1 ADDITIONAL STUDIES (RISK ASSESSMENT,...

EIA / RA STUDY FOR INSTALLATION OF MOUNDED STORAGE VESSELS FOR STORAGE CAPACITY AUGMENTATION AT HPCL LPG BOTTLING PLANT MANDANA, TEHSIL- LADPURA, CABLE NAGAR, KOTA (RAJASTHAN)

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1 ADDITIONAL STUDIES (RISK ASSESSMENT, DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN)

1.1. INTRODUCTION

Industrial process & activities inherently pose hazards. There may be possible hazards to human

beings, flora-fauna, all forms of property and the environment as a whole. Extreme care is essential in

handling all of them in various stages of manufacturing viz. processing, treatment etc. The

management aims at full preparedness to meet effectively the eventualities resulting from any

unfortunate occurrence of fuel hazards/accidents. Hazard analysis involves the identification and

quantification of the various hazards (unsafe conditions) that exist in the project site. On the other

hand, risk analysis deals with the identification and quantification of risks; the plant equipment and

personnel are exposed to, due to accident resulting from the hazards present in the plant.

The main objective of the risk assessment study is to determine damage due to major hazards having

damage potential to life and property and provide a scientific basis to assess safety level of the

facility. The secondary objective is to identify major risk in manufacturing process, operation,

occupation and provide control through assessment. To prepare on-site, off site, for control of

hazards.

The concept of risk assessment and its industrial application has been well acclaimed since more

than a decade. A variety of major accidents have focused attention on the dangers of risk exposure

for human health and environment.

Risk analysis (RA) provides a numerical measure of the risk that a particular facility poses to the

public. It begins with the identification of potential hazardous events and determination of impact of

each event. The consequences of each event are then calculated for numerous combinations of

weather conditions and wind direction. These consequences predications are combined to provide

numerical measures of the risk for entire facility.

Risk for a particular facility is based on the following variables:

Multiple accident outcomes

Population distribution

Site specific meteorological data

Risk analysis is a tool which helps to translate hindsight (accidents) into foresight (planning) showing

ways and means (improved engineering, procedure and supervision) to prevent the calculated

accident from happening”.

1.2. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

Risk assessment is a process of estimating the likelihood of an occurrence of specific consequences

(Undesirable events) of a given severity of damage potential to life and property. The main objective

of risk assessment study is to determine the potential risks and their likelihood for the proposed

activities of the project proponent and accordingly suggesting the mitigation measures.

This is achieved by the following:

To conduct systematic identification of probable hazards (Toxic/flammable) prevailing in the

facility i.e. identification of probable failure scenarios.

Identification of specific plant sections which could trigger events in both process operations

and storage areas.


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Identification of maximum credible loss scenario (MCLS) & worst case scenarios taking into

account the safety features to be incorporated in the plant design and other parameters such

as response time, trips provided etc.

To asses, the potential risks associated with identification hazards to which the plant, people

and outside community may be subjected to.

Consequence analysis of various hazards to determine the vulnerable zones for each

probable accident scenario.

1.2.1. Methodology

To carry out the quantitative Risk assessment, following methodology was adopted. Identification

vulnerable zone for toxic dispersion, area on fire (Thermal Radiation), Flash fire, and Explosion over

pressure (Vapour cloud Explosion) by using software, named Effect.

Start

Gather required information and documents

List out hazardous inventories and storage tank/pipelines/vessels details

Define the failure scenarios and identify probable hazards associated with them

Define parameters for each of the chemicals and each of hazards

Define release type (continuous/ instantaneous) and determine release rates

Simulate selected cases for consequence of failure scenarios

Summarize the consequences

Superimpose vulnerable zones on the plot plan

Appraise the extent of damage to plan and personnel

Discuss and recommended mitigative / remedial measures

End


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1.2.2. Hazard identification

This is the process of examining each location including the work area & other free space as norms,

plant activities, storage for the purpose of identifying all hazards which are “inherent to the job”. Work

areas include but are not limited to machine workshops, laboratories, office areas, agricultural and

horticultural environments, stores and transport, maintenance. Tasks can include (but may not be

limited to) industrial equipment, Hazardous substances and/or dangerous goods, driving a vehicle,

dealing with emergency situations, construction.

1.2.3. HPCL LPG Bottling Plant, KOTA IN BRIEF

HPCL LPG Bottling Plant, Kota was commissioned in the year 2002 and located at Manda village on

the Kota- Jhalawar Road (National Highway no. 12) on 68 acres of land

The installed storage capacity of the LPG plant is 506 MT which contains 2 x 159 bullets, 1 x 98

and 1 x 90 bullets. LPG is being received to the LPG Bottling Plant by road through Truck Tankers

of generally 17 MT capacity from Ajmer, Jaipur, Baroda (Koyali/Dumad); Jamnagar & Kandla

etc. are provided with a single liquid inlet/outlet line at bottom, one vapour inlet/outlet line connected

with LPG vapour compressor at the top. Two numbers of safety valves have been provided on the top

of each storage vessel. All the storage vessels are provided with level gauges. Presently, the bottling

capacity of LPG plant is 50 TMTPA.

The empty LPG cylinders brought into premises by truck are received and stored in the empty shed.

The empty cylinders are fed to carousels / filling gun after due inspection through conveyor system in

the filling shed. The filling operation stops as soon as the weight of LPG in the cylinder reaches 5,

14.2 & 19 kg. After filling, these cylinders are counter checked for correct weight, tested for leaks from

valves & O-Rings, leaks from body & Bung. Then these cylinders are capped and sealed before

sending them to the filled cylinder shed for dispatch. Any defective cylinder detected during test is

emptied at evacuation unit and sent for cold repair in “valve-changing” shed.

HPCL LPG bottling Plant Kota supplies packed LPG domestic & non domestic filled cylinders in five

revenue district of Rajasthan ( Jhalwar, Bundi, Sawai Madhopur, Karauli, dholpur) and two revenue

district of Madhya Pradesh (ujjain, Gwalior). The present available storage at Kota plant provides a

coverage of about 3.5 days which is very low in emergency; the plant becomes dry due to low

tankage, disruption of road traffic due to natural calamities etc.

In order to meet the growing demand and maintain the normal continuity of LPG gas cylinder supply

to the consumers through distributors, HPCL proposes to install 03 nos. of Mounded Storage Vessels

of 500 MT capacity each. The storage capacity augmentation would increase the days cover from 3.5

days to 6.0 days, which in turn would increase the present status of continuity of gas cylinder supply

to the consumers.

1.2.3.1. Maximum Inventory of LPG

Details on maximum LPG Inventory at plant are provided in below mentioned Table. To analyze

Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) Scenarios, following inventory of LPG has been considered:


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TABLE 1

INVENTORY OF LPG AT HPCL LPG BOTTLING PLANT, KOTA

SN

Status

Product Storage Unit

Identification

Type (Horton

Sphere/Bullets)

No. of

Bullets/MSV

Capacity of

Bullets/MSV

Maximum

Inventory

(MT)

1. Existing LPG A/G BULLET Bullet 2 159 318


3. Existing LPG A/G HS Bullet 1 90 90

4. Proposed LPG MSV Mounded

Storage Vessel

3 500 1500

Total (After execution of proposed

expansion)

2006 MT

Maximum permissible filling is 85% of the volume (15% is left as vapor space).

1.2.3.2. IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS AT HPCL LPG BOTTLING PLANT, KOTA

LPG is highly inflammable and explosive. It is regarded as dangerous because of its intrinsic

properties, i.e. flash point, heat of combustion, reactivity, flammability limits etc. In addition to such

intrinsic properties, other aspects like storage under pressurized liquefaction, operating conditions

and large storage quantity are also relevant. These include storage and other operating parameters.

Typical physico-chemical properties of Propane & Butane, which are basic constituents of LPG, are

given in following Table; whereas Material Safety Data Sheet for LPG has been provided in Appendix

I. LPG, marketed in India, is governed by IS 4576 and LPG Test Methods by IS 1448.

TABLE 2

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS (LPG)*

SN Physical property Commercial

Butane

Commercial

Propane

1. Relative density (to water) of liquid at 15.6 °C 0.57 to 0.58 0.50 to 0.51

2. Liters/MT of liquid at 15.6 °C 1723 to 1760 1957 to 2019

3. Relative density (to air) of vapor at 15.6 °C & 1015.9 mbar 1.90 to 2.10 1.40 to 1.55

4. Ratio of gas to liquid volume at 15.6 °C and 1015.9 mbar 233 247

5. Volumes of gas/air mixture at lower limit of flammability from 1

volume of liquid at 15.6 °C and 1015.9 mbar.

12900 12450

6. Boiling point at 760 mm Hg, (°C) -0.5 - 42.1

7. Vapor pressure at 20°C (bar) 2.1 8.3

8. Vapor pressure at 20°C (Kgf/cm2) 2.551 9.184

9. Vapor pressure at 20°C (Kg/cm2) 2.1 8.3

10. Vapor pressure at 50°C (bar) 7 19.6

11. Vapor pressure at 50°C (Kgf/cm2) 7.143 20

12. Lower limit of flammability (% v/v) 1.8 2.2

13. Upper limit of flammability (% v/v) 9.0 10.0

* Source: Major Hazard Control, A Practical Manual, International Labor Office (ILO), Geneva &

MSDS of LPG.

Identification of Chemical Release & Accident Scenarios

The accident scenarios have been divided into the following categories according to the mode of

release of LPG, physical effects and the resulting damages:


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A. Pressurized liquefied gas or boiling liquid releases under pressure leading to Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE).

B. Flammable gas release leading to Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE).

C. Pool fire or jet fire of spillage mainly causing different levels of incident thermal radiation.

D. Spreading of hydrocarbon vapor with wind posing fire hazard to the surrounding property and population depending upon level of concentration.

The list of hazardous events could be short-listed since many of them would have similar and

identical incident outcomes. They could be reduced to representative set of incidents.

Following assumptions have been made while judging the representative set of incidents:

1. An instantaneous failure of one of the component of pressurized liquefied gas storage would

lead to rapid release of the entire content of that unit. Ex: leakage from cylinder valve, failure of

LPG cylinder, LPG Storage vessel/Bullet, failure of safety valve, failure of pipeline etc.

2. Full bore rupture of liquid and vapor lines may ultimately lead to catastrophic failure of any

vessel of the system. This assumption is based on fluid discharge rates, dispersion of LPG and

ignition of the plume or cloud. Ex: LPG loading hose failure, filling machine ½” hose failure,

bottom connection failure, top connection failure.

3. A crack or a hole resulting into a leakage is a most credible scenario. Ex: Pump mechanical

seal failure, gasket failure, 2” hole in pipeline.

TABLE 3 LIST OF FAILURE CASES

SN Failure case Failure mode Remarks

1 6” bottom connection failure Nozzle failure Overpressure, LFL

2 LPG Tank truck Failure Random failure of vessels and

connections

LFL, BLEVE, Blast effect

3 Bullet safety valve release Overpressure LFL

4 Pump mechanical seal failure Mechanical seal failure LFL

5 Gasket failure Gasket failure LFL

6 Filling machine ½ “ hose failure Hose failure LFL

7 Leakage from LPG cylinder

valve

Valve leakage LFL

8 Failure of LPG cylinder Random failure of equipment LFL, missile effect

9 2” hole in pipeline Pipeline failure LFL, overpressure

The analysis when carried out based on aforementioned assumptions has lead to reduction of the

total list of incidents into three representative sets of incidents. They are:

Catastrophic failures of storage vessel, or any full bore liquid line rupture.

Liquid release through a hole.

Vapor release through a hole.


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The impact of liquid release or vapour release will be less as compared to catastrophic failure of

storage vessel or line carrying LPG. The released amount will be get dispersed in atmosphere after

some time, within that, the source of leak can be detected with the help of automatic control from and

by gas detectors at strategic locations.

1.2.4. HAZARD AND OPERABILITY STUDY (HAZOP)

A HAZOP study identifies hazards and operability problems. The concept involves investigation into

the plant deviation from the design intent. The HAZOP study is done at various stages of project

implementation (from inception to production). In the present study “Guide word” HAZOP has been

adopted. The HAZOP has been done with P& I diagram given in Figure 2.1 to 2.3. This technique has

been applied because this is most well known type of HAZOP. The main objectives of this HAZOP

study are:

- To verify adequacy of the plant safety measures.

- To check operability / safety procedures.

- To verify that safety instrumentation is reacting to its best parameters.

Since bottling plant at Mandana, Kota is operating, the main aim of the present study is to verify the

safety system of the plant and problems which prevent efficient operation and suggest necessary

safety systems. The HAZOP study is also taken up to verify the safety systems in Carousal and other

plant features being installed. While doing the present HAZOP study following specific consequences

is considered:

- Plant personnel safety.

- Damage to plant or equipment.

- Loss of LPG.

- Insurability.

- Public safety around the plant.

1.2.4.1. TERM USED IN HAZOP STUDY

Some standard terms are internationally used in HAZOP study. These terms are explained in the following paragraphs.

Study Nodes

The location on piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) at which the process parameters are investigated for deviations are called study nodes.

Intention

The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of deviations at study nodes. This can take a number of forms and can either be descriptive or diagrammatic e.g. flow sheets, line diagrams, P&IDS.

Deviations

These are departures from intention which are discovered by systematically applying the guide word (e.g. “more pressure”)

Causes

These are the reasons why deviations might occur. Once a deviation has been shown to have credible cause, it can be treated as a meaningful, deviation. These causes can be hardware failures, human errors, an unanticipated process state (e.g. change of composition), external disruption (e.g., loss of power), etc.

Consequences

These are the results of deviations should they occur (e.g. release of toxic materials). Trivial consequence relative to study objective, are dropped.


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Guide Words

These are simple words which are used to qualify or quantify the intention in order to discover the deviations. The guide words given below are the ones most after used in HAZOP.

Guide words Meaning No Negative of design intent Less Quantitative decrease More Quantitative increase Part of Quantitative decrease As well as Quantitative increase Reverse Logical opposite to intent Other than Complete substitution such as corrosion

It may be mentioned that the above mentioned guide words have been applied by dividing plant in to various sections (terms by “unit” in HAZOP tables) of pipelines. A particular guide word at a particular unit may not have a realistic effect for the efficient operation of the plant. Hence all the guide word which give unrealistic situations has not been given

1.2.5. Consequence Analysis

Introduction

This chapter deals with the quantification of various effects of release of LPG on the surrounding area

by means of mathematical models and internationally recognized Safety software like WHAZAN,

EFFECTS & CAMEO.

It is intended to give an insight into how the physical effects resulting from the release of hazardous

substances can be calculated by means of computerized models and how the vulnerability models

can be used to translate the physical effects in terms of injuries and damage to exposed population &

environment Models, applied in the analysis, are listed below.

EFFECTS by TNO, The Netherlands

WHAZAN by DNV Technical, UK.

CAMEO (Computer Aided Management of Emergency Operations) by National safety

Council Environment & Health, USA.

TABLE 4

MATHEMATICAL & ANALYTICAL MODELS FOR HAZARD ANALYSIS

S. No.

Phenomenon Applicable Models

1 Ou Outflows:

Liquid, Two phase Mixtures, Gas/vapor

Bernoulli flow equation; phase equilibrium; multiphase flow models; orifice/nozzle flow equations; gas laws; critical flow criteria

2 DI Discharges:

Spreading liquid

Vapor jets

Flashing liquids * Evaporation of liquids

Spreading rate equation for no penetrable surfaces based on cylindrical liquid pools Turbulent free jet model Two zone flash vaporization model Spreading, boiling & moving boundary heat transfer models; Film &met


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S. No.

Phenomenon Applicable Models

on land & water stable boiling phenomenon; cooling of semi-infinite medium

3 cvo Dispersion:

Heavy Gas

Natural Gas * Atmospheric Stability

Boundary dominated, stably stratified & positive dispersion models (similarity)

3D Models based on momentum, mass & energy conservation Gaussian Dispersion models for naturally buoyant plumes Boundary layer theory (turbulence), Gaussian distribution models

4 Heat Radiation:

Liquid pool fires

Jet fires

Fire balls

Burning rate, heat radiation & incident heat correlation (semi imperial); Flame propagation behavior models Fire jet dispersion model API fire ball models relating surface heat flux of flame, geometric view factor & transmission coefficients

5 Explosion:

BLEVE

Vapor Cloud Explosion

Fire balls & physical over pressure models Deflagration & Detonation models

6 Vulnerability:

Likely damage

Probit functions; Non-Stochastic vulnerability models

First, attention is paid to the factors, which are decisive for the selection of the models to be used in a

particular situation, after which the various effect models are discussed.

1.2.5.1. Factors that Influence the Use of Physical Effect Model

In order to calculate the physical effects of the incidental release of hazardous substances the

following steps have been carried out in succession:

Understanding of the form in which the hazardous substance is in existence, i.e. gas

condensed to liquid in case of LPG;

Determination of the various ways in which the release can take place, i.e., above or below

the liquid level from a storage unit;

Determination of the outflow volume or quantity (as a function of time) of the gas, vapor or

liquid, i.e., in the event of volatile liquid outflow: estimating the initial flashed quantity and there

after the rate of evaporation from the pool of the liquid;

Dispersion of the gas or the vapor which may be released into the atmosphere;

In the case of LPG (pressurized liquefied gas), the quantity of vapor cloud within flammability limits is

required to be calculated. Finally, the analysis results in computation of heat radiation intensity

(KW/m2) and pressure wave intensity (bar) with respect to distance for various fire & explosion MCA

scenarios. In this analysis final effect calculations have been made for following incident outcomes:

1. Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE):

Heat radiation intensity & pressure wave effects with respect to the distance from center of vapor

cloud.


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2. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE):

Heat radiation intensity & pressure wave effects with respect to distance from center of fireball.

1.2.5.2. Models for Determining the Source Strength For Release of A Hazardous Substance

Source strength of a source means the volume of the substance released with respect to time. The

release may be instantaneous or continuous. Continuous releases are those where the outflow is a

relatively small fraction of the inventory. Instantaneous releases are those where the inventory is

released in a period of 10-20 second or less.

In case of instantaneous release, the strength of the source is given in kg whereas in continuous

release source strength depends on the outflow time and expressed in kg/s. In order to find the

source strength, it is first necessary to determine the state of a substance in a vessel, pipe or drum

the physical properties, viz. pressure and temperature of the substance and to arrive at the phase of

release. This may be gas, gas condensed to liquid or liquid in equilibrium with its vapor. The inventory

and isolation consideration are reviewed to determine if the release should be modeled as

continuous, time limited or instantaneous.

1.2.5.3. Instantaneous Release

Instantaneous release will occur, for example, if a storage tank fails. Depending on the storage

conditions the following situations may occur.

(A) Instantaneous release of a Gas:

The source strength is equal to the contents of the capacity of the storage system.

(B) Instantaneous release of a Gas Condensed to Liquid:

In the case of a gas condensed to liquid, a flash off will occur due to reduction in pressure of the

liquefied gas to atmospheric pressure. The liquid will spontaneously start to boil.

(C) Instantaneous release Resulting from a BLEVE:

A BLEVE is a physical explosion, which occurs when the vapor side of a storage tank is heated by

fire e.g. a flare/torch. As a result of the heat the vapor pressure rises and the tank wall gets

weakened. At a given moment the weakened tank wall is no longer capable to withstand the

increased internal pressure and burst open. As a result of the expansion and flash off pressure wave

occurs. With flammable gases, a fireball occurs in addition to the pressure waves.

(D) Instantaneous release of a Liquid:

In the event of the instantaneous release of a liquid a pool of liquid will form. The evaporation can be

calculated on the basis of the pool.

1.2.5.4. Semi- Continuous out flow

In the case of a semi continuous outflow, it is again first of all necessary to determine whether it is

gas, a gas condensed to liquid or liquid that is flowing out. The following situations may occur here.

(A) Gas Outflow:

The model with which the source strength is determined in the event of a gas outflow is based on the

assumption that there is no liquid in the system.


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(B) Vapor Outflow:

If the outflow point is located above the liquid level, vapor outflow will occur. In the case of a gas

compressed to liquid the liquid will start boiling as a result of the drop in pressure. The source

strength of the out flowing vapor is a function of the pressure in the storage system and after the

liquid has reached the boiling point at atmospheric pressure the temperature will remain constant.

(C) Liquid Outflow:

If the outflow point is located below the liquid level, liquid outflow will occur resulting in a flash off. The

outflow will generally be so violent that the liquid will be turned into drops as a result of the intensity of

the evaporation. The remaining liquid, which is cooled down to boiling point, will start spreading on

the ground and forms a pool. Evaporation will also take place from this pool, resulting in a second

semi continuous vapor source.

1.2.5.5. Models for Evaporation

In application of evaporation models, LPG is a case of pressurized liquefied gas. If gas condensed to

liquid is released, flash off will occur resulting in an instantaneous gas cloud. If there is little flash off,

the remaining liquid, which has cooled to its boiling point at atmospheric pressure, will spread on the

ground and start evaporating. The same model can now be used for the evaporation as for the

evaporation of gas cooled to liquid. From the pool, which is formed, evaporation will take place as a

result of the heat flow from the ground and any solar radiation. The evaporation model only takes

account of the heat flow from the ground since the heat resulting from solar radiation is negligibly

small compared with the former. The evaporation rate depends on the kind of liquid & subsoil.

1.2.5.6. Models for Dispersion

The gas or vapor released either instantaneously or continuously will be spread in the surrounding

area under the influence of the atmospheric turbulence. In the case of gas dispersion, a distinction is

required to be made between neutral gas dispersion and heavy gas dispersion. The concentrations of

the gas released in the surrounding area can be calculated by means of these dispersion models.

These concentrations are important for determining whether, for example, an explosive gas cloud can

form or whether injuries will occur in the case of toxic gases.

1.2.5.7. Heavy Gas Dispersion Model:

If the gas has density higher than that of air due to higher molecular weight or marked cooling, it will

tend to spread in a radial direction because of gravity. This results in a “gas pool” of a particular

height and diameter. As a result of this in contrast to a neutral gas, the gas released may spread

against the direction of the wind.

1.2.5.8. Models for Heat Load and Shock Waves

MODEL FOR FLARE/JET FIRE/TORCH

If an out flowing gas forms a cloud with concentrations between the lower and upper explosion limit

and ignition takes place, a torch occurs. A model with which the length of a torch and the thermal load

for the surrounding area can be calculated, assumes an elliptical shaped torch. The volume of the

flare in this model is proportional to the outflow. In order to calculate the thermal load, flare is

regarded as a point source located at the center of the flare. This center is taken as being half a flare

length from the point of outflow.


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MODEL FOR BLEVE

BLEVE stands for Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion. A BLEVE is a follow-up effect, which

occurs if the vapor or liquid side of the tank is heated by a torch or a pool fire. Due to the heating, the

internal pressure will rise and the material tank wall would weaken. At a given moment the weakened

tank wall will no longer be able to withstand the increased internal pressure and it will burst open. As

a result of the expansion and flash off a pressure wave occurs. The effects of a BLEVE for a tank with

a flammable liquid are as follows:

A fireball.

Pressure wave effects resulting from the expansion of the vapor and the flash off

Cracking of the tank, resulting in the formation of numerous fragments of the tank. These fragments can be hurled over fairly great distances by the energy released.

TABLE 5

DAMAGE DUE TO INCIDENT RADIATION INTENSITY

Incident Radiation

intensity, KW/m2

Type of damage

37.5 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment

25.0 Minimum energy required to ignite wood, at infinitely long exposure (non piloted)

12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, melting plastic tubing etc.

4.5 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 seconds,

however blistering of skin (first degree burns) is likely

1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure

0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation

TABLE 6

DAMAGE EFFECTS OF BLAST OVERPRESSURE

Blast Overpressure, psi Damage Level

5.0 Major structural damage (assumed fatal to people inside building or within other

structures).

2.5 Eardrum rupture.

2.0 Repairable damage. Pressure vessels intact; light structures collapse.

1.0 Window breakage, possibly causing some injuries.

0.03 Damage of Glass.

0.01 Crack of Windows.

IGNITION OF A GAS CLOUD (VCE)

If a flammable gas is not ignited directly, the plume/cloud will spread in the surrounding area. The

drifting gas cloud will mix with air. As long as the gas concentration is between the lower and upper

explosion limit, the gas cloud may catch fire/explode by an ignition source. The flammable content of

a gas cloud is calculated by a three-dimensional integration of the concentration profiles, which fall

within the explosion limits. If the gas cloud ignites two situations may occur, namely non- explosive

combustion (flash fire) and explosive combustion (flash fire + explosion). Models exist for the

calculation of the peak over pressure in explosive combustion, which calculates the pea k over

pressure as a function of the distance from the center of the gas cloud.


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VULNERABILITY MODELS

Vulnerability models or dose response relations are used to determine how people are injured by

exposure to heat load or a toxic dose. Such models are designed on the basis of animal experiments

and on the basis of the analysis of injuries resulting from accidents occurred earlier. Vulnerability

models often make use of a probit function. In a Probit function a link is made between the load and

the percentage of people exposed who suffer a particular type of injury. The Probit function is

represented as:

Pr = k1 + k2ln (V)

In which,

Pr = Probit, a measure for the percentage of the people exposed who incur a particular injury (relation

between percentages & probit is given in Table 7)

k1= a constant depending on the type of injury and type of load

k2= a constant depending on the type of load

V = load or dose

TABLE 7

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERCENTAGES & PROBITS

Percentage Probit Values

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

0 - 2.67 2.95 3.12 3.25 3.36 3.45 3.52 3.59 3.66

10 3.72 3.77 3.82 3.87 3.92 3.96 4.01 4.05 4.08 4.12

20 4.16 4.19 4.23 4.26 4.29 4.33 4.36 4.39 4.42 4.45

30 4.48 4.50 4.53 4.56 4.59 4.61 4.64 4.67 4.69 4.72

40 4.75 4.77 4.80 4.83 4.85 4.87 4.90 4.92 4.95 4.97

50 5.00 5.03 5.05 5.08 5.10 5.13 5.15 5.18 5.20 5.23

60 5.25 5.28 5.31 5.33 5.36 5.39 5.41 5.44 5.45 5.50

70 5.52 5.55 5.58 5.61 5.64 5.67 5.71 5.74 5.77 5.81

80 5.84 5.88 5.92 5.95 5.99 6.04 6.08 6.13 6.18 6.23

90 6.28 6.34 6.41 6.48 6.55 6.64 6.75 6.88 7.05 7.33

- 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

99 7.33 7.37 7.41 7.46 7.51 7.58 7.65 7.75 7.88 8.09

INJURIES RESULTING FROM FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS AND GASES

In the case of flammable liquids and gases and immediate ignition a pool fire or BLEVE or a flare will

occur depending on the conditions. The injuries in this case are mainly caused by heat radiation. It is

only in the case of a BLEVE that injuries may occur as a result of the shock wave or tank fragments

flying about. Serious injuries as the result of the shock wave generally do not occur outside the

fireball zone. Fragmentation of the storage system can cause damage up to distance of over 1 km

depending on the capacity of the affected storage tank. If the gas is not ignited immediately, it will

disperse into the atmosphere. If the gas cloud ignites it is assumed that everyone present within the

gas cloud will die as a result of burns or asphyxiation. Outside the gas cloud the duration of the

thermal load will be too brief to cause any injuries. In the event of very rapid combustion of the gas

cloud the shock wave may cause damage outside the limits of the cloud. Explosive combustion will

only occur if the cloud is enclosed to some extent between buildings and obstacles.


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DAMAGE MODELS FOR HEAT RADIATION

It is assumed that everyone inside the area covered by the fire ball, a BLEVE, a torch, a burning pool

or gas cloud will be burned to death or will asphyxiate. The following probit functions are an example

of a method that can be used to calculate the percentage of lethality and first-degree burns that will

occur at a particular thermal load and period of exposure of an unprotected body.

Lethality: Pr = -36.83 + 2.56 ln (t.q4/3)

First degree burn symptoms: Pr = -39.83 + 3.0186 ln (t.q4/3)

In which, t = exposure time in seconds and; q = thermal load W/m2

Damage criteria for quantification of damage due to heat radiation have been briefed in Table 8.

TABLE 8

(DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR BLEVE/VCE OR FIRE BALL) HEAT RADIATION

SN Likely Damage Incident Flux

(KW/M2)

1. 100% Lethality & Severe damage to property Within fireball

2. 100% Lethality 37.5

3. 50% Lethality 25

4. 1% Lethality 12.5

5. Not Lethal, First degree burns 4.5

DAMAGE MODEL FOR PRESSURE WAVE

Pressure waves are generated due to BLEVE/VCE. Damage criteria for quantification of damage due

to pressure wave have been briefed in Table 9. A peak over pressure of 0.1 bar is taken as the limit

for fatal injury and 0.03 bar as the limit for the occurrence of wounds as the result of flying fragments

of glass. Following inferences are used to translate an explosion in terms of damage to the

surrounding area:

Everyone within the contours of the exploding gas cloud will die as a result of burns or

asphyxiation. Establishments in this zone will be fully destroyed.

In houses with serious damage it is assumed that one in eight persons present will be killed as a

result of the building collapsing. Within the zone with a peak over pressure of 0.3 bar the risk of

death in houses is 0.0125, i.e. one in eighty people will be killed.

TABLE 9

(DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR BLEVE/VCE OR FIRE BALL) PRESSURE WAVE

SN Likely Damage Peak Over Pressure (bar)

1. Heavy (90%) 0.3

2. Repairable (10%) 0.1

3. Damage of glass 0.03

4. Crack of windows 0.01


14

CLIMATOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

Climatological conditions have been studies for the month March to May 2017 at Kota. Data is taken

from weather site. Form available data, it is found that, the minimum is 27 °C and maximum

temperatures is 42.3 °C for the month of July and May respectively . Relative humidity as minimum

and maximum is recorded as 12 % and 79%. Maximum wind speed and average wind flow data

given in following table.

As LPG is heavier than air, it would try to settle on the ground from air in downwind2 direction. The

downwind drifting & dispersion of LPG in air would be primarily decided by following factors:

1. Wind Direction & Wind Velocity

2. Atmospheric Stability {it decides mixing of LPG & air. More turbulent atmosphere is

characterized by “Un-stable” Atmosphere (Class F: Highly Unstable). In this condition dilution of

LPG would be fastest; whereas in Very Stable Atmosphere (Class A) dilution will be lower and

up to a large distance concentration of LPG will be above LEL.}

Month Temperature

Relative

Humidity

Rainfall

(Monthly

Total)

(mm)

Mean

Wind

Speed

(Km/h)

% No. of Days of Wind From

Max

(oC)

Min

(oC)

% N NE E SE S SW W NW Calm

Jan

I 23.5 11.5 64 6 4.3 6 9 16 7 2 5 8 10 37

II 38 18 37 31 5 0 1 2 3 3

Feb I 26.8 14.3 51 9.5 5.2 6 11 13 5 2 7 14 11 31

II 29 24 32 25 3 1 2 5 6 2

Mar I 33.2 19.9 36 3.8 6.1 6 8 15 10 2 8 17 14 20

II 18 28 30 17 2 1 3 8 9 2

Apr I 39.1 25.7 25 7.3 7.8 9 7 7 5 2 10 25 24 11

II 12 24 18 5 1 1 7 13 22 3

May I 42.3 29.9 31 11 10.6 6 4 5 3 1 18 37 22 4

II 15 17 10 3 1 2 12 25 28 2

Jun I 40.3 29.6 49 64.8 12 6 3 3 3 2 21 43 17 2

II 31 12 9 5 3 3 19 27 18 4

Jul I 34.4 27.0 72 252.7 11.5 4 4 3 2 1 28 43 12 3

II 59 5 5 6 4 4 27 33 11 5

Aug I 32.4 25.8 79 225.1 10 5 4 3 2 2 23 41 16 4

II 67 9 8 5 3 3 21 30 14 6

Sep I 34.2 25.7 68 86.5 8.3 8 6 3 3 1 15 30 22 10

II 51 20 13 6 3 2 11 16 18 8

Oct I 34.4 22.5 48 16.1 4.9 6 6 11 6 3 8 17 16 27

II 29 16 27 19 8 1 3 2 9 15

Nov I 29.9 17.1 51 8.3 3.6 5 9 10 7 2 7 9 9 42

II 31 12 34 25 7 1 1 1 2 17

Dec I 25.4 12.6 60 2.8 3.6 5 7 13 5 1 5 7 8 49

II 37 10 39 30 6 1 1 1 2 10

Annual

Total or

Mean

I 42.3 11.5 53 -- 6 7 9 5 2 13 23 15 20

II 35 693.90 16 22 15 4 2 9 14 12 6


15

From the climatologically data following three conditions are chosen for modeling VCE/BLEVE

scenarios & finding “Back Fire” potential.

I II III

Very Stable Atmosphere

(Pasquill Stability Class A)

Neutral Atmosphere

(Pasquill Stability Class D)

Un-stable Atmosphere

(Pasquill Stability Class F)

Velocity = 1 m/s Velocity = 2 m/s Velocity = 4 m/s

RESULTS OF MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT (MCA) ANALYSIS

Identified Maximum Credible Accident scenarios (MCA‟s) or Maximum credible loss scenario‟s

(MCLS) for HPCL LPG plant are BLEVE, VCE and jet /Back fire. Among these three scenarios

BLEVE will lead to damage the property of plant and / or may affect the neighboring facilities. The

LPG plant is surrounded by farmlands.

Effect of VCE and BLEVE will fall beyond the plant boundary and affect the neighboring farmland. As

the plant in its all directions are surrounded by farmlands. Special care needed to be taken by the

plant officials while running the plant by handling and storage of LPG.

However, chances of occurrence of BLEVE and VCE are rarest of rare.

Mounded Storage (Vessels):

Mounded storage of LPG i.e. creating a sand mound around the LPG storage vessels, which are

placed above the ground level, is now increasingly being considered by HPCL as the best solution for

protecting LPG vessels from BLEVE.

The mounded storage system provides the following advantages:

1. LPG stored in the form of mounded storage eliminates the possibility of BLEVE.

2. The cover of the mound protects the vessel from fire engulfment, radiation from a fire in close proximity and acts of sabotage or vandalism. Water cooling systems are not required.

3. The area of land required to locate a mounded system is minimal compared to conventional storage.

4. The mounded storage of LPG has proved to be safer compared to above ground vessels as it provides intrinsically passive & safe environment.

In addition, the mounding material provides good protection against most of the external influences

like flying objects and pressure waves from explosions. Figure below show representative drawing of

mounded storage.


16

1.3. BACKFIRE POTENTIAL DUE TO CONTINEOUS RELEASE OF LPG FROM SOURCE

1.3.1. Continuous release:

The most probable case could be that of a continuous release. Any leakage in the system would

result in to a continuous release and the plume may travel down wind. Analyzing downwind

concentration, it has been found that LPG quantity in air is well within Upper & Lower Explosion

Limits (UEL & LEL) up to a considerable distance. Ignition of this plume may cause a backfire. This

analysis shows the distances up to which the plume is within LEL; backfire may occur if the plume

comes in contact with an ignition source. The results are tabulated in Table 10.

TABLE 10

BACKFIRE POTENTIAL DUE TO CONTINUOUS RELEASE OF LPG

Bore

sizes

(mm)

Outflow

Rate

(Kg/s)

Wind Conditions*

I II III

Quantity

within

LEL &

UEL (KG)

Distance

Range for

Concentration

within LEL &

UEL

Quantity

within

LEL &

UEL (KG)

Distance

Range for

Concentration

within LEL &

UEL

Quantity

within

LEL &

UEL (KG)

Distance

Range for

Concentration

within LEL &

UEL

10 1.84 139 69-192 16.5 18-46 2.42 5-14

50 46.10 27000 536-1493 2860 122-321 396 35-89

LEL: = 1.90E-2(1.9 x 10-2); UEL = 9.50E-2(=9.50 x 10-2)

Wind Conditions*:

I II III

Very Stable Atmosphere Neutral Atmosphere Un-stable Atmosphere



17

1.3.2. Unconfined Vapour Cloud Explosion (UVCE)

Vapor Cloud can ignite and burn as deflagration or fire balls causing lot of damage by radiation

starting secondary fires at some distance. Vapor Cloud ignites and explodes causing high over

pressures and very heavy damage. The later is termed as “Percussive unconfined Vapor Cloud

Explosion” i.e. PUVCE in short.

Various meteorological conditions (as mentioned above) have been considered for analyzing drifting

& dilution of a vapor cloud, so that all probable consequences of a vapor cloud explosion can be

foreseen. Worst come worst, there may be instantaneous release of the entire LPG vapor present in

the unit. If it comes in to contact of an ignition source during or immediately after the release or as in

a case of backfire resulting in jet fire, it may lead to a BLEVE.

Otherwise, the second MCA scenario is drifting & dilution of a vapor cloud along the wind and then

coming into contact of an ignition source (i.e., case of delayed ignition), leading to a VCE. This

scenario is particularly important to identify unforeseen OFF-SITE emergencies.

Instantaneous Release:

As the vapor cloud drifts in the wind direction, it may explode depending on the quantity of LPG

present within flammability limits and availability of ignition source. Applying the pertinent models,

quantity of LPG within flammability limits for various downwind distances have been calculated for

above mentioned wind conditions. If this ignition mixture will catch fire from any ignition source may

get explode.

LPG Tank Lorry Decantation (TLD) bay

6 bays are provided for unloading at time within bottling plant. The hazard distances in respect of

catastrophic failure of LPG Tank Truck of 17 MT capacity tanker was calculated and tabulated as

below:

TABLE 11

VCE SCENARIO - CLOUD DRIFTING, DILUTION & QUANTITY OF LPG WITHIN UEL & LEL

FOR INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE OF LPG FROM CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE 17 MT

TRUCK TANKER.

Distance

From

Source

Very Stable Wind (V = 1 m/s) Neutral atmosphere Wind (V =

2 m/s)

unstable atmosphere

Wind (V = 4 m/s)

Percent

%

Qnty.

(Kg)

Max.

Conc.

(m3/m

3)

Percent

%

Qnty.

(Kg)

Max.

Conc.

(m3/m

3)

Percent

%

Qnty.

(Kg)

Max.

Conc.

(m3/m

3)

75 11.6 2086 1.28E+00 15.5 2796 9.00E-01 24.5 4404 5.10E-01

The hazard distances for overpressure and flash fire due to Tank Truck and failure for wind velocities

1m/s and very stable atmosphere, 2m/s & Neutral atmosphere, 4m/s & unstable atmosphere are

given in below Table 12.


18

TABLE 12

HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO FAILURE OF TANK TRUCK OF CAPACITY 17 MT

Failure cases Wind speed/

Stability

Hazard distances (m)

LFL 0.3bar 0.1bar 0.03bar 0.01bar

Tank truck Failure (17

MT)

1m/s/A 2086 200.5 473.5 1393 4006

2m/sD 2796

4m/sF 4404

Wind Conditions:

I II III

Very Stable Atmosphere (Pasquill

Stability Class A)

Neutral Atmosphere (Pasquill

Stability Class D)

Un-stable Atmosphere (Pasquill

Stability Class F)


TABLE 13

DAMAGE DISTANCE DUE TO VCE FOR FAILURE OF TANK TRUCK (17 MT)

S.No. Unit LPG Tanker

1. Service LPG

2. Max. Outflow quantity (MT) 17

3. Accident Scenario VCE

4. Quantity within UEL & LEL (KG) 2086 2796 4404

5. Effect of Wind: Chosen wind condition

I

II

III

6. Duration of fire ball (s) 6.2 6.7 7.5

7. Dia. of cloud (m) 77.7 85.4 99

8. Max. Intensity of Heat Radiation at center of

the cloud (KW/m2) 206.2 206.2 206.2

9.

Damage Distance (m) for heat radiation (from center of fireball)

Severe damage to life & property (100% Lethality)

37.75 42.75 49.5

100% Lethality (37.5 KW/m2) 75.81 83.1 95.96

50% Lethality (25 KW/m2) 96.04 105.186 121.15

1% Lethality (12.5 KW/m2) 127.6 140.02 160.975

First degree burns (4.5 KW/m2) 214.64 230.92 267.67

First degree burns (1.6 KW/m2) 362.84 398.33 461.74

Above Ground Storage Tank

LPG from Truck tankers is transferred to the bullets LPG storage tanks for storage differential

pressure method. The hazard distances in respect of catastrophic failure of above ground storage

tank is calculated and tabulated as below.


19

TABLE 14

VCE SCENARIO - CLOUD DRIFTING, DILUTION & QUANTITY OF LPG WITHIN UEL & LEL FOR

INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE OF LPG FROM CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE ABOVE

GROUND BULLET OF 159 MT

Distance From Source

Very Stable Wind (V = 1 m/s) Very Stable Wind (V = 2 m/s) Very Stable Wind (V = 4 m/s)

Percent %

Qnty. (Kg)

Max. Conc. (m

3/m

3)

Percent %

Qnty. (Kg)

Max. Conc. (m

3/m

3)

Percent %

Qnty. (Kg)

Max. Conc. (m

3/m

3)

75 9.6 15192 1.61E+00 11.6 18435 1.28E+00 21.4 33991 6.06E-01

100 10.7 16939 1.41E+00 13.6 21642 1.06E+00 27.9 44361 4.30E-01

125 11.8 18742 1.25E+00 15.8 25081 8.84E-01 34.9 55494 3.14E-01

150 13.0 20599 1.12E+00 18.1 28738 7.48E-01 42.1 66942 2.41E-01

175 14.2 22510 1.01E+00 20.5 32600 6.39E-01 49.1 78101 1.88E-01

The hazard distances for overpressure and flash fire due to bullets rupture and failure for wind

velocities 1m/s and very stable atmosphere, 2m/s & Neutral atmosphere, 4m/s & unstable

atmosphere are given in below Table 15.

TABLE 15

HAZARD DISTANCES FOR INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE OF LPG FROM CATASTROPHIC

FAILURE OF THE ABOVE GROUND BULLET OF 159 MT


Stability

Hazard distances (M)


Failure of Above

ground bullets 1m/s/A 15192 Kg 277 591 1623 4542

2m/sD 18435 Kg 296 630 1731 3215

4m/sF 33991 Kg 363 773 2123 5941

Wind Conditions:

I II III


Stability Class A)


Stability Class D)


Stability Class F)


TABLE 16

DAMAGE DISTANCE DUE TO VCE IN CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE ABOVE GROUND

BULLET OF 159 MT

SN Unit LPG Bullet

1. Service LPG

2. Max. Outflow quantity (Kg) 159000



5. Effect of Wind:


20

Chosen wind condition I II III

6. Duration of fire ball (s) 10.4 11 12.8

7. Dia. of cloud (m) 148.1 157.7 192.4

8. Max. Intensity of Heat Radiation at center of the

cloud (KW/m2)

218.3 218.3 218.3

9. Damage Distance (m) for heat radiation (from center of fireball)

10. Severe damage to life & property (100% Lethality) 109.15 78.65 96.2

11. 100% Lethality (37.5 KW/m2) 145.64 154.81 187.87

12. 50% Lethality (25 KW/m2) 185.51 196.95 238.19

13. 1% Lethality (12.5 KW/m2) 247.23 262.47 316.32

14. First degree burns (4.5 KW/m2) 419.02 446.18 537.73

A combination of fire and explosion, sometimes referred as fireball, due to pipeline rupture with an

intense radiant heat emission in a relatively shorts time interval along with generation of heavy

pressure waves and flying fragments of the vessel. This heat intensity is sufficient to cause severe

skin burns and deaths at several hundred meters from the unit, depending on the quantity of the

Liquid involved. Explosions are characterized by a shock-wave, which can cause damage to

buildings, breaking windows and ejecting missiles over distances of several hundred meters. however

this is not consider as credible incident

FIGURE 1: DAMAGE DISTANCE DUE TO VCE IN A/G BULLET OF CAPACITY 159 MT


21

TABLE 17






Percent %

Qnty. (Kg)

Max. Conc. (m

3/m

3)

Percent %

Qnty. (Kg)

Max. Conc. (m

3/m

3)

Percent %

Qnty. (Kg)

Max. Conc. (m

3/m

3)

75 1.2 10053 1.50E+00 12.7 12596 1.15E+00 25 24709 4.97E-01

100 11.5 11370 1.29E+00 15.2 15088 9.21E-01 33.1 32761 3.41E-01

125 12.9 12736 1.13E+00 18.0 17777 7.24E-01 41.6 41194 2.45E-01

150 14.3 14149 9.96E-01 20.9 20647 6.25E-01 49.9 49407 1.83E-01

175 15.8 15068 8.84E-01 23.9 23680 5.25E-01 57.1 56502 1.40E-01

The hazard distances for overpressure and flash fire due to Bullet rupture and failure for wind

velocities 1m/s and very stable atmosphere, 2m/s & Neutral atmosphere, 4m/s & unstable

atmosphere are given in below Table 18.

TABLE 18




Stability



Rupture of Horton

Sphere 1m/s/A 10053 kg 242 515 1414 3958

2m/sD 12596 kg 260 555 1525 4267

4m/sF 24709 kg 326 695 1909 5341

Wind Conditions:

I II III


Stability Class A)


Stability Class D)


Stability Class F)


TABLE 19

DAMAGE DISTANCE DUE TO VCE IN CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF ABOVE GROUND BULLET

OF 99 MT

SN Unit LPG BULLET

1. Service LPG





22

5. Effect of Wind:

Chosen wind condition

I

II

III


7. Dia. of cloud (m) 129.5 139.4 173.5


cloud (KW/m2)

218.3 218.3 218.3


10. Severe damage to life & property (100% Lethality) 64.75 69.7 86.75

11. 100% Lethality (37.5 KW/m2) 127.78 137.32 169.87 12. 50% Lethality (25 KW/m2) 163.15 175.04 215.78 13. 1% Lethality (12.5 KW/m2) 217.75 233.6 287.41 14. First degree burns (4.5 KW/m2) 373.62 394.24 479.35



23

TABLE 20






Percent %

Qnty. (Kg)

Max. Conc. (m

3/m

3)

Percent %

Qnty. (Kg)

Max. Conc. (m

3/m

3)

Percent %

Qnty. (Kg)

Max. Conc. (m

3/m

3)

75 10.3 9261 1.47E+00 13 11684 1.15E+00 25.8 23204 4.77E-01

100 11.7 10506 1.27E+00 15.6 14054 8.95E-01 34.3 30846 3.25E-01

125 13.1 11798 1.11E+00 18.5 16615 7.28E-01 43.1 38788 2.32E-01

150 14.6 13137 9.71E-01 21.5 19349 6.02E-01 51.5 46387 1.72E-01

175 16.1 14520 8.60E-01 24.7 22237 5.04E-01 58.5 52650 1.32E-01

.

TABLE 21




Stability



Rupture of Horton

Sphere 1m/s/A 9261 kg 235 501 1376 3851

2m/sD 11684 kg 254 541 1487 4161

4m/sF 23204 kg 319 681 1869 5231

Wind Conditions:

I II III


Stability Class A)


Stability Class D)


Stability Class F)


TABLE 22

DAMAGE DISTANCE DUE TO VCE IN CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF ABOVE GROUND BULLET

OF 90 MT

SN Unit LPG BULLET

1. Service LPG




5. Effect of Wind:

Chosen wind condition

I

II

III


7. Dia. of cloud (m) 126.1 136 169.7


24


cloud (KW/m2)

218.3 218.3 218.3


10. Severe damage to life & property (100% Lethality) 63.05 68 84.85

11. 100% Lethality (37.5 KW/m2) 124.53 134.08 166.3 12. 50% Lethality (25 KW/m2) 159.01 170.98 211.32 13. 1% Lethality (12.5 KW/m2) 212.03 228 281.21 14. First degree burns (4.5 KW/m2) 363.79 384.74 468.97



25

1.3.3. Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE) Scenario For LPG Tank Truck,

Bullets and Horton Sphere.

The phenomenon of BLEVE results in to the sudden rupture of vessel/Tank Truck containing liquefied

flammable gas under pressure due to fire impingement. The immediate ignition of the expanding fuel

air mixture leads to the intense combustion creating a fireball. In the event of fireball following shell

failure of LPG Pipeline & Tank Truck, the fireball size and duration will be shown below:

TABLE 23

DAMAGE DISTANCE DUE TO BLEVE FOR FAILURE OF TANK TRUCK (17 MT)

S. No. Unit LPGTanker17MT

1 Service LPG

2 Max. Outflow quantity (MT) 17

3 Accident Scenario BLEVE

4 Duration of fire ball (s) 10.9

5 Dia. of cloud (m) 156.5

6 Max. Intensity of Heat Radiation at center of the cloud (KW/m2) 206.2

7 Damage Distance (m) for heat radiation (from center of fireball)

Severe damage to life & property (100% Lethality) Damage of glass 78.25

100% Lethality (37.5 KW/m2) 149.6

50% Lethality (25 KW/m2) 187.16

1% Lethality (12.5 KW/m2) 247.14

First degree burns (4.5 KW/m2) 402.47

No discomfort (1.6 KW/m2) 726.61

8 Damage Distance for Pressure Wave (from center of fireball)

Heavy (90%) (0.3 bar) 200.5

Repairable (10%) (0.1 bar) 473.5

Damage of glass (0.03 bar) 1393

Crack of Windows (0.01 bar) 4006

For BLEVE in 17MT LPG Truck Tanker, the radius of fireball would be about 78.25 m and duration of

fireball 10.9 sec. All persons inside the fireball diameter are likely to be killed, (indoors &outdoors).

There will be 100% lethality upto 149.6m from the LPG tanker, whereas 50%lethality and 1% lethality

or severe burns will be up to 187.16m & 247.14 m respectively. It is estimated that first-degree burn

will be up to 402.27 m. There will not be any discomfort after 726.61 m. this is remote possibility,

however this is not consider as credible incident.

TABLE 24

DAMAGE DISTANCE DUE TO BLEVE FOR RUPTURE OF 159 MT ABOVE GROUND BULLET

S. No.

Unit LPG Withdrawal from Bullets

1 Service LPG

2 Max. Outflow quantity (kg) 78500



26

S. No.


4 Duration of fire ball (s) 16


6 Max. Intensity of Heat Radiation at center of the cloud

(KW/m2)

218.3


Severe damage to life & property (100% Lethality) Damage of glass

126.3

100% Lethality (37.5 KW/m2) 244.62

50% Lethality (25 KW/m2) 308.66

1% Lethality (12.5 KW/m2) 409.98


For BLEVE due to rupture of Rupture of 159 MT above Ground Bullet, the radius of fireball would be about 126.3m and duration of fireball 16 sec. All persons inside the fireball diameter are likely to be killed, (indoors &outdoors). There will be 100% lethality up to 244.62 m from the A/G Bullet, whereas 50% lethality and 1% lethality or severe burns will be up to 308.66 m & 409.98 m respectively. It is estimated that first-degree burn will be up to 682.7 m this is remote possibility, however this is not consider as credible incident

FIGURE 4: DAMAGE DISTANCE DUE TO BLEVE IN A/G BULLET OF CAPACITY 159 MT


27

TABLE 25


S. No.


1 Service LPG






(KW/m2)

218.3



108.7

100% Lethality (37.5 KW/m2) 211.52

50% Lethality (25 KW/m2) 267.65

1% Lethality (12.5 KW/m2) 355.77


For BLEVE due to rupture of Rupture of 99 MT above Ground Bullet, the radius of fireball would be

about 108.7 m and duration of fireball 14.2 sec. All persons inside the fireball diameter are likely to be

killed, (indoors &outdoors). There will be 100% lethality up to 211.52 m from the A/G Bullet, whereas

50% lethality and 1% lethality or severe burns will be up to 267.65 m & 355.77 m respectively. It is

estimated that first-degree burn will be up to 587.68 m this is remote possibility, however this is not

consider as credible incident


28

FIGURE 5: DAMAGE DISTANCE DUE TO BLEVE IN A/G BULLET OF CAPACITY 99 MT

TABLE 26


S. No.


1 Service LPG






(KW/m2)

218.3



105.4

100% Lethality (37.5 KW/m2) 205.29

50% Lethality (25 KW/m2) 259.81

1% Lethality (12.5 KW/m2) 345.39


For BLEVE due to rupture of Rupture of 90 MT above Ground Bullet, the radius of fireball would be

about 105.4 m and duration of fireball 13.8 sec. All persons inside the fireball diameter are likely to be


29

killed, (indoors &outdoors). There will be 100% lethality up to 205.29 m from the A/G Bullet, whereas

50% lethality and 1% lethality or severe burns will be up to 259.81 m & 345.39 m respectively. It is

estimated that first-degree burn will be up to 569.73 m this is remote possibility, however this is not

consider as credible incident

FIGURE 6: DAMAE DISTANCE DUE TO BLEVE IN A/G BULLET OF CAPACITY 90 MT

1.3.4. Secondary or Domino Effects

A fire or explosion in one facility may lead to another one; the effects of this nature are called

Secondary or Domino effects.

However in case of major LPG leakage or rupture/failure of facility handling LPG in the bottling plant

and the plume traveling in down wind direction may meet an ignition source and due to backfire

phenomenon severe damage to the LPG bottling plant may occur.

Referring the damage distances for BLEVE/VCE; it is possible that fire or explosion in one segment

of the plant may cause adverse impact to the other segments of the plant.

1.3.5. Analysis for Propensity towards Predicted Consequences

Risk of operation of any activity involving hazardous chemicals consists of the following two elements:

1. Consequences of certain unwanted event &


30

2. Propensity that these consequences will occur

Propensity or likelihood of the predicted consequence for the LPG bottling plant will depend upon the

following items:

1. Propensity of the LPG bottling plant towards occurrence of initiating event

2. Propensity that the designed counter measures provided in the LPG bottling plant would fail

3. Propensity of certain consequence of an accident

1.3.6. Propensity of the LPG Bottling Plant towards Occurrence of Such Initiating Event

The event could be a single component failure, for example, leakage of LPG from pipeline or any

equipment or any tank. To evaluate this aspect for the LPG bottling plant Risk Analysis has been

carried out.

PROPENSITY OF FAILURE OF THE DESIGNED COUNTER MEASURES

Upon occurrence of the initiating event, certain designed counter measures in the LPG bottling plant

would start functioning for example sprinkler system will get activated as the temperature rises above

79 deg (Quartzoid bulb fitted); isolation of the affected area from other areas by the personnel by

closing the valves to restrict the quantity of escaping petroleum; on hearing the emergency alarm the

emergency team would immediately start functioning and take the necessary action to restrict or limit

the damage. On the contrary these counter measures may fail also. Therefore a lot would depend on

response of the emergency team.

PROPENSITY OF A CERTAIN CONSEQUENCE OF AN ACCIDENT

Any initiating event would take place first, there after the designed counter measures would attempt

to limit the effects of the initiating event. Such deviations from the intended operation may lead to an

accident. In reality, accident scenario and severity of the consequences will depend on type of LPG

release, quantity of the LPG involved, location of the Bulk Unloading Shed/Pump shed/LPG filling

shed/Filled LPG cylinder shed/Liquid or Vapor line etc.), availability of ignition source, response of

emergency systems and emergency team, weather conditions (wind velocity & direction), etc. Further

propensity of being killed or injured would also depend on the aspects like time of accident and

number of people in damage area in that time.

FAILURE FREQUENCY DATA

1. For process/ pressure vessel, failure frequency for shell is 3 per million per year whereas for

pressurized storage vessel, the failure frequency is 1 per million per year.

2. For Full Bore Vessel Connection Failure of different diameters, failure frequency is as follows:

3. For Full Bore Process Pipeline Failure of different diameters, failure frequency is as follows:

Diameter, mm d 50 50<d<150 d 150

Failure Frequency (per meter per million per year) 0.3 0.09 0.03

4. In case of valves, for full bore hole sizes, leak frequency is 10-5 per valve year; for hole size of

10% of cross-sectional area of valve, leak frequency is 10-4 per valve year and for hole size of

1% of cross-sectional area, leak frequency is 10-3 per valve year.

Diameter, mm 25 40 50 80 100 150

Failure Frequency (per million per year) 30 10 7.5 5.0 4.0 3.0


31

5. In cases of flanges for section leak similar to the leak of 1% cross sectional area of the pipe

work where the flange is located, leak frequency is 10-4 per flange year, whereas for minor leak

which has 10% of the cross sectional area of a section leak, leak frequency is 10-3 per flange

year.

1.3.7. Frequency Estimation for Occurrence of MCA Scenarios

Based on this data, frequency for occurrence of various MCA scenarios is estimated.

Applying equipment failure rate data and ignition probability data probability values have been

estimated for consequences of various MCA scenarios.

TABLE 27

PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF THE IDENTIFIED ACCIDENT SCENARIOS

SN Accident Scenario Probability

1. Minor LPG Leakage 10+1

2. Major LPG leakage 2.1 x 10-2

3. Major LPG leakage causing Back fire (plume moving in down wind direction

catching fire) 1 x 10

-4

4. Jet fire in pipeline/equipment (other than storage area) 5.7 x 10-4

5. Jet fire in pipeline (storage area) 2.4 x 10-4

6. Jet fire in Sphere 8.3 x 10-4

7. Vapor Cloud Explosion due to major release of LPG from pipeline/equipment

other than storage unit 4.2 x 10

-5

8. Vapor Cloud Explosion due to major release of LPG from storage unit 9.5 x 10-5

9. BLEVE in Bullet / road tanker 8.9 x 10-6

1.4. Risk Acceptability Criteria

There is no clearly numerical value defined and prescribed as to the risk acceptability criterion in our

country. However mostly accepted criteria for an accident scenario having significant damage

potential is “Frequency should not be more than 10-6” as prescribed in other standard text (TNO,

Purple Book & US standard published text).

Risk can be seen as relating to the Probability of uncertain future events. Risk is defined as

“multiplication of the probable frequency and probable magnitude of future loss” (combined effect).

The risk is also made "as low as reasonably practicable" (ALARP) and it is having reasonable impact

on neighbourhood. Hence, considerable measures being taken to mitigate the possible accident

scenarios. While conducting the risk analysis, a quantitative determination of risk involves three major

steps:-


32

IRPA (Individual Risk per Annum):

IRPA

10-3/yr

10-4/yr

10-5/yr

10-6/yr

Intolerable

The ALARP or Tolerable

region (Risk is tolerated only)

Broadly Acceptable region

(no need for detailed working todemonstrate ALARP)

Fundamental improvements needed.Only to be considered if there are no

alternatives and people are well informed

Too high, significant effort required toimprove

High, investigate alternatives

Low, consider cost-effective alternatives

Negligible, maintain normal precautions

NOTE- A risk of 10 per million per year or 10-5/Year; effectively means that any person standing at a

point of this level of risk would have a 1 in 100 000 chance of being fatally injured per year.

It can be seen that, the probability / frequency of occurrence of BLEVE in storage unit or transporting

unit is 8.9 x 10-6. Hence, as per IRPA, the risk is coming under “Broadly Acceptable region” which

require maintaining normal precautions within the plant (Occurrence rarest of rare).

Individual Risk Criteria for Public

Societal Risk

It is the risk experience in a given time period by the whole group of personnel exposed, reflecting the

severity of the hazard and the number of people in proximity to it. It is defined as the relationship

between the frequency and the number of people suffering a given level of harm (normally taken to

refer to risk of death) from the realization of the specified hazards. It is expressed in the form of F-N

curve. There is no locality/residence surrounding to the LPG plant. The risk is coming under “Broadly

Acceptable region” which require maintaining normal precautions within the plant (Occurrence rarest

of rare).

Uncertainty Surrounding Consequence Analysis

Analytical and mathematical models employed in quantification of damage distances are based on

many considerations, which have been discussed earlier. In many cases, very general data is

available on component and equipment failures, for which statistical accuracy is often poor.

Probability data has been found quite subjective, so that, when combined in a fault tree or event tree

the incident frequencies thus computed may not have a higher confidence range.


33

Consequences of the Identified Accident Scenarios: Summary

1. LPG leakage may lead to back fire; however it is less likely that the leaked gas would find an

ignition source within the plant.

2. Due to backfire a jet fire may be caused at the source of leakage. (i.e, traveling back of the fire

from source of ignition to the place of release/leakage of LPG.)

3. If the jet fire is impinging/heating the liquid/vapor LPG containing pipeline/ equipment/storage unit;

it may escalate the accident potential to BLEVE/VCE.

4. Massive release of LPG (cloud) may lead to VCE at a place where it comes in contact with an

ignition source.

5. Pressure wave effect of BLEVE/VCE may collapse other structures in the plant.

However, considering the LPG alarms, fire hydrant points, water monitors, automatic sprinkler

system, fire extinguishers, process safety alarms provided in the LPG bottling plant as per OISD

norms, reduce the chances of escalation of fire or explosion.

6. It is found that the inter unit distance of the LPG Facility & Utilities such as air compressor, MCC

Room, etc are as per OISD 118(II)/ &144. Referring the damage distances for BLEVE/VCE; it is

possible that fire or explosion in one segment of the plant may cause adverse impact to the

Utilities of the plant. But considering the safety measures available at the plant, probability of

occurrence of such accidents is rare rest of rare.

7. Likely number of people affected by the identified accident scenario will depend on many factors

(e.g. time, wind direction, atmospheric stability, availability of ignition source, domino effect etc.).

A detailed survey of the LPG bottling plant has been carried out and recommendations have been

made separately to improve safety based on risk evaluation.

1.4.1. General Hazards

Slips, trips and fall

Unguarded machinery

Working in confined space

Moving machinery, on-site transport, forklifts and cranes

Exposure to controlled and uncontrolled energy source

Inhalable agents (gases, vapors, dusts and fumes)

Noise and Vibration

Electrical burns and shock

Manual handling and repetitive work

Failure due to automation

Ergonomics


34

1.4.2. Preventive measures for hazardous energy

Preparation for shutdown

Equipment isolation

Lock-out and tag out application

1.5. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH

Occupational health needs attention both during construction and erection and operation and

maintenance phases. However, the problem varies both magnitude and variety in the above phases.

Operation and Maintenance

The problem of occupational health, in the operation and maintenance phase is due to noise hearing

losses. Suitable personnel protective equipment will be given to employees. The working personnel

will be given the following appropriate personnel protective equipment:

Industrial safety helmet: crash helmet.

Face shield with replacement acrylic vision.

Zero power goggles with cut type filters on both sides and blue color glasses.

Welders equipment for eye and face protection.

Cylindrical type earplug, Ear muffs, Canister Gas mask.

Self-contained breathing apparatus.

Safety belt

Leather/rubberized hand gloves

Electrically tested electrical resistance hand gloves

Industrial safety shoos with steel toe, and

Electrical safety shoes without steel toe and gumboots.

1.6. SAFETY PLAN

1.6.1. General

All work place, aisles and work surrounding areas will be kept clean and free from all obstructions.

On completion of job, all tools, equipment, left over materials will removed to proper places for

storage.

Waste, oily rags and other inflammable materials will be kept in proper places.

Slippery substance such as grease or oil if spilled on floor will be cleaned immediately or at least

covered with sand, saw-dust or anti-slippery materials units it is cleaned.

Nails, planks with protruding nails and such sharp objectives will not be left on the floor.

1.6.2. Wearing apparel

No person working on or near moving machinery will wear loose clothing such as shirts with dangling

sleeves, gloves and jewelry like rings, ear-ring, wrist-rings and chain lockets etc. all persons engaged


35

in oiling or cleaning of machinery will put on tight fitting cloths shoes and boots must be properly

laced.

1.6.3. Fire Fighting and Protective Equipment

Protective equipment and safety appliance like goggles, face shields, aprons, gloves, safety boots,

helmets, respirators, gas masks etc, are issued for personal protection for jobs, where special

hazards exists and these will be used by workers where provided, while engaged on such work.

TABLE 28

FIRE FIGHTING AND PPE

Sl. No.

Total Requirement Available with Installation

Neighboring Units

Civil Authorities

1 FIRE FIGHTING APPLIANCES/EQUIPMENT‟S/CHEMICALS

Firefighting engines 6 Available Available

Water storage capacity 7200 KL (2 Tanks)

Available Available

Fire Housed 52 Available Available

Jet/Fog/Spray Nozzles 8 Available Available

Foam Branch Not Applicable

Available Available

Jumbo jet Nozzles 2 Available Available

Foam Compound (KL) Not applicable Not Applicable Not required

2 SAFETY EQUIPMENT‟S

PVC Suit 2 nos. Available Available

Refill Cylinders for B.A. Set 2 nos. Available Available

Fire Proximity Suit 2 nos. Available Available

3 COMMUNICATION

Walkie-Talkie 12 nos. Available Available

Public Address System 2 nos. Available Available

Megaphone 1 Available Available

4 TRANSPORT

Jeeps Qualis 1 Available Available

Boats Nil Nil Nil

5 MISCELLANEOUS

Ropes (Metres) 50

Empty durms 20 Available Available

Buckets 13 Available Available

Sand bags 45 Available Available

Dewaterings pump Nil Nil Nil

Pneumatic pump Nil Nil Nil

Photo Camera 1 Available Available

Video Camera Nil Nil Nil

6 EQUIPMENT‟S FOR CORPS DISPOSAL

Light Metal Stretchers 2 Available Available

Rubber gloves 2 Available Available

1.7. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS.

Administrative controls largely involve the development of safe working practices procedures. These

controls may include:

Rescheduling hot work to cooler parts of the day and maintenance to cooler seasons.


36

Encouraging workers to take short breaks.

Allowing new workers or workers returning from holidays to acclimatize to the heat.

Decreasing heat exposure duration e.g. by rotation of workers.

Consider job sharing/rotation or using extra workers.

Screen workers for heat intolerance (e.g. those with heart and blood pressure problems or

previous heat illness).

Training of workers in the hazards associated with working in heat and recognizing heat

related illnesses, safe work practices, control measures and the use and maintenance of

personal protective equipment.

1.8. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)

Where exposure to heat cannot be prevented or reduced by any other form of control, all exposed

persons must be provided with PPE. PPE may be used in addition to other control measures.

PPE designed to protect persons in hot environment will include:

Eye wear, such as ultra-violet glasses

Non-flammable and heat reflective clothing and equipment protective gloves and footwear.

1.9. RISK MANAGEMENT & INSURANCE PLANNING

Identification of all major internal and external pure risks including the natural risks and

analysis of the impact of above risks.

Scrutiny of all existing major insurance policies in respect of;

Rationalization of basic rate of premium and widening of covers

Applicability/eligibility of discounts in premium.

Application of suitable clauses, warranties and conditions

Identification of possible areas for refund of premium and suggestions regarding procedure for

the same.

Selection of insurance coverage on the basis of risk analysis

Providing guidelines on documentation requirements, procedures for claims under various

policies, evaluation of insures.

Risk assessment including prediction of the worst case scenario and maximum credible

accident scenario will be carried out. The worst case scenario is taken into account the

maximum inventory of storage at site at any point in time.

Calculation of Cooling Water Requirement during any emergency in plant:

At HPCL, LPG Bottling Plant, there are four above ground Bullets equipped for storage of LPG. Fire

water requirement during any emergency to be available with Kota LPG Plant is calculated as below:

Since LPG is highly inflammable & explosive and is stored under pressurized condition. As alternate

power supply; Six Diesel operated Fire Fighting Pumps provided for parallel operation of water

pumping in the Fire Hydrant Main Ring. Each Fire Engine is capable of delivering 410 KL/hour, two


37

nos. of Jokey pumps of 25 m3/Hr capacities each for Maintaining Hydrant Pressure above 7 kg/cm2&

Two Fire Water Static Storage Tanks having Total capacity of each 3700 m3.

Cooling water rate requirement as per OISD – 144 = 10 LPM/m2 for storage vessels

Cooling water rate requirement as per OISD – 144 = 20 LPM/m2 for pump house

Calculation of Cooling Water Rate (as per OISD – 144 and other standards) required for

various facilities in the Plant

A. Calculation of Largest Risk Area:

Effective Surface area calculation for various areas

TABLE 29

FACILITY WISE FIRE WATER CALCULATION

Facility wise fire water calculation: Facility

Surface area (M2)

Spray density (LPM/M2)

Water requirement (m3/hr)

LPG Bullets (4 Nos.) 1050 10 630

LPG Pump/com. Shed 120 20 144

Bulk Unloading Shed 384 10 230

Filling Shed 2112 10 1267

Filled Cylinder Shed 1157 10 694

Cold Repair (Valve Change) Shed

352 10 211

Cylinder Unloading/loading Shed

126 82 82

From Above table, it is found that “Filled Shed” having largest area as compared to others. Hence,

largest Risk Area is “Filled Shed”.

B. Calculation of Water requirement at the rate of water consumption for 4 Hrs (Sprinklers +

Monitors):

Sprinkler Flow = 10 Lit/Min/Sq M

SINGLE LARGEST RISK Single largest risk area (“Filled Shed”) =1267 M2. Water required for single largest risk area = 1256 M3/hr. Water For supplementary hose stream Protection=288 M3/hr Total Water Requirement as per OISD = 1555 M3/hr PUMP & STORAGE AREA No. of main pumps required = 1555/410 = 3.79 say 4 = 4 nos. No. of spare pumps = 2 nos. Water required (for 4 hrs. = 4 X 410) = 6560 m3. Capacity of each pump = 410 m3/hr.


38

Water storage capacity (3600 m3+3600 m3) = 7200 m3. No. of jockey pumps = 2 nos.

TABLE 38

FIRE WATER STORAGE IN PLANT

Capacity of each jockey pump = 25 M3/hr.

Actual

Required Shortfall

Water storage 7200 M3 6560 M3 NIL

Main fire pumps 4 NOs. NIL NIL

Spare fire pumps 2 NOs. NIL NIL

Jockey pump 2 NO. NIL NIL

Hence, Total Water Storage quantity is sufficient.

RECOMMENDATIONS

M/s HPCL, LPG plant is having good conditions of housekeeping, electrical distributions of wires,

maintenance schedules, maintenance of inspection and testing records, etc. regular training to

employees and to new joiners also being provided. Regular safety meetings are carried out involving

the issues related to safety of plant and employees / workers.

Based on site visit and risk analysis study results, following are the recommendations suggested to

HPCL for efficient operation & production and for safety of plant. These are:-

Plant Practices & House Keeping:

1. Shrubs & Grass /vegetation near Storage area should be removed regularly.

2. First Aid Box must be in place at define and strategic locations. It must contain basic medical

kit components which are in good condition to use and must have Anti Snake Serum.

3. Emergency Contact No. should be updated on regular basis.

4. Weeds, grass, shrubs or any combustible material should be removed from the plant premise

or kept at remote dedicated yard for disposal.

5. At the time of field visit it is observed that water from the reservoir outsite the plant is routed

through the plant. So there is a chance of Water logging inside the plant due uncertain inflow

of external water resources / reservoirs. Uncertain inflows of water inside the plant to be

manage properly by implicating best engineering practices to avoid the further operational

problem.

6. It is also observed that from wind data record analysis, LPG plant area is falls under the prone

to heavy wind. Due care should be taken to avoid blowing of roof on various sheds in plant

and to avoid hazards due to roofs.


39

For Safe Operational Practices:

7. It is recommended to follow the regular maintenance schedules of LPG handling and storage

facilities.

8. All firefighting facilities and PPE‟s should be maintained in good conditions and should be

inspected regularly.

9. Mock drill and safety awareness training must be practiced at regular interval and be

documented.

10. Total turnaround of plant must be done at obvious time to appraise integrity of all equipment

,valves and other strategic installations

Others:

11. Documentation of available firefighting facilities withal Mutual aid members must be

maintained and it should be renewed timely or after any significant or major change in

available facilities.

12. Mutual aid members should be involved in mock drills and district authority must be involved

or being informed at least.

13. All required documents with emergency contact numbers should be maintained at emergency

control center and at other strategic locations.

14. It is recommended to adopt Hot line system for ease of situation during emergency situation.

1.10. DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

1.10.1. General

Emergency/disaster is an undesirable occurrence of events of such magnitude and nature that

adversely affect production, cause loss of human lives and property as well as damage to the

environment. Industrial installations are vulnerable to various kinds of natural and manmade

disasters. Examples of natural disaster are flood, cyclone, earthquake, lightning etc. and manmade

disasters are like major fire, explosion, sudden heavy leakage of toxic/poisonous gases, civil war,

nuclear attacks, terrorist activities, sabotage etc. It is impossible to forecast the time and nature of

disaster, which might strike an undertaking. However, an effective disaster management plan helps to

minimize the losses in terms of human lives, plant assets and environmental damage and resumes

working condition as soon as possible.

Risk Analysis forms an integral part of disaster management plan and any realistic disaster

management plan can only be made after proper risk analysis study of the activities and the facilities

provided in the installation. Correct assessment and evaluation of the potential hazards, advance

meticulous planning for prevention and control, training of personnel, mock drills and liaison with

outside services available can minimize losses to the plant assets, rapidly contain the damage effects

and effectively rehabilitate the damage areas.

1.10.2. Location of the Plant, surrounding areas & Population


40

The LPG bottling plant of M/s HPCL situated at village-Mandana, District –Kota. The plant is mainly

surrounded as North Side – Agricultural land, South Side – Rajasthan Tourist Development

corporation Midway facilities for truck parking and servicing, 400 m from boundary wall Mandana

village 2 km population 14000, West Side – NH-12,kota Jhalawar Hoghway-200m Agricultural land

and Anotia Village . East Side – Bombay Delhi Railway Line 200M from Boundary wall Forest land.

1.11. APPROACH TO DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Modern approach to disaster management plan involves –

Risk Analysis Study

Action Plan

Risk Analysis study involves

Risk Identification

Risk Evaluation

Risk identification involves

Identification of hazardous events in the installation, which can cause loss of capital

equipment, loss of production, threaten health and safety of employees, threaten public health

and damage to the environment.

Identification of risk important processes & areas to determine effective risk reduction

measures.

Risk evaluation involves calculation of damage potential of the identified hazards with damage

distances, which is then termed as consequence analysis as well as estimation of frequencies of the

events.

Hazardous areas with different hazard scenarios and their damage potential with respect to fire &

explosion have already been mentioned in Risk Analysis chapter. However, failure rate of different

hazard scenarios has been discussed broadly based on data available for similar incidents outside

India.

Probability of any hazardous incident and the consequent damage also depends on-

Wind speed

Wind direction

Atmospheric stability

Source of ignition

Presence of plant assets & population exposed in the direction of wind

Action plan depends largely on results of risk analysis data and may include one or more of the

following:

Plan for preventive as well as predictive maintenance

Augment facilities for safety, firefighting, medical as per requirements of risk analysis.

Evolve emergency handling procedure both on-site and off-site.

Practice mock drill for ascertaining preparedness for tackling hazards/emergencies at any

time - day or night

1.12. GENERAL NATURE OF THE HAZARD

In LPG Bottling Plant, LPG is handled which is highly inflammable and explosive. Hence main risks

involved in the plant are fire and explosion. Any small fire in the installation, if not extinguished


41

immediately, can cause large-scale damage and may have a cascading effect. Hence, LPG bottling

plant requires.

A quick responsive containment and control system requiring well planned safety and

firefighting system.

Well-organized trained manpower to handle the process equipment & systems safely.

Well trained personnel to handle safety and firefighting equipment to extinguish fire inside the

installation promptly as well as tackle any type of emergency.

1.13. HAZARDOUS AREAS OF THE PLANT

The plant activities handling LPG can be subdivided into following sections:

TABLE 31

FACILITY DETAILS

SN Activities Place

1 Bulk LPG unloading TLD shed

2 LPG Storage Bullets/ Mounded Bullet(Proposed)

3 LPG Pumping LPG Pumps

4 LPG Vapour Compression Compressor House

5 LPG Cylinder (empty) Unloading Empty Cylinder storage

6 LPG Cylinder Filling Filling shed

7 LPG Cylinder Storage & Transportation Filled cylinder storage shed

Since LPG is highly inflammable and explosive, hazard exists in all these areas. However, risk varies

due to varying inventory of the material and operations involved. Accordingly, the areas may be listed

in order of decreasing risk and the nature of hazard as given below as per results of risk analysis

Chapter.

TABLE 32

POSSIBLE HAZARDS

SN Area Hazards

1 Bullet/Mounded Bullet outlet line Thermal Radiation &Vapour Cloud Explosion

2 Road Tanker BLEVE

3 LPG unloading Fire, Vapour Cloud Explosion

4 LPG filling & storage - do -

5 LPG pumping & LPG vapor compression - do –

6 Bullet BLEVE

The damage potential of the above sections has been discussed in detail in the chapter on Risk

Analysis. The credible hazard scenarios are found to be gasket failure, mechanical seal failure of

pumps, road tanker unloading arm failure and small bore pipe line failure etc.

Apart from the above, fire cannot be ruled out in substation & MCC as well as in other places from

short circuiting and also secondary fire from nearby industries. However, major accident may occur in

the plant and call for emergency/disaster.

1.14. DISASTER PREVENTIVE AND PRE-EMPTIVE MEASURES

1.14.1. After identification and assessment of disaster potential the next step in disaster management

plan is to formulate and practice the preventive measures. Proper preventive and pre-emptive

measures can reduce the disaster potential to a minimum.


42

1.14.2. Some of the preventive & pre-emptive measures, which are to be taken in the existing plant,

are as follows:

a) Safety measures

Following safety tips should always be borne in mind while working in the plant to avoid emergency &

hazardous situation.

(i) Follow specified procedures and instructions for start-up, shut down and any maintenance

work.

(ii) Follow permit to work system.

(iii) Identify correctly the part of the plant in which work is to be done.

(iv) Isolate the part, machine properly on which work is to be done.

(v) Release pressure from the part of the plant on which work is to be done.

(vi) Remove flammable liquid/gases thoroughly, on which work is to be done.

(vii) Use non-sparking tools.

b) Plant Inspection

Apart from planned inspection, checks and tests should be carried out to reduce failure probability of

containments.

(i) Pressure vessels and pipeline during their operational life.

(ii) Pressure relief valves to avoid fail danger situation. The safety relief valves connected with

pressure vessels and piping should be checked and calibrated at regular intervals according

to specification. Safety valves releasing LPG should be allowed to dissipate at higher

elevation.

(iii) Critical trips, interlocks, & other instruments should be checked regularly to avoid fail danger

situation.

(iv) Gas detection, heat detection &fire fighting system should be checked regularly to ensure

proper functioning for avoiding emergency situation. However, no gas detection and heat/fire

detection system is available.

(v) Lightning protection system.

c) Performance or Condition Monitoring

A systematic monitoring of performance or condition should be carried out especially for large

machines and equipment, which may be responsible for serious accidents/disaster in case the

defined limits are crossed.

(i) Vibration, speed & torque measurements for pump, compressors, DG sets etc.

(ii) Thickness and other flaw measurements in metals of pressure vessels like LPG Storage

Bullets, Emptying vessels, Inlet & Outlet lines from storage vessels etc.

Many types of non-destructive testing/condition monitoring techniques are available. X-ray

radiography, acoustic emission testing, magnetic particle testing, eddy current inspection techniques

etc. are used for detection of flaws and progression of cracks in metals. Testing equipment is also

there for checking vibration, speed, torque etc.

The above condition monitoring techniques should be applied regularly by internal/ external agencies.

Immediate corrective measures should be taken if any flaws are detected.


43

d) Preventive Maintenance

A schedule for preventive maintenance for moving machineries e.g. chain conveyers and other

equipment like pumps, compressors etc. should be prepared based on experience in other similar

plants as well as instruction of the suppliers. The schedule should be followed strictly during

operation as well as planned shut-down period.

e) Entry of Personnel

Entry of unauthorized personnel is strictly prohibited inside the premises. The persons entering the

plant should not carry matches, lighters, mobile phones, etc. and hot work should not be permitted

except in-designated areas with all precaution.

1.15. DISASTER CONTROL/RESPONSE PLAN

It has been already mentioned that disaster arrives without any warning unexpectedly in spite of all

precautions & preventive measures taken. However, an efficient control/response plan can minimize

the losses in terms of property, human lives and damage to the environment can be minimum.

1.15.1. Objectives of the Plan

The plan should be developed to make best possible use of the resources at the command of the unit

as well as outside resources available like State Fire Services, Police, Civil Defence, Hospitals, Civil

Administration, neighboring institution and industries.

It is not possible for a company to face a disaster single handed and calls for use of all available

resources in the surrounding area. Advance meticulous planning minimizes chaos and confusion,

which normally occur in such a situation and reduce the response time of Disaster Management

Organization.

The objectives of disaster management plan are:

(i) To contain and control the incident.

(ii) To rescue the victims and treat them suitably in quickest possible time.

(iii) To safeguard other personnel and evacuate them to safer places.

(iv) To identify personnel affected/dead.

(v) To give immediate warning signals to the people in the surrounding areas in case such

situation arises.

(vi) To inform relatives of the casualties.

(vii) To provide authoritative information to news media and others.

(viii) To safeguard important records & information‟s about the organization.

(ix) To preserve damaged records &equipments needed as evidence for any subsequent enquiry.

(x) To rehabilitate the affected areas.

(xi) To restore the facilities to normal working condition at the earliest.

1.15.2. On-site and Off-site Planning

An on-site emergency is one, which is having negligible effects outside the factory premises and can

primarily be controlled by internal facilities and resources available. Some help may be required from

external agencies or local authorities.

An off-site emergency will affect the neighboring areas and population outside the factory premises

and would require substantial contribution from local authorities and institutions like police, civil

defense, state hospital and civil administration in addition to state fire services.


44

1.15.3. Both on-site and off-site emergency/disaster response plan can be subdivided into -

On-Site Emergency

The plant has an installed storage capacity of 507 MT of LPG to be held in 4 nos.of A/G Bullets and

proposed mounded storage vessel capacity 3x500 MT.

TABLE 33

ON-SITE STORAGE CAPACITY OF LPG

Pressure Vessel Unit Storage Capacity No. of Vessels Total Storage

Capacity (MT)

A/G Bullets 159 MT 2 318



Mounded Storage Vessels 500 MT 3 1500

The LPG is a variable mixture of propane and butane liquefied at the saturated vapor pressure

corresponding to a typical liquid temperature of 35oC (308oK). Propane is often the dominating

fraction. The capacity of LPG road tankers is 17 MT.

1.16. ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN IN STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATION OF A

MAJOR

1.16.1. Accident Hazard Site

The requirement of an ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN with detailed disaster control measures was

embodied for the first time in Section 41B (4) of THE FACTORIES (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1987 (23rd

May, 1987) and came into force subsequently. The requirement is applicable to HPCL, LPG plant as

per the First Schedule of the said Act, item 29 entitled "Highly Flammable Liquids and Gases".

Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989, notified and enforced by

Union Ministry of Environment & Forests on 27th November, 1989 under Sections 6, 8 and 25 of THE

ENVIRONMENT (PROTECTION) ACT,1986 concurrently provide the requirement of a 0N-SITE

EMERGENCY PLAN by the occupier of accident hazard site, under Rule 13 Sub-rule 1.

1.16.2. Emergency Control Philosophy

The principal strategy of emergency control at HPCL‟s LPG Bottling Plant is prevention of the

identified major hazards. Since hazards can occur only in the event of loss of containment, one of the

key objectives of detail engineering, construction, commissioning and operating of the plant is total

and consistent quality assurance. HPCL is committed to this philosophy, so that the objectives of

prevention can have ample opportunities to mature and be realized in practice.

The second control strategy adopted for potential emergencies is surveillance of handling and

storage of hazardous substances.

Yet another control measure to be adopted is early detection of any accidental leak of LPG by gas

detectors and by trained and vigilant operating staff and activation of well-structured, resourced and

rehearsed emergency plan to intercept the incident with speed and ensure safety of employees,

assets, public and environment as a matter of priority.

1. First responder is operator or maintenance worker who on discovering fire / explosion / gas

Leak shall inform to location incharge/ area supervisor .

2. Call for „HELP‟.


45

3. Try to extinguish or contain fire with help of nearest available fire extinguisher, water

hydrant, without endangering himself.

4. Immediately notify control room confirm location, type & extent of emergency, numbers of

injured, if any and nature if injuries, name of reporter etc.

5. Control room operator shall inform to Base In-charge who shall take charge to deal with

emergency, inform to O&M In-charge.

6. Fire coordinator shall take immediate „turnout‟ and action to control emergency.

7. Security coordinator shall carry out rescue operations at site and control of personnel to

those required for emergency control.

8. Shift in-charge security shall contact, Plant Manager (SIC), & Manager (Plant) HSE Officer

and apprise them about nature & extent of emergency.

9. Shift-In-charge –Security ( Main Gate) shall

Communicate emergency message to All Plant Officers

Organize arrangement for transportation of officials to site.

Inform all duty/ off duty drivers to turn up for duty.

10. Plant Manager & All other officers shall rush to site with members of Emergency

Management team and take action to mitigate / contain emergency.

11. All coordinators shall be at respective duty stations and obey instructions from PM.

12. PM will assume full responsibility of emergency action plan. He shall take decision

regarding level of emergency, start of Emergency Control Centre (ECC).

13. PM shall take necessary emergency control measures till situation is brought under control.

He shall initiate actions & decisions regarding:

Operation & maintenance

Shut-down of plant & equipment

Evacuation of personnel

Medical assistance to injured

Assistance from mutual aid members and external agencies.

Escalation of emergency & reporting incident to district authorities

Communication & assistance to affected public

TABLE 34

On site-Emergency Organogram & HPCL Organogram Correspondence:

SN Emergency Organization Chart HPCL Emergency Organogram

Primary Alternate

1 Chief Incident Controller Plant Manger Mgr. (Plant)

2 Site Incident Controller Mgr. (Plant) Operations Officer

3 Administration Coordinator Operations Officer Operations Officer

4 Communication Coordinator Operations Officer Operations Officer)

5 Fire & Safety Coordinator Mgr. (Plant) Operation Officer

6

Emergency Management Team

Operations & Maintenance

Mechanical

Electrical

Instrumentation

Civil

Communication Services

Safety & Maintenance Section


46

7 Security Coordinator Operation Officer Operation Officer

8 Support & Auxiliary Services Team

HR & Welfare Coordinator

Transport & Logistics

Media & Public Relations

Medical Services

Finance Coordinator

Material Coordinator

S&D Section

Note:

1. Plant Manager shall be Chief Incident Controller for over all coordination.

2. Manager (Plant) shall be Site Incident Controller at Site.

3. All Coordinators shall report to the Site Incident Controller at site

4. All HPCL Employees working inside shall assemble at ASSEMBLY POINT in front of Admin.

(Here after all HPCL Employees means the persons whose role is not defined in action plan)

TABLE 35

Emergency Organogram during off-office hours (including holidays)

Emergency Coordinator HPCL designation

Chief emergency coordinator Security supervisor/Security team

1 Chief Incident Controller Plant Manager

2 Site Incident Controller Manager (Plant)

3 Fire & Safety Coordinator

Operation Officer

4 Security Coordinator Operation Officer

FIRE – IN – CHIEF LOCATION-IN-CHARGE

ALTERNATE FIRE-IN-CHIEF: MANAGER (P)

AUXILIARY TEAM RESCUE TEAM (IN CHARGE: MAINTENANCE (IN CHARGE: FINANCE

OFFICER OFFICER)

COMBAT TEAM (INCHARGE: SHIFT INCHARGE)

FIGURE 7: ORGANIZATION CHART FOR OPERATING SHIFT


47

1.16.3 Content of On-Site Emergency Plan Information

In the departmental "Guide of MS & IHC Rules, 1989", published in 1992, the Union Ministry of

Environment & Forests (MOEF), Government of India, specified broadly the content of an on-site

emergency plan (Page 39). This report on emergency plan has been prepared, in so far as is

practicable, in accordance with those guidelines. The guidelines were subsequently notified in

October 1994 in Official Gazette (SO-2882) of Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of

India and are reproduced below:

Details that need to be furnished in the on-site emergency plan as per schedule- 11 of MS & IHC

Rule 1989 are –

(i) Name and address of the person furnishing the information.

(ii) Key personnel of the Organization and responsibilities assigned to them in case of an

emergency.

(iii) Outside Organization if involved in assisting during an on-site emergency:

- Type of accidents

- Responsibility assigned.

(iv) Details of liaison arrangement between the Organizations.

(v) Information on the preliminary hazard analysis:

- Type of accidents.

- System elements or events that can lead to a major accident.

- Hazards.

- Safety relevant components.

(vi) Details about the site:

- Location of dangerous substances.

- Seat of key personnel.

- Emergency control room.

(vii) Description of hazardous chemicals at plant site:

- Chemicals (quantities and toxicological data).

- Transformation if any, which could occur.

- Purity of hazardous chemicals.

(viii) Likely dangers to the plant

(ix) Enumerate effects of -

- Stress and strain caused during normal operation.

- Fire and explosion inside the plant and effect, if any, of fire and explosion outside.

(x) Details regarding

- Warning, alarm, safety and security systems.

- Alarm and hazard control plans in the line with disaster control and hazard control

planning, ensuring the necessary technical and organizational precautions.

- Reliable measuring instruments, control units and servicing of such equipments.

- Precautions in designing of the foundations and load bearing parts of the building.

- Continuous surveillance of operations.

- Maintenance and repair work according to the generally recognized rules of good

engineering practices.

(xi) Details of communication facilities available during emergency and those required for an

offsite emergency.

(xii) Details of firefighting and other facilities available and those required for an offsite emergency.

(xiii) Details of first aid and hospital services available and its adequacy.


48

An outline of these details is provided in the pages following under the headings stated above, in so

far as the headings apply to KOTA LPG Bottling plant.

1.17. KEY PERSONNEL OF ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE EVENT OF AN

EMERGENCY

It is to be understood that the first few minutes after the start of an incident are most vital in

prevention of escalation. Therefore the personnel available at the site on round the clock basis play

an important role. Some of them are the “KEY PERSONS”. Since the LPG plant is operated by

trained operators and contract personnel with four officer HPCL has envisaged that emergency in

LPG plant will be handled by operation in-charge of LPG plant i.e. Plant manager with the help of

other officers & workers of LPG Bottling Plant. Plant Manager will nominate different Emergency

Coordinators to control emergency situation.

The role of various coordinators is to assess the situation form time to time, take appropriate

decisions in consultation with the CHIEF CONTROLLER and to provide timely resources and

instructions to the Key Persons to fight the emergency. Key Persons as far as possible are available

on a round the clock basis. An organogram of the officers at the LPG Bottling Plant during emergency

is presented in this section.


49

FIGURE 8: ORGANISATION CHART FOR ON-SITE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

1.17.1 Key Personnel Chart

Role of key personnel is clearly defined to avoid confusion and to meet the emergency effectively.

The Chief Incident Controller and the Site Incident Controller are two main positions for effective

control of an emergency at site. They shall be supported by Emergency Management Team

comprising of technical resources from Operations & Maintenance, mechanical, electrical,

instrumentation, civil, communications, technical services etc. Fire & Safety, Security, HR (Personnel

& Administration), Finance & Accounts, C&P personnel shall also take due roles & responsibilities.

The duties and responsibilities of Chief Controller and other Coordinator are as follows:

1.18. DUTIES & RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY PERSONS & COORDINATORS

During an emergency situation, Roles & Responsibilities (duties) of HPCL personnel‟s are defined

below:-

Medical Services

and Ambulance

Fire Brigade

Services

Police

Services

Off-Site Incident

Commander

(District

Magistrate) Medical Services

and Ambulance

Fire Brigade

Services

Off-Site Incident

Commander

(District

Magistrate) Medical Services

and Ambulance

Fire Brigade

Services

Off-Site Incident

Commander

(District

Magistrate)

CHIEF INCIDENT

CONTROLLER

Medical Services

and Ambulance

Fire Brigade

Services

Affected Stake

Holders and

Government

Authorities

Off-Site Incident

CONTROLLER (District

Magistrate/ District

Authority)

SITE INCIDENT

CONTROLLER

Mutual Aid

Municipal transport

rescue and

rehabilitation team

Support

Service*

Administration and Communication

Coordinator

Fire Safety &

Emergency

Handlers /Fire

Fighting Teams

Operation Team,

technical team, etc.


50

1.18.1 Chief Incident Controller (Plant Manager):

1. Assessment of Situation, declaration of emergency and activate the action plan.

2. Mobilization of main coordinators & key personnel at respective locations

3. Activation of Emergency Control Centre (ECC).

4. Depending on seriousness of the emergency, seek assistance mutual aid members & external

agencies like Police, Fire Brigade, Hospitals etc.

5. Exercise control of the unaffected areas.

6. Continuously review and monitor the emergency situation.

7. Direct shutdown of Plant and evacuation of personnel as and when necessary.

8. Ensure that injured are receiving prompt medical treatment, take stock of casualties, if any and

that relatives are properly informed / advised.

9. Ensure correct accounting and position of personnel.

10. Taking decision in consultation with district authorities, when the Off-Site Emergency to be

declared.

11. Regulate vehicular movement in the Plant.

12. Arrange for chronological records of the incident / emergency.

13. If emergency is prolonged, arrange for replacement of emergency handling personnel.

14. Authorize statements to external agencies, media.

15. In case of escalation of situation which may leads to damage to nearby population inform district

authorities to warn nearby population.

16. Ensure that incidents are investigated and recommendations are implemented.

1.18.2 Site Incident Controller (Manager -Plant):

17. The Site Incident Controller (SIC) shall be identified by the Chief Incident Controller and will report

directly to him. Shed In-charge will act as SIC at their respective Area till the arrival of SIC.

Responsibilities of the Site Incident Controller shall include the following:-

18. He shall put in action workable emergency control plan, establish emergency control centre,

organize and equip the organization with ERDMP and train the personnel.

19. Immediately on knowing about the emergency, he shall proceed to the site.

20. Assess the level of emergency and apprise CIC / ECC about situation

21. Activate the emergency procedure / control plan as required.

22. Direct all operations within the affected area as per priority

23. Ensure affected area is cordoned off and all non-essential workers in the affected area are

evacuated to the assembly point.

24. Ensure search, rescue and fire fighting operation are started.

25. Minimize damage to plant, property & environment

26. Alert medical centre and any specialist support as required.

1.18.3 Administration and Communication Coordinator (Operations Officer):

Communications Coordinator shall ensure that: 1. ECC communication equipment and systems are maintained to a high standard and functional

throughout the emergency.

2. Back-up communication system is available in the event of the ECC Room is not available.

3. Providing quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency

situations.


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1.18.4 Fire Safety Coordinator – (DSO):

1. Activate local Siren(s).

2. Rush to the site and take charge of fire and rescue operations.

3. Work in close association with site incident controller / chief incident controller.

4. Render technical guidance and logistics to fire personnel.

5. Establish danger zone and arrange barricading if necessary.

6. Ensure sufficient firefighting chemicals and rescue equipment‟s are available at site.

7. Ensure that fire water pump house is manned and sufficient hydrant pressure in fire water

mains and monitor water level in reservoir.

8. Arrange for additional fighting resources help from mutual aid partners & other fire services if

necessary, in consultation with site incident controller.

9. Coordinate with outside fire brigades and agencies for fire fighting / rescue operations.

10. Ensure that casualties are promptly sent to first aid Centre / hospital.

1.18.5 Support & Auxiliary Services Coordinator

1. Rush to his office and take charge of medical, welfare and media.

2. Activate medical Centre and render first aid to the injured by assigning first-aid personnel to

specific duties.

3. Arrange additional medical supplies, drugs and equipment‟s, spares for firefighting, as required.

4. Arrange ambulance for transporting casualties and coordinate with hospitals for prompt medical

attention to casualties.

5. Keep all the vehicles and drivers in readiness and send vehicles as per requirement of different

coordinators and officials. to mobilize transport to various teams for facilitating the response

measures;

6. to monitor entry and exit of authorized personnel into and out of premises;

7. Head Counts at assembly points.

8. Arrange canteen facilities and proper food / refreshment.

9. Arrange to meet emergency clothing requirement.

10. Arrange to contact the families of the injured.

11. Maintaining public relation and arrange media briefing wherever necessary

12. To control the mob outside, if any, with the assistance of the police and to provide administrative

and logistics assistance to various teams.

13. Issue press statement with the approval of Competent Authority / OIC.

14. Take help of welfare bodies, social organizations, NGO‟s, local administrations, blood bank,

blood donors, hospitals, doctors, ambulance services, water supply department, transport hire

service, catering services as per requirement.

15. Inform police, civil authorities, statutory authorities etc. with the approval of CIC. Also, inform to

a) Human Resources and Welfare Services Coordinator. b) Transport and Logistics Services Coordinator. c) Media and Public Relations Coordinator. d) Operations and Technical Coordinator.

1.18.5. (a) Haulage & House Keeping Team (Mechanical):

1. Rush to the site.

2. Work in close association with site incident controller.

3. Assist site incident controller in assessing scale of emergency and take corrective action to

minimize damage to equipment/ Plant in consultation with other coordinators.


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4. Ensure that key mechanical personnel are present at site with proper tools.

5. Render technical guidance and logistics to mechanical personnel.

1.18.5 (b) Electrical contractor :

1. Rush to the site.

2. Work in close association with site incident controller.

3. Assist site incident controller in assessing scale of emergency and take corrective action to

minimize damage to equipment/Plant in consultation with other coordinators.

4. Ensure that key instrument personnel are present at site with proper tools.

5. Render technical guidance and logistics to instrument personnel.

6. Provide assistance to control room engineer for Plant shut down/instrument control requirement.

7. Ensure that key electrical personnel are present at site with proper tools.

8. Render technical guidance and logistics to electrical personnel.

9. Ensure electric supply of affected equipment/area isolated if required.

10. Ensure proper lighting is provided during handling of emergency if required.

1.18.5 (c) Operations Coordinator

He shall proceed to control room immediately.

1. Assess the situation and apprise chief incident controller, site incident controller and other key

persons about the emergency situation

2. He shall handle Plant operations under directions of CIC.

3. He shall direct Emergency management team for appropriate action.

4. He shall monitor all critical process parameters, alarms and ensure safety of Plant & equipment‟s.

5. Warn all the employees in the affected shed /Plant area and evacuate them to assembly point if

need arises.

6. Assign Time recorder to start Log of emergency as well as time recording.

7. Initiate rescue activities; and first aid need to be given to injured persons, pending arrival of

ambulance.

8. Notify the adjacent areas.

9. Ensure that only persons having authorized duties enter their area.

1.18.6Security Coordinator (S&D Officer):

Security Coordinator reports to CIC / SIC and is responsible for security of installation during

emergency. He shall ensure that systematic efforts are launched and no confusion or panic is

created. He shall carry out following actions:

1. Assist F&S department in evacuation and escorting workers & visitors to assembly areas.

2. Maintain security of premises in the event of evacuation.

3. Maintain the law and order; assist authorities in case of public unrest.

4. Close all gates, control traffic and allow only authorized persons to enter in consultation with site

incident controller / shift coordinator.

5. Cordon off the area of accident and coordinate with external security personnel if necessary.

6. Direct the external help / authorities to respective coordinators.

7. Keep contact with security in order to seek mutual assistance as required.


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1.18.6 (a) Maintenance of ERDMP Records.

S&M Section maintains records for all kind of emergencies covering near Miss, Level-I, Level-II and Level-III. Safety Officer will maintain separate registers for Incident Record, Near Miss, Preliminary Accident report file etc. at their respective Base Stations. Post–disaster documentation like resources deployed, relief, rehabilitation measures and lesson learned to avoid re-occurrence of any such emergency need to be prepared by Safety Officer. 1.18.6 (b) Time Recorder An officer shall be assigned the responsibility is to maintain an accurate time record of key information received from the incident or emergency location and to record the actions initiated by the site incident controller and for implementing the emergency response actions below: 1. To record key incident events / actions on incident status board / display manually or

electronically;

2. To maintain essential equipment checklist status.

3. To ensure all status and information is up to date and correctly displayed;

4. To take all necessary recorded material to the alternate ECC room in the event of

emergency in main ECC room; and

5. To maintain a log book.

1.18.6 (c) Communications Services.

1. “The Communications Coordinator shall ensure the actions below: a. Ensuring the ECC equipment and systems are maintained to a high standard and remain

functional throughout the emergency. b. Ensuring a back-up communication system is available in the event of the ECC Room is

not available. c. Providing quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency

situations.”

Providing quality and diverse communication systems for use in routine and emergency

situations.”

1.19 INFORMATION ON PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS

1.19.1 Types of Accident

Kota LPG plant has potential for FIRE AND EXPLOSION in the event of leakage of LPG. Failure

cases may be considered as follows:

SN Failure Case Failure Mode Consequences

1 Full bore / 20% CSA failure of LPG

outlet line of Mounded

Bullets(Proposed)

Random Failure Dispersion, Vapor cloud

explosion, Jet fire

2 Full bore / 20% CSA failure of LPG

outlet line of Bullets


explosion, Jet fire

3 LPG pump discharge line full bore Random Failure Dispersion, Vapor cloud


54

SN Failure Case Failure Mode Consequences

failure(Proposed) explosion, Jet fire

4 Road tanker failure Random Failure Dispersion, fire ball, BLEVE

5 LPG pump mechanical seal failure Random Failure Dispersion, VCE, Jet fire

6 LPG Pump Outlet Line Gasket failure Dispersion, VCE, Jet fire

7 Road Tanker unloading arm failure Random Failure Dispersion, VCE, Jet fire

8 Filled cylinder failure(Domino) Random Failure Dispersion , fire Ball, BLEVE

9 Safety valve failure for Bullet Random Failure Dispersion

10 Safety valve failure for Mounded

Bullet

Random Failure Dispersion

11 Carousel line failure Random Failure Dispersion, Vapor cloud

explosion, Jet fire

12 LPG vapor compressor outlet line

Full bore failure(Proposed)


explosion, Jet fire

13 Catastrophic Failure of a Single

Bullet

Random Failure Dispersion , fire Ball ,

Vapor cloud explosion, BLEVE

14 Domino Effects Of Bullets Random Failure Dispersion , fire Ball

,BLEVE

1.19.2 System elements or events that can lead to major accident

Equipment failure, process abnormal conditions such as LPG storage system over-pressure, over-

temperature, over-filling etc. can give rise to a major loss of containment and a major accident.

Human error can also cause a major accident.

1.19.3 Hazards

A LPG fire at Kota plant has been characterized in the form of –

1. Jet Flame.

2. Fireball.

3. Flash Fire.

4. BLEVE.

5. Vapour Cloud Explosion.

GAS CLOUD EXPLOSIONS are also potential hazards, which can cause widespread damage very

quickly. After consequence analysis done with the help of world renowned SOFTWARE i.e. EFFECT

it has been found that damage distances in case of non-credible scenario extend beyond 0.5 KM.

1.19.4 Safety relevant components

The hazardous working areas of Kota plant should have a number of sensitive flammable gas

detectors strategically located downwind to detect any LPG leakage and raise alarm.

These detectors shall be supplemented by manually operated break-glass type fire alarm call points

linked to electric sirens and a centralized and manned alarm annunciation panel.

All LPG strategic areas should be fitted with 'heat-bulb' actuated medium velocity water sprinkler

systems supported by fire fighting water pumps. An extensive network of pressurized fire hydrant

system has been installed to fight fire anywhere within plant and to cool vessels and structures to

ensure their safety during an incident, involving incidence of dangerous heat flux.

Adequate on-site manpower shall be suitably trained and equipped to carry out fire fighting operation

efficiently. A number of diverse fire fighting media such as DCP, CO2 Fire extinguishers etc. are


55

strategically located in various parts of the plant in suitable dispensers. Foam or any other equivalent

substance should be used in adequate measure to cut-down evaporation from a LPG pool and thus

inhibit fire and formation of a flammable gas cloud.

1.20 DETAILS ABOUT THE SITE

a) Locations of dangerous substances

The locations of 4nos. of LPG Bullets, proposed Mounded Storage Vessels are shown in the Plot

Plan attached as Annexure IX

b) Seat of key personnel

Most of the key personnel who will be engaged in on-site emergency handling are located in OFFICE

BUILDING also marked in the plant layout.

c) Emergency control room

The emergency control room (ECR) is located at the plant manager‟s office room.

1.21 DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDOUS CHEMICAL (S) AT PLANT SITE

a) Chemicals (quantities & toxicological data)

SN

Status

Product Storage Unit

Identification

Type (Horton

Sphere/Bullets)

No. of

Bullets/MSV

Capacity of

Bullets/MSV

Maximum

Inventory

(MT)



3. Existing LPG A/G HS Bullet 1 90 90

4. Proposed LPG MSV Mounded

Storage Vessel

3 500 1500

Total (After execution of proposed

expansion)

2006 MT

Total: 2006 MT

LPG is the only hazardous substance on-site.

It is essentially non-toxic.

b) Transformation if any, which could occur

LPG, which is a mixture of 65% propane and 35% butane is stored and handled as pressure liquefied

gas. In the event of a leak the liquefied LPG will flash to propane and butane gases.

c) Purity of hazardous chemicals

Depending on the source of incoming LPG, there might be traces of propylene. No other impurity is

envisaged.

1.21.1 Likely Dangers to Plant

The possible dangers to plant and people have been analyzed in the consequence analysis. Principal

danger is that of a fire (pool or jet) and gas cloud explosion. All hazards identified are both unlikely


56

and infrequent if good operation and maintenance standards are achieved and more importantly,

maintained.

1.22 ENUMERATE EFFECTS

a) Stress and strain caused during normal operation

Because the gas mixture is pressure liquefied and large quantity of LPG either during frequent

unloading of tank trucks or during bottle filling is involved various elements of the storage and

handling systems will be subjected to stresses due to pressure and large flows. Integrity of elements

such as joints, hoses, valves and pressure relief system is very important for this plant to prevent loss

of containment through equipment failure.

System pressure may increase somewhat during hot summer months and this would increase strain

on all pressure containing equipment, particularly joints and seals.

The LPG plant has been adequately designed to take care of these operational stresses and strain.

High volume of bottle filling and cylinder testing operations would require the associated equipment to

stand up to heavy duty repeatedly without failure. In other words these equipments must be highly

reliable.

Periodic inspection, preventive maintenance of such equipment will thus be critical. HPCL shall take

proper care of operation and maintenance to meet such needs.

b) Fire and explosion inside the plant and effect, if any, outside

Based on Consequence Analysis it has been found that the effect distances and areas of fire and

explosion reach more than 0.5 Km in case of non-credible failure scenario like BLEVE in Bullets and

0.3 Km for Bullet outlet line full bore failure.

1.23 DETAILS REGARDING WARNING ALARM, SAFETY & SECURITY SYSTEMS

One 3.0 Km range Electric Siren, Six Hand Sirens have been installed to announce the on-set of an

emergency. This can be triggered manually as and when a gas leak is detected.

1.23.1 Other Alarms

High-level alarms are to be provided in the storage vessels to provide a warning to the filling operator

if more than 85% volumetric capacity is filled.

Alarm by scanning network of gas detectors spread throughout the site to detect presence of LPG at

2% LEL level or above. The audio-visual alarm will come on in control room alarm annunciation

panel.

Sprinkler system has been provided in LPG pump house LPG filling & filled cylinder storage shed as

well as at the bullets to be operated manually. Actuation by heat fuses bulk system to be considered.

a) Precautions in designing of the foundation & load bearing parts of the building

Foundations and load bearing parts are designed by competent Engineering Agency as per approved

Codes of Practice and take into account operational loads and extremes of storm, lighting and flood.

All storage tanks are electrically grounded to a network of earth stations with buried electrodes.

b) Continuous surveillance operations

The LPG storage and handling operations will be continually under surveillance to prevent major

incidents and to intercept one at the developing stage. Leakage condition should be continuously

scanned by the gas detectors to be provided at vulnerable places.


57

c) Maintenance and repair work according to the generally recognized rules of good

engineering practice

Preventive and breakdown maintenance and repair work are be carried out under the supervision of

Plant Manager / Dy. Manager. Equipment and criticality oriented inspection, periodic non-destructive

testing and maintenance schedules are prepared with specialist inputs from within HPCL, OISD and

equipment manufacturers.

Details of communication facilities provided for emergency

(i) One 3.0 Km range Electric Siren to announce nature of emergency.

(ii) 3 hand sirens are also provided.

(iii) An interplant paging system in Non-flame proof areas and as well as in flameproof areas are

provided for normal and emergency announcements and communication with master control

in the control room.

(iv) For inter-location communications and requisite number of P&T telephones including tie lines

and hot lines for communication with district emergency services, authorities, hospitals etc.

(v) The interplant paging and public address system are having the following features-

- All call with answer back

- Group call with answer back

- Interfacing with walkie talkies

- Field call stations

(vi) Walkie Talkies and mobile phones are deployed for mobile-to-mobile and mobile-to-stationary

communication.

(vii) A broad communication diagram outlining interactions between various role players.

1.23.2 Details of Fire Fighting & Other Facilities Available

The LPG Bottling Plant of HPCL at Kota is provided with following fire fighting system:

Details of firefighting facilities are as follows:

Fire water Tanks (above ground)

2 A/G tanks - 3200 KL each.

Firewater pumps (Diesel driven)

Numbers : 4+2

Capacity (each) : 410 KL/hr

Discharge Pressure: 7 Kg/cm2g

1.23.3 Personal Protective Equipment

The following of personal protective equipment will be available during an emergency.

(i) Fire proximity suit - 1 no

(ii) Fire entry suit - Nil

(iii) Explosive meter - 2 no.

(iv) Water gel blanket - 2 no.

(v) Safety helmet - 30 nos.

(vi) Rubber hand gloves for use in electrical jobs -2 pair.

(vii) Low temp. rubber hand gloves for LPG emergency – 4 pairs

(viii) Low temp. Suit for LPG emergency – 2 nos.

(ix) BA Set - 1 no.


58

The quantities available are sufficient to meet the needs of emergency handling personnel.

1.23.4 Rehearsal and Testing

'Fire Drills' are arranged periodically to test out the laid down system and facilities. The emergency

handlers also "act out" their individual roles in accordance with the emergency procedures laid down

to demonstrate that the entire emergency response system can perform efficiently and accurately.

Mock drills for emergency are to be conducted twice in a year.

1.24 SALIENT FEATURES OF ON-SITE EMERGENCY

Effect distances for various ranges of distances against a heat flux of 4.5 KW/M2. People will have to

be evacuated in the event of fire.

1.25 OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

An integral part of the Disaster Management Plan is the Off-Site Emergency Plan. The plan is mainly

dependent upon a very close co-ordination and assistance from the Local Administration like Police,

Fire Brigade, Medical Services (hospitals) etc.

1.25.1 Off-Site Action

HPCL LPG Bottling Plant, Kota (Rajasthan) is notified as a „Major Accident Hazard‟ installation under Manufacture Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals MSIHC rules, 1989 of EPA. Therefore, it is required to formulate an Off-site Emergency Plan. Emergency Action Plan for Emergency during Off- Shift Hours (Including Holidays):

1. During other than office hours (including holidays) the Security In-charge shall perform the

duties of Site Incident Controller. Security at Visitor Gate shall also perform duties of

Communication, Welfare & Medical, and Material Coordinator in addition to his normal

duties till the arrival of the concerned coordinator.

2. The Security in-charge in consultation with the site incident controller shall act upon

depending on the situation till arrival of the concerned coordinators for effective handling of

emergency. They shall take care of the safety of personnel, plant, property etc. Safe

operating procedures which are already in practice shall be followed.

3. All other non-essential personnel whose roll is not defined in the action plan shall assemble

at assembly points and wait for further instruction from CIC Control Room.

During offsite emergency chief incident controller will coordinate with district authorities for effective

coordination of District crisis management group as per the District disaster Management plan

circulated.

The Chief Controller will inform about the incident like Fire, Explosions to –

(i) Police and District Collector.

(ii) Fire Brigade.

(iii) Medical Services.

(iv) Technical/Statutory Bodies.

(v) Rehabilitation Agencies.

(vi) Electricity Board.


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1.25.2 Responsibilities of the Services

1] Police

1. To control traffic & mob by cordoning off the area.

2. Arrange for evacuation of people on advice from the Site Controller/District Collector.

3. Broadcast/communicate through public address systems to the community on advice from the

District/Sub Collector.

4. Inform relatives about details of injured and casualties.

2] Fire Brigade

1. Fighting fire & preventing its spread.

2. Rescue & salvage operation.

3] Medical/Ambulance

1. First Aid to the injured persons.

2. Shifting critically injured patients to the hospitals.

3. Providing medical treatment.

4] Technical/Statutory Bodies

(Constitutes Factory Inspectorate, Pollution Control Board, Technical Experts from Industries)

1. Provide all technical information to the emergency services, as required.

2. Investigate the cause of the disaster.

5] Rehabilitation

1. Arrange for evacuation of persons to nominated rescue centre and arrange for their food,

medical and hygienic requirements.

2. Coordinating with the Insurance Companies for prompt disbursement of compensation to the

affected persons.

3. Maintain communication channels of the affected industry like telephone, telex etc. in perfect

working condition.

6] Electricity Board

To put off the power supply to the plant, if specifically asked for by HPCL.

7] Important Telephone Numbers Who May be

Contacted during Emergency:

1. Police station 100

2. Hospital 108

3. Fire Brigade 101

4. DC

5. Plant manager


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External Resources: Particulars Name Address Ph. No. Any Other Info.

1. Fire Station Kota Srinathpuram, Kota

0744-2472355

09829063227

2. Fire Station Kota Sabji Mandi, Kota 0744-2392201

09829063227

3. Ambulance Mandana Mandana, Kota 9672973085

108

4. Ambulance Kota Vigyan Nagar, Kota

9672973083

108

5. Ambulance Free Kota Free Amb. 0744-2433841

6. Hospitals Mandana Mandana, Kota 0744-2812707

9530390495/9530390496

7.Govt. Medical college

Government Medical College,

Rangbari Road Kota

744-2470674

8.Civil Hospital Maharao Bhimsing Hospita,

Nayapura, Kota 744-2450242/42

9.Nominated Hospt. Global Modi Hospital,

Swami Vivekananda Nagar, Rajasthan Housing Board Colony, Kota

0744-2209859

10.Police Station Mahendra Maru

Mandana Mandana Thana, Kota

0744-2812633

SHO 9530444163

11. S.P. Rural, Kota Kota Nayapura, Kota 0744-2350601

0744-2350602 ®

12. S.P. CITY Kota Police Line, Kota 0744-2350700

13. Drug Stores (National Medical)

Vigyan Nagar, Kota

Vigyan Nagar, Kota

0744-2412714

14. District Collector Kota Nayapura, Kota 0744-2451200

0744-2451100

15. Availability of Cranes

Kota Ambika Cranes, Kota 9414190070

16. water supplies, sand, morum, vehicles etc.

Kota Nayapura, Kota 0744-2325031


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17. CID (State) Kota Civil Lines, Nayapura, Kota 0744-2450216/2350805

18. IB Kota Rangbari, Scheme, Kota 0744-2476696

19. Any major industry nearby (Mutual Aid Member)

CONCOR, Mandana

Rawata Road, Mandana Kota 9001017991 0744-2812962

B. Identification of Communication Resources:

Particulars Name Address Ph. No. Any Other Info.

1. BSNL Mandana Mandana, Kota 0744-2812698 9414024365

2. Retail Outlets

HP Fueling Centre

Mandana, Kota 0744-2812933 9414187620

3. Railway Station

Kota 0744-2467194/95

4. Power Houses

Mandana Mandana, Kota 9414844237 9413390814

5. Civil Authorities (Defence)

Kota Nayapura, Kota 0744-2320296/297

6 Dy. Chief Inspector Factory & Boilers

Kota 436, Dada Bari, Shastri Nagar, Kota

0744-2500660 9413128876

7. Local All India Radio / Doordarshan/ other channels

Kota Jhalawar Road, Kota 0744-2322442 9414183442

Medical Facilities. Details of medical facilities to be provided (a) Facilities available at first aid centre

(b) Details of trained persons in first aid in the plant

(c) Facilities available at identified hospitals

(d) Facilities available at other local hospitals

(e) Antidotes and emergency medicines

(f) Details of specialist doctors in the town

(g) Details of hospital in nearby cities


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Hospital Government Govt. Hospital Mandana 0744-2450242

Government Medical College, Rangbari Road Kota

0744-2470674

Maharao Bhimsing Hospita, Nayapura, Kota

0744-2450241

Opera Hospita, Indiravihar, Mahavir Nagar II Kota

0744-2425121

Sahayaka Acharya Mbs Hospital, Near Cottage Ward, Nayapura, Kota

0744-2450242

Fortis Modi Hospital, Swami Vivekananda Nagar, Rajasthan Housing Board Colony, Kota

0744-2209859

Government Medical College, Rangbari Road Kota

0744-2470674

Maharao Bhimsing Hospita, Nayapura, Kota

0744-2450241

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