Embodied Cog

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EMBODIED COGNITION 5/2/12 Dr Pelham Carter

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embodied cogntion

Transcript of Embodied Cog

Page 1: Embodied Cog

EMBODIED COGNITION 5/2/12

Dr Pelham Carter

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Where is my mind?

• Cognitive Psychology is well known for theories and

models but they don’t often seem ‘situated’ anywhere.

• Abstract models sometimes linked to brief neurological

processes.

• Very little about the interaction between the body and the

mind – at least in how cognition is embodied.

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Aims

• To consider:

- The impact of the body/physiology on cognitive processes

and architecture.

- Examples of the interaction between the two.

- The difference between embodied cognition and

distributed cognition. Is there any over lap?

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Traditionally Separate

• Cognitive processes quite abstract

• Modelled often as Information Processing stages.

• Traditionally seen as quite indirect (revealed through

behaviour) and as an internal process.

• Little location or interaction.

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• Atkinson & Schiffrin (1968)

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Traditionally Separate

• Gradual changes as biological evidence was added to the

mix.

• Braining imaging allowed for neural correlates to be

connected to behaviour and processes.

• Not just abstract internal processes – processes now in a

specific location and level of activation.

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• Kensinger & Schacter (2005)

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Computer Metaphor

• Still an information processing approach but with software

and hardware.

• Hardware = the biological system, the brain

• Software = the information processing stages, the models

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More than that

• We’re not just a central processor.

• We’re not just an input/output

• What we can and can’t do is determined by our physiology

• For years Cognitive Psychology (most in fact) has ignored the fact that our behaviour is mediated by our physical characteristics.

• These could feed backwards even further. If behaviour is constrained by the body are cognitive processes and architecture.

• Influence of emotional and physiological state.

• We have more resources, and influences, than just the brain.

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Embodied

• Similar in style to the Whorfian Hypothesis (interaction

between thoughts and language).

• Interaction between emotional state and cognition

• Between physiological state and cognition

• Between context/environment and cognition

• Between anatomy and cognition.

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Interaction of self, environment and mind

• Our action is directed and has a purpose (Gibson 1966;

Tolman, 1947).

• The body is more than just something for moving your

brain around.

• The body is a (Wilson & Foglia, 2011):

- Constrainer

- Distributor

- Regulator

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Use and Understanding of Metaphor

• Lakoff & Johnson (1980) – Metaphors we live by.

Commonality to some metaphors and language used that

stems from our physical involvement and characteristics.

• To move forward is good, best foot forward, ‘retrace

steps’, to put something behind you, head and shoulders

above, etc.

• Dichotomies (Up/Down, Forward/Backward)

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Language

• Glenbergs’s Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg et al, 2009) – understanding of language established through relevant action schemas.

• Activation of the schemas might active the same underlying neural correlates to the actual behaviour (links to mirror neurons).

• McNeil (1992) – Gesturing can aid language processing and communication.

• Not just a case of pointing or demonstrating but processing. Quicker to process.

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Thought & Categorization

• Slepian et al (2011) – Gender perception can be

influenced by tactile feedback. Participants had to

squeeze a ball whilst judging faces.

• Soft ball led to more judgements of neutral faces as being

female.

• Miles et al (2010) – the direction in which we ‘sway’ is

determined by whether we are thinking ‘ahead’ or ‘behind’

temporally.

• Thought there is some debate over this…(see link)

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Morality and Cleanliness

• Appears to be a connection between physical cleanliness and moral ‘dirtiness’.

• Lee & Schwarz (2010) – participants had to lie via voicemail or email, and then later rated various products.

• Rated products that would cleanse the lying area more highly and would pay more for them (mouthwash vs. hand sanitizer)

• Zhong & Liljenquist (2006) – had participants recall a transgression. One group then offered a hand wipe, and the other group was not.

• Group with the hand wipe reported less guilt over past transgression and were less likely to volunteer for further studies.

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Action

• Gibsonian (1966) direct perception. We perceive not just

for the sake of it but to act.

• Our actions are then guided, determined and constrained

by the actions possible, expected and needed.

• Affordances – when we perceive and object we can

perceive its uses directly.

• What those uses are can be context driven.

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Mirror System

• Embodied Cognition can be demonstrated in how we use

mirroring to aid understanding.

• Replicating the actions of another allows us to understand

intent and state (creating resonance).

• If we see someone smile we can mimic the physical

action and in doing so are quicker to recognise the

expression and the implications.

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Blocking Example

• Niendthal et al (2001)

• Oberman et al (2007)

• Blocked mimicry using a pen biting, pen balancing or gum

chewing task.

• This blocked facial mimicry as the facial muscles were

tasked.

• Shown pictures or video of a face that transitioned from

one emotion to another (happy -> sad, sad-> happy).

• Blocking led to slower recognition of related emotional

states, especially happiness which is usually the most

involved in regards to the facial muscles.

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Mirror Neurons

• Seems to be a neurological correlate. Certain neurones involved in actions are activated by observing said action.

• If you see someone reached for an item a similar level of activation for the corresponding motor areas might be found within your own brain.

• Di Pellegrino et al (1992) found mirrored activity in the F5 area in macaque monkeys.

• Gallese et al (1996) found evidence to suggest this internal activity of the Mirror Neuron System (MNS) is somatotopically distributed.

• For human understanding/mirroring of action Brodmann area 44 seems to be involved (Carr et al, 2003)

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Theory of Mind

• Theory of mind (Frith & Happe, 1995; Baron-Cohen, 1995) – actually might be down to mirror neuron involvement.

• Understanding of action rather than an abstract cognitive construct of intended behaviour.

• If there is a ‘fault’ or ‘block’ with the resonance or mirror neuron involvement for certain social actions and behaviours then the understanding of them will be limited.

• Broken Mirror theory of Autism (Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006)

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Off loaded into environment

• Books, Computers, calculators, even our fingers to an

extent…

• This is arguably distributed cognition rather than purely

embodied cognition.

• What we are likely to use in the environment is

determined by physiological need and ease, and is often

an extension of a normal physiological/embodied ability.

• See early tool use

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What about distributed cognition?

• Similar in that it refers to cognition being more than just an abstract internal process.

• We can distribute cognitive load or processes throughout the environment to help.

• We use calculators, we write notes, we use computers to save files, we visualise and use markers to help play games or solve problems…

• Can see an interaction between distribution and embodied.

• Using your fingers to count is a distribution – using a base 10 system for the count is a potentially an influence of embodied cognition (though this is debatable).

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Body based when offline

• Even without overt behaviour our cognition can remain

embodied (Wilson, 2002).

• Mental and Spatial Imagery – when remembering

locations and objects we tend to do so from an egocentric

point of view (Shelton & McNamara, 2007; Tlauka et al,

2011).

• Episodic memory – tend to be a ‘reliving’ of an event from

a first person perspective.

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Phantom Limb

• Lets consider a working example – Phantom Limb

• When limbs are amputated or lost due to trauma some people still ‘feel’ and experience the limb as if it is still there (Sherman et al, 1984).

• Often this phantom of the limb can be uncomfortable (can itch) or painful.

• The limb can become paralyzed.

• http://www.ted.com/talks/vilayanur_ramachandran_on_your_mind.html (from 9:30 mark)

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Phantom Limb

• Interaction here between the experience of the limb and

the visual perception.

• Vision provides feedback about the phantom limb which

then influences the perception and experience of the limb.

• This is not something done solely from abstract cognition.

• The patient knows the limb is not there and has always

known. But it is not until there is mediation from physical

feedback that a change occurs.

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Paradigm shift or additional paradigm?

• Is this an additional way of thinking about and

investigating psychology or is this an entirely new

framework which we should be working within?

• Arguably it changes how we should view cognition – no

longer abstract or brain centred, which much theory and

research currently is.

• Does this mean there is little value in the previous

research? Do we have to start again?

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Reading & Video

• Wilson & Golonka (2013) Embodied cognition is not what you think it is [on blackboard or here]

• Wilson, R., A. and Foglia, L., "Embodied Cognition", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) [Link]

• Slepian, M., L., Weslbuch, M., Rule, N.O, & Ambady, N. (2011) Tough & Tender: Embodied Categorization of Gender. [blackboard]

• Ramachandran & Oberman (2006) Broken Mirrors: A Theory of Autism [blackboard or here]

• Ramachandran, VS (2007) TED Talk: 3 clues to Understanding your brain [link]