The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups LAURA CASARES FIELD and GORDON HANKA Presented by M9880105...

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The Expiration of IPO Share LockupsLAURA CASARES FIELD and GORDON HANKA

Presented by M9880105 梁雅珺 M9880202 陳芊蘋 M9880206 劉書汎

Introduction

• Share Lockups• The typical lockup lasts for 180 days • When lockups expire, we find a permanent 40

percent increase in average trading volume and a statistically prominent three-day abnormal return of -1.5 percent

• Venture Capital effect • Information asymmetry

FlowchartI. Data and Methods

II. Results

III. Hypotheses

IV. Ownership Changes after the IPO

V. Reported Insider Sales Before the Unlock Day

VI. Conclusion

I. Data and Methods

• (A). The sample• Writer use information from Securities Data

Corporation (SDC) to identify our sample of initial public offerings(IPO).

• This paper examine three variables: 1.the number of shares offered 2.the length of the lockup period 3.and the number of shares locked up.

I. Data and Methods

• (B). Summary Statistics• Table I

I. Data and Methods

• (B). Summary Statistics• Figure 1

I. Data and Methods

• (C)Calculation of Abnormal Returns

I. Data and Methods

• (D) Calculation of Abnormal Volume

II. Results

• (A). Abnormal Returns Around the Unlock Day• Figure 2

II. Results

• (A). Abnormal Returns Around the Unlock Day• Table II

II. Results

• (B). Abnormal Trading Volume Around the Unlock Day

• Figure 3

II. Results

• (C). Cross-sectional Determinants of the Abnormal Volume and Return

• Venture Financing:• Among the venture-financed firms, the three-

day abnormal return is almost three times larger than non-venture-financed firms and the three-day abnormal volume is five times higher 75 percent above normal rather than 15 percent.

II. Results

• (C). Cross-sectional Determinants of the Abnormal Volume and Return

• Robustness Checks:• Is This a Day 180 Effect?• observing a “Lockup” effect, rather than a

“Day 180” effect

II. Results

• (C). Cross-sectional Determinants of the Abnormal Volume and Return

• Table III

III. Hypotheses

• (A). An Increase in the Proportion of Trades at the Bid

• Figure 4

III. Hypotheses

• (B). Price Pressure

Figure 2 Figure 4

III. Hypotheses

• (C). Trading Costs• Figure 5

III. Hypotheses

• (D). Downward-Sloping Demand Curves• A demand curve effect is caused by a permanent

increase in the stock of shares that must be owned by the public, whereas a price pressure effect is caused by a temporary flow of sell orders.

• (E). Worse-than-Expected Insider Sales• Conclude that the abnormal return is probably not

driven solely by worse-than-expected insider sales.

IV. Ownership Changes after the IPO

• Table 6

V. Reported Insider Sales Before the Unlock Day

• Here provide evidence on the frequency of early release:

• if the stock price is high relative to the offer price, and trading volume is not too thin, the underwriter will occasionally grant small, partial early release to executives who need cash for personal reasons.

VI. Conclusion

• Insider sales tend to convey bad news , permanent 40 percent increase in trading

volume and a statistically prominent three-day abnormal return of -1.5 percent.