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POLS 425 U.S. Foreign Policy
Week 2: Major WorldviewsPractice and Analytical
Implications
January 17, 2007
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Three Readings
Mearscheimer and Walt, “An Unncessary War”
RUPE, “Behind the War in Iraq”
Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Liberal Realism”
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
An Unnecessary War
Why was the U.S.war against Iraqunnecessary?
Professors John Mearscheimer and Stephen Walt
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Why was the War Unnecessary? The war was unnecessary because the
justifications for the war were based on distorted history, and more importantly, faulty logic
The primary flaw in the argument for war was that Saddam, as the leader of sovereign state, was somehow immune to the laws of realism, that he was a fundamentally irrational and therefore undeterrable “madman”
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Why was the War Unnecessary?
The logic of realism tells us that “madman” arguments are, on their face, almost always wrong!
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Why was the War Unnecessary?
Key assumptions and logic in Realism
Actors are presumed to be rational
Saddam, as a rational actor, was deterrable
The principle of deterrability means that Saddam did not represent a military threat to the United States
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
"I acted because I was not about to leavethe security of the American people inthe hands of a madman. I was notabout to stand by and wait and trust in
the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein”- George W. Bush October 10, 2003
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Was Saddam a Serial Aggressor?
A look at the evidence
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): The “First” Gulf War
Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Iran-Iraq War
Iraq was threatened by the emergence of new, very hostile regime
Iran was diplomatically isolated
Iraq’s was supported by a “coalition of the willing” including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and France
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Iran-Iraq War
U.S. support of Iraq: a critical point
Realist logic: Washington feared the spread of Iran's theocratic, anti-Western ideology, which threatened American interests in the region
With American support, Iraq’s capacity to achieve its strategic goal was very high
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait
The authors: “Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was primarily an attempt to deal with Iraq's continued vulnerability”
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait
“We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America”
April GlaspieUS Ambassador to Iraq
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Why didn’t Saddam Back Down? Wasn’t that irrational?
Remember: Acting rationally does not mean you always make the right decision; sometimes you make a bad decision, but this is because actors generally do not have access to “perfect information”
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
Why didn’t Saddam Back Down?
Other points
Once the US response was unmistakable, Saddam tried to negotiate a diplomatic settlement
During the conflict, Iraq did not use chemical-biological weapons against the US or its allies; nor were “Scuds” used against Saudi Arabia
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
What about a nuclear Iraq? Now that’s a clear threat, isn’t it?
Direct threat to the United States
Indirect threat, through “nuclear blackmail”
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U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and
Implications
“The first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they [Iraqis] do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration”
- Condoleeza Rice