Fire and Explosion Hazard Management UK Offshore model Presentation to the Dutch Seveso Inspectorate...

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Transcript of Fire and Explosion Hazard Management UK Offshore model Presentation to the Dutch Seveso Inspectorate...

Fire and Explosion Hazard Fire and Explosion Hazard ManagementManagement

UK Offshore modelUK Offshore model

Presentation to the Presentation to the Dutch Seveso InspectorateDutch Seveso Inspectorate

bybyGraham DalzellGraham Dalzell

(TBS)(TBS)33

Risk Management Model :ISO 18001Risk Management Model :ISO 18001

Policy

Planning

ImplementMonitor

ReviewLeadership

Understanding

Communication

(TBS)3

Leadership = AttitudeLeadership = Attitude Careful, courageous or recklessCareful, courageous or reckless Investing or cost cuttingInvesting or cost cutting Short term profit or long term stability and Short term profit or long term stability and

securitysecurity Keeping going or prepared to stopKeeping going or prepared to stop No room for errorNo room for error Managing rules and compliance or managing Managing rules and compliance or managing

hazards.hazards. Appeasing the regulator or matching their Appeasing the regulator or matching their

requirements to your own aimsrequirements to your own aims Understanding or ignoranceUnderstanding or ignorance Owning hazards and risks – or employing Owning hazards and risks – or employing

consultantsconsultants Reactive audit culture or proactive hazard Reactive audit culture or proactive hazard

managementmanagement

Is it Safe?Is it Safe?

Society demands the answer: YesSociety demands the answer: Yes

Is this what the managers of your Is this what the managers of your major hazard sites ask?major hazard sites ask?

We do risk assessmentsWe do risk assessments

and we make recommendations,and we make recommendations,

and we implement them,and we implement them,

so the risk has gone away, hasn’t it?so the risk has gone away, hasn’t it?

Should we just deliver recommendationsShould we just deliver recommendations

oror

Should we deliver risk and hazard knowledgeShould we deliver risk and hazard knowledge

The Good News CultureThe Good News Culture

LESSONS FROM LONGFORDLESSONS FROM LONGFORD

The Esso Gas Plant ExplosionThe Esso Gas Plant Explosion

Professor Andrew HopkinsProfessor Andrew Hopkins

Australian National UniversityAustralian National University

ISBN 1-86468-422-4ISBN 1-86468-422-4

Hazard UnderstandingHazard Understanding

We will all know what is dangerous,We will all know what is dangerous,

why it is dangerouswhy it is dangerous

and what each of us must do to keep and what each of us must do to keep us all safe.us all safe.

(TBS)3

How can we manage How can we manage if we don’t understand?if we don’t understand?

Most common comments during Most common comments during accident investigationsaccident investigations

No-one told me that could

happen

I didn’t know that was

important

I didn’t know it would be like

that

So what’s this and what caused it?So what’s this and what caused it?

Who are Who are WEWE??

Everyone who manages a company, Everyone who manages a company, operation, design department or contract.operation, design department or contract.

Everyone who operates, maintains, Everyone who operates, maintains, inspects or audits a plantinspects or audits a plant

Everyone who designs a facility,Everyone who designs a facility,process, assembly or component process, assembly or component

Everyone who supports design and Everyone who supports design and operation.operation.

(TBS)3

Operations

Maintenance

Engineering

Contracts

Design

Director

Manager

Supervisor

Individual

Communication :We have a finite Communication :We have a finite capacity for informationcapacity for information

• in our memoryin our memory• in an aide memoirin an aide memoir• accessible as a detailed referenceaccessible as a detailed reference

But do our risk analysesBut do our risk analyseslook like this?look like this?

Distilling the information:Distilling the information:Who needs to know whatWho needs to know what

Senior management

Business and regionalmanagers

Plant and project managers

Operators, techniciansand designers

Corporate risk levels; patterns of risk by business type and location; future risks; the underlying risk drivers

Facility risk levels; patterns of risk by facility hazard and personnel; demandson business processes and others

Facility hazards, their relative risks andcharacteristics; hazard strategy; criticalmeasures; operating limits

Hazard characteristics, why measurescritical are critical, performance standards and limitations

Assigning the responsibilities:Assigning the responsibilities:Who carries the can – and who says stop?Who carries the can – and who says stop?

Senior management

Business and regionalmanagers

Plant and project managers

Operators, techniciansand designers

Setting the tolerable risk levels and deciding how close to operate; providing the resources to reduce risk

Operating within corporate risk levels;providing the supporting infrastructure;Deciding how risks should be managed

Operating the plant within its limits;managing the hazards and activities;ensuring critical measures are suitable

Comply with procedures; maintain theircompetence and the plant to theperformance standards

DevelopingDeveloping the the

knowledgeknowledge

FacilitiesAnalysis

FacilitiesAnalysis

FacilitiesAnalysis

Hazard RegistersHazard Registers

Hazard Registers

Critical Measures Critical Measures

Performance stds Performance stds

Regional/business Risk profileRegional/business

Risk profileRegional/business

Risk profile

CorporateRisk

Level

Policy: -Policy: - What do we want?:What do we want?:

Policies must be structured and integrated:Level 1 – Leadership, accountability and tolerable risk levelsLevel 2 – Risk management, resourcing, and relationshipsLevel 3 – Processes; design, operations, maintenance, contractsLevel 4 – Competencies, procedures, operating limits and plant

(TBS)3

Typical Corporate HSE Typical Corporate HSE management systemmanagement system

Leadershipand

Accountability

Risk AssessmentAnd Management

Crisis and Emergency

Management

Incident Analysis and

Prevention

Design and Construction

PeopleBehaviours and

Competence

Working with Contractors and others

Management Of Change

Community and Stakeholder Awareness

Customers andProducts

Operationsand

Maintenance

Informationand

Documentation AssessmentAssurance andImprovement

HSEMSHSEMS Default set of rules?Default set of rules? Discrete and unrelated elements?Discrete and unrelated elements? Audit and compliance culture?Audit and compliance culture? Different owners?Different owners? No coordination?No coordination? Generic requirements rather than Generic requirements rather than

matching hazardsmatching hazards No risk based investment and No risk based investment and

infrastructure?infrastructure? Importance based on perception not riskImportance based on perception not risk Cyclical emphasis on elements and Cyclical emphasis on elements and

hazards?hazards?

A SAFETY CASE A SAFETY CASE IS IS NOTNOT

A HAZARD AND RISK A HAZARD AND RISK MANAGEMENT SYSTEMMANAGEMENT SYSTEM

But many companies But many companies

think that it isthink that it is

Typical Corporate HSE Typical Corporate HSE management systemmanagement system

Leadership and Accountability

Risk AssessmentAnd Management

Crisis and Emergency

Management

Incident Analysis and

Prevention

Design and Construction

PeopleBehaviours and

Competence

Working with Contractors and others

Managementof

Change

Community and Stakeholder Awareness

CustomersAnd

Products

Operationsand

Maintenance

Informationand

Documentation

AssessmentAssurance andImprovement

Bringing all the parts of hazard Bringing all the parts of hazard management togethermanagement together

Inputs

Outputs

WHAT WE CAN EXPECT FROM THE COMPANY

• Minimum default standards for people and plant

• Actual condition and provision

• History and knowledge

WHAT THE RISK ASSESSMENT SHOULD DELIVER

• Hazard an risk knowledge

• Extra requirements above the default provision

• Critical plant, processes and procedures

What have we got, what do we need, What have we got, what do we need, what can we provide, how do we live with it?what can we provide, how do we live with it?

Planning:-Planning:- What do we need to do?What do we need to do?

•Understand the hazards

•Reduce risks at source

•Decide how, what and who we need to manage the hazards

•Set performance standards and operating limits

•Evaluate the risks

•Identify the improvements

•Determine the resources needed to implement hazard management

(TBS)3

HAZIDHAZARD UNDERSTANDING

Cause Severity Consequence Escalation

ELIMINATE

STRATEGY

SYSTEM

STANDARDS

EVACUATE MITIGATE

CONTROLPREVENT

EXTERNALOPERATIONS

ACTIVEPASSIVE

ROLE and SUCCESS RATE

RISK

IS IT GOOD ENOUGH?

MINIMISE at SOURCE

NO: - IMPROVE or CHANGE

YES: PROCEED

COMMUNICATE

ELIMINATEELIMINATE

Inherently safer design and operationInherently safer design and operation• Designing out hazards – simpler plantDesigning out hazards – simpler plant• Eliminating or minimising causesEliminating or minimising causes• Reducing the severity pressure, Reducing the severity pressure,

inventory, hole size)inventory, hole size)• Reducing consequence – fewer people, Reducing consequence – fewer people,

better layout, lower overpressuresbetter layout, lower overpressuresDesign out people – the make mistakes Design out people – the make mistakes

and they die.and they die.

STRATEGYSTRATEGY

What is the “design case”What is the “design case”• Is it practical to contain the effects?Is it practical to contain the effects?

Rigorous source, consequence and Rigorous source, consequence and escalation analysis – effective control and escalation analysis – effective control and mitigationmitigation

• Is it practical to make sure that extreme Is it practical to make sure that extreme events do not occurevents do not occur

Rigorous causation analysis and effective Rigorous causation analysis and effective preventionprevention

SYSTEMSSYSTEMS

Passive – no moving parts –Passive – no moving parts –highly reliablehighly reliable Active –breaks down and requires Active –breaks down and requires

maintenance and intervention – maintenance and intervention – predictable reliabilitypredictable reliability

Operational – needs competent people and Operational – needs competent people and judgement – judgement – subject to errorsubject to error

External – relying on others outside your External – relying on others outside your control – control – needs clear definition of needs clear definition of expectationsexpectations

Performance standardsPerformance standards

ActiveActive• Functionality, Availability, Reliability, Functionality, Availability, Reliability,

SurvivabilitySurvivability PassivePassive

• Functionality, Inspection Frequency, Functionality, Inspection Frequency, SurvivabilitySurvivability

OperationalOperational• Numbers, Role, Competence , AvailabilityNumbers, Role, Competence , Availability

ExternalExternal• Duty, Availability, ResourceDuty, Availability, Resource

Risk Assessment:Risk Assessment:

How do we manage How do we manage

the judgement of adequacy?the judgement of adequacy?

Is it good enough?Is it good enough?

UKOOA Risk based decision making frameworkUKOOA Risk based decision making framework

Codes and

Standards

GoodPractice

EngineeringJudgement

QualitativeRisk Assessment

QRA

CompanyValues

SocietalValues

Well understoodWell understoodlower risklower riskhazardshazards

Well understoodWell understoodrisk specificrisk specific

major accidentmajor accidenthazardshazards

Extreme Extreme consequenceconsequenceuncertain uncertain

hazardshazards

“As Low as Reasonably Practical”

Implementation:-Implementation:- Making it workMaking it work

• Share the hazard and risk knowledge

• Establish the business processes

• Assign the responsibilities

• Provide the resources

• Embed or confirm the requirements:- procedures, competencies, performance standards

• Implement the improvements

(TBS)3

The Reality – The Reality – Badly Maintained?Badly Maintained?

The Reality – Badly Operated?The Reality – Badly Operated?

Monitoring:-Monitoring:- Is it working?Is it working?• Advanced safety auditing (ASA)

- Confirm hazard understanding

- Is the process complete and is it working?

• Competence assurance

• Adequacy and compliance with procedures

• Plant integrity verification

• Adequacy of resources

(TBS)3

Review:-Review:- How and where How and where do we improve?do we improve?

4 levels of improvement

• Strategic corporate risk reduction- business rationalisation/closure

• Infrastructure and resourceenhancement, facility improvement

• Hazard management improvement;- strategy, system selection

• Performance improvement- people, plant, procedures

(TBS)3

Proactive Hazard ManagementProactive Hazard Management

notnot

Retrospective Risk AssessmentRetrospective Risk Assessment

(TBS)(TBS)33