Post on 29-May-2020
Islamic State’s
Online Strategy:
Then and Now
Prof. Maura Conway
Dublin City University
@galwaygrrl
Structure of Presentation:1. What’s the Problem? 2. ISIL/ISIS/IS’s Online Activity: 2015 3. IS’s Online Activity: 20174. Disruption & Its Impacts 5. Future Trends
Structure of Presentation:1. What’s the Problem? 2. Daesh/ISIS/ISIL/IS’s Online Activity:
2015 3. IS’s Online Activity: 20174. Disruption & Its Impacts 5. Future Trends
• Analysis of open and closed-source data
Significant role for Internet in contemporary terrorism
• Variety of activity, not just ‘radicalisation’, but attack preparation, etc.
• Exposure to large amounts of extremist content, and networking around it, can cause some individuals to become violently radicalised
What’s the Problem?
‘Islamic State’ Online: 2014 – 2015
• High volume
• Multiple languages
• Widely across many platforms
• Professional appearance/ structuring (e.g. aerial drone footage, al-Kasasbehvideo, Cantlie series, magazines)
• In-tune with online youth culture (#yodo, CoD, cats, selfies, etc.)
• Interaction around the content, with other ‘fans’ and fighters ‘in the field
‘Islamic State’ Online: 2014 – 2015
• High volume
• Multiple languages
• Widely across many platforms
• Professional appearance/ structuring (e.g. aerial drone footage, al-Kasasbehvideo, Cantlie series, magazines)
• In-tune with online youth culture (#yodo, CoD, cats, selfies, etc.)
• Interaction around the content, with other ‘fans’ and fighters ‘in the field
‘Islamic State’ Online: 2014 – 2015
• High volume
• Multiple languages
• Widely across many platforms
• Professional appearance/ structuring (e.g. aerial drone footage, al-Kasasbehvideo, Cantlie series, magazines)
• In-tune with online youth culture (#yodo, CoD, cats, selfies, etc.)
• Interaction around the content, with other ‘fans’ and fighters ‘in the field’
Vibrant online community
Crowd-sourced Jihad
• Content glamourising the Syria conflict, esp. suicide attacks
• Content exhalting virtues of the Islamic State
• Direct exhortations to:
- Travel to Syria (‘Foreign Fighter’)
- Commit acts of terrorism in home/third countries
• Practical instructions on accomplishing above
Crowd-sourced Jihad
• Content glamourising the Syria conflict, esp. suicide attacks
• Content exhorting virtues of the Islamic State
• Direct exhortations to:
- Travel to Syria (‘Foreign Fighter’)
- Commit acts of terrorism in home/third countries
• Practical instructions on accomplishing above
Conflict Context
Technology Context
Crowd-sourced Jihad
• Content glamourising the Syria conflict, esp. suicide attacks
• Content exhorting virtues of the Islamic State
• Direct exhortations to:
- Travel to Syria (‘Foreign Fighter’)
- Commit acts of terrorism in home/third countries
• Practical instructions on accomplishing above
Conflict Context
Technology Context
Immersive Experience
‘Islamic State’ Online: 2017
• Under pressure in ‘real world’:
– Conflict is raging
– More people needed to fight
– Loss of territory less safe spaces
– Social Media operators targeted (al-Adnani and others)
– Cyber infrastructure targeted (hacking and ‘hard’ attacks)
Decline in output from July/August 2016
Down 36% by end Feb. 2017 (570 items)
• Online circulation of that content impacted by takedown strategies
Disruption: Twitter
Loss of Community
Where’s IS’s Online Community Now?
Future Trends
Two enormously fast-changing realms, so very difficult to predict, but …
• Increased use of messaging apps
• Live-streaming (Magnaville)