1 The Keystone Center Joint Fact-Finding On Nuclear Power.

1

The Keystone Center

Joint Fact-FindingOn Nuclear Power

Nuclear Power Joint Fact-Finding

Endorsements

*Peter Bradford,Bradford Brook

AssociatesFormer NRC

Commissioner

David BrownExelon

Mark BrownsteinEnvironmental Defense

*Thomas CochranNatural Resources

Defense Council

*Armond CohenClean Air Task Force

*Paul GenoaNuclear Energy Institute

Victor GilinskyEnergy consultantFormer NRC

Commissioner

Chris MaslakGE Energy – Nuclear

*Patrick MazzaClimate Solutions

*Brian MolineKansas Corporation

Commission

*Mano NazarAmerican Electric

Power

Brian O’Connell

NARUC

Timothy PettitDuke Energy

*Sonny PopowskyPennsylvania Office of

Consumer Advocate

Vito StaglianoNational Commission

on Energy Policy

Jonathan TempleBritish Embassy

Steve WardMaine DEP, Former

Public Advocate, Maine’s Public Advocate

Greg WhiteMichigan PSC

Michael WilsonFPL Group

Kurt ZwallyNational Wildlife

Federation

*Steering Committee

This report is designed to be an accurate portrayal of the NJFF group’s discussions and joint findings. By endorsing this report, participants agree that they “generally support” the package of findings and the way the issues are described. To ensure an open and candid dialogue, participants presented their personal opinions in the Dialogue deliberations and not necessarily the official positions of their organizations. Therefore, the recommendations do not represent official government or organizational positions.

Mike GodfreySouthern Nuclear

Judi GreenwaldPew Center on Global Climate Change

James HardingConsultant, Formerly Seattle City Light

Randy HutchinsonEntergy Corporation

William LanouetteWriter and public-policy analyst

Allison MacfarlaneGeorge Mason University

*Ted MarstonMarston Consulting

Catherine Morris, The Keystone Center


Key Findings• There was no agreement on the likely

expansion of nuclear power. To achieve 25 gigatons of carbon reductions over 50 years would require sustaining the most rapid decade of historical growth in nuclear power for that entire period.

• The estimated life-cycle cost of electricity from new nuclear plants might reasonably be between 8 to 11 cents per kWh based on recent construction experience and escalation of construction materials.

• Safety and security has improved in the U.S. The safety and security culture in some countries raises concerns about further expansion of nuclear power abroad.Catherine Morris, The Keystone Center


Key Findings• Geologic repositories are the best option for long-

term disposal of spent fuel. Given our experience with Yucca Mountain, the search for a second or alternate site would benefit from a different approach.

• Older spent fuel can be stored safely and securely on-site. Centralized facilities are a reasonable option for spent fuel from decommissioned plants.

• Diversion or theft of material from bulk fuel handling facilities is a principle proliferation concern.

• GNEP attempts to address several proliferation concerns over expanding nuclear power globally, but the program is not a credible strategy to solve the radioactive waste problem or the proliferation problem. Catherine Morris, The Keystone Center


Climate Change: Major Reason for Study

•Under “business as usual” projections, global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels are expected to double by 2050 – from 7 GtC/yr to 14 GtC/yr.

•But stabilizing the atmosphere at 500 PPM CO2 requires avoiding this growth and then rapidly shrinking CO2 emissions after 2050.

•To get to 2050, we would need seven “wedges” of low-carbon energy, each enough to displace 25 GtC over 50 years.

Armond Cohen, Clean Air Task Force

Source: Pacala, Socolow. Carbon Mitigation Initiative. Princeton U.


How much nuclear capacity would that mean?

One wedge would require that we roughly triple the size of global nuclear power plant capacity, from 370 GW to 1070 GW, or about 700 net GW.

Current

One Wedge

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To sustain a wedge, first we would need to replace most existing plants over 50 years



Build Rate for a Wedge

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2007

Historic nuclear build rate by decade (MW)

20 GW/yr


Source: IAEA data

1070 GW would mean an average build rate of approximately 20 GW per year for 50 years, comparable to the rate achieved during the fastest ten-year period of world nuclear expansion (1981-90).


How does this compare to current projections?

• More optimistic than current announcements reported by WNA for new plants

• Higher than average 40-year historical growth rate

• More rapid than rate forecast by DOE for U.S.



Additional infrastructure needed to support one nuclear

wedge• 11-22 large enrichment plants• 18 fuel fabrication plants• 10 nuclear waste repositories the

size of the statutory capacity of Yucca Mountain—713,000 tons of spent fuel.



Effect of Climate Change Policy

•In a carbon-constrained world, in which either a substantial greenhouse gas (GHG) tax or cap and trade program is implemented, the relative economics of nuclear power (as compared to fossil-fueled power) will improve.

•The degree of relative improvement will depend on such factors as the stringency of the carbon cap and the means of allocating carbon allowances.



Regulatory Framework While some companies have announced their intentions to build “merchant” nuclear power plants, it will be easier to finance nuclear power in states where the costs are included in rate base with a regulated return on equity.

Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity

As of February 2003

Source: EIA

Jim Harding, Energy Consultant


Summary of Life Cycle Cost(Cents/kWh)

Category Low Case High Case

Capital Cost 4.6 6.2

Fuel 1.3 1.7

Fixed O&M 1.9 2.7

Variable O&M 0.5 0.5

Total 8.3 11.1

Levelized Life Cycle Cost A reasonable range for the expected life cycle cost of new nuclear power is between 8 and 11 cents per kWh delivered to the grid.



Main Assumptions (2007$)

Low Case High Case

Overnight Cost $2,950/kW $2,950/kW

Plant Life 40 years 30 years

Capital Cost, Including Real Interest

$3,600/kW $4,000/kW

Capacity Factor 90% 75 %

Financial 8% debt, 12% equity, 50/50 ratio

8% debt, 15% equity, 50/50 ratio

Depreciation 15-year accelerated 15-year accelerated

Fixed O&M $100/kW/year $120/kW/year

Variable O&M 0.5 cents/kWh 0.5 cents/kWh

Fuel 1.2 cents/kWh 1.7 cents/kWh

Grid Integration $20/kW/year $20/kW/year

Cost Analysis Assumptions



This Is Today’s Picture

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Jun-98 Jun-99 Jun-00 Jun-01 Jun-02 Jun-03 Jun-04 Jun-05 Jun-06

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Chemical Engineering Plant Cost Index

Marshall & Swift Equipment Cost Index

General Construction Cost Indices

Source: Chemical Engineering Magazine, August 2006



Fuel Cost Issues

Source: Thomas L. Neff, Center for International Studies, MIT, “Uranium and Enrichment Supply”; Presentation Winter 2006



Scale-Up Issues

• More standardized design and better construction practices

• But, there’s been a loss of US industrial capacity:– Skilled labor and materials issues

• Only two steel mills worldwide available for forging large components

• Six year lead-time for other key components• Reduced number of sub-suppliers; N-Stamp

Holders• Other pinch points throughout the supply chain,

with potential for monopoly pricing– Fragmented market structure – different

utilities; different contractors– Uranium mining and enrichment capacity



Safety and Security • On balance, most commercial nuclear power plants in the

U.S. are safer today than they were before the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island.

• Concerns about nuclear plant expansion in certain other countries that currently have significant weaknesses in legal structure (rule of law); construction practice; operating, safety, and security cultures; and regulatory oversight.• While plants have gotten safer since the TMI accident, public concern over plant security is greater today than it was before September 11, 2001.

• Transparency is a key cornerstone for public trust-building.

• Over the next 2 or 3 decades, the safety and security of the U.S. nuclear industry will largely be determined by that of existing reactors. Paul Genoa, Nuclear Energy Institute


Safety and Security Substantial changes have been made to the nuclear power plant licensing process in the last 15 years. Some members of the group believe that the procedural modifications limit effective public involvement and could have a deleterious effect on safety and security.

Construction Permit Application *

Construction Permit Application *

ConstructionConstruction Operating License Application*

Operating License Application*

Operating License Issued *

Operating License Issued *

OperationsOperations

* Public Comment Opportunity

Limited Work Authorization*

Limited Work Authorization*

New NRC 10 CFR Part 52 Licensing Process

Early Site Permit *Early Site Permit *

ConstructionConstruction

Construction Acceptance Criteria Met *

Construction Acceptance Criteria Met *

OperationOperation

Combined License *

Combined License *

Design Certification *

Design Certification *

Old 10 CFR Part 50 Licensing Process

Paul Genoa, Nuclear Energy Institute


WasteSpent nuclear fuel must ultimately be placed in long-term disposal facilities, and the best disposal option is a deep underground geologic repository.

Source: http://www.dalton.manchester.ac.uk/research/areas/geotechnical/images/Repository_001.jpg


Schematic of a typical nuclear waste repository


Waste•Yucca Mountain has a statutory capacity limit that is less than the amount of spent fuel expected to be produced by currently operating reactors over their licensed lifetimes.

•The Yucca Mountain project has repeatedly failed to meet its own schedule. Given this experience, the search for a second site or an alternative site would benefit from a different approach.



WasteOlder spent fuel must be stored on an interim basis until an operating repository is available. This spent fuel can be stored safely and securely in either spent fuel pools or dry casks, on-site. Centralized interim storage is a reasonable alternative for managing waste from decommissioned plant sites and could become cost-effective for operating reactors in the future.



WasteTransport of spent fuel and other high-level radioactive waste is highly regulated, and it has been safely shipped in the past. Transport of spent fuel to any repository will take many years to complete, and will require ongoing regulatory oversight and continued vigilance.



Reprocessing • While reprocessing of commercial spent fuel has

been pursued for several decades in Europe, overall fuel cycle economics have not supported a change in the U.S. from a “once-through” fuel cycle.

• The long-term availability of uranium at reasonable cost suggests that reprocessing of spent fuel will not be cost-effective in the foreseeable future.

• A closed fuel cycle with any type of separations program will still require a geologic repository for long term management of waste streams.

Source: NJFF calculations based on the same approach used in MIT study.

Tom Cochran, Natural Resources Defense Council


Proliferation • Expansion of nuclear power in ways that

substantially increase the likelihood of the spread of nuclear weapons is not acceptable.

• Critical shortcomings in current IAEA safeguards and the international community has not demonstrated that the enforcement mechanisms are effective.

• A principal proliferation concern is the diversion or theft of material from bulk fuel handling facilities (e.g., reprocessing, enrichment, mixed oxide fuel fabrication, and plutonium storage facilities) to develop weapons capability.



Proliferation Growing stocks (250MT and growing at 10 MT/yr) of civilian separated plutonium pose a significant proliferation risk and require extraordinary protection and international attention. Diversion or theft of these stocks represents a risk of weapons development by sub-national terrorist organizations. Levels of physical protection and risk vary widely from country to country.

Estimated Quantities of Civilian Separated Plutonium by Country

Country Civilian Pu StockAs of End of 2005 (Tonnes)

Belgium 3.3

France 81.0

Germany 12.5

India 5.4

Japan 5.9

Russia 41.0

Switzerland <2.0

UK 105.0

Total 250.0



Global Nuclear Energy Partnership •Group agrees with several premises of the GNEP,

but the program is not a strategy for resolving either the radioactive waste problem or the weapons proliferation problem. GNEP attempts to address the following proliferation concerns:

– All grades of plutonium, regardless of the source, could be used to make nuclear explosives and must be controlled.

– Reprocessing poses a problem in non-weapons states. Widespread use of mixed-oxide fuel by both weapons states and non-weapons states is similarly troublesome.

– Even in the weapons states, plutonium must be protected, and one should not increase stocks of plutonium in separated or easily separated forms such as mixed-oxide fuel.



Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

• The participants believe that critical elements of the GNEP are unlikely to succeed because it requires:– Deployment of commercial-

scale reprocessing plants, uneconomical to date.

– A large fraction of commercial reactor fleets to be fast reactors, but to date have proven to be uneconomical and less reliable than conventional LWRs.

Source: http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepProgram.html



For More Information

• Full text available at www.keystone.org

• Catherine Morris, Director Energy Program (202) 452-0785, [email protected]

1 The Keystone Center Joint Fact-Finding On Nuclear Power.

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Transcript of 1 The Keystone Center Joint Fact-Finding On Nuclear Power.