Securing Digital Democracy 5 || Securityy Proceduresahevia/cursos/2013/cc5317/...Securing Digital...

Securing Digital DemocracySecuring Digital Democracyg g yg g yLecture 5 | Security ProceduresLecture 5 | Security Procedures5 | y5 | y

J. Alex HaldermanUniversity of Michigan

Securing Digital Democracy5.1 Voter Registration

Voter RegistrationVoter RegistrationVoter RegistrationVoter Registration


Voter A th ti ti

Voter A th ti ti

EnfranchisementEnfranchisementAuthenticationAuthentication

Almost 1/3 of eligible U.S. citizens not registered!


https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/register‐to‐vote/app‐pdf/english‐blank.pdf

Securing Digital Democracy

V t R i t ti D t b (VRD )V t R i t ti D t b (VRD )

5.1 Voter Registration

Voter Registration Databases (VRDs)Voter Registration Databases (VRDs)

Voter A th ti ti

Voter A th ti ti

EnfranchisementEnfranchisement

SecuritySecurity PrivacyPrivacy

AuthenticationAuthentication

SecuritySecurity PrivacyPrivacy

Securing Digital Democracy5.2 Voter Authentication

Voter AuthenticationVoter AuthenticationVoter AuthenticationVoter Authentication


(left) Public domain image from Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mustermann_nPA.jpg(right) Image by DNI Electronico via Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dnielectronico.jpgLicensed under a Creative Commons Attribution‐Share Alike 2.1 Spain license


Image by Joe Hall (Flickr user joebeone), licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license, http://www.flickr.com/photos/joebeone/292549434/


Manufacturer product sheet from Premiere Electionshttp://www.premierelections.com/documents/product_sheets/expresspoll_5000.pdf


VoterID?VoterID?

5.2 Voter Authentication

VoterID?VoterID?

Voter Voter E f hi tE f hi tVoter Authentication

Voter Authentication

EnfranchisementEnfranchisement


Image by Flickr user isafmedia, licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5007269322/in/photostream/


Looking AheadLooking Ahead

5.2 Voter Authentication

Looking Ahead…Looking Ahead…

Securing Digital Democracy5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Guarding against TamperingGuarding against TamperingGuarding against TamperingGuarding against Tampering


Between polling and counting At all times!


http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf


Tamper‐Evident SealsTamper‐Evident Seals

5.3 Guarding Against Tampering

Tamper‐Evident SealsTamper‐Evident Seals



Image from Argonne National Laboratory Vulnerability Assessment Teamhttp://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/index.html


l f l


Mean Median

f f

Results for 244 Seals

Defeat time for one person

1.4 mins 43 secs

Cost of $78 $5tools/supplies

Cost per seal attacked

$0.62 $0.09

Time to devise successful attack

2.3 hrs 12 mins

(19% use or in consideration for nuclear safeguards!)(left) Image from Argonne National Laboratory Vulnerability Assessment Team, http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/new.html(data) From Johnston et al., http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/index.html


Cup SealSeal



Padlock


PadlockSeal



Tape


pSeals



Evaluating a Seal ProtocolEvaluating a Seal Protocol


Is the seal going to be in place when the attacker has access? Does the seal act all need to be remo ed to get in?

Evaluating a Seal ProtocolEvaluating a Seal Protocol

Does the seal actually need to be removed to get in? Can the attack just remove it temporarily without leaving evidence? Can the attack replace it with a new seal without leaving evidence? Can the attack replace it with a new seal without leaving evidence? Do election officials properly record seal numbers for each machine? Do election officials properly check the seal numbers later? Do election officials properly check the seal numbers later? Do officials inspect for evidence of tampering? If anomalies are detected, are they recorded and reported? If anomalies are detected, are they recorded and reported? Is appropriate action taken?

Adapted from http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf


Old way: Evidence


Old way: Evidence

N id “A i id ”New idea: “Anti‐evidence”

192380 ‐‐‐‐‐‐192380secret erasedsecret

Securing Digital Democracy5.4 Field Testing

Field TestingField TestingField TestingField Testing


“Zero”ZeroTape


Logic & AccuracyLogic & AccuracyTesting


ParallelParallelTesting What if problems are found?


https://www.usenix.org/conference/evtwote12/automated‐analysis‐election‐audit‐logs


Human FactorsHuman Factors

5.4 Field Testing

Human FactorsHuman Factors


Tracking ProblemsTracking Problems

5.4 Field Testing

Tracking ProblemsTracking Problems

Securing Digital DemocracySecuring Digital Democracyg g yg g yLecture 5 | Security ProceduresLecture 5 | Security Procedures5 | y5 | y

J. Alex HaldermanUniversity of Michigan

Securing Digital Democracy 5 || Securityy Proceduresahevia/cursos/2013/cc5317/...Securing Digital...

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