歯 pdf - kfpa.or.kr · the National Fire Protection Association. ... 325(0.9) 260(0.7) 117(0.3)...

2003. 3

KOREAN FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION

This is provided under the Agreement of Cooperation between

the Korean Fire Protection Association and the National Fire Protection Association

FOREWORD

We are pleased to issue a revised edition of an English booklet entitled "Korean Fire Data" which offers an outline of Korean fire statistics during the year 2001.

The first edition was published in 1997 in accordance with the "Agreement of Cooperation between the NFPA(National Fire Protection Association) and the KFPA (Korean Fire Protection Association)". It was probably the first Korean fire related statistics in English and paved for disseminating the information to the world including USA. Since then, revised editions have been issued annually.

Let us take a look at the Korean fire data in the year 2001.Thirty six thousand and one hundred and sixty nine(36,169) fires were attended by

public fire services, an increase of 3.8% from the previous year. Casualties rose slightly, but the death toll fell by 2.8% from 531 in 2000 to 516 in 2001. Property loss accounts for 167.75 billion Won (approx. US $140 million) in 2001, 11.7% increased from 151.97 billion Won (approx. US $126 million) in 2000.

With regard to the property loss in 2001, it still showed high increase rate of 11.7%, average 20.9% increase per annum for the past ten year period. In particular Korean non-life insurance companies say that the actual property losses may be estimated to several times as much as the above official figures. In addition, the rate of fire occurrence in Korea has increased by an average of 8.6% per annum for the past ten years.

The above fire statics shows that fire safety in Korea still has to attain more solid establishment in various areas compared to the advanced countries such as USA, Japan and Western European nations. Therefore Korea should make sincere efforts to increase investment in fire infrastructure and to enhance the peoples' safety awareness in cooperation with government and private sectors.

We hope this booklet serves not only to deliver the current Korean fire data but to reduce the worldwide fire disaster.

2001 Fire Report ��1

. Summary of Fire Incidents in 2001 ��3

. Fires for the 10-Year Period ('92-'01) ��7

Fire Investigation Reports ��27

Tire Factory Fire ��27

Shopping Center Fire ��41

Daegu Subway Fire ��49

SOURCE : 2001 Fire Statistics Report by the Ministry of Government Adminstration and Home Affairs of the Republic of Korea

2001 FIRE REPORT

- 3 -

I. Summary of Fire Incidents in 2001

1. Fire Loss Summary

Category '01 '00 Rise & FallIncrease

Rate(%)

No. of Fires

Deaths

Injuries

Property Loss

( million)

36,169

516

1,860

169,750

34,844

531

1,853

151,972

1,325

15

7

17,778

3.8

2.8

0.4

11.7

2. '01 Fires by Causes

CategoryNo. of Fires

(Rate %)

Fire Casualties

(Deaths/Injuries)

Property Loss

( million)

Total 36,169 516/1,860 169,750

Electrical

Smoking

Arson

Ember

Gas

Children Playing

Fireplace

Stove

Oil

Matches Candles

Others

12,300(34.0)

4,445(12.3)

2,709(7.5)

2,464(6.8)

1,479(4.1)

1,371(3.8)

668(1.8)

425(1.2)

397(1.1)

292(0.8)

9,619(26.6)

77/381

26/114

120/306

14/120

22/204

13/26

6/34

13/44

5/91

14/23

206/517

67,856

6,764

8,358

9,303

2,801

2,231

1,574

1,902

1,056

848

67,057

- 4 -

3. '01 Fires by Property Types

Category No. of Fires(Rate %)

Fire Casualties(Deaths/Injuries)

Property Loss( million)

Total 36,169 516/1,860 169,750

Residential

Vehicle

Factory

Restaurant

Shop

Warehouse

Workplace

Hotel Motel

School

Ship

Market

Others

10,011(27.7)

5,973(16.5)

3,913(10.8)

2,212(6.1)

1,662(4.6)

822(2.3)

591(1.6)

325(0.9)

260(0.7)

117(0.3)

49(0.1)

10,234(28.3)

336/859

42/89

17/211

12/99

16/75

0/18

7/78

16/81

0/8

5/6

0/4

65/332

30,369

13,152

51,433

12,448

12,209

7,321

4,123

1,003

519

4,010

576

32,587

4. '01 Fires by Months

Months No. of Fires Deaths InjuriesProperty Loss( million)

Total 36,169 516 1,860 169,750

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

3,681

2,916

3,722

3,737

3,014

2,613

2,451

2,381

2,630

2,436

3,047

3,541

75

45

74

47

29

26

23

28

29

40

36

64

199

176

142

167

182

150

132

114

148

117

165

168

16,832

13,248

20,080

16,194

14,241

14,079

10,610

8,768

12,325

11,099

14,159

18,115

- 5 -

5. '01 Fires by Major Cities and Provinces

Cities &Dos(Provinces)

No. of Fires Deaths Injuries Property Loss( million)

Total 36,169 516 1,860 169,750

Seoul

Pusan

Daegu

Inchon

Gwangju

Daejun

Ulsan

Gyunggi-Do

Gangwon-Do

Chungbuk-Do

Chungnam-Do

Jeonbuk-Do

Jeonnam-Do

Gyeongbuk-Do

Gyeongnam-Do

Jeju-Do

7,379

2,123

914

1,637

836

1,067

1,340

7,726

1,315

1,250

1,502

1,580

1,562

1,943

3,495

500

98

33

17

16

10

8

10

104

16

17

30

35

31

41

42

8

351

118

50

86

50

77

34

360

71

78

80

81

101

159

148

16

16,163

4,295

4,418

7,092

3,148

3,785

4,858

45,151

10,708

9,095

9,907

6,968

11,348

11,784

17,845

3,185

Thirty six thousand and one hundred and sixty nine(36,169) fires were attended by

public fire services, an increase of 3.8% from the year before.

Casualties rose a slight increase but death toll fell by 2.8% from 531 in 2000 to 516 in 2001. Property loss accounts for 169.75 billion in 2001, 11.7% increased from 151.97 billion in 2000.The leading causes of 2001 fires were electrical distribution involved, smoking, arson, ember and gas etc. and they account for 64.7% of the total fires in 2001. Electrical distribution fires involved ranked first, occupied about 34% of all fires in 2001.Twenty-seven point seven percent(27.7%, 10,011) of the total 36,169 fires occurred in homes, including houses and apartments ranked first, vehicles fires ranked second or 16.5%(5,973), factory fires ranked third or 10.8%(3,913).

- 6 -

6. Catastrophic Fires for the Last 5 Year Period('97 - '01)

Year No. of Fires Deaths InjuriesProperty Loss( million)

'97

'98

'99

'00

'01

8

7

3

5

6

28

41

79

31

41

73

179

92

86

80

4,649

7,413

15,779

345

970

increase rate(%) 4.3 27.7 20.8 63.9

* A catastrophic fire is defined as following according to the "Fire Investiga-tion & Report Regulation".

- Death toll : Not less than five people - Injuries : Not less than ten people - Property loss : Not less than two billion Won( 2 billion)

Catastrophic fires for the last 5 years marked an average 4.3% increase rate per year.

But the 6 catastrophic fires in 2001 represented a 20.0% increase from 2000.

The 41 fire deaths in 2001 showed a increase of 46.4% from 1997 and a 32.3%

increase from 2000, with a 27.7% increase per year for the last 5 year.

The 80 fire injuries in 2001 showed a 9.6% increase from 1997, but a decrease of

7.0% from 2000, with a 20.8% increase per year for the last 5 year.

In 2001, property damage caused by fires amounted to 970 million, which marked

an decrease of 79.1% and 181.2% respectively from 1997 and 2000.

- 7 -

II. Fires for the 10-Year Period ('92-'01)

1. Number of Fires for '92-'01

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Total Fires

Residential

Vehicles

Year '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01IR

(%)

TF

R

VH

17,458

5,088

2,967

18,747

5,456

3,176

22,043

6,197

3,837

26,071

7,116

4,485

28,665

7,893

5,431

29,472

8,021

5,606

32,664

9,854

5,377

33,856

9,936

5,487

34,844

9,734

5,871

36,169

10,011

5,973

8.6

8.1

8.4

* TF:Total Fires, * R:Residential(Houses & Apartments), * VH:Vehicles,* IR:Increase Rate

The number of fires for the last 10-year period has shown an average 8.6%

increase rate per year since 1992. In 2001, total 36,169 fires occurred to be up by

107.2% from 1992. Fires in houses and apartments marked an average 8.1%

increase rate per year, and resulted in a 96.8% rise from 5,088 fires in 1992 to

10,011 fires in 2001. Vehicle fires have risen with an average 8.4% rate per year

to mark a 101.3% increase rate in 2001 compared to 1992. In 2001, the number

of fires in houses and apartments and vehicles accounted for 44.2% (15,984 fires)

of the total 36,169 fires.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Total Fires

Deaths

Injuries

Year '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01IR(%)

TF

Deaths

Injuries

17,458

510

1,237

18,747

573

1,204

22,043

555

1,324

26,071

571

1,648

28,665

589

1,634

29,472

564

1,631

32,664

505

1,779

33,856

545

1,825

34,844

531

1,853

36,169

516

1,860

8.6

0.3

4.9

* TF:Total Fires, * IR:Increase Rate

- 8 -

2. Fire Casualties for '92-'01

Increase trend in fire deaths

- Deaths in 2001 : increased average 0.3% per annum for the last

10-year period

- Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 2.8% decrease

- Numbers in 2001 compared to 1992 : 1.2% increase

Increase trend in fire injuries

- Injuries in 2001 : increased average 4.9% per annum for the last

10-year period

- Numbers rate in 2001 compared to 2000 : 0.4% increase

- Numbers rate in 2001 compared to 1992 : 50.4% increase

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

180,000

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Losses(\million)

Year '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01IR

(%)

PL( mil.)

52,675 51,890 132,624 100,745 113,148 121,712 159,721 166,426 151,972 169,750 20.9

* PL:Property Loss, * IR:Increase Rate

- 9 -

3. Property Loss for '92-'01

Increase trend in property loss - Increase trend for the last 10-year period : increased average 20.9% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 11.7% increase - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1992 : 222.3% increase

Property loss order by places - 1st : factory 51,433mil.(30.3% of total 169,750mil.) - 2nd : residential 30,369mil.(17.9% of total 169,750mil.) - 3rd : vehicles 13,152mil.(7.7% of total 169,750mil.)

Property loss order by causes - 1st : electrical fires 67,856mil.(40.0% of total 169,750mil.) - 2nd : embers 9,303mil.(5.5% of total 169,750mil.) - 3rd : arson 8,358mil.(4.9% of total 169,750mil.)

Fires(in thousands)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in tenthousands)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)

Category '97 '98 '99 '00 '01Increase Rate(%)

FiresDeathsInjuries


10,07575

27352,628

10,89788

39257,647

11,20459

30154,673

11,79673

38958,985

12,30077

38167,856

5.13.4

11.96.8

- 10 -

4. Fires by Cause for the 5-Year Period '97-'01

4-1. Electrical Fires

Fire trend - 5-year : increased average 5.1% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 4.3% increase - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : 22.1% increase

Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 3.4% and 11.9% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths up by 5.5% and injuries downed by 2.1% - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths and injuries up by 2.7% and 39.6% respectively

Property loss - 5-year trend : increased average 6.8% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 15.0% increase - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : 28.9% increase

Fires(in thousands)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


3,6261199

5,463

3,8561090

5,384

4,25620

1186,695

4,3032592

5,862

4,44526

1146,764

5.330.06.06.5

- 11 -

4-2. Smoking


Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 30.0% and 6.0% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths and injuries up by 4.0% and 23.9% respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths and injuries up by 136.4% and 15.2% respectively


Fires(in thousands)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


2,655116259

7,306

3,056112288

9,272

2,43499

2707,878

2,559122274

7,542

2,709120306

8,358

1.41.64.54.6

- 12 -

4-3. Arson


Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 1.6% and 4.5% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths downed by 1.6% and injuries up by 11.7% - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths and injuries up by 3.4% and 18.1% respectively


Fires(in thousands)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


1,5661593

2,281

1,9389

322,630

1,83558

1072,227

1,6967

462,256

1,3711326

2,231

-2.1125.6

17.10.04

- 13 -

4-4. Children Playing

Fire trend - 5-year : decreased average 2.1% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 19.2% decrease - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : 12.5% decrease

Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 125.6% and 17.1% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths up by 85.7% and injuries downed by 43.5% - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths and injuries downed by 13.3% and 72.0% respectively

Property loss - 5-year trend : increased average 0.04% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 1.1% decrease - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : 2.2% decrease

Fires(in thousands)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


1,7571681

5,580

1,6683762

4,952

1,9109

737,689

2,1799

576,674

2,46414

1209,303

9.227.820.717.6

- 14 -

4-5. Embers


Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 27.8% and 20.7% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths and injuries up by 55.6% and 110.5% respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths downed by 12.5% and injuries up by 48.1%


Fires(in hundreds)

FC(in tens)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


5306

981,029

4751263

1,147

3717

77950

3686

76962

3975

911,056

-6.36.81.21.3

- 15 -

4-6. Oils

Fire trend - 5-year : decreased average 6.3% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 7.9% increase - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : 25.1% decrease

Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 6.8% and 1.2% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths downed by 16.7% and injuries up by 19.7% - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths and injuries downed by 16.7% and 7.1% respectively


Fires(in hundreds)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

18.0

20.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


84726

1942,115

1,82721

3279,881

1,76525

2943,029

1,59044

2763,031

1,47922

2042,801

23.96.56.6

72.6

- 16 -

4-7. Gases

Fire trend - 5-year : increased average 23.9% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 7.0% decrease - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : 74.6% increase

Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 6.5% and 6.6% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths and injuries downed by 50.0% and 26.1% respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths downed by 15.4% and injuries up by 5.2%

Property loss - 5-year trend : increased average 72.6% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 7.6% decrease - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : 32.4% increase

Fires(in thousands)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in ten

thousands)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


8,021313740

21,003

9,854263766

27,875

9,936293813

29,728

9,734308801

26,989

10,011336859

30,369

6.12.43.9

10.7

- 17 -

5. Fires by Property Type for the 5-Year Period '97-'01

5-1. Residential(Houses & Apartments)




Fires(inthousands)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in ten

thousands)

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


3,66327

25340,507

3,40418

21949,236

3,65719

21960,303

3,97330

27649,607

3,91317

21151,433

1.9-3.3-2.77.5

- 18 -

5-2. Factories


Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries decreased average 3.3% and 2.7% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths and injuries downed by 43.3% and 23.6% respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths and injuries downed by 37.0% and 16.6% respectively


Fires(inthousands)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


5,6064478

12,002

5,37750

10911,404

5,4875384

10,466

5,87157

10811,414

5,9734289

13,152

1.70.26.92.8

- 19 -

5-3. Vehicles


Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 0.2% and 6.9% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths and injuries downed by 26.3% and 17.6% respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths downed by 4.5% and injuries up by 14.1%


Fires(in thousands)

FC(in hundreds)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


1,7014099

6,909

2,02346

1329,598

2,06727

1389,801

1,99033

1389,624

2,2121299

12,448

7.1-16.9

2.417.1

- 20 -

5-4. Restaurants


Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths decreased average 16.9% per annum and injuries increased average 2.4 per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths and injuries downed by 63.6% and 28.3% respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths downed by 70.0% and no changes in injury numbers


Fires(in hundreds)

FC(in tens)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

18.0

20.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


1,7561575

11,287

1,7691679

14,288

1,73419

10413,266

1,74116

10811,882

1,6621675

12,209

-1.32.42.62.9

- 21 -

5-5. Shops

Fire trend - 5-year : decreased average 1.3% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 4.5% decrease - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : 5.4% decrease

Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 2.4% and 2.6% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths showed no changes and injuries downed by 30.6% - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths up by 6.7% and no changes in injury numbers


Fires(in hundreds)

FC(in tens)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


6449

412,836

5306

553,481

5462

463,005

5211142

2,987

5917

784,123

-1.578.423.711.6

- 22 -

5-6. Workplaces

Fire trend - 5-year : decreased average 1.5% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : 13.4% increase - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : 8.2% decrease

Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths and injuries increased average 78.4% and 23.7% per annum respectively - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : deaths downed by 36.4% and injuries up by 85.7% - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : deaths downed by 22.2% and injuries up by 90.2%


Fires(in hundreds)

FC(in tens)

PL(in thousands)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


8093

145,775

7794

247,777

8652

186,298

9573

177,651

822-

187,321

1.0-16.711.78.2

- 23 -

5-7. Warehouses


Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths decreased average 16.7% per annum and injuries increased 11.7% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : injuries up by 5.9% - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : injuries up by 28.6%


Fires(in hundreds)

FC(in tens)

PL(in hundreds)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


3011363

792

2791147

913

3511177

1,068

3151460

828

3251681

1,003

2.96.5

12.87.7

- 24 -

5-8. Hotels & Motels




Fires(in hundreds)

FC(in tens)

PL(in hundreds)

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Fires

Fire Casualties(FC)

Property Loss(PL)


FiresDeathsInjuries


1748

60421

22117

964

220-2

625

23418

717

260-8

519

11.0-43.835.120.2

- 25 -

5-9. Schools


Fire casualties - 5-year trend : deaths decreased average 43.8% per annum and injuries increased 35.1% per annum - Numbers in 2001 compared to 2000 : injuries showed no changes - Numbers in 2001 compared to 1997 : injuries downed by 86.7%


- 26 -

FIRE INVESTIGATION REPORT

Tire Factory Fire

- 29 -- 29 -

Tire Factory Fire

1. Genera l

Fire Location : Jewon-myon Geumsan-Gun(County) Chungnam-Do(Province)

Fire Date & Time : Around 18:30 on 11th of March in 2002

Fire Place : Refining process of tire factory

Property loss : About 50 billion Won

Fire Casualties : none

Fire Cause : Worker's carelessness

Around 18:30 on 11th of March in 2002, a fire broke out from the microwave oven

for the raw rubber in the refining process of the vehicle tire factory of this company.

Employees on the spot tried to extinguish the fire at the early stage, but they failed.

The flame spread to the near rack-type warehouse. In spite of the large-scale

extinguishing effort of the fire brigade, the fire continued with awful flame and smoke

for 8 hours or longer. The property loss of this fire was assumed to be 50 billion Won

and 3 employees of this company got injured slightly at the early stage of fire fighting.

2. Fac tory overview

(1) General

The construction of this factory was started in 1994 and completed with the

state-of-art automatic facility in 1997. Of 887,700㎡ of the site area, the total area of

buildings of this large-scale tire factory is 189,654㎡ consisting of 28 buildings,

including two manufacturing buildings. It produced 5.4 million tires yearly at the early

stage, and it is now producing 10 million tires yearly through enlarging its facility. This

worldwide tire manufacturing company exports 50% of produced products and has the

plan to product 11.5 million tires yearly until 2007.

- 30 -- 30 -

(2) Building condition

Main buildings including two manufacturing factories have 20m or further of

inter-building distance and properly deployed to prevent them from the mutual spread

of the fire. The factory building where the fire broke out is a large-scale one with

123,463㎡ of the total area, adjoins to 20m street on every side, and most of its

structure is constructed of steel-frame and panel(some of RC structure). The refining

process where the fire broke out has rubber storage on the 1st floor, process facility

room such as heating room on the 2nd floor, and office on the 3rd floor partly. Mixing

devices such as Banbury mixer are installed through 1st to 3rd floor, which makes an

inefficient fire separation between floors. It has no fire separation between 11-level

rack-type raw material warehouse and refining process at its north-west side due to

openings for the input/output of raw material.

(3) Fire protection system

The factory building where the fire broke out has in and out door hydrant, fire alarm

and automatic fire detectors, dry-pipe sprinkler and deluge system at the partition of

each process for enforcing the fire-resistive performance. Carbon dioxide extinguishing

system was locally installed at the microwave oven of the refining process for

extinguishing the fire from the outside.

3. Acc ident

Around 18:30 on Monday, 11th of March in 2002, when the fire broke out at the

heating room on the 2nd floor of the refining process due to the internal abnormality

of the microwave oven, a worker on the spot ignoring the safety regulation opened the

door to spread the flame over the entire refining process.

At the early stage of the fire, employees on the spot tried to extinguish the fire with

fire extinguishing system, but failed to stop spreading the flame instantly. And, 50 or

more fire engines and 200 or more fire fighters fought to extinguish the fire, but they

had difficulty to catch the fire because the factory had much combustibles, what is

- 31 -- 31 -

worse, it was windy, and an awful poisonous gas was generated. The fire lasted for

8 hours or longer and the spread fire grew up 200m or higher at maximum to light up

the whole neighborhood like a daylight.

Preventing the flame from spreading to other areas such as the near rolling process

and six carbon storage tanks, the fire brigade prevented the fire from spreading over the

entire manufacturing factory by concentrating on extinguishing the main fire, and finally

caught it at 02:00 on 12th of March, 7 hours and a half since the fire started.

Even after the main fire was extinguished, a black smoke continued to skyrocket by

the noon on 12th of March, assumed to be smoldering at its deep part even though

surface fire had been extinguished.

We can learn that we should continue to put out the remaining fire after

extinguishing the main fire on rubber, and also that the fire could be revived at several

days after extinguishing the fire when the melting rubbers in smoldering was revealed

to the surface to meet air.

4. Ana lyz ing the cause

It was reported that this fire accident occurred by spreading the fire ignited from the

microwave oven. So, we can assume the cause and the spreading process of the fire by

analyzing the structure, the potential ignition, and the burning characteristics in the

microwave oven as follows:

(1) Structure of Microwave oven

The microwave oven has the body of iron with the rectangular tunnel shape, and its

inside can be viewed only via the monitoring window installed at the door when it was

closed. A specific volume of natural rubber inside of the oven is heated to the required

temperature by microwave.

- 32 -- 32 -

(2) First ignition

Even with the oven door closed, there exists sufficient air enough to ignite. Plus raw

rubber and attached rubber scraps are combustible. So they can play a role of igniting

source within the microwave oven. In this case, it was reported that it was impossible

to prove a concrete igniting cause because a severe burning made the remaining of the

oven completed burnt and destroyed to deform. But, at the point that the fire was

ignited during heating within the microwave oven, if raw rubber includes foreign

materials such as metal or wood scrap, it is assumed that one or more igniting source

such as the electric spark and locally generated high temperature ignited raw rubber, a

combustible material, to be burnt. Of course, there exists a possibility to be ignited by

the electric equipment for microwave heating, but the electric equipment has a standard

wire and is installed within the metal pipe, so the possibility to ignite due to the

electric ignition is excluded.

(3) Spreading the fire

If the fire is ignited into combustibles at the closed space, oxygen within the space

is exhausted to make it automatically extinguished. But, if any air is flown into by

opening the door during burning, the fire may be rapidly developed to spread.

Accordingly, it is assumed that the fire ignited from the inside of the microwave oven

had been developed into incomplete combustion due to insufficient supplying oxygen

within the oven but when a worker opened the door of the oven to check the inside

abnormality of the oven, the fire was rapidly spread to the outside of the oven by

sufficiently supplying oxygen. At the early stage of the fire, the extinguishing work was

carried around the oven with its own fire protection system, but failed, and the fire was

spread over the entire refining process.

- 33 -- 33 -

[Picture 1] Microwave oven assumed as the firing point

5. Loss

The fire had the 3-story refining process of the factory and the 11-level rack-type

warehouse completely burnt to make the steel frame such as rack-type warehouse

completely collapsed. And, most of the burnt building part was impossible to reuse

because the RC columns and the floors exteriors of the 2nd and 3rd were detached and

cracked. All of annex facilities such as mechanical facilities(Banbury mixer within the

refining process, etc.) and electronic facilities of MCC room were completely damaged.

In addition, business interruption loss reached to a considerable amount because of 120

tons g raw rubber damage.

As for the outside damage of the factory, rubber and compound melted by the fire

were mixed with extinguishing agents and flown into near rivers to cause environmental

pollution giving underwater ecosystem bad effect.

Based on the insurance benefit, the property loss of this accident reached to about 50

billion Won. Three employees of this company inhaling smoke got injured during the

extinguishing process.

- 34 -- 34 -

[Picture 2] Inside of burnt refining process

[Picture 3] Remainings of collapsed rack-type warehouse

6. P r o b l e m s & Measures

As for the cause of spreading this fire to a large-scale one, we can sort problems

into several ones. Especially, considering that main causes can be said to be insufficient

awareness about the hazard of the said facility and workers' carelessness, risks should

- 35 -- 35 -

be analyzed, safety measures should be considered, and safety training of workers

should be thoroughly carried for hazardous facilities.

(1) Insufficient analyzing hazard of the facility to ignite and training of workers

Due to characteristics of the refining process, small-scale fire has been frequently

occurred within specifically partitioned devices such as microwave oven and Banbury

mixer. As for the microwave oven, combustible foreign materials easy to ignite or

with low ignition point exist by entering rubber mixed with carbon not excluded into

the inside of the steel pallet for loading rubber or entering raw rubber mixed with

rubber scrap and oil. It is one of dangerous facilities to ignite frequently if potential

igniting source is added to these foreign materials when sparking between steel pallet

within the microwave oven and roller heating the microwave. If the safety-related

department have notified the person in charge of the said facility of the hazard about

characteristics of closed/partitioned part such as microwave oven and thoroughly trained

the person, this fire could not be spread to a large-scale one.

(2) Automatic sprinkler

Generally, if the sprinkler is properly installed and maintained, the fire can be mostly

extinguished at the early stage without spreading to a large one. Although a dry pipe

sprinkler was installed at the refining process and the rack-type warehouse of the burnt

factory, it seems that they have maintained the dry valve of the sprinkler closed

keeping it inactive by considering that the safety inspection result carried by Korean

Fire Protection Association before the accident pointed out the leakage of the branch

pipe of the sprinkler and the abnormal condition of the compressor. The rack-type

warehouse storing rubber has a very large fire load. And the intensive fire makes water

sprayed into the flame not so easily. Therefore, only if ESFR sprinkler、with a quick

operative capability instantly extinguishing the fire to spray sufficient water over the

given area, are installed instead of closed type sprinklers, it can be possible to make a

substantial extinguishing work.

- 36 -- 36 -

(3) Insufficient fire separation

Warehouse and working area of the factory should have comparted with a fire barrier

to prevent the fire from spreading to each other. But, because the fire separation was

not completed between the rack-type warehouse and the refining process, the fire

started from the refining process spread to the 11-level rack-type warehouse, and large

amount of combustible rubber stored at the warehouse was burnt, which made it

developed to a large one.

▣ Burning and spreading characteristics of fire in a compartment

The fire in a compartment passes through the composite burning/spreading process

such as circulation, radiation and conduction according to various types and the inside

condition of the compartment, and has the following characteristics by spreading stage

as follows:

1. H o w to spread the fire

Circulation, radiation and conduction occurred from the flame spreading process can

be explained in comparison with the common stove as follows: (the stove within a

specific compartment turned on)

(1) Circulation

Flame is moved and spread by circulation within

a medium such as gas or liquid by air circula-

tion within a compartment caused by tempe-

rature difference.

(propotional to temperature difference; q＝h A ΔT)

Reference

- 37 -- 37 -

(2) Radiation

It transmits energy as a electromagnetic wave generated from flame or high

temperature to other area, which can be compared feeling warm near the stove in our

daily lives. (proportional to the 4th power of temperature; q＝σ A (T14－T2

4) )

(3) Conduction

Heat is transmitted within material by contacting with combustibles or to contacted

material, by which the external metal of the stove gets wholly heated by the flame

within the stove. ( proportional to temperature difference; q＝k A (T1－T2)/Δx ) )

2. B u r n i n g characterist ics in a c o m p a r t m e n t

Assuming that the fire is generated from combustibles within the compartment

ignited from some source, the fire can be developed one of the followings:

Natural burning : [Fig. 1] → [Fig. 2] → [Fig. 3] or

Complete burning : [Fig. 1] → [Fig. 2] → [Fig. 4] →[Fig. 5]

(1) Early stage of fire

It is a sort of fuel controlled fire which the fire starts from the source ignited on

combustibles. And, it is controlled by the surface area of combustibles under sufficient

oxygen remained within it even with windows and doors within a compartment not

opened. (See [Fig. 1])

※ Fuel Controlled Fire and Ventilation Controlled Fire

Fuel controlled fire, under sufficient oxygen inflow at the open space on fire, has a

form changing its spreading direction propotional to burning characteristics and surface

area of combustibles and its flame is spread to the direction of strong volatility and to

wider surface area of combustible exposed to flame, of which spreading is controlled

by condition of combustibles.

Generally, the burning type becomes fuel controlled fire at the early stage when the

flame is weak, because it has sufficient oxygen. Also, it becomes fuel controlled fire at

fire with windows opened and has a short burning time, because air is sufficiently

- 38 -- 38 -

supplied.

On the contrary, as for the ventilation controlled fire, the flame is spread to the

direction controlled by spreading direction and growing stage according to the volume

of oxygen inflow in the direction based on oxygen inflow condition at the fire-occurred

place except combustibles explosive and highly volatile containing oxygen.

Generally, if combustibles are pyrolyzed(decomposed) and the flame becomes strong

when it reaches nearly to Flash over increasing the indoor temperature rapidly, oxygen

is rapidly exhausted and the burning type changes from the fuel controlled fire to the

ventilation controlled fire controlled by ventilating volume. Also, because air supply is

limited at the fire of basement or floor without windows, it becomes a sort of

ventilation controlled fire and has a long burning time.

- 39 -- 39 -

(2) Spreading stage of inside burning

A specific layer is created at the ceiling by rising gas with high temperature

including product generated from burning within the compartment as it proceeds to

burn, radiating heat is diffused to the bottom direction, the entire temperature is risen

to about 500℃ by the composite burning-spreading mechanism such as conduction,

circulation and radiation caused by the flame grown from the fire spot, flammable gas

is produced by pyrolyzing at the point where the flame has not reached yet and

exposed surface such as near floor, and oxygen density is rapidly dropped. (See [Fig.

2])

(3) Extinguishing stage with openings not opened

When the outside air can not be flown into because windows and doors within a

compartment are not lost by flame and high temperature, consistent oxygen difficiency

increases pyrolyzed products and combustion products, and it changes to smoldering

until oxygen density becomes to almost nothing, and it is finally extinguished. (See

[Fig. 3])

(4) Openings opened by flame or manually

When the flame temperature within a compartment is risen to cause windows and

doors burnt to open or manually opened, products with expanded state incompletely

burnt by dropping oxygen density down keeps the state expanded by high temperature.

Then, if oxygen is rapidly supplied, the flame is spread and transmitted to the direction

where oxygen is flown into, which is so called Backdraft phenomenon. (See [Fig. 4])

(5) Completely burnt stage of inside and outside

Oxygen flown into the opening burns all of inside combustibles, makes ceiling and

walls collapsed, which finally reaches to be extinguished. (See [Fig. 5])

The above progress by burning stage can be shown as a graph according to

temperature and time at the following [Fig. 6].

- 40 -- 40 -

[Fig. 6] Temperature-time curve in a compartment fire

- 41 -- 41 -


Shopping Center Fire

- 43 -- 43 -

Shopping Center Fire

1. G e n e r a l

Fire Location : Pohang City, Gyeoungbuk-Do(province)

Fire Date & Time : Around 16:55 on 11th of July in 2001

Fire Place : Shop at the 1st floor

Property loss : 804,300 thousands Won

Fire Casualties : 52 (4 died, 48 injured)

Fire Cause : Careless welding

This accident was caused by the fire ignited the melted bead of the roof panel

fallen down into the polyurethane foam at the ceiling, insulating materials. The roof

panel was melted by the hot welding rod which one of five welding workers took on

the roof during exchanging the flue of the boiler at the outside of the building.

2. Bu i ld ing

Completed on 6th of December in 1999, this dome-type steel-frame building with

K-SPAN roof and sandwich-panel wall, a large-scale discount house, consists of a

2-story shop and an annex, which has floors and occupants as shown at the

following table 1.

[Table 1] Floors and occupants

Building Area (㎡) 1st floor 2nd floor

A4,697

(1st floor : 4,033, 2nd floor : 664)

shop office, restaurant, karaoke

B 300

(1st floor: 218, 2nd floor: 82)

bank cafe

3. O c c u r r e n c e of f i r e

- 44 -- 44 -

This fire is assumed to be ignited by the melted bead of the roof panel fallen

down into the polyurethane foam at the ceiling, insulating materials. The roof panel

was melted by the hot welding rod which Mr. L(34) of five welding workers of DK

engineering Co. took on the roof during exchanging the flue of the boiler at the

outside of the building for the shop and the office.

Seeing the fire, they tried to extinguish it by two fire extinguishers and fire hoses,

but failed. So, they called the regional fire station by the phone(119) when the fire

spread over the entire building in an instant by igniting a lot of inflammables within

the building making it impossible to extinguish the fire. When the fire brigade

arrived at the scene, a black smoke covered the sky and a flame wrapped the entire

building. Evacuating 100 or more shoppers around the shop gate to a safe place, fire

fighters and rescue members extinguished the fire by 18:30, elapsing about one hour

and a half from the occurrence.

This accident made the entire building damaged or collapsed causing 800-million

Won or more of property loss and 52 casualties(4 died and 48 injured) who were

suffocated by the smoke or exposed to the flame although 300 or more of customers

and employees quickly escaped from the shop to the outside of the building.

[Picture 1] Fighting to suppress the fire on the scene

- 45 -- 45 -

[Picture 2] Fired building and its surrounding

[Picture 3] Building collapsed by the fire

- 46 -- 46 -

4. F i re p r o t e c t i o n system

The fire protection systems of this building consists of fire extinguishers,

standpipe, automatic sprinkler system, emergency broadcast system and fire alarm

system. Also, the evacuating system consists of two escape stairs(indoor and outdoor)

and three exits. The interior materials of the building is made of light-weight panel.

The fire protection system is installed as shown at Table 2.

[Table 2] Fire protection systems

BuildingFire

extingui-sher

Valve connection

SprinklerEmergency

broadcasting device

Automatic fire detector

Connecting water

sprinkler

A 21 4 422/2 22 25/10 41/5

B 4 - - - - -

5. P r o b l e m s

(1) Generally, the characteristics of large-scale shopping building has many

unspecific persons coming and going and heavy fire load due to displaying or

loading lots of combustibles. But, the main structures such as column, beam,

floor, wall and ceiling fell short of the fire resistive performance.

(2) Although the installation standard related to fire separation such as wall, fire

shutter is prescribed by the building law, the supervision over the construction

work after the completion of the building was insufficient. And, if the exterior

wall is constructed by styrofoam sandwich panel and the roof constructed by the

steel panel applied by polyurethane foam, the fire separation prescribed by the

current law has no practical effect.

- 47 -- 47 -

(3) Because the roof is constructed by the steel panel easily melted by heat, the fire

on the polyurethane foam of the roof causes to make the roof fallen down

instantly, the fire extinguishing system such as sprinkler, hose system was useless,

and the fire shutter didn't work.

(4) If the sandwich panel including the styrofoam is applied to the exterior wall, the

color steel panel to the roof, and the polyurethane foam to the interior surface,

they are rapidly burnt and generate large amount of poisonous gas by the fire.

Nevertheless, these kinds of materials are preferred for shortening the construction

period.

(5) The inspection of the regional fire station and the training for the person in

charge were carried to report the welding work in advance and to keep the safety

regulation. But, the negligence of the person in charge led to fail to keep it, and

the worker carried the electronic welding around the oil tank for the boiler.

6. M e a s u r e s

In order to minimize the loss of casualties and property from the emergency by a

fire, the large-scale shopping building with the characteristics of many unspecific

persons coming and going and heavy fire load due to displaying or loading lots of

flammables should make a systematic and reasonable disaster measures by generally

reviewing items to install and to maintenance evacuating systems (enclosed stairways,

exit, etc.) considering the safety at the emergency, alarm systems(automatic fire

detector, emergency broadcast system, etc.), and fire extinguishing systems(standpipe,

sprinkler, etc.) at the stage of planning and designing the building, and should

thoroughly supervise the construction and keep the fire protection plan after the

completion of the building.

By reviewing the cause of this accident, measures for revealed problems are as

follows:

(1) According to the performance standard about the fire resistive construction of the

building prescribed at the current construction law, the fire resistive performance of

main structures(column, beam, floor, ceiling, wall(interior and exterior), etc.) of the

- 48 -- 48 -

building should be reinforced with totally considering the structural integrity and the

fire load according to occupants.

(2) For preventing the fire from spreading over the entire building by shutting off

smoke or flame from the fire origin to the other areas on the event of the fire within

the building, it is necessary to make a strategical measures which regulations related

to fire shutter, fire door, and wall for separating can be selectively applied to

according to characteristics(scale, occupancy, accommodated persons, fire load, etc.)

of the building.

(3) It is necessary to maintain thoroughly fire protection systems such as automatic

fire detection system, emergency broadcast system, standpipe and sprinkler system in

order to operate normally.

(4) Considering the spread of the flame and casualties due to the generated

poisonous gas, you should use noncombustible materials for partition, interior, wall

or ceiling, and minimize combustible materials at least.

(5) The biggest cause of the fire by the welding work was carelessness about safety

for fire. And, monitoring the fire should have be done around the working area by

a specific period after the work. Basic fire prevention regulations for welding/cutting

work are as follows:

Every combustible material should be horizontally placed 11m or further from

the working spot, and if not, the combustible material should be safely covered

or protected by fireproof cover.

Openings of wall, floor or duct within 11m of the working spot should be

completely covered.

The working spot should be equipped with two fire extinguishers according to

kinds of the expected fire.

After completing the work, a fire watchman should be deployed to monitor

continuously the fire around the working spot for 30 minutes or longer.

- 49 -- 49 -


Daegu Subway Fire

- 51 -- 51 -

Daegu Subway Fire

1. General

Fire Location : Jungangno station, line No. 1 of Daegu subway,

143-90, Namil-dong, Joong-gu, Daegu

Fire Date & Time : Around 9:53 on 18th of February in 2003

Fire Place : Inside of Subway train (No. 1079 Train)

Fire Cause : Arson

Fire Casualties : 193 died, 146 injured (estimated)

Station structure : 3rd basement; platform, 2nd basement; waiting area/gate,

1st basement; entrance way/shopping district

[Fig. 1] Cross-sectional view of the floors and subway train fire

- 52 -- 52 -

2. Cause and condition

(1) Accident cause

A direct cause for this fire accident is the arson attack by a man of paralytic illness

with aphasia and depression who is dissatisfied with his body and society.

(2) Initial ignition

At the moment when the train (No. 1079) was about to arrive from Banwoldang

station to Jungangno station at around 9:52 am, Kim Dae-han (57, jobless), a mentally

deranged person, tried to set fire to a PET bottle filled with gasoline using a lighter

at the 2nd car of a six-car train. Several passengers managed to stop him, but, when

the fire was ignited, he threw the firing bottle in the car. And then the fire spread to

all the cars of the train in a moment into a big fire.

(3) Spread

The initial fire instantly generated from gasoline scattered around the car was

quickly moved to chair, floor and interior materials within the train which were

not fireproof, and then instantly spread within the train without any delay for

passengers to extinguish the fire.

[Picture 1] High heat burnt the inside of the train

- 53 -- 53 -

Interior finishes set on fire by gasoline generated vast combustible and noxious

gas make the inside of the train hot in a second, which emitted high heat

(possible to melt steel-frame) to destroy all of window panes, and the fire was

spread to all the cars of the train via the passage between cars.

Hot flame and radiant heat emitted from the firing train made the inside

temperature of the platform (a closed space with a tunnel shape) increased rapidly

(1000℃ or so). The radiant heat spread the fire to another train (No. 1080) on the

1m-apart opposite track, and it is assumed that the fire spread along the ceiling of the

platform.

High heat and dense smoke generated from the 3rd basement spread along the

entrance stairway of the platform at the 3rd basement to the upper basement reaching

to the waiting area and the gate at the 2nd basement. This high heat melted the

plastics (acryl, etc.) at the high part (such as ceiling) of the 2nd basement waiting

area while the lower part of the same area had relatively less damage.

[Picture 2] Burnt and broken main column and interiors of the 3rd basement

platform

The shopping district of the 1st basement, a separate building from the subway

- 54 -- 54 -

station, had two passages connecting to the subway track at the center crossroad.

Two automatic fire shutters installed at the passage to the shopping district was

operated, which caused a little damage by entering smoke but there was no direct

damage by flame.

The inside of the fired subway station was filled with high heat, smoke and noxious gas

for 4 hours after the accident, and poisonous gas and smoke was continuously coming out

from vents of four ground entrances.

3. Evacuation

For the first time, about 200 passengers was on the fired train (No. 1079). All

the doors of each car were opened right after the fire. Most of passengers were

able to escape because it took time to fill the platform area with smoke, but

some of them (about 20 casualties) got damage.

No. 1080 train with passengers less than No. 1079 train arrived and stopped at

the opposite track after 4 minutes or less, when the platform had already filled

with the smoke.

No. 1080 train opened doors after stop in a while but instantly closed them to

prevent the smoke entering into cars. The driver did not grasp the critical

condition for an urgent escape, so he was waiting for the order from the

command center with doors closed for 5 minutes or longer after arriving at the

station, which lost time and opportunity for passengers to escape safely.

It is estimated that most of passengers in No. 1080 train were closed to death

because it was impossible to open doors manually under the condition that the

electric power was automatically cut off by the heat. At the moment the driver

received the order from the control center and tried to escape passengers from

cars to the platform.

- 55 -- 55 -

Under the normal condition, it takes only 2 minutes from the 3rd basement

platform to the ground, but, under the fired situation, passengers out of cars

could not easily escape from the station because the station was filled with

smoke and noxious gas and it was too dark with lightings and directional signs

out.

One of 119 rescuers said "We especially found many deaths around the gate of the

2nd basement." So, it is estimated that most of passengers narrowly escaped from cars

could not escape due to noxious gas and smoke but were suffocated.

[Picture 3] Concrete ceiling at the right above of the track exploded by high heat

4. Fire protection system and extinguishing

(1) Installing and using fire protection system

Even though two small dry chemical extinguishers per car of the train was equipped,

- 56 -- 56 -

but they were almost useless for the flame rapidly spreading with gasoline, and

it is estimated that nobody could try to extinguish the fire by the extinguisher.

Indoor hydrant connections were installed every 25m at both platforms of the

3rd basement, but it was difficult to use them under this situation and they were

not used actually.

Sprinklers were installed at the waiting area and the gate of the 2nd basement,

but it is estimated that water for extinguishing fires was not sprinkled because

there was no evidence using water at the floor of the 2nd basement.

Air conditioning systems which should switch as the equipment for eliminating

smoke at the fire to forcefully vent out smoke and noxious gas did not operate

properly at the early stage of the fire, and ducts for exhausting smoke were

made of thin steel panel, so it is estimated that they were collapsed by the flame

to become useless.

[Picture 4] The fire fighters were venting smoke by the portable venting machine. Dense smoke from the fired station was coming out of venting holes on the ground.

- 57 -- 57 -

(2) Extinguishing and rescuing of fire brigade

At the early stage of the fire, about 150 fire engines and rescue trucks such as

fire brigades and central rescue team of Daegu and neighboring regions turned

out to extinguish the fire and to rescue people.

The main fire was caught by the extinguishing effort of the fire brigade by 3

hours and 50 minutes after the outbreak of fire.

Even though 3~4 hours had passed after the accident, rescuing effort went

wrong due to smoke and noxious gas filling the station.

5. Damage and loss

(1) Casualties

Dead : about 193 (estimated)

Injured : about 146

[Picture 5] Not used indoor hydrant and valve connection at the platform of the 3rd basement with its surface severely burnt (the hose within it was not burnt because its door was closed at the fire)

- 58 -- 58 -

(2) Direct damage

12 cars of two trains burnt by the fire

Most facilities including some of fire resistant constructions at the platform of

the 3rd basement damaged

Interior finishes (such as the ceiling) of waiting area and station facilities

smoke-stained and partly burnt

※ About 15 billion Won is estimated for recovering the subway

(3) Indirect damage

Inconvenience and time loss due to traffic problem (about 4 month or longer

is estimated for recovering the station)

The country lost its authority because the safety awareness of Korea was

fallen

(4) Compensation

Compensation from liability insurance (Korea Local Finance Association)

- Indemnity : 40 million Won per person, 1 billion Won per accident

- Domestic medical fee : 1 million Won per person, 5 million Won per

accident

Compensation as special disaster area (national)

Dead : 123,390,000 won per person at maximum

Injured : within the half of the compensation for the dead

Other : Condolent payment and funeral expenses are separately offered

6. Problem

This accident exposed the synthetic and whole problem for the safety management of

fire, which can be analyzed as follows:

(1) Deficiency in safety awareness and training for fire

Insufficient measures and relaxed precaution of people according to increased

arson crime

- 59 -- 59 -

Lack of basic measures such as instantly stopping the train at the fire of the

subway

Safety guidance was not given at the fire

Insufficient man power for the safety management by the excuse for

rationalizing the subway management

Absence of practical safety training program for improving people's safety

awareness

(2) Insufficient safety standard and equipment

Deficiency in fire safety standard of domestic subway train

Uncertain standard for interior finishes (FRP, PVC, polyurethane, acryl, etc.)

of vehicle

No regulation for venting noxious gas at burning

Weak emergency power supply

Emergency power supply for quick, accurate and sufficient time not secured

Insufficient fire protection system

Directional sign : insufficient illuminance and bad lighting condition for

smoke

Emergency lighting : bad lighting system and insufficient illuminance due to

switching to emergency power supply

Smoke exhaust system : insufficient capability venting smoke

Sprinkler system : Not installed at the platform (except the track area)

Insufficient development of fire-extinguishing ability

Insufficient extinguishing technique according to the fire characteristics of the

underground tunnel

(3) Deficiency of crisis management

Insufficient initial action of the master control center for the fired train

Fire alarm at the field ignored by the machine control center

No action for escaping passenger by the driver at the emergency

- 60 -- 60 -

The driver pulled out the master control key and escaped from the fire.

Passengers did not know well how to open the door manually at the

emergency.

7. Conclusion and measures

This tragedy exposed the insensitivity for the safety and the candid condition of the

safety management of our society, which was caused by relaxed awareness for arson,

ignorance of the fire characteristics which could be instantly developed from a small

fire at the subway area to the big one, and failure of initial reaction - totally

unarmed condition.

As for measures by fire safety technologies, it is necessary to consider the effects of

the noxious gas as well as the use of noncombustibles for interior finishes of public

vehicles (subway, train, etc.) and public facilities.

Also, as for the large underground area and public facilities vulnerable to fire, the

safety measures should be enhanced more by evaluating the egress means through

simulation and performing evacuation/escape training at the field.

As for large buildings/facilities and important public facilities, a detailed and concrete

crisis management system for emergency should be built up. And also the insurance

measures should be prepared for the sufficient compensation after the accident.

This is provided under the Agreement of Cooperation between the

KFPA and the NFPA. Please feel free to contact Risk Management

Department of KFPA if you have any inquires.

(E-Mail [email protected], Tel 82-2-780-8111, Fax 783-4094)

2002 KOREAN FIRE DATAPublished in March 2003

Edited by Risk Management Department

Published by Korean Fire Protection Association35-4 Yoido-Dong, Yongdungpo-Ku

Seoul 150-885, KOREA

TEL 82-2-780-8111

FAX 82-2-783-4094

E-Mail [email protected] // http://www.kfpa.or.krRegistered No. 13-794 (1997.8.14)

Printed by Leewhan (Tel 82-2-764-1116)ISBN 89-88874-30-7 93530

- 62 -- 62 -

歯 pdf - kfpa.or.kr · the National Fire Protection Association. ... 325(0.9) 260(0.7) 117(0.3)...

Documents

Transcript of 歯 pdf - kfpa.or.kr · the National Fire Protection Association. ... 325(0.9) 260(0.7) 117(0.3)...