Post on 02-Dec-2015
description
EMBODIED COGNITION 5/2/12
Dr Pelham Carter
Where is my mind?
• Cognitive Psychology is well known for theories and
models but they don’t often seem ‘situated’ anywhere.
• Abstract models sometimes linked to brief neurological
processes.
• Very little about the interaction between the body and the
mind – at least in how cognition is embodied.
Aims
• To consider:
- The impact of the body/physiology on cognitive processes
and architecture.
- Examples of the interaction between the two.
- The difference between embodied cognition and
distributed cognition. Is there any over lap?
Traditionally Separate
• Cognitive processes quite abstract
• Modelled often as Information Processing stages.
• Traditionally seen as quite indirect (revealed through
behaviour) and as an internal process.
• Little location or interaction.
• Atkinson & Schiffrin (1968)
Traditionally Separate
• Gradual changes as biological evidence was added to the
mix.
• Braining imaging allowed for neural correlates to be
connected to behaviour and processes.
• Not just abstract internal processes – processes now in a
specific location and level of activation.
• Kensinger & Schacter (2005)
Computer Metaphor
• Still an information processing approach but with software
and hardware.
• Hardware = the biological system, the brain
• Software = the information processing stages, the models
More than that
• We’re not just a central processor.
• We’re not just an input/output
• What we can and can’t do is determined by our physiology
• For years Cognitive Psychology (most in fact) has ignored the fact that our behaviour is mediated by our physical characteristics.
• These could feed backwards even further. If behaviour is constrained by the body are cognitive processes and architecture.
• Influence of emotional and physiological state.
• We have more resources, and influences, than just the brain.
Embodied
• Similar in style to the Whorfian Hypothesis (interaction
between thoughts and language).
• Interaction between emotional state and cognition
• Between physiological state and cognition
• Between context/environment and cognition
• Between anatomy and cognition.
Interaction of self, environment and mind
• Our action is directed and has a purpose (Gibson 1966;
Tolman, 1947).
• The body is more than just something for moving your
brain around.
• The body is a (Wilson & Foglia, 2011):
- Constrainer
- Distributor
- Regulator
Use and Understanding of Metaphor
• Lakoff & Johnson (1980) – Metaphors we live by.
Commonality to some metaphors and language used that
stems from our physical involvement and characteristics.
• To move forward is good, best foot forward, ‘retrace
steps’, to put something behind you, head and shoulders
above, etc.
• Dichotomies (Up/Down, Forward/Backward)
Language
• Glenbergs’s Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg et al, 2009) – understanding of language established through relevant action schemas.
• Activation of the schemas might active the same underlying neural correlates to the actual behaviour (links to mirror neurons).
• McNeil (1992) – Gesturing can aid language processing and communication.
• Not just a case of pointing or demonstrating but processing. Quicker to process.
Thought & Categorization
• Slepian et al (2011) – Gender perception can be
influenced by tactile feedback. Participants had to
squeeze a ball whilst judging faces.
• Soft ball led to more judgements of neutral faces as being
female.
• Miles et al (2010) – the direction in which we ‘sway’ is
determined by whether we are thinking ‘ahead’ or ‘behind’
temporally.
• Thought there is some debate over this…(see link)
Morality and Cleanliness
• Appears to be a connection between physical cleanliness and moral ‘dirtiness’.
• Lee & Schwarz (2010) – participants had to lie via voicemail or email, and then later rated various products.
• Rated products that would cleanse the lying area more highly and would pay more for them (mouthwash vs. hand sanitizer)
• Zhong & Liljenquist (2006) – had participants recall a transgression. One group then offered a hand wipe, and the other group was not.
• Group with the hand wipe reported less guilt over past transgression and were less likely to volunteer for further studies.
Action
• Gibsonian (1966) direct perception. We perceive not just
for the sake of it but to act.
• Our actions are then guided, determined and constrained
by the actions possible, expected and needed.
• Affordances – when we perceive and object we can
perceive its uses directly.
• What those uses are can be context driven.
Mirror System
• Embodied Cognition can be demonstrated in how we use
mirroring to aid understanding.
• Replicating the actions of another allows us to understand
intent and state (creating resonance).
• If we see someone smile we can mimic the physical
action and in doing so are quicker to recognise the
expression and the implications.
Blocking Example
• Niendthal et al (2001)
• Oberman et al (2007)
• Blocked mimicry using a pen biting, pen balancing or gum
chewing task.
• This blocked facial mimicry as the facial muscles were
tasked.
• Shown pictures or video of a face that transitioned from
one emotion to another (happy -> sad, sad-> happy).
• Blocking led to slower recognition of related emotional
states, especially happiness which is usually the most
involved in regards to the facial muscles.
Mirror Neurons
• Seems to be a neurological correlate. Certain neurones involved in actions are activated by observing said action.
• If you see someone reached for an item a similar level of activation for the corresponding motor areas might be found within your own brain.
• Di Pellegrino et al (1992) found mirrored activity in the F5 area in macaque monkeys.
• Gallese et al (1996) found evidence to suggest this internal activity of the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) is somatotopically distributed.
• For human understanding/mirroring of action Brodmann area 44 seems to be involved (Carr et al, 2003)
Theory of Mind
• Theory of mind (Frith & Happe, 1995; Baron-Cohen, 1995) – actually might be down to mirror neuron involvement.
• Understanding of action rather than an abstract cognitive construct of intended behaviour.
• If there is a ‘fault’ or ‘block’ with the resonance or mirror neuron involvement for certain social actions and behaviours then the understanding of them will be limited.
• Broken Mirror theory of Autism (Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006)
Off loaded into environment
• Books, Computers, calculators, even our fingers to an
extent…
• This is arguably distributed cognition rather than purely
embodied cognition.
• What we are likely to use in the environment is
determined by physiological need and ease, and is often
an extension of a normal physiological/embodied ability.
• See early tool use
What about distributed cognition?
• Similar in that it refers to cognition being more than just an abstract internal process.
• We can distribute cognitive load or processes throughout the environment to help.
• We use calculators, we write notes, we use computers to save files, we visualise and use markers to help play games or solve problems…
• Can see an interaction between distribution and embodied.
• Using your fingers to count is a distribution – using a base 10 system for the count is a potentially an influence of embodied cognition (though this is debatable).
Body based when offline
• Even without overt behaviour our cognition can remain
embodied (Wilson, 2002).
• Mental and Spatial Imagery – when remembering
locations and objects we tend to do so from an egocentric
point of view (Shelton & McNamara, 2007; Tlauka et al,
2011).
• Episodic memory – tend to be a ‘reliving’ of an event from
a first person perspective.
Phantom Limb
• Lets consider a working example – Phantom Limb
• When limbs are amputated or lost due to trauma some people still ‘feel’ and experience the limb as if it is still there (Sherman et al, 1984).
• Often this phantom of the limb can be uncomfortable (can itch) or painful.
• The limb can become paralyzed.
• http://www.ted.com/talks/vilayanur_ramachandran_on_your_mind.html (from 9:30 mark)
Phantom Limb
• Interaction here between the experience of the limb and
the visual perception.
• Vision provides feedback about the phantom limb which
then influences the perception and experience of the limb.
• This is not something done solely from abstract cognition.
• The patient knows the limb is not there and has always
known. But it is not until there is mediation from physical
feedback that a change occurs.
Paradigm shift or additional paradigm?
• Is this an additional way of thinking about and
investigating psychology or is this an entirely new
framework which we should be working within?
• Arguably it changes how we should view cognition – no
longer abstract or brain centred, which much theory and
research currently is.
• Does this mean there is little value in the previous
research? Do we have to start again?
Reading & Video
• Wilson & Golonka (2013) Embodied cognition is not what you think it is [on blackboard or here]
• Wilson, R., A. and Foglia, L., "Embodied Cognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) [Link]
• Slepian, M., L., Weslbuch, M., Rule, N.O, & Ambady, N. (2011) Tough & Tender: Embodied Categorization of Gender. [blackboard]
• Ramachandran & Oberman (2006) Broken Mirrors: A Theory of Autism [blackboard or here]
• Ramachandran, VS (2007) TED Talk: 3 clues to Understanding your brain [link]