Securing Digital DemocracySecuring Digital Democracyg g yg g yLecture 5 | Security ProceduresLecture 5 | Security Procedures5 | y5 | y

J. Alex HaldermanUniversity of Michigan

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Voter RegistrationVoter RegistrationVoter RegistrationVoter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Voter A th ti ti

Voter A th ti ti

EnfranchisementEnfranchisementAuthenticationAuthentication

Almost 1/3 of eligible U.S. citizens not registered!

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/register‐to‐vote/app‐pdf/english‐blank.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy

V t  R i t ti  D t b  (VRD )V t  R i t ti  D t b  (VRD )

5.1 Voter Registration

Voter Registration Databases (VRDs)Voter Registration Databases (VRDs)

Voter A th ti ti

Voter A th ti ti

EnfranchisementEnfranchisement

SecuritySecurity PrivacyPrivacy

AuthenticationAuthentication

SecuritySecurity PrivacyPrivacy

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Securing Digital Democracy5.2 Voter Authentication

Voter AuthenticationVoter AuthenticationVoter AuthenticationVoter Authentication

Securing Digital Democracy5.2 Voter Authentication

(left) Public domain image from Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mustermann_nPA.jpg(right) Image by DNI Electronico via Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dnielectronico.jpgLicensed under a Creative Commons Attribution‐Share Alike 2.1 Spain license

Securing Digital Democracy5.2 Voter Authentication

Securing Digital Democracy5.2 Voter Authentication

Image by Joe Hall (Flickr user joebeone), licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license, http://www.flickr.com/photos/joebeone/292549434/

Securing Digital Democracy5.2 Voter Authentication

Manufacturer product sheet from Premiere Electionshttp://www.premierelections.com/documents/product_sheets/expresspoll_5000.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy

VoterID?VoterID?

5.2 Voter Authentication

VoterID?VoterID?

Voter Voter  E f hi tE f hi tVoter Authentication

Voter Authentication

EnfranchisementEnfranchisement

Securing Digital Democracy5.2 Voter Authentication

Securing Digital Democracy5.2 Voter Authentication

Image by Flickr user isafmedia, licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5007269322/in/photostream/

Securing Digital Democracy

Looking AheadLooking Ahead

5.2 Voter Authentication

Looking Ahead…Looking Ahead…

Securing Digital Democracy5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Guarding against TamperingGuarding against TamperingGuarding against TamperingGuarding against Tampering

Securing Digital Democracy5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Between polling and counting At all times!

Securing Digital Democracy5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy

Tamper‐Evident SealsTamper‐Evident Seals

5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Tamper‐Evident SealsTamper‐Evident Seals

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Image from Argonne National Laboratory Vulnerability Assessment Teamhttp://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/index.html

Securing Digital Democracy

l f l

5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Mean Median

f f

Results for 244 Seals

Defeat time for one person

1.4 mins 43 secs

Cost of  $78 $5tools/supplies

Cost per seal attacked

$0.62 $0.09

Time to devise successful attack

2.3 hrs 12 mins

(19% use or in consideration for nuclear safeguards!)(left) Image from Argonne National Laboratory Vulnerability Assessment Team, http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/new.html(data) From Johnston et al., http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/index.html

Securing Digital Democracy5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Securing Digital Democracy5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Cup SealSeal

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy

Padlock

5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

PadlockSeal

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy

Tape 

5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

pSeals

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy

Evaluating a Seal ProtocolEvaluating a Seal Protocol

5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Is the seal going to be in place when the attacker has access? Does the seal act all  need to be remo ed to get in?

Evaluating a Seal ProtocolEvaluating a Seal Protocol

Does the seal actually need to be removed to get in? Can the attack just remove it temporarily without leaving evidence? Can the attack replace it with a new seal without leaving evidence? Can the attack replace it with a new seal without leaving evidence? Do election officials properly record seal numbers for each machine? Do election officials properly check the seal numbers later? Do election officials properly check the seal numbers later? Do officials inspect for evidence of tampering? If anomalies are detected, are they recorded and reported? If anomalies are detected, are they recorded and reported? Is appropriate action taken? 

Adapted from  http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy

Old way: Evidence

5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Old way: Evidence

N  id  “A i id ”New idea: “Anti‐evidence”

192380 ‐‐‐‐‐‐192380secret erasedsecret

Securing Digital Democracy5.4 Field Testing

Field TestingField TestingField TestingField Testing

Securing Digital Democracy5.4 Field Testing

“Zero”ZeroTape

Securing Digital Democracy5.4 Field Testing

Logic & AccuracyLogic & AccuracyTesting

Securing Digital Democracy5.4 Field Testing

ParallelParallelTesting What if problems are found?

Securing Digital Democracy5.4 Field Testing

https://www.usenix.org/conference/evtwote12/automated‐analysis‐election‐audit‐logs

Securing Digital Democracy

Human FactorsHuman Factors

5.4 Field Testing

Human FactorsHuman Factors

Securing Digital Democracy

Tracking ProblemsTracking Problems

5.4 Field Testing

Tracking ProblemsTracking Problems

Securing Digital DemocracySecuring Digital Democracyg g yg g yLecture 5 | Security ProceduresLecture 5 | Security Procedures5 | y5 | y

J. Alex HaldermanUniversity of Michigan