Post on 05-Jul-2018
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Dynamic Positioning and Control Systems
12131 Community Rd.
Poway, CA 92064
858-679-5500 General Fax: 858-679-5501
Document Number
24005418PS-310
Document Title
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
NMS6000 DP (DP Class 2) System
Remontowa 1674-09
Prepared by: Robert Theisen
Approved by: Robert Theisen Systems Engineer
Revision: A Date: 19-Jun-08
REVISION STATUS
Rev. DateDescription
A 19-Jun-08 Initial Release.
CONTROL STATUS
Unless over stamped “MASTER” or “CONTROLLED” in red,this document has been provided for information only and
will not be updated.
This document is, or contains, confidential and proprietary information of L-3 Communications. Its receipt or
possession does not convey any rights to reproduce or disclose it, or its contents, or to manufacture, use, or
sell anything it may describe or reference. Reproduction, disclosure, or use without specific written
authorization of L-3 Communications is strictly prohibited. This technical data is controlled under the Export
Administration Regulations ECCN [8E992], and may not be exported to a Foreign Person, either in the U.S.
or abroad, without the proper authorization of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
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Table of Contents
1. Single Point Failure Mode Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 3 1.1. Purpose ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.2. Definition ................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.3. Single Point Failure Assessment .......................................................................................................................... 3
1.3.1. Vessel Electrical Power Plant ................................................................................................................. 3 1.3.2. Vessel Propulsion ..................................................................................................................................... 4 1.3.3. System Architecture.................................................................................................................................. 5 1.3.4. Redundant DP Control Consoles ........................................................................................................... 5 1.3.5. Independent Backup Joystick (JS) System ........................................................................................... 5 1.3.6. Control Power ............................................................................................................................................ 6 1.3.7. Redundant Programmable Logic Controllers ....................................................................................... 6 1.3.8. DP Control Network .................................................................................................................................. 7 1.3.9. DP Control Console Mode Select ........................................................................................................... 7 1.3.10. DP Control Console Automatic Backup ................................................................................................. 7 1.3.11. Signal Processor Unit ............................................................................................................................... 7 1.3.12. External Serial Sensors ............................................................................................................................ 8
1.3.13. DP/Bridge/Independent JS Control Selector Switch ............................................................................ 9 1.4. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................................. 9
Appendix A System Block Diagrams
Appendix B Vessel FMEA
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1. Single Point Failure Mode Analysis
1.1. Purpose
The purpose of this document is to provide a single point failure analysis for the L-3 Communications DPCSNMS6000 Dynamic Positioning (DP) System.
The DP has been designed to meet the ABS DP Class 2 requirements.
The focus of this document is an analysis of the DP System hardware. DP System Software controlling the
communications highways is also assessed as applicable.This review also addresses areas of possible system degradation, as contrasted with system failure, and offerssuggestions on how these problems can be alleviated.
1.2. Definition
The definition of a single point failure is any piece of hardware (or section of software) whose loss would cause acomplete failure of the automatic positioning of the vessel. Component failures that result in system degradation,which are not considered a system failure are also addressed to a certain extent.
It should be noted that the foregoing material assumes the Customer is familiar with the system architecture andterminology.
1.3. Single Point Failure Assessment
A single point failure assessment was made for the NMS6000 DP system. The results are attached andsummarized below.
1.3.1. Vessel Electrical Power Plant
The vessel power plant is shown in Figure 1-1 below. The Remontowa 1674-09 NMS6000 software is designed foroperation in split bus modes with all Generators online.
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MAIN SWITCHBOARD
THRUSTERSTERN
SUPPLY 2
GENERATOR 1
-SG1
MSB
22Q
-G1
BUSS TIE BREAKER
GENERATOR 1
SG1 G1
SHAFT DIESEL
-G2 -SG2
GENERATOR 2
G2
DIESEL
GENERATOR 2
SG2
SHAFT
STARBOARDBUSS
PORTBUSS
11Q
THRUSTER 1BOW
T1
33Q 32Q
STERN BOWTHRUSTER 2THRUSTER
T2T3
Figure 1-1 Remontowa 1674-09 Propuls ion System
1.3.2. Vessel Propulsion
The vessel propulsion system is shown in Figure 1-2 below.
PORT MAIN
PORT
RUDDER
PROPELLER (T4)
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1.3.3. System Architecture
See the NMS6000 DP System Block Diagrams in Appendix A.
1.3.4. Redundant DP Control Consoles
The L-3 Communications DPCS NMS6000 DP System consists of dual redundant NMS6000 units. The NMS6000units consist of two (2) primary consoles, DP1 and DP2. The operator can select which of the two consoles is theOn-Line Master Controller; the other console automatically becomes the backup, which takes over upon loss of theMaster.
A joystick for both surge and sway and a potentiometer for moment control are provided on the DP1 and DP2control consoles. These controls only work with the Master DP control console when either the Manual Headingmode or the Manual Position mode is selected.
1.3.5. Independent Joystick (JS) System
An NMS6000 Independent Joystick (JS) System is provided. The Independent JS unit consists of a separateControl Console, shared Signal Processors and Control Network and is powered by a separate, dedicated PowerSource. The operator can select control from the Independent JS control by way of the 3-way Selector Switchlocated at the bridge console.
A joystick for both surge and sway and a potentiometer for moment control are provided on the Independent JScontrol console. These controls only work with the Selector Switch in the Independent JS position.
Although it is referenced within this document, the Independent JS is not included within the scope of the overallFMEA, since it functions as a stand alone system.
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1.3.6. Control PowerThree (3) UPSs are provided to power the DP System. UPS 1 and 2 are 24VDC UPSs. UPS 3 is a small AC UPSwhich powers the Cyscan position reference system sensor.
Each NMS Control Console is provided with its own separate UPS Power. The loss of a UPS will result in the lossof DC power to the specific items listed in the table below. Each UPS is capable of a minimum of 30 minutes ofbattery back-up time at the full system load.
For redundancy, each SPU is also fed with a secondary, backup DC supply from the Ship’s EmergencySwitchboard, the same source that supplies the Independent Joystick system.
The UPS power is supplied to the DP System Equipment as follows:
Equipment UPS1
(24VDC)
UPS2
(24VDC)
UPS3
(AC)
DC Supplyfrom Ship’sEmergency
Switchboard
DP 1 (Computer, Display andConsole)
X
DP 2 (Computer, Display andConsole)
X
IND JS (Computer, Display andConsole)
X
SPU 1 (PLC 1) X X
SPU 2 (PLC 2) X X
DGPS 1 X
DGPS 2 X
Cyscan System X
Wind Sensor 1 X
Wind Sensor 2 X
VRU (via SPU 1, +24V) X
VRU (via SPU 2, +24V) X
Gyro 1 X
Gyro 2 X
Alarm Printer 1 (via 24/230 inv) X
Alarm Printer 2 (via 24/230 inv) X
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Each SPU/PLC pair is powered from a separate UPS, with DC power backup from the emergency switchboard.
1.3.8. DP Control Network
The NMS6000 Controllers are connected to the Signal Processor Units via a peer-to-peer redundant control anddata transmission network—channels A and B. Upon loss of channel A, channel B carries all data, and vice-versa.
1.3.9. DP Control Console Mode Select
The NMS6000 Redundancy exchange is implemented using a Dual Redundant Ethernet network on which eachnode multicasts a Voting Packet on a preconfigured multicast channel. Each node reads and stores the votingpacket from the other nodes and uses this information to manage the manual and automatic Master/Backupexchange. If node 1 is Master, then node 2 is the automatic hot backup and vice versa.
Manual mastership transfer is done by pressing the “NMS Online” button on the Backup Console UI.
1.3.10. DP Control Console Automatic Backup
If a Voting Packet is timed out, the system will zero the data for that node. If the Voting packet from the Masterconsole is timed out, the Hot Backup will automatically take control and become the Master. The new status isreflected in the Voting packet so when the old Master comes back up it will now become a hot backup.
1.3.11. Signal Processor Unit
Two (2) Signal Processor Units (SPU) are provided with the NMS6000 DP System. For redundancy, the SPUs arepowered from two independent sources (L-3 24VDC UPSs and the Ship emergency DC distribution switchboard).
The SPUs perform the input/output consolidation and distribution between the field sensor control and monitoringand the control processors located in the DP Control Consoles.
The I/O is divided between the two (2) SPUs and interfaces to the redundant ControlNet network and PLCs via the
Redundant Media Adapters (ACNRs).
1.3.11.1. Signal Processing I/O Matrix
The I/O is divided between the SPUs to minimize the impact of the loss of an SPU or of an ACNR within an SPU.
The Thruster, Main Prop and Rudder I/O is divided between the SPUs as follows:
Thrusters/Main Props & Rudders
SPU1 SPU2
Thruster 1 (Fwd Bow Tunnelthruster)
X
Thruster 2 (Aft Bow Azimuththruster)
X
Thruster 3 (Stern Tunnel thruster) X X
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SPU2-ACNR: Loss of interface and control of Bow Tunnel Thruster 2, Stbd Main Prop and Stbd
Rudder
Note: Stern Tunnel Thruster can be controlled from either SPU. The circuit is designed so that SPU1 is the primarycontroller but if it should fail then control transfers to SPU2.
Other DP System analog and discrete I/O signal groups are distributed between the SPUs to provide the requiredredundancy for the overall DP system.
Analog / Discrete Signals
Device / Equipment Qty
SPU1 SPU2
DP Online Signal 2 X X
Independent JS Online Signal 2 X X
UPS (alarms) 3 X X
Vertical Reference Unit(signal/power)
2 X X
1.3.12. External Serial Sensors
External position, environmental and heading sensors are redundant and include:
• Two (2) DGPS’s. Each DGPS provides serial position data to both DP consoles and the IndependentJS console.
• One (1) Cyscan System. The Cyscan System provides serial position data to both DP consoles andthe Independent JS console.
• Two (2) Gyrocompasses. Each Gyrocompass provides serial heading data to both DP consoles andthe Independent JS console.
• Two (2) Wind Sensors. Each Wind Sensor provides serial speed and direction data to both DPconsoles and the Independent JS console.
The serial sensors are interfaced to the NMS6000 DP System via Allen Bradley Point IO modules and theControlNet network. For redundancy, the serial sensors are divided between the Point IO ACNRs, with each
ACNR powered from a separate source.
The serial sensors are divided between the three (3) ACNRs as follows:
Serial Sensors Flexlogix PLC #1 Flexlogix PLC #2 Flexlogix PLC #1
Point IO ACNR 1 Point IO ACNR 2 Point IO ACNR 3
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As a result of this division, the worst case effect due to the single point failure loss of a Point I/O ACNR module is:
Point I/O ACNR1: Loss of DGPS1, Cyscan, Wind 1
Point I/O ACNR2: Loss of DGPS2, Gyrocompass 2, Wind 2
Point I/O ACNR3: Loss of Gyrocompass 1
1.3.13. DP/Bridge/Independent JS Control Selector Switch
An industrial-grade, three position DP/Bridge/Independent JS control switch is provided with the NMS6000 andperforms the following functions:
1. The switch position determines which console is in control (DP1/DP2, Bridge or the Independent JS)
2. When the switch position is DP or Independent JS, the individual thrusters, main props and rudders areselected for DP or Independent JS control.
In the highly unlikely event of a complete failure of the DP/Bridge/JS control switch, the ability to transfer into or outof the various control modes (Bridge, DP, Independent JS) and the ability to select the thrusters/main props andrudders online will be affected.
Each of the contacts on the switch is electrically isolated, so an electrical failure of one contact will not affect theothers. A failure of one thruster/main prop or rudder select contact (or signal) will only affect the ability to selectthat one unit for DP or Independent JS control.
There are redundant DP and Independent JS Online signals from the switch to SPU 1 and SPU 2, so the loss ofone of these contacts (or signals) will not impact the DP or Independent JS Systems.
1.4. Conclusions
There are no known single point failures within the NMS6000 DP System that can cause loss of DP control of thevessel.
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APPENDIX A
SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAMS
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TouchDisplay
Computer/CPU
DP #1 System
CH: B
CH: A
Dual RedundantEthernet
DP 1 Control Stn.
SPU 1
CH: A
CH: B
Dual Redundant Co-Ax
Control Net
JS/Man/DP
Switch
To
Thruster
Interfaces
To
Thruster
Interfaces
SPU 2
Computer/CPU
TouchDisplay
DP #2 System
Control
Console
DP 2 Control Stn.
Control
Console
PLC 1
I/O
PLC 2
I/O
Independent System
Computer/CPU
TouchDisplay
Control
Console
Independent Control Stn.
Figure A-1, NMS6000 DP Contro l and Data Networks
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Control Console 1
Computer/CP 1
UPS 1Power
Dist.
Panel 1PORT
Ship's Power
220 VAC
50-60Hz
SPU 1
DC/AC
Inverter
Alarm
Printer 1
DGPS 1
GYRO 1
VRU 1
DP #1 SYSTEM
= 24 VDC
DP #2 SYSTEM
From Customer Power Source
PLC 1
I/O
Display 1
STBD
Ship's Power
220 VAC
50-60Hz
UPS 2Power
Dist.
Panel 2
PLC 2
I/O
SPU 2
VRU 2
From
Power Dist.
Panel 3
24 VDC
From
Power Dist.
Panel 3
24 VDC
WIND 1
Control Console 2
Computer/CP 2
Display 2
WIND 2
DGPS 2
DC/AC
Inverter
Alarm
Printer 2
GYRO 2
Figure A 2 NMS6000 Power Distr ibution (cont next page)
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Figure A-2, NMS6000 Power Distribution (cont.)
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APPENDIX B
VESSEL DP FMEA SPREADSHEET
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Remontowa 1674-09 NMS6000 DP (Class 2) System
Component
Description Function Mode of Operation Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Detection Failure Effect
Corrective
Action
Loss of DP
Control and
Monit oring Loss of Saf et y
Loss of Steering/
Propulsion/
Navigation
Preventat
Act ions
DP1
Trackball
Secondary User
Interface pointing
device.
User Interface, navigation and object
control/selection.
Inability to control
pointing device.
Loss of
Connection
and/or Faulty
Trackball.
Mouse cursor not
tracking and/or
command objects
not selected.
Loss of video
display at the DP1
Console and/or
user interface
navigation.
Utilize
touchscreen if
trackball
operations fail.
Check serial
cabling to unit.
Clean trackball
roller mechanisms
as required.
No No No Periodically c
trackball
components
DP1 Touchscreen Primary User
Interface for DP
alarm, control and
monitoring system.
Receive video signal from DP
Computer, transmit operator
instructions through touch screen.
Blank screen, or
touch screen not
responding
Loss of power,
Service Stopped,
Faulted.
Mouse cursor not
tracking and/or
command objects
not selected.
Loss of video
display at the DP1
Console and/or
user interface
navigation.
Utilize trackball if
touchscreen
selections do not
operate. Check
power, verifycable, check
video
transmitter/receiv
er, replace unit.
Recalibrate
Touchscreen Unit
if required.
Transfer control
to remaining DP2
control station.
No No No
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Remontowa 1674-09 NMS6000 DP (Class 2) System
Component
Description Function Mode of Operation Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Detection Failure Effect
Corrective
Action
Loss of DP
Control and
Monit oring Loss of Saf et y
Loss of Steering/
Propulsion/
Navigation
Preventat
Act ions
DP2
Trackball
Secondary User
Interface pointing
device.
User Interface, navigation and object
control/selection.
Inability to control
pointing device.
Loss of
Connection
and/or Faulty
Trackball.
Mouse cursor not
tracking and/or
command objects
not selected.
Loss of video
display at the DP2
Console and/or
user interfacenavigation.
Utilize
touchscreen if
trackball
operations fail.Check serial
cabling to unit.
Clean trackball
roller mechanisms
as required.
No No No Periodically c
trackball
components
DP2 Touchscreen Primary User
Interface for DP
alarm, control and
monitoring system.
Receive video signal from DP
Computer, transmit operator
instructions through touch screen.
Blank screen, or
touch screen not
responding
Loss of power,
Service Stopped,
Faulted.
Mouse cursor not
tracking and/or
command objects
not selected.
Loss of video
display at the DP2
Console and/or
user interface
navigation.
Utilize trackball if
touchscreen
selections do not
operate. Check
power, verifycable, check
video
transmitter/receiv
er, replace unit.
Recalibrate
Touchscreen Unit
if required.
Transfer control
to remaining DP1
control station.
No No No
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R t 1674 09 NMS6000 DP (Cl 2) S t
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Remontowa 1674-09 NMS6000 DP (Class 2) System
Component
Description Function Mode of Operation Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Detection Failure Effect
Corrective
Action
Loss of DP
Control and
Monit oring Loss of Saf et y
Loss of Steering/
Propulsion/
Navigation
Preventat
Act ions
14
15
SPU #1
Module 11
1794-IB10xOB6
System IO
Channel
24VDC Digital Input Failure of IO Input
Module
Loss of power,
Internal
Component
Failure, loss of
communications
with the PLC.
NMS Alarms
Module Fault
Indication
Loss of Digital
Input Signals
Listed Below.
Check power,
verify cable, verify
module. Replace
affected modules.
See Note * below No No
0 DP ONLINE 1
1 IND JS ONLINE 1
2 UPS1 AC LINE FAIL ALM
3 UPS1 COMMON ALM4 UPS3 AC LINE FAIL ALM
5 UPS3 COMMON ALM
6
7
8
9
10 STERN TUNNEL THR (T3)
CONTROL SELECT
11
12
13
14
15
SPU #1
Module 12
1794-IE8/B
System IO
Channel
24VDC Analog Input Module Failure of IO Input
Module
Loss of power,
Internal
Component
Failure, loss of
communications
with the PLC.
NMS Alarms
Module Fault
Indication
Loss of Analog
Input Signals
Listed Below.
Check power,
verify cable, verify
module. Replace
affected modules.
See Note * below No No
0 SPU1 24VDC SUPPLY
1 +10 VDC VOLTAGE MONITOR
2 -10 VDC VOLTAGE MONITOR
3 VRU1 PITCH FEEDBACK
4 VRU1 ROLL FEEDBACK
5
6
7
Loss of voltage monitor indication and alarm. Operator alerted by voltage out of range.
Loss of roll data. Operator alerted by VRU roll mismatch. VRU1 roll data excluded from average.
Loss of pitch data. Operator alerted by VRU pitch mismatch. VRU1 pitch data excluded from average.
Loss of voltage monitor indication and alarm. Operator alerted by voltage out of range.
Loss of voltage monitor indication and alarm. Operator alerted by voltage out of range.
Loss of ability to control T3 from SPU 1, control will default to SPU 2.
Loss of DP Online 1. No impact on DP system due to redundant signal in SPU 2. Operator alerted if there is a mismatch.
Loss of IND JS Online 1. No impact on Ind JS system due to redundant signal in SPU 2. Operator alerted if there is a mismatch.
Loss of UPS1 AC Line Fail Alm. No impact on DP System
Loss of UPS1 Common Alm. No impact on DP SystemLoss of UPS3 AC Line Fail Alm. No impact on DP System
Loss of UPS3 Common Alm. No impact on DP System
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Remontowa 1674 09 NMS6000 DP (Class 2) System
Component
Description Function Mode of Operation Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Detection Failure Effect
Corrective
Action
Loss of DP
Control and
Monit oring Loss of Saf et y
Loss of Steering/
Propulsion/
Navigation
Preventat
Act ions
* The most prob able cause for lo ss of FlexLogix PLC, Flex I/O module or ACNR (ControlNet Reundant Media Adapter) is a hardware fault in the effected component. The loss of aFlexLogix PLC will result in a los s of commu nicat
to all Flex IO modules associ ated with the PLC. There is one FlexLogix PLC in each SPU1 and SPU2. Thruster, Power Plant and Enviro nmental interfaces are split between the two SPU's for redundancy purpo ses, so that loss oSPU (or PLC) will not cause a loss of posit ion as long as the other SPU, PLC, Flex I/O modules and ACNR are fully available. A failure of an indiv idual modul e or of a single channel on a module will generate appropriate alarms.
Some operator action may be required. Singe failures are evaluated under the assumption th at all other equipment is fully available.
** Loss of the ability t o command a thruster (from the DP system) or a failure at the thruster (resultin g in a loss of control or o ut of control thrus ter) will require the operator to take the affected thruster offline. If the thruster is no
responding to com mands from the DP system then the other remaining thrusters will be commanded to compensate for the affected thruster in order to maintain positi on. DP system thrust er commands go to zero upon failure o
ACNR or Modul e (associ ated wi th the thruster commands)
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Remontowa 1674-09 NMS6000 DP (Class 2) System
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( ) y
Component
Description Function Mode of Operation Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Detection Failure Effect
Corrective
Action
Loss of DP
Control and
Monit oring Loss of Saf et y
Loss of Steering/
Propulsion/
Navigation
Preventat
Act ions
11
12
1314
15
SPU #2
Module 21
1794-IB10xOB6
System IO
Channel
24VDC Digital Input Failure of IO Input
Module
Loss of power,
Internal
Component
Failure, loss of
communications
with the PLC.
NMS Alarms
Module Fault
Indication
Loss of Digital
Input Signals
Listed Below.
Check power,
verify cable, verify
module. Replace
affected modules.
See Note * below No No
0 DP ONLINE 2
1 IND JS ONLINE22 UPS2 AC LINE FAIL ALM
3 UPS2 COMMON ALM
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
SPU #2
Module 22
1794-IE8/B
System IO
Channel
24VDC Analog Input Module Failure of IO Input
Module
Loss of power,
Internal
Component
Failure, loss of
communications
with the PLC.
NMS Alarms
Module Fault
Indication
Loss of Analog
Input Signals
Listed Below.
Check power,
verify cable, verify
module. Replace
affected modules.
See Note * below No No
0 SPU2 24VDC SUPPLY1 +10 VDC VOLTAGE MONITOR
2 -10 VDC VOLTAGE MONITOR
3 VRU2 PITCH FEEDBACK
4 VRU2 ROLL FEEDBACK
5
6
7
SPU #2
Module 23
1794-OF4I
System IO
Channel
24VDC Analog Output Module Failure of IO
Output Module
Loss of power,
Internal
Component
Failure, loss ofcommunications
with the PLC.
NMS Alarms
Module Fault
Indication
Loss of Analog
Output Signals
Listed Below.
Check power,
verify cable, verify
module. Replace
affected modules.
See Note * below No No
Loss of DP Online 2. No impact on DP system due to redundant signal in SPU 2. Operator alerted if there is a mismatch.
Loss of voltage monitor indication and alarm. Operator alerted by voltage out of range.Loss of voltage monitor indication and alarm. Operator alerted by voltage out of range.
Loss of voltage monitor indication and alarm. Operator alerted by voltage out of range.
Loss of UPS2 Common Alm. No impact on DP System
Loss of pitch data. Operator alerted by VRU pitch mismatch. VRU1 pitch data excluded from average.
Loss of roll data. Operator alerted by VRU roll mismatch. VRU1 roll data excluded from average.
Loss of IND JS Online 2. No impact on Ind JS system due to redundant signal in SPU 2. Operator alerted if there is a mismatch.Loss of UPS2 AC Line Fail Alm. No impact on DP System
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Component
Description Function Mode of Operation Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Detection Failure Effect
Corrective
Action
Loss of DP
Control and
Monit oring Loss of Saf et y
Loss of Steering/
Propulsion/
Navigation
Preventat
Act ions
DGPS 1, 2 DP Position
Reference
Satellite Position Reference System Loss of sensor
data on DP 1,
DP2, Independent
JS Consoles.
Most probable
cause is antenna
shadowing,
scintillation, loss
of power, internal
component
failure, loss of
communications,
or loss of
differentialcorrection.
Operator alerted
by visual and
audible alarms
Data faulted and
excluded from
blended position
estimate
If the DPGS is the
only online
position reference
system, the DP
system will
automatically go
into Dead
Reckoning
Mode". Take
sensor offline ifcontinued high
levels of signal
noise. Select
different
reference sensor
online.
Yes, if the only
reference sensor
online. No loss of
position if other
sensors are
selected online.
No No
Cyscan System DP Position
Reference
Cyscan Position Reference System Loss of sensor
data on DP
Consoles.
Most probable
cause is high
signal noise orinteference with
target.
Operator alerted
by visual and
audible alarms
Data faulted and
excluded from
blended positionestimate
If the Cyscan is
the only online
position referencesystem, the DP
system will
automatically go
into Dead
Reckoning
Mode". Take
sensor offline if
continued high
levels of signal
noise. Select
different
reference sensor
online.
Yes, if the only
reference sensor
online. No loss ofposition of other
sensors are
selected online.
No No
Gyro 1, 2 Heading
Reference
Gyrocompass Reference System Loss of sensor
data on DP
Consoles.
Most probable
cause is gyro
fault, or loss of
power.
Operator alerted
by visual and
audible alarms
Data faulted and
excluded from
average heading
calculation.
Operator should
take failed gyro
offline.
No loss of
position. Loss of
heading, if it is the
last Gyro online.
No No
Loss DP Reference Sensors
Reference Sensors
24005418PS-310 Rev A Commercial In Confidence Page
Remontowa 1674-09 NMS6000 DP (Class 2) System
8/15/2019 DP2Rementoa FMEA
30/30
Component
Description Function Mode of Operation Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Detection Failure Effect
Corrective
Action
Loss of DP
Control and
Monit oring Loss of Saf et y
Loss of Steering/
Propulsion/
Navigation
Preventat
Act ions
Wind 1, 2 Wind Speed and
Direction
Wind Speed and Direction
Reference System
Loss of impacted
Wind Sensor data
on DP Consoles.
Most probable
cause is Wind
Sensor fault, or
loss of power.
Operator alerted
by visual and
audible alarms
Data faulted and
excluded from
average wind
speed anddirection
calculation.
Operator should
take failed Wind
Sensor offline.
No No No
24005418PS-310 Rev A Commercial In Confidence Page