Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy, A New Approach or More of the Same: A

Comparative Historical Analysis

Patrick J. Riebsame

Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State

University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

In

Political Science

Thesis Committee:

Aaron Brantly (Chair)

Priya Dixit

Besnik Pula

May 6, 2020

Virginia Beach, Virginia

Keywords: Russia’s Modern Foreign Policy

Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy, A New Approach or More of the Same: A Comparative

Historical Analysis

Patrick J. Riebsame

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Russia’s foreign policy within a comparative historical framework

and theorizes that Russian foreign policy while briefly deviating from its historical pattern

following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has realigned its current trajectories with its more

traditional foreign policy strategies. This correction is largely consistent with Soviet notions of

great power status and is rooted in a desire to secure its own national interests and achieve

geopolitical objectives.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. For context, chapter one provides an historical

overview of the traditional challenges faced by the Russian state, many of which remain today.

Chapter two examines several core theories of foreign policy, providing a theoretical foundation

from which the following chapters will routinely reference. Chapter three offers an historical

synopsis of three discrete periods of Russian foreign policy and hypothesizes that the modern

Russian state implements its foreign policy within a Defensive realist framework consistent with

that of the former Soviet Union. Chapter four demonstrates how periods one and three are similar

and fit within a consistent theoretical framework while concurrently demonstrating that period

two was a temporal anomaly in the Russian approach to foreign policy. Chapter five addresses

the implications associated with the continuation of Defensive realist foreign policy actions

conducted by the Russian state. Finally, chapter six revisits the central theme of the work and

contends that based on all demonstrated evidence the foreign policy of Russia today is in fact

consistent with its historical patterns of behavior.

Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy, A New Approach or More of the Same: A

Comparative Historical Analysis

Patrick J. Riebsame

GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Russia's foreign policy across three distinct periods of time and

theorizes that Russian foreign policy while briefly deviating from its historical pattern following

the collapse of the Soviet Union, has realigned its current trajectories with its more traditional

foreign policy strategies. This correction is largely consistent with Soviet notions of great power

status and is rooted in a desire to secure its own national interests and achieve geopolitical

objectives.

This thesis compares the Soviet Union's foreign policy strategy throughout its

intervention in Afghanistan from 1979 - 1989, the Russian Federation's objectives prior to, and

immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 - 1993, and modern Russia's

objectives in Syria from 2015 to the present. Russia's modern foreign policy shares many

parallels with that of the former Soviet Union and should be considered a return to, rather than a

divergence from its traditional approach to international relations. The main goal of this thesis is

to determine, "What is Russia's modern Foreign Policy strategy and how has it changed over

time?" This thesis compares each period by focusing primarily on the Russian state's actions and

its leaders' perceptions regarding threats to their regional and global objectives throughout each

period.

IV

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Aaron Brantly, Dr. Scott Nelson, Dr.

Priya Dixit, and Dr. Besnik Pula for guiding my work on “Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy, A

New Approach or More of the Same: A Comparative Historical Analysis.” Their insights

provided unique clarity to a complicated topic and centered the direction and purpose of my

work from start to finish. Finally, I would like to express my whole-hearted thanks to my

parents, Pete and Susan Riebsame, whose support and encouragement has been invaluable along

the way. Any errors or inaccuracies contained within this document remain my individual

responsibilities.

V

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One

Introduction: 1

Section 1: Historical Background.

Chapter Two

International Relations Theories Defined: 22

Chapter Three

Introduction: Russian Foreign Policy relative to International Relations theories. 30

Section 1: An historical overview of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy goals in Afghanistan from 1979 –

1989.

Section 2: An historical overview of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy goals prior to, and following

the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 – 93.

Section 3: An historical overview of modern Russia’s foreign policy goals in Syria from 2015 – Present.

Chapter Four

Introduction: Comparative Historical Analysis of the following foreign policy periods 49

Section 1: The Soviet Union’s Foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan from 1979 – 89.

Section 2: Russian Foreign policy objectives prior to, and immediately following the collapse of the Soviet

Union from 1989 – 93.

Section 3: Modern Russian Foreign policy objectives in Syria from 2015 – Present. The return of Russia’s

traditional foreign policy approach.

Conclusions:

Chapter Five

Russian Foreign Policy Implications Going Forward: 67

Chapter Six

Conclusions: 77

Abbreviations 85

Figures 86

Bibliography 89

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The unique confrontation between Russia and the West has renewed public interest into

the foreign policy goals and objectives of the Russian Federation. Following the collapse of the

Soviet Union, the West redirected its attention towards threats arising within the Middle East,

North Africa, and Far East, leaving Russia to struggle in relative isolation, all the while seeking

to maintain influence throughout its historical areas of interest. Recent events in Syria have once

again called significant attention to Russia’s current relationship with the West. Russia’s

resurgent influence within the Middle East has also raised questions regarding Russia’s current

and future strategies relative to the global community, and how Russia intends to pursue these

new objectives in modern times.

For over a quarter century following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the

Soviet Union, the military and power balance between the West and Russia has become

increasingly lopsided as the United States and her allies became progressively entrenched within

the Middle East. While Russia’s global influence was crippled throughout much of the early

1990s, it remained assertive within its remaining spheres of influence, namely throughout the

many newly independent former Soviet states in Eurasia and Central Asia. The void left behind

by the former Soviet Union enabled the West, to be more specific NATO, to quickly assert itself

as the dominant collective security power within Europe. NATO’s collective security assurances

and renewed interest in expansion quickly brought many former Soviet satellite states into the

fold and disregarded the impact such an expansion may have upon Russia’s increasingly insecure

2

national mindset.1 The Kremlin’s weakened state and lack of concrete leverage prevented it from

pursuing any real actions beyond lodging formal protests across international institutions such as

the United Nations. As a result, Russia turned its attention towards the development and

cultivation of regional objectives while temporarily suspending the importance of its global

ambitions. Economic reforms spurred by higher energy prices have enabled Russia’s recent

resurgence in military capabilities, aggressive maneuvering, and foreign influence.2

Consequently, this resurgence has intensified Western concern for not only its eastern bloc

NATO allies, but for all of Europe.

This competition postured by Russia is designed to secure itself from perceived threats

from the West, and in particular the United States. From the Kremlin’s perspective Russia as a

whole is threatened, and its actions are in defense of the current regime as well as the states

which Russia has historically maintained a significant amount of control and influence over. In

response to this perceived threat Russia has sought to reestablish itself as a great power in the

eyes of the global community, and in doing so solidify the internal stability of its government.

This effort has focused upon securing its national borders from Western influence, to include the

borders of states that the Kremlin believes fall within its periphery. Russia’s influence over these

states reinforces its belief that as a great power it has the inherent right to act in the defense of its

priorities there, claiming that their sovereignty is less absolute than its own. From the West’s

perspective, these actions by the Russian Federation can appear as both aggressive and offensive

in nature. However, these actions cannot be truly understood without first comparing Russia’s

1 Bryan Frederick, Matthew Povlock, Stephen Watts, Miranda Priebe, and Edward Geist, Assessing Russian

Reactions to U.S. and NATO Posture Enhancements, (Santa Monica, California, RAND Corporation, 2017), 1-3, 53-

59. 2 Paul Stronski and Richard Sokolsky, The Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework, (Washington, DC,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 25-29.

3

foreign policy behavior across several isolated periods of time. Therefore, this paper seeks to

answer the following research question:

“What is Russia’s modern Foreign Policy strategy and how has it changed over

time?”

This paper hypothesizes that Russia’ ultimate goal is to reset the current world order in

favor of a bi-polar, or even tri-polar system. To achieve this goal, it also hypothesizes that Russia

implements its current foreign policy within a defensive realist framework. Finally, Russia’s

narrative reinforces these key goals in nearly all of its actions across all manner of international

and regional forums and has grown to define the core interests of its foreign policy concepts

since the collapse of the Soviet Union.3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military and

power balance between the West and the Russian Federation drastically shifted in favor of the

United States and her allies. As a partial result, the U.S. led an effort to expand NATO’s

membership and welcomed much of the greater Euro-Atlantic region under its umbrella.

Additionally, U.S. involvement within the Middle East further shifted influence and access there

away from Russia. Meanwhile, Russian security concerns were widely overlooked by the United

States and her allies, except as a possible source of instability should the Russian Federation

further decline.4

Contemporary Russian foreign policy is reflective of its past experiences, driving

Moscow’s actions and goals on the world stage. Principle among its philosophy is the pursuit of

3 David A. Shlapak, The Russian Challenge, (London, Chatham House Report, 2018), vii-viii. 4 Keir Giles, The Turning Point for Russian Foreign Policy, (Army War College, 2017), 4.

4

strategic depth, an expansionist perspective derived from the inherent need to place vast swaths

of territory between it and its perceived threats, regardless of their legitimacy. In considering

Russia’s historical geographic territories, such a philosophy is not wholly unrealistic, as it does

not truly possess any significant geographic obstacles preventing a foreign incursion onto

sovereign Russian territory. Throughout its history, modern Russia, the Soviet Union, Imperial

Russia, and the principality of Muscovy have all faced the challenge of securing territory as a

means of distancing itself from hostile actors to the west, south, and east.5 The continued

presence of such baseline insecurities has prompted Russia’s dogged pursuit of recognition as a

great power. From its perspective, the only true deterrent against foreign intervention is its

internationally recognized status as a great power, as this status would legitimize its territorial

conquests and reinforce its geopolitical ambitions. Both of these pursuits have fueled and

agitated Russia’s complicated relationship with the West, and routinely placed it opposite the

United States.6

It is important to remember that the current Russian state is less than three decades old,

but logically maintains a centuries old memory comprised of significant victories, as well as

significant defeats. From the perspective of the modern Russian administration and citizenship,

the current state is the heir to a long, illustrious tradition of great power status, a belief that its

current government does not fail to take advantage of. In their eyes, the ambitions of the Russian

state are legitimate pursuits, reinforced by valid conquests.7 Historian Stephen Kotkin once

noted that “Whatever the original causes behind early Russian expansionism—much of which

was unplanned—many in the country’s political class came to believe over time that only further

5 Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, (Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 2019), 4. 6 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 3. 7 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 4.

5

expansion could secure the earlier acquisitions. Russian security has thus traditionally been party

predicated on moving outward, in the name of preempting external attack.”8

Russia’s uncertain and oftentimes combative relationship with the West has been central

to its foreign policy narrative for centuries. Peter the Great’s founding of the New Russian

Capital of St. Petersburg on the Baltic Shores, Catherine the Great’s engagement with early

enlightenment European thinkers, Czar Alexander I’s efforts to place Russia within a tight circle

of European powers, and Joseph Stalin’s consolidation of territory away from Europe has

constantly linked Russian desires to Europe across its history.9 Counter to this historical trend,

Russia’s own elites and political thinkers have continuously questioned the Russo - European

relationship. More recently, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov argued that while over the

centuries Russia has seen itself as a part of Europe, it has also seen itself as better than the West,

and as the link between the East and West. Furthermore, Lavrov argued that the central problem

inherent to Russia’s relationship with the West is that it (the West) is unwilling to simply allow

Russia to be Russia and continues to insist that Russia conform to Western liberal values,

something that no Russian leader or citizen would ever willingly accept. Finally, and perhaps

most importantly, Russia’s greatest setbacks have come at the hands of the West, and the lessons

learned from those setbacks have evolved to define the Kremlin’s perspective regarding its

security and defense policies.10

Russia’s loss of territory following the 1917 revolution and the 1918 Brest-Litovsk

Treaty, as well as following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 resulted in a significant

sense of state insecurity, as it had lost all strategic depth between itself and its perceived

8 Stephen Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics,” Foreign Affairs, 95, no. 3 (May/June 2016). 9 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 9. 10 Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics,”

6

competitors. In March of 1918, the newly installed Bolshevik government of Russia signed the

aforementioned Brest-Litovsk Treaty, which enabled it to leave World War I, but required it to

make significant territorial concessions (most of present day Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic

States, Finland, and parts of Turkey) to the Central Powers. As the Bolsheviks retreated from the

war their political, military, and economic capabilities collapsed, prompting Armenia,

Azerbaijan, and Georgia to all declare independence. This independence was short lived

however, as most of these states were reclaimed by the Soviet Union within a decade.11

Similar to the concessions made by the Russian Empire following 1918, when the Soviet

Union dissolved in 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, the South Caucasus, and

parts of Central Asia all withdrew from it. This time however, a decade later Russia had not

regained much of its previous territory and has struggled to reestablish control and influence over

its neighbors.12

11 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 16. 12 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 16.

7

Figure 1.1

Map 1: Russia in Europe in 1914.13

13 “Central Europe 1914,” The Map Archive, https://www.themaparchive.com/central-europe-1914.html.

8

Figure 1.2

Map 2: Russia in Europe According to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (March 1918).14

14 “Treaty of Brest-Litovsk,” The Map Archive, https://www.themaparchive.com/treaty-of-brest-litovsk-3-march-

1918.html.

9

Figure 1.3

Map 3: Russian Federation in 1991.15

15 “USSR to Russian Federation 1991,” The Map Archive, https://www.themaparchive.com/ussr-to-russian-

federation.html.

10

Regaining the territorial depth and influence lost in 1918 and 1991 became a top priority

for both the early Soviet government as well as for the new Russian state following the Soviet

Union’s collapse.16 Russia’s historical quest for great power status has mirrored its pursuit of a

territorial buffer, and, because Russia has had to repeatedly regain lost territory and status over

the course of its history, any suggestions that Russia no longer belongs amongst the world’s great

powers is a topic Russia is particularly sensitive to.17

In the mid-nineteenth century, Russian historian Nikolay Danilevsky argued that Russia

has been routinely mistreated by Europe, which had disregarded Prussia’s aggression against

Denmark and its subsequent annexation of two Danish provinces. This reaction by Europe was

contradictory to Russia’s similar defense of its interests in Turkey, which Europe quickly

denounced as illegitimate. President Putin has publicly maintained that such a bias still exists,

and has further lamented Europe’s double standards when addressing the West’s condemnation

of the Russian annexation of Crimea, while the severing of Kosovo from Serbia was widely

accepted by European powers.18

Long before the accusations against Russia for the use of “little great men” in Ukraine,

such tactics were a doctrinal part of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy approach. Soviet military

engagement, executed through the use of proxies in varying levels of armed conflict has been

commonplace. Russian military personnel under overt and covert aliases participated in the

1936-1939 Spanish Civil War as well as in Cuba during in the Angola crisis in 1974-1975.19

Soviet personnel have also been deployed across crisis zones in parts of Asia and the Middle

East during the Cold War, in particular to Afghanistan from 1979 – 1989, and Soviet pilots even

16 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 4. 17 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 7. 18 Vladimir Putin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” President of Russia, March 18, 2014. 19 “The Angola Crisis 1974-1975,” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian.

11

flew missions during the Korean War from August to November of 1950, and in Yemen during

the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, during the 1962 conflict between Indonesia and the

Netherlands, Soviet assistance was provided by then leader Nikita Khrushchev in the form of

submarines, naval vessels, and even jets to fight in support of Indonesia.20 Finally, in 1970, the

Kremlin provided jets and air defense assets to Egypt in an attempt to rebalance Israeli air

superiority.21 These actions set a precedent for current Russian activities today in Syria as Russia

attempts to regain its former influence, access, and power.

Russia’s modern policy toward the West has evolved into an ideological impasse,

exacerbating a competition between fundamentally opposite world views. During the Soviet Era

the competition was between Communism and Capitalism, and, while there was a relatively brief

period when Russia attempted to join the West in the early 1990s, that failure has led Russia to

embrace a wholeheartedly anti-Western philosophy. As communism fell it was replaced by an

oddly complementary mix of nationalist, authoritarian, and state capitalist approaches as a means

of replacing, and providing a viable alternative to the West’s liberal democratic capitalism. This

combination of state and cultural doctrines, reinforced by the perceived threat of an expanding

West, has fed the notion that Russia is being encircled by a hostile Western ideology.22 George

Kennan wrote in “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”:

“. . . the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in

a hurry . . . and it can afford to be patient. These precepts are fortified by the

lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces

20 “The Soviet Bloc Armed Forces and the Cuban Crisis,” National Indications Center, June 18, 1963. 21 “The USSR and the Egyptian-Israeli Confrontation,” Central Intelligence Agency, May 14, 1970. 22 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 9.

12

over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection,

flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities . . .

Its [the Soviet Union’s] political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly,

wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. . . . The main thing is that

there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired

goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be

reached at any given time.”23

As this thesis will argue, the Russian foreign policy approach under the tenure of

Vladimir Putin fits Mr. Kennan’s caricature of former Soviet strategies during their occupation

of Afghanistan nearly forty years ago. Russia’s modern approach has been defined by a mixture

of efficient, low-cost, low-risk, endeavors aided by the limited use of military force and political

capital to increase its national power.24 Again, while the West may confuse these actions as

offensive in nature, the source of its political philosophy can be found within Russia’s historical

need to defend itself by accumulating power and influence. Furthermore, while this approach has

been influenced by modern technological advancements, it remains consistent with the basis of

historical Russian foreign policies.

Dr. Dmitri Vitalyevich Trenin, the current director of the Carnegie Moscow Center,

summarized the shifting Russian political perspective in 2006, stating that “”Until recently,

Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western solar system, very far from the center but still

fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia’s leaders have given up on

becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system.”25

23 George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 25, no. 4, July 1947. 24 Gurganus and Rummer, Russia’s Global Ambitions in Perspective, 10. 25 Trenin, Dmitri, “Russia Leaves the West,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 85, no. 4, July/August 2006.

13

While there were moments of cooperation with the United States following 1991, the

relationship slowly took on a negative curve, prompting Russia to pursue alternative institutions

in order to develop a counter-weight to what it claimed was a threatening U.S. led unipolar world

order.26 In addition to consistently calling attention to its status as a great power, Russian elites

have routinely called for revision to the established world order and the elimination of what it

sees as a unipolar leadership construct. This advocacy for a multipolar international community

would certainly include Russia, and potentially China, as the opposite check upon the current

system dominated by the United States.

In 2008 then President Dmitry Medvedev included the multipolar construct as one of his

five key principles of Russian foreign policy, stating that “The world should be multipolar.

Unipolarity is unacceptable; domination is impermissible. We cannot accept a world order in

which all decisions are taken by one country, even such a serious and authoritative country as the

United States of America.”27 Russia’s history as a great power has certainly impacted this

perception of the U.S led world order, and even though its capacity to impact the greater world

community diminished significantly following 1991, it did not consider its privileges as a great

power to have been reduced in any way.

From its viewpoint, Russia’s great power status implies particular privileges within its

geographic proximity, enabling it to interject or interfere in neighboring conflicts, or influence

the decision making of a state, or group of states within its sphere of influence. Additionally, the

exclusivity of these privileges allow it to cooperate with other great powers on equal footing due

to its independence and greater level of sovereignty relative to its neighboring states. As if to

26 Andrew Radin and Clint Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, (Santa Monica, California, RAND

Corporation, 2017), 27. 27 Paul Reynolds, “New Russian World Order: The Five Principles,” BBC News, September 1, 2008.

14

reinforce this point, President Medvedev also argued that “Russia, just like other countries in the

world, has regions where it has its privileged interests. In these regions, there are countries with

which we have traditionally had friendly and cordial relations, historically special relations.”28

Russian support for specific international institutions goes hand-in-hand with its own

perceived privileges, but withholds support from international institutions or multilateral

agreements that do not provide it the recognition it has historically enjoyed. Much of this opinion

is derived from the power it is granted (i.e. Veto power or permanent membership) by said

institution or multilateral agreement. The United Nations (UN) is a perfect example of such an

institution, where Russia enjoys permanent membership and veto power on the Security Council.

Furthermore, Russia also favors organizations that enable it to prevent or delegitimize

interference in what it believes are its domestic affairs, even if those interests lie outside of

Russia’s internationally recognized territorial boundaries.29

Russia also sees the UN as a mechanism of order that can be beneficial to its foreign

policy objectives. The UN’s rules and organizational structure play to Russia’s benefit where

other institutions do not. Additionally, and at times more critical than UN regulations, is the fact

the Russia maintains the same level of prestige at the UN as does the United States. This equal

footing with Russia’s most prominent rival in the West provides it with a platform from which to

freely discuss, and proactively influence its national and strategic objectives.30

From the U.S. perspective, traditional characteristics of sovereignty, self-determination,

democracy, and human rights all align. Together, they enable a country to select which

international institutions to pursue acceptance into, and the freedom to act upon that decision

28 Reynolds, “New Russian World Order: The Five Principles.” 29 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 36. 30 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 31.

15

without interruption by a foreign power. Furthermore, the U.S. has traditionally viewed the

interference in another state’s sovereign territory as justified if that state has failed to provide for

the minimum standards of protecting its citizen’s wellbeing. Russia supports an altogether

different interpretation of the United States’ exportation of sovereignty, democracy, and human

rights.31 According to Russia, the United States has used this philosophy as a general cover for

expanding its sphere of influence and indoctrinating states into its unilateral system of foreign

domination. Additionally, as previously mentioned Russia sees itself as more sovereign than

other countries, particularly its neighboring states. Due to this proximity, Russia feels that it has

the right to protect its interests within ‘less sovereign’ states, preventing them from freely

pursuing their own foreign policy goals.32 This perspective has put Russia in conflict with the

United States’ ideals and objectives, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

Drawing from Russia’s imperial conquests in the 16th through 19th centuries as well as

during the era of the Soviet Union, Russia has developed an identity which includes the ‘Little

Russians’ (Ukrainians), the ‘White Russians’ (Byelorussians), and the ‘Great Russians’ (ethnic

Russians). Additionally, due to their shared language Russia’s identity is also connected to many

of the post-Soviet states and regions of Central Asia. Russia’s responsibility to this diverse group

of states and peoples is communicated through what Russia calls the Russkiy Mir, or Russian

world, meaning support for Russia’s “compatriots.”33 This Russian identity applies to a

significant amount of territory across two continents, which directly contributes to its sense of

historical insecurity. Stephen Kotkin, a professor of history and international affairs at Princeton

University observed, “Russia has felt perennially vulnerable and has often displayed a kind of

31 National Security Strategy, (The White House, Washington, 2015), 19-21. 32 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 31. 33 Igor Zevelev, NATO’s Enlargement and Russian Perceptions of Eurasian Political Frontiers, (George Marshall

European Center for Security Studies, Germany, undated), 17.

16

defensive aggressiveness…Today, too, smaller countries on Russia’s borders are viewed less as

potential friends than as potential beachheads for enemies.”34

This far-reaching concept of vulnerability does not wholly originate from outside of

Russia, the threat from within is widely understood by the current administration as well.

Russia’s swift leadership changes have not always been peaceful matters, and the prospect of

regime change from within is not lost on Putin or his inner circle. Gleb Pavlovsky, a former

advisor to Putin, observed that “In the Kremlin establishment, ever since Yeltsin’s 1993 attack

on the Parliament, there has been an absolute conviction that as soon as the power centre shifts,

or if there is mass pressure, or the appearance of a popular leader, then everybody will be

annihilated. It’s a feeling of great vulnerability.”35 Therefore, the United States’ propensity for

seeking regime change in unstable states is certainly perceived as a threat across the Russian

leadership establishment.

To this end, the collapse of the Soviet Union has been misinterpreted by the West, unlike

the defeat of Nazi Germany, Russia would not emerge as a completely different society open to a

transition towards Western liberalism. Rather, while Russia did initially transition away from the

authoritarian governments of Leninism and adopt some liberal economic practices and

institutions, it did not escape the transition away from a top-heavy oligarchy capable of

monopolizing specific aspects of the country’s economy and government.36 This transition has

been largely guided by ex-Chekist Vladimir Putin, who in turn has sought to combine political,

economic, informational, and irregular warfare techniques, backed by conventional military

operations and a nuclear arsenal to challenge the West. In doing so, Putin has steered Russia

34 Kotkin, “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics.” 35 Gleb Pavlovsky, “Putin’s World Outlook,” New Left Review, Vol. 88, July/August 2014, p. 62. 36 Shlapak, The Russia Challenge, 1-5.

17

back into contention as a great power through a largely opportunistic yet defensive approach to

foreign policy.37

As a substitute to NATO, Russia has pursued the development of regional security

arrangements within its perceived spheres of influence. In November 1990, twenty-two NATO

and Warsaw Pact countries signed the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) in Paris.

That same day, those same nations and their neutral neighbors adopted the Charter of Paris at the

second security summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) further linking

security to democratic principles.38 Russia encouraged the elevation of the CSCE, with the goal

of developing a Eurasian-European institution that could enhance cooperation with the West,

while keeping Russia’s interests and influence intact throughout the region.39 At the time, the

CSCE was one of the few surviving institutions of the Soviet Union. Created in 1970s during

negotiations between the Eastern and Western Blocs, the CSCE was born out of the 1975

Helsinki Final Act, which established shared principles, specifically tying hard security with

human rights, as well as reinforced territorial integrity concepts. The CSCE would later be

renamed as the Organization on Security and Cooperation (OSCE), which simply replaced

“Conference” with “Organization.” Russia’s preference for the OSCE over NATO lies with its

veto power within the organization, which has granted it significant weight in the decision

making and direction the organization has taken in Russia’s near abroad.40 However, this veto

power is one of the larger reasons why the continuation of the OSCE was largely unsuccessful in

encouraging the United States’ participation.

37 Shlapak, The Russia Challenge, 1-5. 38 Philip Remler, “Russia and Cooperative Security in Europe: Times Change, Tactics Remain,” Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, August 1, 2019. 39 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 45. 40 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 47.

18

In the early 1990s, the security functions of the CSCE and later the OSCE provided

enough value for Russia to rationalize its membership, as it dealt with several small wars by

secessionist groups in Karabakh (Azerbaijan), South Ossettia and Abkhazia (Georgia),

Transdniestria (Moldova), and Chechnya. With the exception of Chechnya these were not

conflicts for independence. Rather, they sought to reshape the territorial boundaries drawn by the

Soviet Union for them. Karabakh sought to be absorbed into Armenia, and Abkhazia, South

Ossetia, and Transdniestria desired reintegration back into the Soviet, and later Russian state.41

Russia took a back seat to the OSCE in moderating the resolutions for all of these conflicts

except Chechnya, which it actively fought and opposed. Over time, and as resolutions were

delayed, Russia developed a generic playbook to manage these protracted conflicts. First, it

sought to ensure that each conflict did not evolve into a hot war against Russian desires. Second,

Russia would continue to support secessionists while playing a mediation role in the settlement

process, guaranteeing that Russian interests were central to the agreed upon terms. And finally,

no settlement, whether comprehensive or interim could undermine the interests of the Russian

state.42 In its most basic form, this Russia playbook used the OSCE as a mediator between

Russian interests with the West, guaranteeing that ‘frozen’ conflicts remain frozen without

Russian approval on the global stage. However, Russian interests within the Helinski Act and

later the OSCE were primarily driven by arms control and hard security. As Russia’s concerns

over those issues diminished over time so did its principle reasons for remaining attached to the

goals of both agreements. Additionally, specific security language within the OSCE charter

restricts member states from strengthening their security at the expense of other states, language

that Russia has used to rationalize its actions in Georgia in 2008 against NATO encroachment,

41 Remler, “Russia and Cooperative Security in Europe: Times Change, Tactics Remain,” 9. 42 Remler, “Russia and Cooperative Security in Europe: Times Change, Tactics Remain,” 10-12.

19

and later in Ukraine in 2014 to prevent EU expansion.43 Much of the West disagrees with this

Russian interpretation of the OSCE’s purpose, and its role in managing security conflicts within

the region.

NATO and EU enlargement represents one of the largest points of contention between

the United States and Russia. The U.S. has routinely argued that NATO’s enlargement is not

intended to threaten Russia and has no designs to challenge Russia’s internationally recognized

sovereign territory. However, Russia continues to cite NATO enlargement as the primary reason

for its diminishing influence within it’s near abroad, and among the former Soviet states.

Regardless of the language the United States and NATO use to quell Russian suspicions, it is

unlikely that Russia’s current administration will divorce itself their suspicions towards the

West.44

Partly in response to NATO, Russia has pursued the development of security institutions

in its own neighborhood, namely, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the

Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The CIS, which contains all of the former

Soviet States except for the Baltic countries was originally intended to manage the transition

away from the former Soviet Union. However, the CIS’s capabilities are relatively limited, and

Russia has focused much greater effort on developing the CSTO, which was intended to mirror

NATO’s collective security guarantees for Eurasian and Central Asian states aligned with

Russia. In theory, the CSTO would serve as a defensive counterweight to NATO and to Western

desires of expansion. Currently, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and

43 Remler, “Russia and Cooperative Security in Europe: Times Change, Tactics Remain,” 13-19. 44 Hugh Bayley, Why NATO Matters: A parliamentary case for strengthening the transatlantic pillars of the

Alliance, (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels, 2014), 33-35.

20

Tajikistan are the only participating members within the CSTO. As a result, the CSTO has never

gained the traction, or participation necessary to truly rival NATO.45

While the CSTO and CIS formally recognize the independence and equality of their

associate states, Russia commands significant informal sway over these countries, partly through

its looming threats to cause instability in member states if they do not strictly follow Russia’s

lead.46 From Russia’s perspective, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), CSTO, and CIS all

provide Russia with a public and formal front to assert its influence across the region. Similarly,

Russian leaders view NATO and the EU as similar institutions manipulated by the United States

to achieve and maintain its own larger influence over Euro-Atlantic decision making.47

In 2011, Putin outlined the creation of another regional integration process, this time the

Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), which would be unified by the Common Economic Spaces of

Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan (CES). The project would be formally established in 2012, and

supposedly establish the foundation of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Future expansion

of this project would include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, rounding out the creation of a formal

Eurasian Union.48 While the formation of the Eurasian Union has never gained the strength or

the membership to rival the European Union, its very existence has provided an alternative,

albeit not a very attractive alternative to the more successful European economic institutions.

One of the most impactful outcomes of the 2008 Bucharest Summit was that both

Ukraine and Georgia would be authorized to pursue membership into NATO, a decision that

would prompt Russia to aggressively prevent this from occurring. Shortly thereafter, Russia

45 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, (New York, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013),

208-210. 46 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 49. 47 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 49. 48 Uwe Halback, Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union, (German Institute for International Security Affairs, 2012), 1-4.

21

undertook a military campaign against Georgia with the belief that the war with Georgia “would

force a reassessment of U.S. democracy promotion policies and a recalculation in Washington

about how far to go in pushing NATO membership in Georgia and Ukraine.”49 Years later, as if

to reaffirm this point of contention Sergey Lavrov wrote that NATO’s choice to pursue

enlargement “is the essence of the systemic problems that have soured Russia’s relations with the

United States and the European Union.”50

Finally, in contrast to the expansion of Western liberalism, Russia maintains the

following core interests: First, the defense of the country and the regime. Second, maintaining

influence in the near abroad. Third, advancement of Russia’s vision of great power status.

Fourth, reinforce the concept of noninterference in domestic affairs. And fifth, continue political

and economic cooperation as a partner equal to other great powers.51 These foreign policy

themes and priorities are reflected within the Soviet Union’s and Russian Federation’s endorsed

state strategy, and align with one prominent International Relations theory, the theory of

Defensive Realism.

The following chapters of this document will seek to demonstrate why modern Russian

foreign policy strategies align with this specific International Relations theory, and in doing so

answer this thesis’ research question by comparing the periods of time being considered as

outlined within the introduction.

49 Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, (Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 309. 50 Lavrov, Sergey, “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background,” Russia In Global Affairs, March 3, 2016. 51 Radin and Reach, Russian Views of the International Order, 2-3.

22

CHAPTER TWO

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will introduce and define five International Relations theories stemming

from or related to the Realist school of thought. Building off the historical background provided

within chapter one, chapter two examines several core theories of foreign policy and establishes

a foundation from which chapters three and four will reference within their comparative

historical analysis framework. This approach will allow for a more complete comparison of the

periods of foreign policy considered in later chapters, and in doing so provide the necessary

information to support the central theme of this thesis, that based on all demonstrated evidence

the present foreign policy of Russia is in fact consistent with historical patterns of Russian

behavior.

As previously mentioned, this chapter will rely upon five prominent International

Relations theories whose origins are relative to the Realist school of thought. The theories being

considered are as follows: Classical Realism as described by Hans J. Morgenthau within Politics

Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Structural and Defensive Realism as

described by Kenneth Waltz within Theory of International Politics, Offensive Realism as

described by John Mearsheimer within The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, and Neoliberal

International Relations Theory as described by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye within Power

and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition.

Finally, while not included within the five previously mentioned International Relations

theories, this chapter will acknowledge Constructivism as an alternative theory to the Realist and

Neoliberal schools of thought.

23

International Relations Theories Defined.

Classical Realism:

Classical realism has been traditionally defined through Morgenthau’s six principles of

political realism, which has become more commonly referred to as ‘Classical realism.’

Morgenthau’s principles are as follows: 1. Politics, like society, are governed by objective laws

that our founded in human nature. 2. Interests are defined in terms of power, and as a result,

political actions are motivated by the accumulation of greater power. 3. Interests, and by

extension political actions are dependent upon the political and cultural context within which

their state’s foreign policy is formulated. 4. Classical realism is conscious of the moral

significance of political action. Therefore, universal moral principles cannot be applied to the

actions of states in isolation and should consider the circumstances influencing said actions. 5.

Classical realism does not endorse or identify with the moral aspirations of a particular state. In

other words, all states are tempted to mask their ambitions for greater power with moral

justifications.52

Morgenthau’s principles characterize state behavior as both fundamentally tied to human

nature and the accumulation of power. Therefore, as human nature is intrinsically flawed, so too

is the international system of order associated with states. As a result, the international system is

shaped by how states pursue their interests and compete with one another for greater power

within an imperfect world order.53

Structural Realism:

Structural realism was originally outlined by Kenneth Waltz in 1979, and has served as

the foundation for several other realist schools of thought. Structural realism, commonly referred

52 Hans. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978), 3-12. 53 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5-12.

24

to as Neorealism, argues that the exchanges between states can be understood by first

considering how the anarchic nature of the international system influences each nation’s actions.

In other words, the lack of a central governing body overseeing the actions of states within the

international system promotes a chaotic and competitive geopolitical environment. Furthermore,

the absence of a singular authority within the international system exacerbates its anarchical

nature, preventing states from achieving a legitimate sense of security within the world order. In

response to the security concerns Waltz contends that it is the international system’s structure

which drives the pursuit of greater power, and the nature of each state’s pursuit is predicated

upon the balance of power, or lack thereof perceived by each state.54

Waltz’s balance of power concept aligns neatly with another important aspect of

structural realism, the inevitable emergence of great powers within the world order. Due to the

international systems anarchical and competitive nature, the accumulation of power by a state or

states over time would seemingly dictate that great powers would emerge. As a result, the

structure of the international system would become polarized in favor of the great power state’s

interests. Such a development would give rise to a unipolar system within which one state would

command overwhelming influence over smaller, weaker states. Similarly, the emergence of two

or more great power states simultaneously would create a bipolar or multipolar system within

which great powers would compete against one another. However, regardless of how many great

power states develop, the balance of power between states, their security concerns, and the

anarchical nature of the international system remain central to Neorealism’s core principles.55

54 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Long Grove, Illinois, Waveland Press Inc. 1979), 31-33, 41-

43, 110-116. 55 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 31-33, 41-43, 110-116.

25

Waltz’s theory would later serve as a singular reference point, or theoretical foundation from

which Defensive and Offensive realist schools of thought would emerge.

Defensive Realism:

Building upon his overarching theory of Structural realism, Kenneth Waltz refined his

interpretation of foreign policy behavior within his theory of Defensive realism. As a result, this

theory shares many principles with Structural realism and can be safely considered a subset of it.

Defensive realism endorses the importance of the international system’s structure when

considering how nations act relative to the distribution of power between states. However, where

Structural realism focuses upon understanding the impact the anarchical system may have upon

the international community, Defensive realism posits that rather than maximize power by any

means necessary, states first seek to maintain their security through defensive and otherwise

moderate foreign policies, thus protecting their current position and maintaining the ‘status quo,’

within the international system.56 Furthermore, Waltz contends that states are not inherently

aggressive, prioritizing the maintenance of their standing and power within the international

system above that of increasing it.

This approach to interpreting state behavior within the international system lends itself to

the belief that nations prioritize consistent security guarantees and international recognition

above aggressive power accumulation via military conflict. Furthermore, Defensive realists

argue that the benefits of conquest rarely outweigh the negatives associated with it, and that even

successful conquests or acquisitions of greater power will drive other states to seek new means

of balancing the international power structure. However, this does not mean that Defensive

realists reject that opportunities for state enlargement exist. Rather, Defensive realism suggests

56 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 19, 105-110, 126-127.

26

that while states are fundamentally opposed to military aggression, they may seek conflict in

order to maintain or preserve the ‘status quo’ within the international community.57

Offensive Realism:

In contrast to Kenneth Waltz’s Defensive realism, John Mearsheimer’s theory of

Offensive realism approaches the concept of power politics from an altogether different angle.

While Mearsheimer’s theory concerning Offensive realism shares many foundational

characteristics with Structural realism, it significantly diverges from this school of thought when

considering how states attempt to accumulate greater power. Rather than prioritizing moderate

political strategies designed to maintain the ‘status quo,’ Mearsheimer argues that the combative

structure of the international system promotes aggression and conflict between competing states,

and is especially common between, or by great power nations. At its core, Offensive realism is

concerned with five central principles. First, great powers are the most prominent actors in world

politics. Second, all states regardless of size maintain some form of offensive capability. Third,

other state’s intentions are never certain. Fourth, a state’s survival is its primary motivator. And

fifth, regardless of current strength, states are rational actors capable of implementing logical

strategies geared towards the accumulation of greater power within the international system.58

Mearsheimer’s theory emphasizes that state security cannot truly be guaranteed while

potential rival powers remain. As a result, states will seek to establish themselves as the global or

perhaps regional hegemonic power in order to solidify their claims of great power status. Unlike

Waltz’s assertion that states seek to maintain the ‘status quo,’ Offensive realism caters to the idea

57 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 105-110, 126-127. 58 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 4-8,

366, 420-421.

27

that “great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony

now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power.”59

Neoliberal International Relations Theory:

Finally, Neoliberal International Relations theory is described by Robert O. Keohane and

Joseph Nye as a necessary and logical response to the realist school of thought. While both

theories see the nation-state as the central protagonist to intra-state and global relationships,

Neoliberals contend that more productive foreign policy decisions can be made through a variety

of cooperative and mutually beneficial actions.60 According to Keohane and Nye, the potential

for proactive cooperation as opposed to competition enables what they call “complex

interdependence” to develop between states. This assertion opposes the realist belief that states

maintain constant competition against each other across all facets of power accumulation.

Additionally, Neoliberals focus upon the accumulation of absolute gains in power, rather

than relative gains compared to other states. In other words, Neoliberals believe that state actions

promoting the accumulation of power across multiple states (i.e. a win-win scenario), is possible

regardless of their formal international affiliation. This supposition by Neoliberals prompted the

introduction of game theory into the Neoliberal mechanism for understanding why states do, or

do not cooperate with one another.61

Finally, the prospect of “complex interdependence” offers that modern states are capable

of guaranteeing their individual survival through dependence upon nonorganic security

mechanisms such as multinational coalitions and alliances. This concept of interdependence is

not limited strictly to collective security agreements, and can extend beyond the traditional

59 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 35. 60 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (Boston, Little,

Brown and Company, 1989), 21-24. 61 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 148-155.

28

spheres of intra-state diplomacy, oftentimes including multinational corporations and

organizations. In short, Neoliberal thought attempts to explain complex international

relationships within an environment where security is not the primary motivator behind certain

actions, and where mutually beneficial actions can be accepted.62

Constructivism as an Alternative:

Constructivism attempts to demonstrate how core concepts within international relations

are “socially constructed,” and influenced by the constant evolution of social practices and

interactions between states. According to Alexander Wendt, Constructivism is founded upon two

basic principles, “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared

ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are

constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.”63

This philosophy challenges the belief that the international system’s anarchical nature is

the primary reason for competition between states. While Realist and Neoliberal International

Relations theories place an emphasis upon how the lack of a centralized governing institution

drives individual state’s foreign policies, Constructivism argues that these theories “do not

predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other’s sovereignty, will

have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on.”64 Because these theories

do not recognize the influence of social identities upon power politics, Constructivism suggests

that these theories are lacking in predictive capabilities.65 From a Constructivist perspective, the

process of intra-state interaction can be explained by analyzing the common, or opposing ideas

62 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 19-31, 149-151. 63 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. 64 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” International

Organization, 1992, 396. 65 Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics,” 396–399.

29

and social principles endorsed by states. Such analysis has the potential to offer additional clarity

into why states act the way they do within the international system.

CONCLUSION

This chapter introduced several core theories of foreign policy relative to the Realist

school of thought, as well as presented several alternative theories challenging the Realist

approach. This overview of opposing theories will allow for a more complete comparison of

specific periods of Russian foreign policy within Chapter three, which will address the foreign

policy challenges faced by the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan from 1979 – 1989, the

Russian Federation’s goals prior to, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 –

1993, and modern Russia’s foreign policy goals in Syria from 2015 – present.

30

CHAPTER THREE

INTRODUCTION: Russian Foreign Policy relative to International Relations theories.

Chapter three introduces the three periods of Russian foreign policy being compared, and

provides an overview of the critical foreign policy challenges faced by the Russian state within

each period. Additionally, this chapter hypothesizes that the modern Russian state implements its

foreign policy within a defensive realist framework, a framework that is consistent with that of

the former Soviet Union. For ease of comparison, the period of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan

from 1979 – 1989 will be referred to as period one, the period leading up to, and immediately

following the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 – 1993 will be referred to as period two,

and the period containing Russian involvement within Syria from 2015 to the present will be

referred to as period three. Each of these periods highlight Russia’s grand foreign policy strategy

at the time, and can be viewed as prime examples of Russia’s overarching foreign policy

approach. Overall, this chapter seeks to outline the background information required to support

the central theme of this thesis, that based on all demonstrated evidence the present foreign

policy of Russia is in fact consistent with historical patterns of Russian behavior.

SECTION 1: An historical overview of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy goals in

Afghanistan from 1979 – 1989.

In order to accurately describe Soviet foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan a short

review of the conflict period is necessary. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

(PDPA) took control of the government in a military coup in April 1978.66 From the onset the

newly installed PDPA requested Soviet military support and aide to solidify its government.

66 Joseph Collins, Soviet Policy toward Afghanistan, (The Academy of Political Science, 1987), 198-199.

31

Initially, the Kremlin denied these requests. However, several internal and external events

impacting the Afghan situation towards the end of 1979 would eventually encourage the Soviet

Union to change its policies.67

First, the overall situation of the PDPA was quickly deteriorating. By the end of 1979, the

party had split into rival Khalai and Parcham factions, and the possibility of an anti-communist

and pro-Western government replacing the PDPA was becoming more and more likely.

Additionally, Soviet military advisors continued to report the growing security crisis in the

country, confirming that a legitimate threat to the PDPA regime existed.68 Concurrently, the

Shah of Iran was overthrown in January of 1979 and resistance against the Afghan PDPA regime

began to gain additional momentum. Instability across Iran prompted the Islamist government to

adopt a hostile attitude toward both the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, the

Kremlin feared a similar Islamic movement might topple the newly installed and pro-Soviet

Afghan government. Previously, the Soviets had coexisted with a pro-Western Iran, but the

prospect of losing Afghanistan was viewed as unacceptable by the Soviet leadership. Finally,

should Afghanistan be allowed to shift allegiances it could become yet another hostile country on

the Soviet Union’s southern border.69

The potential for the disintegration of the PDPA was viewed as a threat to Soviet security

objectives and access for a number of reasons. First, given the stark cultural differences between

the two states it was unlikely that a new, non-PDPA regime would ever be as friendly, or as

submissive to the Kremlin as was the current government in Afghanistan. While the PDPA was

67 Halliday, Fred, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding

Wound,’” Review of International Studies, 1999, 678. 68 Halliday, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding

Wound,’” 678. 69 Collins, Soviet Policy toward Afghanistan, 200.

32

classified as a 'socialist-oriented' party, it would have been better defined as an orthodox pro-

Soviet communist party. The ousting of such a Soviet leaning regime would represent a

significant blow to the standing of the Soviet bloc as a whole.70 Second, the loss of a proxy

within the Middle East would inevitably result in the loss of prestige and power within the

international community. Furthermore, a Soviet loss in Afghanistan would only compound the

international problems faced by the USSR. As a result of these negative factors the Soviet Union

chose to prop up the PDPA by sending a significant military force to the country in 1979,

seeking to stabilize the country and preserve its influence and power there.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan should not be described as anything more than a

stabilizing force for the PDPA. Joseph Collins, an avid spectator and reporter of events in

Afghanistan argued that the Soviets were not concerned with, “talk about protecting the

population; Soviet operations were all about protecting the regime and furthering Soviet

control.”71 Over the course of the next decade the Soviet military engaged a U.S. backed

insurgency with mixed results. While Soviet forces enjoyed moderate success within the

country’s urban areas, the undeveloped countryside proved highly problematic for the Soviet

Union’s conventional military forces. Scholar Louis Dupree labeled Soviet tactics as "migratory

genocide," which in some cases targeted whole communities and sought to depopulate the

countryside. These brutal tactics had a direct effect on how the Mujahideen, Pakistan, and

international community responded, and in many cases prevented future negotiations towards

deescalating violence across the country.72

70 Halliday, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding

Wound,’” 679. 71 Ryan Evans, “The war before the war: Soviet precedent in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, 2013, 5-6. 72 Evans, “The war before the war: Soviet precedent in Afghanistan,” 6.

33

The Soviet’s inability to pacify these regions of Afghanistan would be a key contributor

to their eventual decision to withdrawal from the country. By the time Mikhail Gorbachev

ascended to power in 1985 the situation in Afghanistan had worsened considerably. The belief

that the war in Afghanistan was a lost cause was gaining popularity both in the Politburo and in

the military, and the costs for remaining in Afghanistan were mounting.73 Gorbachev described

the war as a “bleeding wound,” even though the conflict was “…in our vital, national interest

that the USSR invariably have good and peaceful relations with all contiguous states. This is a

vitally important goal of our foreign policy.”74 Despite the deteriorating situation there

Gorbachev would seek to make concessions to the rebels in exchange for maintaining a favorable

regime in Afghanistan. Such a compromise would allow the Soviets to preserve the ‘status quo’

within the fractured region. In doing so, they would have the opportunity to cultivate other pro-

Soviet ties in the post-colonial era.75

Gorbachev’s attempts at compromising with the various rebel factions, as well as the

international community faced many challenges. First, many orthodox Soviet supporters within

the Kremlin resisted him and the timetable he proposed for withdrawing from Afghanistan.

Second, the US, Pakistan, and their rebel proxies had enjoyed significant success in the mid-

1980s. As a result, they believed that the removal of the current Kabul regime was well within

their current capabilities and were encouraged to delay any potential agreement. Finally, the

PDPA leadership also sought to delay Soviet concessions and withdrawal, as such an action

would certainly result in them losing power within the Afghan government.76

73 Evans, “The war before the war: Soviet precedent in Afghanistan,” 3. 74 Mikhail Gorbachev, “Excerpts from Gorbachev’s Speech to the Party,” The New York Times, February 26, 1986.

19-21. 75 Collins, Soviet Policy toward Afghanistan, 200. 76 Halliday, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding

Wound,’” 686.

34

Despite Gorbachev’s efforts at attaining political reform within the Afghan regime and

negotiating future concessions, his goal of preserving Soviet influence within Afghanistan would

eventually fail. In February of 1988 Gorbachev would formally announce a timetable for the

withdrawal of military forces from Afghanistan, a process which would not be completed until

the following year.77

This period of Soviet interventionism and military support is reflective of its grand

foreign policy strategy at the time. Afghanistan was not the only state within the Middle East that

had become dependent upon the Soviet Union for military support. During this period, the states

of Libya, Syria, Algeria, Yemen, South Yemen, and to a lesser extent Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon,

Jordan and Morocco all were connected to the Soviet Union through arms deals. As the United

States encroached upon Soviet influence within the region it also threatened the ‘status quo’ of

arms imports there.78 This grand strategy for the region encouraged dependence upon the Soviet

Union for military support, and favored the defense of pro-Soviet states against democratic

influence. These policies were imperative to the regime throughout the 1980s, and the Soviet

Union was determined to defend it.

This era of Soviet foreign policy can be understood by comparing it against Waltz’s

description of Defensive realism. The Kremlin’s fear of losing a proxy state along its southern

border was logical response for several reasons. First, an unstable Afghanistan represented a

legitimate security concern to the Soviet Union, as infighting there would likely bleed over into

the adjoining states. Second, the prospect of losing a proxy state due to Western influence would

damage the Soviet Union’s international standing and weaken its hold on other proxies within

77 Halliday, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘Second Mongolia’ to ‘Bleeding

Wound,’” 687-689. 78 Alexander Bennett, “Arms Transfer as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” Middle East

Journal, 1985. 745-752.

35

the Central Asian region. Viewed in this manner it becomes more apparent that the Soviet

military action within Afghanistan was less a conquest, and more of an intervention. Military

aggression of this type would comfortably align with the Defensive realist principles described

by Waltz, as such actions were meant to maintain the ‘status quo’ both in Afghanistan and within

the larger global community.

The Soviet Union’s defensive foreign policy throughout the 1980s would eventually give

way to more liberal policies within period two. This transition away from its historical approach

was prompted by Gorbachev’s decision to introduce elections and a multi-party system to the

Soviet Union. This move towards democratization would eventually weaken and destabilize the

Communist party’s control of the country. Additionally, Gorbachev’s decision would polarize

the Soviet Union, encouraging Boris Yeltsin’s democratic movement to align itself opposite the

hardline Communist elite. Gorbachev’s victory within the 1990 elections brought with it the

potential for dramatic economic and governmental reforms, something the Communist elite

refused to support. In response, a coup was planned against Gorbachev in August of 1991. While

the coup was unsuccessful it did diminish Gorbachev’s hold on power and propel Yeltsin to the

forefront of Soviet and Russian politics. Gorbachev’s weakness prompted him to resign from

power in December of 1991, placing Yeltsin into the presidency and breaking the Soviet Union

away from its traditional approach to foreign policy.79

79 Office of the Historian, “The Collapse of the Soviet Union,” United States of America Department of State, 1-2.

36

SECTION 2: An historical overview of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy goals prior

to, and following the collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 – 93.

The period of time directly leading up to, and immediately following the collapse and

disillusion of the Soviet Union in 1991 was characterized by a dramatic shift in Russia’s foreign

policy approach relative to the international community, and was driven by the drastic

differences between the USSR and the new Russian Federation. The Russian Federation’s

geographic boundaries were significantly different, what had been the western and southern

proxies of the Soviet Union before 1992 was now multiple independent countries. Countries that

had previously comprised a multinational empire of many nations assembled through conquest

and expansion.80 Where the Soviet Union was a multinational empire, with half its population

non-Russian the new Russian Federation was a nation-state inhabited by a majority of ethnic

Russians. In the new Russia, Marxism and Leninism had given way to the promotion of free

market democratic values and wide ranging military reductions.81 These policy revisions enabled

the new government to approach its foreign policy goals with a far greater openness toward

cooperation with the West. However, these drastic changes did not occur overnight and were the

result of significant leadership and social changes within the Soviet Union during the late 1980s

and early 1990s.

The events leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union can be characterized as

nothing short of imperial collapse that caught many Western and Soviet observers by surprise.

Prior to its catastrophic breakdown, the Soviet Union had demonstrated various indicators of

decline, but nothing the international community believed would result in revolution. The

standard of living within the Soviet Union was much lower than in Europe, but it still retained

80 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 4-5. 81 Michael Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998. 1-4.

37

access to vast resource reserves.82 Additionally, while growth of the country’s GDP had slowed

and its budget deficits had increased, the gap remained below 9 percent through 1989, a figure

many external spectators would consider manageable.83 Finally, while the sudden drop in oil

prices from 1980 to 1986 was certainly a heavy blow to the Kremlin’s finances, it never reached

the all-time lows of the 1970s.84 Clearly, the economic situation of the Soviet Union was not the

only contributor to its destruction and there must have been other factors present.

Coinciding with economic stagnation, the introduction of liberal reforms by Gorbachev in

the late 1980s extended beyond stimulating the economy and attempted to pacify the

international community mounting against the Soviet Union’s actions in Afghanistan and

Eurasia. In doing so, Gorbachev introduced reforms that were idealistic in nature and designed to

create a more moral Soviet Union supportive of Western principles.85 Gorbachev’s moral pivot

would also prevent the Soviet Union from employing violent repression tactics across its proxies,

a practice that had become commonplace in eastern Europe.86

The acceleration of imperial decline was also helped along the way by Gorbachev’s new

approach to managing Soviet satellite states. Gorbachev asserted that every country had the right

to choose its own international orientation and domestic political system, and essentially

abandoned the Soviet doctrine holding the empire together.87

After seventy years of Soviet rule the Kremlin’s key leadership chose to look inward and

institute change, change that would eventually result in the crumbling of the Soviet Union and

the creation of the Russian Federation in December of 1991. These new Russian democrats

82 Aron, Leon, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” Foreign

Policy, 2011, 1-3. 83 Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” 2-3. 84 Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” 3. 85 Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” 4. 86 Aron, “Everything You Think You Know About the Collapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong,” 5. 87 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 11.

38

chose to adopt and pursue a philosophy inspired by the West, embracing free markets, self-

determination, and potential integration into Western institutions. Boris Yeltsin, who assumed

control of the new Russian state following Gorbachev’s resignation in December of 1991 formed

a government focused on implementing the ideals championed by these democrats. As a result,

the new Russian state adopted a foreign policy that was markedly more pro-Western than

anticipated. However, these amendments carried a clear anti-Soviet flavor, and oftentimes had

little to do with improving or developing Russia’s national interests abroad. Rather, Yeltsin’s

early efforts prioritized dismantling the old Soviet system instead of serving the many needs of

the country’s new electorate.88

As Yeltsin’s new government stabilized in the years following the collapse of the Soviet

Union it would eventually turn outward, seeking to join any and all European or Euro-Atlantic

international institutions willing to accept it. This effort caught many groups by surprise, and

while NATO and the European Union did not accept Russia’s full membership, they would

eventually compromise by offering Russia institutional partnerships. However, while these

arrangements promised an unprecedented level of inclusion, they did not provide the

involvement and decision-making power the new Russian government coveted. From the

Kremlin’s perspective, Russia was being granted admittance into the second-tier bodies of these

organizations and denied the power and prestige the former Soviet Union had commanded.89

The end of the arms race between the USSR and the United States also opened the doors

for potential integration into the Western international community.90 Furthermore, as Russia

began to implement new policies to align with the West between 1987 and 1993 it faced

88 McFaul, Michael, “What Are Russian Foreign Policy Objectives?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

May 1, 1999, 2. 89 Trenin, Dmitri, “Russia’s Post-Soviet Journey: From Europe to Eurasia,” Foreign Affairs, December 25, 2016, 2. 90 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 14.

39

challenges common to other Western democracies, namely, terrorism, religious fundamentalism,

and nuclear proliferation.91 These challenges were compounded by economic crisis, social

disorder, and political confusion, all of which inhibited the Gorbachev-Yeltsin policy of

cooperation with, and integration into the West. While these difficulties certainly originated from

the state’s communist legacy, many Russians blamed them on the West.92

The Gorbachev-Yeltsin foreign policy fell victim, as well, to the circumstances across

Russia's new borders. As former Soviet satellite states achieved newfound independence many

encountered periods of instability and conflict. Wars erupted in the Caucasus and Central Asia,

and Russia was drawn into several of them in an attempt to retain its influence there. Perhaps

most disastrously was the Yeltsin government’s military campaign against rebels seeking

independence for Chechnya, which would create significant negative attention from the

international community against the new Russian state. Additionally, the Russian interventions

in Georgia, Armenia, and in Tajikistan all contradicted the spirit of the new foreign policy.93 As

a result of these distractions, five years after the end of the Soviet Union cooperation and

integration into the West ceased to be the unchallenged centerpiece of Russian foreign policy.94

Within this period the new Russian Federation turned away from direct confrontation

with the West in favor or establishing cooperative and mutually beneficial agreements within its

historical sphere of influence as well as within the larger international community. This foreign

policy approach diverges from the principles of Defensive realism in favor of those championed

by Neoliberals. The establishment of “complex interdependence” with the West was viewed as

the mechanism by which the Russian Federation could integrate across Europe and beyond.

91 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 15. 92 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 16. 93 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 17-18. 94 Mandelbaum, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” 20.

40

Furthermore, such actions would drastically alter the ‘status quo’ as Russia severely reduced its

military footprint and restructured its economic system. Lastly, the new government’s openness

to seeking entry into additional Western international institutions beyond the UN had the

potential to incorporate Russia into various economic, social, and collective security

organizations supported by the West. This undertaking required the Kremlin to make significant

military and territorial sacrifices, and for a brief period abandon some, but not all of its

international power in order to redefine itself as a country.

Yeltsin’s grand strategy of liberal-democratic reform would not play out as he originally

intended. The country’s economic decline coupled with his massive reformation program would

progressively place him more and more at odds with the legislature, its speaker Ruslan

Khasbulatov, and his own vice president, Aleksandr Rutskoi.95 Facing significant opposition

throughout the summer of 1993, Yeltsin would eventually dissolve the legislature in September

and set elections for a new parliament in December. This action would result in significant

clashes between civilian protestors, police, and even legislators who had barricaded themselves

within the Moscow White House. Yeltsin broke the insurrection with military force, ordering

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev to occupy the White House with troops. Within three months

following these clashes a new constitution was approved through a national referendum, granting

the presidency and Yeltsin enormous powers that remain to this day. Yeltsin’s actions solidified

the government but also ushered in opportunities for widespread corruption to occur, corruption

that would pull Russia away from truly integrating into the West. Finally, the power consolidated

by Yeltsin during the chaos of 1993 was transferred to Vladimir Putin in 1999 following

95 Mikhail Sokolov and Anastasia Kirilenko, “20 Years Ago, Russia Had Its Biggest Political Crisis Since the

Bolshevik Revolution,” The Atlantic, 2013. 1-3.

41

Yeltsin’s surprising resignation. Putin has since turned Russia away from Yeltsin’s policies in

favor of a more authoritarian construct.96

SECTION 3: An historical overview of modern Russia’s foreign policy goals in Syria from

2015 – Present.

Russia announced its entrance into the Syrian conflict with airstrikes int