Post on 30-Jan-2021
Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy, A New Approach or More of the Same: A
Comparative Historical Analysis
Patrick J. Riebsame
Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
In
Political Science
Thesis Committee:
Aaron Brantly (Chair)
Priya Dixit
Besnik Pula
May 6, 2020
Virginia Beach, Virginia
Keywords: Russia’s Modern Foreign Policy
Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy, A New Approach or More of the Same: A Comparative
Historical Analysis
Patrick J. Riebsame
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Russia’s foreign policy within a comparative historical framework
and theorizes that Russian foreign policy while briefly deviating from its historical pattern
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has realigned its current trajectories with its more
traditional foreign policy strategies. This correction is largely consistent with Soviet notions of
great power status and is rooted in a desire to secure its own national interests and achieve
geopolitical objectives.
This thesis is divided into six chapters. For context, chapter one provides an historical
overview of the traditional challenges faced by the Russian state, many of which remain today.
Chapter two examines several core theories of foreign policy, providing a theoretical foundation
from which the following chapters will routinely reference. Chapter three offers an historical
synopsis of three discrete periods of Russian foreign policy and hypothesizes that the modern
Russian state implements its foreign policy within a Defensive realist framework consistent with
that of the former Soviet Union. Chapter four demonstrates how periods one and three are similar
and fit within a consistent theoretical framework while concurrently demonstrating that period
two was a temporal anomaly in the Russian approach to foreign policy. Chapter five addresses
the implications associated with the continuation of Defensive realist foreign policy actions
conducted by the Russian state. Finally, chapter six revisits the central theme of the work and
contends that based on all demonstrated evidence the foreign policy of Russia today is in fact
consistent with its historical patterns of behavior.
Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy, A New Approach or More of the Same: A
Comparative Historical Analysis
Patrick J. Riebsame
GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Russia's foreign policy across three distinct periods of time and
theorizes that Russian foreign policy while briefly deviating from its historical pattern following
the collapse of the Soviet Union, has realigned its current trajectories with its more traditional
foreign policy strategies. This correction is largely consistent with Soviet notions of great power
status and is rooted in a desire to secure its own national interests and achieve geopolitical
objectives.
This thesis compares the Soviet Union's foreign policy strategy throughout its
intervention in Afghanistan from 1979 - 1989, the Russian Federation's objectives prior to, and
immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 - 1993, and modern Russia's
objectives in Syria from 2015 to the present. Russia's modern foreign policy shares many
parallels with that of the former Soviet Union and should be considered a return to, rather than a
divergence from its traditional approach to international relations. The main goal of this thesis is
to determine, "What is Russia's modern Foreign Policy strategy and how has it changed over
time?" This thesis compares each period by focusing primarily on the Russian state's actions and
its leaders' perceptions regarding threats to their regional and global objectives throughout each
period.
IV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Aaron Brantly, Dr. Scott Nelson, Dr.
Priya Dixit, and Dr. Besnik Pula for guiding my work on “Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy, A
New Approach or More of the Same: A Comparative Historical Analysis.” Their insights
provided unique clarity to a complicated topic and centered the direction and purpose of my
work from start to finish. Finally, I would like to express my whole-hearted thanks to my
parents, Pete and Susan Riebsame, whose support and encouragement has been invaluable along
the way. Any errors or inaccuracies contained within this document remain my individual
responsibilities.
V
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter One
Introduction: 1
Section 1: Historical Background.
Chapter Two
International Relations Theories Defined: 22
Chapter Three
Introduction: Russian Foreign Policy relative to International Relations theories. 30
Section 1: An historical overview of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy goals in Afghanistan from 1979 –
1989.
Section 2: An historical overview of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy goals prior to, and following
the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 – 93.
Section 3: An historical overview of modern Russia’s foreign policy goals in Syria from 2015 – Present.
Chapter Four
Introduction: Comparative Historical Analysis of the following foreign policy periods 49
Section 1: The Soviet Union’s Foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan from 1979 – 89.
Section 2: Russian Foreign policy objectives prior to, and immediately following the collapse of the Soviet
Union from 1989 – 93.
Section 3: Modern Russian Foreign policy objectives in Syria from 2015 – Present. The return of Russia’s
traditional foreign policy approach.
Conclusions:
Chapter Five
Russian Foreign Policy Implications Going Forward: 67
Chapter Six
Conclusions: 77
Abbreviations 85
Figures 86
Bibliography 89
1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The unique confrontation between Russia and the West has renewed public interest into
the foreign policy goals and objectives of the Russian Federation. Following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the West redirected its attention towards threats arising within the Middle East,
North Africa, and Far East, leaving Russia to struggle in relative isolation, all the while seeking
to maintain influence throughout its historical areas of interest. Recent events in Syria have once
again called significant attention to Russia’s current relationship with the West. Russia’s
resurgent influence within the Middle East has also raised questions regarding Russia’s current
and future strategies relative to the global community, and how Russia intends to pursue these
new objectives in modern times.
For over a quarter century following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the military and power balance between the West and Russia has become
increasingly lopsided as the United States and her allies became progressively entrenched within
the Middle East. While Russia’s global influence was crippled throughout much of the early
1990s, it remained assertive within its remaining spheres of influence, namely throughout the
many newly independent former Soviet states in Eurasia and Central Asia. The void left behind
by the former Soviet Union enabled the West, to be more specific NATO, to quickly assert itself
as the dominant collective security power within Europe. NATO’s collective security assurances
and renewed interest in expansion quickly brought many former Soviet satellite states into the
fold and disregarded the impact such an expansion may have upon Russia’s increasingly insecure
2
national mindset.1 The Kremlin’s weakened state and lack of concrete leverage prevented it from
pursuing any real actions beyond lodging formal protests across international institutions such as
the United Nations. As a result, Russia turned its attention towards the development and
cultivation of regional objectives while temporarily suspending the importance of its global
ambitions. Economic reforms spurred by higher energy prices have enabled Russia’s recent
resurgence in military capabilities, aggressive maneuvering, and foreign influence.2
Consequently, this resurgence has intensified Western concern for not only its eastern bloc
NATO allies, but for all of Europe.
This competition postured by Russia is designed to secure itself from perceived threats
from the West, and in particular the United States. From the Kremlin’s perspective Russia as a
whole is threatened, and its actions are in defense of the current regime as well as the states
which Russia has historically maintained a significant amount of control and influence over. In
response to this perceived threat Russia has sought to reestablish itself as a great power in the
eyes of the global community, and in doing so solidify the internal stability of its government.
This effort has focused upon securing its national borders from Western influence, to include the
borders of states that the Kremlin believes fall within its periphery. Russia’s influence over these
states reinforces its belief that as a great power it has the inherent right to act in the defense of its
priorities there, claiming that their sovereignty is less absolute than its own. From the West’s
perspective, these actions by the Russian Federation can appear as both aggressive and offensive
in nature. However, these actions cannot be truly understood without first comparing Russia’s
1 Bryan Frederick, Matthew Povlock, Stephen Watts, Miranda Priebe, and Edward Geist, Assessing Russian
Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements, (Santa Monica, California, RAND Corporation, 2017), 1-3, 53-
59. 2 Paul Stronski and Richard Sokolsky, The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework, (Washington, DC,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 25-29.
3
foreign policy behavior across several isolated periods of time. Therefore, this paper seeks to
answer the following research question:
“What is Russia’s modern Foreign Policy strategy and how has it changed over
time?”
This paper hypothesizes that Russia’ ultimate goal is to reset the current world order in
favor of a bi-polar, or even tri-polar system. To achieve this goal, it also hypothesizes that Russia
implements its current foreign policy within a defensive realist framework. Finally, Russia’s
narrative reinforces these key goals in nearly all of its actions across all manner of international
and regional forums and has grown to define the core interests of its foreign policy concepts
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.3
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military and
power balance between the West and the Russian Federation drastically shifted in favor of the
United States and her allies. As a partial result, the U.S. led an effort to expand NATO’s
membership and welcomed much of the greater Euro-Atlantic region under its umbrella.
Additionally, U.S. involvement within the Middle East further shifted influence and access there
away from Russia. Meanwhile, Russian security concerns were widely overlooked by the United
States and her allies, except as a possible source of instability should the Russian Federation
further decline.4
Contemporary Russian foreign policy is reflective of its past experiences, driving
Moscow’s actions and goals on the world stage. Principle among its philosophy is the pursuit of
3 David A. Shlapak, The Russian Challenge, (London, Chatham House Report, 2018), vii-viii. 4 Keir Giles, The Turning Point for Russian Foreign Policy, (Army War College, 2017), 4.
4
strategic depth, an expansionist perspective derived from the inherent need to place vast swaths
of territory between it and its perceived threats, regardless of their legitimacy. In considering
Russia’s historical geographic territories, such a philosophy is not wholly unrealistic, as it does
not truly possess any significant geographic obstacles preventing a foreign incursion onto
sovereign Russian territory. Throughout its history, modern Russia, the Soviet Union, Imperial
Russia, and the principality of Muscovy have all faced the challenge of securing territory as a
means of distancing itself from hostile actors to the west, south, and east.5 The continued
presence of such baseline insecurities has prompted Russia’s dogged pursuit of recognition as a
great power. From its perspective, the only true deterrent against foreign intervention is its
internationally recognized status as a great power, as this status would legitimize its territorial
conquests and reinforce its geopolitical ambitions. Both of these pursuits have fueled and
agitated Russia’s complicated relationship with the West, and routinely placed it opposite the
United States.6
It is important to remember that the current Russian state is less than three decades old,
but logically maintains a centuries old memory comprised of significant victories, as well as
significant defeats. From the perspective of the modern Russian administration and citizenship,
the current state is the heir to a long, illustrious tradition of great power status, a belief that its
current government does not fail to take advantage of. In their eyes, the ambitions of the Russian
state are legitimate pursuits, reinforced by valid conquests.7 Historian Stephen Kotkin once
noted that “Whatever the original causes behind early Russian expansionism—much of which
was unplanned—many in the country’s political class came to believe over time that only further
5 Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2019), 4. 6 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 3. 7 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 4.
5
expansion could secure the earlier acquisitions. Russian security has thus traditionally been party
predicated on moving outward, in the name of preempting external attack.”8
Russia’s uncertain and oftentimes combative relationship with the West has been central
to its foreign policy narrative for centuries. Peter the Great’s founding of the New Russian
Capital of St. Petersburg on the Baltic Shores, Catherine the Great’s engagement with early
enlightenment European thinkers, Czar Alexander I’s efforts to place Russia within a tight circle
of European powers, and Joseph Stalin’s consolidation of territory away from Europe has
constantly linked Russian desires to Europe across its history.9 Counter to this historical trend,
Russia’s own elites and political thinkers have continuously questioned the Russo - European
relationship. More recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that while over the
centuries Russia has seen itself as a part of Europe, it has also seen itself as better than the West,
and as the link between the East and West. Furthermore, Lavrov argued that the central problem
inherent to Russia’s relationship with the West is that it (the West) is unwilling to simply allow
Russia to be Russia and continues to insist that Russia conform to Western liberal values,
something that no Russian leader or citizen would ever willingly accept. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, Russia’s greatest setbacks have come at the hands of the West, and the lessons
learned from those setbacks have evolved to define the Kremlin’s perspective regarding its
security and defense policies.10
Russia’s loss of territory following the 1917 revolution and the 1918 Brest-Litovsk
Treaty, as well as following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a significant
sense of state insecurity, as it had lost all strategic depth between itself and its perceived
8 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs, 95, no. 3 (May/June 2016). 9 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 9. 10 Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics,”
6
competitors. In March of 1918, the newly installed Bolshevik government of Russia signed the
aforementioned Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which enabled it to leave World War I, but required it to
make significant territorial concessions (most of present day Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic
States, Finland, and parts of Turkey) to the Central Powers. As the Bolsheviks retreated from the
war their political, military, and economic capabilities collapsed, prompting Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia to all declare independence. This independence was short lived
however, as most of these states were reclaimed by the Soviet Union within a decade.11
Similar to the concessions made by the Russian Empire following 1918, when the Soviet
Union dissolved in 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the South Caucasus, and
parts of Central Asia all withdrew from it. This time however, a decade later Russia had not
regained much of its previous territory and has struggled to reestablish control and influence over
its neighbors.12
11 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 16. 12 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 16.
7
Figure 1.1
Map 1: Russia in Europe in 1914.13
13 “Central Europe 1914,” The Map Archive, https://www.themaparchive.com/central-europe-1914.html.
8
Figure 1.2
Map 2: Russia in Europe According to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (March 1918).14
14 “Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,” The Map Archive, https://www.themaparchive.com/treaty-of-brest-litovsk-3-march-
1918.html.
9
Figure 1.3
Map 3: Russian Federation in 1991.15
15 “USSR to Russian Federation 1991,” The Map Archive, https://www.themaparchive.com/ussr-to-russian-
federation.html.
10
Regaining the territorial depth and influence lost in 1918 and 1991 became a top priority
for both the early Soviet government as well as for the new Russian state following the Soviet
Union’s collapse.16 Russia’s historical quest for great power status has mirrored its pursuit of a
territorial buffer, and, because Russia has had to repeatedly regain lost territory and status over
the course of its history, any suggestions that Russia no longer belongs amongst the world’s great
powers is a topic Russia is particularly sensitive to.17
In the mid-nineteenth century, Russian historian Nikolay Danilevsky argued that Russia
has been routinely mistreated by Europe, which had disregarded Prussia’s aggression against
Denmark and its subsequent annexation of two Danish provinces. This reaction by Europe was
contradictory to Russia’s similar defense of its interests in Turkey, which Europe quickly
denounced as illegitimate. President Putin has publicly maintained that such a bias still exists,
and has further lamented Europe’s double standards when addressing the West’s condemnation
of the Russian annexation of Crimea, while the severing of Kosovo from Serbia was widely
accepted by European powers.18
Long before the accusations against Russia for the use of “little great men” in Ukraine,
such tactics were a doctrinal part of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy approach. Soviet military
engagement, executed through the use of proxies in varying levels of armed conflict has been
commonplace. Russian military personnel under overt and covert aliases participated in the
1936-1939 Spanish Civil War as well as in Cuba during in the Angola crisis in 1974-1975.19
Soviet personnel have also been deployed across crisis zones in parts of Asia and the Middle
East during the Cold War, in particular to Afghanistan from 1979 – 1989, and Soviet pilots even
16 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 4. 17 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 7. 18 Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia, March 18, 2014. 19 “The Angola Crisis 1974-1975,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian.
11
flew missions during the Korean War from August to November of 1950, and in Yemen during
the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, during the 1962 conflict between Indonesia and the
Netherlands, Soviet assistance was provided by then leader Nikita Khrushchev in the form of
submarines, naval vessels, and even jets to fight in support of Indonesia.20 Finally, in 1970, the
Kremlin provided jets and air defense assets to Egypt in an attempt to rebalance Israeli air
superiority.21 These actions set a precedent for current Russian activities today in Syria as Russia
attempts to regain its former influence, access, and power.
Russia’s modern policy toward the West has evolved into an ideological impasse,
exacerbating a competition between fundamentally opposite world views. During the Soviet Era
the competition was between Communism and Capitalism, and, while there was a relatively brief
period when Russia attempted to join the West in the early 1990s, that failure has led Russia to
embrace a wholeheartedly anti-Western philosophy. As communism fell it was replaced by an
oddly complementary mix of nationalist, authoritarian, and state capitalist approaches as a means
of replacing, and providing a viable alternative to the West’s liberal democratic capitalism. This
combination of state and cultural doctrines, reinforced by the perceived threat of an expanding
West, has fed the notion that Russia is being encircled by a hostile Western ideology.22 George
Kennan wrote in “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”:
“. . . the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in
a hurry . . . and it can afford to be patient. These precepts are fortified by the
lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces
20 “The Soviet Bloc Armed Forces and the Cuban Crisis,” National Indications Center, June 18, 1963. 21 “The USSR and the Egyptian-Israeli Confrontation,” Central Intelligence Agency, May 14, 1970. 22 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 9.
12
over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection,
flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities . . .
Its [the Soviet Union’s] political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly,
wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. . . . The main thing is that
there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired
goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be
reached at any given time.”23
As this thesis will argue, the Russian foreign policy approach under the tenure of
Vladimir Putin fits Mr. Kennan’s caricature of former Soviet strategies during their occupation
of Afghanistan nearly forty years ago. Russia’s modern approach has been defined by a mixture
of efficient, low-cost, low-risk, endeavors aided by the limited use of military force and political
capital to increase its national power.24 Again, while the West may confuse these actions as
offensive in nature, the source of its political philosophy can be found within Russia’s historical
need to defend itself by accumulating power and influence. Furthermore, while this approach has
been influenced by modern technological advancements, it remains consistent with the basis of
historical Russian foreign policies.
Dr. Dmitri Vitalyevich Trenin, the current director of the Carnegie Moscow Center,
summarized the shifting Russian political perspective in 2006, stating that “”Until recently,
Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the center but still
fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia’s leaders have given up on
becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system.”25
23 George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 25, no. 4, July 1947. 24 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 10. 25 Trenin, Dmitri, “Russia Leaves the West,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 85, no. 4, July/August 2006.
13
While there were moments of cooperation with the United States following 1991, the
relationship slowly took on a negative curve, prompting Russia to pursue alternative institutions
in order to develop a counter-weight to what it claimed was a threatening U.S. led unipolar world
order.26 In addition to consistently calling attention to its status as a great power, Russian elites
have routinely called for revision to the established world order and the elimination of what it
sees as a unipolar leadership construct. This advocacy for a multipolar international community
would certainly include Russia, and potentially China, as the opposite check upon the current
system dominated by the United States.
In 2008 then President Dmitry Medvedev included the multipolar construct as one of his
five key principles of Russian foreign policy, stating that “The world should be multipolar.
Unipolarity is unacceptable; domination is impermissible. We cannot accept a world order in
which all decisions are taken by one country, even such a serious and authoritative country as the
United States of America.”27 Russia’s history as a great power has certainly impacted this
perception of the U.S led world order, and even though its capacity to impact the greater world
community diminished significantly following 1991, it did not consider its privileges as a great
power to have been reduced in any way.
From its viewpoint, Russia’s great power status implies particular privileges within its
geographic proximity, enabling it to interject or interfere in neighboring conflicts, or influence
the decision making of a state, or group of states within its sphere of influence. Additionally, the
exclusivity of these privileges allow it to cooperate with other great powers on equal footing due
to its independence and greater level of sovereignty relative to its neighboring states. As if to
26 Andrew Radin and Clint Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, (Santa Monica, California, RAND
Corporation, 2017), 27. 27 Paul Reynolds, “New Russian World Order: The Five Principles,” BBC News, September 1, 2008.
14
reinforce this point, President Medvedev also argued that “Russia, just like other countries in the
world, has regions where it has its privileged interests. In these regions, there are countries with
which we have traditionally had friendly and cordial relations, historically special relations.”28
Russian support for specific international institutions goes hand-in-hand with its own
perceived privileges, but withholds support from international institutions or multilateral
agreements that do not provide it the recognition it has historically enjoyed. Much of this opinion
is derived from the power it is granted (i.e. Veto power or permanent membership) by said
institution or multilateral agreement. The United Nations (UN) is a perfect example of such an
institution, where Russia enjoys permanent membership and veto power on the Security Council.
Furthermore, Russia also favors organizations that enable it to prevent or delegitimize
interference in what it believes are its domestic affairs, even if those interests lie outside of
Russia’s internationally recognized territorial boundaries.29
Russia also sees the UN as a mechanism of order that can be beneficial to its foreign
policy objectives. The UN’s rules and organizational structure play to Russia’s benefit where
other institutions do not. Additionally, and at times more critical than UN regulations, is the fact
the Russia maintains the same level of prestige at the UN as does the United States. This equal
footing with Russia’s most prominent rival in the West provides it with a platform from which to
freely discuss, and proactively influence its national and strategic objectives.30
From the U.S. perspective, traditional characteristics of sovereignty, self-determination,
democracy, and human rights all align. Together, they enable a country to select which
international institutions to pursue acceptance into, and the freedom to act upon that decision
28 Reynolds, “New Russian World Order: The Five Principles.” 29 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 36. 30 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 31.
15
without interruption by a foreign power. Furthermore, the U.S. has traditionally viewed the
interference in another state’s sovereign territory as justified if that state has failed to provide for
the minimum standards of protecting its citizen’s wellbeing. Russia supports an altogether
different interpretation of the United States’ exportation of sovereignty, democracy, and human
rights.31 According to Russia, the United States has used this philosophy as a general cover for
expanding its sphere of influence and indoctrinating states into its unilateral system of foreign
domination. Additionally, as previously mentioned Russia sees itself as more sovereign than
other countries, particularly its neighboring states. Due to this proximity, Russia feels that it has
the right to protect its interests within ‘less sovereign’ states, preventing them from freely
pursuing their own foreign policy goals.32 This perspective has put Russia in conflict with the
United States’ ideals and objectives, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
Drawing from Russia’s imperial conquests in the 16th through 19th centuries as well as
during the era of the Soviet Union, Russia has developed an identity which includes the ‘Little
Russians’ (Ukrainians), the ‘White Russians’ (Byelorussians), and the ‘Great Russians’ (ethnic
Russians). Additionally, due to their shared language Russia’s identity is also connected to many
of the post-Soviet states and regions of Central Asia. Russia’s responsibility to this diverse group
of states and peoples is communicated through what Russia calls the Russkiy Mir, or Russian
world, meaning support for Russia’s “compatriots.”33 This Russian identity applies to a
significant amount of territory across two continents, which directly contributes to its sense of
historical insecurity. Stephen Kotkin, a professor of history and international affairs at Princeton
University observed, “Russia has felt perennially vulnerable and has often displayed a kind of
31 National Security Strategy, (The White House, Washington, 2015), 19-21. 32 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 31. 33 Igor Zevelev, NATO’s Enlargement and Russian Perceptions of Eurasian Political Frontiers, (George Marshall
European Center for Security Studies, Germany, undated), 17.
16
defensive aggressiveness…Today, too, smaller countries on Russia’s borders are viewed less as
potential friends than as potential beachheads for enemies.”34
This far-reaching concept of vulnerability does not wholly originate from outside of
Russia, the threat from within is widely understood by the current administration as well.
Russia’s swift leadership changes have not always been peaceful matters, and the prospect of
regime change from within is not lost on Putin or his inner circle. Gleb Pavlovsky, a former
advisor to Putin, observed that “In the Kremlin establishment, ever since Yeltsin’s 1993 attack
on the Parliament, there has been an absolute conviction that as soon as the power centre shifts,
or if there is mass pressure, or the appearance of a popular leader, then everybody will be
annihilated. It’s a feeling of great vulnerability.”35 Therefore, the United States’ propensity for
seeking regime change in unstable states is certainly perceived as a threat across the Russian
leadership establishment.
To this end, the collapse of the Soviet Union has been misinterpreted by the West, unlike
the defeat of Nazi Germany, Russia would not emerge as a completely different society open to a
transition towards Western liberalism. Rather, while Russia did initially transition away from the
authoritarian governments of Leninism and adopt some liberal economic practices and
institutions, it did not escape the transition away from a top-heavy oligarchy capable of
monopolizing specific aspects of the country’s economy and government.36 This transition has
been largely guided by ex-Chekist Vladimir Putin, who in turn has sought to combine political,
economic, informational, and irregular warfare techniques, backed by conventional military
operations and a nuclear arsenal to challenge the West. In doing so, Putin has steered Russia
34 Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics.” 35 Gleb Pavlovsky, “Putin’s World Outlook,” New Left Review, Vol. 88, July/August 2014, p. 62. 36 Shlapak, The Russia Challenge, 1-5.
17
back into contention as a great power through a largely opportunistic yet defensive approach to
foreign policy.37
As a substitute to NATO, Russia has pursued the development of regional security
arrangements within its perceived spheres of influence. In November 1990, twenty-two NATO
and Warsaw Pact countries signed the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) in Paris.
That same day, those same nations and their neutral neighbors adopted the Charter of Paris at the
second security summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) further linking
security to democratic principles.38 Russia encouraged the elevation of the CSCE, with the goal
of developing a Eurasian-European institution that could enhance cooperation with the West,
while keeping Russia’s interests and influence intact throughout the region.39 At the time, the
CSCE was one of the few surviving institutions of the Soviet Union. Created in 1970s during
negotiations between the Eastern and Western Blocs, the CSCE was born out of the 1975
Helsinki Final Act, which established shared principles, specifically tying hard security with
human rights, as well as reinforced territorial integrity concepts. The CSCE would later be
renamed as the Organization on Security and Cooperation (OSCE), which simply replaced
“Conference” with “Organization.” Russia’s preference for the OSCE over NATO lies with its
veto power within the organization, which has granted it significant weight in the decision
making and direction the organization has taken in Russia’s near abroad.40 However, this veto
power is one of the larger reasons why the continuation of the OSCE was largely unsuccessful in
encouraging the United States’ participation.
37 Shlapak, The Russia Challenge, 1-5. 38 Philip Remler, “Russia and Cooperative Security in Europe: Times Change, Tactics Remain,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, August 1, 2019. 39 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 45. 40 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 47.
18
In the early 1990s, the security functions of the CSCE and later the OSCE provided
enough value for Russia to rationalize its membership, as it dealt with several small wars by
secessionist groups in Karabakh (Azerbaijan), South Ossettia and Abkhazia (Georgia),
Transdniestria (Moldova), and Chechnya. With the exception of Chechnya these were not
conflicts for independence. Rather, they sought to reshape the territorial boundaries drawn by the
Soviet Union for them. Karabakh sought to be absorbed into Armenia, and Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, and Transdniestria desired reintegration back into the Soviet, and later Russian state.41
Russia took a back seat to the OSCE in moderating the resolutions for all of these conflicts
except Chechnya, which it actively fought and opposed. Over time, and as resolutions were
delayed, Russia developed a generic playbook to manage these protracted conflicts. First, it
sought to ensure that each conflict did not evolve into a hot war against Russian desires. Second,
Russia would continue to support secessionists while playing a mediation role in the settlement
process, guaranteeing that Russian interests were central to the agreed upon terms. And finally,
no settlement, whether comprehensive or interim could undermine the interests of the Russian
state.42 In its most basic form, this Russia playbook used the OSCE as a mediator between
Russian interests with the West, guaranteeing that ‘frozen’ conflicts remain frozen without
Russian approval on the global stage. However, Russian interests within the Helinski Act and
later the OSCE were primarily driven by arms control and hard security. As Russia’s concerns
over those issues diminished over time so did its principle reasons for remaining attached to the
goals of both agreements. Additionally, specific security language within the OSCE charter
restricts member states from strengthening their security at the expense of other states, language
that Russia has used to rationalize its actions in Georgia in 2008 against NATO encroachment,
41 Remler, “Russia and Cooperative Security in Europe: Times Change, Tactics Remain,” 9. 42 Remler, “Russia and Cooperative Security in Europe: Times Change, Tactics Remain,” 10-12.
19
and later in Ukraine in 2014 to prevent EU expansion.43 Much of the West disagrees with this
Russian interpretation of the OSCE’s purpose, and its role in managing security conflicts within
the region.
NATO and EU enlargement represents one of the largest points of contention between
the United States and Russia. The U.S. has routinely argued that NATO’s enlargement is not
intended to threaten Russia and has no designs to challenge Russia’s internationally recognized
sovereign territory. However, Russia continues to cite NATO enlargement as the primary reason
for its diminishing influence within it’s near abroad, and among the former Soviet states.
Regardless of the language the United States and NATO use to quell Russian suspicions, it is
unlikely that Russia’s current administration will divorce itself their suspicions towards the
West.44
Partly in response to NATO, Russia has pursued the development of security institutions
in its own neighborhood, namely, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CIS, which contains all of the former
Soviet States except for the Baltic countries was originally intended to manage the transition
away from the former Soviet Union. However, the CIS’s capabilities are relatively limited, and
Russia has focused much greater effort on developing the CSTO, which was intended to mirror
NATO’s collective security guarantees for Eurasian and Central Asian states aligned with
Russia. In theory, the CSTO would serve as a defensive counterweight to NATO and to Western
desires of expansion. Currently, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and
43 Remler, “Russia and Cooperative Security in Europe: Times Change, Tactics Remain,” 13-19. 44 Hugh Bayley, Why NATO Matters: A parliamentary case for strengthening the transatlantic pillars of the
Alliance, (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels, 2014), 33-35.
20
Tajikistan are the only participating members within the CSTO. As a result, the CSTO has never
gained the traction, or participation necessary to truly rival NATO.45
While the CSTO and CIS formally recognize the independence and equality of their
associate states, Russia commands significant informal sway over these countries, partly through
its looming threats to cause instability in member states if they do not strictly follow Russia’s
lead.46 From Russia’s perspective, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), CSTO, and CIS all
provide Russia with a public and formal front to assert its influence across the region. Similarly,
Russian leaders view NATO and the EU as similar institutions manipulated by the United States
to achieve and maintain its own larger influence over Euro-Atlantic decision making.47
In 2011, Putin outlined the creation of another regional integration process, this time the
Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), which would be unified by the Common Economic Spaces of
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (CES). The project would be formally established in 2012, and
supposedly establish the foundation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Future expansion
of this project would include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, rounding out the creation of a formal
Eurasian Union.48 While the formation of the Eurasian Union has never gained the strength or
the membership to rival the European Union, its very existence has provided an alternative,
albeit not a very attractive alternative to the more successful European economic institutions.
One of the most impactful outcomes of the 2008 Bucharest Summit was that both
Ukraine and Georgia would be authorized to pursue membership into NATO, a decision that
would prompt Russia to aggressively prevent this from occurring. Shortly thereafter, Russia
45 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, (New York, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013),
208-210. 46 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 49. 47 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 49. 48 Uwe Halback, Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union, (German Institute for International Security Affairs, 2012), 1-4.
21
undertook a military campaign against Georgia with the belief that the war with Georgia “would
force a reassessment of U.S. democracy promotion policies and a recalculation in Washington
about how far to go in pushing NATO membership in Georgia and Ukraine.”49 Years later, as if
to reaffirm this point of contention Sergey Lavrov wrote that NATO’s choice to pursue
enlargement “is the essence of the systemic problems that have soured Russia’s relations with the
United States and the European Union.”50
Finally, in contrast to the expansion of Western liberalism, Russia maintains the
following core interests: First, the defense of the country and the regime. Second, maintaining
influence in the near abroad. Third, advancement of Russia’s vision of great power status.
Fourth, reinforce the concept of noninterference in domestic affairs. And fifth, continue political
and economic cooperation as a partner equal to other great powers.51 These foreign policy
themes and priorities are reflected within the Soviet Union’s and Russian Federation’s endorsed
state strategy, and align with one prominent International Relations theory, the theory of
Defensive Realism.
The following chapters of this document will seek to demonstrate why modern Russian
foreign policy strategies align with this specific International Relations theory, and in doing so
answer this thesis’ research question by comparing the periods of time being considered as
outlined within the introduction.
49 Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, (Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 309. 50 Lavrov, Sergey, “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background,” Russia In Global Affairs, March 3, 2016. 51 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 2-3.
22
CHAPTER TWO
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will introduce and define five International Relations theories stemming
from or related to the Realist school of thought. Building off the historical background provided
within chapter one, chapter two examines several core theories of foreign policy and establishes
a foundation from which chapters three and four will reference within their comparative
historical analysis framework. This approach will allow for a more complete comparison of the
periods of foreign policy considered in later chapters, and in doing so provide the necessary
information to support the central theme of this thesis, that based on all demonstrated evidence
the present foreign policy of Russia is in fact consistent with historical patterns of Russian
behavior.
As previously mentioned, this chapter will rely upon five prominent International
Relations theories whose origins are relative to the Realist school of thought. The theories being
considered are as follows: Classical Realism as described by Hans J. Morgenthau within Politics
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Structural and Defensive Realism as
described by Kenneth Waltz within Theory of International Politics, Offensive Realism as
described by John Mearsheimer within The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, and Neoliberal
International Relations Theory as described by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye within Power
and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.
Finally, while not included within the five previously mentioned International Relations
theories, this chapter will acknowledge Constructivism as an alternative theory to the Realist and
Neoliberal schools of thought.
23
International Relations Theories Defined.
Classical Realism:
Classical realism has been traditionally defined through Morgenthau’s six principles of
political realism, which has become more commonly referred to as ‘Classical realism.’
Morgenthau’s principles are as follows: 1. Politics, like society, are governed by objective laws
that our founded in human nature. 2. Interests are defined in terms of power, and as a result,
political actions are motivated by the accumulation of greater power. 3. Interests, and by
extension political actions are dependent upon the political and cultural context within which
their state’s foreign policy is formulated. 4. Classical realism is conscious of the moral
significance of political action. Therefore, universal moral principles cannot be applied to the
actions of states in isolation and should consider the circumstances influencing said actions. 5.
Classical realism does not endorse or identify with the moral aspirations of a particular state. In
other words, all states are tempted to mask their ambitions for greater power with moral
justifications.52
Morgenthau’s principles characterize state behavior as both fundamentally tied to human
nature and the accumulation of power. Therefore, as human nature is intrinsically flawed, so too
is the international system of order associated with states. As a result, the international system is
shaped by how states pursue their interests and compete with one another for greater power
within an imperfect world order.53
Structural Realism:
Structural realism was originally outlined by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, and has served as
the foundation for several other realist schools of thought. Structural realism, commonly referred
52 Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978), 3-12. 53 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5-12.
24
to as Neorealism, argues that the exchanges between states can be understood by first
considering how the anarchic nature of the international system influences each nation’s actions.
In other words, the lack of a central governing body overseeing the actions of states within the
international system promotes a chaotic and competitive geopolitical environment. Furthermore,
the absence of a singular authority within the international system exacerbates its anarchical
nature, preventing states from achieving a legitimate sense of security within the world order. In
response to the security concerns Waltz contends that it is the international system’s structure
which drives the pursuit of greater power, and the nature of each state’s pursuit is predicated
upon the balance of power, or lack thereof perceived by each state.54
Waltz’s balance of power concept aligns neatly with another important aspect of
structural realism, the inevitable emergence of great powers within the world order. Due to the
international systems anarchical and competitive nature, the accumulation of power by a state or
states over time would seemingly dictate that great powers would emerge. As a result, the
structure of the international system would become polarized in favor of the great power state’s
interests. Such a development would give rise to a unipolar system within which one state would
command overwhelming influence over smaller, weaker states. Similarly, the emergence of two
or more great power states simultaneously would create a bipolar or multipolar system within
which great powers would compete against one another. However, regardless of how many great
power states develop, the balance of power between states, their security concerns, and the
anarchical nature of the international system remain central to Neorealism’s core principles.55
54 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Long Grove, Illinois, Waveland Press Inc. 1979), 31-33, 41-
43, 110-116. 55 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 31-33, 41-43, 110-116.
25
Waltz’s theory would later serve as a singular reference point, or theoretical foundation from
which Defensive and Offensive realist schools of thought would emerge.
Defensive Realism:
Building upon his overarching theory of Structural realism, Kenneth Waltz refined his
interpretation of foreign policy behavior within his theory of Defensive realism. As a result, this
theory shares many principles with Structural realism and can be safely considered a subset of it.
Defensive realism endorses the importance of the international system’s structure when
considering how nations act relative to the distribution of power between states. However, where
Structural realism focuses upon understanding the impact the anarchical system may have upon
the international community, Defensive realism posits that rather than maximize power by any
means necessary, states first seek to maintain their security through defensive and otherwise
moderate foreign policies, thus protecting their current position and maintaining the ‘status quo,’
within the international system.56 Furthermore, Waltz contends that states are not inherently
aggressive, prioritizing the maintenance of their standing and power within the international
system above that of increasing it.
This approach to interpreting state behavior within the international system lends itself to
the belief that nations prioritize consistent security guarantees and international recognition
above aggressive power accumulation via military conflict. Furthermore, Defensive realists
argue that the benefits of conquest rarely outweigh the negatives associated with it, and that even
successful conquests or acquisitions of greater power will drive other states to seek new means
of balancing the international power structure. However, this does not mean that Defensive
realists reject that opportunities for state enlargement exist. Rather, Defensive realism suggests
56 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 19, 105-110, 126-127.
26
that while states are fundamentally opposed to military aggression, they may seek conflict in
order to maintain or preserve the ‘status quo’ within the international community.57
Offensive Realism:
In contrast to Kenneth Waltz’s Defensive realism, John Mearsheimer’s theory of
Offensive realism approaches the concept of power politics from an altogether different angle.
While Mearsheimer’s theory concerning Offensive realism shares many foundational
characteristics with Structural realism, it significantly diverges from this school of thought when
considering how states attempt to accumulate greater power. Rather than prioritizing moderate
political strategies designed to maintain the ‘status quo,’ Mearsheimer argues that the combative
structure of the international system promotes aggression and conflict between competing states,
and is especially common between, or by great power nations. At its core, Offensive realism is
concerned with five central principles. First, great powers are the most prominent actors in world
politics. Second, all states regardless of size maintain some form of offensive capability. Third,
other state’s intentions are never certain. Fourth, a state’s survival is its primary motivator. And
fifth, regardless of current strength, states are rational actors capable of implementing logical
strategies geared towards the accumulation of greater power within the international system.58
Mearsheimer’s theory emphasizes that state security cannot truly be guaranteed while
potential rival powers remain. As a result, states will seek to establish themselves as the global or
perhaps regional hegemonic power in order to solidify their claims of great power status. Unlike
Waltz’s assertion that states seek to maintain the ‘status quo,’ Offensive realism caters to the idea
57 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 105-110, 126-127. 58 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 4-8,
366, 420-421.
27
that “great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony
now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power.”59
Neoliberal International Relations Theory:
Finally, Neoliberal International Relations theory is described by Robert O. Keohane and
Joseph Nye as a necessary and logical response to the realist school of thought. While both
theories see the nation-state as the central protagonist to intra-state and global relationships,
Neoliberals contend that more productive foreign policy decisions can be made through a variety
of cooperative and mutually beneficial actions.60 According to Keohane and Nye, the potential
for proactive cooperation as opposed to competition enables what they call “complex
interdependence” to develop between states. This assertion opposes the realist belief that states
maintain constant competition against each other across all facets of power accumulation.
Additionally, Neoliberals focus upon the accumulation of absolute gains in power, rather
than relative gains compared to other states. In other words, Neoliberals believe that state actions
promoting the accumulation of power across multiple states (i.e. a win-win scenario), is possible
regardless of their formal international affiliation. This supposition by Neoliberals prompted the
introduction of game theory into the Neoliberal mechanism for understanding why states do, or
do not cooperate with one another.61
Finally, the prospect of “complex interdependence” offers that modern states are capable
of guaranteeing their individual survival through dependence upon nonorganic security
mechanisms such as multinational coalitions and alliances. This concept of interdependence is
not limited strictly to collective security agreements, and can extend beyond the traditional
59 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 35. 60 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (Boston, Little,
Brown and Company, 1989), 21-24. 61 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 148-155.
28
spheres of intra-state diplomacy, oftentimes including multinational corporations and
organizations. In short, Neoliberal thought attempts to explain complex international
relationships within an environment where security is not the primary motivator behind certain
actions, and where mutually beneficial actions can be accepted.62
Constructivism as an Alternative:
Constructivism attempts to demonstrate how core concepts within international relations
are “socially constructed,” and influenced by the constant evolution of social practices and
interactions between states. According to Alexander Wendt, Constructivism is founded upon two
basic principles, “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared
ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are
constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”63
This philosophy challenges the belief that the international system’s anarchical nature is
the primary reason for competition between states. While Realist and Neoliberal International
Relations theories place an emphasis upon how the lack of a centralized governing institution
drives individual state’s foreign policies, Constructivism argues that these theories “do not
predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other’s sovereignty, will
have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on.”64 Because these theories
do not recognize the influence of social identities upon power politics, Constructivism suggests
that these theories are lacking in predictive capabilities.65 From a Constructivist perspective, the
process of intra-state interaction can be explained by analyzing the common, or opposing ideas
62 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 19-31, 149-151. 63 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. 64 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” International
Organization, 1992, 396. 65 Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” 396–399.
29
and social principles endorsed by states. Such analysis has the potential to offer additional clarity
into why states act the way they do within the international system.
CONCLUSION
This chapter introduced several core theories of foreign policy relative to the Realist
school of thought, as well as presented several alternative theories challenging the Realist
approach. This overview of opposing theories will allow for a more complete comparison of
specific periods of Russian foreign policy within Chapter three, which will address the foreign
policy challenges faced by the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan from 1979 – 1989, the
Russian Federation’s goals prior to, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 –
1993, and modern Russia’s foreign policy goals in Syria from 2015 – present.
30
CHAPTER THREE
INTRODUCTION: Russian Foreign Policy relative to International Relations theories.
Chapter three introduces the three periods of Russian foreign policy being compared, and
provides an overview of the critical foreign policy challenges faced by the Russian state within
each period. Additionally, this chapter hypothesizes that the modern Russian state implements its
foreign policy within a defensive realist framework, a framework that is consistent with that of
the former Soviet Union. For ease of comparison, the period of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan
from 1979 – 1989 will be referred to as period one, the period leading up to, and immediately
following the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 – 1993 will be referred to as period two,
and the period containing Russian involvement within Syria from 2015 to the present will be
referred to as period three. Each of these periods highlight Russia’s grand foreign policy strategy
at the time, and can be viewed as prime examples of Russia’s overarching foreign policy
approach. Overall, this chapter seeks to outline the background information required to support
the central theme of this thesis, that based on all demonstrated evidence the present foreign
policy of Russia is in fact consistent with historical patterns of Russian behavior.
SECTION 1: An historical overview of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy goals in
Afghanistan from 1979 – 1989.
In order to accurately describe Soviet foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan a short
review of the conflict period is necessary. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) took control of the government in a military coup in April 1978.66 From the onset the
newly installed PDPA requested Soviet military support and aide to solidify its government.
66 Joseph Collins, Soviet Policy toward Afghanistan, (The Academy of Political Science, 1987), 198-199.
31
Initially, the Kremlin denied these requests. However, several internal and external events
impacting the Afghan situation towards the end of 1979 would eventually encourage the Soviet
Union to change its policies.67
First, the overall situation of the PDPA was quickly deteriorating. By the end of 1979, the
party had split into rival Khalai and Parcham factions, and the possibility of an anti-communist
and pro-Western government replacing the PDPA was becoming more and more likely.
Additionally, Soviet military advisors continued to report the growing security crisis in the
country, confirming that a legitimate threat to the PDPA regime existed.68 Concurrently, the
Shah of Iran was overthrown in January of 1979 and resistance against the Afghan PDPA regime
began to gain additional momentum. Instability across Iran prompted the Islamist government to
adopt a hostile attitude toward both the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, the
Kremlin feared a similar Islamic movement might topple the newly installed and pro-Soviet
Afghan government. Previously, the Soviets had coexisted with a pro-Western Iran, but the
prospect of losing Afghanistan was viewed as unacceptable by the Soviet leadership. Finally,
should Afghanistan be allowed to shift allegiances it could become yet another hostile country on
the Soviet Union’s southern border.69
The potential for the disintegration of the PDPA was viewed as a threat to Soviet security
objectives and access for a number of reasons. First, given the stark cultural differences between
the two states it was unlikely that a new, non-PDPA regime would ever be as friendly, or as
submissive to the Kremlin as was the current government in Afghanistan. While the PDPA was
67 Halliday, Fred, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding
Wound,’” Review of International Studies, 1999, 678. 68 Halliday, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding
Wound,’” 678. 69 Collins, Soviet Policy toward Afghanistan, 200.
32
classified as a 'socialist-oriented' party, it would have been better defined as an orthodox pro-
Soviet communist party. The ousting of such a Soviet leaning regime would represent a
significant blow to the standing of the Soviet bloc as a whole.70 Second, the loss of a proxy
within the Middle East would inevitably result in the loss of prestige and power within the
international community. Furthermore, a Soviet loss in Afghanistan would only compound the
international problems faced by the USSR. As a result of these negative factors the Soviet Union
chose to prop up the PDPA by sending a significant military force to the country in 1979,
seeking to stabilize the country and preserve its influence and power there.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan should not be described as anything more than a
stabilizing force for the PDPA. Joseph Collins, an avid spectator and reporter of events in
Afghanistan argued that the Soviets were not concerned with, “talk about protecting the
population; Soviet operations were all about protecting the regime and furthering Soviet
control.”71 Over the course of the next decade the Soviet military engaged a U.S. backed
insurgency with mixed results. While Soviet forces enjoyed moderate success within the
country’s urban areas, the undeveloped countryside proved highly problematic for the Soviet
Union’s conventional military forces. Scholar Louis Dupree labeled Soviet tactics as "migratory
genocide," which in some cases targeted whole communities and sought to depopulate the
countryside. These brutal tactics had a direct effect on how the Mujahideen, Pakistan, and
international community responded, and in many cases prevented future negotiations towards
deescalating violence across the country.72
70 Halliday, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding
Wound,’” 679. 71 Ryan Evans, “The war before the war: Soviet precedent in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, 2013, 5-6. 72 Evans, “The war before the war: Soviet precedent in Afghanistan,” 6.
33
The Soviet’s inability to pacify these regions of Afghanistan would be a key contributor
to their eventual decision to withdrawal from the country. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev
ascended to power in 1985 the situation in Afghanistan had worsened considerably. The belief
that the war in Afghanistan was a lost cause was gaining popularity both in the Politburo and in
the military, and the costs for remaining in Afghanistan were mounting.73 Gorbachev described
the war as a “bleeding wound,” even though the conflict was “…in our vital, national interest
that the USSR invariably have good and peaceful relations with all contiguous states. This is a
vitally important goal of our foreign policy.”74 Despite the deteriorating situation there
Gorbachev would seek to make concessions to the rebels in exchange for maintaining a favorable
regime in Afghanistan. Such a compromise would allow the Soviets to preserve the ‘status quo’
within the fractured region. In doing so, they would have the opportunity to cultivate other pro-
Soviet ties in the post-colonial era.75
Gorbachev’s attempts at compromising with the various rebel factions, as well as the
international community faced many challenges. First, many orthodox Soviet supporters within
the Kremlin resisted him and the timetable he proposed for withdrawing from Afghanistan.
Second, the US, Pakistan, and their rebel proxies had enjoyed significant success in the mid-
1980s. As a result, they believed that the removal of the current Kabul regime was well within
their current capabilities and were encouraged to delay any potential agreement. Finally, the
PDPA leadership also sought to delay Soviet concessions and withdrawal, as such an action
would certainly result in them losing power within the Afghan government.76
73 Evans, “The war before the war: Soviet precedent in Afghanistan,” 3. 74 Mikhail Gorbachev, “Excerpts from Gorbachev’s Speech to the Party,” The New York Times, February 26, 1986.
19-21. 75 Collins, Soviet Policy toward Afghanistan, 200. 76 Halliday, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding
Wound,’” 686.
34
Despite Gorbachev’s efforts at attaining political reform within the Afghan regime and
negotiating future concessions, his goal of preserving Soviet influence within Afghanistan would
eventually fail. In February of 1988 Gorbachev would formally announce a timetable for the
withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan, a process which would not be completed until
the following year.77
This period of Soviet interventionism and military support is reflective of its grand
foreign policy strategy at the time. Afghanistan was not the only state within the Middle East that
had become dependent upon the Soviet Union for military support. During this period, the states
of Libya, Syria, Algeria, Yemen, South Yemen, and to a lesser extent Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Jordan and Morocco all were connected to the Soviet Union through arms deals. As the United
States encroached upon Soviet influence within the region it also threatened the ‘status quo’ of
arms imports there.78 This grand strategy for the region encouraged dependence upon the Soviet
Union for military support, and favored the defense of pro-Soviet states against democratic
influence. These policies were imperative to the regime throughout the 1980s, and the Soviet
Union was determined to defend it.
This era of Soviet foreign policy can be understood by comparing it against Waltz’s
description of Defensive realism. The Kremlin’s fear of losing a proxy state along its southern
border was logical response for several reasons. First, an unstable Afghanistan represented a
legitimate security concern to the Soviet Union, as infighting there would likely bleed over into
the adjoining states. Second, the prospect of losing a proxy state due to Western influence would
damage the Soviet Union’s international standing and weaken its hold on other proxies within
77 Halliday, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding
Wound,’” 687-689. 78 Alexander Bennett, “Arms Transfer as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” Middle East
Journal, 1985. 745-752.
35
the Central Asian region. Viewed in this manner it becomes more apparent that the Soviet
military action within Afghanistan was less a conquest, and more of an intervention. Military
aggression of this type would comfortably align with the Defensive realist principles described
by Waltz, as such actions were meant to maintain the ‘status quo’ both in Afghanistan and within
the larger global community.
The Soviet Union’s defensive foreign policy throughout the 1980s would eventually give
way to more liberal policies within period two. This transition away from its historical approach
was prompted by Gorbachev’s decision to introduce elections and a multi-party system to the
Soviet Union. This move towards democratization would eventually weaken and destabilize the
Communist party’s control of the country. Additionally, Gorbachev’s decision would polarize
the Soviet Union, encouraging Boris Yeltsin’s democratic movement to align itself opposite the
hardline Communist elite. Gorbachev’s victory within the 1990 elections brought with it the
potential for dramatic economic and governmental reforms, something the Communist elite
refused to support. In response, a coup was planned against Gorbachev in August of 1991. While
the coup was unsuccessful it did diminish Gorbachev’s hold on power and propel Yeltsin to the
forefront of Soviet and Russian politics. Gorbachev’s weakness prompted him to resign from
power in December of 1991, placing Yeltsin into the presidency and breaking the Soviet Union
away from its traditional approach to foreign policy.79
79 Office of the Historian, “The Collapse of the Soviet Union,” United States of America Department of State, 1-2.
36
SECTION 2: An historical overview of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy goals prior
to, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 – 93.
The period of time directly leading up to, and immediately following the collapse and
disillusion of the Soviet Union in 1991 was characterized by a dramatic shift in Russia’s foreign
policy approach relative to the international community, and was driven by the drastic
differences between the USSR and the new Russian Federation. The Russian Federation’s
geographic boundaries were significantly different, what had been the western and southern
proxies of the Soviet Union before 1992 was now multiple independent countries. Countries that
had previously comprised a multinational empire of many nations assembled through conquest
and expansion.80 Where the Soviet Union was a multinational empire, with half its population
non-Russian the new Russian Federation was a nation-state inhabited by a majority of ethnic
Russians. In the new Russia, Marxism and Leninism had given way to the promotion of free
market democratic values and wide ranging military reductions.81 These policy revisions enabled
the new government to approach its foreign policy goals with a far greater openness toward
cooperation with the West. However, these drastic changes did not occur overnight and were the
result of significant leadership and social changes within the Soviet Union during the late 1980s
and early 1990s.
The events leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union can be characterized as
nothing short of imperial collapse that caught many Western and Soviet observers by surprise.
Prior to its catastrophic breakdown, the Soviet Union had demonstrated various indicators of
decline, but nothing the international community believed would result in revolution. The
standard of living within the Soviet Union was much lower than in Europe, but it still retained
80 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 4-5. 81 Michael Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998. 1-4.
37
access to vast resource reserves.82 Additionally, while growth of the country’s GDP had slowed
and its budget deficits had increased, the gap remained below 9 percent through 1989, a figure
many external spectators would consider manageable.83 Finally, while the sudden drop in oil
prices from 1980 to 1986 was certainly a heavy blow to the Kremlin’s finances, it never reached
the all-time lows of the 1970s.84 Clearly, the economic situation of the Soviet Union was not the
only contributor to its destruction and there must have been other factors present.
Coinciding with economic stagnation, the introduction of liberal reforms by Gorbachev in
the late 1980s extended beyond stimulating the economy and attempted to pacify the
international community mounting against the Soviet Union’s actions in Afghanistan and
Eurasia. In doing so, Gorbachev introduced reforms that were idealistic in nature and designed to
create a more moral Soviet Union supportive of Western principles.85 Gorbachev’s moral pivot
would also prevent the Soviet Union from employing violent repression tactics across its proxies,
a practice that had become commonplace in eastern Europe.86
The acceleration of imperial decline was also helped along the way by Gorbachev’s new
approach to managing Soviet satellite states. Gorbachev asserted that every country had the right
to choose its own international orientation and domestic political system, and essentially
abandoned the Soviet doctrine holding the empire together.87
After seventy years of Soviet rule the Kremlin’s key leadership chose to look inward and
institute change, change that would eventually result in the crumbling of the Soviet Union and
the creation of the Russian Federation in December of 1991. These new Russian democrats
82 Aron, Leon, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” Foreign
Policy, 2011, 1-3. 83 Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” 2-3. 84 Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” 3. 85 Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” 4. 86 Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” 5. 87 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 11.
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chose to adopt and pursue a philosophy inspired by the West, embracing free markets, self-
determination, and potential integration into Western institutions. Boris Yeltsin, who assumed
control of the new Russian state following Gorbachev’s resignation in December of 1991 formed
a government focused on implementing the ideals championed by these democrats. As a result,
the new Russian state adopted a foreign policy that was markedly more pro-Western than
anticipated. However, these amendments carried a clear anti-Soviet flavor, and oftentimes had
little to do with improving or developing Russia’s national interests abroad. Rather, Yeltsin’s
early efforts prioritized dismantling the old Soviet system instead of serving the many needs of
the country’s new electorate.88
As Yeltsin’s new government stabilized in the years following the collapse of the Soviet
Union it would eventually turn outward, seeking to join any and all European or Euro-Atlantic
international institutions willing to accept it. This effort caught many groups by surprise, and
while NATO and the European Union did not accept Russia’s full membership, they would
eventually compromise by offering Russia institutional partnerships. However, while these
arrangements promised an unprecedented level of inclusion, they did not provide the
involvement and decision-making power the new Russian government coveted. From the
Kremlin’s perspective, Russia was being granted admittance into the second-tier bodies of these
organizations and denied the power and prestige the former Soviet Union had commanded.89
The end of the arms race between the USSR and the United States also opened the doors
for potential integration into the Western international community.90 Furthermore, as Russia
began to implement new policies to align with the West between 1987 and 1993 it faced
88 McFaul, Michael, “What Are Russian Foreign Policy Objectives?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
May 1, 1999, 2. 89 Trenin, Dmitri, “Russia’s Post-Soviet Journey: From Europe to Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs, December 25, 2016, 2. 90 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 14.
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challenges common to other Western democracies, namely, terrorism, religious fundamentalism,
and nuclear proliferation.91 These challenges were compounded by economic crisis, social
disorder, and political confusion, all of which inhibited the Gorbachev-Yeltsin policy of
cooperation with, and integration into the West. While these difficulties certainly originated from
the state’s communist legacy, many Russians blamed them on the West.92
The Gorbachev-Yeltsin foreign policy fell victim, as well, to the circumstances across
Russia's new borders. As former Soviet satellite states achieved newfound independence many
encountered periods of instability and conflict. Wars erupted in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
and Russia was drawn into several of them in an attempt to retain its influence there. Perhaps
most disastrously was the Yeltsin government’s military campaign against rebels seeking
independence for Chechnya, which would create significant negative attention from the
international community against the new Russian state. Additionally, the Russian interventions
in Georgia, Armenia, and in Tajikistan all contradicted the spirit of the new foreign policy.93 As
a result of these distractions, five years after the end of the Soviet Union cooperation and
integration into the West ceased to be the unchallenged centerpiece of Russian foreign policy.94
Within this period the new Russian Federation turned away from direct confrontation
with the West in favor or establishing cooperative and mutually beneficial agreements within its
historical sphere of influence as well as within the larger international community. This foreign
policy approach diverges from the principles of Defensive realism in favor of those championed
by Neoliberals. The establishment of “complex interdependence” with the West was viewed as
the mechanism by which the Russian Federation could integrate across Europe and beyond.
91 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 15. 92 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 16. 93 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 17-18. 94 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 20.
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Furthermore, such actions would drastically alter the ‘status quo’ as Russia severely reduced its
military footprint and restructured its economic system. Lastly, the new government’s openness
to seeking entry into additional Western international institutions beyond the UN had the
potential to incorporate Russia into various economic, social, and collective security
organizations supported by the West. This undertaking required the Kremlin to make significant
military and territorial sacrifices, and for a brief period abandon some, but not all of its
international power in order to redefine itself as a country.
Yeltsin’s grand strategy of liberal-democratic reform would not play out as he originally
intended. The country’s economic decline coupled with his massive reformation program would
progressively place him more and more at odds with the legislature, its speaker Ruslan
Khasbulatov, and his own vice president, Aleksandr Rutskoi.95 Facing significant opposition
throughout the summer of 1993, Yeltsin would eventually dissolve the legislature in September
and set elections for a new parliament in December. This action would result in significant
clashes between civilian protestors, police, and even legislators who had barricaded themselves
within the Moscow White House. Yeltsin broke the insurrection with military force, ordering
Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to occupy the White House with troops. Within three months
following these clashes a new constitution was approved through a national referendum, granting
the presidency and Yeltsin enormous powers that remain to this day. Yeltsin’s actions solidified
the government but also ushered in opportunities for widespread corruption to occur, corruption
that would pull Russia away from truly integrating into the West. Finally, the power consolidated
by Yeltsin during the chaos of 1993 was transferred to Vladimir Putin in 1999 following
95 Mikhail Sokolov and Anastasia Kirilenko, “20 Years Ago, Russia Had Its Biggest Political Crisis Since the
Bolshevik Revolution,” The Atlantic, 2013. 1-3.
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Yeltsin’s surprising resignation. Putin has since turned Russia away from Yeltsin’s policies in
favor of a more authoritarian construct.96
SECTION 3: An historical overview of modern Russia’s foreign policy goals in Syria from
2015 – Present.
Russia announced its entrance into the Syrian conflict with airstrikes int