DP2Rementoa FMEA

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Dynamic Positioning and Control Systems

12131 Community Rd.

Poway, CA 92064

858-679-5500 General Fax: 858-679-5501

Document Number

24005418PS-310

Document Title

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

NMS6000 DP (DP Class 2) System

Remontowa 1674-09

Prepared by: Robert Theisen

Approved by: Robert Theisen Systems Engineer

Revision: A Date: 19-Jun-08

REVISION STATUS

Rev. DateDescription

A 19-Jun-08 Initial Release.

CONTROL STATUS

Unless over stamped “MASTER” or “CONTROLLED” in red,this document has been provided for information only and

will not be updated.

This document is, or contains, confidential and proprietary information of L-3 Communications. Its receipt or

possession does not convey any rights to reproduce or disclose it, or its contents, or to manufacture, use, or

sell anything it may describe or reference. Reproduction, disclosure, or use without specific written

authorization of L-3 Communications is strictly prohibited. This technical data is controlled under the Export

Administration Regulations ECCN [8E992], and may not be exported to a Foreign Person, either in the U.S.

or abroad, without the proper authorization of the U.S. Department of Commerce.


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Table of Contents

1. Single Point Failure Mode Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 3 1.1. Purpose ..................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.2. Definition ................................................................................................................................................................... 3 1.3. Single Point Failure Assessment .......................................................................................................................... 3

1.3.1. Vessel Electrical Power Plant ................................................................................................................. 3 1.3.2. Vessel Propulsion ..................................................................................................................................... 4 1.3.3. System Architecture.................................................................................................................................. 5 1.3.4. Redundant DP Control Consoles ........................................................................................................... 5 1.3.5. Independent Backup Joystick (JS) System ........................................................................................... 5 1.3.6. Control Power ............................................................................................................................................ 6 1.3.7. Redundant Programmable Logic Controllers ....................................................................................... 6 1.3.8. DP Control Network .................................................................................................................................. 7 1.3.9. DP Control Console Mode Select ........................................................................................................... 7 1.3.10. DP Control Console Automatic Backup ................................................................................................. 7 1.3.11. Signal Processor Unit ............................................................................................................................... 7 1.3.12. External Serial Sensors ............................................................................................................................ 8

1.3.13. DP/Bridge/Independent JS Control Selector Switch ............................................................................ 9 1.4. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................................. 9

Appendix A System Block Diagrams

Appendix B Vessel FMEA


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1. Single Point Failure Mode Analysis

1.1. Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide a single point failure analysis for the L-3 Communications DPCSNMS6000 Dynamic Positioning (DP) System.

The DP has been designed to meet the ABS DP Class 2 requirements.

The focus of this document is an analysis of the DP System hardware. DP System Software controlling the

communications highways is also assessed as applicable.This review also addresses areas of possible system degradation, as contrasted with system failure, and offerssuggestions on how these problems can be alleviated.

1.2. Definition

The definition of a single point failure is any piece of hardware (or section of software) whose loss would cause acomplete failure of the automatic positioning of the vessel. Component failures that result in system degradation,which are not considered a system failure are also addressed to a certain extent.

It should be noted that the foregoing material assumes the Customer is familiar with the system architecture andterminology.

1.3. Single Point Failure Assessment

A single point failure assessment was made for the NMS6000 DP system. The results are attached andsummarized below.

1.3.1. Vessel Electrical Power Plant

The vessel power plant is shown in Figure 1-1 below. The Remontowa 1674-09 NMS6000 software is designed foroperation in split bus modes with all Generators online.


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MAIN SWITCHBOARD

THRUSTERSTERN

SUPPLY 2

GENERATOR 1

-SG1

MSB

22Q

-G1

BUSS TIE BREAKER

GENERATOR 1

SG1 G1

SHAFT DIESEL

-G2 -SG2

GENERATOR 2

G2

DIESEL

GENERATOR 2

SG2

SHAFT

STARBOARDBUSS

PORTBUSS

11Q

THRUSTER 1BOW

T1

33Q 32Q

STERN BOWTHRUSTER 2THRUSTER

T2T3

Figure 1-1 Remontowa 1674-09 Propuls ion System

1.3.2. Vessel Propulsion

The vessel propulsion system is shown in Figure 1-2 below.

PORT MAIN

PORT

RUDDER

PROPELLER (T4)


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1.3.3. System Architecture

See the NMS6000 DP System Block Diagrams in Appendix A.

1.3.4. Redundant DP Control Consoles

The L-3 Communications DPCS NMS6000 DP System consists of dual redundant NMS6000 units. The NMS6000units consist of two (2) primary consoles, DP1 and DP2. The operator can select which of the two consoles is theOn-Line Master Controller; the other console automatically becomes the backup, which takes over upon loss of theMaster.

A joystick for both surge and sway and a potentiometer for moment control are provided on the DP1 and DP2control consoles. These controls only work with the Master DP control console when either the Manual Headingmode or the Manual Position mode is selected.

1.3.5. Independent Joystick (JS) System

An NMS6000 Independent Joystick (JS) System is provided. The Independent JS unit consists of a separateControl Console, shared Signal Processors and Control Network and is powered by a separate, dedicated PowerSource. The operator can select control from the Independent JS control by way of the 3-way Selector Switchlocated at the bridge console.

A joystick for both surge and sway and a potentiometer for moment control are provided on the Independent JScontrol console. These controls only work with the Selector Switch in the Independent JS position.

Although it is referenced within this document, the Independent JS is not included within the scope of the overallFMEA, since it functions as a stand alone system.


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1.3.6. Control PowerThree (3) UPSs are provided to power the DP System. UPS 1 and 2 are 24VDC UPSs. UPS 3 is a small AC UPSwhich powers the Cyscan position reference system sensor.

Each NMS Control Console is provided with its own separate UPS Power. The loss of a UPS will result in the lossof DC power to the specific items listed in the table below. Each UPS is capable of a minimum of 30 minutes ofbattery back-up time at the full system load.

For redundancy, each SPU is also fed with a secondary, backup DC supply from the Ship’s EmergencySwitchboard, the same source that supplies the Independent Joystick system.

The UPS power is supplied to the DP System Equipment as follows:

Equipment UPS1

(24VDC)

UPS2

(24VDC)

UPS3

(AC)

DC Supplyfrom Ship’sEmergency

Switchboard

DP 1 (Computer, Display andConsole)

X

DP 2 (Computer, Display andConsole)

X

IND JS (Computer, Display andConsole)

X

SPU 1 (PLC 1) X X

SPU 2 (PLC 2) X X

DGPS 1 X

DGPS 2 X

Cyscan System X

Wind Sensor 1 X

Wind Sensor 2 X

VRU (via SPU 1, +24V) X

VRU (via SPU 2, +24V) X

Gyro 1 X

Gyro 2 X

Alarm Printer 1 (via 24/230 inv) X

Alarm Printer 2 (via 24/230 inv) X


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Each SPU/PLC pair is powered from a separate UPS, with DC power backup from the emergency switchboard.

1.3.8. DP Control Network

The NMS6000 Controllers are connected to the Signal Processor Units via a peer-to-peer redundant control anddata transmission network—channels A and B. Upon loss of channel A, channel B carries all data, and vice-versa.

1.3.9. DP Control Console Mode Select

The NMS6000 Redundancy exchange is implemented using a Dual Redundant Ethernet network on which eachnode multicasts a Voting Packet on a preconfigured multicast channel. Each node reads and stores the votingpacket from the other nodes and uses this information to manage the manual and automatic Master/Backupexchange. If node 1 is Master, then node 2 is the automatic hot backup and vice versa.

Manual mastership transfer is done by pressing the “NMS Online” button on the Backup Console UI.

1.3.10. DP Control Console Automatic Backup

If a Voting Packet is timed out, the system will zero the data for that node. If the Voting packet from the Masterconsole is timed out, the Hot Backup will automatically take control and become the Master. The new status isreflected in the Voting packet so when the old Master comes back up it will now become a hot backup.

1.3.11. Signal Processor Unit

Two (2) Signal Processor Units (SPU) are provided with the NMS6000 DP System. For redundancy, the SPUs arepowered from two independent sources (L-3 24VDC UPSs and the Ship emergency DC distribution switchboard).

The SPUs perform the input/output consolidation and distribution between the field sensor control and monitoringand the control processors located in the DP Control Consoles.

The I/O is divided between the two (2) SPUs and interfaces to the redundant ControlNet network and PLCs via the

Redundant Media Adapters (ACNRs).

1.3.11.1. Signal Processing I/O Matrix

The I/O is divided between the SPUs to minimize the impact of the loss of an SPU or of an ACNR within an SPU.

The Thruster, Main Prop and Rudder I/O is divided between the SPUs as follows:

Thrusters/Main Props & Rudders

SPU1 SPU2

Thruster 1 (Fwd Bow Tunnelthruster)

X

Thruster 2 (Aft Bow Azimuththruster)

X

Thruster 3 (Stern Tunnel thruster) X X


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SPU2-ACNR: Loss of interface and control of Bow Tunnel Thruster 2, Stbd Main Prop and Stbd

Rudder

Note: Stern Tunnel Thruster can be controlled from either SPU. The circuit is designed so that SPU1 is the primarycontroller but if it should fail then control transfers to SPU2.

Other DP System analog and discrete I/O signal groups are distributed between the SPUs to provide the requiredredundancy for the overall DP system.

Analog / Discrete Signals

Device / Equipment Qty

SPU1 SPU2

DP Online Signal 2 X X

Independent JS Online Signal 2 X X

UPS (alarms) 3 X X

Vertical Reference Unit(signal/power)

2 X X

1.3.12. External Serial Sensors

External position, environmental and heading sensors are redundant and include:

• Two (2) DGPS’s. Each DGPS provides serial position data to both DP consoles and the IndependentJS console.

• One (1) Cyscan System. The Cyscan System provides serial position data to both DP consoles andthe Independent JS console.

• Two (2) Gyrocompasses. Each Gyrocompass provides serial heading data to both DP consoles andthe Independent JS console.

• Two (2) Wind Sensors. Each Wind Sensor provides serial speed and direction data to both DPconsoles and the Independent JS console.

The serial sensors are interfaced to the NMS6000 DP System via Allen Bradley Point IO modules and theControlNet network. For redundancy, the serial sensors are divided between the Point IO ACNRs, with each

ACNR powered from a separate source.

The serial sensors are divided between the three (3) ACNRs as follows:

Serial Sensors Flexlogix PLC #1 Flexlogix PLC #2 Flexlogix PLC #1

Point IO ACNR 1 Point IO ACNR 2 Point IO ACNR 3


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As a result of this division, the worst case effect due to the single point failure loss of a Point I/O ACNR module is:

Point I/O ACNR1: Loss of DGPS1, Cyscan, Wind 1

Point I/O ACNR2: Loss of DGPS2, Gyrocompass 2, Wind 2

Point I/O ACNR3: Loss of Gyrocompass 1

1.3.13. DP/Bridge/Independent JS Control Selector Switch

An industrial-grade, three position DP/Bridge/Independent JS control switch is provided with the NMS6000 andperforms the following functions:

1. The switch position determines which console is in control (DP1/DP2, Bridge or the Independent JS)

2. When the switch position is DP or Independent JS, the individual thrusters, main props and rudders areselected for DP or Independent JS control.

In the highly unlikely event of a complete failure of the DP/Bridge/JS control switch, the ability to transfer into or outof the various control modes (Bridge, DP, Independent JS) and the ability to select the thrusters/main props andrudders online will be affected.

Each of the contacts on the switch is electrically isolated, so an electrical failure of one contact will not affect theothers. A failure of one thruster/main prop or rudder select contact (or signal) will only affect the ability to selectthat one unit for DP or Independent JS control.

There are redundant DP and Independent JS Online signals from the switch to SPU 1 and SPU 2, so the loss ofone of these contacts (or signals) will not impact the DP or Independent JS Systems.

1.4. Conclusions

There are no known single point failures within the NMS6000 DP System that can cause loss of DP control of thevessel.


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APPENDIX A

SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAMS


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TouchDisplay

Computer/CPU

DP #1 System

CH: B

CH: A

Dual RedundantEthernet

DP 1 Control Stn.

SPU 1

CH: A

CH: B

Dual Redundant Co-Ax

Control Net

JS/Man/DP

Switch

To

Thruster

Interfaces

To

Thruster

Interfaces

SPU 2

Computer/CPU

TouchDisplay

DP #2 System

Control

Console

DP 2 Control Stn.

Control

Console

PLC 1

I/O

PLC 2

I/O

Independent System

Computer/CPU

TouchDisplay

Control

Console

Independent Control Stn.

Figure A-1, NMS6000 DP Contro l and Data Networks


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Control Console 1

Computer/CP 1

UPS 1Power

Dist.

Panel 1PORT

Ship's Power

220 VAC

50-60Hz

SPU 1

DC/AC

Inverter

Alarm

Printer 1

DGPS 1

GYRO 1

VRU 1

DP #1 SYSTEM

= 24 VDC

DP #2 SYSTEM

From Customer Power Source

PLC 1

I/O

Display 1

STBD

Ship's Power

220 VAC

50-60Hz

UPS 2Power

Dist.

Panel 2

PLC 2

I/O

SPU 2

VRU 2

From

Power Dist.

Panel 3

24 VDC

From

Power Dist.

Panel 3

24 VDC

WIND 1

Control Console 2

Computer/CP 2

Display 2

WIND 2

DGPS 2

DC/AC

Inverter

Alarm

Printer 2

GYRO 2

Figure A 2 NMS6000 Power Distr ibution (cont next page)


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Figure A-2, NMS6000 Power Distribution (cont.)


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APPENDIX B

VESSEL DP FMEA SPREADSHEET


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Remontowa 1674-09 NMS6000 DP (Class 2) System

Component

Description Function Mode of Operation Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Detection Failure Effect

Corrective

Action

Loss of DP

Control and

Monit oring Loss of Saf et y

Loss of Steering/

Propulsion/

Navigation

Preventat

Act ions

DP1

Trackball

Secondary User

Interface pointing

device.

User Interface, navigation and object

control/selection.

Inability to control

pointing device.

Loss of

Connection

and/or Faulty

Trackball.

Mouse cursor not

tracking and/or

command objects

not selected.

Loss of video

display at the DP1

Console and/or

user interface

navigation.

Utilize

touchscreen if

trackball

operations fail.

Check serial

cabling to unit.

Clean trackball

roller mechanisms

as required.

No No No Periodically c

trackball

components

DP1 Touchscreen Primary User

Interface for DP

alarm, control and

monitoring system.

Receive video signal from DP

Computer, transmit operator

instructions through touch screen.

Blank screen, or

touch screen not

responding

Loss of power,

Service Stopped,

Faulted.

Mouse cursor not

tracking and/or

command objects

not selected.

Loss of video

display at the DP1

Console and/or

user interface

navigation.

Utilize trackball if

touchscreen

selections do not

operate. Check

power, verifycable, check

video

transmitter/receiv

er, replace unit.

Recalibrate

Touchscreen Unit

if required.

Transfer control

to remaining DP2

control station.

No No No

24005418PS-310 Rev A Commercial In Confidence Page


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Component


Corrective

Action

Loss of DP

Control and


Loss of Steering/

Propulsion/

Navigation

Preventat

Act ions

DP2

Trackball

Secondary User

Interface pointing

device.

User Interface, navigation and object

control/selection.

Inability to control

pointing device.

Loss of

Connection

and/or Faulty

Trackball.

Mouse cursor not

tracking and/or

command objects

not selected.

Loss of video

display at the DP2

Console and/or

user interfacenavigation.

Utilize

touchscreen if

trackball

operations fail.Check serial

cabling to unit.

Clean trackball

roller mechanisms

as required.

No No No Periodically c

trackball

components

DP2 Touchscreen Primary User

Interface for DP

alarm, control and

monitoring system.

Receive video signal from DP

Computer, transmit operator

instructions through touch screen.

Blank screen, or

touch screen not

responding

Loss of power,

Service Stopped,

Faulted.

Mouse cursor not

tracking and/or

command objects

not selected.

Loss of video

display at the DP2

Console and/or

user interface

navigation.

Utilize trackball if

touchscreen

selections do not

operate. Check

power, verifycable, check

video

transmitter/receiv

er, replace unit.

Recalibrate

Touchscreen Unit

if required.

Transfer control

to remaining DP1

control station.

No No No



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R t 1674 09 NMS6000 DP (Cl 2) S t


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Component


Corrective

Action

Loss of DP

Control and


Loss of Steering/

Propulsion/

Navigation

Preventat

Act ions

14

15

SPU #1

Module 11

1794-IB10xOB6

System IO

Channel

24VDC Digital Input Failure of IO Input

Module

Loss of power,

Internal

Component

Failure, loss of

communications

with the PLC.

NMS Alarms

Module Fault

Indication

Loss of Digital

Input Signals

Listed Below.

Check power,

verify cable, verify

module. Replace

affected modules.

See Note * below No No

0 DP ONLINE 1

1 IND JS ONLINE 1

2 UPS1 AC LINE FAIL ALM

3 UPS1 COMMON ALM4 UPS3 AC LINE FAIL ALM

5 UPS3 COMMON ALM

6

7

8

9

10 STERN TUNNEL THR (T3)

CONTROL SELECT

11

12

13

14

15

SPU #1

Module 12

1794-IE8/B

System IO

Channel

24VDC Analog Input Module Failure of IO Input

Module

Loss of power,

Internal

Component

Failure, loss of

communications

with the PLC.

NMS Alarms

Module Fault

Indication

Loss of Analog

Input Signals

Listed Below.

Check power,


module. Replace

affected modules.


0 SPU1 24VDC SUPPLY

1 +10 VDC VOLTAGE MONITOR

2 -10 VDC VOLTAGE MONITOR

3 VRU1 PITCH FEEDBACK

4 VRU1 ROLL FEEDBACK

5

6

7

Loss of voltage monitor indication and alarm. Operator alerted by voltage out of range.

Loss of roll data. Operator alerted by VRU roll mismatch. VRU1 roll data excluded from average.

Loss of pitch data. Operator alerted by VRU pitch mismatch. VRU1 pitch data excluded from average.



Loss of ability to control T3 from SPU 1, control will default to SPU 2.

Loss of DP Online 1. No impact on DP system due to redundant signal in SPU 2. Operator alerted if there is a mismatch.

Loss of IND JS Online 1. No impact on Ind JS system due to redundant signal in SPU 2. Operator alerted if there is a mismatch.

Loss of UPS1 AC Line Fail Alm. No impact on DP System

Loss of UPS1 Common Alm. No impact on DP SystemLoss of UPS3 AC Line Fail Alm. No impact on DP System

Loss of UPS3 Common Alm. No impact on DP System



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Remontowa 1674 09 NMS6000 DP (Class 2) System

Component


Corrective

Action

Loss of DP

Control and


Loss of Steering/

Propulsion/

Navigation

Preventat

Act ions

* The most prob able cause for lo ss of FlexLogix PLC, Flex I/O module or ACNR (ControlNet Reundant Media Adapter) is a hardware fault in the effected component. The loss of aFlexLogix PLC will result in a los s of commu nicat

to all Flex IO modules associ ated with the PLC. There is one FlexLogix PLC in each SPU1 and SPU2. Thruster, Power Plant and Enviro nmental interfaces are split between the two SPU's for redundancy purpo ses, so that loss oSPU (or PLC) will not cause a loss of posit ion as long as the other SPU, PLC, Flex I/O modules and ACNR are fully available. A failure of an indiv idual modul e or of a single channel on a module will generate appropriate alarms.

Some operator action may be required. Singe failures are evaluated under the assumption th at all other equipment is fully available.

** Loss of the ability t o command a thruster (from the DP system) or a failure at the thruster (resultin g in a loss of control or o ut of control thrus ter) will require the operator to take the affected thruster offline. If the thruster is no

responding to com mands from the DP system then the other remaining thrusters will be commanded to compensate for the affected thruster in order to maintain positi on. DP system thrust er commands go to zero upon failure o

ACNR or Modul e (associ ated wi th the thruster commands)



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( ) y

Component


Corrective

Action

Loss of DP

Control and


Loss of Steering/

Propulsion/

Navigation

Preventat

Act ions

11

12

1314

15

SPU #2

Module 21

1794-IB10xOB6

System IO

Channel

24VDC Digital Input Failure of IO Input

Module

Loss of power,

Internal

Component

Failure, loss of

communications

with the PLC.

NMS Alarms

Module Fault

Indication

Loss of Digital

Input Signals

Listed Below.

Check power,


module. Replace

affected modules.


0 DP ONLINE 2

1 IND JS ONLINE22 UPS2 AC LINE FAIL ALM

3 UPS2 COMMON ALM

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

SPU #2

Module 22

1794-IE8/B

System IO

Channel

24VDC Analog Input Module Failure of IO Input

Module

Loss of power,

Internal

Component

Failure, loss of

communications

with the PLC.

NMS Alarms

Module Fault

Indication

Loss of Analog

Input Signals

Listed Below.

Check power,


module. Replace

affected modules.


0 SPU2 24VDC SUPPLY1 +10 VDC VOLTAGE MONITOR

2 -10 VDC VOLTAGE MONITOR

3 VRU2 PITCH FEEDBACK

4 VRU2 ROLL FEEDBACK

5

6

7

SPU #2

Module 23

1794-OF4I

System IO

Channel

24VDC Analog Output Module Failure of IO

Output Module

Loss of power,

Internal

Component

Failure, loss ofcommunications

with the PLC.

NMS Alarms

Module Fault

Indication

Loss of Analog

Output Signals

Listed Below.

Check power,


module. Replace

affected modules.


Loss of DP Online 2. No impact on DP system due to redundant signal in SPU 2. Operator alerted if there is a mismatch.

Loss of voltage monitor indication and alarm. Operator alerted by voltage out of range.Loss of voltage monitor indication and alarm. Operator alerted by voltage out of range.


Loss of UPS2 Common Alm. No impact on DP System

Loss of pitch data. Operator alerted by VRU pitch mismatch. VRU1 pitch data excluded from average.

Loss of roll data. Operator alerted by VRU roll mismatch. VRU1 roll data excluded from average.

Loss of IND JS Online 2. No impact on Ind JS system due to redundant signal in SPU 2. Operator alerted if there is a mismatch.Loss of UPS2 AC Line Fail Alm. No impact on DP System



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Component


Corrective

Action

Loss of DP

Control and


Loss of Steering/

Propulsion/

Navigation

Preventat

Act ions

DGPS 1, 2 DP Position

Reference

Satellite Position Reference System Loss of sensor

data on DP 1,

DP2, Independent

JS Consoles.

Most probable

cause is antenna

shadowing,

scintillation, loss

of power, internal

component

failure, loss of

communications,

or loss of

differentialcorrection.

Operator alerted

by visual and

audible alarms

Data faulted and

excluded from

blended position

estimate

If the DPGS is the

only online

position reference

system, the DP

system will

automatically go

into Dead

Reckoning

Mode". Take

sensor offline ifcontinued high

levels of signal

noise. Select

different

reference sensor

online.

Yes, if the only

reference sensor

online. No loss of

position if other

sensors are

selected online.

No No

Cyscan System DP Position

Reference

Cyscan Position Reference System Loss of sensor

data on DP

Consoles.

Most probable

cause is high

signal noise orinteference with

target.

Operator alerted

by visual and

audible alarms

Data faulted and

excluded from

blended positionestimate

If the Cyscan is

the only online

position referencesystem, the DP

system will

automatically go

into Dead

Reckoning

Mode". Take

sensor offline if

continued high

levels of signal

noise. Select

different

reference sensor

online.

Yes, if the only

reference sensor

online. No loss ofposition of other

sensors are

selected online.

No No

Gyro 1, 2 Heading

Reference

Gyrocompass Reference System Loss of sensor

data on DP

Consoles.

Most probable

cause is gyro

fault, or loss of

power.

Operator alerted

by visual and

audible alarms

Data faulted and

excluded from

average heading

calculation.

Operator should

take failed gyro

offline.

No loss of

position. Loss of

heading, if it is the

last Gyro online.

No No

Loss DP Reference Sensors

Reference Sensors




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Component


Corrective

Action

Loss of DP

Control and


Loss of Steering/

Propulsion/

Navigation

Preventat

Act ions

Wind 1, 2 Wind Speed and

Direction

Wind Speed and Direction

Reference System

Loss of impacted

Wind Sensor data

on DP Consoles.

Most probable

cause is Wind

Sensor fault, or

loss of power.

Operator alerted

by visual and

audible alarms

Data faulted and

excluded from

average wind

speed anddirection

calculation.

Operator should

take failed Wind

Sensor offline.

No No No


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