Presentation to PETRONAS-PETRAD-INTSOK-CCOP

Deepwater Subsea Tie-back Workshop

25th January 2011 Presented by:

Naila Rusma Idris, GTS

Co-author: M Hisham A Bakar, Nur Jasmin A Hakim, A Sirwan M Tuselim

© 2011 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS) All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or

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©2011 PETROLIAM NASIONAL BERHAD (PETRONAS)

CONFIDENTIAL

Deepwater Pipeline Integrity Assessment

Group Technical Solutions (GTS)

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Presentation Outline

1. Presentation Objectives 2. Background

• PIMS: The big picture • Pipeline Integrity Assessment • Reference codes & standards

3. GTS Methodology and related case study

4. Conclusions 5. Challenges 6. Lesson Learnt

Objectives

Presentation Objectives

• To share the importance of pipeline integrity management. • To highlight GTS methodology for deepwater pipeline integrity assessment.

Background

8

Leak due to accelerated wall thinning? Damage caused by third party?

Leak due to cracking? Severe coating damage?

Have you experienced this?

Why is it happened?

• Pipeline failures are usually related to a breakdown in a ‘system’.

PIMS Fitness

for Service

Engineering&

Design

Audit & Baseline Assessment

Training I & M

Operation Control & Monitoring

Repair &

Rehab

Reference: A. Cosham, P. Hopkins; The Pipeline Defect Assessment Manual (PDAM) ; Penspen Ltd. 2003

Risk and Reliability Assessment

PIPELINE INTEGRITY

MANAGEMENT

SYSTEMS

PHILOSOPHY:

“ENSURING A

PIPELINE IS SAFE AND

SECURE FOR

EFFICIENT

TRANSPORTATION OF

HYDROCARBONS”

Pipeline Integrity Management

Pipeline Integrity Assessment

PIMS INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT

BASELINE ASSESSMENT

INSPECTION

RISK ASSESSMENT

FITNESS FOR SERVICE

• What is pipeline integrity assessment?

• Defined as thorough evaluation of a potentially unacceptable anomaly.

• When should we perform pipeline integrity assessment?

• When an anomaly is observed or detected OR upon availability of inspection results for projection of future integrity.

Pipeline Integrity Assessment

• For typical subsea pipeline system, the integrity assessment may be split into:

• Corrosion assessment • Mechanical assessment e.g. fatigue in free span, displacement causing overstress or damage by third party.

• What is the outcome of integrity assessment? • Pipeline integrity/ risk status • I&M planning • Repair & rehab option.

Reference Codes & Standard

• DNV-RP-F116 Integrity Management of Submarine Pipeline

Systems, Oct 2009. • ASME/ ANSI B31.8S: Supplement to B31.8 on Managing System

Integrity of Gas Pipelines, 2009. • PCSB RBI Manual for Offshore Pipelines, 2000. • DNV-RP-F105 Free Spanning Pipelines, March 2002. • DNV RP F101- Parts A & B: Corroded Pipelines, 2004 (updated

2006). • ASME B31.G: Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength of

Corroded Pipelines, 2009. • API 1160 Managing System Integrity for Hazardous Liquid

Pipelines, Nov 2001.

GTS Methodology

Case study

• Integrity assessment for a deepwater pipeline in Malaysia.

• High dense phase with high pressure pipeline system.

• Rigid pipeline running from subsea PLET to onshore gas terminal.

• High wall thickness and deepwater subsea pig launcher which posed challenge for normal in-line inspection.

GTS Integrity Assessment Methodology

Engagement Session with Client

Site Visit Interview Session with Operation Personnel

Identify Gaps

Identify Facilities Limitation

Threats Identification

System Compliance Review

Data Verification

Data Gathering & QA/QC

Inspection Reference Plan (IRP) Development

Risk Assessment Alternative Inspection Technology

Assessment

Mechanical Assessment

Corrosion Assessment Internal Inspection

External Inspection

Revision 0 Year: 2010

Threat Identification

No Threat Group Findings

1 Design, fabrication and installation (DFI)

No significant threat been introduced during this stage. The only concern is on the functionality of subsea launcher which are yet to be executed.

2 Corrosion – internal/ external/ erosion

CMP is not specific and tailored to actual operating condition and requirement. Pipeline never been inspected internally, actual condition not known.

3 Third party / external impact

No history of third party interference or external impact but there is probability at shallow water section.

4 Structural On-bottom stability is within design acceptable limit except for free span.

5 Natural hazard No history of extreme weather or natural hazard recorded within the area.

6 Operation related Pipeline O&M manual not available.

Risk Assessment

• Corrosion assessment

» Internal corrosion

» External corrosion

• Mechanical assessment

» On-bottom stability

» External impact

» Defect assessment

» Free span

• Risk assessment exercise identified risk level status for the pipeline system.

Corrosion Risk Assessment

• Internal and External Corrosion: High risk category

5 M H H VH VH

4 L M H H VH

3 L L M H H

2 VL L L M H

1 VL VL L L M

A B C D E

Pro

bab

ility

of

Failu

re (

PO

F)

Consequence of Failure (COF)

On-bottom Stability

• On bottom stability: Medium risk category

5 M H H VH VH

4 L M H H VH

3 L L M H H

2 VL L L M H

1 VL VL L L M

A B C D E

Pro

bab

ility

of

Failu

re (

PO

F)

Consequence of Failure (COF)

External Impact P

rob

abili

ty o

f Fa

ilure

(P

OF)

Consequence of Failure (COF)

• External impact: Medium risk category

>10-2 M H H VH VH

10-3 to 10-2 L M H H VH

10-4 to 10-3 L L M H H

10-5 to 10-4 VL L L M H

<10-5 VL VL L L M

A B C D E

Free span Detailed Assessment

• Free span: Very High risk category

Defect Assessment

• Defect assessment not performed due to no inspection data.

Overall Pipeline System Risk

Inspection Reference Plan (IRP)

• Based on the findings and assessment results, the Inspection Reference Plan (IRP) is then developed to detail out the inspection plan and risk management activity for the pipeline system.

Conclusions

Conclusions

• Structured implementation of PIMS is the key to successful pipeline integrity management.

• GTS deepwater pipeline integrity assessment methodology combined more than two elements in PIMS.

• Deliverables of the study:

(i) pipeline risk status, and

(ii) inspection reference plan.

• All identified gaps and threats should be resolved by pipeline operator in a timely manner to ensure pipeline system is within operating risk limit.

Challenges

Challenges

• Data unavailability due to inspection challenges has lead to some assumptions during study.

• High pressure system limits corrosion modeling.

• No specific code and standard for deepwater pipeline integrity management and assessment.

Lesson Learnt

• Realistic design for future deepwater pipeline system: to consider operational challenges, integrity management and I&M requirements i.e. practicality of subsea launcher for inspection, subsea tie-ins etc.

• The industry to develop recommended practice specific to deepwater pipeline integrity management and assessment.

Lesson Learnt

THANK YOU