Daesh evolved irregular threat analysis

ISIL’S EVOLVED IRREGULAR THREAT

Report for the Strategic Multilayer Assessment

Noetic Corporation

November 2015


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Copies Recipient

1 Strategic Multilayer Assessment

Authors

Role Name

Principal Steve Williams

Author John Watts

Contributors Jeffrey Lin

Noetic Corporation

1900 L Street NW, Suite 525

Washington DC 20036

Phone +1 202 296 4260

Fax +1 202 204 1666

Web www.noeticgroup.com

http://www.noeticsolutions.com.au/



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CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................. IV INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1

Background ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 Aim ....................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Scope ................................................................................................................................................................... 2

PART 1: EXAMING ISIL THROUGH AN EITP LENS .................................................................. 2

Project History ..................................................................................................................................................... 2 Key Findings ........................................................................................................................................................ 3 ISIL From an EIT Perspective ............................................................................................................................. 4

PART 2: UNDERSTANDING ISIL’S CAPABILITIES................................................................. 11

Centre of Gravity Analysis................................................................................................................................ 12 Analysis of key battles ...................................................................................................................................... 24

PART 3: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND BEYOND .................................................. 26

Implications for the Region .............................................................................................................................. 26 Implications for the Broader Jihadi Movement ............................................................................................... 28 Implications for the Other Irregular Groups.................................................................................................... 29

SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 31

Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................................... 31

ANNEX A: EVOLVED IRREGULAR THREAT METHODOLOGY ANNEX B: ISIL CAPABILITY MATRIX ANNEX C: ISIL'S EVOLVED IRREGULAR THREAT CASE STUDY ANNEX D: ISIL KEY BATTLE ANALYSIS ANNEX E: BIBLIOGRAPHY



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This report was written as a part of the Joint Staff’s Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office’s support to

CENTCOM’s Special Operations Command (SOCCENT). The SMA SOCCENT effort is a robust, multi-

disciplinary approach to understanding the complex challenge posed by the emergence of the Islamic State of

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also referred to as ISIS, IS and Daesh). In particular, this effort seeks to better

understand the future implications of ISIL’s rise in the future, once the ISIL crisis has been resolved and a

degree of stability has been re-established.

2. The Evolved Irregular Threat methodology was developed in order to understand the potential future threats

that irregular groups could pose to U.S. forces if they are able to innovate faster than the U.S. can react.

Terrorist, sub-state and irregular groups have in the past demonstrated the ability to close technological

capability gaps through innovation and leveraging of commercially available technologies. In some cases, this

has resulted in the development of near-state like capabilities or new cheap and effective tactics that pose

major challenges to more advanced military forces.

3. In order to better understand ISIL’s capabilities in comparison to existing advanced irregular group case

studies, Noetic applied the EIT methodology to ISIL. This approach involved mapping ISIL capabilities across

a spectrum of control, then building a Center of Gravity (COG) construct. ISIL’s success to date correlates

closely with EIT’s predictions, which further validates the theoretical underpinnings of the methodology.

4. After mapping ISIL capabilities across the spectrum of control, it is clear that ISIL is a resilient irregular force

with significant coercive, administrative and persuasive tools available to achieve their goals. Their resiliency

is evident from their ability to withstand, and further expand, despite coalition air strikes. The range of

capabilities ISIL demonstrates across the spectrum differentiates them from most other sub-national irregular

groups, and confirms that their comparison with other previously analysed proto-state groups is apt.

5. Earlier EIT analysis identified a number of likely trends that would characterize future irregular groups. ISIL

has confirmed the importance of some of these trends, such as the importance of modern communications,

social media and networked systems and actors. But it has reversed other predicted trends, such as the

criticality of virtual leaders and organizations, distributed enemy capability development and increased use of

autonomous systems. Moreover, despite seizing large quantities of modern and sophisticated military

equipment, ISIL has employed it in a limited fashion. Its tactics remain strikingly conventional, and when using

asymmetric tactics, they tend to adhere to commonly used and well proven irregular approaches. There are a

number of possible reasons for this, including the experience and background of key leaders and the lack of

military necessity for other approaches.

6. While all irregular groups have distinct characteristics relevant to their context, ISIL is truly unique. It may

demonstrate less innovation than previously examined groups, but it has developed several existing

approaches to a level of sophistication beyond what could be expected of most irregular groups. The key

drivers of ISIL’s success is their bureaucratic competence, extensive planning and preparation and

sophisticated human intelligence and security apparatus. It is the effective execution of these tasks that has

led to their establishment of perhaps the closest approximation of a state of any irregular group. In particular,

ISIL’s administrative and persuasive capabilities are remarkably sophisticated and will likely be a bench mark

for irregular groups in the future.



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7. After mapping ISIL’s capabilities, this analysis determined three CoGs:

a. The Establishment of a Credible Caliphate. By self-proclaiming an Islamic caliphate and meeting

several key religious requirements, ISIL has created a perception of legitimacy and authority amongst

certain supporting communities. It gives gravitas to their cause that would not be possible by other

means.

b. Integrated, Independent Financial Resources. ISIL has managed to generate more funding than

almost any irregular group, earning it the moniker ‘the richest terrorist group in the world’. More

importantly, it has done so independent of state backing, allowing it geopolitical freedom of action.

c. Leveraging Identity Politics and Engaging the Disenfranchised. ISIL has successfully exploited

political division and created instability in order to generate support and promote their cause. They have

also managed to generate support from around the world by appealing to diverse demographics in a

variety of ways.

8. ISIL has proven itself to be an effective fighting force and has had some remarkable successes. But it has

also suffered some high profile defeats. Its unwillingness or inability to employ some of the high end military

capabilities it has acquired in those instances, its lack of creative technology employment and its reliance on

low tech solutions to tactical problems raises questions about their ability to adapt to military challenges. Its

approaches have been well executed and to effective to a degree, but it may also point to a limitation to

effective combat a motivated and well equipped military opposition.

9. In the longer term, few groups are likely to learn anything new from ISIL’s military approaches and the tactics

they have employed does not appear to pose new risks of additional capability gaps. However, it has created

new benchmarks in the administrative and persuasive capability areas which will likely be adopted and

replicated by groups in the future. While it will be difficult for groups to replicate many aspects of ISIL’s

success due to different political and environmental contexts, ISIL’s rapid and successful rise will have

ongoing implications for the region and irregular groups around the globe for many years to come.



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INTRODUCTION

Background

1. The Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office provides planning support to Combatant Commands

(COCOM) with complex operational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinary solutions that are

not within core Service/Agency competency. The SMA office has developed a proven methodology merging

multi-agency expertise and information to address complex operational requirements that call for multi-

disciplinary approaches utilizing skill sets not normally present within any one service/agency. The SMA

process uses robust multi-agency collaboration leveraging intellectual/analytical rigor to examine

factual/empirical evidence with the focus on synthesizing existing knowledge. The end product consists of

actionable strategies and recommendations, which can then be used by planners to support Course of Action

Development. SMA is accepted and synchronized by Joint Staff, J3, Deputy Directorate Global Operations

(DDGO) and executed by OSD/ASD(R&E)/EC&P/Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO).

2. In 2014, SMA undertook a successful analysis to understand the psychological, ideological, narrative,

emotional, cultural and inspirational (“intangible”) nature of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Following on from this effort, current commander Special Operations Command Central, Major General

Nagata, requested that SMA consider:

“Given that when the dust settles and some degree of durable stability has been established in the Middle

East, it will no longer look as it did prior to the start of the Syrian civil war and the rise of ISIL; therefore,

the question is what will the Middle East look like when the ISIL crisis has been resolved?”

3. As part of the SMA multi-agency approach, Noetic has utilized the analytical framework developed during its

initial Evolved Irregular Threat (EIT) methodology, which was undertaken on behalf of the Office of the

Secretary of Defense to analyze the comparative advantages and innovations that underpinned the success

of irregular groups to reach near-state like status. The first EIT project examined a range of sub-state groups

with near state-like capabilities (primarily Hezbollah, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam and Lashkar-e-Taiba) by

mapping those capabilities across a spectrum of control which ranged from coercive, through administrative to

persuasive. The analysis was used to develop a series of wargames that tested an evolved, future irregular

threat against current U.S. forces to identify potential future vulnerabilities.

4. For the SMA analysis, Noetic has analyzed ISIL’s capabilities to better understand the elements that have

underpinned its rapid and remarkable rise. By mapping the capabilities using the same methodology as the

initial analysis it is possible to undertake a like-for-like comparison with the findings from the earlier research

and compare ISIL’s strengths and weaknesses to historical examples. The analysis then uses the capability

map to build a ‘Centers of Gravity’ (COG) construct to better understand ISIL’s key innovations and

successes, such as its sophisticated organizational and funding model and its ability to harness identity

politics to generate support.

5. Terrorist, non-state and sub-state groups have demonstrated an ability to learn from the experiences of other

groups and adopt successful methods. No matter the eventual fate of ISIL, other irregular and terrorist groups

will likely learn from and utilize many of these methods. This report seeks to identify and forecast the potential

ripple effects that ISIL’s rise will have regionally and globally in the future.




Aim

6. The aim of this report is to apply the Evolved Irregular Threat methodology to the case study of the Islamic

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in order to understand their level of innovation and what broader

implications it will have for the region and beyond.

Scope

7. The scope of this report is develop a case study of ISIL that maps their capabilities across the ‘spectrum of

control’ in order to build a Center of Gravity construct. Using this case study, ISIL will then be examined

comparatively against other advanced sub-national and irregular groups that have established proto-states

and/or near-state like capabilities and the trends identified during previous EIT wargames. This analysis will

be used to assess the key successes and limitations of ISIL’s innovations, and consider broader implication

for those innovations on the region and beyond.

8. The report is divided into three main sections. The first section summarizes the historical case studies and

key findings of previous Evolved Irregular Threat (EIT) analysis. From this, a general analysis of ISIL’s

capabilities will be discussed in relation to the three parts of the ‘spectrum of control’: coercive, administrative

and persuasive. This section will also draw broad comparisons between ISIL and the potential future trends

forecasted during the EIT wargames.

9. The second section will examine ISIL capabilities in more specificity, based on the CoG construct included in

annex C. This section will broadly discuss the key elements of the three identified CoGs: the establishment of

a credible caliphate; their integrated and independent financial resources; and the leveraging of identity

politics and engagement of the disenfranchised. This section will also examine the outcomes of several key

ISIL battles, and the role that innovation could or did play in their success or defeat.

10. Finally, the third section will consider what the legacy of ISIL’s innovations will have on the region and

beyond. No matter the final fate of ISIL, successful innovations will be adopted and adapted by other irregular

groups and those that have helped it to succeed will take lessons from it that they will develop in the future.

11. This analysis is based on open source reporting and unclassified information and is written for an unclassified

audience. As such, it is limited to discussion of ISIL capabilities and actions that have been reported in the

media, presented and published by international and national governments and the research and analysis

undertaken by Noetic, academia, and think tanks.

PART 1: EXAMING ISIL THROUGH AN EITP LENS

Project History

12. The first Evolved Irregular Threat Project was undertaken to broadly inform DOD future technology

development efforts by assessing the operational capabilities of various non-state actors in the current and

future operating environment (circa 2025). The project analyzed how various adversary and friendly

capabilities interact with each other in a measure-countermeasure dynamic at both the tactical and




operational levels of war. The knowledge assembled during the study provided a model for assessing the

capabilities and vulnerabilities of emerging or anticipated threat groups operating across multiple domains in

the urban littoral battlespace. The project also provided a replicable methodology for inexpensively but

rigorously wargaming Red- and Blue team capabilities, especially in an irregular warfare context.

13. The project analyzed ‘evolved irregular threat’ groups – armed sub-state or non-state actors such as military

units, terrorist networks, insurgent movements, militia groups or armed criminal actors including piracy

networks, people/drug/arms smuggling rings or urban gangs – against a spectrum of control, from coercive

(combat capabilities) through administrative (governance capabilities) to persuasive (political and propaganda

capabilities).

14. The study examined Hezbollah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Lashkar-e-Taiba because

historically they represented fiercely capable and flexible organizations by learning to exploit the logistical,

financial, technological, political and economic infrastructure in place as part of the global network of people,

communities, organizations and governments. Thriving off local and global conditions, these groups used

coercive and persuasive tactics to attract popular and financial support to their causes, allowing them to

employ capabilities in ways that have shocked and surprised both state militaries and global audiences. In

some instances, these groups were innovators and diffusors of knowledge and materiel; in others, they

copied, learned or shared best practices across a global network of armed non-state actors where tactical and

technical innovations are quickly developed, distributed and absorbed into operational concepts. Taken

together, the range of capabilities of these groups covers nearly the entire spectrum of combat, governance

and political/propaganda capabilities that armed non-state actors may employ. As such, these groups

provided an excellent model to compare ISIL against.

Key Findings

15. The first study found that the key trends most likely to affect the future warfare environment include constant

hyper global interconnectedness; the ubiquitousness of social and international media; migration patterns

including rapid urbanization in littoral regions and cross-border migration; the presence of virtual diaspora

populations linked to their countries of origin by information technology; and the impact of technological

innovation and diffusion of enemy capability development including the ability of adversaries to rapidly design,

prototype and field capabilities more cost-effectively and at a potentially much faster rate than the U.S.

military. While no single trend will dominate the global future, all of these trends are mutually reinforcing and

will influence the capabilities, priorities and behavior of non-state actors in such a way that markedly reshapes

the future conflict environment.

16. The broad observations from the first Evolved Irregular Threat Project that related to the groups themselves

centered on:

+ Networked Systems and Actors;

+ Virtual Leaders and Organizations;

+ Distributed Enemy Capability Development;

+ Universal Technology Platforms;




+ Lower Barriers to Entry; and

+ Robotics and Increasingly Autonomous Technologies.

ISIL From an EIT Perspective

17. Examing the key findings of the original EIT wargames in light of ISIL’s recent actions highlights some

interesting points of consideration. The previous EIT analysis identified a number of commonalities and trends

that were predicted to become increasingly prominent amongst irregular groups in coming years. Despite the

project focusing on a 2025 timeframe, these trends began appearing within months of the project’s completion

during the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. Both in Libya and subsequently in the early days of the Syrian

conflict, innovative ordinary citizens built potent weapon systems using a makeshift combination of

commercially available technology and surplus military equipment.1 These included, for instance, the

mounting of machine guns2 or rockets

3 onto ATVs which were remotely controlled by a computer game

controller. During the early stages of the Syrian civil war, various groups battled the Assad regime with make-

shift tanks, not dissimilar to those built by Mexican Drug cartels. In some cases, these too employed remote

weapon stations controlled by commercially available computer components4. While the effectiveness and

lethality of these systems is questionable5, they nonetheless demonstrated that irregular groups could and

would innovate in order to close the technology gap when fighting a superior military force.

18. While ISIL’s claim to be a reborn Caliphate is arguable, thanks to the inclusion of many experienced ex-

Baathist party members in its ranks and the seizure of Iraqi government and military equipment it has become

a close approximation of an actual state. It controls territory, manages the economy, generates a relatively

large revenue stream and regulates the population and society it controls.

19. Yet, there has been a comparatively low level of innovation demonstrated by ISIL to date. After the seizure of

Iraqi military bases, it was feared that with access to high-end conventional weapon systems ISIL would be

near unstoppable. Fortunately, the grimmest of these forecasts have not come to pass, and in fact it is since

the seizure of that equipment that they have suffered several high profile and notable military defeats.

20. Air strikes have degraded some of their capabilities, and no doubt the larger equipment’s vulnerability to such

strikes limits ISIL commander’s willingness to deploy them. But despite the high profile defeats, ISIL has

employed those high end capabilities sparingly and it’s military innovations have been limited to evolving

existing techniques (using coordinated armored vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs)) or adopting dated military

tactics (e.g. tunnelling to plant explosives under defensive hard points).

21. In contrast, other irregular groups examined during the previous analysis were able to build effective (within

their own contexts) near-state capabilities without the resources or high end capabilities that ISIL has

1 Alan Taylor, “DIY Weapons of the Libyan Rebels”, The Atlantic, Jun 14, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2011/06/diy-

weapons-of-the-libyan-rebels/100086/ 2 Steve Johnson, “Libyan Rebels Build Nifty Remote Control Guns”, The Firearm Blog, June 23, 2011,

http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2011/06/23/libyan-rebels-build-nifty-remote-control-guns/ 3 John Reed, “Rebel Tech: Four Wheelers and Rockets”, Defense Tech, July 10, 2011 http://defensetech.org/2011/07/10/rebel-

tech-four-wheelers-and-rockets/ 4 Robert Beckhusen, “Playstation-Controlled DIY Tank May Be The Wildest Weapon Yet In The Syria War”, Wired, October 12,

2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/12/rebel-armor/ 5 Mitch Swenson, “Check Out These Homemade Kurdish Tanks: They’re Terrible”, War is Boring, https://medium.com/war-is-

boring/check-out-these-homemade-kurdish-tanks-86459f92e161


http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2011/06/diy-weapons-of-the-libyan-rebels/100086/


http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2011/06/23/libyan-rebels-build-nifty-remote-control-guns/

http://defensetech.org/2011/07/10/rebel-tech-four-wheelers-and-rockets/


http://www.wired.com/2012/12/rebel-armor/

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/check-out-these-homemade-kurdish-tanks-86459f92e161

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/check-out-these-homemade-kurdish-tanks-86459f92e161



acquired. For those groups that did have access to state funding and support, they were able to effectively

employ the technologies in new ways tailored to their threat environment and objectives.

22. It could be countered that ISIL’s has innovated only to the extent it needs to within its own context and that

further innovation is unnecessary to achieve its objectives. This is a valid argument and the hybrid warfare

that ISIL has adopted has proven effective enough that it has not only weathered year-long coalition bombing

campaign, but expanded its reach during that time. But the objective of this analysis is not to identify a specific

defeat mechanism. Rather it is to understand the broader and future implications of ISIL’s approach. Irregular

groups learn from each other’s experiences and adopt successful tactics and techniques. By separating out

capabilities and innovations and examining their potential broader utility, we can develop an idea of

characteristics that will shape other irregular threats in the coming years.

Coercive Capabilities

23. When compared with historical near-state irregular groups ISIL has demonstrated lower levels of combat

innovation. Whereas the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) were able to build a crude air force by

modifying civilian platforms6, ISIL reportedly has several helicopters and even fighter jets

7 (Mi17, UH-60

Blackhawks, MiG-21s8) seized from surrendered Iraqi military bases, yet do not appear to have used them.

Issues of maintenance and military readiness are likely key factors in their limited use, which may be a

reflection of the lack of a state support, a lack of intent or ability to invest in the capability. ISIL has employed

seized heavy artillery, but targeting by U.S. air strikes has degraded their stockpile and their vulnerability

seems to have reduced willingness to deploy on occasion. ISIL has evolved existing tactics to create combat

effects by other means, for instance utilizing waves of suicide bombers in lieu of artillery bombardment and

using armored vehicles as Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIED)9 to reduce the risk that they

are stopped before reaching their target. These tactics may be highly effective, and only possible by a group

with a cadre of deeply committed fighters, but the underlying concept remain essentially conventional. In

effect, it is a different form of preparatory fire against a defensive position prior to an assault.

24. The most distinctive feature of ISIL tactics is its hybrid10

nature, combining conventional and irregular tactics.

This has become the standard approach for irregular groups, but ISIL’s access to higher end conventional

capabilities has reinforced the conventional aspects compared with other groups. The ubiquity of this

approach means that it cannot really be considered innovative, but an optimizing of the approach due to

increased competence of commanders and increased access to more capable weapons. It could also be

argued that while other irregular groups, including those they have fought against, have utilized more

‘innovative’ home made weapon systems, those systems have not always proven effective on the battlefield

and thus ISIL are right not to adopt them. Another potential reason could be that ISIL’s effectiveness and

6 Paul French, “The Tamil Tigers”, Air-force Technology, September 14, 2007, http://www.airforce-

technology.com/features/feature1270/ 7 Dave Majumdar, “Syrian Military Claims to Have Destroyed Two ISIS MiGs”, USNI News, Aviation, October 22, 2014,

http://news.usni.org/2014/10/22/syrian-military-claims-destroyed-two-isis-migs 8 Bill Roggio, “Islamic State Documents Takeover of Syrian Airbase”, Long War Journal, August 27, 2014,

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/08/islamic_state_photos.php 9 “ ISIS Captured 2300 Humvee Armored Vehicles from Iraqi Forces in Mosul”, Agence France Presse, The Guardian, May 31,

2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/isis-captured-2300-humvee-armoured-vehicles-from-iraqi-forces-in-mosul 10

Bryan Price, et al, “The Group that Calls Itself a State The Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State”, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, December 16, 2014, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-the-evolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state


http://www.airforce-technology.com/features/feature1270/


http://news.usni.org/2014/10/22/syrian-military-claims-destroyed-two-isis-migs

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/08/islamic_state_photos.php

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/01/isis-captured-2300-humvee-armoured-vehicles-from-iraqi-forces-in-mosul

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-the-evolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state




territorial gains have meant that they haven’t needed to be innovative to succeed. Yet, they have suffered

defeats in a number of high profile battles (Kobani, Tikrit)11

, where technology could possibly have military

shortcomings. Whether combat innovations could have given ISIL the edge to win in those battles is

instructive either way: if high-end or innovative capabilities could have tipped the battle, then perhaps their

inability to think creatively and adapt is a potential weakness. Conversely, if they are unlikely to have been

decisive, then perhaps we currently place too high a value on irregular innovation.

25. ISIL’s irregular/conventional hybrid approach could be explained by the make-up of the group: a blend of

extremist terrorists and former Baathist state officials. Considering the influx of fighters from around the world

however, it is surprising that there is not a higher degree of creativity evident. Robotics was a key focal point

in the earlier EIT analysis, and Hezbollah has demonstrated12

a range of innovative uses for drones beyond

the filming of propaganda and low level surveillance that ISIL appears to have used them for.13

A key finding

of the EITP report was the risk of homemade precision munitions. It is surprising that ISIL has not attempted

to strap explosives to smaller drones as a makeshift precision weapon in urban combat for instance.

Administrative Capabilities

26. ISIL is certainly not the first irregular group to seek to govern the area they control, but they appear to have

had a more detailed plan than most to achieve it from the outset. The planning was detailed and

comprehensive, and aided by jihadists with long experiences with other groups as well as former Baathists

officials from Saddam Hussein’s regime. They have sought to shape society through not only issuing laws,

religious interpretations and decrees, but in setting up schools and managing the administrative functions of a

ruling government. While their execution and effectiveness at running governmental services may be

questionable14

, in many cases it represented an improvement over existing services15

and their approach will

likely provide a model for others in the future. The establishment of structured and hierarchical governance16

also gives a perception of legitimacy and real depth.

27. One of ISIL’s greatest innovations is the way they have financed and funded their activities17

. Even before it

managed to gain control of large portions of Western Iraq, ISIL was being referred to as the world’s richest

terrorist group18

. Through seizure of primary resource extraction sites, basic refining, smuggling, looting of

antiquities, taxing of populations under their control and seizure of banks and other assets, ISIL has been able

11 Jessica Lewis McFate, “The ISIS Defense in Iraq: Countering an Adaptive Enemy” Institute for Study of Warfare, Middle East

Security Report, no. 27, May 2015, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/isis-defense-iraq-and-syria-countering-adaptive-enemy 12

Peter Bergen, Emily Schneider, “Hezbollah Armed Drone? Militant’s New Weapon”, CNN, September 22, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/opinion/bergen-schneider-armed-drone-hezbollah/index.html?iref=allsearch 13

Abdelhak Mamoun, “Haditha Police shoots down reconnaissance drone belonging to ISIS in western Anbar” for Iraqi News, September 27, 2015, http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/haditha-police-shoots-reconnaissance-drone-belonging-isis-western-anbar/ 14

Ghaid Sary, “Inside Mosul: Residents Recount How IS Took Over Their Lives”, BBC News, Middle East, June 9, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32957861 15

Jeremy Bender “An ISIS defector explained a key reason people continue joining the group” for the Business Insider, Nov 18, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-defector-explains-why-people-continue-joining-group-2015-11 16

Michael Fitzsimmons, “Governance, Identity and Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Ramadi and Tal Afar”, March 2013, Strategic Studies Institute, pp 123-126, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1150.pdf 17

Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), February 2015, www.fatf-gafi.org/methodandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-organisation-isil.html 18

Terrence McCoy, “ISIS Just Stole $425 M, Iraqi Governor Says, and Became the ‘World’s Richest Terrorist Group”, The Washington Post, June 12, 2014 http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/12/isis-just-stole-425-million-and-became-the-worlds-richest-terrorist-group/


http://www.understandingwar.org/report/isis-defense-iraq-and-syria-countering-adaptive-enemy


http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/22/opinion/bergen-schneider-armed-drone-hezbollah/index.html?iref=allsearch

http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/haditha-police-shoots-reconnaissance-drone-belonging-isis-western-anbar/


http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32957861

http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-defector-explains-why-people-continue-joining-group-2015-11

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1150.pdf

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/methodandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-organisation-isil.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/12/isis-just-stole-425-million-and-became-the-worlds-richest-terrorist-group/




to generate large revenue’s19

independently of State backing. This means that ISIL is free to pursue its own

goals free of State-sponsored constraints, limitations or directions. In particular, ISIL’s detailed book keeping20

and expense tracking has been a key characteristic of their approach. While the resources available will differ

in other regions or contexts, ISIL’s planning for administrative governance and approach to revenue

generation and application will likely provide a model for other groups in the future.

Persuasive Capabilities

28. ISIL has become the world’s best known and most infamous terrorist group because of its persuasive

capabilities. Its use of social media to identify and connect with potential supporters; recruit; broadcast its own

narrative; and shock and horrify its adversaries has been well covered21

. At a deeper level, its ability to

develop a cohesive narrative that suit it purposes, produce slick and high quality vehicles for that narrative

(such as its multilingual magazine Dabiq and online videos) and distribute them globally surpasses any other

group in history.

29. Their approach is not without precedent. Other national movements or protest groups (such as Free Tibet

groups and supporters of East Timorese independence) have in the past been very successful in keeping

their issues in the public eye and pushing for political change. Arab groups fighting Israel (Fatah, Hezbollah,

Hamas et al) have long been skilled at manipulating specific incidents and violence generally to their own

ends. Al Qaeda and other Islamic Extremists have used video sermons and violence to spread their message

and gain support for over a decade.

30. But none have exploited the international and social media spheres as effectively or with the degree of

sophistication that ISIL has. In a sense their success again reflects the development and best use of existing

approaches rather than any degree of true innovation, but the scale and style of ISIL’s products represents a

true advancement in what was considered possible by an irregular group. In any case, the use of carefully

developed, targeted and well produced narrative vehicles spread through social and traditional media will be a

model all irregular groups will seek to utilize in the future. The fact that ISIL has also been able to use the

‘terror shock value’ that results from their violent propaganda as a combat multiplier on the ground further

reinforces the benefits of this approach and the success of ISIL’s application of it. In this case, ISIL’s success

validates a key finding of the critical nature of media and social networks that was forecasted during the

earlier Evolved Irregular analysis. In this area at least, ISIL has demonstrated what an evolved irregular threat

will look like.

Networked Systems and Actors

31. This finding from the earlier analysis was based on the nature of the advanced terrorist and irregular groups

over the past decades which had state backing (Hezbollah), global networks of sleeper cells and a focus on

global effects (Al Qaeda) and/ or globally dispersed diaspora with a strong collective identity. The trend

indicated that the global network of agents or sympathizers would expand the actions of a specific group well

19 United Nations, Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, “The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the Al-

Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant: report and recommendations submitted pursuant to resolution 2170(2014)”, November 2014 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/815 20

Hannah Allam, “Meticulous Bookkeeping Bolster’s ISIL’s March on Baghdad”, Sydney Morning Herald, July 4, 2014, http://www.smh.com.au/world/meticulous-bookkeeping-bolsters-isils-march-on-baghdad-20140704-zsvyf.html 21

Jacob Siegel, “ISIS is Using Social Media to Reach YOU, Its New Audience”, The Daily Beast, August 31, 2014 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/31/isis-s-use-of-social-media-to-reach-you-its-new-audience.html


http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2014/815

http://www.smh.com.au/world/meticulous-bookkeeping-bolsters-isils-march-on-baghdad-20140704-zsvyf.html

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/31/isis-s-use-of-social-media-to-reach-you-its-new-audience.html



beyond its borders. The types of dispersed support networks could span the spectrum from relatively benign

political agitation and lobbying (protests, petitions), through criminal (sourcing of illicit goods) to violent action

(a bombing in retaliation for an action). The perceived threat was that any action that occurred regionally

could have drastic immediate implications elsewhere, in effect creating a form of deterrence by the terrorist

group. The key risk was that the actors were geographically unconstrained.

32. The ISIL case study both confirms and subverts this trend. ISIL is defined in large part by its geographic

anchors. It concentrates its force and draws strength from control over physical territory. Is this sense, it

reverses the predicted trend, which assumed that physical terrain was no longer important, and in fact a

liability. Further, ISIL does not have a traditional or easily defined diaspora. It appeals to a broad range of

actors for a range of very different reasons. While there is an obvious religious link, it alone is not sufficient to

explain the connection with all sympathisers, recruits or supporters. It is not universally compelling in the way

national movements can be, and it crosses a broader range of self-interests, cultural and other identities. ISIL

has been very effective in engaging and connecting with each of those different sub-groups, but not in a

homogenous or one dimensional manner.

33. ISIL has actively sought to engage their network of supporters to spread their narrative through-out traditional

and particularly non-traditional/ social media. Sympathizers retweet messages and set up false accounts to

amplify the message. Those living outside the caliphate who have never lived there engage in deep

conversations with potential supporters to engage with them personally and emphasize the element of the

narrative that resonate most strongly to that individual. This tactic has been highly effective and has helped to

establish perceptions of success and credibility, which acts as a force multiplier for their messaging and is a

key attraction for the recruiting foreigners to join their cause.22

34. Regionally they have used their networks to gather detailed human intelligence and established sleeper cells

to spring surprise attacks and seize territory. This approach was a critical element of their early success in

rapid expansion and establishment of their caliphate. It is likely that they have sought to replicate this

approach more broadly throughout the region, the extent of which there network has developed and the risk it

poses is not yet clear.23

But following the string of terrorist attacks by groups claiming some association or

alliance with ISIL, from Turkey to Beirut, to the Sinai, Libya and Paris, it is clear that ISIL sees this networked

capability as a key element of future success. This is reinforced by the magnetism of the ISIL brand that has

drawn declarations of allegiance from other irregular groups, quickly expanding the influence and reach of the

group.

35. The degree of control and coordination of ISIL over those allied groups is not clear. The capabilities of each

also vary drastically. Similarly, while there have been a number of high profile attacks around the globe linked

to ISIL, until recently they appear to have predominately been undertaken by individuals or small groups who

are acting on their own initiative without coordination from ISIL leadership. Certainly ISIL has encouraged

such attacks, and retrospectively claimed association with them, but there has been little indication that they

have a global network of actors that can undertake actions, or indeed a desire to have one. The outcomes of

the investigations into the apparent bombing by ISIL of the Russian Metrojet plane in Eqypt and the

22 Rukmini Calimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young American” in the New York Times, June 27, 2015

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruiting-american.html 23

Bilal Y. Saab, “Can the House of Saud Survive ISIS?” in Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2015 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-06-11/can-house-saud-survive-isis


http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruiting-american.html

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-06-11/can-house-saud-survive-isis



coordinated attacks in Paris may provide evidence that ISIL’s ability to project force and utilize their networks

globally has improved. Whether they were coordinated and generated by ISIL leadership from within the

caliphate or not, the inspiration that ISIL generates for jihadist ‘self-starters’ is still significant.24

Virtual Leaders and Organizations

36. The trend of virtual leaders is inherently linked with the trend of networked systems and actors. In recent

decades, many irregular groups have operated with leadership groups providing their guidance and

coordinating resources virtually, and with their organizations operating in a dispersed manner. One of ISIL’s

key strengths has been the control of physical space and the concentration of its operators and leadership

within the caliphate. As such, the ability to lead and coordinate a virtual network is less important to achieving

their aims. As mentioned above, there are signs that ISIL has a network of sleeper cells throughout the region

that could grow in the future. It is also likely that ISIL could band together self-starter cells in other countries to

quickly form a virtual organization. If in the future ISIL changes its approach and seeks to fund, support and

control other groups virtually, the risk that it poses will increase dramatically.

37. As pressure continues to grow on ISIL within its physical caliphate, it is likely that the importance of virtual

leadership will grow. Already ISIL provides guidance and leadership to its supporters, encouraging them to

inflict violence within their home territories without specific direction from central leadership. To a limited

extent this has been a successful low cost, low payoff approach for ISIL. But if it becomes apparent that ISIL

leadership did have a direct operational link to the recent Paris attacks, it will mark their transition to an

approach more closely associated with Al Qaeda.

38. One key issue that arose during the earlier EIT analysis was the idea that a group could provide virtual

governance or judicial rulings. While ISIL has sought to spread its message and has made new or amended

religious decrees, they have not yet sought to directly influence religious interpretation outside of the areas

they control. The EIT report envisioned a future where virtual or geographically displaced authority figures

would make decisions and pass judgement in local affairs virtually. If ISIL’s influence and credibility grows,

and if communities seek to apply the ideology outside of the areas under their control, then ISIL would be well

positioned to makes this possibility a reality. In effect, they could administer control remotely over citizens in

different countries.

Distributed Enemy Capability Development

39. The ability of sub-state groups to rapidly develop, prototype, test and field new capabilities and technologies

was seen as a critical capability and future threat during the previous analysis. Evidence of sub-state militaries

and transnational criminals building crude submarines, patrol ships, armed aircraft and armored vehicles was

seen as just the beginning of a trend of irregular groups closing the technology gap with more advanced

military forces. As discussed above, despite ISIL attaining advanced, high tech military hardware from raided

Iraqi and Syrian bases, very little of it has been deployed in battle. Even less has been deployed in new or

innovative ways, other than using substituting armored vehicles for ordinary ones in VBIED attacks.

24 Mark Hosenball and Mark Trevelyan “Coordinated Or Not, Attacks Show Islamic State’s Growing Reach” Reuters, Jun 26, 2015 http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/26/us-security-attacks-idUSKBN0P62F420150626?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=twitter


http://blogs.reuters.com/search/journalist.php?edition=us&n=mark.hosenball&

http://blogs.reuters.com/search/journalist.php?edition=us&n=mark.trevelyan&

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/26/us-security-attacks-idUSKBN0P62F420150626?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=twitter




40. It is unclear whether this lack of capability development or technological innovation is because they are

unable to achieve it, or because they do not see a need for it. With the facilities and infrastructure that are

under their control, it is likely that if necessary, ISIL could achieve a significant degree of capability

development. The up-armoring of mining trucks25

as giant VBIEDs would suggest that they have the technical

capability within their organization to undertake substantial mechanical improvements. If ISIL’s control of key

logistics corridors comes under greater pressure or they continue to lose terrain to western supplied rebels,

they may have to. As yet, however, this trend has not been seen to any significant degree and has not made

ISIL significantly more dangerous.

Universal Technology Platforms

41. This trend is another that is evident with ISIL, but has not posed the degree of risk envisioned from the EIT

forecasts. The EIT prediction was that sub-state groups would use cheap crypto equipment for secure

communications, and the same communications infrastructure (internet services, GPS, cellular networks) as

U.S. forces reducing the chance that they would be disrupted. Known as ‘technology hugging’, the U.S. would

not target or disrupt systems that are critical to itself and to civilians, and therefore the irregular group would

be able to use them with little risk of having it destroyed.

42. ISIL has certainly done this, using cell networks to communicate, social media services to broadcast their

message and no doubt GPS for unit coordination. However, the U.S. and its allies do not appear to have

considered degrading those capabilities in its approach thus far and it does not create a significantly greater

capability than what any other irregular group would have access to. Moreover, it has not provided a military

edge or mitigation strategy that has impeded western action. In reality, ‘technology hugging’ poses the

greatest problem to military planning amongst large friendly or civilian populations in dense urban

environments, particularly where an enemy is hiding amongst that population. In the unlikely scenario that the

U.S. would commit large numbers of ground forces and engage ISIL in direct conflict, it would likely be in

areas where such services are already disrupted or degraded, and would not cause significantly greater

suffering to the populations affected by it.

Lower Barriers to Entry

43. As with ‘distributed enemy capability development’ above, ISIL has yet to demonstrate a significant uptake in

many commercially available technologies. This finding considered the possibility of non-state actors

acquiring a more lethal set of capabilities largely as a result of technical innovation, access and diffusion.

Cyber was an area of particular concern. Whereas hackers claiming to be from a number of Syrian factions

have struck out using cyber-attacks, the cyber threat from ISIL has remained largely hypothetical. This is

despite their ubiquitous use of other online tools, such as social media and messaging services. As with the

earlier discussion, the lack of uptake in this area could in large part be accounted for by the lack of need –

ISIL has advanced military equipment and is not currently fighting an enemy with a significant technological

edge over them.

44. There are certainly areas where ISIL has used commonly available technology to achieve more sophisticated

results. The ubiquity of smart phones, with their cameras and social media connections, have been vital in

25 Tyler Rogoway, “ISIS Used This Huge Crudely Modified Truck To Attack A Key Syrian Air Base”, Foxtrot Alpha, Aug 24, 2015,

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/isis-used-this-huge-crudely-modified-truck-to-attack-a-1726246835





ISIL’s messaging and branding. Likewise, the use of high quality consumer video cameras have been an

important element of producing sophisticated videos – elaborate and gory executions are captured with a

multitude of the latest Go-Pro cameras. Commercially available drones have been used for filming, with some

reports of them also being used for battle field reconnaissance. Access to GPS and cell phones would assist

in the coordination of military attacks, but no more than any other irregular group, or civilian camping group.

45. ISIL has used commercially encrypted messaging services as a secure means of communication. ‘Whatsapp’

appears to be widely for both internal and external communication. More recently ‘Telegram’ has emerged as

a particularly useful communication tool for secure messaging. These services definitely count as having a

low barrier of entry, as they are widely available on any smart phone and are used by all segments of society.

It also appears that ISIL’s ability to use these tools is limited to its untampered with commercial form, with little

indication that they modify these tools further. If and when the U.S. and other gain the ability to compromise

these means, ISIL will simply discard that approach and move on to another that performs the same function.

46. One area where technological advances has directly benefited ISIL is in the finance sector. The ability to

communicate and move money anonymously over the internet, and to bypass banking restrictions and

financial sanctions, has enabled ISIL to generate funds from foreign donations. As we assess ISIL’s financing

capabilities to be a key COG, this is an area of significant concern.

Robotics and Increasingly Autonomous Technologies

47. The age of commercial and consumer robotics is at a break out point. There are a multitude of personal

drones available to consumers, mostly orientated towards filming people undertaking leisure activities.

Commercial applications are expanding, from inspecting crops and wild fires to delivering medicines. The idea

of drone delivered pizza or Amazon packages no longer seems fanciful. Yet, the use of drones and robotic

systems by ISIL seems limited. There has been instances of drone use by ISIL, but there is little unclassified

reporting on it. What use has been made appears to be less than other irregular groups (Hezbollah in

particular), who have used robotic and semi-autonomous systems for a range of military applications from

reconnaissance to spoofing opponent radars and testing response times. As yet, ISIL does not appear to

have used robotic systems for anything other than producing propaganda videos and some localized

reconnaissance. This could be an area of significant risk if they broaden their application of the technology.

PART 2: UNDERSTANDING ISIL’S CAPABILITIES

48. Examining ISIL’s individual capabilities in isolation do not give a robust understanding of their competitive

advantages and the likely lessons that other groups will take away from their success. To better understand

the nature of capabilities, we developed a COG construct. Understanding an adversary’s COG is a key

analytical tool for military planners to understand how best to combat and defeat them. COG constructs

enable analysts to determine what capabilities and characteristics enable a non-state actor to maintain

capabilities to wage hybrid warfare. Often, non-state actors may have a state sponsor to provide funding,

training, personnel and weapons, or an active diaspora outside of the theater. Directing action against these

COGs in the military and non-military domain will not only shorten the timeframe and reduce the effort in

combating these groups, but will also make it far more difficult for similar successor groups to replace them.




49. COG constructs consist of a series of deconstructions to identify the elements that constitute a particular

strength and the inherent vulnerabilities that, if disrupted, could undermine that strength. They are broken

down as follows:

50. COG constructs are primarily used to identify potential defeat mechanisms. However, that is not the primary

purpose of this analysis. This analysis has been develop in order to assist in the understanding how the

disparate and multifaceted capabilities ISIL employs combine to generate effects. By dissecting the key

aspects of their success, we can better understand what elements are unique to ISIL’s circumstances and

what may be transferrable or repeatable by other irregular groups in the future.

51. It is worth noting that there have been numerous other analyses which have used a similar approach,

including in support of the same SMA effort. This analysis was undertaken independent of any other and for

the sole purpose of use in this analysis. In some cases the results will differ, as a COG construct is a

subjective analysis influenced by a range of different factors, including methodology, experiences of the

analysts and available information. In other cases, there will be strong correlations. Both outcomes positively

contribute to the collective understanding and of ISIL.

Centre of Gravity Analysis

52. There are numerous interpretations of what a COG is and how the framework should be utilized. The U.S.

doctrinal definition is “The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will

to act.”26

Some interpretations focus on the ‘strength’ aspect and argue that an enemy’s COG should be its

greatest strength. In this analysis, we have interpreted it in a more holistic sense, as a great strength that

would generate the will to fight, and without which the very existence of the opponent as a threat would be

undermined.

53. This analysis identified three ISIL COGs: the establishment of a credible caliphate, their integrated and

independent financial resources and the leveraging of identity politics and engagement of the disenfranchised.

Each of these three elements represents a key foundation of ISIL as we currently understand it. If any one of

these three were significantly impacted to the extent that ISIL needed to change its approach or seek a

different way of achieving its objectives, it would significantly alter the very nature of the organization.

54. One high profile omission from the COG list is media capabilities. Many analysts have assessed this to be a

COG, and sought to identify way to undermine this strength by identifying its inherent critical capabilities,

26 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; Joint Publication 1-02.

November 8, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf

Critical Capabilities

Critical Requirements

Critical Vulnerabilities


http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf



critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities. While this analysis does not disagree with identification of

ISIL’s media capabilities as one of its greatest strengths, this analysis has assessed that the neutralization of

it would not deal an existential blow to ISIL. ISIL’s media capabilities, both in production, broadcast and

ongoing engagement represents a new level of sophistication and efficacy. It is a key element to establishing

their credibility as well as attracting funding and new recruits. It is also used as a force multiplier in combat

and control of the general population. It will no doubt be the bench mark and inspiration for irregular groups in

the future.

55. Losing any element of this capability would represent a significant setback that could hamper ISIL across its

range of operations and its ability to achieve its objectives. In fact, it is a capability that underpins all three of

the COGs identified here and represent critical capabilities for each. But this analysis does not assess that the

loss of that ISIL’s media would convince foreign fighters to go home, ISIL leadership to abandon their ideology

or the Sunni populations of Iraq and Syria to fight back against ISIL rule. A significant loss of any one of the

three COGs identified here, on the other hand, could undermine ISIL’s ability to function in its current form.

For instance, ISIL generates much of its authority and credibility from the perception that it legitimately meets

the requirements of a caliphate. If it lost the control over that territory, or was delegitimized in the eyes of its

supporters, it would need to fundamentally change its structure and operational approach. Similarly, it if lost

its financial independence and needed to turn to another state for support or an alliance, it would contradict its

own assertion of the falsehood of modern states. Lastly, losing the support of the disenfranchised populations

it seeks to exploit would impact every aspect of its operations from its attraction of new recruits to the

broadcasting of its messages around the world.

Establishment of a Credible Caliphate

56. The most critical of ISIL’s COGs is the establishment of a credible Caliphate. While the majority of the global

Islamic population and Islamic Scholars have denounced ISIL’s ideology27

, establishing a credible and

justifiable Caliphate is central to ISIL’s strategy and belief system. ISIL leadership believes that the end times

are imminent and seek to re-establish the caliphate in order to meet the requirements of the Quran’s

prophecy, thereby setting the conditions for the final battle between the armies of ‘Rome’ and Islam.28

The

belief that the end-times are imminent is both a differentiator from other groups, such as Al Qaeda, and a key

motivator for ISIL’s religious extremist core. This belief attracts fundamentalist Muslims who believe the Day of

Judgement of near, and provides an explanation and justification for ISIL’s actions. The existence of a

caliphate triggers additional obligations on all Muslims. Moreover, to proclaim oneself a caliph, and therefore

the leader of all Muslims, requires the ‘authority which stems from control over land.29

57. Meeting the legal requirements of a Caliph is therefore assessed as the first critical capability in this COG

construct. ISIL achieves this because, in contrast to previous ISIL leaders, Al Baghdadi is of the Quraysh tribe

and appropriately educated in religious matters. ISIL have also established Shura and Sharia councils and a

27 Michelle Leung & Ellie Sandmeyer, “Muslim Leaders Have Roundly Denounced Islamic State, But Conservative Media Won't

Tell You That” In Media Matters For America, August 21, 2014, http://mediamatters.org/research/2014/08/21/muslim-leaders-have-roundly-denounced-islamic-s/200498 28

William McCants, The Believer, The Brookings Institution, September 1, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever?utm_content=buffer40489&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer#.VeWnvrpP3iA.email 29

Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants” in The Atlantic, March 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/


http://mediamatters.org/research/2014/08/21/muslim-leaders-have-roundly-denounced-islamic-s/200498


http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever?utm_content=buffer40489&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer#.VeWnvrpP3iA.email


http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/



hierarchy of senior leaders to further solidify their fulfilment of the requirements. In fact, ISIL has established

an entire framework of leaders and governors to govern the area under their control.

58. By declaring a caliphate, with Al Baghdadi as the caliph, ISIL claims authority over all Muslims worldwide and

triggers a number of religious obligations that would otherwise remain dormant. While those who reject ISIL

and their self-proclamations of authority will similarly be unmoved by these obligations (on the ground that

ISIL’s self-proclaimed caliphate is illegitimate), there is still a significant Muslim population on the fringes of

the mainstream who do not naturally fall into the extremist camp, but may be persuaded by a ISIL’s

propaganda that they have true religious legitimacy. In this context, Al-Baghdadi’s religious credentials,

ancestry and tribal associations are of critical importance. Other groups have sought to claim the

establishment of caliphate before, but have not appropriately met the necessary requirements.

59. An equally important critical capability, closely linked with the first, is the control of physical space and a

significant population. Not only is it a key element in establishing the credibility of the caliphate and meeting

religious legal requirements for Baghdadi as a Caliph, but it is key to their propaganda narrative and appeal to

Sunni’s seeking a path back to political empowerment and inclusion. It differentiates them from other jihadi

groups and gives legitimacy to their claims.

60. ISIL is certainly not the first terrorist group to seek to control land. In fact it represents a more traditional

strategy for irregular groups. But it is a significant departure from the ideology and strategic approach of Al

Qaeda, the movement that ISIL grew out of. The decentralized and dispersed approach Al Qaeda took was

specifically intended to avoid the vulnerabilities and burdens that control over land imposed on a group and

reduce the risks from the sophisticated long range strike capabilities of the West. While it is yet to be seen

whether ISIL will be able to sustain the burden of governing such a large population and area in the long term,

the success of the strategy to date will likely influence other irregular groups as they develop their own

strategy.

61. In order to control both the physical space and approximately four million people resident in it, ISIL requires a

large military force. The vast distances, dispersed populations and tactics favoured by ISIL requires significant

mobility which they achieve through a large light infantry force, usually mounted in pick-ups and captured Iraqi

Army Humvees. Estimates of the size of ISIL’s military force range from 15,000 to 30,000 at various times.

This makes it larger than many other irregular groups, and their sophisticated planning and logistics set them

apart from many others which allows them to operate further from their bases. Their ability to control key

corridors and lines of communications are also critical.

62. The support of the local Sunni population is both a consequence of ISIL’s effective control as well as a key

contributor to it. The control of the population is aided through the use of their armed forces as a police force

with appointed religious police to enforce ISIL’s laws and edicts. Use of sleeper cells has been pivotal in

several battles, whereby ISIL supporters and fighters have infiltrated population centers and taken control with

little fighting, allowing their main forces to advance into the territory with minimal resistance. ISIL also

operates a sophisticated intelligence network and can identify and eliminate opposition through their informant

network and secret police.

63. ISIL has demonstrated a range of capabilities that aid both their offensive and defensive operations. Their use

of heavy weapons seized from the Iraqi Army was important in their early operations, though more recently




they have shown a preference for using armored vehicle borne IEDs and tunnelling to degrade defensive hard

points during the assault. Their use of vehicle borne IEDs is a new iteration of established techniques,

employing multiple synchronized and simultaneous VBIED attacks and the armoring of large vehicles

(including mining trucks) in order to carry large quantities of explosives that will survive defensive fire during

its approach. These vehicles are not dissimilar in design to the ‘home made’ armored vehicles developed by

Mexican drug cartels and other Middle Eastern militant groups. The scale and sophistication of the vehicles

ISIL has built are on par with the other groups, demonstrating that they have the technical capacity for make-

shift capability development.

64. Heavy weapons ISIL have in possession and have employed in battle includes tanks (T-55, T-62 and T-72),

protected infantry vehicles (BMPs and MRAPs), Grad Multiple Rocket Launchers and various calibers of

artillery (up to 155 mm). In order to defend key territory they have taken ISIL have also demonstrated the use

of mines, booby traps/ IEDs, employment of snipers and reportedly chemical weapons.30

65. After taking control of an area, ISIL has been quick to establish their own rule of law. Many Islamic irregular

groups impose a form of sharia law on populations they control, but here again ISIL has elevated it to a new

level. As stated above, Al Baghdadi is a knowledgeable Islamic scholar and played a central role in ensuring

the coherence and legitimacy of ISIL’s religious views before becoming its leader31

. ISIL has swept away

centuries of Islamic jurisprudence and has actively worked to promulgate and enforce their own

interpretations and decrees. While the vast majority of the global Islamic populations and academics reject

these interpretations, ISIL has invested time and effort into ensuring that, to their target audience at least,

their religious interpretations appear legitimate.

66. ISIL has rapidly established their own religious courts and used religious police forces within their territory to

enforce their rule of law, brutally punishing any transgressions. This approach has a number of effects. Most

obviously the brutal imposition of their own laws has a psychological impact on the controlled population,

creating fear of ISIL retribution and discouraging any dissent or disobedience. It further reinforces their

reputation and perception as a conquering force. More broadly, in the ungoverned spaces that ISIL has

expanded into it creates an effective authority and provides clear and enforceable rules where few may have

previously existed. While brutal, this authority creates stability and predictability and ensures the population

somewhere to take their grievances.

67. ISIL’s societal control goes beyond rules and laws. From the outset ISIL leaders developed detailed and

sophisticated plans to infiltrate, map and spy on target populations and communities. They identified persons

and institutions that could create resistance so that they could be quickly eliminated. Detailed files were

developed on key community leaders and prominent families to understand their allegiances and political

sympathies, wealth and any indiscretions that could be used to black mail them.32

Once ISIL gained control in

an area, personnel of utility to the group were co-opted and forced to take sharia courses before being put

30 Raja Abdulrahim, “Islamic State Accused of New Chemical Weapons Attack in Syria” in The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 23, 2015

http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-accused-of-using-chemical-weapons-in-syria-1440353562 31

William Mcants, The Believer, A Brookings Essay, September 1, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever?utm_content=buffer40489&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer#.VeWnvrpP3iA.email 32

Christoph Reuter, “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State” in Spiegel Online, April 18, 2015 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html


http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-accused-of-using-chemical-weapons-in-syria-1440353562



http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html



back to work to ensure delivery of key services. Secular education was eliminated and replaced by ISIL’s own

schools, as ISIL sought to bring the local youth under their influence.

68. ISIL’s surveillance and intelligence web has been a key tool for population control. From the outset, no

individual or group has been entirely sure whether they are under surveillance and by whom. Highly detailed

profiles and record keeping has been used to target individuals and groups either for elimination or co-option.

It has also been a key tool for the spreading of anxiety and fear, and has effectively dismantled any node of

potential resistance to the group in areas it controls. While this approach is not new – it actually follows a

similar methodology to Soviet security apparatus - it may in fact be the most effective application of such

techniques by an irregular group.

69. The sophisticated communication capabilities of ISIL have been central to any discussion of the group’s

success, and with good reason. While it follows the tradition of many other Islamic irregular militant groups of

using online graphic videos, recorded sermons and regular glossy magazines to spread its message, the

sophistication and reach of ISIL’s communications efforts is at least a generation ahead of any other group.

This is a critical capability for establishing the credibility of its caliphate as it broadcasts their military

successes, religious justifications for their actions and show flattering perspectives of life under their control.

In short, it allows them to control their own narrative and drive the discussion, at least to their target audience.

70. The requirements that underpin this capability are substantial. They require the development and production

of multilingual official propaganda across mediums, including written, video, online and through social media.

To achieve this, they require religious experts and writers capable of effectively framing their arguments and

writing convincing articles. They also need technically skilled personnel such as spokesmen, editors, graphic

designer, photographers and videographers along with many others who are capable of producing material on

par with a mid-level media company. Finally, they need a large and motivated group of dispersed supporters

to engage their target audience through social media platforms.

71. The ability to frame their position, control narrative and communicate their values to a global audience is

critical in an age of information dominance. It was been a key element in enabling them to generate financial

support (both from donors and exploiting kidnapped foreign nationals) and recruit significant numbers of

fighters. Most importantly, however, it creates a perception of a sophisticated and professional organization

that gives credibility and legitimacy to their cause.

72. An additional way that ISIL reinforces the credibility of their caliphate as a quasi-state is to adopt many of the

trappings and prerogatives of one. They have mimicked legitimate states by dividing areas into provinces

(Wilayas), established ministries and appointed governors and other official sounding appointments across a

range of administrative functions including those relating to trade, law and security. They issue precious metal

coins as currency and impose ISIL issued ID cards and official documents on their controlled populations.

Their control and provision of public services, including education, water and rubbish collection all reinforce

the image of a functioning governing body – at least in comparison to the lack of services provided by the

respective recognized central governments. They use clearly identifiable symbols and icons that has the

additional benefit of reinforcing their brand image. These include appropriating the Islamic ‘Black Banner’ and

other symbols associated with Muhammed to imply that they are a true successor of Islamic heritage. While

ISIL does not appear to have used them widely, by clothing soldiers in their propaganda videos in tailored

military uniforms, along with prisoners in orange jump suits, reinforces the perception of a modern state. While




this capability does not provide a tangible military effect, it is a critical element in the branding and messaging

of ISIL and in reinforcing the perception of the caliphate as a legitimate entity.

73. The final critical capability for this CoG is ISIL’s regulation of economic activity within its territory. This

capability provides a dual benefit as it increases their societal control while ensuring generation of funds.

There are a number of key requirements necessary for ISIL to achieve this economic control. Their control

over the population allows them to set and enforce standards, quality controls and rules for trading. As an

ancillary, this provides another control mechanism for ISIL to impose religious constraints on the population.

Moreover, by establishing and maintaining stable (if exploitative) monetary policies and controlling the

distribution of certain products, ISIL provides the average person with the structure they need to effectively

function in their day-to-day lives. As has been seen in Afghanistan with the Taliban, for many in impoverished

rural areas the imposition of a stricter set of laws can be an acceptable trade-off to stability and clear

economic rules.

74. ISIL generates funds from economic activity in a wide variety of ways, from extortion to the paying of religious

fines. But the taxing of trade and the salaries of government workers pay is significant. Most importantly, and

the factor differentiates ISIL from many other groups, is the technical and administrative skills it has to run the

bureaucracy and bookkeeping necessary to effectively tax the population. Further, it can set production goals,

distribute commodities and services, regulate trade (including cross border) and apply resources to provide

public services. ISIL’s efficiency and direct management of trade is epitomized by their establishment of

separate lanes for trucks transporting different commodities (agricultural, electronic etc).33

Integrated, Independent Financial Resources

75. The second CoG this analysis identified was ISIL’s integrated and independent financial resources. ISIL’s

funding levels has been notable since before it declared its caliphate. As soon as it began to emerge in its

latest iteration ISIL has been referred to as the richest terrorist group in the world.34

ISIL is distinctive in that it

has been able to independently raise funding on par with state-backed groups. There are plenty of ways that

irregular and sub-state groups can generate funding, but their levels of funding are usually limited unless they

are deeply involved in criminal activities (such as narcotics production and smuggling) or have state

sponsorship. The independent nature of ISIL’s financing means that they are not influenced or constrained by

the political agenda of another state, and therefore unconstrained by the need to conform to international

norms.

76. What is also strikingly significant about ISIL funding model is its diversity. It generates income from the usual

sources such as foreign donations, extortion of the population under its control and the kidnapping and

ransom of foreign nationals. But it also exploits natural resources and cultural artefacts. Individually, none of

these revenue generating activities is new or unique, but the scale, sophistication and diversity will provide

key lessons to future groups. For these reasons, among others, limiting ISIL’s funding streams has been very

difficult. Finally, as with their media activities, the technical skill and sophistication of those managing the

groups finances is remarkable.

33 Mitchell Prothero, “Islamic State issues fake tax receipts to keep trade flowing” for McClatchy D.C., September 3, 2014

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/middle-east/article24772591.html 34

Amanda Macias and Jeremy Bender, “Here's How The World's Richest Terrorist Group Makes Millions Every Day”, in Business Insider, Aug 27, 2014 http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-worlds-richest-terrorist-group-2014-8


http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/middle-east/article24772591.html

http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-worlds-richest-terrorist-group-2014-8



77. This strategy has long been ingrained in the group and was a key feature in many of the group’s early tactics

and approaches. Even before Al Baghdadi took over ISIL and it launched its current expansion, ISIL had in

place a sophisticated corporate-style bureaucracy that was able to accurately track expenditures and

determine fighters compensation based on factors such as family size.35

The independent and diversified

nature of ISIL’s funding are critical to their resiliency and long term sustainability, and uniquely possible

because of their level of bureaucratic competence.

78. The criticality of generating funds is obvious. Money buys weapons and capabilities for a group to achieve its

objectives. Targeting a terrorist or insurgent group’s funding is a critical approach in defeating it. In the case of

ISIL however, this key strength may also provide an even more of a critical vulnerability. ISIL’s greatest

financial commitment is paying its soldiers, and while many are motivated by religion, it is unlikely that they

would be able to hold together as motivated and effective a fighting force if they were unable to pay salaries.

ISIL also offers and distributes non-monetary incentives to its fighters, but the inability to cover salaries would

likely cause a rapid degradation in their combat ability and limit its attractiveness to new recruits. Furthermore,

ISIL is reportedly already struggling to provide essential services in some areas, and constriction of funding

would amplify the challenge. This would degrade the perception of ISIL as a legitimate state and alternative to

national governments, and risk undermining support from local communities. In short, dislocating this CoG

would have a significant impact on the first CoG as well.

79. ISIL’s greatest revenue generation comes from the seizure of oil wells and refineries in Northern Syria and

Western Iraq. This has allowed them to generate approximately 44,000 barrels per day in Syria and 4,000 per

day in Iraq, for an estimated daily income of $1-3 million (selling at below market rates).36

It is not unusual for

irregular groups to target natural commodities as a source of income. From illegal logging in South East Asia

and South America to diamond and other mines in Africa, they are often a key source of revenue. The scope

of ISIL’s seizure of oil production facilities is nonetheless remarkable. ISIL has generated profit from selling

the crude and refined oil it has seized at refineries and oil pipelines, and to a lesser degree, continued to

pump and refine itself. The former approach netted large financial gains during ISIL’s expansion, but offered a

finite opportunity. The latter offers ongoing revenue generation but is limited by kinetic degradation of facilities

by coalition bombing and the limited availability of technically trained personnel to maintain operations. In

most cases, former oil field employees appear to have been coerced into assisting ISIL at oil worksites, with

little evidence of ISIL attracting outside expertise.37

Much of the ongoing refining appears to have been

undertaken by smaller, make-shift and mobile refining operations which also limits the overall output. Some of

the refined products must also be used for vehicles and power generation within the caliphate, further

reducing the stocks available for sale in the future.

80. Oil is not the only commodity or industrial base that ISIL has sought to leverage, though it is its most profitable

one. Other mineral resources and natural commodities has also been targeted and exploited, but it is

agriculture that is arguably ISIL’s second most strategically important industry. Continued production of

35 Hannah Allam, “Records show how Iraqi extremists withstood U.S. anti-terror efforts” for McClatchy D.C., June 23, 2014,

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/middle-east/article24769573.html 36

Louise Shelley, “Blood Money: How ISIS Makes Bank” in Foreign Affairs, November 30, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2014-11-30/blood-money 37

United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 13 November 2014 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning AL-Qaida and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2014/815, November 14, 2014



https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2014-11-30/blood-money



agricultural products is key for the ongoing health and sustainability of the caliphate’s economy and for

feeding both their soldiers and the general population. Evidence indicates ISIL calculated the importance of

this industry from the start of their expansion and targeted key equipment and facilities from the outset to

ensure it was effectively leveraged to their ends.38

81. There are a number of other key capabilities that underpin ISIL’s ability to leverage domestic local industry. In

order to monetize the outputs, ISIL needs a network or transportation modes and traders to move the goods

and sell them at market. ISIL’s control of key routes is clear from any map of the area under their control, and

has been elaborated on in other studies as part of the SMA effort. While the threat of airstrikes poses a risk to

the transportation of those goods, it is unlikely that coalition ordinance would be expended on such low value

targets. Despite control of many key border crossings (recent losses to the Kurdish forces along the

Turkish/Syria border notwithstanding) ISIL has demonstrated an ability and willingness to utilize smuggling

routes and black markets for trading. This also requires the existence of buyers in foreign and potentially

hostile territories willing to purchase their commodities, and in some cases the acquiescence of neighboring

countries to ignore that trading.

82. While commodities are ISIL’s greatest source of revenue, they also generate significant revenue from the

taxation and extortion of the local population. This taxation takes many forms, including taking a percentage of

the salaries paid by the respective central governments to civil servants, forced taxation of Christians and

other minority groups in order avoid conversion to Islam, protection money from local businesses and

institutions and taxing of trade within their territory. Even prior to its capture, ISIL was generating up to $12

million a month from Mosul alone. This is further enhanced by sophisticated taxation systems that taxes trade

in and around the their region of control, even going so far as to issue fake tax receipts to maintain trade

flows.39

83. A well-documented, and often mourned, source of ISIL revenue has been the monetization of heritage and

cultural assets. Plundering of heritage sites has long been a feature of war. Islamic militant groups such as

the Taliban have previously destroyed significant cultural and heritage sites in the past on religious grounds.

But no group in recent history has successfully monetized that destruction to the extent that ISIL has. ISIL has

managed to set up international smuggling networks and black markets to move plundered antiquities out of

their area of control and to sell to collectors and museums for tens of millions of dollars. The trade is so

lucrative that ISIL set up a ‘Ministry of Antiquities’ to better profit from it.40

84. Donations from foreign backers is a common avenue for terror group funding and ISIL is no exception.

Though to date this has been one of the least significant revenue streams for the group, as oil production is

degraded by air strikes and they lose their supply of ransom victims, it may become an increasingly important

way to close funding gaps. This capability relies on complicit legal and illicit financial systems, interlocutors to

smuggle in physical cash and a willing group of foreign donors with sufficient means to donate. It is likely the

rise of crypto currencies and other innovative currency exchange technologies are also of great utility to the

group.

38 Christopher Reuter, op cit

39 Charles Lister, “Cutting off ISIS' Cash Flow” For Brookings, October 24, 2015

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/10/24-lister-cutting-off-isis-jabhat-al-nusra-cash-flow 40

Louisa Loveluck, “Islamic State sets up 'ministry of antiquities' to reap the profits of pillaging” in The Telegraph, May 30, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11640670/Islamic-State-sets-up-ministry-of-antiquities-to-reap-the-profits-of-pillaging.html


http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/10/24-lister-cutting-off-isis-jabhat-al-nusra-cash-flow

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11640670/Islamic-State-sets-up-ministry-of-antiquities-to-reap-the-profits-of-pillaging.html




85. ISIL’s financial success has not just stemmed from revenue generation. Their seizure of assets in the territory

they take control of also reduces the degree of expenditure necessary to achieve their goals. In some cases,

the violent seizure of assets is a revenue generation activity in itself, such as gold and currency from banks

(believed to be more than $500B from Mosul’s banks alone). In addition, they have seized stockpiles of

commodities, such as refined petroleum products as well as the production infrastructure necessary to

continue to produce them. None of this is new, innovative or different from various irregular groups throughout

history. The significance, once again, stems from the early identification and deliberate targeting of banks,

factories and other sites as key for the future success of the group.

86. On a more specific level, ISIL had mapped out where wealth and assets were located on a family basis so

that they could target wealthy families and institutions for exploitation. Beyond currency and valuable items,

property and luxury goods have been seized and used as rewards and bonuses to foreign fighters. This is

turn also acts as a recruiting tool to attract more fighters to their caliphate.

87. The violent seizure of potential valuable assets is not limited to money. ISIL is estimated to have raised

around $20 million last year from the capture and ransom of European and other foreigners. While some of

those captured have been publicly and brutally executed for publicity purposes, ISIL has shown that its desire

to create outrage is balanced with a pragmatic desire to generate revenue. The capture and ransom of

foreigners has long been a source of revenue for groups from South American guerrillas to Somali pirates, but

ISIL has reinforced its ongoing utility.

88. Of most significance, however, has been the seizure of military arms and ammunition from the Syrian and

Iraqi government. Particularly in the Iraq where U.S. military aid supplied the Iraqi military, this has meant the

acquisition of advanced and sophisticated military equipment not available to most irregular groups. This not

only provides capability beyond what a non-state backed irregular force can hope to acquire, it also eliminates

the cost of purchasing sufficient arms and ammunition to supply their troops. The circumstances that have led

to this outcome are somewhat unique – an unstable government with large supplies of sophisticated modern,

recently provided military hardware combined with a brittle military force liable to run away from the advancing

force. But it is nonetheless a significant lesson for other groups to learn and one that has been critical in ISIL’s

success to date. Without the need to expend funds in acquiring arms and ammunition (not to mention the

potential difficulty of finding willing arms suppliers), ISIL has been able to focus their expenditure on

personnel.

89. The third aspect that underpins this CoG is ISIL’s financial management. Once again, ISIL’s technical

administrative competence has maximized the utility and value of the funds they’ve generated to achieving

their ends. From the outset, ISIL has used sophisticated accounting and bookkeeping infrastructure to pay

fighters, track revenue collection from diverse sources and expend those funds to deliver public services and

achieve key objectives.

90. The funds have been used to not only pay its fighters wages above that of other rebel groups or national

government employees, approximately $400 per month, but also to provide public services, wages of

teachers and other public officials41

, pay bribes and to assist or pay off allied or rival militant groups.

41 S.B. “Where Islamic State gets its money” in The Economist, January 4

th, 2015, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-

explains/2015/01/economist-explains


http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/01/economist-explains




91. There are a number of underlying critical requirements that are necessary for ISIL to be successful in this

beyond sufficient funds to disperse. Competent managers at every level, clear guidance and training for those

managers. Corrupt officials willing to take bribes, smugglers willing to accept the risks of transporting goods,

strong market demand for their commodities (including Syrian, Kurdish and Turkish enemies in need of their

oil supplies), and neglected border controls are all necessary for the ongoing sustainability of this approach.

Leveraging Identity Politics and Engaging the Disenfranchised

92. The third CoG this analysis has identified is ISIL’s ability to leverage identity politics and engage

disenfranchised populations to support their cause. This is a broad description of the success ISIL has had in

gaining support and notoriety, and it covers many different aspects. While those facets may not intuitively

seemed linked, it is the combination of several factors combined that has created such overwhelming

success. As such, it must be understood as a whole if it is to be effectively addressed. Some of the

confluence of factors are unique to ISIL and its environment, but others exemplify growing trends that will be

important in understanding what comes after.

93. The more is known about ISIL, the more it becomes clear that the latest incarnation of the group is being led

by highly competent planners with well-developed strategies for achievement of their goals. These were

effectively implemented, and the group’s fait accompli takeover of parts of Western Iraq were the result of

years of planning. It is impossible to say whether a stronger or more inclusive Iraqi government would have

been successful in resisting ISIL’s advance or whether ISIL would have even survived if the Syrian civil war

had not broken out. But it can be confidently said that the vacuum of effective and inclusive governance in the

areas that ISIL now controls was a key factor in the speed and success of ISIL’s early expansion. ISIL is

highly effective at identifying potential or extant societal gaps, and then exploiting them for their own gain. The

current generation of ISIL leaders are in many ways a product of the turbulence that has been a feature of the

Middle East since the 2003 fall of the Saddam Hussein government. Its ideology thrives in that environment,

and it will continue to take advantage of further ungoverned spaces that arise.

94. In some ways, this has been reinforced by the fact that ISIL is not the primary concern of any one key national

actor. While ISIL appears to have actively antagonized and attacked every neighboring country, they have

managed to be only the second largest concern each of them. The complex multi-polarity of the region means

every national and sub-national entity has at least one other threat that they consider to be of greater concern

that ISIL. This has meant that despite the bombing campaign against them, they are not always the key

targets (e.g. U.S. targeting of Jabhat Al Nusra in early sorties, Turkey targeting PKK positions) and the

campaign has lacked unity of effort and maintenance of a central aim. Whether by deliberate plan or not, ISIL

has managed to remain slightly lower on the risk threshold of every major opponent, which has allowed them

some degree of freedom of action and alleviated pressure from their forces.

95. ISIL has been able to amplify their reach and influence through inspiring allegiance from, allying with or

coercing other militant groups throughout the region. Amongst the many affiliated, allied and supported

groups outside of the contiguous caliphate, the exploitation of ungoverned spaces has also been a critical

feature. Many of these areas, including Nigeria, Libya, Afghanistan and Yemen, have also recently, or are still

experiencing, some form of recent conflict or exist in areas long neglected by central governments. In some of

these cases, well established groups who are the primary instigator in the conflict have aligned with ISIL (such




as Boko Harem), while in others ISIL has sought to ally with or co-opt groups and individuals in existing multi-

polar conflicts (such as in Afghanistan and Yemen).

96. It would be dangerous, however, to assume that ISIL and its affiliates are simply opportunists that only target

areas of existing chaos. It is clear that ISIL identified the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq as the best

opportunity for them to remerge as an openly insurgent force and developed a specific strategy to create the

instability that would provide them with favourable conditions.42

This proved to be a highly effective strategy

against a central government already struggling to provide effective governance and facing difficult sectarian

tensions. It is not yet clear whether ISIL has the capacity to replicate this approach against a stronger, more

capable political entity, though there are indications they may be seeking to do so in some Gulf countries. If

they are able to replicate this approach against stronger political entities, it will represent a dangerous new

evolution of their capabilities. Until then, it must be assumed that any weak central government with a

population sympathetic to jihadist goals is a possible target to similar outbreaks of instability.

97. The partnering with other militant groups is a key aspect of the ISIL story. Within ISIL’s main areas of

operation in Iraq and Syria, the absorption of other militant groups has been an important source of fighters

and increased territorial control. The perception of ISIL’s success to date is a key motivator for many of the

groups, and a result not only of their military competence but also their media and public relations capabilities.

98. There are a wide range of motivations for other militants to align with ISIL and not all groups align out of

shared ideology. Many local militant groups have either been coerced into fighting with ISIL, or are doing so

for pragmatic reasons or political expediency. But the combination of projected values, self-definition and on

the ground success has successfully drawn other groups to their cause. The fact that multiple, independent

groups have sought to align themselves with ISIL indicates that their publicly stated aims resonate with a

large portion of local fighters and the broader jihadi community. Moreover, ISIL has the organizational

structure, flexibility and competence to effectively manage the various relationships.

99. It is unclear the degree of support and coordination ISIL provides to the groups from other regions who have

sworn allegiance. The degree of training, funding and advisors supplied to each would depend on the context.

In Nigeria, Boko Harem are an established group that operate independently. In Afghanistan, it is likely that

ISIL is providing more direct support, in part to gain access to the drugs trade. In the Sinai Peninsula and

Libya, the answer is probably somewhere in between: absorbing existing groups but likely providing advisors

and potentially material support. As has been a prominent aspect of ISIL’s success in the other CoGs, their

bureaucratic competence is again a critical capability. It has given them the capability to manage the various

relationships and alliances that allowed the creation of a network of affiliated jihadist groups.

100. For individuals, ISIL’s message effectively engages with target populations because it connects with both real

struggles and perceived injustices. Since ISIL and its previous incarnations have been central to the growth of

sectarian violence in Iraq over the past decade, it is unsurprising that they have also benefited heavily from it.

ISIL’s message of the threat posed by Shia militia and the oppression suffered by Sunnis has been aided by

the actions of both the Syrian and Iraqi governments, and the actions of Iran and the Shia militia’s has

reinforced it. It plays up the Sunni population’s feelings of disempowerment and persecution to engage

populations that would otherwise reject their ideology and tactics. No matter the origin of the sectarian

42 William McCants, “Inside the ISIS Blueprint for Winning”, for The Daily Beast, September 29, 2015,

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/29/inside-the-isis-blueprint-for-winning.html





tensions or the degree to which ISIL is an instigator or manipulator of them, for many Sunnis in Iraq, ISIL

currently represents the best chance of regaining political power and security in the near term.

101. Moreover, ISIL has managed to globalize regional political differences into a struggle that appeals to the

disengaged around the world. The message it broadcasts is sufficiently multifaceted that it resonates with

different demographics for different reasons. Many other ideological or religious terrorist groups have gained

supporters from around the world, but ISIL has managed to do it with such scope and fervour that they have

created a form of virtual diaspora akin to that usually associated with national identity. The power of the

diaspora, and its ability to generate funding, acquire weapons and provide political pressure, is evident in

previous irregular group case studies, from the IRA to LTTE. ISIL has somehow turned religious and

ideological supporters into a shared identity that crosses many different demographics.

102. The motivations for supporting and even joining ISIL vary widely. They include true religious believers,

adventure seekers, criminals looking for new opportunities and lonely teenagers who have been engaged by

charismatic social network users. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to delve deeply into each, but it is

important to note that ISIL has managed to develop a multifaceted narrative that is able to have great impact

with different audiences depending on their context and perspective. It has been able to offer meaning to

different types of disenfranchised people from diverse walks of life. To supporters it represents not just the

fulfilment of a religious prophecy, but a chance for redemption; an opportunity to achieve greatness; an

alternative to Western values and way of life; or just an opportunity for adventure and spoils.

103. Despite the heavy religious overtones of ISIL’s propaganda, the number of recruits motivated to join ISIL for

religious reasons may be limited. A minority of those who have sought to move to ISIL’s caliphate are well

educated, such as doctors and engineers. Young foreign fighters, many with dual-nationality and originating

from over 100 countries, make up a large portion of ISIL’s fighting force. The rest are drawn from local

populations, either through integration of local affiliates, recruiting from prisons or by drafting local villagers.

Many of those who have joined lack a deep or sophisticated understanding of Islam,43

and in some case ISIL

recruiters have actively sought to discourage potential recruits from engaging with moderate, mainstream

Muslim communities.

104. Whatever the motivating factors are to join the movement, ISIL has benefited from an interlinked and

interconnected global society where recruits and supporters have been able to travel relatively easily to their

caliphate, aided by reliable commercial transportation throughout the region and loose border controls.

Combined with powerful broadcast means in social media, a large support base of sympathisers willing to

amplify their message and sophisticated media production capabilities, ISIL has been able to globalize their

struggle more powerfully than any group before it.

105. ISIL’s brutal tactics and emphasis on violence is central to their notoriety. This has been a key aspect to their

strategy from the start and is based on significant academic discussion within the jihadist community on how it

should be employed and the benefits that can be expected from it. This approach serves a broad range of

functions from recruiting new supporters to acting as a combat multiplier by instilling perceptions of invincibility

in their opponents causing them to flee the battlefield. They achieve this effect through the creation and

broadcast of regularly produced, sophisticated videos depicting battlefield success, terror attacks and

43 United Nations Security Council, Op Cit




execution of their enemies. The ability of their intelligence network to identify and target key opponents, and

the use of suicide bombings outside their areas of control further reinforce the perception of their capability

and reach.

106. One area of competitive advantage ISIL has over other self-proclaimed caliphates is a perception of

legitimacy. By meeting the legal requirements, as described in the first CoG above, ISIL gains a perception of

authority and legitimacy that reinforces their message. In the process, it triggers obligations on the global

Muslim population that would otherwise remain dormant. The majority of the Muslim population rejects ISIL’s

caliphate as being illegitimate, it also rejects these obligations. But for those with extremist leanings or

sympathies, or are easily persuaded by propaganda, it is a powerful recruiting tool that can influence those

who would not otherwise feel compelled to act.

Analysis of key battles

107. ISIL’s expansion and rapid rise has in large part been as a result of military success. It has won a number of

high profile battles that have routed their enemies and enabled rapid expansion to claim control of an area

roughly the size of the United Kingdom. This success has been achieved through a hybrid warfare approach

that uses both conventional and irregular tactics as the situation necessitates. As noted above, the evolution

of these tactics represents an iterative development of well-proven techniques. While they have for the most

part been effective, over the past year there have been some notable and high profile defeats. An analysis of

these battles, contained in annex D, is useful for understanding areas where technological innovation could

have assisted ISIL.

108. There are several common themes in ISIL’s notable successes, particularly in Mosul, Ramadi and Palmyra.

First, the use of human intelligence, particularly through sleeper cells within the cities, allowed identification of

key targets. A thorough understanding of the opposition they faced in those cities along with prepositioned

forces capable of seizing key terrain at the outset of fighting was also critical. The accurate identification and

rapid seizure of critical infrastructure made their advanced a fait accompli, and when combined with their

terror shock tactics, made resistance by the defensive forces appear futile.

109. The use of effective human intelligence was combined with effective communications through long range

radios and the use of numerous, coordinated VBIEDs strikes to eliminate or degrade key defensive positions

and create a psychological effect on defenders. The use of VBIEDs by ISIL is of particular interest. This has

been a ubiquitous tactic by irregular and terrorist groups against better armed opponents in the Middle East

over the past decade. Even before the invasion of Iraq, it was a tested and proven approach. ISIL’s has

developed the tactic further, however, by utilizing protected vehicles to better assure a successful strike

against the intended target, and the use of coordinated, simultaneous strikes at the outset of a battle.

110. The up-armoring of vehicles for this purpose is one of the few examples where ISIL has demonstrated a

home-grown engineering capability on par with bench mark irregular groups. The vehicles used have ranged

from seized military armored personnel carriers, to the up-armoring of mining trucks. While not particularly

innovative, the technique has been effective. In at least one case, ISIL has used an opportune weather storm

to cover its attack, providing protection against coalition air strikes and mitigating their technological and

military vulnerabilities.




111. ISIL’s vulnerability to coalition airstrikes, unsurprisingly, has been a key vulnerability. This was most evident

in the battles for Kobane and Irbil where supplies, fighting formations, artillery and vehicles were all targeted

and effectively undermined ISIL’s advantages against the defending Kurdish forces. But coordination of the

Kurdish units, allowing flanking of ISIL strong points, and a lack of capabilities for fighting in urban

environments also hampered ISIL. The sophisticated coordination of a superior force was the key factor in

ISIL’s defeat in Tikrit.

112. It would appear that ISIL’s greatest mitigation strategy to the vulnerability to coalition airstrikes is conceptual

rather than technological. They move in numbers small enough to fall below a value threshold for aerial

bombing, attack outlying positions and use weather to cover assaults. It may also be using the constrained

nature of coalition operations to draw attention to an expected battle, providing freedom of movement

elsewhere.44

In addition, ISIL has established a tunnel system under some captured cities in order to provide

protection, undetectable movement between buildings and to store supplies. While not as sophisticated as

those developed by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, they on par with other irregular groups.45

The existence

of such tunnels further demonstrates ISIL’s engineering capacity, and ability to identify and develop mitigation

strategies to compensate against their vulnerabilities.

113. Nonetheless, there are still areas where enhanced technology or innovative ideas could enhance ISIL’s

technological capabilities and limit their inherent vulnerabilities. The threat of airstrikes and the challenges of

urban combat emphasize the need for small, agile units. ISIL would therefore be well served by increasing the

lethality of tactical their groups. In particular, providing increased indirect fire and area weapons systems

would allow them to operate more independently. While ISIL has used cheap drones for surveillance

missions, it is surprising they have not attempted to fit them with a small explosive payload to create an

improvised guided or ‘smart’ strike weapon. This would not be effective against large targets, but would be

useful for striking at specific positions and if used in large numbers could have a significant psychological

effect. Improvised or homemade GBAD weapons featured prominently in previous EIT wargames, and it is

surprising that the capability has not been further developed since that time.

114. Similarly, home-made robotic weapon carriers were forecasted to be a prominent and critical capability and

saw some development in the Libyan conflict in 2012. Considering the resources available to ISIL, and the

challenges of urban terrain they continue to fight in, it is surprising that they have not developed such a

capability for themselves. A remotely controlled ATV with a machine gun or rocket launcher mounted on it

does not seem beyond their engineering scope, and would provide small units in urban terrain a useful

capability.

115. While intelligence gathering has been a key feature in ISIL’s success to date, there are still areas where it

could be further improved. Improved signals capability for intercepting and jamming enemy communications

would have been useful capabilities in several battles, and if sophisticated enough, might even be able to

further mitigate the risk of coalition airstrikes. Longer range radios and more sophisticated radio encryption

tools would also be necessary in larger military encounters against more hardened opposition.

44 Ahmed Meiloud, “This is how IS survived a year of bombing and ground war” in Middle East Eye, June 2, 2015,

http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/how-survived-year-bombing-and-ground-war-1619065958#sthash.whU0aspm.dpuf 45

Associated Press, “ISIS Dug Network of Tunnels Under Conquered Iraqi City of Sinjar” in NBC News, November25, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-dug-network-tunnels-under-conquered-iraqi-city-sinjar-n469366


http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/how-survived-year-bombing-and-ground-war-1619065958#sthash.whU0aspm.dpuf

http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-dug-network-tunnels-under-conquered-iraqi-city-sinjar-n469366



PART 3: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION AND BEYOND

116. For irregular groups wanting to replicate ISIL’s success, there are several key trends that stand out. Firstly,

ISIL’s remarkable success has been built on a foundation of bureaucratic competence and hard learned

experience. Even with access to highly sophisticated and modern military equipment, military success has

been achieved through the psychological impact of their brutal tactics and sophisticated human intelligence

networks. The effectiveness of light and mobile hybrid warfare has been reinforced, but not in a way that is

significantly different or more sophisticated than has been seen in other recent conflicts. The ability of a sub-

national group to independently fund itself to the level that ISIS has will be a key lesson for other sub-national

groups. But the way in which they have done it, including the extraction of primary resources and exploitation

of cultural artifacts for instance, will not necessarily be relevant to other groups in other regions. Moreover,

lack of state support still creates constraints and limitations that state-linked groups do not face, such as

ongoing supply of advanced technologies and the training to employ them. For the purpose of better

understanding the future threat implications of ISIL’s success to examine each aspect in the context of

regional and global follow-on effects.

Implications for the Region

117. As discussed in the first section, previous EIT forecasts assumed that the burden of responsibility that comes

with controlling territory, combined with their vulnerability to modern air strikes, would mean that virtual

organizations and leadership structure would be a necessity for any sub-national group going forward. While it

is likely that this trend will continue to be key for many groups in the future and could potentially create a

greater risk than the traditional territorial control model, ISIL has demonstrated that it is still possible, and in

some ways advantageous, to prioritize territorial control. Not all sub-national or ideological groups will gain the

same credibility and authority that ISIL has through the establishment of its ‘caliphate’, but it is safe to assume

that now that they have done so, it will be a benchmark that all future extremist jihadi groups in the region will

seek to emulate.

118. While it does not represent a new or innovative style of warfare, the success and effectiveness of ISIL’s

application of hybrid warfare tactics will reinforce the popularity of the technique. Further, the success of ISIL’s

up-armored and coordinated VBIEDs strikes will likely remain a key technique that will continue to be used

into the future. Similarly, while ISIL’s use of captured indirect fire assets were used in a conventional manner,

it’s effectiveness in some battles may convince other groups of the necessity of the capability and its utility

beyond harassing attacks, and be a motivator for future groups to seek out such capabilities in the future.

119. Despite reportedly having access to sophisticated systems, ISIL’s air defense capability has not been

particularly evident. This is likely because coalition aircraft are operating beyond their reach and because it is

concentrated around vital assets. Nonetheless, it is an important capability that other groups will continue to

seek it out. The application of air defense weapons in the region will be driven by access to the weapons than

rather than by any innovative application. That said, ISIL’s use of mitigation strategies to protect them from

coalition airstrikes, such as moving in small groups and use of bad weather as a cover, will likely be copied.

120. Intelligence has always been a critical function of warfare, but in today’s information rich environment, it is

more critical than ever. ISIL’s human intelligence capabilities will likely be studied and adopted by groups in




the region and beyond. Whether or not other groups will have the skill and competence to employ it to the

same degree of success as ISIL will be the determining factor. Beyond intelligence gathering, ISIL’s ability to

penetrate every level of society within its caliphate’s borders sets a gold standard for future sub-national

groups. Whether that penetration is possible outside of the context that ISIL is operating is debateable. It is

unlikely, for instance, that ISIL would have the same success in Shi’a areas of Iraq. It is also unclear whether

it’s franchised or allied groups will be able to achieve the same penetration of society within their own

‘provinces’. Further, the brutality of ISIL’s reign may eventually prove too much for the local populations, and

they may find a way past the destruction and suppression of alternative societal power centers to revolt

against ISIL’s control.

121. No matter which groups adopt ISIL approaches in the future, the depth of ISIL’s social penetration will linger

in the region for a significant time. A key element of ISIL’s approach has been to integrate foreign fighters into

the local communities through marriage. Even in the unlikely case that ISIL is defeated in the near future,

many of these foreign fighters may choose to live on in the region with their new families. ISIL has also

imposed educational, judicial and cultural values on the local populations, which will have an enduring impact

on the local population’s perspectives into the future, unless replaced by strong governance by the central

authority that resonates with their aspirations and beliefs.

122. Many of the most potent regional sub-national groups are funded or supported by a major regional power.

While this approach still has significant advantages, ISIL’s ability to fund itself has demonstrated that it is

possible to remain independent. Some of the ways that ISIL has achieved this, such as selling of antiquities

and extraction of oil, are unique to the Middle East region. While it is likely that future groups in the region will

seek funding from national sponsors, it would be unsurprising if they took lessons from ISIL on how to

supplement their funding through the diverse range of resource extraction employed by ISIL.

123. As has been highlighted numerous times already, ISIL’s bureaucratic competence and coinciding ability to

apply resources to achieve their desired endstates will be a key lesson for future groups. However, the current

ISIL organization has benefited from some very specific conditions that are rare: the de-Baathification process

and the centralizing of key jihadi leaders in Iraqi jails following the fall of Saddam Hussein. It is unlikely that

identical conditions will occur outside of the region, or even within the region in the near future. Nonetheless, if

and when ISIL fractures or is defeated, those who are currently involved in that situation will continue to

benefit from the intellectual capital they have developed and it is likely that the experiences and lessons

learned by ISIL will continue to feature in any follow-on groups into the future. More broadly, the follow-on

effects of the de-Baathification process should serve as a lesson for the handling of future post-conflict

environments following regime change.

124. By far the most prominent element of ISIL’s success to date has been their ability to frame their own narrative

and broadcast that narrative through diverse channels to local and global audiences. This success has

lessons for all national and sub-national groups, but the impact of ISIL’s leveraging of identity politics and

sectarian tensions will influence the future of the region for many years to come. Even if the central

government is able to regain effective control of the areas within ISIL’s caliphate, many of the underlying

grievances will likely remain and be a key leverage point for other groups throughout the region. The only way

this will be displaced is if some other national, supra-national or sub-national group is able to build a greater




narrative that is more appealing and holds greater resonance for the regional populations, as the Baathists did

in the 1960s.

125. ISIL has been particularly effective in the areas under its control in either absorbing or destroying rival

groups. Tribal politics and allegiances have always been critical in Iraq and the region, and in Syria ISIL has

confronted rival militias and gained their allegiance or gone to war with them. Many of the networks that ISIL

has established will likely remain if/ when ISIL is defeated. The nature and implications of those relationships

is unpredictable, but it is hard not to assume that they will continue to shape the region into the future. ISIL’s

destruction of any civic entity or potential rival authority is an underlying reason for the lack of opposition to

their rule. Whatever happens to ISIL in the future, it will take time and resources to fill that vacuum and

redevelop the civil society in those regions. Until that occurs, the area will remain vulnerable to organized and

motivated outsiders who seek to exploit that vacuum.

Implications for the Broader Jihadi Movement

126. Now that ISIL has successfully established a self-proclaimed Islamic caliphate and maintained control of

extensive territory, it is unlikely that future jihadi groups in the region will be satisfied with virtual or aspirational

caliphates. Their success will likely convince the wider jihadi community that a physical caliphate is not only

possible, but necessary. It is unlikely that future jihadis will easily return to the Al Qaeda philosophy of slow

and steady building towards a future caliphate. While it is unlikely that many other groups will possess the

capabilities to replicate ISIL’s success, if ISIL in its current form is dismantled then it is likely that other groups

will seek to position themselves as its successor. ISIL itself has claimed that even if it lost control of its current

proto-state then it would transition to the areas controlled by allied groups.

127. In reality, unless the current core leadership prevails and is able to move on mass to another area, ISIL as

we currently know it will be unlikely to re-establish itself to the same extent. However, elements of its

administrative approach, underlying philosophy and technical competence will inevitably filter throughout the

wider jihadi community. This means that off-shoot or successor jihadi groups will continue to display greater

sophistication in hybrid warfare, administrative competence, diversity of resource extraction and more

sophisticated media production. As foreign fighters return to their places of origin, these new skills and

perspectives could improve the capabilities of groups in places such as North Africa, the Caucasus and

Central Asia.

128. ISIL’s approach seeks to exploit ungoverned spaces or create them by destabilizing weak political

governance. There are plenty of those spaces around the world, and some militant jihadi groups in areas with

low governance and perceived grievances amongst their Muslim populations, may take inspiration from the

success of ISIL to declare their own Islamic nation. Areas of vulnerability beyond those already in conflict,

such as Chechnya, include Western China, Eastern Myanmar and parts of Indonesia. Some of these areas

may have the necessary conditions to replicate ISIL tactics, such as increasing sectarian tensions, leveraging

identity politics to mobilize local support and further destabilizing weak political institutions. It is unlikely,

however, that they will be able to succeed as ISIL has because the unique context in which ISIL’s rise

occurred is not easily reproduced.

129. In none of those situations is there a complex web of competing agendas between regional powers that

would supersede the threat they posed. There is also not the opportunity to seize the quantity and quality of




military hardware that existed in Western Iraq. Nor is there necessarily the diversity of accessible revenue

generation opportunities available in the Middle East. Furthermore, any Islamic state or emirate declared

outside of the Middle East region is unlikely to have the same degree of perceived authority and importance

as ISIL, unless it is as a satellite of the current Caliphate. While they may not achieve the scale, profile or

longevity of ISIL’s proto-state, they could still use the capabilities copied from the ISIL model to establish their

own areas of control with devastating consequences for their own regions.

130. The slick sophistication of ISIL’s media capabilities has set a bench mark for future groups, and it is likely that

any future jihadi group will seek to copy or improve upon the quality and style of ISIL’s media production. The

fundamentals of ISIL’s approach is not dramatically different to the approach other groups have taken in the

past, but the sophistication and polish displayed by ISIL’s media arm sets it apart. As with the networks of

fighters and alliances across the Middle East, the global networks of support will not disappear even if ISIL

was to be defeated. As such, many supporters may seek to find another group to get behind, and it is likely

that many of the social media engagement techniques will continue, albeit in a more fractured and less

motivated fashion.

131. Brutality has long been a hallmark of sub-national groups and in particular amongst jihadi extremists. ISIL,

however, has escalated the level and intensity of that tendency in accordance with the theory. It has sought to

position itself as the ‘strongest horse’ among jihadist groups and that its high levels of violence signal its

strength. Unless this approach is widely accepted within the community as being the reason for its downfall, it

is likely that the support for this operating principle will continue. The number of groups that ascribe to it will

probably remain small, as it was the key reason ISIL were rejected by Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups, but

there will remain an extreme element who will maintain belief in the approach. Similarly, the impact and profile

that ISIL has gained will ensure that at least some of their religious perspectives and interpretations will live

on with fringe elements of the jihadist and Islamic extremists communities into the future.

132. Most dangerously for the West, ISIL’s encouragement of lone wolf and ‘self-starter’ terrorist groups planning

and executing their own attacks independently of any support network may continue long after ISIL

disappears. While this tactic was a key strategy of Al Qaeda’s, ISIL’s perceived success and notoriety has

been more effective in motivating individuals and groups to take action. Whether such individuals would

remain as motivated if ISIL were defeated or the caliphate dissolved remains to be seen. It is likely that at

least some of those ISIL fighters who are scattered by an ISIL defeat will seek to revive the movement

elsewhere by continuing such attacks.

Implications for the Other Irregular Groups

133. ISIL’s success will be heeded not only within the jihadist community, but by a range of irregular groups.

Historically, tactics, training and technical knowledge have been shared by a range of diverse groups. The

IRA has been linked to other irregular groups, including in South America and the Middle East for instance.

Iterative developments of the application of suicide bombers also moved between the Tamil Tigers and

various jihadist groups. In the globalized and interconnected system we now live in, it is inevitable that groups

will look at and learn from the ISIL experience, beyond the diffusion that inevitably occurs through direct

contact. It is impossible to effectively pick all of the attributes that will be adopted, but some forecasts can

confidently be made. In understanding the potential lessons learned by other groups, it is important to




understand and distinguish the elements of ISIL’s success that stem from the local context, such as recent

history, politics and culture, and those that can be copied.

134. The use of social media and the sophisticated media production capabilities of ISIL have already been

covered in significant depth. Needless to say, while the approach, content and style may not be of use to

other irregular groups, the way it was developed and employed has direct application. For groups that are

driven by an ideological motivation, such as environmentalists, the way that ISIL has forged together a

network of motivated supporters willing to engage the wider public may provide new approaches beyond the

stale theatrical demonstrations and shock documentaries. Similarly, groups of nationalists seeking

independence, such as the Uighers, West Papuans or Rohingyas, may look to the media methods of ISIL for

inspiration in raising the profile of their cause. While it came as a result of ISIL actions rather than as their own

tactic, the ability for the Yazidi diaspora to influence U.S. policy is also an important lesson to learn and

reinforces the role that Diasporas can play.

135. Moreover, the ability of ISIL to develop a huge, motivated network of supporters despite the lack of a clearly

nationalist or ideological underpinning demonstrates the power of a social movement if promoted forcefully

and effectively. While in this case the religious overtones bordered on the ideological, religions generally

include more diversity in perspectives and values than nationalist or purely ideological allegiances. As a key

characteristic of younger generations is the need to take part in ‘social justice’ causes, this is a trend that is

likely to grow in importance and could be dangerously leveraged by other groups in the future. A cause that

inspired a militant virtual diaspora that unites the disenfranchised in mega city slums with those in the West

through the internet, for instance, could potentially mobilize an even larger and more sophisticated threat. An

example of this would be if the anti-globalization movements of the late 90’s and early 2000’s caught on with a

cyber-activist group such as ‘Anonymous’, and coalesced around a central issue.

136. For militant groups that employ a hybrid warfare approach, there will be tactical lessons that can be learned

from ISIL. These include the use of multiple, coordinated and protected VBIED as a form of preparatory fire

before an assault, though finding sufficient volunteers for suicide missions may be more difficult for other

groups. The ISIL experience reinforces the benefits of units remaining small, light and fast, and the challenges

inherent in utilizing large and complex conventional weapon systems. Their use of drones for surveillance will

likely spread not through direct diffusion, but because the technologies will be ubiquitous and their utility is

self-evident.

137. ISIL has highlighted the ongoing utility and criticality of good human intelligence and bureaucratic

competence. These are hard learned skills that take time and training, so it is unlikely that every other group

will be able to copy them in the short term. However, a movement that has time to plan and seeks to achieve

greater and longer lasting success should note the value in investing in these capabilities.

138. ISIL has proved that even in the era far reaching drone strikes, there are advantages to holding and

controlling land. This is not easily done, and many regions will not provide the economic benefits that Western

Iraq and Eastern Syria can provide. In the long term, the burden of maintaining and defending that territory

may become too much for ISIL to sustain, but it at least demonstrates that organizations do not have to

remain completely invisible and dispersed to withstand Western opposition, if they operate with necessary

caution.




139. The ability for a sub-national group to amass massive funding while remaining independent of state

sponsorship is also a new lesson. Again, the environment may not provide the necessary critical capabilities,

such as extant smuggling routes, acquiescent neighbouring states or extant resources to replicate ISIL’s

success, but it demonstrates the importance of careful bookkeeping, diversified income streams and

entrepreneurial approaches to the area under control.

140. Finally, ISIL has been successful in large part because of the instability and competing agendas of the major

players within the region. If each of the countries neighbouring the self-proclaimed caliphate prioritized their

extermination, the current state of ISIL would be very different. Instead, each is focused on another,

apparently greater threat to stability and security. Whether ISIL is in this position by design or luck, the lesson

for other irregular groups is to exploit regional competition and tension and remain slightly below the threshold

of other concerns in order to avoid undue pressure. ISIL is not unique in this, Boko Harem provides another

example of how conducive such environments can be. But unlike in the past, there are fewer regions in the

world that are so unstable to allow this to readily occur. Africa is the most likely region, but as nations

increasingly work together to stabilize the region rather than support the groups to destabilizing their

neighbours, the opportunities are shrinking. Eastern Europe has become less stable in recent years, but the

over-arching consideration there is great power politics, which sub-national groups will be able to take

advantage of but will find it harder to influence or shape. In Asia, State level and near-peer confrontations are

more likely, and most of the irregular groups that remain there are contained to one or two more advancing

countries, which will make it difficult to engineer similar power vacuums. In South and Central America, there

is reduced tension between states and any irregular groups will face competition with well-resourced

transnational criminal groups who’s key motivator is profit, and therefore may have competing interests.

SUMMARY

Conclusion

141. While it’s eventual longevity is yet to be determined, ISIL has proven itself to be one of the most effective,

magnetic and wealthiest sub-national irregular groups in history. During its initial expansion, it appeared

unstoppable and no matter its eventual fate, its rise will impact the region and the world for years to come. It

has developed many of the existing irregular tactics and methodologies to their ultimate form, and will

undoubtedly influence and shape the thinking of the jihadist community into the future. Moreover, while

irregular groups such as Hezbollah have fought full scale war with advanced militaries before, few have so

brazenly challenged all of a regions and several global powers simultaneously.

142. However, many of the elements that enabled their success have developed over a decade and a half and are

specific to the context and conditions of the region it exists in. Other irregular groups may be able to replicate

ISIL’s success in the future or in other regions, but they will be unlikely to do it following an ISIL template.

Applying the EIT methodology to the ISIL case study explains their resiliency as their capabilities stretch

across the spectrum of control. A COG analysis highlights areas where they may be vulnerable, but also

demonstrates the magnitude of the challenge of defeating them.

143. The groups studied in the previous EIT analysis were selected because at their peak they were fiercely

capable organizations that thrived off regional and global conditions to develop and employ near-state like




capabilities across the spectrum of control from coercive through administrative to persuasive. They achieved

this by exploiting logistical, financial, technological, political and economic infrastructure in place along with a

global network of people, communities, organizations and governments. These groups have proved to be

technical innovators and diffusers of knowledge that developed best practice approaches into highly effective

operational concepts. ISIL fits neatly into this group and demonstrates the same degree of competence and

capability that they do. While the strengths and weaknesses differ between each of the groups and in some

cases ISIL represents a polar opposite approach to some of them, many of the key forecasts have been

further validated and reinforced. In many of the capability areas, such as developing global networks and

shaping their own narrative, ISIL represents the best in art and has set a bench mark for future irregular

groups to aspire to.

144. Ultimately, the purpose of the EIT methodology is to understand the potential future threats that irregular and

sub-national groups pose, and consequently the potential capability gaps the U.S. may in confronting them.

There is no doubt that ISIL has exposed U.S. and western capability gaps, and the limitations of technologies

we have come to rely upon. It could be argued that limited effectiveness of U.S. intervention owes more to

political constraints, diplomatic complexities and the lack of political will by all involved rather than a

technological limitation. Some of these trends and subsequent capability gaps were accurately forecast by

previous EIT analysis, such as in the area of information operations. ISIL has proven others either wrong or

not yet universally applicable, such as the criticality of virtual organizations and leadership.

145. The primary objective of the EIT method is to identify and understand evolving trends amongst irregular

groups to better prepare for future threats. Having applied the EIT methodology to the ISIL case study, the

lack of ISIL military innovation provides few new forecasts or trends that would be likely to create new future

capability gaps. But their effectiveness at employing existing approaches does reinforces the scope of the

challenge we face closing the current ones.



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ANNEX A

EVOLVED IRREGULAR THREAT METHODOLOGY

Theoretical Framework

1. Counterinsurgency (COIN) theorists have long understood insurgency as a ‘competition for government’

between a non-state armed actor and a government, occupying power, or other recognized authority.46

The

CoG of insurgent movements has been identified as the ability to manipulate and mobilize a mass population

base, maintaining control over that population. Governments that are losing to insurgencies are seen as being

‘out-governed’ rather than merely outfought47

and populations, especially in rural subsistence economies, are

seen as risk-averse, responding favorably to predictability and order.48

2. More recently, theorists and practitioners have evolved a new understanding of the mechanisms through

which this occurs. Joel S. Migdal developed a functional construct, the state-in-society framework that allows

analysts to measure the effectiveness of unlike control systems (states versus insurgencies, gangs, criminal

groups, etc.).49

Stathis Kalyvas showed that support follows strength, certainty and order in normative

systems, which, like ‘rules of the road’ give populations clear boundaries.50

What this means is that

populations respond to predictable, ordered systems which tell them exactly what they need to do, and not do,

in order to be safe. Dr. David Kilcullen explained the spectrum of control in insurgent normative systems, the

theory of competitive control, and the relationship between control and resilience.51

Analytical Approach 3. Kilcullen’s theory of competitive control states that “In irregular conflicts where at least one warring party is a

non-state actor, the local armed actor that a given population perceives as most able to establish a normative

system for resilient, full-spectrum control over violence, economic activity and human security, is most likely to

prevail within that population’s residential area.”52

The first Evolved Irregular Threat Project analyzed selected

‘evolved irregular threat’ groups against the spectrum of control, from coercive (combat capabilities) through

administrative (governance capabilities) to persuasive (political and propaganda capabilities). Evidence

suggests that groups that apply capabilities across the widest spectrum (from coercion to persuasion) are the

most agile, resilient and resistant to countermeasures, since they can compensate for losses in one part of

the spectrum by applying capabilities from another. Groups that are effective along only a narrow band of the

spectrum are more brittle, and more likely to fail under pressure. The spectrum can be graphically illustrated

46 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger Publishers,

1966). 47

Bernard F. Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," Naval War College Review (Winter 1998, first published April 1965). 48

James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia, (New Haven Ct: Yale University Press, 1978). 49

Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 50

Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 51

David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 52

Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 2010.



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as follows:

Capability Analysis Format 4. The EIT methodology considers the future military capability development to fill warfighting requirements as a

continuous cycle of conceptualization, experience, innovation and experimentation. For example, the U.S.

Army uses the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and

facilities) framework as its problem-solving construct for evaluating current capabilities and advancing

solutions that address gaps requiring mitigation or closure. The EIT methodology uses a taxonomy of three

capability baskets – combat, governance and political/propaganda – to assess enemy capabilities. The

purpose of this approach is to advance thinking on the different ways that various actors could employ

capabilities in isolation or as part of a multilevel battle of persuasion and coercion outside of a current U.S.

Department of Defense framework. In order to maintain consistency across the analysis, this study of ISIL

utilized the same framework and methodology as the original EIT project. This approach provided the

additional benefit of undertaking a similar but independent capability of ISIL analysis to the SMA SOCCENT

Phase 1 work, providing comparative perspectives.

5. The first step in the process involved analyzing combat capabilities using the dated Battlefield Operating

Systems (BOS) framework as described in U.S. Army Field Manual 7-15 (August 2003) and other doctrinal

publications.53

Although the Battle Operating Systems (BOS) has been superseded by ‘warfighting function’

we have continued to use BOS in this study in order to maintain consistency with the earlier analysis, and

because it is more broadly applicable to non-Western or conventional warfighting groups.

53 The project team recognized that BOS terminology is no longer used by the U.S. military, but that given its capability spectrum

breakdown it provided an analytically useful tool with which to analyze capability. Department of the Army, FM 7-15 The Army Universal Task List (August 2003).



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6. The Battlefield Operation Systems are:

+ Intelligence (remains essentially the same);

+ Maneuver (now Movement and Maneuver warfighting function);

+ Fire support (now Fires warfighting function);

+ Air defense (combined with some other and new functions, now Protection warfighting function);

+ Mobility, countermobility and survivability (Combined with Movement and Maneuver warfighting

function);

+ Combat service support (now Sustainment warfighting function); and

+ Command and control (now Conduct Mission Command).

7. Second, EITP analyzes governance capabilities using Joel S. Migdal’s Strong Societies and Weak States.

The State-in-Society framework suggests that societies are not static formations but are constantly developing

as a result of perpetual struggles over three levels of social control: compliance, participation and legitimacy.

This structure provides a functional rather than structural template to analyze the social control achieved by

states in competition with non-state actors, to include insurgent groups, criminal networks, militias and others.

Migdal identifies four functional capabilities of the state including the capability to:

+ Penetrate society;

+ Regulate social relationships;

+ Extract resources; and

+ Appropriate resources to determined ends.

8. The State-in-Society framework therefore provides a viable comparative capability framework to evaluate the

ability of states and non-state armed groups to wield social control over populations.

9. Third, EITP analyzed political and propaganda capabilities using an organic Information Operations (IO)

framework. EITP sought to analyze all informing, influencing, and behavior manipulation activities through a

framework tailored to the broad information capabilities of non-state actors, using four categories for political

and propaganda operations:

+ Framing – agenda-setting, informing supporters through non-coercive means;

+ Persuasion – influencing or persuading adversaries through non-coercive means;

+ Dissuasion – deterring or confronting opposition through coercive and non-coercive means; and

+ Leveraging – provoking, manipulating or mobilizing local populations, governments, adversaries or

broader networks (e.g. global diasporas) for political advantage through mass media and other channels.

10. IO capabilities are used to inform the decisions of supporters and influence the decisions of adversaries. By

using propaganda to shape the environment and ultimately the behavior of governments, groups, and

individuals, irregular actors can manipulate and mobilize supporters and sympathizers to defeat political

threats.



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11. Together, the three baskets of capabilities outlined above provide a comprehensive analytical framework for

capabilities across the full spectrum from coercive (combat capabilities analyzed through BOS), through

governance (state or state-like capabilities analyzed through State-in-Society functions) to political and

propaganda (analyzed through the organic IO capabilities framework).



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ANNEX B

ISIL CAPABILITIES MATRIX

Combat Capabilities

Maneuver Fire Support Air Defense Mobility, Counter mobility and survivability

Combat Service Support

Intelligence Command and Control

Cri

tica

l C

ap

ab

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ies

1. Technical mounted motorized light infantry, company level units, total of about 10,000-15,000 fighters proficient in those operations 2. Infiltrate forces behind enemy lines, for reconnaissance missions and terrorist attacks, at night and inclement conditions 3. Platoon and Company level attacks on enemy lines of communications 4. Dedicated foreign fighters willing to fight to the death 5. Dispersal and coordination of forces for multiple avenues of attack on key targets such as cities, as well as retreat 6. Lighting attacks against enemy fixed positions and large units 7. Recruitment of other groups and individuals 8. Sleeper cells to support attacks

1. Use ground-based indirect-fire weapons systems such as mortars, anti-tank missiles, rockets and medium tube artillery to suppress enemy forces 2. Use suicide bombers to destroy enemy strongpoints and checkpoints, terrorize civilians 3. Use of tanks and IFVs to provide urban fire support and shock

1. Deny enemy helicopter operations and low altitude CAS missions by concentrating AAA and MANPADS at key sites like command centers 2. Mobile air defenses on SPAAGs and technicals to protect maneuver units

1. Defend urban neighborhoods with entrenched company level units supported by snipers and IEDS 2. Defend key avenues of approach. 3. Defend key infrastructure. 4. Use of IEDs and landmines to hinder enemy movement and cover withdrawals. 5. Disrupt enemy lines of communication, logistics. 6. Disrupt enemy avenues of approach through scorched earth tactics 7. Construct hardened fighting positions, logistical and communications infrastructure. 8. Presence of civilians to act as human shields, and civilian casualties as political points

1. Provide resupply of weapons and ammunition to forward fighting positions. 2. Evacuate casualties. 3. Treat casualties 4. Capture of enemy weapons and supplies 5. Smuggle supplies 6. Repair airstrike and battlefield damage to infrastructure

1. Identify enemy order of battle and locations during urban operations 2. Maintain high level of operational security. 3. Determine enemy movements 4. Identify potential supporters in area of operations 5. Counterintelligence and internal security measures against internal resistance

1. Attract and manage Salafist vassal groups 2. C4ISR infrastructure of radio, cellular and Internet communications for military and governance 3. Dissemination of propaganda for internal and foreign audiences 4. Replace killed and captured field commanders and regional governors 5. Establish regional and extra-regional alliances of convenience 6. Establish centralized, effective strategic planning



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Combat Capabilities




Req

uir

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en

ts

1.1 Technicals, Humvees, MRAPs, BRDMs and other light AFVs 2.1 ISR, operational/staff planning, communications equipment, infiltration, sympathizers and supporters 3.1 Units proficient in small-unit battle drills, trained leaders, communications 4.1 Ability to recruit and transport foreign recruits to ISIL territory, equip them with suicide bombs and small arms, train, pay and indoctrinate 5.1 Unhindered access to roads, bridges and other transportation infrastructure 6.1 Motorized and mechanized forces, intelligence to identify enemy formations 7.1 Ability to present a strong ideological narrative, along with financial and material support to allied groups 8.1 Successful infiltration of ISIL fighters, covert recruitment of local fighters and supplies and intelligence support

1.1 122mm BM-21 Grad rockets, M198 155mm howitzer, truck mounted 84mm mortars 2.1 Suicide bombers, car bombs and other VBIEDS 3.1 T-55 and T-72 tanks, BMP-1 and BMP-2 IFVs

1.1 SA-7 Grail and Stinger MANPADS, Shilka SPAAG, ZSU-23-2 AAA 2.1 Mobile FN-1, Igla MANPADS, AAA on technicals

1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1 Trained infantry and fire support units, direct and indirect fires, small arms, anti-tank weapons, mines and other explosives 4.1 requires well equipped explosive experts to build booby traps and IEDs 4.1 requires IED factories with standardized production, reliable supply lines and institutional quality control 7.1 Explosives, incendiaries stockpiled for fighters at key sites 8.1 Ability to coerce civilians to remain in urban battlefields and areas

1.1 and 2.1 require wheeled vehicles, roads and other transportation infrastructure, communications, volunteers and other supporters, external funding, pre-planned depots 3.1 requires trained medical staff, field hospitals, volunteers and other supporters 4.1 requires battlefield victories and defection to gain access to vehicles, supplies and sophisticated armament 5.1 Requires smugglers with access and ability to cross borders, terrain, and procure supplies at affordable costs 6.1 Construction units, and workers (conscripted/volunteer/captives), supplies like concrete and telecommunications gear

1.1 espionage, small uav 2.1 trained cadre, volunteers and supporters, secure communications, popular support, checkpoints 3.1 source knowledge and expertise from global recruits and regional proxies 4.1 presence of local fighters and sympathizers, along with money and supplies to induce cooperation 5.1 CI and internal security cadre with disciplinary remit over ISIL, mobility and informer network

1.1 Continued safety and freedom of Al Baghdadi, and successors 2.1 Loyalty of ISIL personnel, especially leaders, mobile telecommunications such as field radios, access to Internet and social media 3.1 Access to Internet and social media platforms, cadre of experienced propagandists capable of recruiting online sympathizers to spread the cause 4.1 Experienced pool of mid rank cadre, replenished by recruitment of disaffected locals, foreign volunteers and defectors from other armed groups and regime, maintain a clear line of succession 5.1 Institutional capability to impart funding, IO skills 6.1 Trained and experienced staff personnel, such as ex Baath personnel, and C4ISR infrastructure to support strategy making and implementation



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE C OF ANNEX B

Combat Capabilities




Vu

lnera

bilit

ies

CR 1.1 Vulnerable to enemy detection, ISR, indirect and direct fires, along with desertion and defection, decrease in conscription and recruitment CR 2.1 Vulnerable to enemy detection, ISR, indirect and direct fires, espionage, communications jamming CR 3.1 Vulnerable to enemy detection, ISR, indirect and direct fires CR 4.1 Direct and indirect fires, detection, infrastructural targeting CR 5.1 Direct and indirect fires, infrastructural targeting CR 6.1 Direct and Indirect fire, ISR CR 6.1 vulnerable to disillusionment of ISIL aims and conduct, defection of fighters CR 7.1 is vulnerable to decreased popular support in enemy territories, local informants and CI operations.

CR 1.1, 2.1 and 3.1 vulnerable to direct and indirect fires, counter-battery fires, air strikes, espionage and sabotage, electromagnetic jamming, battlefield capture. CR 2.1 vulnerable to advanced explosives detection equipment CR 3.1 is vulnerable to antitank weapons, lack of maintenance and support, close quarter urban fighting

CR 1.1 and CR 2.1 Vulnerable to counter-battery fires and SEAD missions, destruction by ground forces, lack of maintenance and training

CR 1.1-1.7 vulnerable to kinetic strikes (especially air operations), superior maneuver operations, speed, armor and combined arms CR 1.1 vulnerable to ERA equipped AFVs, and tunnel warfare tactics by enemy CR 2.1 vulnerable to flanking and aerial attacks CR 4.1 vulnerable to enemy engineers, such as MRAPs and unmanned mine clearance vehicles CR 4.1 vulnerable to destruction of IED factories (especially by airpower), sabotage, loss of logistics for supplies and IED transportation to battlefield CR 7.1 vulnerable to capture and depletion through usage

CR 1.1 and 2.1 vulnerable to sanctions, kinetic strikes (rocket artillery and air strikes), espionage and sabotage CR 3.1 vulnerable to inability to source medical supply, and loss of medical personnel due to casualties or defection CR 4.1 vulnerable to defeats and lack of ground engagements CR 5.1 vulnerable to law enforcement crackdown on border guard corruption, smuggling, and air strikes on smugglers, financial sanctions on smugglers CR 6.1 vulnerable to depletion and destruction of supplies, inability to train engineers

CR 1.1 vulnerable to electro-magnetic interference, denial of network access, enemy counterintelligence and denial/deception CR 2.1 vulnerable to espionage, eroded local support, kinetic attacks CR 3.1 Loss of support/narrative viability CR 4.1 is vulnerable to lack of resources to recruit supporters, supporters may be alienated or coerced away from supporting ISIL CR 5.1 is vulnerable to infiltration of ISIL hierarchy and dissension, loss of CI personnel from air strikes and battle, splintering of ISIL structure

CR 1.1 vulnerable to assassinations, other kinetic strikes, internal strife CR 1.1, 2.1, 3.1 vulnerable to espionage and sabotage, kinetic strikes, jamming CR 3.1 vulnerable to cyber-attacks, especially distributed no state opponents CR 4.1 vulnerable to decreased recruitment and deaths/desertion of mid-level cadre to maintain hierarchical redundancy 4.1 is vulnerable to loss of senior personnel, enemy intelligence collection and targeting of senior personnel, and intra-hierarchy dissension that threatens chain of command CR 5.1 vulnerable to capture in transit or death of personnel sent to work with foreign vassals, and loss of telecommunications and courier networks CR 6.1 is vulnerable to loss of experienced general staff personnel due to death, defection/desertion and capture



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ISIL: Governance Capabilities

Penetrate society (ground presence)

Regulate relationships Extract Resources Apply Resources to group ends

Cri

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ap

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1. Establishment of Caliphate to demand Sunni obligations 2. De facto state administration in eastern Syria and western Iraq, consisting of 12 regional governors and ISIL wide councils on military, economic and religious affairs 3. Control of media 4. Establishment of religious schools 5. Abu al Baghdadi 6. Ally with local power brokers to navigate the human terrain 7. Provision and control over services such as health, utilities, communications

1. Sharia courts 2. Religious police 3. Credible interpretation of religious texts 4. Enforce punishments 5. Make religious decrees 6. Support and meditate disputes among other Salafist jihadi groups

1. Sale of refined oil 2. Sale of crude oil 3. Raising of external donations 4. Soliciting of anonymous online donations 5. Looting and selling of antiquities 6. Internal Extortion 7. Agriculture 8. Seizure of banks and capital assets 9. Maintain independent financing model protected from U.S. anti—money laundering efforts 10. Conscription of local population, including children

1. Wages for foreign fighters 2. Provision of gifts/ spoils of war 3. Thorough tracking and auditing of resources 4. Monopolize resource distribution in controlled areas, deny resources to enemy populations as food/economic warfare 5. Expand ISIL control through armed and other means 6. Spread ISIL propaganda in old and new media




Cri

tica

l R

eq

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1.1 Ability to contest and control populated areas 2.1 Armed force to institute rule 3.1 Access to Internet and audience, suppress competing media 4.1 Continued legitimacy to claim Caliphate claim, educational personnel and infrastructure 5.1 Abu al Baghdadi remains alive and at large 6.1 Ability to reward local power brokers, and coercive ability to punish them 7.1 Recruit foreign doctors, engineers and specialists, and pay/coerce local equivalents

1.1 Ability to identify, judge and punish transgressions with credible religious judges 2.1 Armed enforcement and network of informants 3.1 Support of Salafist clerics and silencing all opposing clerics 4.1 Identify and custody of said prisoners, at least coercion of local population to have a monopoly on arresting, sentencing and punishing transgressors 5. Clerical organization to proclaim decrees, and telecommunications to propagate decrees 6.1 Disillusionment of Salafist groups with other terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, disorganization among competing Salafist groupings

1.1 Access to crude oil, refinery infrastructure and ability to maintain production infrastructure 2.1 Access to crude oil production, production maintenance and smuggling networks 3.1 Access to international financial systems, formal and informal 4.1 Cryptocurrency, other digital markers of value and ability to translate and launder into hard currency, goods or services 5.1 Possession of archaeological sites and museums, network of smugglers and middlemen 6.1 Coercive ability to tax populace and seize assets 7.1 Arable land, maintain farming and irrigation infrastructure, transport of food and commodities 8.1 Presence of banks inside captured areas 9.1 Network of money transfers and international banking, as well as ability to supply goods to foreign buyers 10.1 Ability to conduct census, and network of informers to monitor compliance of conscript pool

1.1 Maintain sufficient funds to pay foreign fighters and conscripts 2.1 Continued battlefield success and holding current territories 3.1 Intra-organizational communications and established chain of command 4.1 Armed and financial ability to distribute resource allocation and collection, control of transportation network/infrastructure, economic experts to ensure efficient distribution 5.1 Control over borders, transportation, merchants



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE E OF ANNEX B




Cri

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uln

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CR 1.1 vulnerable to renewed civil conflict, popular resistance CR 2.1 vulnerable to loss of territory, and inability to provide goods such as governance and food CR 3.1 vulnerable to electro-magnetic interference, kinetic strikes, counter-propaganda CR 4.1 vulnerable to assassination/capture, loss of stature CR 5.1 is vulnerable to capture/assassination/prolonged absence from public/communications CR 6.1 vulnerable to defection of regional allies upon disaffection over ISIL rule, inability to pay, or recruitment by adversaries

CR 1.1 requires coercive monopoly, vulnerable to assassination, military defeats, kinetic strikes on Sharia court infrastructure CR 2.1 vulnerable to loss of popular support from ISIL rule, disillusionment of informants CR 3.1 vulnerable to dissemination of alternate religious interpretations, especially by tribal and other established authorities CR 4.1 vulnerable to armed resistance by prisoners, loss of law enforcement capabilities, especially communications, local refusal to accept punishment of transgressors CR 5.1 vulnerable to loss of legitimacy and anger at ISIL clerics from battlefield reversals, and backlash against religious rule, access to alternative religious authorities CR 6.1 vulnerable to crackdown on other Salafist groupings, loss perceived ISIL power if financial resources and territories diminish, rise of another more successful/radical Salafist group

CR 1.1 vulnerable to sanctions and loss of economic assets, loss of Mosul (ISIL economic center of gravity) CR 2.1 vulnerable to law enforcement crackdown on illicit networks/finance, firing of corrupt officials, kinetic strikes on oil production and storage infrastructure, lack of trained personnel CR 3.1 vulnerable to law enforcement freezing ISIL and business affiliate funds, and refusal of banks to conduct transactions in ISIL territory CR 4.1 is vulnerable to digital surveillance and subsequent law enforcement and intelligence action CR 8.1 is vulnerable to depletion of banks in territories, and no recent bank captures CR 9.1 is vulnerable to resistance from parents and family members, unwillingness of families and local authorities to aid conscription

CR 1.1 vulnerable to state failure, collapse, civil war CR 2.1 vulnerable to battlefield losses, loss of popular support/acquiesce and subsequent resistance, depletion of lootable resources and funds CR 3.1 vulnerable to electro-magnetic interference, cyber-attacks, assassinations, enemy intelligence collection and kinetic attacks CR 4.1 is vulnerable to loss of border crossings, degraded and destroyed transport infrastructure like bridges, arrest of suppliers/buyer network and inability to finance purchases and obtain supplies

ISIL: IO Capabilities

Framing Persuasion Dissuasive

Cri

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Cap

ab

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1. Affirm/enforce ISIL as the one true Caliphate for all Muslims, charismatic authority 2. Existential struggle against everyone in the region who does not recognize ISIL's authority 3. Construct narratives that resonate with identity politics and grievances 4. "Weaponize discontent" for a global audience

1. High production videos of atrocities to convince Sunnis of ISIL's divine sanction and purifying mission 2. Mass usage of social media to reach a scattered but global audience of true believers, reach the radicals 3. Support claim to Caliphate and legitimacy by control, gaining Salafist allegiance and ideological implementation 4. Inspire magazine and other traditional media

1. Undermine adversary will through escalating violence from ISIL atrocities 2. Undermine rivals' governance legitimacy through propaganda of ISIL success, routine governance and piety 3. Perceived regional and global ubiquity of armed operations to raise intervention unpopularity and costs



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE F OF ANNEX B



Cri

tica

l

Req

uir

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en

ts 1.1 and 2.1 require continued battlefield successes, regime stability and

ideological purity 3.1 Exploit Sunni regional and global grievances by attacking enemies such as Baghdad and Damascus regimes 4.1 Visible ISIL actions against U.S. lead coalition, Iran and Syrian government like execution of prisoners and armed actions

1.1 Acquisition and access to prisoners and hostages 2.1 Social media network manned by dedicated staff and volunteers, especially members of foreign background 3.1 Control and functional governance over territory; presence of operational Salafist groups able to pledge allegiance to ISIL, opposition to U.S., Iran and Arab states to lend support to ISIL apocalyptic narrative

1.1 and 2.1 require ability to communicate to enemy audiences through social media, along with actual examples of ISIL military and governance successes 2.1 requires ISIL ability to hold and govern territories to maintain support 3.1 requires battlefield success and holding current territory, and apparent presence of active ISIL supporters aboard



Cri

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Vu

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CR 1.1 vulnerable to direct and indirect fires, air strikes, jamming, sabotage, alternate media, lack of endorsement by Sunni religious authorities, increases in education and informational awareness in ISIL personnel CR 2.1 Vulnerable to adversary exploiting ISIL battlefield reversals for propaganda value, along with counter propaganda from other Muslims (especially Salafists) CR 3.1 vulnerable to wider, visible role of Sunni forces fighting against ISIL, and integration of credible non ISIL Sunni actors in power structures CR 4.1 is vulnerable to lack of new ISIL spectaculars, such as military success, ISIL atrocities and misgovernment could redirect discontent at them

CR 1.1 vulnerable to running out of victims, audience desensitization to violence, and psychological blowback CR 3.1 Vulnerable to direct and indirect fires, air strikes, battlefield losses, popular resistance CR 2.1 vulnerable to law enforcement crackdown on foreign activists and telecommunications disruption, chosen vassal in a 'vilayet' could lose to competitors or counterinsurgency forces, weakening ISIL prestige, attrition and inability to replace foreign born propagandists CR 2.1 vulnerable to social media supporters shifting allegiances away from ISIL CR 2.1 vulnerable to condemnation/narratives by defected ISIL personnel and victims (especially Sunni)

CR 1.1 and CR 2.1 vulnerable to direct and indirect fires, air strikes, jamming, sabotage, alternate media CR 2.1 vulnerable Internet activism, harassment and sabotage, loss of territory, decreased living standards and discontent in territories CR 3.1 vulnerable to perceived and actual battlefield reversals, internal uprisings



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ANNEX C

ISIL’S EVOLVED IRREGULAR THREAT CASE STUDY EVOLVED

Significance of ISIL Case Study

1. The Islamic State in Iraqi and the Levant (ISIL) is a designated terrorist group controlling significant territory in

eastern Syria and western Iraq, in addition it is affiliated with other sub-state group in Afghanistan, Algeria,

Libya, Pakistan, Nigeria and Yemen which also territory under their control. They govern a functioning

pseudo-state with a complex administrative structure. At the top of the military command is the emirate, which

consists of Baghdadi and two deputies, both of whom formerly served as generals in the Saddam-era Iraqi

army: Abu Ali al-Anbari, who controls ISIS’ operations in Syria, and Abu Salem al-Suleiman, who controls

operations in Iraq. ISIS’ civilian bureaucracy is supervised by 12 administrators who govern territories

(vilayats) in Iraq and Syria, overseeing councils that handle matters such as finances, media, and religious

affairs.

2. ISIL has been extraordinary among sub-state groups in its rapid rise to international prominence through the

rapid seizure of territory, escalating brutality, establishment of a self-proclaimed Caliphate, and the

recruitment of tens of thousands of foreign volunteers and allegiance of multiple terrorist groups across the

world. All actions that many other terrorist groups have aspired to, and failed in (including Al Qaida). ISIL’s

three centers of gravity have made it one of the most powerful armed non-state actors in the world. ISIL’s

unique attributes in its rapid rise to power include sustained fund raising in at least the hundreds of millions

through the extraction of oil and other mineral commodities and taxation of a captive populace, and the

organization and ideological ability to manipulate inter-organizational relations with other armed groups to

expand ISIL’s regional and global influence.

Study Methodology and Theoretical Framework

3. A great deal of open source information can be gathered about ISIL to provide a strategic and operational

overview of its outlook, organization, tactics, history and ideological underpinnings. This study has been

undertaken as a part of the Joint Staff’s Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) office at the request of

SOCCENT. SMA draws upon a wide range of military, government, academic and private sector agencies to

undertake a broad and differentiated analysis of key issues. As part of this effort, this analysis draws upon

past and ongoing efforts by SMA partners which include quantitative and qualitative analysis, broad literature

review, current reporting and first-hand accounts.

4. This study examines unclassified knowledge about ISIL through the analytical lens of the Evolved Irregular

Threat Project (EITP). EITP was a project undertaken for the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2011 that

examined the potential threat irregular groups could pose to the U.S. the future if they continued to evolve and

adopt emerging technology trends. The study examined in depth Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam, all of which had demonstrated near-state like capabilities in the past. To do

this, the capabilities of the groups were mapped across a ‘spectrum of control’ that spanned coercion,

administration and persuasion. A group with effective capabilities across the spectrum was considered

‘resilient’. The capabilities were then analyzed for Centers of Gravity (COG), which were further broken down



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE B OF ANNEX C

into Critical Capabilities, Critical Requirements and Critical Vulnerabilities, to better understand the nature of

the threat.

5. Centers of gravity (COG) enable analysts to determine what capabilities and characteristics enable a non-

state actor to maintain capabilities to wage hybrid warfare. Often, non-state actors may have a state sponsor

to provide funding, training, personnel and weapons, or an active diaspora outside of the theater. While

attacking these COGs while regular sustained, often multinational efforts, focusing on these COGs in the

military and non-military domain will not only shorten the timeframe and reduce the effort in combating these

groups, but also make it far more difficult for similar successor groups to arrive.

6. Center of Gravity analysis:

Terminology/ Acronyms

Term Definition

ISF Iraqi Security Forces

ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and Levant

KRG Kurdish Regional Government

FSA Free Syria Army

PMF Popular Mobilization Forces

EITP Evolved Irregular Threat Project

Critical Capabilities

Critical Requirements

Critical Vulnerabilities



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CENTER OF GRAVITY ANALYSIS – ISIL

IDENTIFIED COG # 1: ESTABLISHMENT OF A CREDIBLE CALIPHATE

# Critical

Capability

Critical Requirements Critical Vulnerabilities Comments & References

1 Meet Legal

Requirements

of Caliph

1.1. Proclamation of a Caliph

who is religiously eligible,

such as Al Baghdadi

1.2. Establishment of a Shura

and Sharia Council

1.3. Survival of senior cadre

(e.g. by constant

movement, rural and

urban hideouts)

1.4. Chain of succession to

maintain command

continuity and cohesion

against setbacks

CR 1.1 Vulnerable to

death/incapacitation/captur

e during airstrikes, special

operations, and battle

CR 1.2, CR 1.3 and 1.4

Council members

vulnerable to kinetic attacks

such as airstrikes,

intragroup disunity over

operations, ideology and

succession, and is also

vulnerable to enemy

intelligence, inadvertent

decapitation during battle


intragroup disputes (e.g. ex

Baathists vs. jihadis, locals

vs. foreign volunteers, and

along ethnic lines)

* A Caliph, according to

accepted Sunni

jurisprudence, must be 15

years of age, schooled in

religious learning (Al

Baghdadi has a PhD in

Islamic Studies), and

descent from the Prophet

Muhammad, of the Quraysh

Tribe

2 Control over

Physical

Space and

Population

2.1. Armed, mobile infantry to

seize and hold territory

2.2. Logistics to sustain

organized fighting force

2.3. Defensive measures to

protect territory (e.g.

Booby traps, IEDs,

snipers to wear down

and stop counter

offensives in urban

areas)

2.4. Armed presence and

police force to control

populace in urban areas

2.5. Heavy weapons such as

T-55 tanks* and Grad

rocket launchers to

suppress/intimidate

uprisings and provide

offensive/defensive fire

support

2.6. Identify and eliminate

opposition through

informant network, secret

CR 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5

and 2.7 Vulnerable to

airstrikes and artillery,

urban combat, mechanized

warfare


capture, natural

deterioration of

infrastructure

CR 2.4 vulnerable to kinetic

and electronic counter IED

methods, mine clearing

vehicles, loss of access to

IED materials, counter

sniper methods

CR 2.4 vulnerable to local

armed resistance, defection

CR 2.5 vulnerable to

counterbattery fire,

inadequate logistics,

inability to replace losses

through capture, defection

*Believed to have several

dozen T-55, a dozen T-62,

several T-72 tanks, one

hundred BMP IFVs, several

hundred MRAPs, MTLB,

M113 APCs, fifty M198

155mm howitzers, several

dozen BM-21 Grad MRL



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police

2.7. Roads and motorized

capability to move forces

around territory

and smuggling


counterintelligence, inability

to pay/persuade informants

CR 2.7 vulnerable to lack of

road and vehicular

maintenance

3

Possession of

Sovereign

Prerogatives

3.1. Coinage of precious

metal coins

3.2. Imposition of ISIL

authority symbols, such

as ID cards and official

documents

3.3. Display of clearly

identifiable icons and

symbols, including

appropriated ones 5.5

Monopoly over providing

public goods, such as

education and services

CR 3.1 is vulnerable to

precious metal shortages,

refusal of economic actors

to accept face value of

coins

CR 3.2 is vulnerable to loss

of and popular rejection of

ISIL legitimacy in

conjunction with territorial

losses


of ISIL military credibility

due to propaganda and

military reversals

4 Communicate

ISIL Case for

Caliphate

4.1. Develop and produce

multilingual official and

volunteer propaganda in

various mediums to

promote ISIL’s Islamist

credentials

4.2. Depiction of atrocities to

emphasize apocalyptic

urgency

4.3. Destruction of ‘un-

Islamic’ artifacts, items,

sites, books

4.4. Use of Social Media to

communicate with

international audience

4.5. Monopoly on education

4.6. Disseminate propaganda

in physical and digital

mediums

4.7. Generate narrative to

appeal to target audience

4.7.1. Frame narrative

of ISIL championing

Sunnis against any and

all oppressive authorities

4.7.2. Promote Daqaa

as the final battle against

the Anti-Christ


of propaganda staff and

volunteer due to combat

and defection, increased

Salafist and grassroots

expressions of opposition

by Muslims alienated by

ISIL extremism, discrediting

of ISIL through loss of

respect and ridicule

CR 4.1 is Vulnerable to the

presence of secular, non-

observant ex Baathist

officials in ISIL hierarchy


running out of atrocity

targets and backlash from

Muslims

CR 4.6 vulnerable to loss of

access to social media and

other media platforms

through shutting down

accounts, denial of service

CR 4.7 Vulnerable to rise of

political alternatives for

Sunni population,

prominent ISIL defeats and

Apocalyptic claims of the

Antichrist and Daqaa justify

ISIL atrocities by exigent

eschatology



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atrocities/misrule against

Sunnis

CR 4.5 is vulnerable to lack

of qualified teachers,

inability to maintain

educational infrastructure,

loss of territory

CR 4.7 vulnerable to loss of

production staff and

facilities, use of geolocating

and forensics on ISIL

propaganda to gain

operational intelligence

5 Establish Rule

of Law

5.1 Ability to make credible

and enforceable religious

decrees and

interpretations

5.2 Religious police and

courts with ability to

identify and punish

religious crimes

5.3 Female police to enforce

religious laws, removal of

women from public life

5.4 Use of force and financial

control to mobilize local

administration

5.5 Banning of secular

education

5.6 State of rules, laws to be

enforced

CR 5.1 More moderate and

compelling interpretations

by competing religious

figures

CR 5.2 and 5.6 Vulnerable

to popular armed

resistance, guerilla action,

inability to maintain

sufficient religious police

cadre


inadequate training of

religious jurists


attrition of female police

cadre


disruption of financial

network, sabotage

CR 5.5 and 5.6 Vulnerable

to loss of territory, inability

to enforce ban on education

due to weakening L&E

capability, underground

education and justice

system

6 Regulate

Economic

Activity

6.1 Set and enforce

economic regulations,

quality standards on food

6.2 Control distribution of

commodities and

consumer goods to

population

6.3 Control and set monetary

policy

6.4 Approval, and


breakdown in enforcement

and information capability,

lack of agricultural and

trade capabilities


trade embargos, inability to

pay for imported goods.



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE F OF ANNEX C

bureaucracy to set

production goals,

manage marketplaces

and cross border trading

6.5 Regulate and tax trade,

including internationally


inflation, counterfeiting, loss

of territory


of bureaucrats, inability to

train managerial personnel,

corruption, tightening of

border control

CR.5 Monitoring and

accounting of trade,

effective enforcement

capabilities


IDENTIFIED COG #2: INTEGRATED, INDEPENDENT FINANCIAL RESOURCES

# Critical

Capability


1 Extract and

Monetize

Natural

Commodities

1.1 Extract natural resources 1.1.1Extraction Site (including crude oil and other minerals) 1.1.2 Processing Facilities, including fixed and mobile refineries 1.1.3 Trained personnel to operate and maintain extraction facilities

1.2 Agriculture

1.2.1 Irrigation, farmland,

equipment

1.2.2 Storage facilities, such

as grain silos

1.3 Network of traders and

transportation

1.3.1 Middlemen to facilitate

commodities export

1.3.2 Tankers, pipelines, roads

to move commodities

1.4 Bureaucracy to manage,

oversee and collect funds

from trade

1.5 Buyers in hostile territories

and aboard to purchase

commodities

CR 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2,

1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.3.2, and 1.4

are vulnerable to kinetic

action, loss of specialized,

value adding economic

partners

CR 1.2 Ability to attract and

retain sufficiently trained

personnel (including pay,

security and desire to work

for regime)

CR 1.1.2 is vulnerable to

capture or destruction


drought, disease, loss

agricultural personnel from

ISIL purges


legal crackdown in non ISIL

territory


inability to obtain market

information, loss of trading

partners, wartime losses,

neutralization of

management bureaucracy,

enemy sabotage and

*Extracted mineral

commodities include

primarily oil, as well as

natural gas and potash



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE G OF ANNEX C

deception, bribery


local law and international

enforcement and financial

sanctions, plunging

commodities prices,

reduction in foreign

demand

2 Violent

Leveraging of

non-Group

Assets

2.1 Looting, usage and sale of

personal, commercial and

government property

2.2 Banks with large onsite cash

deposits and valuables*

2.3 Capture and use of heavy

weapons and dual use

equipment like construction

machines,

telecommunications


depletion of lootable and

cash convertible property,

and lack of new conquests


depletion of existing bank

deposits, lack of recent

bank captures

CR 2.3 Vulnerable to lack

of military victories to

maintain looting, inability to

maintain heavy assets

*ISIL is believed to have

seized up to $500 million in

cash from Mosul banks in

June 2014

3 Tax populace,

and Extortion

3.1 Extract fees and services

from population base

3.2 Monopoly of force to extort

populace, especially minority

groups

3.3 Foreign hostages to ransom

3.4 “Tax” civil servants receiving

payments from Baghdad and

Damascus

CR 3.1, 3.2 Vulnerable to

loss of urban areas, armed

resistance, breakdown of

ISIL law enforcement


economic decline in ISIL

territory


armed resistance, inability

to organize extortionist

activities

CR 3.3 Vulnerable to loss

of hostages from

executions and rescue,

unwillingness of

governments to pay

ransoms

CR 3.4. Vulnerable to

governments ceasing

monetary transfers, weight

of tax burdens inciting

discontent

4 Access to licit

and illicit

international

financial

network

4.1 Leverage contributions from

foreign sympathizers to meet

ISIL needs

4.2 Interlocutors’ ability to

smuggle physical cash into

ISIL territories

CR 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4

Vulnerable to intelligence,

especially electronic and

cyber, and subsequent law

enforcement actions



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE H OF ANNEX C

4.3 Wireless banking and digital

currencies to enable black

market financial activity

4.4 International banking system

to facilitate payments to ISIL’s

middle men traders

4.5 Compliant and negligent

foreign state authorities to

ensure ISIL access to

banking and other financial

services


disruption of smuggler

network


blacklisting of ISIL and

associates, heightened

enforcement of sanctions


strengthened international

sanctions cooperation,

punishment/removal of

corrupt officials, criminals

and banks, international

pressure on compliant

states

5

Monetize

Cultural,

Heritage and

Social Assets

5.1 Established international

network to traffic antiquities

and other cultural goods

5.2 Museums and private

collections of antiquities

5.3 Control of antiquities sites

5.4 Logistical support, such as,

excavation tools, appraisal of

antiquities values, storage

5.5 Control of poppy and hashish

crops

5.6 Presence of smugglers and

smuggling routes

CR 5.1 Vulnerable to law

enforcement, interdiction,

unwillingness to purchase

ISIL sourced items


capture and depletion of

museum holdings


depletion of sites,

airstrikes, capture, theft


of equipment and

personnel from armed

action and inability to

pay/maintain

CR 5.5, 5.6 is vulnerable to

ISIL ideological dictates,

unwillingness of narcotics

syndicates to cooperate

with ISIL, non ISIL law

enforcement action

6 Distribute and

Manage

Resources

towards ISIL

ends

6.1 Sophisticated accounting bookkeeping infrastructure to pay fighters, track revenue collection and budget public expenditures

6.1.1 Identify and transfer funds and resources to allied/subordinate groups

6.2 Financial resources to bribe officials, and pay civil servants

6.3 Ability to apply financial

resources to generate public

aid, such as food handouts


military action to

incapacitate ISIL

bureaucracy, inability to

bureaucracy to gather,

process and act on

information due to lack of

training, degraded

information collection and

inability to replace lost

personnel

CR 6.1 Vulnerable to purges

* ISIL personnel costs

are higher compared to

other Middle Eastern

militants, especial for

foreign fighters and

families

**Ex Baathist

personnel are vital to

the bureaucratic

allocation of resources,

as well as smuggling



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE I OF ANNEX C

6.4 Access to smuggling

networks

6.5 Armed control of border posts

6.6 Corrupt local official in

neighboring countries to

facilitate trade

6.7 Strong market demand for

smuggled goods

6.8 Smugglers feel risk/reward

ratio is worthwhile

6.9 International supply of

smuggled items, including

consumer goods,

construction, capital

equipment and military

supplies

6.10 Neglect of border, controls by

neighboring nation states

of bureaucracy for

ideological, infighting and

political reasons

CR 6.1.1 and 6.2

Vulnerable to increasing

expenditures, against a

declining revenue base

CR 6.2 Vulnerable to civilian

and defector

unwillingness to work with

ISIL due to atrocities,

danger, and ideological

differences


disruption and breakdown

of transportation

infrastructure, alternate

sources of public aid to

population

CR 6.4.1 Vulnerable to loss

and destruction of border

crossings and transport

infrastructure (lack of

maintenance)

CR 6.4.2 Vulnerable to law

enforcement, arrest of

corrupt officials,

international cooperation


lack of market demand

from decreased economic

resources


interdiction of smugglers,

increased fighting that

reduces smuggler

willingness for risk


stricter border controls

and lack of funds to

create sufficient market

demand


strengthened international

sanctions cooperation,

punishment/removal of

corrupt officials, pressure

on compliant state and

sub-state actors on ISIL

networks



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE J OF ANNEX C

trade, loss of border posts

to enemies, militarization

of border


IDENTIFIED COG #3: LEVERAGING IDENTITY POLITICS AND MOBILIZING THE DISENFRANCHISED

# Critical Capability


1 Continue to Expand into and, Sustain Presence in, Ungoverned Spaces

5.1 Populated areas suffering

from a collapse in central

governance

5.2 Presence of armed groups in

communal violence

5.3 Access to globalized

networks like transportation

and communications

5.4 Charismatic ideology and

accompanying military

success to standout from

other armed groups

5.5 Military and social

mobilization capabilities to

prevent establishment of

governance

CR 1.1 Vulnerable to stabilization by other forces, such as multi-national coalitions, as well as further destabilization from ecological collapse CR 1.2 Vulnerable to competition from other armed groups, and state intervention CR 1.3 Vulnerable to sanctions and restrictions by the international community. CR 1.4 Vulnerable to battlefield reversals, airstrikes, loss of charismatic leaders, and new battlefield success by other armed groups that draw away Salafist sympathy CR 1.5 Vulnerable to widespread popular support for government/discontent with ISIL that undermines its ability to prevent alternate narratives emerging among the population

2 Develop Narrative to Engage the Alienated and Unaligned

2.1 Exploit sense of Sunni disempowerment, persecution

2.2 Presence of veteran cadre to attract and inspire Sunni fighters

2.3 Use Coalition airstrikes and Iraq/Syrian atrocities to recruit new fighters

2.4 Establish relations with tribal leaders and ex-Baathists to draw upon their support bases

2.5 Narrative tailored to: 2.5.1 Foreign Jihadis 2.5.2 Adventure Seekers

CR 2.1 Vulnerable to perceived ISIL weakness from military defeats, political accommodation with government, emergence of alternative political-military Sunni vehicle

CR 2.2 Vulnerable to defection of local Sunnis, disagreements over ISIL rule

CR 2.3 vulnerable to airstrikes, combat attrition

Leveraging Identity Politics and Engaging the Disenfranchised



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE K OF ANNEX C

2.5.3 Ex-Ba’athists 2.6 Alienated Persons/Outsiders

CR 2.4 vulnerable to reduction/standardization of casualty invites, overshadow by ISIL atrocities

CR 2.5 vulnerable to Baath/tribal defections, unwillingness to join due to ISIL ideology and actions, attempts to grab power, lack of resources, existing arrangements with ISIL enemies, perceived regional/ethnic favoritism

3 Identify, Align and Leverage other Armed Groups

3.1 ISIL perceived success and control of territory to encourage coalition building to create narrative of dominance and expectations of future victories

3.2 Offer training, funding and advisers to subordinate groups

3.3 Existence of multiple, independent Salafist armed groups willingly to align with ISIL approaches, values and identity

3.3.1 Organizational flexibility to integrate and control new allies/franchises

CR 3.1 Vulnerable to visible military setbacks, breakdown of order in ISIL territory, eclipse by military successes of other Salafist groups, split in ISIL

CR 3.1 Vulnerable to visible defeats, ungoverned population, expressed dissatisfaction by Muslim clergy and masses

CR 3.2 Vulnerable to reduced financial resources, loss of trained personnel to liaison with subordinate groups

CR 3.3 Vulnerable to factional dissatisfaction with ISIL strategy and leadership, especially in operational matters and division of authority

CR 3.3 Vulnerable to ISIL affiliates in Libya, Nigeria and elsewhere could renounce ISIL/their defeat would tarnish ISIL ‘brand’

CR 3.4 Vulnerable to leadership struggle, internal politics which degrades ISIL ability to organize and delegate subordinate units

4 Organizational Infrastructure to Manage Relationships

4.1 Ex Ba’ath officers and officials to administer territories

4.2 Veteran Jihadis from the Iraq War with credibility and capability to lead

4.3 Funds to pay local and foreign fighters, civilian

CR 4.1 Vulnerable to defections, ideological purges, assassinations, and airstrikes

CR 4.1 Vulnerable to disenfranchisement and dissatisfaction of ex



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE L OF ANNEX C

services, informers 4.4 Intelligence and

counterintelligence activities 4.5 Tactical understandings with

other Salafist groups and Damascus, in order to focus resources on other opponents

3.4 Align capabilities and interests with other groups through flexible ISIL hierarchy

Baathist officers

CR 4.1 Vulnerable to popular and jihadi animus against ex Baathist personnel

CR 4.2 Vulnerable to attrition of veteran cadre by kinetic means, losing credibility from association with ex-Baathist ‘opportunists’

CR 4.3 Vulnerable to loss of financial resources

CR 4.4 Vulnerable to loss of intelligence personnel (especially ex Baathist) in combat, airstrikes, purge/power struggles, defections, infiltration CR 4.5 Vulnerable to opportunism from Assad and Salafists, such as attacking ISIL during weakness, cutting deals with other ISIL opponents

5 Use of Terror to Spread Narrative of ISIL Invincibility and Prowess

5.1 Graphic, public punishments

of religious and political

opposition through

executions, maiming

5.2 Use of suicide bombings, execution of POWS to create terror among enemy forces 5.3 Use of ISIL intelligence to ferret out political opposition, rivals and regime personnel, to purge 5.4 Disseminate recordings of ISIL videos to cement ISIL reputation as most brutal armed actor in the Middle East

CR 5.1 and 5.2 Vulnerable to alienating general population and less dedicated ISIL fighters, reducing efficacy of ISIL governance CR 5.1 Vulnerable to opposition from partners like ex Baathists who view such violence as counterproductive CR 5.2 Vulnerable to endangering to the death opposition from enemy forces, instead of surrender or defection CR 5.3 Vulnerable to decreased efficacy of ISIL security apparatus from wartime attrition, backlash from brutality hinder willingness of population to cooperate with ISIL personnel in maintaining order

CR 5.4 Vulnerable to inability to distribute digital and physical media, dissemination could alienate potential ISIL popular support



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE M OF ANNEX C

6 Globalize the Struggle

6.1 Accessible transportation for foreign volunteers

6.2 Loose border and visa controls, especially in countries bordering ISIL territory

6.3 Effective propaganda to globally reach disaffected global audiences

6.4 Current foreign volunteers extol ISIL rule on media platforms Claim responsibility for lone wolf attacks aboard to create impression of broader global capability even if none exists, and to further strengthen perception and brand association

CR 6.1 Vulnerable to coordinated international crackdown and control on travel, visa regimes

CR 6.2 Vulnerable to increased law enforcement, militarized borders, international information sharing

CR 6.3 Vulnerable to sustained grassroots counter-narrative from Muslims, loss of access to social and media platforms, ISIL military reversals, displacement of ISIL in public consciousness by other ‘outsider’ appealing groups

CR 6.3 Vulnerable to decline in ISIL prestige and power, as ISIL becomes unable to escalate message with further brutality and victories, imploding ISIL civilian life discredits alternative narrative to globalization

CR 6.4 Vulnerable to foreign volunteers defecting and deserting, denouncing ISIL CR 6.5 Vulnerable to heighted counterterrorist activities, disbelief over ISIL actual involvement, ‘normalization’ of lone wolf attacks as criminal activity, vs. terrorism

*ISIL, in terms of population and territory controlled, is by far the most successful Salafist non-state group in history

Summary

7. ISIL has three operational Centers of Gravity which aid its ability to expand, control and maintain a proto-state

center around core territory; its perceived Salafist legitimacy stemming from its claim as being the new

Caliphate; its ability to generate revenue unprecedented for a proto-state/NGO actor; and its ability to

leverage identity politics into alliances and allegiance. ISIL’s claim of establishing a Caliphate gives it a sense

of religious legitimacy that no other Salafist group has been able to claim to date, as well as triggering a range

of religious duties that are dormant without a physical Caliphate. Its vast fundraising and resource extraction

operations enable it to increase its military strength, as well as provide a modicum of governance in

conquered territory. Holding territory establishes a practical claim to sovereignty, which provides it with both

an armed base to build military strength and draw in motivated believers. ISIL benefits from its alliance of



WWW.NOETICGROUP.COM PAGE N OF ANNEX C

veteran jihadi warriors and ex-Baathist middle ranking officials to establish organization competence which

has leveraged wartime chaos in Iraq and Syria to systematically eliminate fractured opposition.

8. ISIL’s propaganda capabilities, while important and impressive, are not considered a COG in and of itself as it

is assessed that ISIL could continue to function and fight without (albeit not as well or as successfully)

Further, while they have demonstrated a capability well beyond other groups, their techniques are generally

an evolution of previously used successful techniques and not unique to the group. Propaganda is an

enabling factor that enables ISIL to build on its core strengths, such as the legitimacy of its claim to Caliphate

and the universal implications thereof, but it is a function, just like possessing conventional military capabilities

such as massed artillery batteries and mechanized formations. Additionally, the general Sunni population of

Iraq and Syria cannot be considered a COG for ISIL, given that despite control of between six to eight million

people, the core ISIL local fighting strength is estimated to be 30,000 at best.




ANNEX D

ISIL KEY BATTLE ANALYSIS EVOLVED

Mosul

Result: Victory

Factors: Sleeper cells already inside Mosul were able to report on the disposition and movement of Iraqi forces,

before launching flanking attacks on Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) during the attack. Additionally, ISIL used vehicle

borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), primarily built from civilian vehicles and captured Humvees, to

devastate Iraqi formations and positions (there were no Iraqi armored vehicles in Mosul). ISIL commanders also

communicated with their sleeper cells, and motorized infantry, through use of portable telecommunications.

Enhancements: To improve upon ISIL battlefield performance at Mosul, the usage of light mechanized forces to

further rout fleeing Iraqi forces would increase the psychological and material effects of the victory. Such

mechanized forces are likely to be 4X4 and 6X6 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, such as the Norinco WZ551,

Otokar Cobra, Emirati Nimr or South African RG-34. Such light IFVs would be mobile enough for cross country

capability in most Iraqi/Syria terrain, while also carries heavy firepower in the form of anti-tank missiles and

autocannons. Additionally, light IFVs would be cheaper and easier to maintain, as well as capture.

Precision guided artillery fire, in the form of laser guided Krasnopol or Copperhead laser guided 152/155mm

shells, would aid operations in urban areas centered around rivers, such as Mosul. They could target bridges

being used by security forces moving across the river, in response to ISIL activity. Even more, laser and satellite

navigation guided artillery rounds would allow ISIL forces to maintain an around the clock and effective

bombardment of enemy forces, further destroying their morale and material capability. Sleeper cells would be

very useful in identifying targets for and evaluating the effectiveness of such artillery strikes. Precision artillery

could neutralize enemy airfields, denying close air support from helicopters, as well as preventing evacuation of

medical casualties and deployed reinforcements.

Kobane

Result: Defeat

Factors: Coalition airstrikes were the most significant factor in ISIL’s defeat at Kobani; the destruction of fighting

formations, supplies, armored vehicles and artillery neutralized ISIL material and numerical advantages against

the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga/FSA were able to coordinate in urban fighting to use flanking maneuvers to

surround ISIL strongpoints in Kobani.

Enhancements: ISIL’s failure at Kobani can be laid on several factors, such as arrival of enemy formations,

Coalition airstrikes which disrupted ISIL C4I infrastructure and prevented the massing of forces needed to capture

decisive urban objectives. The solution to this shortcoming would be to increase the lethality of individual ISIL

small units and persons with advanced small urbans. Man portable smart grenade launchers, such as the

Chinese ZH-05 or South Korean K-11 assault rifles would give ISIL infantry a quick and reliable source of fire




support to attack entrenched enemies sheltering inside buildings and fortifications. Routing Peshmerga and their

FSA allies from Kobani would be accomplished more quickly if ISIL personnel had the ability to fire programmable

20mm airburst grenades through the windows of enemy buildings. Dispersing fire support to the individual soldier

would greatly mitigate the effects of Coalition airstrikes on ISIL fire support: hitting a T-55 tank is easy enough, but

a single soldier in urban combat would be rather out of the question.

Jamming enemy communications would also degrade the ability of enemy forces to communicate intelligence and

command during fluid urban fighting. Degrading communications through relatively portable electronic warfare

measures would also decrease the ability of Peshmerga and other forces to call in Coalition airstrikes in real time.

Tikrit

Result: Defeat

Factors: The great number of Iraqi forces, about 30,000 Iraqi Security Forces, militia and tribal forces, used their

superior numbers to surround Tikrit and gradually capture the city through attritional warfare. Iranian advisers

from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were crucial in coordinating the movement among those disparate

forces, as well as providing specialized functions such as intelligence. The ability of the Iraqis to sustain the vast

logistical needs of the 30,000 force by resupplying food, fuel and ammunition enabled Iraq to maintain its

numerical and technological edge during the siege.

Enhancements: ISIL was almost guaranteed to lose Tikrit due to the vast number of Iraqi forces arrayed against

it, with 30,000 ISF, militia and tribal fighters against roughly one thousand ISIL fighters. However, the

cumbersome advance of Iraqi forces suggested that at a minimum, Iraqi forces were constrained in part by the

need to resupply their vast logistical footprint. Longer ranged precision guided battlefield munitions (i.e. ATGMs,

PGM mortar rounds), perhaps mounted on mobile platforms like technical, can attack Iraqi lines of communication

and rear areas.

ISIL forces could use SIGINT capability to discern location and timing enemy attacks/air-artillery strikes.

Intercepting enemy communications at the tactical level would allow them to evacuate compromised and exposed

positions, while concentrating urban forces to meet the axis of enemy attacks.

Long range snipers to kill enemy commanders and foreign advisers would provide ISIL with another way to prevail,

or at least lengthen the duration, of defensive battles. In addition to heavy sniper rifles such as the Barrett M107

and Chinese M99 50 caliber rifles for making shots up to 2km, computer aided “smart shooting” technology like

Trackpoint would massively increase the lethality of even mediocre ISIL snipers. The primary mission of ISIL

snipers in defending urban centers would be to single out and kill high value targets such as enemy commanders

and foreign advisers. Killing foreign advisers like IRGC or US advisory personnel would offer several benefits; it

would demoralize local and foreign enemy forces, serve as a propaganda victory (especially against western

personnel), and force more operational restrictions upon surviving foreign advisors, thus decreasing their efficacy.

Of special note is that heavy sniper and anti-material rifles have already been seen in the hands of Syrian rebels

like the FSA, it is also highly likely that ISIL forces also have access to such weaponry already.




Ramadi

Result: Victory

Factors: After nearly a year of sustained fighting in the Ramadi city environs, ISIL forces routed Iraqi national and

local forces. Key factors in Ramadi included the usage of armored VBIEDs, especially Humvees, and armored

bulldozers that broke through Iraqi strong points. ISIL forces also took advantage of a sandstorm to use as cover

against airstrikes, as they mass forces and marched into Ramadi. Additionally, long range radios were used by

ISIL units to coordinate maneuver and suicide bombings.

Enhancements: Improvements to ISIL’s performance at Ramadi would include the ability to engage and destroy

routed Iraqi forces. Given that Coalition airstrikes could aid retreating Iraqi forces, it would be necessary for

pursuing ISIL forces to quickly force close quarter combat with Iraqi forces in order to reduce the efficacy of said

airstrikes. To that end, ISIL forces would need light mechanized forces using small wheeled AFVs, as opposed to

motorized technical units, to have rapid all terrain maneuver capability.

And to reduce airstrike attrition during transit, such mechanized units would need training and sufficient command

and control to move in small units while converging on routed enemy forces. It would be difficult for ISIL to get

such training; most of its ex Baathist officers have had no experience in mechanized warfare for over a decade at

this point. To track enemy forces on the move, ISIL forces would need real time intelligence, in the form of light

UAVs and radio intercept equipment to anticipate that the axis of enemy retreat.

Palmyra

Result: Victory

Factors: ISIL motorized desert forces were the key to capturing Palmyra in May 2015, they first bombarded

government position with missiles, before moving in to capture key infrastructure like airfields, ammunition dumps

and oil fields. Despite heavy artillery fire and several Syrian counterattacks, ISIL routed Syrian forces from

Palmyra by May 26th

. ISIL forces had also used HUMINT and battlefield reconnaissance to gauge the strength of

Syrian Army positions and checkpoints, before moving in to seize those areas. Syrian forces since May 2015

have made occasion efforts at recapturing infrastructure around Palmyra, especially natural gas fields.

Enhancements: The biggest boost that ISIL could have received at Palmyra would have been in stronger

intelligence gathering capabilities. This would likely be the form of light, truck launched UAVs such as the RQ-7

Shadow, a 350kg UAV which is small enough to be easily mobile, while having enough robust intelligence

gathering capabilities to support division level units. ISIL could capture such UAVs from Syrian or Iraqi forces,

who already operate such American, Chinese and Iranian light UAVs. In addition to intelligence gathering, ISIL

forces could repurpose such light UAVs into kamikaze attack missions, for the purpose of terrorizing enemy forces

before land assaults.

ISIL could use counterbattery fire as well. The Syrian artillery was a hindrance to ISIL movement during the Battle

of Palmyra, as well as providing fire support for Syrian counterattacks. Given that ISIL deployed large quantities of

missiles during Palmyra to destroy outlying Syrian outposts, counterbattery radars radio intercept equipment and




UAVs would allow ISIL artillery to engage in counterfire missions against enemy artillery, forcing them to either

shift engagement away from ISIL infantry and armor, or move out of ISIL missile range.




ANNEX E

BIBLIOGRAPHY EVOLVED

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shoots-reconnaissance-drone-belonging-isis-western-anbar/

B. Ahmed Meiloud, “This is how IS survived a year of bombing and ground war” in Middle East Eye, June 2,

2015, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/how-survived-year-bombing-and-ground-war-

1619065958#sthash.whU0aspm.dpuf

C. Alan Taylor, “DIY Weapons of the Libyan Rebels”, The Atlantic, Jun 14, 2011,


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Every Day”, in Business Insider, Aug 27, 2014 http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-worlds-richest-

terrorist-group-2014-8

E. Associated Press, “ISIS Dug Network of Tunnels Under Conquered Iraqi City of Sinjar” in NBC News,

November25, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-dug-network-tunnels-under-

conquered-iraqi-city-sinjar-n469366

F. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Archive of Islamic State Administrative Documents”, Aymenn Jawad Al-

Tamimi's Blog, January 27, 2015, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-

administrative-documents

G. Ben Hubbard, “Offering Services, ISIS Digs in Deeper in Seized Territory”, New York Times, Middle East,

June 16, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/middleeast/offering-services-isis-ensconces-

itself-in-seized-territories.html?_r=0

H. Bernard F. Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," Naval War College

Review, Winter 1998, first published April 1965

I. Bilal Y. Saab, “Can the House of Saud Survive ISIS?” in Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2015


J. Bill Roggio, “Islamic State Documents Takeover of Syrian Airbase”, Long War Journal, August 27, 2014,


K. Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss, “Islamic State utilizes 7 foreigners in Baiji suicide assaults”, The Long War

Journal, June 14, 2015, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/islamic-state-utilizes-7-

foreigners-in-baiji-suicide-assaults.php

L. Bruce Hoffman, “Today's Highly Educated Terrorists”, The National Interest, September 15, 2010,

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/bruce-hoffman/todays-highly-educated-terrorists-4080

M. Bryan Price, et al, “The Group that Calls Itself a State The Evolution and Challenges of the Islamic State”,

Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, December 16, 2014, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-

group-that-calls-itself-a-state-understanding-the-evolution-and-challenges-of-the-islamic-state

N. Charles C. Caris & Samuel Reynolds, “ISIS Governance in Syria”, Institute for the Study of War, 2014,

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS_Governance.pdf

O. Charles Lister, “Cutting off ISIS' Cash Flow” For Brookings, October 24, 2015












http://www.aymennjawad.org/2015/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents

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Daesh evolved irregular threat analysis

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Transcript of Daesh evolved irregular threat analysis