Nordic fathers and family policies

Danish and Swedish gender equality logics and child

care politics

Tine Rostgaard, Professor, Department of Political Science, Aalborg University, Fibigerstræde 1, Aalborg 9220, Denmark. Email: tr@dps.aau.dk

Guðný Björk Eydal, Professor, Faculty of Social Work, University ofIceland, Oddi v/ Sturlugotu, 101 Reykjavik, Iceland. Email: ge@hi.is

Paper for the ESPAnet conference, Sept. 6-8 2012, Edinburg

Stream 12: Co-ordinator Birgit Phau-Effinger

Very first draft – not for quotation

Abstract

The five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden are known for their extensive family and gender equality policies. The gender equality model is often claimed to be the dominant model in Nordic parenthood policies, implying a dual earner/dual carer model. Comparative research shows that the Nordic countries have, despite important similarities, chosen different paths when developing child-care policies. This paper compares the development of child-care policies in Denmark and Sweden from the early 1960´s and onward. Applying the theoretical perspective of historical institutionalism, this paper seeks to gain an understanding of the dynamics and processes behind this variation in national child care politics and polices in the two countries, and to understand the mechanisms behind it

A closer look at the development of child care policies in Denmark and Sweden from the early 1960s until today, however, reveals considerable variation in the embeddedness of the gender equality ideal in the child care policy configuration, with important implications for the outcome in terms of policy configurations and gender equality incentives in these two countries. In this paper it is argued that the broad institutionalization of the gender equality principle in Sweden has shaped the development of the child care policies. In Denmark, a less ideological approach to the gender equality principle is evident. As a result child care policies in accordance has been developed as a more pragmatic response to the increase in women’s labour market participation, however, with the important exception of the notion of the pedagogical needs of the child, which early on came to frame the agenda setting.

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Introduction

The vision of gender equality is strong and institutionally embedded in all the five Nordic countries, with the Nordic council of gender equality stating s on its website: “The vision for the work with Nordic gender equality is that it will be the best in the world and a model for other countries. It should be a matter of course that men and women in the Nordic region have equal opportunities and be treated equally at all levels in society” (Nordic council of gender equality, n.d.). As Leira (2006) notes, the ‘gender equality model’ is thus the model that is predominantly being presented and promoted in Nordic childcare- and parenthood policies. This model implies the dual earner/dual carer model, calling for men and women’s equal participation in the labour market and in the family.

The Nordic countries share a history of developing support to parents of young children. From the 1960s and onward the support was designed to facilitate maternal labour force participation, this goal being especially pronounced in Denmark and Sweden. In these two countries, the goal of gender equality in work life has to a high degree received broad political backing and has overall resulted in extensive child-care services and leave schemes (Ellingsæter & Guldbrandsen, 2007).

Under scrutiny, Denmark and Sweden have, however, followed different historical paths in the development of these childcare policies and have pursued the goal of gender equality with various measures and outcomes. Whereas the Danish leave policies are not based on explicit expectations that fathers should take leave, Sweden has promoted gender equality and active fatherhood since the mid-1970s. Sweden has thus been much more active in transforming the gender contract towards a more active fatherhood, at least in its leave policies, but has on the other hand also created a child care model which results in longer spells out of the labour market, that have mainly been taken by the mother. Denmark in contrast has facilitated the care of also smaller children outside the home in formal day care, accompanied by shorter leave periods, and no specific measures encouraging fathers to take up leave.

Applying the theoretical perspective of historical institutionalism, this paper seeks to gain an understanding of the dynamics and processes behind this variation in national child care politics and polices in the two countries, and to understand the mechanisms behind it. The paper seeks to understand which ideas have been the driving forces and in particular which actors have been important in setting the agenda and influencing the childcare policy making process. In particular the paper investigates whether and how the gender equality ideal has been framing the development of childcare policies in the two countries. The paper asks if there have been different political goals and aims in regards to the position of gender quality and the means of policies where governments left of the centre

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vs. governments right of centre have been ruling. Thus the paper takes a special focus on the actors who have driven the development, with an emphasis on the role of political parties, but also takes into account the influence of the organized labour movement and women’s movement. The paper examines the development from the early 1960s until today, in order to see whether the timing and sequencing of the changes is of importance, and if and how path dependency has influenced the development.

The paper draws mainly on secondary data of child-care policies and national statistics. The paper is organized in the following way: in the next section the theoretical framework of the paper is discussed, then a description of the general characteristics of the Nordic gender politics and the cultural and social context for the development of child care policies is provided. This is followed by an analysis of the day care policies and following this, an analysis of the development in parental leave policies, and finally concluding comments and discussion.

Explaining variation in politics

Why do policies differ between countries? As stated in the introduction this paper seeks to understand which ideas have been the driving forces and in particular which actors have been important in setting the agenda and influencing the childcare policy making process in the two countries in question. Steinmo points out that in order to understand ideas we also need to investigate the actors: “Bringing ideas into our understanding of institutional change, then, bring agents back into institutional analysis. One could argue that a key weakness of Institutionalism in the past has been that actors could be simple hostages of the institutions that they inhabit. Integrating ideas into the analysis addresses this problem by making institutions both a constraining/incentivising force and the object of political contestation” (Steinmo, 2008, p.*).

The welfare literature offers a wide range of explanatory theories, including the perhaps straightforward theory that policy outcomes are the result of politics (Castles and Obinger, 2007; Nygård, 2006). Scholars who have examined and/or acknowledged the impact that political parties have on the development of social polices referred to this theoretical perspective in somewhat different terms. For instance, Castles (1982) speaks of the ‘politics matter perspective’ while Hibbs (in Schmidt 2010) refers to ‘parties do matter´ view or ‘partisan theory’.

Among the most influential schools of thought, is the one that emphasizes the importance of the electoral support of left-wing parties, the strength of left-of-centre governments, and the organizational strength of the working class as important explanatory factors regarding

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the formation of welfare state policies and for the increase in welfare spending (for example Esping-Andersen, 1991; Korpi, 1978; 2000; 2003). Hence in Esping-Andersens Three Worlds of Welfare Systems (1991), he defines the Nordic welfare model as belonging to the Social-Democratic Model. While the role of the Social Democratic Parties and the actors left of the centre is recognised to be the main factor behind the Nordic welfare states (op. cit.; Flora and Heidenheimer, 1981), scholars have pointed out the important role of other parties at certain points in time (Baldwin, 1991a, 1991b; Castles and Mitchell, 1993).

Thus, we may assume that the goals and measures of political parties vary (Castles and Obinger, 2007). Ellingsæter and Leira (2006, p. 7) thus state that the gender equality model and the promotion of the parental sharing of both paid and unpaid work and care, is mainly a model supported by social democrats and the left. The centre-right wing in contrast is in favour of an alternative family model, which is formally gender-neutral. This model valorises unpaid work and care, and the use of for instance cash for care in order to make care ‘costless’ for the carer. In the light of this we may assume that when left-wing parties and coalition governments left-of-centre are in power, a policy line favouring gender equality between men and women in family as well as working and public life is pursued. Policy measures are likely to be parental leave schemes that emphasize the active role of both parents and high day-care volume. We may also expect politics favouring a collectivist and state approach to welfare provisions. Likewise, we may expect that cash for care allowances, and limited day care are the result of right-wing governments, with conservative parties more prone to advocate traditional and family oriented policies, and liberal parties to be more prone to advocate non-collectivist, non-state and individualized policies.

It is, however, also important to note that, beside the political parties, there are numerous other important actors participating in the policy making at each time. In the field of childcare policies, partners of the labour market have in the Nordic countries shown to be been influential, e.g. as partners in collective bargaining (Lammi-Taskula, 2007). Furthermore, various scholars have also drawn attention to the influence of women’s claim making and the contribution of women’s activist groups in shaping the welfare state in general (for example Skocpol 1992; Jenson 1989; Hobson 1993; Wennemo, 1994), and more specifically in bargaining for the development and expansion of day care, in the beginning of the 20th century and again in the 1960s-1970s and onwards (Bergquist et al., 1999: Morgan, 2009). Experts have also been important actors in the Nordic countries, not at least in the field of family and care policies (Lundquist and Petersen, 2010).

Still as the criticism of the welfare regime theory has pointed out political agency and their vested interests and ideals may not be static. Short-term political factors may determine the goal setting and the alliances made between the various actors (see e.g. Pierson 2001,

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Bonoli and Palier, 2000). Thus by applying the perspective of historical institutionalism allows us to investigate how changing contexts, be it social, economic, demographic or political, influence the opportunity structures that actors have for making interpretations of social problems and the claims and alliances they make (Hall, 1989, 1997). We also emphasise the formation of and mobilization of the various actors, as well as their ability to be represented in the policy formation and in agency constellations (Thelen, 2002). And acknowledge the importance of institutional path-dependency but also adhere to the argument made by Thelen, that “the impact of institutions is often heavily mediated by features of the overarching political or historical context” (Thelen 2002, 93), why the timing as well as sequencing of political developments is considered important.

Nordic gender equality policies

As noted earlier, the gender equality model is often presented as being predominant in Nordic parenthood policies, promoting the parental sharing of both paid and unpaid work and care, and the dual-earner/dual-carer family. However, this represents the last stage of a long societal development. Overall, gender equality policies have in the Nordic countries developed stepwise. The first main stage towards a more gender equal society took place in the Nordic countries when formal equal rights of men and women was established, such as voting rights, which was extended to women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The second stage was characterised by women gaining access to arenas like the labour market and the public sphere. The third stage implied “...full integration of women and men at all levels of the labour market and in the private sphere i.e. women and men sharing both economic and care responsibilities of the family, may be seen as a phase dominated by a gender reconstruction approach and gender reconstructive political measures” (Kjeldstad, 2001:79).

Thus, the 1960s and onwards can be viewed as a period where the Nordic gender-equality project encouraged women’s participation in the labour market. In Denmark as well as in Sweden, women’s labour market participation had by the mid-1960s increased to nearly 50 % of women in the working age group, and this has increased to around 76 % by 2005 (Table 1).

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Table 1. Labour market participation and share of labour force, men and women, Denmark and Sweden, 1967-2005.

Denmark Sweden

Men Women Men Women1967 86 49 82 491970 83 51 81 531975 80 55 80 591981 79 63 77 661985 78 65 77 681991 80 70 77 711995 85 74 80 762000 85 76 80 762005 84 76 81 76

Source: Cederstrand, 2011. Note: 1967-1991 including 16-74 years, and 1995 onwards 15-64 years.

During this period all the Nordic countries developed extensive policies in order to enable equality among both men and women, including an expansion of the day care facilities, however, the expansion in full-time day care has been an especially important policy measure for facilitating women’s labour market participation in Denmark and Sweden (Eydal and Rostgaard, 2011). In addition to the day-care services, the Nordic countries enacted parental-leave policy (from 1974-1981), providing both parents the rights to paid parental leave. In the 1990s the emphasis was placed on the father’s individual right to parental leave (use-it-or- loose-it). Sweden was the forerunner for shared leave and the promotion of active fatherhood (Valdimarsdóttir, 2006; Klinth and Johansson, 2010).

As the following overview (table 1) on the public support for care in Denmark and Sweden shows, the countries do employ quite different policy configurations when it comes to the care of pre-school children. Sweden offers a somewhat long parental leave of 69 weeks, while Denmark offers only 50 weeks of leave after the birth of the child 1. As a consequence, 17 % of children under the age of 1 year are in Denmark cared for outside the family, in public day care, while all Swedish children in this age group are cared for at home. Some variation is also found in the provision for the 1-2 year olds where as many as 90 % of Danish children and 70 % of Swedish children are in day care, while child are outside the family is the dominant model among the 3-5 year olds in both countries. Both countries provide a cash for care scheme, i.e. cash which is available for parents to use to organised day care themselves. Parents may stay at home or purchase day care. As is indicated in the table and more thoroughly investigated later in the paper, however only few parents use this policy option.

1 In addition, there is 4 weeks for the mother before birth.

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Table 2. Child-care policies and take-up for pre-school children in various age groups, Denmark and Sweden, 2007.

Denmark Sweden0-1 year Paid parental leave (50* weeks)

Day care provision (17%)Paid parental leave (69 weeks)Day care provision (-)

1-2 year Day care provision (90%)(Municipal schemes of cash for care)

Paid parental leave(Municipal schemes of cash for care)Day care provision (70%)

3-5 year Day care (96%) Day care provison (97%)Source: NOSOSKO, 2009. *64 weeks with part-time leave. In addition, 4 weeks prior to birth.

Some difference is also apparent when investigating the cultural setting for the dual earner-dual carer model. The Nordic countries are often treated in the literature as countries with similar goals and values, however value studies display differences between Denmark and Sweden with more scepticisms towards the working mother in Sweden among both men and women in general, and among the respondents in the child bearing years. Following table 3 shows those who answered that the agreed strongly or agreed that a pre-school child suffers if his or her mother takes up work outside the home.

Table 3. Support for working mother. Male Female Age 30-49 Total

Denmark 24 13 10 18Sweden 46 30 35 38

Source: Inglehart, Basánez, Díez-Medrano, Halman and Luijkx, 2004:D061) % of respondents answering ‘agree strongly’ or ‘agree’ to the statement: A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother work, %.

Thus, the difference in values among the countries towards children’s best could contribute to understanding the different politics of the Nordic childcare policies, as care ideals, defined by Horchschild (2003, p. 333) as an idea about who gives care and how much of what kind of care is ‘good’, are often closely related to policies and available services.

Overall, Denmark and Sweden thus share common traits in the development of child care policies, but as is evident there are important differences in the policy configuration and in the attitudinal support towards the working mother. To what degree have the gender equality ideal been framing this variation in child care policies and what have been the role of the various actors in setting the goals and deciding on the policy measures? In the next section we investigate the day care politics, before we in the following section turn to the leave politics.

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Day care politics facilitating women’s paid labour

The Nordic day care modelThe public day care has as mentioned been considered one of the cornerstones in the Social Democratic Model, and especially as a way to support gender equality through women’s labour force participation. Accompanying the increase in women’s take up of paid labour, the mid-1960s thus constituted a period of time of a complete reorientation of early childhood care and education, where traditional perspectives on the best of the child and the male bread winner family model were replaced by norms of out of-home socialization and care and the working mother (Mitchel and Mahon, 2002).

Children’s day care as a consequence during the 1960s became an increasingly important issue in the social debate throughout the Nordic countries in 1960s and 1970s, but the political agenda of facilitating women’s labour force participation has been especially pronounced in Sweden as well as in Denmark. In these two countries, the goal of gender equality in work life has to a high degree received broad political backing and has influenced the day care policies (Ellingsæter & Guldbrandsen, 2007). Denmark was the first Nordic country to develop comprehensive legislation on day care in 1964, followed by Sweden in 1973 (Broddadóttir et al. 1997; Sipilä 1997; Borchorst, 1985), and as Table 4 shows, full-time provision in these countries early on far exceeded what the other Nordic countries provided.

Table 4. Children age 3-6 years enrolled full time in day care institutions (FT); part time (PT) and family day care (Fam.). Percent of all children in the age group 1975, 1981, 1984 in the Nordic Countries.Year 1975 1981 1984

FT PT Fam FT PT Fam FT PT FamDenmark 25 7 2 31 8 8 43 8 7Finland 9 9 3 15 10 12 17 10 4Iceland -- -- -- 8 30 3 9 34 12Norway 6 4 -- 12 23 -- 16 25 1Sweden 12 28 6 26 24 15 33 21 19Source: Hanssen and Elvehøj 1997:181;183. Note: Family day care is publically subsidized day care provided in a family setting.

Day care and gender equality in SwedenWhat may explain the position of the two countries? The politics matter explanation seems to have some relevance at least when examining the development of the day care services in Sweden, at least from the late 1960s and onwards. Before this time, day care policy had low priority on the Social Democrats’ agenda, which along with the labour movement as well as the employers’ associations based their social and economic agendas on the notion of the male breadwinner family (Neumann, *). It took more than 30 years of Social-

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Democratic ruling before the party became fully committed to investing in day care , and in fact Sweden by 1968 had the lowest day care coverage for pre-schoolers among the OECD countries, with provision for only 2 % of children aged 4 years, 11 % of the 5-year olds, and 43 % of the six-year-olds in childcare and pre-school programs (Lamb 1992 in Neumann, *).

From the 1960s, however, the party came to play a key role in supporting the child care services in the years to come (Moss and Kamerman, 2009). One important component was the increasing hostility of the Swedish left in the early 1960s towards privately provided and faith-based child-care solutions. A favourable economic situation with flourishing labour market and strong alliances with the trade unions, especially the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), which represents mainly male blue-collar workers, also pawed the way for the new policy agenda. LO’s interest in child care was, however, newfound, as the organisation had in the 1940s and 1950s been negative towards supporting women’s labour market participation by an expansion of day care. The change in interest came also less from a gender equality agenda than from the interest in making use of the internal labour reserve of Swedish women, as a way to prevent the influx of migrant workers that had been witnessed in other European countries (Neumann, *). Also the Confederation of Swedish Employers (SAF) was interested in ways of facilitating women’s labour market participation, from their side due to the need for labour, and together with the LO they set up the Women’s Commission of the Labor Market, in order to investigate the need for day care. In 1961, the commission presented its views to the government, advocating an acceleration of the expansion in day care facilities (Pestoff and Strandbrink, 2002). Despite the increasing number of women entering the workforce (See also table 1) and the gradual societal acceptance of the dual earner family model, the Social-Democratic party was, however, still hesitant towards politically acting on any gender equality policies that involved child care. It required the mobilization of the feminist movement taking to demonstrating on the streets and continued pressure from the labour movement and employers’ organisation, before the party presented a new policy line (Neumann, *; Mahon, 2002).

A key year was 1968 where the Social-Democratic government stipulated that men and women are equally responsible for economic support, care and supervision of children (Haas, 1993), a somewhat radical statement even at that time. In the same year the government commissioned a National Commission on Child Care to submit proposals on how to develop a new child care system. The Commission report became to be highly influential in the years to come as it pawed the way for a new understanding of child care provision, which was to integrate former poverty relief for poor children and pedagogical activities for middle class parents into one model (Gunnerson et al, 1999). The first

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preschool law passed in parliament in 1973, holding high ambitions of expanding day care services, followed this.

Despite the investments in day care, with continuing increase in women’s labour market participation and growing fiscal constraints, demand quickly outweighed supply. By the end of the 1970s only one in three children of working parents had access to public childcare. The support for further investments into day care came, however, not only from the Social- Democratic party but also from young liberals, an alliance, which made it difficult for bourgeois parties to be in opposition. During the 1970s the Liberals and Social Democrats thus competed in presenting measures to expand day care, in accordance with the new gender equality ideals (Neumann, *). As the gradual acceptance of the idea about gender neutrality took place over the 1960s and 1970s in Sweden, it meant that there were no ideological differences in stand point between the political parties in this regard. Generally, they agreed that it was problematic to uphold legislation that enforced traditional gender roles. The change in political standpoint was also made from more pragmatic reasoning, from the gradual acceptance of the dominance of the dual earner family model, to the fear of losing voters among the young women (Cederstrand, 2011).

Since then there has been a comprehensive societal and political commitment to the importance of day care services, in order to facilitate women’s take up of paid labour, but increasingly also for the sake of the child. In 1995 a Social-Democratic government obliged the municipalities to provide full-time child-care to all children between the ages of 1-12 if parents were working or studying. As of 2003, this right was extended to children over 4 years of unemployed parents and for children whose parents were on parental leave with a younger sibling. These children were given a right to 15 hours weekly child-care (Hiilamo, 2008; Meagher and Szebehely, 2012).

Political differences have in the 1980s and 1990s instead concerned the responsibility for provision, as private actors have been invited in, in addition to the parent cooperative day care facilities, which were established already from the mid-1970s and grew in number from the mid-1980s. The entry of private-for-profit actors has created new political cleavages between parties, with the left traditionally supporting collective and public provision and the right arguing for more choice among providers (Pestoff and Strandbrik, 2002).

Denmark: The role of care workers interestGender equality as an ideological foundation to a lesser degree than in Sweden constitutes the underlying rationale for the development of the Danish day care system. Gender equality policies have then - and now – been of a more symbolic nature, with general

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although somewhat unenthusiastic acceptance among politicians of the need for action but with little done (Borchorst & Dahlerup, 2003). Instead, day care has and is also today regarded as a pragmatic solution to solve the need for care as women entered the labour market. Another important rationale was the pedagogical needs of the child which seem from the very start to have a prominent place on the agenda.

As in Sweden, the expansion of day care facilities in Denmark went hand in hand with an accompanying increase in women’s employment in the 1960s and 1970s (see also Table 1). During the 1960s, there was full employment in Denmark, and as in Sweden, the need for labour was solved by making use of the unused female labour force potential instead of opening up for inwards migration. Women were in general encouraged to take up work, and especially part-time work, and the number of women in employment nearly doubled from 515.000 women in 1960 to 918.100 women in 1970 (Ligestillingsrådet, 1992). Women also to a higher degree than before continued to work after marriage; in 1960 23.1 % of maried women participated in the labour market increasing to 46.8 % by 1969 (Sløk 1970: 9).

The need thus arose for a system of day care that could substitute maternal care for children and facilitate women’s take up of paid labour, but this was not the only agenda. The independent needs of children for child care was the main objective for the professional care workers, social pedagogies, who could ally with the woman’s organizations, advocating for professionalized and high quality day care facilities (Kremer, 2006).

The professional care workers proved a strong partner for the women’s organisations who had initially on their own not been especially active in advocating for child care in the 1950s and 60s. Instead they had fought for women’s possibilities for taking up education and entering the labour market, but had made no demands for an expansion in day care to solve the problem of women’s double work burden. Partly this was due to an acceptance of the strong mother and child ideology which persisted to dominate the debate Borchorst, 1985). As an example, even within the trade union representing female manual labour, Kvindeligt arbejderforbund (KAD) there persisted to be resistance against mothers taking up part-time work out of the concern for the child (Hagmann & Jensen, 2006) . But the women’s movement passiveness was also due to the class differences between the middle-class women dominating the women’s movement and the working class women whom they were to represent (Borchorst, 1985). This meant that up until the 1970s the women’s organisations continued to advocate for part-time day care only, while the trade unions representing women argued for full-time day care, especially out of concern for single mothers (Borchorst, 2002).

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While the women’s trade unions were active in advocating for expansions in day care, the main organization representing blue-collar male workers, Landsorganisationen i Danmark (LO) was up through the 1960s very reluctant in advocating for any family policies, including day care, as this was considered to be private affairs of the members themselves (Hagmann & Jensen, 2006).

The professional care workers, the child and youth pedagogues, instead proved to be a strong political actor in the expansion of formal day care. Their representatives had in the early 1960s been invited by the Social-Democratic Minister of Social Affair to comment on the development of day care and could in 1963 present an ambitious plan for the expansion of pedagogically based day care centre facilities, available for all children from the age of 3 and up (Borchorst, 1985).

Although agreeing with the need to expand day care, both the Social Democrats and the Bourgeois parties initially supported instead the family day care solution (dagpleje) as this offered a more gradual break with the family care model. However, the alliance of women’s organizations and care workers fought for the day care centres as family day care was seen to provide a less professional service and was to be an emergency solution only (Kremer, 2006). The agenda of the professionalized care provision was also brought forward by the influential trade union for the social pedagogies, BUPL, who could play a significant role in the corporate based culture of the Danish political system (Kremer, 2006; Bertone, 2003).

The 1964 Child and Youth Care Act on day care took in the ideas from the professional care workers union in establishing a municipal day care system based on the ideas of universalism and centre based facilities. The law also made it possible to provide public subsidies family day care, but this care solution was considered a supplement only to the day care centre facilities. The law was enacted with broad political support from all parties, who agreed on the pedagogical benefits for the children and the need for facilitating female labour market participation. The law represented thus a new era where day care was not only for working-class children, but a provision for all children. This was enforced in the 1974 Social Service Law that stipulated that municipalities should ensure the provision of necessary places, i.e. a first step towards an individual entitlement had been taken (Rostgaard & Fridberg, 1998; Kremer, 2006).

A halt for the expansion of day care, however, came in 1973, as the combination of economic problems following the oil crisis and general legitimacy problems sent shock waves through the political system. There was no longer full employment and the landslide election victory by a protest and right wing party, the Progress Party, hailed the end of former solidaristic welfare policies. This party was especially concerned with the costs for the tax payers, and initiated a very critical campaign against the pedagogues, resulting in a

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reduction in the number of staff in the day care centres and in much tighter control over their use of work time (Borchorst, 1985). The Liberals (Venstre) now made up government and a number of cuts, including cuts in day care for children, were introduced.

When the Social Democrats could again set up office on their own in 1979, the country was in the midst of the implications of the second oil crisis, triggering the need for a re-structuring of welfare principles. In a famous speech given at the OECD in 1980, the minister of social affair, Ritt Bjerregaard, renounced the universalistic principle and argued for the re-introduction of the needs principle in day care policy also (Rostgaard & Fridberg, 1998). She also criticized what she saw as specialization and professionalization of social work and suggested the delegation of the responsibilities to local actors and networks. This included that parents should to a greater extent themselves take care of their children, rather than making it the responsibility of the welfare state. As a consequence of the new police line, the influence of the pedagogies was further undermined. Day care centres and family day care were for the first time equated and a 10 % extra enrolment of children was allowed without increasing staff resources (Borchorst, 1985).

Still, despite the attempt to decouple the pedagogical needs of the child and the responsibilities of the welfare state, places in the day care facilities continued to grow albeit slowly, also during the right wing-majority government which took over power from 1982-1993, as the importance of child care received political support across all party lines. When the Social Democrats took over power again they consolidated this by introducing an individual entitlement to day care for all children aged 1 and over in 1995, also as a way to force the local authorities to tackle the long waiting lists. As a result, 173.000 new places were created in the period 1993-1999, and waiting lists dropped from 59.000 children to 8.500 children in the same period (Kremer, 2006). A strengthening of the right to a day care place including the ½-1 year olds initially met with opposition from the local authorities but in 1999 an amendment of the Service Law made it possible for local authorities to raise parental fees from 30 to 33 % and by 2000 nearly 90% of municipalities had introduced the extended day care guarantee, thus extending the principle of universalism.

Nevertheless, the speech in 1980 initiated an important ideological change, favouring de-professionalisation and privatization and these ideas were later to be taken up by the right-wing government which in 1990 proposed and enacted a new law on subsidies to parents or companies organizing day care, the so-called Puljeordninger. Although the new scheme was never widely used, it marked a significant shift in who holds the responsibility for the organization and provison of day care. The amendment of the Service Law, which was passed by all parties except the right wing Progress Party, a similar right wing protest party the Danish Folkparty (Dansk Folkeparti) and the left-wing The Red-Green Alliance

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(Enhedsliste), thus also allowed municipalities to make use of private for profit providers of day care. Only few for-profit providers have, however, set up facilities and in general there is still great skepticism in the population and among also the Social-Democrats in regards to for-profit privatization of day care services, quite contrary to the attitudes to for-profit privatization of home care for elderly, which has become generally popular.

Parental leave giving rights to fathers also

While the day care politics and policies are important for the understanding of the facilitation of the dual earner model, it requires an investigation of also the leave politics and policies in order to fully comprehend the embeddedness of also the dual carer model.

Again the Nordic countries have a long historical tradition of public support to mothers in order for them to take leave of absence from paid work to care for their new-born child. With the exception of Iceland, the Nordic countries have since the immediate post war period addressed the need for providing leave and compensation for lost income for mothers prior to and following the birth of the child (Gauthier 1996; Rostgaard & Fridberg, 1998; Eydal, 2005). In addition to the maternity leave, all the Nordic countries implemented laws on paid parental leaves during the late 1970s and early 1980s, which extended the period of leave and made it possible for parents themselves to decide how to divide parts of the leave entitlements between them (Kamerman and Moss, 2009; Eydal and Gíslason, 2008). At present, Sweden offers the longest leave period of 16 months, during which a flat-rate benefit is paid in 3 months, 8 weeks of these are set of for the mother in relation to birth-giving, while it is not stipulated that the mother uses the leave prior to birth. On top of this, there is a 2 months quota for both the mother and the father, i.e. each parent is intended to take at least 2 months leave. In Denmark, the leave is considerable shorter with 52 weeks in all. The first 4 weeks is maternity leave for the mother before birth giving, followed by 14 weeks of maternity leave. The father is entitled to 2 weeks of paternity leave to be taken in relation to the birth. In addition there is 10 weeks parental leave to be shared between the parents. Denmark, as the only Nordic country, does not offer a father’s quota. Fathers take up of leave is also considerably lower than in Sweden, at 8 % of total leave benefit days, compared to 24 % in Sweden (See Table 5).

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Table 5. Parental leave in Denmark and Sweden, percentage of income covered, weeks of entitlements and the percentage of total number of benefit days used by fathers in 2010

Denmark Sweden% of income 100 80Total weeks 52 (64*) 69- only mother before birth 4 0-only mother after birth 14 8- only father 0 8- father with mother 2 2Per cent of total benefit days used by fathers

8 24

Source: NOSOSCO 2012: 45. * With part-time leave

In fact Sweden was the first country in the world to develop a scheme of paid parental leave. The Social Democrats in 1972 proposed that the maternity leave should be transformed into parental leave and as of 1974 all Swedish parents became entitled to a total of 24 weeks parental leave, with a wage replacement percentage at 90% of former wages. This meant that fathers for the first time achieved an individual right to take leave, and quite uniquely, that no parts of the leave were reserved for the mother. A paternity leave of 10 days was also introduced, giving fathers time of with payment during the first weeks after the birth of the child, at the same time as the mother takes maternity leave (Duvander and Lammi-Taskula, 2010).

In the following decade, the neighboring Nordic countries implemented similar laws. Denmark was however among the last together with Finland to introduce a parental leave. In Denmark, the introduction of parental leave took place in 1984, following a long process of political failures to introduce rights for fathers also. With the 1984 legislation both paternity and parental leave with wage replacement was introduced. However, the Danish parental leave only encompassed 10 weeks out of the in total 28 weeks of leave. The remaining 18 weeks were reserved for the mother, of which 4 weeks were to be taken prior to birth (op. cit.).

An important difference between the two countries was thus found in the terminology surrounding the changes in the leave legislation, and consequently in the rights given to mothers and fathers respectively. The Swedish parental leave from 1974 was termed in gender-neutral language, treating men and women alike. All terms previously referring to a specific gender, such as ‘mother’, or ‘father’, were in the legislation more or less replaced with gender-neutral terms, now only referring to ‘parents’. In Denmark, the majority of the leave was still reserved specifically to the mother.

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Sweden: Considering the father-child bondCederstrand (2011) argues that an important reason for this difference was that in Sweden ideas about gender neutrality became one of the most influential ideational factors behind the development of social policies in general from the mid-1970s onwards, a process exemplified with the aforementioned 1968 gender equality stipulation that that men and women are equally responsible for economic support, care and supervision of children.

That men and women should be treated equally in all respects thus also influenced the reform of the leave scheme in the early 1970s. The Social Democrats, as well as the trade unions, and influential social scientists all supported the parental leave policy, from the interest in persevering women’s employment. It also fitted well with the increasing concern over the low birth rate. An equally significant influence for the development of the parental leave policies was the growing idea about the importance of the emotional relation between the father and his child, and a concern for men’s liberation (Haas, 1991). However, equally important for gaining especially the support from parties to the right was the argument about choice: a gender-neutral scheme would ensure that men and women were free to choose how to split the leave between them. Helping the changes under way was also, that they took place during a time where the welfare state provisions in general were extended and where there despite the oil crisis was general trust in the future. A parental leave scheme of 24 weeks, with 90% of former wages was thus proposed by a government made up by the Social Democrats, and supported unitary in Parliament in 1973 by all political parties, as well as by the major trade unions (Cederstrand, 2011).

Denmark: constituting the mother-child bondIn Denmark, the Social-Democratic party held power during the 1970s as in Sweden, but it was especially parties further to the left which argued for the introduction of specific rights for the father in this period. A number of extra-parliamentary bodies also supported the idea, e.g. a common proposal from the Gender Equality Council and the Child Commission in 1978 argued for the inclusion of fathers and even to set of specifically 13 weeks of leave for the father, for the sake of enabling the father to gain child rearing skills on his own (Cederstrand, 2011).

Any development of the welfare system was, however, also hindered by the impact of the first oil crisis. Changes in the legislation in 1980 – and still under a Social-Democratic government thus only resulted in introducing 4 extra weeks of leave for the mother to be taken prior to birth, in addition to the 14 maternity weeks after birth. In Denmark, the main argument persisted to be how to protect women during and after pregnancy, rather than to extend rights to men also, with reference to biological needs of both the mother and the child. Any introduction of periods of leave that could be used by the father would therefore

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need to be an add-on and not result in shorter time available for the mother. With reference also to the severe economic situation, it was therefore agreed that fathers’ rights were to be last of priorities (Cederstrand, 2011).

One major difference in contrast to Sweden also seems to be that LO took a stand against improving rights for fathers, from the argument that any improvements in rights should first and foremost benefit mothers. As mentioned previously, LO did in general not prioritize the development of family policies high on the agenda, and together with the employer’s organization, DA, they were against any introduction of leave for father, whether paternity or parental leave. Hard pressured both organizations, however, agreed in 1979 to support the introduction of 1 week of paternity leave. The social-democratic prime minster, Anker Jørgensen, however, and against the intention of a united party group and the minister of social affairs, in 1980 decided to withdraw the proposal. According to an interview with a leading official he was in unity with the chairperson of LO, Thomas Nielsen, that “…it was silly to offer men with leave, they just go fishing” (Cederstrand, 2011, p. 134).

With the right-centre party coalition government taking over in Denmark in 1982, it seemed as if rights for fathers were even further away. However, the centre party Radikale Venstre who despite being in opposition, managed to re-introduce the idea, in return for supporting the government’s budgetary plans. The argument made was, just as in Sweden, that the introduction of a parental leave would promote gender equality and benefit the father-child relationship (Cederstrand, 2011).

When the government made the proposal for a parental leave, initially the Social-Democratic party would not support it this would politically benefit Radikale Venstre, but in the final vote in 1983 they supported the proposal of introducing the parental leave. The biological argument was still dominant though, even with the socialist party, SF, who argued for 6 months to be reserved for the mother in order for her to be able to breastfeed. That parents should be able to choose themselves over the entire period was not - as in Sweden - brought up by the parties to the right of the centre, but instead by the marxist-socialist party, Ventre-socialisterne (VS), who argued that choice was necessary if not to indicate that fathers were not able to care for their children (Cederstrand, 2011).

Sweden: Introduction of the father’s quotaIn Sweden, the introduction of shared rights to parental leave did however not result in the desired effect of increasing fathers’ take up of parental leave. This gave impetus to attempting to encourage fathers to take up leave by other means. During a period of opposition between 1976 and 1982 the Social-Democrats thus argued for the need for

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father’s quota, a non-assignable period of leave payment, in order to increase the take up among fathers but the bourgeois coalition government that was in power at the time rejected the proposal ”as being part of a socialist ambition to get family life more centrally controlled” (Klinth in Cronholm, 2009, 233). However, returning to power in 1982 the Social Democrats did not promote the idea again. Instead, in the reform in 1984 they opted for more flexibility and introduced part-time leave, and also initiated a major media campaign, as they argued that fathers needed more information about their rights. The reform also resulted in an extension of the leave to nearly a year (360 days), with 90 days of these with a minimum benefit only.

The bourgeois coalition government that came into power in 1991 was instead the one to propose and enact a special father’s month in 1994 (in fact, 2 months of which 1 was reserved for each parent), after 20 years of debate of whether or not to introduce reserved periods of leave. The introduction of the reserved month to the father would, however, not result in less time for the mother as the total leave length was also extended to 450 days in total, but the compensation level was reduced from 90 % of former wages to 80 %. Again gender equality was the main argument, with concerns over how the low take up of parental leave by fathers affected gender equality in the family and society as such. The introduction of the quota was seen as a means to challenge traditional gender attitudes, in particular among employers. The child’s independent right to time with its father was another argument in the debate (Cedergren, 2011).

A second reserved month was adopted by a Social Democrat-led government in 2002, amongst other persuaded by the increase in take-up by fathers which was evident after the introduction of the first month of father’s quota. The government had originally considered the Icelandic model (3 months for the mother, 3 months for the father and 3 months to share), but never presented proposals to that effect (Cronholm, 2009). Again, the extention of the reserved time was accompanied by an extension to the total leave period, so that the strengthening of fathers’ rights was an add-on and not something that limited the mother’s time with the child. In total, the leave period was now 480 days, of which 60 days were reserved for the father. This time the parties right of the centre were opposed to the idea of reserving time for the father, arguing that the reform was too costly, but also that the state should not intervene in how parents want to share the leave time.

They could however support the gender equality bonus, which was introduced in 2008, so that parents who share the parental leave equally benefit from a tax credit (Duvander and Johansson, 2012). The Liberal People’s Party thus supported the equality bonus (Ferrarini and Duvander, 2010).

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Denmark: the short life-span of the father’s quotaIn Denmark, the Social-Democratic party, which took over power with centre party coalition partners (Centrum-Demokraterne, Det Radikale Venstre, Kristeligt Folkeparti) in 1993, was initially not very active on behalf of promoting gender equality through reforms of the leave scheme. On the contrary, as part of a Labour market reform intended to reduce unemployment, a new Child Care Leave of up to 52 weeks was in 1994 introduced for each parent. The leave was to be taken at the end of the parental leave, extending the total possible leave period to nearly 2½ year after the birth of the child (4+14+10+52+52 weeks), but with a very low benefit of 80 % of the sickness benefit it appealed mainly to mothers2 (Rostgaard & Fridberg, 1998).

In 1998, the Social Democrats were now in government with the centre party Radikale Venstre who had as mentioned previously been actively promoting father’s rights. Inspired by the Swedish (and Norwegian) experiences the coalition government proposed a 2 weeks father’s quota to be placed in weeks 25 and 26, at the end of the maternity leave. The introduction of the quota was far from a response to public outcry for more gender egalitarian leave rights in e.g. the media debate or raised by father’s movement, nor was it a subject of longer parliamentary disagreement: From the introduction of the idea to introduce the father’s quota, it took less than 1 month to the proposal was enacted in parliament. The introduction of the quota also went largely unnoticed in the public debate, even by organizations representing men’s interest and later received little institutional backing in promoting the new leave rights for fathers, contrary to the case in Sweden. As in Sweden, the reserved weeks was additional weeks added on to the existing leave, which now constituted in all 30 weeks (4 weeks prior to birth and 14 weeks following birth for the mother, 2 weeks father’s quota and 10 weeks parental leave) (Rostgaard, 2002). Although the parties right of the centre were in opposition to the proposal, they mainly questioning the need for the quota as fathers seemed little interested in taking leave and referring to the costs for society for adding extra weeks, and the debate was never heated (Cederstrand, 2011).

The father’s quota had in Denmark, however, had a very short span of life: when a new Bourgois government consisting of the liberal party Venstre and the conservative party Konservative came into power in 2001, it picked up on earlier election promises to favour child families and proposed to extend the parental leave period from 10 weeks to 32 weeks, in total 52 weeks, and also introducing the flexibility of part-time leave. In return, the father’s quota would be abolished, as would the child-care leave scheme (Rostgaard, 2002). This has left Denmark as the only Nordic country without a father’s quota. Neither of coalition partners were parties that traditionally argued for policies benefitting child

2 Reduced to 70 % as of Jan. 1995 and 60 % as of April 1997.

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families, but they specifically aimed at this voter group with their proposal (Cederstrand, 2011).

Although the changes in fact constituted of a reduction in available leave time available for parents, from a maximum of 2½ years to only 52 weeks, of which 4 weeks are to be taken before birth, there was perhaps surprisingly no public debate whether this change would have a negative effect for child families. The main argument behind the reform was the extension of flexibility but perhaps more important, the re-introduction of freedom to choose when to take leave. In Denmark, the choice agenda had now been taken over by the Bourgeois parties and their stand that the father’s quota constituted a state coercion on what ought to be a private decision of how to share leave time between men and women, and this stand is still today the dominant whenever reserved time for the father is debated.

Cash for care

While it may be difficult to argue that the gender equality model of extensive day care and parental sharing of leave is the work only of the social-democrats and the left, the cash-for-care schemes giving parents money to organise day care or to support them to stay at home instead of services is probably one of the clearest examples of policy making explained by politics. In all the Nordic countries3, the policies on cash grants for childcare were enacted by right-wing governments (Ellingsæter, 2006; Hattja and Nyberg, 2006; Rostgaard, 2002; Eydal and Rostgaard, 2011). This is in line with the experience in other countries, thus Morgan and Zippel (2003) have also pointed out that conservative and centre parties have been the primary advocates of cash for care.

Benefits can be paid out following the parental leave period and may last until the child has been enrolled full time in public day care (usually at the age of three) (Eydal and Rostgaard, 2011a; Sipila, 2011; Rantalaiho, 2009; Repo, 2010). As following table 6 shows the schemes follow to some extend similar institutional logics but there are also important differences, e.g. that in the Denmark the parent receiving the benefit cannot be active in the labour market at the same time and has to fulfil other requirements as well.

3 Except Iceland where there is no national legislation on cash for care.

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Table 6. Cash for care, Denmark and Sweden, rules for eligibility for cash for care and benefit amount as proportion of AW, 2009

Denmark Sweden

Age of the child? 6 months -3 years 250 days -3 years

Part time day care + partial payments of cash for care?

No Yes

Can be used to pay others for care? No, but other schemes for that Yes

Universal, for all parents regardless of type of income? No No

Paid by state or municipality Municipality Municipality

Cash for care benefits 2009 as % of AW* 2007

24.8 10.7

*AW constructed average wage earner 2007 is calculated by NOSOSKO (NOSOSKO 2008, 2009, p. 212-213). For further information on NOSOSKO AW calculations please see http://nososco-eng.nom-nos.dk/filer/publikationer/tabeller/descrtyp07.pdfSource: Eydal and Rostgaard, 2011a

In both Denmark and Sweden, the choice agenda has been the driving factor behind the development of the cash for care schemes. It is here first and foremost the goal to offer parents the possibility to choose between different forms of support and care for their children, while e.g. in Norway, parental choice is indeed emphasized but so is creating equality between parents that make use of day subsidized day care and parent who do not (Rantalaiho, 2009; Eydal and Rostgaard, 2011b).

In Sweden, the Christian Democratic Party played an important role in proposing the policies on cash for care that was enacted by a government right of the centre in 2008 (Cronholm, 2009). Previously such scheme had been enacted by a government right of the centre in the early 1990s but it was abolished by when the Social Democrats came back into power in 1995 (Eydal and Rostgaard, 2011). In 2006, a new four party coalition right of the centre came into power. One of the partners, the Christian Democrats, advocated for a cash-for-care and in 2008 the law on municipal cash for care scheme (Ferrarini et al. 2010).

Also in the case of Denmark the cash for care was a part of new family policies that a collation government right of the centre enacted (Familjepolitisk redogørelse, 2005). The choice agenda entered the scene from the early 2000s, and the Bourgeois government that came into power in 2003 has continued promoting the issue of choice. Besides the possibilities of municipalities to offer parents cash for care new measures have included

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the right to day care across municipal borders in order to e.g. facilitate day care close to the parental workplace, and the right to financial support for the hiring of a private day carer or support for use of private for-profit and non-profit day care (Finansministeriet, 2005).

ConclusionThe investigation of the three components of child care policies, day care, parental leave and cash for care schemes indicates that the broad institutionalization of the gender equality principle in Sweden to a larger degree than in Denmark has shaped the policy development. -How may this development be explained by the agendas of the political parties and the alliances they have set up? Have they adopted the gender equality agenda? And has the timing of the changes had any importance?

In both countries it seems that the real drive for initiating an expansion in day care facilities in the 1960s was to a large degree driven by the need for labour. In both Denmark and Sweden the response was to encourage women to take up work rather than open up for an influx of migrant workers. In Sweden, strong allies were early on the LO, the employers’ organization and the women’s movement, while it took longer for the Social-Democrats to acting to the new agenda, but as of 1968 the party became fully committed to both the gender equality and the need or expanding day care. During the 1970s another strong ally proved to be the Liberals who competed with the Social Democrats in expanding day care. Today there is a comprehensive societal and political commitment to day care services, for the sake of gender equality in work life, but also for the sake of the child, although the work agenda still means that the right to day care services is only for the +4 year olds.

In Denmark, the need for day care as women increasingly entered the labour market also required a political solution. Here, the women’s movement was split over the ideology of the mother and child. Unlike in Sweden the Danish LO was less interested in advocating for day care as this was regarded a private matter. Instead the real strong player was the care- professionals, who early on managed to set the scene for the introduction of pedagogically based day care centres. Their strong position was later on curtailed with the 1980s agenda of de-professionalization and privatization of care responsibility. Also here do we today, however, find strong commitment to the role of the day care facilities, but in contrast to Sweden the commitment has never been underscored by the gender equality idea. Instead the pedagogical needs of the child have been in the foreground.

In both countries, we do, however, also today find the influence of the free choice agenda, which has affected that for-profit providers have set up facilities, more so in Sweden than in Denmark. Here we find a more traditional cleavage between the parties’ stand, with

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right-wing parties in favour of privatization and left-wing parties in favour of collective provision. But in Denmark the change in agenda also concerned who holds responsibility for the care of the child. This was initiated under a Social-Democratic government. Here, we see a change in fundamental ideas about state vs. private responsibility. This has resulted in policies that fundamentally leave it up to parents to organize day care. However, as the low take up of these schemes - and the high take-up of day care - suggests the change in ideas has not caused any changes in the dominant child care model which is still the publically organized and provided day care provision.

In regards to the development of parental leave, the dominant agenda of gender equality in Sweden - and a growing recognition of the important role of fathers as caregivers – implied that all main actors agreed on a development where fathers could also take leave. The competition between the Social democrats and the Liberal party even caused the latter to be the one to propose the introduction of the father’s quota in 1994. The choice agenda did, however, also seems to have some weight, as bourgeois parties endorsed the idea that parents themselves could choose who should take leave. Later on, the same parties were to propose a father’s quota that in reality restrained the free choice for parents of who should take leave, but the gender equality agenda seem to have been more powerful as an argument.

In Denmark, the biological needs of the mother and the lack of recognition of the role of the father prevented the development of a parental leave as early as in Sweden. In Denmark, the opposition from the major trade union, LO, seems to have been influential in stalling any progress in regards to gender equality measures. The Social-Democrats were thus not successful in getting support for the proposal of introducing parental leave, but the reason seems to be especially the opposition by leading figures within the party and LO. Instead the centre party Radikale Venstre, has been influential in getting both the parental leave and the father’s quota enacted.

The final and more recent empirical case of the cash for care schemes on the other hand confirm the theory that parties right of the centre could ally on policies which are supporting more traditional family models, but which also allow individualized care arrangements.

The investigation of child care politics in Denmark and Sweden indicates that how the various actors interpret the social problems and the solution to these problems are far from straightforward, nor do they necessarily follow the traditional assumptions about party politics. The theoretical framework would assume that left-wing parties would to a larger degree support gender equality measures, but as is evident in Denmark, the Social-Democrats have over time shown to be reluctant and the gender equality agenda has

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indeed been furthered by the centre party Radikale Venstre. Likewise, the choice agenda was in Denmark not only furthered by parties right of the centre but also by a Marxist party interested in choice in order not to indicate that fathers are no able to care for their children.

This indicates that the institutionalization of ideas is essential for understanding how parties across the party lines can support the same policy line and even with the same policy measures, as is the case in Sweden. Only the cash for care scheme seems to have created some cleavage between the right and left wing parties. Gender equality seems to be a shared societal ideal in Sweden, and thus common for all parties, at least in the 1970s and 1980s whereas the choice agenda seems to become more influential in the 1990s and onwards. In Denmark, gender equality has never become institutionalized to the same degree, and here the combination of the concern for the mother focusing on her physical recovery after birth and the breastfeeding of the child, and the concern for the pedagogical needs for the child have been more dominant.

Timing also seems to be essential. The foundations for the extensive day care system in both countries were laid in more prosperous time. The economic problems in the 1970s and 1990s did influence any development, e.g. in Denmark, the reference to the economic crisis following the two oil crises has been used for not developing a parental leave in the 1970s. But timing also seems to be important in understanding how parties right of the centre may propose and manage to enact policies which would be assumed to be in interest of parties to the left. It thus seems to matter to propose changes when the time is ripe, e.g. the Radikale Venstre in Denmark proposing a parental leave and the father’s quota in Sweden proposed by a bourgeois government. Or to propose changes when the electoral is ready for such, e.g. the fear of losing female voters.

Finally, the study of the development of child-care policies in the two countries also gives evidence to the import role of allies. Apart from taking part in formal collective bargaining, labour market partners can be equally influential in setting the agenda, exemplified by the role played by the professional care workers in Denmark, or the influence of Swedish LO and the employer’s organization in setting up a commission on the expansion of day care. What is also evident is, however, that despite organizational support and back up for changes, individual influential persons may prevent changes from taking place.

The investigation of three important child-care policies, day care, parental leave and cash for care, indicates that the broad institutionalization of the gender equality principle in Sweden to a larger degree than in Denmark has shaped the policy development. As a consequence, the main political actors involving women’s movement, labour market

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partners as well as political parties have shared the notion of gender equality and have advanced this ideal through the development of child care policies.

In Denmark, a more pragmatic approach to the gender equality principle is evident, with political parties neither disagreeing, nor in particular advancing policies supporting this ideal. Child care policies in accordance has been developed as a more pragmatic response to the increase in women’s labour market participation, however, with the important exception of the notion of the pedagogical needs of the child, which early on came to frame the agenda setting. Here, an influential actor turned out to be the professional care workers who early on argued for the extension of full-time day care for all children.

As a result countries differ especially in the policy configurations and in gender incentives, in regards to the incentives for fathers to take up leave, and in the dominance of the day care model in the early years of the life of the child.

As the paper has shown, the traditional assumptions of the ideals and interests of parties left and right of the centre do not always hold true. In fact, parties left and right may compete on the same goals and with the same policy measures. The assumption about the role of the women’s movement in favouring gender equality through the expansion of day care also in the 1960s and 1970s seems to be less evident at least in Denmark, where the representatives for women were more in favour of the traditional family model. In both countries the trade unions have on the other hand been successful in promoting – or as in the case of Denmark – withholding change.

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