1The United States asserted speech act 1 when vio-lence between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians escalated

in early1998.In September he SecurityCouncilde-manded hatYugoslaviawithdrawecurity orcesfromKosovo,enablemonitors o return oKosovo, acilitatethe returnof refugees,andbegin politicalnegotiationswith the AlbanianMuslims.Russiavotedfor both reso-lutionsbutargued hatthere was no explicitauthoriza-tion of the use of forceand hat urtherSecurityCouncilactionwas needed to authorize he use of force. Chinaabstainedon bothresolutions, rguinghatKosovowasan internalmatterandYugoslaviawasactingwithin tslegitimate ights.RussiaandChinaabstainedon athirdresolution n October1998endorsing he Holbrookecease-fire greement, rguinghat heydidnotconsiderResolution1203sufficient o authorize heuse of force(speechact2).When Serb abuses in Kosovo increasedin March1999, the United States (speech act 3) arguedthatthe overwhelminghumanitarian risisjustifiedinter-vention even withoutexplicitSecurityCouncilautho-rization.Clinton 1999)asserteda "moralmperative"for NATO to end the atrocities,arguingthat "if theworldcommunityhas thepowerto stopit,we oughttostop genocide and ethniccleansing."Albright(1999)arguedthat humanrightsviolationsare not domesticmattersbut legitimateconcerns of the internationalcommunity;NATO has the right to defend the sta-bility of Europe. State sovereigntyin the post-coldwar world is limited because "legitimate" tates en-sure basic humanrights.States that perpetrateeth-nic cleansing, thus, forfeit their right to territorialintegrity.RussiaandChinacontinued o criticizeNATOpolicy(speechact4).Yeltsinargued hatNATO actionwould"destabilize he situation n the Balkanswithunfore-seeableconsequences or all of Europe."Both arguedthat invokinga humanitarian risis to justifyunilat-eralarmed ntervention iolated the UN charter.Nev-ertheless,NATO commencedthe bombingcampaign(speech act 5), which Russia and Chinadenounced(speechact6).RussianForeignMinister gorIvansaid,"Russia s deeply outragedbyNATO'smilitaryactionagainstsovereignYugoslavia, naction that is nothingshortof undisguised ggression.... OnlytheUN Secu-rityCouncilhas the right o decide(if) the use of forceshould be taken to maintainor restore internationalpeace andsecurity.... The true aimsare obvious.Toimpose on the world the political,military,and eco-nomicdictateof the United States."

PragmaticAnalysisThe pragmatic analysis generates all implicitly con-veyed propositions during the interaction. These con-textual propositions convey truth,appropriateness,andsincerity claims that invoke and/or challenge exist-ing social rules. The pragmatic analysis specifies howeach speech act conveyed validity claims and invokedsocial rules. Communicatively rational actors conveymany implicit propositions during an interaction, andmany are consensual and/or irrelevant to the specificissue of how to implement collective security rules. For

7 Myers,Steven Lee, and Steven Erlanger, "U.S.Is Stepping Up Mili-tary Threats Against the Serbs,"New York Times, 7 October 1998,sec. Al.8 Bohlen, Celestine, "Russia Vows to Block the UN from BackingAttack on Serbs,"New York Times,7 October 1998, sec. A10.9 See Clinton 1999.10Gordon, Michael, "Conflict in the Balkans: Russian Anger Tem-pered by the Need for Cash," New York Times, 25 March 1999,sec. Al.11Eckholm, Eric, "Conflict in the Balkans: Bombing May HaveHardened China's Line,"New York Times, 18 May 1999, sec. All.

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TABLE. PragmaticAnalysisof the GreatPowerInteraction ver KosovoSpeech Act1 U.S.:IfYugoslavia ontinues to violate the humanrightsof the KosovarAlbanians,NATOwilluse militaryorceagainstYugoslavia.Speech act DirectiveImplicature:la. Do notbreak he rules of ourcommunity.CS4)lb. The NATO irective o Yugoslavianotto break he rules of ourcommunitys appropriate. CS4N)1c. We willretaliate fyou break he rules of ourcommunity.CS5)1d. The NATOhreat o retaliateagainst Yugoslavias appropriate. CS5N)le. The use of force is acceptableto resolve the conflict. CS6)2 Russia/China:The SecurityCouncilhas notauthorized he use of force.Speech act:AssertionImplicatures:2a. The NATO irective o Yugoslavianotto break he rules of the internationalommunitys notappropriate.(-CS4N)2b. The NATOhreat o retaliateagainstYugoslavias notappropriate. -CS5N)2c. The use of forceis notacceptableto resolvethisconflict. ~CS6N)3 U.S.:HumanitarianoncernsjustifyNATO se of force.Speech act:AssertionImplicatures:3a. NATO ountriesare actingas citizens inourcommunity.CS1)3b. NATOs obligated o enforce the rulesof ourcommunity.CS2)3c. NATOs establishing ecurity hrougha multilaterallliancecommitment.CS3)4 Russia/China:AnyNATO se of forcewould hreaten nternationalecurity.Speech act:AssertionImplicatures:4a. NATOountriesare notactingas a citizen n ourcommunity.-CS1T)4b. NATOs notobligated o enforcethe rules of ourcommunity.-CS2T)4c. NATOs notestablishing ecurity hroughan alliancecommitment.-CS3T)5 U.S.:NATOnitiatesa bombingcampaign nYugoslavia.Speech act:Punishment directive)Implicatures:5a. NATOs sincerely actingas a citizen nourcommunity.CS1S)5b. NATOs sincerelyenforcing he rules of ourcommunity.CS2S)5c. NATOs sincerelyestablishing ecurity hroughan alliancecommitment.CS3)6 Russia/China:NATOs engaged inunprovokedggressionagainsta sovereignstate.Speech Act:AssertionImplicatures:6a. NATOs a political ival enemy?).(R1orW1?)6b. NATO oes notrecognize Yugoslavia's overeignrights o territorialntegrity.W2)6c. NATOs trying o increaseits relativealliancemilitary apability.R3)Note:The notationnparenthesesfter achpropositionignifieshe socialruleandorvaliditylaimnvokedythatproposition:CS= collectiveecurity,R= rivalry,W= war;1= identityule,2= autonomyule,3= nature f security ule,4= deterrenceule,5= enforcementule, = use of force ule;T= truthlaim, = sinceritylaim,N= normativeightnessrappropriatenesslaim.Forexample,CS5)means hat heprecedingropositionnvokeshecollectiveecuritynforcementule,and(CS5N)means hat heprecedingropositionlaimshat hecollectiveecuritynforcementulesnormativelyppropriate.

reasons of space, then, the pragmaticanalysis in Table 2includes only the disputed propositions conveyedduring the interaction.12 Readers should refer toTable 2 throughout the discussion in this section.

The pragmatic analysis shows that throughout theinteraction the United States invoked collective secu-rity rules, and Russia and China disputed the valid-ity of those collective security rules. Within this over-all pattern, however, each exchange in the interactiongenerated a set of escalated disputes. In speech acts1 and 2, Russia and China disputed the appropriate-ness of United States-invoked collective security deter-rence, enforcement, and use of force rules. Here allveto

12 A more complete analysis, including reflexive intentions, implica-tures, andpresuppositions, as well as explanations for each reference,is athttp://faculty.mckendree.edu/brian-frederking/kosovo.htm.

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AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol.97,No.3powersjustifiedtheir speech acts with collective se-curityrules,arguing hat the other is inappropriatelyinterpretinghose rules.In speechacts 3 and4, Russiaand Chinadisputed he truthof UnitedStates-invokedcollectivesecurity dentity, utonomy, ndthe natureofsecurityrules.Here RussiaandChinabeganto disputewhether the United States would be actuallyinvok-ing collectivesecurityrules with a use of force.And inspeechacts5 and6,RussiaandChinadisputed hesin-cerityofUnitedStates-invokedollective ecurityden-tity, autonomy,and the nature of securityrules.HereRussiaandChinaargued hattheUnited States ndeedinvokedwarand/or ivalry uleswith tsuse of force.Bythe end oftheinteraction,he vetopowershaddifferentunderstandingsf which socialarrangement overnedtheirinteraction. discusseachexchange n turn.In speech acts 1 and 2 the veto powers disagreedabout whetherthe U.S.directive o Yugoslaviaappro-priately nvoked collectivesecurityrules. With its di-rectiveto Yugoslavianspeechact1,theUnited Statesinvoked the collective securitydeterrence rule withpropositionla; it invoked the collective securityen-forcementrulewithproposition1c;and it invoked thecollective securityuse of force rule with propositionle. With theirassertionthat the SecurityCouncildidnot authorize he use of force in speech act 2, RussiaandChinadisputed he appropriatenessf the UnitedStates invokingcollective securityrules to justifyitsdirective oYugoslavia.Theydisputed heappropriate-ness of the United Statesinvoking he collectivesecu-ritydeterrencerule withproposition2a;they disputedthe appropriatenessf the UnitedStatesinvoking hecollective securityenforcementrule with proposition2b;and heydisputed heappropriatenessf theUnitedStates nvoking hecollectivesecurityuse of force rulewithproposition2c.In this firstexchange,the veto powersunderstoodcollectivesecurityrules to governtheirinteraction; llinvoked collective securityrules to justifytheir acts.However,Russia and Chinaarguedthat the UnitedStates andNATO werenotfollowing hose rulesprop-erly.Onecouldinterpret heRussianandChinesecrit-icism as intended to thwart the developmentof anemerginghumanrightsnorm that would justify hu-manitariannterventiongiven internalproblemswithChechnya ndTibet Carpenter 000).WhileChinadidhavethese concerns,Russiahadpreviously upportedSecurityCouncil action regardinghumanrights.Ofthe 32SecurityCouncilresolutionsregardingSomalia,Haiti, Rwanda,and East Timor,Russiavoted yes 31times and abstainedonly once (Heinze and Borer2002). Given this context, I interpret he criticism ostem fromRussia's nsistencethatthe collective secu-rity rules requireda legal processbased on SecurityCouncilaction.Russiawaspreservingts rolein worldpoliticsby asserting heprimacyof the SecurityCoun-cil, not challenging he validityof an emerginghumanrightsnorm.Inspeechacts3 and4the vetopowersdeepened heirdisputeaboutwhetherNATOpolicyappropriatelym-plementscollective securityrules.The U.S. assertionin speechact 3 conveyeda substantive,moralconcep-

tion of collectivesecurity.NATO nterventionwasbothlegallyandmorallyustifiedbecause t intended oaverthumanitarianisasterandwas consistentwithSecurityCouncilResolutions 1199 and 1203. Within the con-textof collectivesecurity,t argued or a ruleenablingregionalenforcementwithoutexplicitSecurityCouncilauthorization.With hesearguments,he UnitedStatesinvoked he collective ecuritydentityrulewithpropo-sition 3a; it invokes the collectivesecurityautonomyrulewithproposition3b;and it invokesthe collectivesecuritynatureof securityrulewithproposition3c.RussiaandChina ountered heUnitedStates'moraland substantive onceptionof collectivesecuritywithaprocedural onceptionof collectivesecurity n speechact 4.Anyuse of force withoutSecurityCouncilautho-rization,they argued,threatened nternationalpeaceandsecurity.With thisassertion, heychallengedU.S.truth claimsthat NATOwas actingas a citizenin theinternational ommunity proposition4a), thatNATOwasenforcing he rulesof the international ommunity(proposition b),andthatNATOwasattemptingo es-tablishsecurity hrougha multilateral ommitment ouse military apability proposition4c). Here thevetopowers disputed ruthclaims about collectivesecurityrules1-3;note that rules1-3 arethe corerulesthatdif-ferentiate he fourglobalsecurity ocialarrangements.With this exchange, hen, Russiaand Chinadisputedthat NATO policy invoked collective securityrules.They beganto suggestthatperhaps he NATOuse offorce invokeda different ocialarrangement.In speechacts5 and6 the conflictbetween the vetopowersescalateddramatically.treat he NATObomb-ing campaignas speech act 5. Withinthe context ofthe earlierinteraction, he use of force defendedtheUnited Statestruth claimsconveyedin speech act 3:NATOwas indeeda citizen n ourcommunity propo-sition5a);NATOwas ndeedenforcing herulesof thecommunity(proposition5b); andNATO was indeedestablishing ecurity hroughan alliancecommitment(proposition5c). Withspeechact6, Russiaand Chinadisputedthe sincerityof U.S. claimsthat the NATOuse of force invokedcollectivesecurityrules.Insteadthey argued hatNATOuse of force is actuallyunpro-voked aggression, nvokingthe rivalry(and perhapswar?) dentityrule nproposition6a,the warautonomyrule that NATOwasviolatingYugoslav overeigntynproposition6b,andthe rivalrynatureof securityrulethat NATOwastryingto increase ts relativealliancemilitarycapability.With thisexchange heveto powerscompletelydis-agreedaboutwhichsocialarrangement overned heirinteraction.While the United Statescontinued to in-vokecollectivesecurity ules,Russiaand Chinaarguedthat t wastrying ocreatea "NATO-centered urope."Theywereno longercriticizingNATO forinappropri-atelyimplementing ollectivesecurityrules; heynowchargedNATOwithblatantlynvoking ivalry ndper-hapseven war rules.Forexample,Russiacharged heUnited Stateswithviolating he UN Charter, ndChinaclaimedthat the United States wasusing pretexts ikehumanrights o begina newformofcolonialismaspartof aglobalstrategy or worldhegemony.

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Consistentwith rivalryrules,Russia and China re-sponded to the NATO use of force in Kosovo byattemptingo increase heirrelativemilitary apability.Russia sent a reconnaissance hip into the Mediter-ranean,revised its militarydoctrineto reinvigoratenuclearweaponscapability, ignedjoint defense ini-tiatives with Belarusand others,held war games inthe Balkans, expelled NATO representativesfromMoscow, uspended ooperationnthePartnershiporPeaceprogram,withdrewts missionandstudents romBrusselsandNATOcountries,and weakenedcommu-nicationbetweenRussianandNATOforces nBosnia.The Duma postponedratificationof the START IIagreement the December 1998bombing n Iraqalsocaused a postponementof thatvote). AlthoughRus-sia never violated UN sanctionsand sent directmil-itary aid to Yugoslavia,the Duma voted 279 to 30to send militaryaid and advisers.China suspendedmilitaryties with the United States and all negoti-ations with the United States over humanrightsis-sues.In June1999,Russia andChinaannounced hatthey would foster a "strategicpartnership"o offsetthe global dominanceof the United States. All ofthese responses nvokedrivalryrules,particularlyherulethatsecurity s based on relative alliancemilitarycapability.Argument AnalysisThe argumentanalysis n Table3 isolatesand formal-izes the disputesgeneratedby the pragmaticanalysis.It lists three sets of interconnecteddisputesdiscussedinthe abovesection:disputed ocialrules,disputedva-lidityclaims,anddisputedpropositions.nspeechacts1 and2, RussiaandChina contestedthe appropriate-nessof NATO'sdirective o Yugoslavia.Here the vetopowersdisagreedabouthow to implement he collec-tive securityrulesregardingdeterrence,enforcement,and the use of force. In speech acts 3 and 4, RussiaandChinadisputed he truthof U.S.claims hatNATOwas enforcingcollectivesecurityrules.Here the vetopowersdisagreedaboutthe core rulesof each socialarrangement:he identity,sovereignty,and natureof

securityrules. nspeechacts5 and6,Russiaand ChinadisputedNATO'ssinceritythat it was enforcingcol-lectivesecurity.Here the agentsdisputedwhich socialarrangementoverned heinteraction,withtheUnitedStatescitingcollectivesecurityrulesandRussia/Chinaclaiming hat the United States s actually nvokingri-valryandperhapseven warrules.Theoverlap n rulesbetween he socialarrangementsfueled this conflict.Specifically,he use of force rule-"the use of force is often necessaryand acceptableto resolve conflicts"-holds in collective securityar-rangements, ivalry, nd war.NATO'suse of forcewasconsistentwith bothU.S. ustificationshat NATOwasinvoking collective security rules and Russian andChinese criticismsthat NATO was invoking rivalryand/orrules.For the UnitedStates,NATO use of forcewas the appropriateway to enforcecommunityrulesregardinghumanrights.For RussiaandChina,NATOuse of forcewasat least anattempt o dominateaglobalrivalryand at most an act of war consistentwithimpe-rialism.Bothwere rational nterpretationsromwithinthe socialarrangementsachclaimedwereoperative.If interpretivemethodsexplainactionby specifyingthe rule(s) agentsfollow,then the dialogicalanalysisof the veto powerconflictoverKosovo enables one toexplainU.S.acts by specifying he collectivesecurityrules tsspeechacts nvoked.Similarly,ne canexplainRussianandChineseactsbyspecifying he rivalryandwar rules their speech acts invoked.Finally,one canexplainthe entire conflictby specifying he differenceandtheoverlapbetweenthesocialarrangements.Kosovoand IraqThedebates aboutthe use of forcein Kosovo andIraqdo not seem similaron the surface.Kosovo was abouthumanrightsabusesandIraqwas aboutnonprolifera-tion.Butatthepragmaticevelof the rulesconstitutingglobal security, here are many stunningsimilarities.Thethree-stageKosovo nteractionoccurredagainre-garding nterventionn Iraq.First, herewas a disputeabouthow to implementcollectivesecuritygivennon-compliancewithcommunityrules:The United States

TABLE . ArgumentAnalysisSpeech Act U.S. Russia/China1. IfYugoslavia...,NATOwill... !12. No SC authorization... -N1/2 & !23. Humanitarianoncerns... N1/3&!34. Forcewould hreatenorder... -T3/4 &!45. NATO ombing ampaign T3/!5&!56. NATO ombing hreatens... -S5/6 &!6DisputedSocial Rules DisputedValidityClaim DisputedPropositionsCS4, CS5, CS6 N1 1b-2a, 1d-2b, le-2cCS1, CS2, CS3 T3 3a-4a, 3b-4b, 3c-4cR1(Wl?)/CS1,W2/CS2,W3/CS3 S5 5a-6a, 5b-6b, 5c-6cNote:Thenotationntheargument nalysisshouldbe readas follows:Anexclamation oint ignifies heperformancef a speech act,S signifies heconveyanceofa sincerity laim,Nsignifies heconveyanceof a normative ightnessorappropriatenesslaim,Tsignifies heconveyanceof a truth laim, signifiesa negation,and/signifies ceterisparibus rgument, Allhingsbeingequal, his s normallyhecase...

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AmericanPolitical cienceReview Vol.97,No.3(and Britain)advocatedthe use of force,and Russiaand China andFrance)advocatedcontinuedweaponsinspections.Second, there was further debate aboutwhether the use of force would actuallyinvoke col-lectivesecurity ules:TheUnitedStatesand Britainar-guedthattheywouldenforcetheSecurityCouncilres-olutionsanddisarm raq f theUN wasunwilling o doso,withRussia,China,andFrancearguing hatanyuseof force withoutSecurityCouncilauthorizationwouldviolate internationalawandunderminenternationalpeace and security.Finally, here was a more funda-mentaldisagreementaboutwhichsocialarrangementgoverned he interaction:TheUnitedStatesbeganthewarin Iraq,andRussia,China,and Francecontendedthattheuseof forcedeliberatelynvokedwar rulesbe-causethe United States neversincerelywanted a UN-centeredenforcementof community ules.The similaritiesbetween the two interactionsalsoextend to the moredetaileddisputes.Table4 listsboththe disputedpropositionsgeneratedby the pragmaticanalysisof theKosovodisputeand herestatedproposi-

tionsreplacing"NATO"with"U.S." nd"Yugoslavia"with"Iraq." he atterdisputes easonably haracterizenot only the globaldebateabout the war in Iraq,butalso theargumentativeasks acing he UnitedStates fit continuesto widen its war on terrorism.The over-all coherenceof these disputed propositionsregard-ing war in Iraq strongly suggests that the events ofSeptember11didnotfundamentally hangeworldpol-itics. Instead,September11 exacerbatedalreadyex-isting tensionsprominently llustrated n the Kosovointeraction.The reason for the similarities s the overlappingnatureof the social arrangements onstitutingglobalsecurity ules,particularlyhe use of forcerule thatex-ists nwar,rivalry, ndcollective ecurityarrangements.The United States was (again)tryingto convincetheinternational ommunity hat its use of force invokescollective ecurity ules.Many ntheinternationalom-munitywere(again) nterpretinghe use of forceto in-vokewarrules.Wittgenstein rgues hatthemeaningofa term sdefinedbyitsuse,byhowspeakersunderstand

TABLE. DisputedClaimsOver he Use of Forcein Kosovoand IraqKosovo IraqSecurityRule UnitedStates Russia/China UnitedStates Criticsof War n IraqIdentity NATOountriesare NATOountriesare The U.S. is actingas The U.S. is notactingactingas citizens in notactingas a a citizen nour as a citizen nourourcommunity citizen nour community communitycommunityIdentity NATOs sincerely NATOs a rival The U.S. is sincerely The U.S. is a rivalactingas a citizen (enemy?) actingas a citizen (enemy?)inourcommunity inourcommunityAutonomy NATOs obligated o NATOs notobligated The U.S. is obligated The U.S. is not

enforce the rulesof to enforce the rules to enforce the rules obligated o enforceourcommunity of ourcommunity of ourcommunity the rules of ourcommunityAutonomy NATOs sincerely NATO oes not The U.S. is sincerely The U.S. does notenforcing he rules recognize Yugoslav enforcing he rules recognize Iraqiof ourcommunity autonomy of ourcommunity autonomyNatureof security NATOs establishing NATOs not The U.S. is The U.S. is notsecurity hrough establishing establishing establishingan alliance security hrough security hrough security hroughancommitment an alliance an alliance alliancecommitment commitment commitmentNatureof security NATOs sincerely NATOs trying o The U.S. is sincerely The U.S. is trying oestablishing increase its relative establishing increase its relativesecurity hrough alliancemilitary security hrough alliancemilitaryan alliance capability an alliance capabilitycommitment commitmentDeterrence The NATO irective o The NATO irective o The U.S. directive o The U.S.directive oYugoslavianot to Yugoslavianot to Iraqnotto break Iraqnotto break hebreak he rules of break he rules of the rules of our rules of ourourcommunitys ourcommunitys communitys communitys notappropriate notappropriate appropriate appropriateEnforcement The NATOhreat o The NATOhreat o The U.S. threat o The U.S. threat oretaliateagainst retaliateagainst retaliateagainst retaliate gainstYugoslavias Yugoslavias not Iraqs appropriate Iraq s notappropriate appropriate appropriateUse of force The use of force is The use of force is The use of force The use of forceacceptableto notacceptableto against Iraq s against Iraqs notresolve this conflict resolve this conflict acceptableto acceptabletoresolvethis conflict resolve thisconflict

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and use the term. In the post-coldwarconstruction fcollectivesecurity, he meaningof the use of force isdefinedbyhowagentsunderstandheact.How willtheinternationalcommunity nterpretthe use of force?Does it invoke collectivesecurityrules or warrules?In both the Kosovo and the Iraqdebates,both sidesassertedthe validityof collective securityrules butdifferedon whetherU.S.use of forceactually nvokedthose rules.

CONCLUSIONThis papermakes three main contributions.First,itcontributes o the constructivist esearchprogrambyofferinga tentativerule-oriented onstructivistheoryof global securityassertingthe existence of war, ri-valry,collectivesecurity,and securitycommunity o-cial arrangements. econd,it adds dialogicalanalysisto the growingtoolkit of interpretivemethods,usingit to studythe veto powerdebate over Kosovo.Third,it contributes o the policydebatesaboutU.S.foreignpolicyafterSeptember11,suggesting hatpreemptionpoliciesarepremisedon a flawedassumptionhattheeventsof September11fundamentally hangedworldpolitics.These three contributions re consistentwiththe tasksof rule-oriented onstructivism:1) assert heexistenceof social arrangements,2) show how theserulesmake actionintelligible,and(3) helpagents"goon"in the world.Within the context of constructivism, he rule-oriented heoryofglobalsecurityofferedheremodifiesWendt's rgumentor"three ultures" fworldpolitics.Conceptualizing lobalsecurityas constitutedby fouroverlappingets of socialarrangementss necessary ounderstand he dominant ecurity rendssince the endof the cold war:movementawayfrom the cold war ri-valryandthe gradual nstitutionalizationf collectivesecurityrules. Wendt'sKantianculture ncludesbothcollectivesecurityandsecurity ommunities,whicharedifferentiated y(amongotherrules)thenecessityandacceptability f the use of force.As the analysisaboveshows,however,the cruxof the debates over KosovoandIraq s how the international ommunity nterpretsthe use of forcein the post-coldwarworld.While theuse of force is centralto collective security, t is notconceivable n securitycommunities.Wendt'sKantianculturehides this importantdistinctionandthus can-not account for the argument presented here. Wendt'ssuggestions that world politics may be slowly movingtoward a Kantian culture ignore the autonomy of col-lective security arrangements as an intermediate stepin that process.Dialogical analysis helps make the speech acts con-structing post-cold war security intelligible by show-ing those acts to be logically consistent with the so-cialrules-beliefs, norms,andidentities-constitutingglobal security structures.Dialogical analysis is one in-terpretive method capable of illustratingconstructivistarguments because it adequately captures the socialontology of constructivism. It analyzes social interac-tion as a dialogue between communicatively rational

actorswho assertvalidityclaimsandevaluate others'validityclaims.Through hisinteraction, inguisticallycompetentagentschallengeand/orperpetuateherulesconstitutingworldpolitics. t doesnot assertcausalex-planations;nstead, t explainsactionby specifying he(both regulativeand constitutive)rule(s) that agentsfollow. It attemptsto offer constructivistsa nonra-tionalist,nonpositivistapproach o analyzesocial in-teraction.Finally,rule-orientedconstructivism nd dialogicalanalysishelp provide practical nsight into issues ofglobalsecurity.Theanalysispresentedherecastsdoubtonjustificationshata newpost-9/11worldnecessitatesmoreaggressive,unilateral,andeven preemptiveU.S.policies. Instead,the war on terrorism s embeddedwithina largerpost-coldwarconstruction f globalse-curityrules.Tensionsabout heappropriatemplemen-tation of collectivesecurityrules to punishthe globalcriminalswhoviolate nternationalulesexistedbeforeand afterSeptember11.ThattheUnitedStates s nowa directvictim of criminalacts does not changethislargercontext; nsteadit exacerbatesalreadyexistingtensions because the United States is now that muchmore determined o enforcecommunity ulesagainstterrorism ndnonproliferation.Thisanalysis uggeststwo broadtrajectoriesor fu-ture global securityrules.One possibility s that theinternational ommunitywill minimize hesetensions,strengthen hepost-coldwarconstruction f collectivesecurityrules, and continue the "war"on terrorismthrough ooperativemultilateral ction.The otherpos-sibilityis that U.S. use of force in Iraq,togetherwithotherlikelyuses of forcein its "war" n terrorism,willbreakdown hepost-coldwarconstruction f collectivesecurityrules and institutionalize ome form of a warsocialarrangement.The Bush administrations splitaboutwhich direc-tion tprefers.Ofcourse,many n the administrationrecriticalof "globalgovernance"andpreferto weakencollectivesecurityrulesbecausethose rules limit theflexibilityof U.S.foreignpolicy.Indeed,the Bush ad-ministrationchallengedemergingcollective securityrules in many ways prior to September11 (e.g., re-jection of the Anti-BallisticMissileTreaty, he KyotoProtocol,and the InternationalCriminalCourt).Con-stantlydeclaringa "war" n terrorism ndusingforcein IraqwithoutSecurityCouncilauthorization, tleaston thesurface, lsoweakencollective ecurity ulesandinvoke a war social arrangement.Many in the adminis-tration continue to assert that September 11 fundamen-tally changed world politics, that the normal rules ofcollective security are no longer applicable, that a warsocial arrangement now governs global security, andthat this new social arrangement justifies preemptiveU.S. policies.However, a terrorist event, even a horrific one, can-not automatically change the rules of global security.Even U.S.foreign policy, although tremendously impor-tant, cannot unilaterally construct a war social arrange-ment through declarations of a "war on terrorism"oreven by invading Iraq. Social rules are constantly ne-gotiated and mediated through the actions of many

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AmericanPolitical cienceReview Vol.97,No.3agents.Whetherfutureglobalsecurityrules are con-stitutedby collectivesecurityrulesor by war rules isalwaysbeingnegotiatedandrenegotiated.Theanalysispresentedhere suggeststhat the post-coldwar rulesgoverning lobalsecurity emain trikinglyimilarafterSeptember11. As in Kosovo, he UnitedStatessoughtSecurityCouncilauthorization rior o interventionnIraq.AndasinKosovo, hevetopowersstruggledwithwhich ruleviolationsshouldtriggermultilateralnter-vention and how to appropriately mplementcollec-tivesecurity ules.The nternationalommunity learlypreferscollectivesecurityrules over a unilateralU.S.war on terrorism.The UnitedStatesmustconsider hisunderlyingon-text inwhich t is fightingtswar on terrorism ndhowotherswill nterprettsuseof force.ContinuingoclaimthatSeptember11fundamentallyhangedworldpoli-tics andadvocatingunilateralismmayeventuallycon-vinceothers hatglobalsecuritys indeedconstitutedbyrulesof war.Suchaworldwouldonlydiscouragemanyfromcooperatingwiththe United States nother areasof thewaronterrorism.TheUnited States smore ikelyto be successful n its waron terrorismby embracingrather than ignoringthe emergingcollective securitynormsandinstitutions.REFERENCESAdler,Emanuel.1992. "TheEmergenceof Cooperation:NationalEpistemicCommunities nd the InternationalEvolution of theIdea of Nuclear Arms Control." International Organization 46(Winter): 67-90.Adler,Emanuel.1997."Seizinghe MiddleGround:Constructivismand World Politics." European Journal of International Politics3 (September):19-63.Adler,Emanuel,and MichaelBarnett,eds.1998.SecurityCommu-

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