Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy

Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier

EUROPOS SÀJUNGAEuropos socialinis fondas MYKOLO ROMERIO

UNIVERSITETAS

 

Who is this person?

Richard Sherman

Assistant Professor of Political Science

Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now

Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1996-2004

Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996

What I do International Relations Political Economy Empirical Political Science Comparative Politics

Where I publish The World Economy Comparative Political Studies Journal of Conflict Resolution International Interactions Economics Letters Social Science Quarterly International Politics Current Politics and Economics of

Europe

My research

Intersection of domestic politics and international relations

International trade politics, related economic & regulatory issues

Connections:

The liberal-realist debate: (how) does domestic politics matter?

The “two-level game” idea (Putnam, Milner, Moravcsik)

International regimes & organizations

Political markets vs. political contests

Privatizing commercial diplomacy

Institutional mechanisms that let private-sector actors:

petition for the initiation of trade disputes

consult formally with government on trade-negotiation agenda issues

attend WTO talks with government officials

negotiate privately (industry-to-industry) on regulatory reform

EU Trade Barriers Regulation US Section 301

US: Private Sector Advisory CommitteesEU: UNICE, WWF, civil-society dialogues

Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, related organizations

Institutional innovation

Nihil nove sub sole?

Industry influence on government

Petition processes for trade complaints (anti-dumping, etc.)

Government organizing industry (corporatism)

But...

Formal avenues for industry to influence government on trade negotiations

Market-opening pressure is institutionalized, not only protectionist pressure

International industry groups are being organized by states

Civil-society groups, as well as industry, are given formal access

Why is this interesting?

The state as a literal agent of interest groups at the international level

Alternative sequencing of actions in two-level games

An open question: can government organize interest groups internationally?

Growing immediacy between domestic politics and international institutions

Normative issues

Research questions

Positive: What are the factors giving rise to “privatized” commercial diplomacy? Which industries & groups are most active, influential? What explains the pattern of activity & access across groups? What are the differences across institutions and polities?

Normative: Is “the cart leading the horse”? Does the government grant of access exclude some important voices ? Can privatized diplomacy be accommodated within the existing global trade

regime? Do these institutional innovations add legitimacy to the process, or do they

lend ammunition to its critics?

Quantitative analysis

Qualitative analysis

Research strategy

Research strategy

Quantitative analysis

Qualitative analysis

• Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US• Political-economy analysis:

--use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301--compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping)

• Institutional analysis--compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes

• Cross-polity analysis--compare patterns in US with those in EU

Research strategy

Quantitative analysis

Qualitative analysis

• Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US• Political-economy analysis:

--use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301--compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping)

• Institutional analysis--compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes

• Cross-polity analysis--compare patterns in US with those in EU

• Interviews and analysis of documents• Information / opinion from industry,

government, and civil-society groups• Emphases:

--implementation and politics / process--extent of business-government cooperation--connection to global trade regime--normative questions

Conclusions

The petition processes are relatively successful still, government might be more enthusiastic than industry

“International corporatism” has proved difficult Civil-society groups are reluctant to become involved in state-organized consultation The petition processes are likely to attract “difficult” cases

It is more striking, then, that they are relatively successful Explaining origins:

institutional causes political/electoral causes hegemony/state-power causes

Normative issues: “nuisance” disputes are perhaps less likely under privatized diplomacy petition processes provide a relatively immediate path to disputes against unauthorized

retaliatory measures Privatized diplomacy provides a documented record of state-industry interaction