This article was downloaded by: [University of Sheffield]On: 27 July 2015, At: 01:34Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WGInquiry: AnInterdisciplinary Journalof PhilosophyPublication details, including instructionsfor authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/sinq20Grounding Recognition:A Rejoinder to CriticalQuestionsAxel HonnethPublished online: 06 Nov 2010.To cite this article: Axel Honneth (2002) Grounding Recognition: ARejoinder to Critical Questions, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal ofPhilosophy, 45:4, 499-519, DOI: 10.1080/002017402320947577To link to this article:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/002017402320947577PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLETaylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy ofall the information (the Content) contained in the publicationson our platform. 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Any substantial or systematic reproduction,redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply,or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden.Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditionsDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 Symposium on Axel Honneth and RecognitionGrounding Recognition: A Rejoinder toCriticalQuestions*Axel HonnethJohann WolfgangGoethe-Universit at,Frankfurt am MainIt is always great good fortune for an author to have his writings meet with areceptive circle of readerswho take themup intheirown work andclarifythem further. Indeed, it may even be the secret of all theoretical productivitythat onereachesanopportunepoint inonesowncreativeprocesswhenothers queries, suggestions, and criticisms give one no peace, until one hasbeenforcedtocomeupwithnewanswersandsolutions. Thefouressayscollected here, in any event, jointly represent an ideal formof such achallenge: I am now compelled to make further theoretical developments andclarications that lead me to a whole new stage of my own endeavours, wellbeyond what I initially had in mind in The Struggle for Recognition. For thisreason, I will not concentratehereoninterpretative issues regardingmyearlier work but will instead take up the problems and challengesthat haveoccasionedseveral revisionsonmy part.For thisreason,it makessense tobegin (in section I) with the points that Carl-Goran Heidegren makes, in termsof ahistoryofsocial theory, regardingmy proposedtheoryof recognition.The issues that still motivate me today can best be expressed via anengagement with the conscientious interpretations he offers. The core of thisrejoinder is based on Heikki Ikaheimos and Arto Laitinens suggestions andcorrections, which they have used to develop my initial approach further, tothe point where thetheoreticaloutlinesof a precise andgeneral concept ofrecognition come into view. It is primarily these two contributions that helpedme develop a productive elaboration of my originally vague intuitions(section II). By way of conclusion (in section III), I take up the penetratingquestionsraisedbyAntti Kauppinenregardingtheuseof theconcept ofrecognition in the broader context of social criticism; he has compelled me totake on several extremely helpful clarications, and they give me theopportunity, in conclusion, to summarize my overarching intentions.*Translatedby Joel Anderson.Inquiry,45, 499520#2002 Taylor& FrancisDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 IIn his attempt to reconstruct the emergence of my model of recognition out oftheinterplayof philosophical anthropology, social theory, andpolitics,Carl-Goran Heidegren is right to attribute a certain priority to philosophicalanthropology. My thinking was indeed shaped fromthe outset by themethodological attitude of the tradition foundedinthe rst thirdof thetwentiethcenturybyMaxScheler, HelmuthPlessner, andArnoldGehlen;despite all the conservative tendencies that could be identied in the contentof this tradition, I still consider it to be an enormous contribution that, in theirreexive analysis of the structures of our lifeworld, they (unlike Heidegger)took an empirical approach and thereby systematically integrated results fromvarious disciplines within the human sciences.1The special insight to whichsuchaphilosophical anthropologyleads can, I believe, nowsensiblybereformulatedinJohnMcDowellsterminology: intheongoingcourseofhistory, whichitselfmust not beconceivedinpurelyscientisticterms, thehumanlifeworldcanbe understoodas theresult of theemergence of asecond nature, in which we habitually orient ourselves in a changing spaceof reasons. I am convinced that philosophical anthropology could be broughteven further up to date if one were to consider the additional convergences ofthesetwoapproachesregardingtheirconcept of value, theiradmissionofbiological constraints, and their concept of perception;2but theseinitialsuggestions are enough, for present purposes, to make clear that, in the wakeof the excesses of linguistic analysis and historicism, philosophicalanthropologyisstillexceedinglyrelevant. Whenwe alsotakeintoaccountthe work of Charles Taylor and Harry Frankfurt over the past few decades, wecan perhaps say that the existential structures of human beings second natureare nowbeingstudiedfromthe perspective of alinguistically informedphenomenology for which scientic results are not without systematicsignicance.Theabove attempt toupdate mytheoretical workshouldnot misleadanyone about the fact that initially, without really having thought through themethodology, I had set out to employ the young Hegels model of recognitionas the key to specifying the universal conditions under which human beingscan form an identity; the underlying intention was basically to conceptualizethe structures of mutual recognition analysed by Hegel not merely aspreconditions for self-consciousness but as practical conditions for thedevelopment of apositiverelation-to-self. Thisledme, intheformof anempiricallyinformedphenomenology, todifferentiatethethreeformsofrecognition to which Heidegrens essay refers, in their original characteriza-tion; in the second part of this rejoinder, I shall address the question of how Inow view this differentiation, in light of the aforementioned methodology. Inanycase,Heidegrenisright that,alreadyat that time,my core ideawas to500 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 distinguish these modes of mutual recognitionaccordingto the constitutivecontribution that each makes to enabling a distinct form of relation-to-self; inthis connection, I was aided by the fact that it was rather easy to see how ErnstTugendhats related discussion3could be developed in a way thatsupplemented the familiar aspect ofself-respect with a consideration of theother two dimensions of basic self-condence and self-esteem. Thusemerged, out of asomewhat forcedreinterpretation of the youngHegel(inuenced, inparticular, bytheresultsofmyworkontheconcept oftheperson), the distinction between the three modes of recognition love, rights,and solidarity with which I am still working today, albeit in a modied form.In The Struggle for Recognition, I had not really worked out whether thesethree modes were to be conceived of as constants of human nature or as theresult of historical processes. The whole tone and argumentation did clearlysuggest that the various forms of recognition could only have been intendedas universal conditions for positive human relation-to-self; at the same time, Ihad given the distinction between legal respect and social esteem a historicalfoundation, at least insofar as I hadinterpretedit as theresult of thetraditional concept of honour splitting into a universalistic moral element andameritocraticelement.4Inowdistinguishmuchmoresharplythaninmyoriginal approach between anthropological starting conditions and histori-cal contingency: although the human form of life as a whole is marked by thefact that individuals can gain social membership and thus a positive relation-to-self onlyvia mutual recognition,itsformandcontent change duringthedifferentiation of normatively regulated spheres of action.5In this way, it alsobecomes clearer howtoviewthe internal linktothesecondtheoreticaldomain mentioned in Heidegrens title. I currently see the connectionbetween philosophical anthropology and social theory as lying in thenormative conditions for social integration: individuals can become membersof society only by developing, via the experience of mutual recognition,anawareness of how rights and duties are reciprocally distributed in the contextof particular tasks. In this way, the use of the concept of recognition allowsthe normative implications that are necessarily inherent in every social theoryto emerge from both directions: from one direction, individual opportunitiesfor a positive relation-to-self depend on conditions that are social in character,since they comprise normatively regulated forms of mutual recognition; fromthe other direction,a given societyschance of meeting with the uncoercedsupport of itsmembersdependsonitsabilitytoorganizetherelationsofrecognition in a way that enables the individual development of those positiveforms of relation-to-self. I am thus more strongly convinced than ever beforethat an account of society will end up on the wrong theoretical track unless itis developed, from the outset, in terms of normative concepts.Of course, noneof thesepointstouchesthetwoissuesthat Heidegrenplacesinthecentreof hisreconstruction. Heisquiteright that I amnotGrounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 501Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 satisedsimplytopresent theconnectionbetweensocial integrationandmutual recognition, and that, drawing on Hegel, I speak instead of anagonisticrelationshipthat requiresapermanent struggleforrecognition;and, in an instructive comparison with the Gehlens anthropological ethics,6he outlines the extent to which I move beyond the monistic framework of apure moralityof respect,in that I speak,in parallel with the three forms ofrecognition, also of three distinct sources of morality. I shall not discuss thissecond point further here, since it will play a larger role in connection with afurtherclaricationoftheconceptofrecognition; therstpoint, however,will be taken up in what follows here, for it has to do with how the concept ofrecognition relates to the third theoretical domain that Heidegren mentions inhis title, namely, politics.The problemHeidegren addresses stems in part fromthe Hegelianinheritance,at least in the sense that what Hegel was gettingat in his earlywritingswastheideathat everyelementaryformofmutual recognitioniscontinuallytranscendedviaastrugglethat leadstoahigherstageintheprocessof recognition. Therehasalwaysseemedtometobesomethingparticularly attractive about the idea of an ongoing struggle for recognition,thoughIdidnotquiteseehowitcouldstill bejustiedtodaywithout theidealisticpresuppositionof aforward-drivenprocessof Spirits completerealization.But drawing on G. H. Meads social psychology which I thenthought I could use to develop the concept of recognition further, innaturalisticterms didseemtoprovidemewiththekeytosolvingtheproblemjustposed: ifwefollowMeadinunderstandingtheexperienceofmutual recognition as the individual evolution of a me that consists in theconsciousness of legitimate social expectations, then the I could perhaps beconceptualized as the source of continual rebellion against established formsof recognition the source that Hegel had wanted to explain in terms of thestructureof consciousness. I havesincebackedawayfromMeadssocialpsychology, however, for I have come to doubt whether his views canactually be understood as contributions to a theory of recognition: in essence,whatMeadcallsrecognitionreducestotheactofreciprocalperspective-taking, without the character of the others action being of any crucialsignicance; thepsychological mechanismbywhichsharedmeaningsandnormsemergeseems toMeadgenerallytodevelopindependentlyof thereactive behaviour of the two participants, so that it also becomes impossibleto distinguish actions according to their respective normative character. Thisexplains why Mead never addresses the question as to what sort of behaviourmight be especially benecial, during the maturation process, for developinga positive relation-to-self; he simply thought that perspective-takingrepresented a psychological process that comes about regardless of theparticularmannerof thereciprocal interaction. Asaresult, Meadssocialpsychology turned out to be much less suitable than I originally thought for502 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 purposes of using the concept of recognition to characterize a specic kindof attitude or action; in a certain sense, the naturalism of his approach is toostrong for it to bepossible to view recognition as habituated behaviour thattakes place in a historically emergent space of moral reasons.IndepartingfromMeadinthisway, Ialsoclosedoffthepossibilityofsimplylocatingthecauseof theconictsthat areintrinsictorelationsofmutual recognitioninthesamesourcethat Meaddid. TheIwhich, forMead, was the prereective locus of all spontaneous impulses can no longerbe seen as the origin of the rebellion against established patterns ofrecognition, given that these are to be viewed nolonger as internalizedbehavioural expectations but rather as intersubjectively binding forms ofaction; it is still particularly tempting to attributeto persons an unconsciouswill to distinguish themselves [Besonderungswillen], but for Mead, it worksby means, again,ofthe inner negationofinternalized norms, rather than bymeans of judgments regarding objectively given standards of action.Regardingthequestionof whether therecouldbeauniedsourceof allimpulsive rebellion against established forms of recognition, we nd ourselvesin the domain of wild speculation; this can easily be made clear in the case ofthe difculties that Judith Butler gets into when she reects on thepsychological causes of the rejection of regimes of recognition andnotoriously vacillates between a theory of drives and a theory ofconsciousness.7At this point, the solutionthatsuggests itselfrst would beto refrain altogether fromgeneralizations about human nature and thus,insteadofattributingtohumanbeingsanydeep-seatedtendencytonegateintersubjectivity, merely postulate a sensibility to injustice that is mediated, ineach case, byexperience and thus merely possible. Relativizing mattershistoricallyinthiswaywould, however, comeat thecostofgivinguptheHegelianclaimthat everyrelationof recognitionshouldincludeaninnerprogressive dynamic: as soon as the experience of not being recognized fullyin ones distinctive identity no longer brings with it a virtually anthropologicalforce but rather becomes dependent on historical and cultural circumstances,one can no longer speak of the necessity of a struggle for recognition.In order to avoid losing entirely the suggestive power of this last thesis and, indeed, to leave a bit of roomto sharpen the point somewhatspeculatively I have recentlytakento substitutingthe recourse to MeadsI with another hypothesis about human nature. In speaking, in a felicitousphrase, of an anthropology of transcendence, Heidegren has in mind the partofmymorerecent workjust outlined, eventhoughhispresentationisnotentirely accurate regarding the extent to which that account differs from theoriginal notion of individuals unconscious will to distinguish themselves. Ina rejoinder to the psychoanalyst Joel Whitebook,8as well as in other essays onobject-relations theory,9I haveattemptedtoextendthe viewthat I haddeveloped,drawingon DonaldWinnicott, in The Strugglefor Recognition.Grounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 503Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 Takentogether, thesemorerecent essaysleadtothethesisthat theearlychildhoodexperiencesof symbiosishavelifelonginuences, inthat theycompel thesubject torebel againandagainagainst theexperienceofnothaving the other at our disposal. Accordingly, I now assume that the impulsetorebel against establishedformsof recognitioncanbetracedtoadeep-seated need to deny the independence of those with whom one interacts and tohave them, omnipotently, at ones disposal. We would then have to say thatthe permanence of the struggle for recognition stems not fromanunsocializable egos drive for realization but rather fromthe anti-socialstriving for independence that leads each subject to deny, again and again, theothersdifference. AlthoughI amconvincedthat I canput forwardmoreevidencefor thisspeculativethesisthanforthe Meadeanalternative, it tooraises an enormous problemregarding the connection with a theory ofrecognition; for it is entirely unclear how these antisocial impulses are to beconnected to the moral experiences we have in mind when speaking of feelinga lack of or a withholding of recognition.At the moment, I am not sure where to go from here. On the one hand liesthe speculative insight (inuenced by object-relations theory) that one mightbe able to trace the fact that relations of recognition are permanently markedby the possibility of conict, ultimately, back to the need to rebel against allformsof recognized independenceof theother, inorder torecreatetheoriginal situation of guaranteed, secure symbiosis; this type of approach couldhelp explain not only the tendency to compulsively deny the distinctivenessof ones romantic partners10but also the historically recurring willingness, inthe face of social threats, to seek refuge in a homogeneous community that isfreefromallthedissonancesintrinsictorelationsofmutualrecognition.11This insight stands in contrast, however, with the decidedly more robust basicconviction that the struggle for recognition is provoked by a particular kindof moral experience: the tendency to challenge established forms of mutualrecognition stems from the historically fuelled feeling that others unjustly failto recognize certain aspects of who one is. Whereas the rst thesispresupposes a need, anchored in human nature,that generatesthe agonisticcharacter of relations of recognition, the second thesis appeals, by contrast, tothemoral vulnerabilityofhumans, whoturntoprotest andrebelliononlywhenfacedwithcertainexperiences. Itseemsthattheonlywaytobridgethesemutuallyexclusiveideaswouldbetoexplaintheemergenceof thismoral vulnerabilityintermsof theearlychildhoodlossof thesymbioticexperience of security; on that assumption, the individual tendency to denythat othersarenot at onesdisposal wouldbemerelytheip-sideof thehumaninterest inhavingessential componentsof whooneisbesociallyrecognized. Before taking up that line of thought in the nal section, I wouldliketoaddressthequestionof what exactlyit makessensetounderstandunder the concept of an act of recognition.504 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 IIAlthoughitwasenough,inreplyingtoHeidegren, tolookbacktovariousinitial motives for myproject, theessays byHeikki IkaheimoandArtoLaitinenconfront mewithsubstantial systematicchallenges. Forhowevermuch recent shifts in political ethics have expanded the research literature onquestions of social recognition, the core conceptual content of what we todaycall recognitionhas hardly been addressedfurther; instead, the concept isemployed vaguely, usually with passing reference to Hegel, for attitudes andpractices by which individuals or social groups are afrmed in certain of theirqualities. What remainsunclear isnot merelytherelationtotheKantianconcept of respect; more than ever before, it has also become clear that theconcept of recognition incorporates various semantic components that differin English, French, and German usage, and that the relationship between themisnot reallytransparent. Thus, inGerman, theconcept appearstodenoteessentiallyonlythat normativesituationassociatedwithawardingasocialstatus, whereas in English and French it encompasses the additional epistemicsense of identifying or knowing again [Wiedererkennung]; adding to thisdifcultyis the factthat,in all three languages,the conceptcanbeused inspeech acts in which one admits something or acknowledges a point, in whichcaserecognition acquiresaprimarilyself-referential sense.12Finally, incompetitionwiththeHegelianusage, thereisalsonowaWittgensteinianinterpretative perspective, according to which recognition stands for aperformative reaction to how people express themselves; especially owing tothewritings of StanleyCavell,13whomakes dowithout anyrecoursetoHegel, the category of acknowledgment has made its way to the inner circleof analytic philosophy.IkaheimosandLaitinenscontributionstothissymposiumhaveclearedsome very helpful paths into this thicket of conceptual confusions andunanswered questions. Both authors address myoriginal proposals withanalytic rigour, in attempts to reformulate them with sufcient independenceofHegel forthetripartitedistinctionof love, rights, andesteemtoacquiresystematic meaning; at the same time, the two proposed interpretativestrategiesdepart fromoneanother enoughtoforcemetomakeachoicebetween them, a choice with signicant implications. As far as I can see, thereare four premises that both authors share and that form the underpinnings fortheir differing attempts at reconstruction. First, they are of the belief that theoriginal mode ofrecognition consists in what the German meaning of theword foregrounds: in the rst instance, it should be understood as a matter ofafrmingthepositivequalities of humanindividuals or groups, althoughneitherauthorrulesout thepossibilityofestablishingasystematiclinktoother senses of the term. Second, Ikaheimo and Laitinen agree inunderscoringrecognitionscharacter asanaction: anact of recognitionisGrounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 505Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 never exhausted by mere words or symbolic expressions, since it is only thecorresponding behaviour that establishes the credibility that mattersnormatively to the recognized subject. This is why both authors speakexplicitly of recognition as a certain attitude. In addition, they share a thirdbelief, that acts of recognitionrepresent adistinctivephenomenoninthesocial worldthatisaccordinglynottobeunderstoodas aside-effectofanother-directed action but rather as the expression of a free-standing intention;whetherwearetalkingof gestures, speechacts, or institutional measures,theseexpressions andprocedures arecases of recognition onlyif theirprimary purpose is directed in some positive manner towards the existence ofanother person or group. This conceptual precommitment rules out, forexample, counting as recognition those positive attitudes that unavoidablyaccompany the pursuit of a series of cooperative interests: if I have a strongdesire, for instance, toplaychessregularlywithsomeone, I amprobablytherebyexpressingaspecial esteemforherintellectual capacities, but theprimary aim of my intentional action is directed at playing chess together. AfourthpremisesharedbyIkaheimoandLaitinenis theabove-mentionedbelief that recognition represents a conceptual species comprising three sub-species.Whatcomesintoviewintheattitudesof love,legal respect,andesteem is the one basic attitude (albeit with differing emphases) that can beconceptualizedgenericallyasrecognition. Thisagreement withmyownproposal is not particularly surprising, since despite their preoccupation withanalytical clarity, they too are ultimately guided by Hegel; but theirreconstructions make clear that there is more theoretical plausibility toHegels tripartite distinction than we would ever guess from merehermeneutic appeals to heritage.Thefourpremisesdiscusseduptonowexpress, withall theclarityonecould hope for, what I too currently take as my point of departure: recognitionistobeconceivedof asthegenuscomprisedof threeformsof practicalattitudes, each reecting the primary aim of a certain afrmation of the other.The real challenge from these two contributions thus begins at the point wherethe agreement ends and the markedlydiffering emphases come tothefore;thispointisindicatedbythequestionas towhetherweshouldunderstandrecognitionmoreasamatterofattributionorof receptivity. SinceIhavenever before considered my conceptual approach from the vantage point ofthispairof alternatives, Ishall beginbypresentingthe twopossibilitiesinabstraction, beforethenturningtothesolutionsproposedbyIkaheimoandLaitinen. With regard to the question of how to characterize appropriately thegeneric case of recognition, we do indeed appear to face two options as tothe cognitive relation to those with whom we interact: the afrmation effectedby such an action can be understood either on the model of attributions as aresult of which the other subject acquires a new, positive property, or on themodel of perception, accordingtowhichanalready-present propertyof a506 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 person is, as a secondary matter, merely strengthened or publicly manifested.In the rst case, what we call recognitionwould award or supplement theaffected subject with something she had not had before; in the second case, bycontrast,itwouldbea matterofa certainkindof perceptionof analreadyindependently existing status.This choice of alternatives marks the point at which the authorsargumentative paths diverge. If I understand themcorrectly, Ikaheimorecommends that I follow the attributive model, whereas Laitinen advises meto adopt the perceptual model. Of course, perception is not quite the rightwordhere, sinceLaitinenpreferstospeak, drawingonJosephRaz, of aresponsive attitude, in order to emphasize the practical features ofrecognition: in recognition we react correctly or appropriately to evaluativepropertiesthat humanbeingsalreadypossessinvariousways. Themodelpreferred by Ikaheimo, by contrast, is free of any tinge of such value realism;he leans unambiguously towards the notion of attribution when he says thatwhat is distinctive ofall forms ofrecognitional attitudes is that one acceptsanotherpersonorgroupashavingparticularcapacities; indeed, at severalpoints in the text, Ikaheimo himself even uses the phrase attribute, as if tounderscore the contrast with Laitinen. The disadvantage I see with this way ofviewing things lies in the same point that Laitinen considers the central defectof the attributive model: if the recognitional attitude were merely to attributepositive qualitiesto the othersubject,we would no longer havean internalcriterionfor judgingtherightnessor appropriateness of suchascriptions;instead, the variabilityof recognition would then have no boundaries, sinceanything couldend up having tocount as a capacityor status, as long as itcomes about through an act of attribution. One way out here could be found inthe thesis that the legitimacy of recognition depends on the normative qualityof the process by which it emerges; but then the concept of recognition wouldloseall themoral implicationsthat distinguishit intherst placefromasociological labeling approach.At rst sight, matters look no better for the opposing approach, thereceptivity or response model proposed by Laitinen. In order to be able toclaim that someone is responding correctly to the evaluative qualities of aperson or group of persons, the objective existence of values must bepresupposedinawaythat isincompatiblewithwhat weknowabout theconstitution of values. Laitinen will be aware of the difculties thataccompanythiskindofvaluerealism, buthemakesnoeffortinhisessayto point the way towards a solution. I think he is right to claim that we shouldlocate recognitionin the spaceofreasons, sothat it isnot deprivedof itscharacterasamoralaction; foronlyifourrecognitionofotherpersonsismotivated by reasons, which we can also try to articulate as necessary, can weunderstand it as a matter of acting on the basis of insight and thus, in a broadsense, expand the domain of the moral. Laitinens further suggestion that weGrounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 507Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 categorizethesereasonsasevaluativealsoseemsplausible, totheextentthatin recognizingpersons (or groups) we alwaysseemto bemakingtheirvaluemanifest; themoral constraints towhichweknowourselvestobesubject in recognizing others result from the valuable qualities to which, in acertainsense, we give public expression inrecognizingthem.The problemstarts at the point where we have to specifyfurther the status of theseevaluative reasons. Here there seems to be no way out except to take recourseto a form of value realism that is incompatible with the rest of our backgroundontological beliefs. Thisunfortunatesituationchanges, however, onceweadmit thepossibilitythatthesevaluesrepresentlifeworldcertitudeswhosecharacter can undergo historical change; then the evaluative qualities that wewould have to be able to perceive in order to respond correctly to them inrecognizing a person or group would no longer be immutable and objectivebut rather historically alterable. To be halfway plausible, however, the picturejust outlined would have to be supplemented with a further element: the sociallifeworldwouldhavetobeconceivedofasakindofsecondnatureintowhich subjects are socialized by gradually learning to experience theevaluativequalities of persons;14this learningprocess wouldhavetobeconceptualizedas a complexone,sinceinit we wouldbeacquiring,alongwiththeperceptionofevaluativequalities, alsothecorrespondingwaysofbehaving whose distinctiveness would have to consist in the obvious restraintof our natural egocentrism; as aresult, wecouldthenviewrelations ofrecognitionas a bundle of customsthat,in theprocessof socialization, arelinked to revisable grounds for the value or worth of other persons.Of course, this line of argument does not yet solve the problemthatgenerates the actual difculties with this type of moderate value realism. Theidea was that the valuable qualities for which we can appropriately recognizesomeonehaverealityonlywithintheexperiential horizonof aparticularlifeworld; those who have been successfully socialized into the culture of thatlifeworld take these values to be objective givens of the social world, in justthe way they initially experience other cultural particularities as self-evidently given facts. This gives rise, within this conception, to the danger ofa form of relativismthat is fundamentallyincompatiblewiththe normativeaimsof theconcept of recognition; for thevaluesintermsof whichtheappropriateness of acts of recognitionwouldbeassessedappear tohavenormative validity only for a single culture. Consequently, the relativism thataccompanies the response or receptivity model would be indistinguishabl efromthe attributionmodel; inboth casesthe validityof the recognitionalattitude, whether it is described as an attribution or as an appropriate response,woulddependexclusivelyonthenormativegivensof theformof lifeinquestion. With regard to the receptivity model defended by Laitinen, I believethatthisdifcultycanbeovercomeonlybeequippingthismoderatevaluerealismwithamorerobust conceptionof progress. That wouldbasically508 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 mean hypothesizing,with regard to the cultural transformationsofvaluablehuman qualities, a developmental path that would allow for justiedjudgments regarding the transhistorical validity of a specic culture ofrecognition. I am fully aware of the burden of proof this hypothesis places onme in the present culture, which is so sceptical of claims to progress; but I donot see Laitinen having any alternative to a conception of progress, either, ifhe wants to avoid, for good reasons, the unfortunate choice betweencompletely ahistorical value realism and cultural value relativism.The picture of moderate value realism that I have presented thus far playsintonotionsof progressinsofar asI takeasmypoint of departuretheexpanding differentiation of evaluative qualities: the thesis would have to bethat,inthe course of historical development,thereisa growingnumberofvalues that, owing to our socialization, we can perceive people as having andforwhichwecan, accordingly, recognizethem. Thisdevelopment canbeunderstoodasprogressinthenormativesense, however, onlyifit canbeshown that, taken as a whole, this development contributes to whatever it isabout relations of recognition that merits so much attention in the rst place;there has to be an internal connection between the expansion of values and thepurposebehindrelationsofrecognition, forit wouldotherwisebeentirelyunclear what weought toviewastheintendedendpoint for apurporteddirectionofhistorical change.Thistheoreticaldemandraisesthe issue thatoccupies IkaheimoandLaitinenextensivelyintheir essays, namely, thequestion regarding the extent to which recognition represents a practice thatought tohavenormativesignicanceforhumanpractical life. TheansweralreadysuggestedbyHegel (andsubsequentlyproposedinever-changingversions) reintroduces human autonomy as the goal of recognition: only thepersonwhoknowsthat sheis recognizedbyotherscanrelatetoherselfrationally in a way that can, in the full sense of the word, be called free. Inthe last section of his article,Laitinen makes clear that we must distinguishhere between two different strong readings of this thesis: we can speak of theconstitutive role of recognition for humanpersonhoodina direct or anindirect sense, depending on whether recognition generates the relevantqualitiesfortherst timeorrathermerelyactualizesthem. Inbothcases,recognition is a necessary condition for becoming a person capable ofautonomous self-determination; but only in the rst case is recognition also asufcient condition, since the subject does not acquire the capacities inquestionpriortotheact of recognition, whereasinthesecondcasethesecapacitieshavetobealreadypresent aspotentialitiesinorder tothenberealized, in a certain sense, as the result of recognition.In light of this useful distinction, it is clear that only the attribution modelwill allow one to speak of recognition being constitutive in a direct sense: ifrecognitional attitudes are understood as attributions, then they represent thenecessary and sufcient conditions for human beings becoming autonomousGrounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 509Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 persons with therelevant properties.By contrast,the response model that Iwould defend (with Laitinen), allows at most for the possibility of speaking ofaconstitutive meaninginanindirect sense: theevaluative qualities thatsubjectsalreadyhavetopossess,accordingtothismodel, wouldthenbeconceivedof as potentialities that recognitional responses transformintoactual capacities. This rather ingenious thesis does, however, need anadditional assumption if it is to explain how, with the help of the concept ofrecognition, we are to imagine this transformation of potentiality intoactuality. It seems to me that an exceptionally apt explanation emerges froman understanding that combines the insight into the constitutive role ofrecognition with the response model: in our recognitional attitudes, werespondappropriatelytoevaluativequalitiesthat, bythestandardsof ourlifeworld, human subjects already possess but are actually available to themonly once they can identify with themas a result of experiencing therecognition of these qualities. Although Laitinen himself gives no indicationof his theoretical sources, the inuence behind the concept of identicationhereseemstobeHarryFrankfurtsconceptoftheperson:accordingtohisaccount, a person counts as autonomous in the strong sense only if she is abletoidentifywholeheartedlywithherowndesiresandcapabilities.15GoingbeyondFrankfurt, however, wewouldhavetosaythat this identicationpresupposes recognition by others: with regard to the capabilities to which, invirtue of my cultures normative presuppositions, I am entitled as a subject, Ican really afrm only those capabilities that are reinforced as valuable throughthe recognitional behaviour of those with whom I interact. To this extent, anexplanatory model of this sort actually represents a middle position betweenpure constructivism and mere representationalism: although we makemanifest, inouractsofrecognition, onlythoseevaluativequalitiesthatarealready present in the relevant individual, it is only as a result of our reactionsthat he comes to be in a position to be truly autonomous, because he is thenable to identify with his capabilities.Having thus explained the purpose in terms of which acts of recognition gettheirnormativesignicanceinhumanlife, Icannowreturntotheideaofprogressthat Isawmyselfhavingtodefendinconnectionwithmoderatevalue realism. I do not think we can do without a conception of progress if wearetoavoidtherelativismthat wouldordinarilyaccompanyclaimstothealterabilityof evaluative human qualities; if we are to elude the implicationthat every evaluative predicate ever to have emerged in history has the samenormative validity, we must be able to derive, from the desired direction ofsuch changes, transhistorical standards for judging them. With regard to thedirectional indexthat is, progressthat wearepermittedtopresupposehistorically,we can get some insight from the foregoing discussion into theunderlying purpose of mutual recognition in human life: every new evaluativequality whose conrmation through recognition increases a human subjects510 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 capacity for autonomy must be viewed as a progressive step in the historicalprocess of cultural transformation. This is not to say that a vague formulationof this sort already clears up the numerous problems connected with claimsregarding progress inevaluative perception; but the line of thought justsketched does still provide us with a criterion that we must attend to in tryingto ascertain a direction within cultural change. In my exchange with NancyFraser,16I have actually tried to make these standards more precise, arguingthat it is the increases in individuality and social inclusion that jointly indicateprogressinsocial acts of recognition; withthehelpof thesepreliminaryreections, I have attempted to show that we ought to view the differentiationof various kinds ofrecognitionnot as an ahistorical givenbut ratheras theresult of a directional process. This raises the further issue withwhichIkaheimoand Laitinenconfront me; for despite their differences,theybothclaimthat the tripartite distinctionof love, rights, and esteemrepresentsanontological or anthropological (and, in any case, ahistorical) distinction.Of course,the justicationseach offers for this thesis are quite different,since they do, after all, defend different models of recognition. In theanalytical schema that Ikaheimo offers in the context of his attribution model,the distinctions between types of recognition appear to be made in terms ofthe logical possibilities formally available in the dimensions of humanpersonality;thoughhespeaksofauseful practice, heisactuallyorientedtowards Hegel when he speaks of the three dimensions of singularity,autonomy, and particularity. By drawing a parallel between these aspects andthethreedistinctqualitiestowhichwecaninprincipleagain,onlogicalgroundsattributeasavaluetohumansubjects, Ikaheimoarrivesat theambitious table with which he wants to elucidate the eld of possible types ofrecognition: inlove, thesingularity of ones partner tointeraction isrecognizedbyhavingattributedtohimthestatusofapersonwhosewell-being as such is valuable; in rights, the autonomy of the other isrecognized by being granted the status of a person who is entitled to performcertain actions; and nally, in esteem, the other is recognized in hisparticularity by being equipped with the status of a person who has value fora third party. I nd especially helpful the ideas that Ikaheimo puts forward, onthe basisof his schema,whenhecrossesthese different variableswithoneanother. In this way, it becomes clear that the various categorical assignmentsare much looser that I envisioned in my original proposal: for example, wecan often demonstrate to children that we care by conrming their autonomythrough the attribution of non-juridical rights, or we can grant persons formalrights that protect them exclusively with regard to their singularity. But evenif weconsider suchextensionstobesensible, thequestionremainsastowhether to view the central categorizations as socio-ontological givens or asmatters of historical circumstance; the fact that love was not uncoupled fromexpectations of utility until the modern period and that legal rights were fusedGrounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 511Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 for a long time with social esteem seems to me to speak more in favour of thesecond answer. Like Ikaheimo, Laitinen also favours an ahistoricalintroductionof thebasictypes of recognition; inhiscase, however, thisstrategy is linked to his value realism, which unlike me, he apparently wantsto understand in ontological terms.Although Laitinen leaves open at the start of his essay whether we shouldunderstand the evaluative qualities of persons in ontological terms, itbecomes clear in the course of his argument that this is precisely his view. Mysuggested wayout, which involves speaking merely of these evaluativequalities social and experiential [lebensweltlich] reality, is not the route heseems to want to take; that is why he answers the question as to which types ofrecognition are to be distinguished, by referring to the various values that canbe seen as betting human essence. It is not surprising that Laitinen therebycomes to the tripartite distinction, since his conceptual orientation, likeIkaheimos, is Hegelian: human subjects can be recognized for good reasonsbecausetheypossesseither thesamedignityasall othersor exceptionalcapacities or specic signicance for others. Fromwhat I said earlierregarding Laitinens distinction between potentiality and actuality, it is clearthat we are to understand these three values as objective, timeless potentialsof human essence: as a result of the corresponding recognitional responses oflegal respect, of love, and of esteem, subjects come to be able to identify withthe three evaluative qualitiesto which they always already potentiallyhaveaccess, independently of all historical transformations. For the reasonsmentioned, I do not agree with such a strong value realism, whichpresupposesanitenumberofrealizablehumanvalues;thistypeofviewignores, as a matter of principle, not onlythe social constitution of allevaluative qualities but also the possibility that new values could emerge.17Inmy view,the space of reasons isalsoa historicallychangingdomain; theevaluative human qualities to which we can respond rationally in recognizingothers form ethical certitudes whose character changes unnoticeably with thecultural transformations of our lifeworld. If we assume, in addition, that thesechanges in our ethical knowledge have occurred in the direction of increasingindividuality and inclusion, then the three forms of recognition that Ikaheimoand Laitinen both presuppose can be understood as the result of a historicallearning process: in our lifeworld, we, the children of modernity, have learnedtoperceiveinother humansubjectsthreepotential evaluativequalitiestowhich we can respond appropriately with the relevant recognitionalbehaviour, accordingtothekindofrelationshipinquestion;whatwethendo, in such acts of recognition, involves publicly making explicit theknowledge that we have acquired in the process of socialization.512 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 IIIInmyresponsetothesystematicproposalsof IkaheimoandLaitinen, thecentral issue was the appropriate understanding of the concept of recognition.Faced with the choice between the attribution model and the response model,I took the path of a moderate value realism: we are to understandrecognition asabehavioural reactioninwhichwerespondrationallytoevaluative qualities that we have learned to perceive, to the extent to whichwe are integratedintothesecondnatureof our lifeworld.Thisformulationdoes not, however, make adequately clear why the concept of recognition,thus understood, refers to a moral action; we are, of course, dealing with anaction that is mediated by evaluative reasons, but that is far from enough toshowthat this must also be a matter of acting morally. The intendedconnection rst arises with Kants claimthat [r]espect is properly therepresentationof aworth[or value: Wert] that infringesuponmyself-love,18that is, somethings (or someones) value can require us to constrainour actions in a non-egoistical manner. Joseph Raz seems to have somethingsimilar in mind when he writes that the value of what is of value determineswhat action, if any, it is a reason to perform.19The implication of this line ofthinking is that the reason why acts of recognition must be moral acts is thatthey are determined by the value or worth of other persons; acts of recognitionareorientednottowardsonesownaimsbutrathertowardstheevaluativequalities of others. If this is so, then we would have to be able to distinguish asmanyforms of moral actionas therearevalues of humanbeings toberecognized;I have thus concluded,in severalrecent essays, thatwe shoulddistinguish three sources ofmorality,whichare meant to correspond tothedifferentiated forms of recognition found in our lifeworld.20My proposal thusoverlaps only supercially with that of Arnold Gehlen, who also distinguishesthree sources of morality; contrarytoHeidegrens assertions, I take mystarting-point not from functional demands of human nature but rather fromaspects of the value of human persons, aspects that have becomedifferentiated as the result of a historical learning process.With these remarks, I am already approaching the theme that is at the coreof Antti Kauppinensessay. Inmentioningtheimplicationsthat Iwishtodraw for moral philosophy from the historically justied distinction betweenthree forms of recognition, I am once again underscoring the point of all myeffortshere:basically, whatIamconcernedwithistheattempt tousetheconcept of recognition to develop the normative foundations on the basis ofwhich social criticism can be justied. The astute comments that Kauppinendirects at this goal of my work are extremely well suited to helping me clarifymattersfurther. Evenjustthefewpageshedevotestotheopaqueeldofsocial criticism make it possible to specify precisely my theoretical point ofdeparture: in contrast to approaches that try to criticize social relationsGrounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 513Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 externally, with reference to universalistic principles, I favour an internalapproach; this means that the standards for critical judgment are to be derivedfromthenormativeconvictionsthat arealreadysharedbytheaddressees.Kauppinen rightly sees as the twofold advantage of such internal critique thatit safely avoids the danger of a merely supposed universalism and that it has,in addition, great motivating force: since the underlying norms in thecriticizedsocietyarealreadyacceptedinsomeway, thosetargetedbythecritiquearemorelikelytobewillingtofollowthem. But alreadyintheinconspicuous qualication that the norms must be shared in some way, onecanseeanindicationthat thismodelofcritiquemustalsobedividedintosubspecies.Whenevertheinternal standardsareexplicit, thatis, wheneverthey are publicly articulated in the society in question, Kauppinen speaks ofsimple internal critique, since all that is needed is a confrontation betweenthoseexplicit normsandthepracticesthat depart fromthem. Bycontrast,whenever the internal standards are assumed to be of only implicitsignicance for the addressees, the situation becomes markedly morecomplicated and requires a form of critique that Kauppinen termsreconstructive: before they can be considered implicit standards, the normsthat aretoprovidetheunderpinningforthecritiquemust rst beeducedinterpretatively, in a reconstruction, from the semantic eld of the existingsocial practices.For Kauppinen, even this set of distinctions is not enough really to revealthewholearrayof possibleforms of social criticism. Not onlydoes thesimple form of social criticism get divided into two further subcategories,thereconstructive formisalsopresentedintwoversions: ifthecritiquemakes weak claims, then it treats the implicitly practised norms as havingonlya contingent, particular character, whereas if it appeals tostrongaspirations, thentheuniversal necessityof thoseimplicit normsmust bedemonstrated. Only after Kauppinen has introduced this last branching does itbecome clear why he had to go so far in drawing these distinctions; his view isthat bothHabermas andI areengagedinaformof social criticismthatcorresponds to the stronger form of reconstructive critique. Accordingly, hedevotesthe main part of hisessayto the questionof whether my theoryofrecognition is actually able to full the wide-ranging aspirations of this typeof critique. Since I agree with Kauppinens astute classication, I must takeup the challenge posed by his questions; indeed, it is not clear to what extentthe concept of recognition sketched thus far could make possible areconstructive form of critique that rests on the universalistic content of asocietys implicit norms.Kauppinens analysis of the critical intent behind my conception ofrecognition is just as wellfounded as his classicatory proposal is convincing.The starting-point here is to be found in the same premises regarding humannature that already came up in my rejoinder to Heidegren: with Hegel, I take it514 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 for granted that human beings need the experience of recognition in order torelate to their capabilities and potentials in a way that permits a free,uncoercedrealizationof their personality. TakingapagefromLaitinen, Ishouldperhaps nowsay that social recognition represents the necessarycondition for subjects being able to identify with their valuable qualities and,accordingly, develop genuine autonomy. This premise remains a claim withinphilosophical anthropology, even though I now emphasize much more thanpreviously the historical alterability of forms of recognition; it is still a matterof the invariant dependence of humans on the experience of recognition, eventhoughitsformsandcontourscanbecomedifferentiatedinthecourseofhistorical transformations. For me, the decisive point that Kauppinen makesinconnectionwithmy anthropological startingassumptions isthe proposalthat he makes in connection with the implicit character of norms ofrecognition: he recommends that these be understood, following RobertBrandom, as generalized behavioural expectations that we follow, notexplicitly or consciously, but rather implicitly; accordingly, we becomeaware of the norms that regulate our behaviour in the form of knowing howonly in those moments when our expectations are disrupted; the interruptionof our action forces us to make explicit the portion of our latent backgroundbeliefs that is ineluctable for making sense of the situation. I see no difcultyin incorporating this suggestion with the ideas I developed earlier, regardingthe basis for acts of recognition in our socially acquired backgroundknowledge: if we think of norms of recognition as patterns of response that wemaster in the course of acquiring evaluative knowledge, this must be a matterof knowing how that we can never completely articulate in explicit rules.This conceptual result actually only explains why the theory of recognitiontakes the form of social criticism that Kauppinen terms reconstructive: thecritique relies on norms of recognition that it must make explicit via a form ofreconstruction, because the validity of those norms has the character ofimplicit knowledge.This does not yet show that the concept of recognitioncan also accomplish the more ambitious tasks that Kauppinen associates withthe strong version of reconstructive critique; that would require demonstrat-ing that the norms of recognition that are reconstructed in each case are not ofa merelycontingent character but have, rather, necessarily universalisticcontent. This is where we come to the most difcult questions that Kauppinendirects at my approach; he is not sure to what extent a societys implicit normsof recognition canyield auniversalistic basis for forms of critique thatattempt to connect up with the self-understanding of their addressees.In my rebuttal, I will skip over the questions that Kauppinen treats underthe rubric of a Priority Challenge. I currently think it is possible, without toomany difculties, to use the historical, sociological, and psychologicalliterature to indicate the priority that normative questions of recognition musthave, from the perspective of those affected, ahead of other moral interests;Grounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 515Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 moreover, I have recently attempted to work out, in several recent texts, theexplanatory proof for a prioritization of this sort.21For me, the real challengebegins at the point where Kauppinen doubts these norms of recognition canyield an adequate basis for a universalistic justication of my criticalaspirations. Therstproblemthat arisesinthiscontext resultsonceagainfrommyrepeatedassertionthat recognitional behaviour serves toenableautonomyor self-realization; this formulationleaves the impressionthatrecognitionisaccordedtheroleof amerelyinstrumental value, whereasautonomy or self-realization occupies the truly decisive position as thehighestmoralvalue. Ishallrstreplybrieytothechargeofinstrument-alism just voiced, before I then turn to the charge of cultural particularism.The suspicion of instrumentalism arises from my starting assumption thatsocial recognitionisanecessaryconditionfortheindividual autonomyofpersons. The character of that claim changes markedly, however, as soon asone notes additionally that these acts of recognition also represent the morallyappropriate response to individuals evaluative qualities; for what wasinitially just a condition loses its purely instrumental meaning in coming tobe also a matter of meeting a moral or ethical demand. Just as Kant locatesboth a precondition and an obligation in the concept of respect, one must seethe concept of recognition as simultaneously representing both as well: it isin virtue of being in accordance with individuals potential evaluativequalities that recognition comes to be a condition for the development of theirautonomy. Inthis sense, it wouldbe a mistake tofollowKauppineninspeakingof recognition asmerelysecondarytoaprimarygoal of self-realization; on the contrary, the point is that individuals autonomy can reachitsfullestdevelopmentonlyvia therelevantrecognitionalresponses, anditwould thus be entirely inappropriate to draw a primary/secondary distinctionhere.With these reections, I am already working within one of the two possiblesolutions that Kauppinen distinguishes, namely, the one he labels thefoundationalistpossibility.I doindeedassume that we shouldunderstandautonomy or self-realizationas the overarching telos of our humanform oflife, interms of whichour internal critiquecanorient itself. Inorder tounderstand how a universalistic approach of this sort can be combined withtheideaof internal critique, however, twothingsneedtobemademoreprecise. I have spoken throughout of autonomy or self-realizationinthemost neutral sense possible, in which we attribute to every human being aninterest inbeingabletofreelydetermineandrealizehisowndesiresandintentions; that is why, on my view, this way of specifying the goal does notentail any culturally specic commitments, or even the designation ofparticular conceptions of thegood. Onthecontrary, aformal concept ofautonomy or self-realization should rather let differences come to the foreregarding the various cultural ways of realizing, within history, the telos of a516 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 relation-to-self that is free from domination or compulsion; this is the samemoveI madevis-a`-visLaitinen, inclaimingthat thechangingevaluativeproperties of human beings specify, in each case, what has to be seen as thedistinctive character of individual autonomy. Granted, this line of thought stilldoes not justify why social criticism that starts out from a societys implicitrecognitionnormsmustrelyonanormativebasisthat isuniversalorevennecessary; thisisbecausefollowingthosenormsfostersonlyoneformofindividual autonomy, whose legitimacy [Geltung] is limited to just oneculture, leaving it without any transcendental validity [Gu ltigkeit]. AsKauppinen rightly surmises, at this delicate point in the argument, I have torelyonaconceptionof progress; for inorder toshowthat thecurrentlydominant norms of recognitionare not just relativelybut ratheruniversallyvalid, it must be possible to assert their normative superiority over allprevious recognition regimes. I have already addressed, in the discussion ofIkaheimo and Laitinen, the conditions under which I consider such a model ofhistory defensible; here I would only add that, in my view, the hemeneuticalcounter-proposal that Kauppinnen defends, following McDowell, itselfcannot be carried out without a weak concept of progress.22In this debate with Kauppinen, I have now reached the point where one canstart to see how the concept of recognition can serve as the basis for a strongversion of reconstructive internal critique. In describing the process by whichit would come to be used in this way, I could hardly do better than Kauppinenhimself does in the nal section of his essay: social criticism reconstructs thenorms of recognition that are already implicit in the ways in which people inthatsocietyrespond toone anothersevaluativequalities,in order tomakeclear, in the exchange with its addressees, the extent to which their de factopracticesandsocial ordercontradict theirimplicitlypractisedideals. Iamunsure, however, whether Kauppinensformulationtakes sufcientlyintoaccount that I presuppose, in the very structure of my approach, that norms ofrecognition are characterizedby a normative surplus [Geltungsuberhang];even when there is no apparent gap between de facto practices and implicitnorms, theidealsassociatedwiththedistinct formsofrecognitionalwayscall for greater degrees of morally appropriate behaviour, than is everpractisedinthat particularreality. Otherwise, Icouldhardlyexplainhowthere could ever be the progress (regarding the historical transformations ofrecognitional attitudes) that I must presuppose in defending the strong modelof critique;here, my hunchisthat normsof recognitionwhichare to beunderstood as patterns of response (acquired through socialization) vis-a`-visevaluative propertiesthat are perceivedinlifeworldcontexts continuallydemand, from within themselves, the further perfection of our moral action,such that the historical process is characterizedby a permanent pressure tolearn.I knowfull well, of course, that I amgetting myself into extremelyGrounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 517Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 speculative terrain here. As is true of Habermas and his approach, I too need aplausible concept of progress for the theory of recognition if I am to justify theuniversalistic content of my internalist approach to critique; and as in the caseof his writings indeed, in a much more underdeveloped and confusing way thebuildingblocksforsucha conceptionarelyingaroundinmy writings,without ever really tting together. What is, above all, unclear to me is how tosquare the anthropologicalspeculationsaboutanti-socialhumantendencieswiththesuggestionsIhavemadeinconnectionwiththestructural surplusregardingthevalidityof recognitionnorms. But theauthorsoftheessayscollected here can take comfort in the fact that there may well be no greatercompliment to the signicance of their criticisms than the admission that I amconfronted here with problems that are difcult to solve.NOTES1 Cf. Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, Social Action and Human Nature, trans. Raymond Meyer(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988), ch. 2.2 John McDowell, Two Sorts of Naturalism, in Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge, MA:HarvardUniversityPress, 1998), pp. 16797.3 Self-Consciousnes s and Self-Determinatio n, trans. Paul Stern (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1986), Lecture11.4 Axel Honneth, TheStrugglefor Recognition: TheMoral Grammarof Social Conicts,trans. Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).5 Honneth, Redistribution as Recognition, in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribu-tionor Recognition?APolitical-Philosophica lExchange(London: Verso, forthcoming) .6 Arnold Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral : Eine pluralistische Ethik (Frankfurt a/M:Athenaum, 1969).7 Judith Butler, The PsychicLifeof Power:Theories inSubjection(Stanford, CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 1997).8 Axel Honneth, FacettendesvorsozialenSelbst. EineErwiderumgaufJoel Whitebook,Psyche55 (2001), pp. 790802.9 Axel Honneth, Postmodern Identity and Object-Relations Theory: On the SupposedObsolence of Psychoanalysis , Philosophical Explorations 2(1999), pp. 22542; AxelHonneth, Das Werk der Negativitat. Eine psychoanalytisch e Revision der Anerken-nungstheorie, inBohleberandSibylleDrews (eds), DieGegenwartderPsychoanalyseDiePsychoanalys ederGegenwart (Stuttgart : Klett-Cotta, 2001), pp. 23845.10 JessicaBenjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis , Feminism, andtheProblemofDomination(New York: Basic Books, 1988).11 Axel Honneth, Angst und Politik Starken und Schwachen der Pathologiediagnos e vonFranzNeumann, in MattiasIser andDavidStrecker (eds), KritischeTheorie der Politik:Franz Neumann eine Bilanz (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, forthcoming) .12 Cf. the entry on Recognition, in Michael J. Inwood, AHegel Dictionary (Oxford:Blackwell, 1992).13 Stanley Cavell, Knowing and Acknowledging, in Must We Mean What We Say?(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1976), pp. 23866.14 John McDowell, Two Sorts of Naturalism, op. cit.; Sabina Lovibond, Ethical Formation(Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 2002), ch. 1.15 Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1988), chs. 7 and 12; and his Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999), esp. chs. 7,11, and 14.16 Axel Honneth, Redistributionas Recognition, op. cit.518 Axel HonnethDownloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015 17 Hans Joas, Die Entstehung der Werte (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 1997); English translationforthcomingfrom PolityPress.18 Immanuel Kant, Groundworkfor theMetaphysics ofMorals, inMaryJ. Gregor(trans.anded.), Practical Philosophy(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996), p. 56,second footnot e[Akademieedition 4:4012].19 JosephRaz, Value, Respect, andAttachment (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2001), p. 166.20 Axel Honneth, DasAnderederGerechtigkei t (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp, 2000), part II;Englishtrans. forthcomingfromPolityPress.21 Axel Honneth, Redistributionas Recognition, op. cit.22 Axel Honneth, Between Hermeneutics and Hegelianism: John McDowell and theChallengeof Moral Realism, inNicholasH. Smith(ed.), ReadingMcDowell (London:Routledge, 2002), pp. 24666.Received 21 September 2002Axel Honneth, Institut fur Sozialforschung , Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universit at Frankfurt /M.,Senckenberganlag e26, DE-60325Frankfurt amMain, Germany. E-mail: honneth@em.uni -frankfurt.deGrounding Recognition:A RejoindertoCritical Questions 519Downloaded by [University of Sheffield] at 01:34 27 July 2015