Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy
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Transcript of Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy
Privatizing Commercial Diplomacy
Institutional Innovation at the Domestic-International Frontier
EUROPOS SÀJUNGAEuropos socialinis fondas MYKOLO ROMERIO
UNIVERSITETAS
Who is this person?
Richard Sherman
Assistant Professor of Political Science
Leiden University, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2004-now
Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 1996-2004
Ph.D., University of Washington, 1996
What I do International Relations Political Economy Empirical Political Science Comparative Politics
Where I publish The World Economy Comparative Political Studies Journal of Conflict Resolution International Interactions Economics Letters Social Science Quarterly International Politics Current Politics and Economics of
Europe
My research
Intersection of domestic politics and international relations
International trade politics, related economic & regulatory issues
Connections:
The liberal-realist debate: (how) does domestic politics matter?
The “two-level game” idea (Putnam, Milner, Moravcsik)
International regimes & organizations
Political markets vs. political contests
Privatizing commercial diplomacy
Institutional mechanisms that let private-sector actors:
petition for the initiation of trade disputes
consult formally with government on trade-negotiation agenda issues
attend WTO talks with government officials
negotiate privately (industry-to-industry) on regulatory reform
EU Trade Barriers Regulation US Section 301
US: Private Sector Advisory CommitteesEU: UNICE, WWF, civil-society dialogues
Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue, related organizations
Institutional innovation
Nihil nove sub sole?
Industry influence on government
Petition processes for trade complaints (anti-dumping, etc.)
Government organizing industry (corporatism)
But...
Formal avenues for industry to influence government on trade negotiations
Market-opening pressure is institutionalized, not only protectionist pressure
International industry groups are being organized by states
Civil-society groups, as well as industry, are given formal access
Why is this interesting?
The state as a literal agent of interest groups at the international level
Alternative sequencing of actions in two-level games
An open question: can government organize interest groups internationally?
Growing immediacy between domestic politics and international institutions
Normative issues
Research questions
Positive: What are the factors giving rise to “privatized” commercial diplomacy? Which industries & groups are most active, influential? What explains the pattern of activity & access across groups? What are the differences across institutions and polities?
Normative: Is “the cart leading the horse”? Does the government grant of access exclude some important voices ? Can privatized diplomacy be accommodated within the existing global trade
regime? Do these institutional innovations add legitimacy to the process, or do they
lend ammunition to its critics?
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
Research strategy
Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
• Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US• Political-economy analysis:
--use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301--compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping)
• Institutional analysis--compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes
• Cross-polity analysis--compare patterns in US with those in EU
Research strategy
Quantitative analysis
Qualitative analysis
• Data set: annual data at industry level, EU and US• Political-economy analysis:
--use industry-level and economy-level factors to explain industry use of TBR and Section 301--compare to corresponding patterns in industry use of protectionist measures (anti-dumping)
• Institutional analysis--compare to broader pattern of WTO disputes
• Cross-polity analysis--compare patterns in US with those in EU
• Interviews and analysis of documents• Information / opinion from industry,
government, and civil-society groups• Emphases:
--implementation and politics / process--extent of business-government cooperation--connection to global trade regime--normative questions
Conclusions
The petition processes are relatively successful still, government might be more enthusiastic than industry
“International corporatism” has proved difficult Civil-society groups are reluctant to become involved in state-organized consultation The petition processes are likely to attract “difficult” cases
It is more striking, then, that they are relatively successful Explaining origins:
institutional causes political/electoral causes hegemony/state-power causes
Normative issues: “nuisance” disputes are perhaps less likely under privatized diplomacy petition processes provide a relatively immediate path to disputes against unauthorized
retaliatory measures Privatized diplomacy provides a documented record of state-industry interaction