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A comprehensive approach to
understand the complex Spirit of “Arab
Springs”, what happened, what is
happening and what are the future
implications for Mediterranean Basin
The Legacy of Arab Springs
A Regional Point of View
Dossier #1 - Mediterranean Affairs
April 2015
Copyright© 2015 by Mediterranean Affairs
All right reserved except for brief quotations in a review. This Paper must not be reproduced
in any form without permission in writing form the publisher.
Mediterranean Affairs is a Think Tank aiming to provide analyses that cover the
Mediterranean area. By carrying out extensive researches, the staff studies various issues of
international policy focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational
challenges such as economic integration.
The main objective is to provide detailed information to the public through the website,
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consultancies and interviews with the media.
April 2015
1 The Legacy of Arab Springs
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 2
External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab transition ................ 6
The Arab Spring and the West ............................................................................................... 8
The Arab Spring and regional actors ................................................................................... 12
Looking at the Arab Spring through a Russian lens.......................................................... 13
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 15
The strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the European Union ............. 16
The EU’s reaction to the Arab spring ................................................................................. 18
Its impact on EU’s policies and the prospects for a revitalization of the relationship 20
Security and Terrorisms: before and after the Arab Spring ............................................... 24
Mission Accomplished, 1st May 2003. ................................................................................. 24
Jihad evolution: from organization to network. ................................................................. 25
Al-Suri's situationist outlook: exploitation or creation of the ideal conditions for a
local jihad ............................................................................................................................................... 25
The relationship of interest between organized crime and phenomena of terrorism
and insurgency. ...................................................................................................................................... 27
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 30
The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, schools of Islamic fundamentalism .................. 31
The Muslim Brotherhood, the History of the Movement in the pre-revolutionary .... 31
The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring ...................................................... 34
The Salafism ............................................................................................................................ 35
The rise of the Salafist phenomenon ......................................................................................... 36
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 37
The role of civil society: what animated them; what animate them now, and how they
perceive the change. .......................................................................................................... 39
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................ 44
References .......................................................................................................................... 47
Authors ............................................................................................................................... 49
Summary
April 2015
2 Introduction
Introduction
‘‘Spring’. The term has been used to identify the recent turmoils happened in the
Arab world, but it is quite reductive. Indeed, it is wrong. It is now more than four years
since the outbreak of the riots and many experts are debating whether it is an ‘infinite’
spring or, indeed, an ‘icy winter’ for some countries. What is certain is the fact that we
cannot talk about a single ‘season’. It will take a long time before than the Arab
countries, especially those in the Mediterranean region, succeed in achieving the hoped-
for stability. Moreover, the revolutionary processes require a very long time, and every
revolutionary onset is undermined by a counter-revolution tending to become
permanent.
The balance of power among the different levels of sovereignty and geopolitics is
not (and will not be) like that prior to 2011. Of course, the sequences of popular
uprisings have resulted implications of global reach, changing the balance in regional
contexts and the relations with the United States and European countries, with effects
on Israel and Iran.
Generally, in Egypt and Tunisia, the Arab Spring was like a wide and spontaneous
popular movement, with strong capabilities of protest and resistance. The protests
began on 18th December 2010, following the extreme protest of Tunisian Mohamed
Bouazizi, who set himself on fire as a result of ill-treatment by the police. That event
gave birth to the so-called Jasmine Revolution, causing a domino effect in the Arab
world. Because of the continuous uprisings, the Tunisian President Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali escaped, while the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was forced resign from
office after nearly 30 years in power. The cases of Egypt and Tunisia had in common
the use of civil resistance, such as strikes, demonstrations, marches and parades and
sometimes extreme acts such as suicide, better known as self-immolation, and self-
injury among the media. It was also important the use of social networks like Facebook
and Twitter to organize, communicate and disclose certain events. This phenomenon
was widespread and in spite of the attempts of government repression were very strong
it would have not been decisive.
The factors that led to the protests were numerous, such as corruption, lack of
individual freedoms, violation of human rights and bad living conditions, which in
many cases are really close to the extreme poverty. The growth of food prices and the
famine are also considered among the main reasons for being discontent; these factors
have affected a wide section of the population in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region in which there were the protests. In Syria, the demonstrations against
the regime of Bashar al-Assad broke out in March 2011 and were organized through
April 2015
3 The Legacy of Arab Springs
their social networks. Although initially the protests were intended to the resignation
of President and the adoption of new institutional reforms, the clashes radicalized later
by the presence of Salafi groups, interested in establishing sharia in Syria. It is well
known as the affair has degenerated into a civil war that lacerates the country today
causing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the region. In addition, the offensives
by the Islamic State represent a new front in the battle for the government of al-Assad.
The Syria’s condition because of its strategic position and its international relations,
has involved neighboring countries and the entire international community. It still
seems to be no solutions. The same can be said on the Libyan crisis. Compared with
the other States involved in the protests, the main problem of the Libyan regime of
Muammar Gaddafi was the failure of development projects and liberalization, and then
the growing popular discontent has finally culminated in the revolution that overturned
the entire country. From 17th February 2011 till now, the Libyan people did not have
a moment of respite: the popular uprisings, the military intervention of NATO, the
death of Gaddafi, the elections in 2012 and in 2014, the kidnapping of former Prime
Minister Ali Zeidan, the Operation Dignity led by General Khalifa Haftar, the judgment
of the Supreme Court (5 November 2014), etc. These can be considered the key steps
in the recent history of Libya but, just the Supreme Court decision, cancelling the
retroactive legislative elections dated 25th June 2014, represented a turning point,
accentuating the divisions between the anti-Islamist Government of Tobruk and the
pro-Islamist Government of Tripoli. The Libyan crisis is ever closer to the implosion
due to the severe internal polarization and the persistent increase in violence between
the two rival governments. Moreover, the presence of groups affiliated to the Islamic
State is a further threat to the country. The Islamic State intends to take advantage of
the Libyan instability to expand its influence in the North African region. The situation
in Libya is a source of extreme concern to the Algerian government, especially in terms
of impact on the stability and security. To contrast the transit of jihadist formations,
Algeria is committed to ensuring the safety of its borders, to prevent terrorists entry
from outside and Algerian militants join with those of neighboring countries, such as
Tunisia and Libya. Meanwhile, although the democratic process in Tunisia is a positive
sign, the Tunisian government has to face terrorist attacks and the phenomenon of
foreign fighters. Given the recent attack to the Bardo National Museum in Tunis (18
March 2015), Tunisia has intensified enforcement actions due to terrorist infiltration
especially in the border areas with Libya and Algeria. The fight against terrorism in the
MENA region is of primary interest for the international community, particularly for
Western countries. The European Union and the United States are aware that the
contrast can not be limited exclusively to military operations: it is also necessary to
prevent any fundamentalist form in the MENA region. And among those considered
most dangerous, there is the Salafist movement, already spread along the southern
April 2015
4 Introduction
coasts of the Mediterranean: according to some experts, instead of Arab Spring we
could speak of ‘Salafist Spring’. However, some countries are not frightened by the
spread of fundamentalist movements. In particular, the Moroccan authorities have
been able to take advantage of popular protests to strengthen their consent,
representing a positive exception to the complex evolution of the Arab Spring. In 2011,
the Moroccan government started a process of constitutional reform that has not
undergone significant accidents or violence: in large part, this was also due to the special
relationship between the King and his people because of his spiritual role and his ability
to play positively the reforms. An important constitutional reform was approved by
popular referendum on 1st July 2011. In particular, includes the recognition of Berber
as an official language (alongside Arabic), the constitutionalization of human rights and
the strengthening of the judiciary’s independence. Moreover, in recent years, Morocco
has made progress in the field of civil and human rights, although there are still some
problems in Western Sahara.
Regionally, the current events in neighboring countries have rekindled fears about
the deteriorating security in Algeria because of external pressures from Libya, the
Sahelian countries and partly also from Tunisia. However, Algeria has remained
essentially unrelated to the profound changes that the southern Mediterranean
countries lived during the Arab Spring. To prevent more radical disorders, President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika has tried to respond to the expectations of Algerian people by
launching reforms and measures to improve the socio-economic conditions, especially
the youngest. Perhaps because of his recent and tragic past, Algeria was not involved
in the regional phenomenon of the growth of fundamentalist movements. The latest
presidential elections have confirmed the ‘Algerian exception’: the voters have decided
not to risk destabilization as neighboring countries, re-electing Bouteflika for the fourth
time despite his precarious health.
However, a warning is that recorded at the beginning of 2015: in fact, there were a
number of démarches against the Algerian government regarding the well-known
problems of the country, for example the high level of inflation, the youth
unemployment (more than 28%) and the lack of diversification in the economy, almost
entirely dependent on exports of hydrocarbons. These events were accompanied by
the organization of parallel institutional events in the same protest’s places, with the
clear aim to draw the attention of the people. The demonstrations were held without
incidents, although some protesters have been arrested, and then to be immediately
released from prison. The repression by the Algerian authorities was openly denounced
by Amnesty International during the presentation of the annual report on human rights.
The danger that the situation in Algeria could destabilize does not scare only the
MENA region but the whole international community, given that Algeria has
April 2015
5 The Legacy of Arab Springs
practically assumed a leadership role within the region in security and counterterrorism.
In addition to the problems already mentioned above, the main Algerian party, the
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), is now in open internal crisis. The party has been
usually characterized by internal conflicts but resolved, however, by a series of
compromises between the different political parties. At the time of the Bouteflika’s
succession the situation will be more complex and the risk of a division within the
party, which can also result in possible splits, should not be excluded.
The Western countries, therefore, have to be very careful to follow closely the
Algeria affairs if they want to avoid a new ‘jihadist battlefield’ in the future and they
intend to preserve its main strategic partner in North Africa for the fight against
terrorism. Moreover, the easy spread of the phenomenon of terrorism in the MENA
region would represent the practical failure of popular uprisings. The main purpose of
this dossier is to analyze the heavy legacy of the Arab Spring and the outlook in the
Mediterranean area. The insights focus on issues that the staff of Mediterranean Affairs
considers essential to better interpret what is happened from 2011 to today: the spread
of Salafist doctrine, the instability of the MENA region in security terms, the role of
civil society in the same area’s countries and that one belonging to the international
community, in particular that one belonging to the European Union.
We do not believe that the meaning of the Arab Spring has been lost. There have
been successful cases: just think of Tunisia’s case, headed toward a rapid process of
democratization, and Morocco’s case, where an institutional revolution was not
necessary to achieve significant reforms in the country. However, in Egypt and Algeria
the forces of the ancient régime still seem quite influential on the people to reach radical
changes. By contrast, the fate of Syria and Libya is very dramatic, locked in civil wars,
with unpredictable outcome but with the certainty that the number of human life loss
is already too high. This framework does not help the experts to define the Arab Spring,
but it is certain that it is still in progress, and what may happen is not at all predictable.
The staff of Mediterranean Affairs has chosen to examine in depth this topic just
to allow its followers to have the necessary keys to understand how much is important
to analyze this phenomenon. In addition to the reasons already mentioned above, we
firmly believe that it is the biggest event happened in the last twenty years in the
Mediterranean region, together with the war in the Balkans in the Nineties. We wish
you a good reading, hoping that you can appreciate the work carried out by the staff
and you can share the content.
Giacomo Morabito
CEO and Founder of Mediterranean Affairs
April 2015
6 External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab transition
External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab
transition
By Gabriele Quattrocchi
The changes taking place in the MENA offer an outstanding testing ground for the role of external
actors. The Arab Spring has actually proved that the drive for political change comes from within the
region itself but many players have seen the turmoil as a chance to spread out their sway in the region.
External actors, have all made a great effort to find a consistent response to the rapid course of events.
The US and the EU perceived the events in the MENA region as opportunities for democratic change,
at least initially. Regional actors, also recognized new opportunities across the Arab countries in
transition, joining those ones that pursue investments without strong normative agendas.
This contribution leaves the stage to those external actors who pursued inconsistent or, at least,
volatile strategies in the region and it implicitly validates the preeminence of domestic factors in driving
the events. It finally concludes that security concerns bring the external actors’ goals into alignment.
A few years after the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring, those processes of
transition to full democracy, which was expected to blossom over the whole region,
are in a deadlock in many countries. Chaos spread in different countries and the early
belief in the democratization of MENA region has been lost. Although some countries
are going through promising developments, others are still experiencing violent civil
wars. After the approval of a new Constitution, Tunisia has completed its first
parliamentary and presidential elections whereas Libya and Syria seem to be not able
to break the spiral of violence choking their own people and the neighbouring
countries. Egypt is ruled by President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, elected after a coup d’état
against the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān) who governed for a short time.
The Islamic State and the whole new form of international terrorism are additional
destabilizing factors in the regional political landscape (Florensa, 2015).
What emerges from the Arab Spring is the increasing fragmentation of the Arab
world. Where previously widespread authoritarianism allowed analogies and arguable
categorizations, differences have stood out between Arab states and societies. The pace
of events has also affected the capacity of different actors to effectively react. The
April 2015
7 The Legacy of Arab Springs
changes taking
place in the
MENA offer an
outstanding
testing ground
for the role of
external actors
who try to
promote
democracy and
stability and to
guarantee
access to natural
resources or to
widen trade
networks. For the purpose of this dossier, ‘external actors’ are meant as those entities
who are not subject to protests and opposition during the Arab Spring but have the
ability and willingness to act.
Many players have seen the turmoil as a chance to spread out their sway in the
region. Still, only in reaction to the emergence of a credible resistance movement in
Libya, the international community, following the UN Security Council approval, set
up a plan directed and managed by NATO to uphold the uprising. Although eventually
successful in securing the overthrow of Gaddafi, the traditional coalition of the willing,
made up of ‘pro-democracy’ western powers, was reluctant to intervene directly in the
conflict on the ground as in Iraq and Afghanistan (Spencer, 2013).
The US and other powers, especially EU countries, have been dealing with difficult
dilemmas all over the region. Western actors quickly realized that they had to walk on
the edge between their support for human rights and democracy, on the one hand, and
their pursuit for security and stability, on the other. The reliability of the former regimes
was brushed aside by political realities and coherent acts were needed to keep safe
positions in a changing region. Yet, the operations in Libya did not spillover to Syria.
The vetoes of China and Russia resulted in the difficulties of building a sort of
international pattern. It was a piece of evidence that external actors have barely been
capable of grasping the growing interconnectedness of developments in the region.
The Arab Spring has actually proved that the drive for political change comes from
within the region itself. External actors, from the European Union to the United States,
have all made a great effort to find a consistent response to the rapid course of events
(Malmvig and Tassinari, 2011).
April 2015
8 External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab transition
In terms of multilateral cooperation, under the Deauville Initiative - an effort
launched by the G8 in Deauville, France, in 2011 to support Arab countries engaged
in transitions towards democracy - the international powers pledged $38 billion in
financing to Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan over 2011- 13. International financial
Institutions also played a key role. International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank
offered loans to support the transitions in the Arab countries. The IMF promised $35
billion to countries affected by Arab Spring unrest. The European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development’s mandate has also been reoriented so that it can
play the same role in supporting transitions in the MENA that it played two decades
ago in Eastern Europe. Anyway the funds committed are not adequate to be labelled
as a ‘Marshall plan’, as it was suggested by someone at the beginning of the transitions.
Further, international efforts, such as the Deauville Initiative, are uncoordinated. More
a statement of support than a firm commitment, many of the funds take the form of
investments or loans, rather than grants (Echagüe, 2012).
Further, identifying the best targets for this assistance, as well as engaging in long-
lasting appraisals of each economy’s absorptive capacities, takes time in countries that
remain both skeptical of US and European intentions and internally divided over how
to realize their needs and priorities (Spencer, 2013). In any case, much of the support
provided by external actors is defined by their strategic interests in the area.
The Arab Spring and the West
As we can also see in the next chapter, The European Union responded to the Arab
Spring with a broad range of tools, including humanitarian assistance, revised policy
programmes, sanctions and diplomacy. The programme SPRING (Support for
Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) was put in place to organize additional
financial resources of €350 million for 2011- 2012. The EU has attempted to embed
political reform within broader socio-economic development. It has also established
country task forces to coordinate support by donors (Echagüe, 2012).
In the early days of the uprisings, the EU presented key proposals containing the
creation of mobility partnerships with Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt aiming at
facilitating travel for local students and businesspeople (Malmvig and Tassinari, 2011).
Similarly, it announced €380 million of new funds for the region – over one third of
them for Morocco, whose constitutional reform was praised as a clear commitment to
democracy.
April 2015
9 The Legacy of Arab Springs
Nevertheless, while the circumstances evolved, the EU’s approach to the southern
neighborhood has been criticized for its incapacity to reply to the events. Although the
EU has not fulfilled its ambition to be a normative power, it has enjoyed recognition
by various MENA countries. Among the international and regional actors, it has the
highest legitimacy (IEMed, 2013; Malmvig and Tassinari, 2011). However, despite the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, whose key feature was arguably the launch of a
‘more coherent’ foreign policy for the EU, with the establishment of the figure of the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and of the
European External Action Service (EEAS), the uprisings shed light on the lack of
foreign, security and defence policy coordination within the EU.
Apart from institutional inconsistencies, the Arab unrests have revealed that the
European governments keep on being seen as pursuing heterogeneous interests. As a
result, the EU is typically slow in reacting to foreign policy crises. Its authority in terms
of delegated competences and its autonomy to use them are limited by the
governments’ consensus. This has damaged the capabilities of the EU to plan internally
and embody externally a coherent reaction to the Arab Spring. Against this backdrop,
the EU has been facing enormous challenges. The growing engagement of regional
actors, the increasing interests in the area of international powers, and the US policy
shortcomings, have put the EU in a difficult position (Florensa, 2015).
Brussels has drafted its policies towards MENA, trying to make up for the implicit
backing it granted to the autocratic regimes. It strives for building up relations with
those countries asking for greater commitment with the EU. Similarly, the US has
pursued the same aim during the Tunisian democratic transition, when US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton and Tunisian Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed Mouldi
Kefi met to launch a new framework for bilateral cooperation, the US-Tunisia Joint
Political and Economic Partnership (JPEP). Within this framework, the United States
Source: Compiled by the IEM ed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey (Malmwig and Tassinari, 2011)
April 2015
10 External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab transition
has pledged $40 million in support of the Tunisian transition process. With these funds,
US meant to support Tunisia’s efforts to lay the basis for responsive, accountable
governance and to prepare for elections. A new ‘Office of Middle East Transitions’ has
been created by the US Department of State to coordinate assistance to transition
countries. The budget request for aid for the Arab Spring countries in the 2013 budget
was $800 million, the larger amount of which was to be addressed towards a new
‘Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund’. External actors had at that point
renounced to try to press on elections or constitutional processes too swiftly. The
Obama administration, like the EU, viewed the uprisings as an opportunity for
democracy without giving up its security interests. The US reaction varied across
countries as well depending on its specific concerns. Indeed, the American responses
to the events have showed the incoherence of US foreign policy in the region as a
whole. It was really active in Egypt by changing its policy frequently: from retreating
support for the Mubarak regime to launching a dialogue with the new President Morsi.
In this case, the US, owing to contingencies, bet on individual actors rather than
supporting the state and its institutions. Eventually, Washington provides direct
support for the military coup under the current President el-Sisi and it is well known
that the persistence of elites, formal institutions, socio-economic networks and political
culture created within previous regimes inevitably results in reform unwillingness.
Furthermore, the Obama administration had to deal with new uncertainties in the
MENA together with the domestic politics characterized by a Republican majority and
the run-up to the elections. Then, the US found itself limited in its action on account
of its alliances with Saudi Arabia - the US did nothing regarding the Saudi-led
repression of the uprising in Bahrain - and with Israel, as the US conditioned its support
to the Ikwān provided that Egypt would commit to the 1979 peace agreement with
Israel (Börzel, Risse and Dandashly, 2015). As a matter of fact, the US arguably pursued
April 2015
11 The Legacy of Arab Springs
the most inconsistent foreign policy toward the MENA region during the Arab Spring.
The active involvement in Libya - without the US military support, the NATO-led
would have probably failed - contributed to eradicate one of the most authoritarian
regimes in North Africa but it also paved the way to a failing state. On the contrary,
the lack of intervention in Syria due to geostrategic constraints resulted in considerable
human rights violations.
Actually, Western pro-democracy actors found themselves in a thorny position
since the war against terrorism and the endorsement of authoritarian regimes brought
about, especially for the US, a deficit of reliability as advocates of democracy. The
unstable security equilibrium in the MENA region remains the chief concern driving
the EU and the US which want to make sure that Egypt and Jordan carry on complying
with existing peace treaties with Israel and that they side with Western positions. As a
result, interim governments have been able to undermine the EU’s newly articulated
criteria of ‘less for less and more for more’ as a measure of democratic transitions. In
Egypt, when the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has taken steps in less
than democratic directions, the EU has not imposed sanctions in the lack of US back-
up (Spencer, 2013).
For the Western countries, new approaches to anticipating rather than following
regional developments are needed, especially to keep pace with those external actors,
less bound to normative agendas.
For the traditional assistance partners of the Arab world, the competition for
influence has raised a new set of challenges. “With Western funding being subject to
new forms of pro-democracy conditionality, the evolving situation has made it easier
for external actors who are not driven by normative agendas to stake a claim to the
region’s future. Russia and China’s veto on the failed draft UN resolution condemning
the use of violence against civilians in Syria in early February 2012 was based on an
alternative set of international principles than those invoked by others under the UN’s
‘Responsibility to Protect’ criteria” (Spencer, 2013).
Besides the principle of non-
interference in the domestic affairs
of sovereign states, the Chinese and
Russian agendas are set respectively
by the accessibility to regional
energy supplies and by the
accessibility to port facilities in Syria
besides the need to assert its weight
in the international political arena.
April 2015
12 External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab transition
Only the US and the EU perceived the events in the MENA region as opportunities
for democratic change, at least initially. The more events evolved, however, the more
the two Western actors prioritized security and stability against the rise of variants of
Islamism which have turned out to be a chief common concern. Even the Turkish
AKP government did not appreciate the rise of Salafist movements in Tunisia and
Egypt, let alone the growing influence of the Islamic State (IS) movement in Syria.
Thus, Western actors based their actions on what was occurring on the field, a kind
of reactive policy that has been, if not original, at least cautious. In spite of it, The EU
and the US are to be considered exceptional actors to the extent to which they
committed to human rights and democracy promotion in reply to the events.
The Arab Spring and regional actors
Western powers are not the only players on the field. Regional actors, also
recognized new opportunities across the Arab countries in transition, joining those
ones that pursue investments without strong normative agendas.
The Gulf countries have remarkably increased their activity in the MENA countries
and have been trying to economically and politically influence the events in the region.
The Gulf states’ interests including keeping political influence, restraining the spread
of the unrest, offsetting Iran’s intrusion. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait have so far
pledged billions of dollars.
Turkey, under the Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), for instance, has
in the last decade emerged as a regional power in the MENA region. Instanbul
enhanced trade relations and strongly backed the Palestinian cause, gaining a bright
image in the Arab world.
According to Malmwig and Tassinari (2011), Turkey has been perceived as having
strongly sided with political change, even when this has run counter to Turkish short-
term security and trade interests. Even though the Turkish government held strong
bilateral ties both with the Gaddafi regime in Libya and with Bashar Al Assad in Syria,
Turkey ended up supporting the opposition in both. Yet Turkey’s role has clearly been
most visible with respect to the Syrian crisis. Ahmet Davutoglu, at that time Turkish
Foreign Minister, has warned President Bashar al-Assad in august 2011 that Ankara’s
patience was running out with his regime's brutal crackdown on civilian demonstrators.
Then, Turkey gave shelter to the Syrian opposition in exile and it provided for the
Syrian refugees within Turkey itself.
Comparing Turkey with Saudi Arabia (Malmwig and Tassinari, 2011), it is however
clear that ‘active involvement’ in the Syrian crisis cannot alone explain why Turkey’s
April 2015
13 The Legacy of Arab Springs
policies are viewed favourably whereas Saudi Arabia, together with Qatar, in spite of
having played a very active role in the Syrian crisis, are not viewed positively in the
survey conducted the scholars (72 percent of the respondents giving a negative
assessment). This pinpoints an important issue about regional credibility: any
international actor’s foreign policy needs to be consistent with the kind of policies
pursued at the domestic level. A credible supporter of democratic change cannot be a
repressive government.
Against this background, another contrast emerges: Turkey and Israel. “While
Turkey, saw itself as a transformative power for the region, Israel tried to insulate itself
as a somewhat ‘active bystander’ from the perceived security risks” stemming from the
unrests (Börzel, Risse and Dandashly, 2015). Extremely concerned about thwarting
potential spillover effects, Israel focused on Egypt and Syria to prevent cross-border
movements of fighters or refugees. Conversely, Ankara initially sponsored its model
affected by a mixture of democracy and moderate Islamism, but soon after the
spreading of the civil war in Syria and the rise of radical Islamism the Turkish
government started to prioritize stability and security goals, undermining its value-
based foreign policy.
Iran failed in its original efforts to make the Arab revolts part of an Iranian
revolutionary storyline. “According to the Iranian leadership, the Arab uprisings were
rebellions against western-allied puppet governments. Yet, at the beginning of the
uprisings, Arab protesters resembled Iran’s Green movement of 2009, which had been
so thoroughly crushed by the regime, rather than the 1979 revolution. The subsequent
events in Libya and Syria made the Iranian narrative even more difficult to sustain, as
both Gaddafi and Bashar al Assad were obviously not allies of western powers”
(Malmwig and Tassinari, 2011).
Looking at the Arab Spring through a Russian lens
The unrests in Tunisia and Egypt were at first perceived in Russia as a revolt against
regimes incapable of changing in a changing world. Later, due to the Western growing
intervention in the region, new versions arose involving possible Western plans and
intentions concerning the Arab countries (Zvyagelskaya, 2014).
Unlike the EU or the US, Russia did not have to balance security goals with efforts
to promote human rights and democracy. Nevertheless, there was also little consistency
in its policy towards the MENA region. In the case of Libya, for instance, it put up
with the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to pass, while it
remained inflexible that no such outside interference should be legitimized against
April 2015
14 External actors’ inconsistent responses to the domestic-driven Arab transition
Assad’s government in Syria.
Unlike for Russia, however, this
inconsistency may challenge the
reliability of the EU and the US
as democracy supporters.
The focus of the Russian
foreign policy has been stability
in the international relations
and the defence of the Russian
companies’ economic concerns.
The Kremlin wants that
Russia’s role as a permanent member of the Security Council and Russian interests are
recognized and respected. In this context, Russia insists on being treated by the
Western powers as an essential partner for reaching the peace in Syria. With Gaddafi
gone and the lack of an effective Libyan government, Moscow has only one remaining
ally in the Middle East. Syria is the only chance to regain influence. But the Kremlin’s
pro-Assad policy has received criticisms, even from Arab world.
What is important for Moscow, it is to prevent regime change and preserve the
Syrian statehood. The negative experience of Libya contributed a great deal to Russian
obstinacy. Further, the prolonged and bloody fighting in Syria has made it clear that
none of the parties involved has been able to achieve a decisive victory.
Russia was also developing contacts with moderate Islamists such as the legally
elected Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. At the same time, however, secular regimes
seem more predictable and reliable. The trip to Moscow in February 2014 of the Field
Marshal Abdul Fattah el-Sisi has to be viewed in a broad political scenario in which
Putin is animated by the desire to renovate Russia’s relations with the new-old regime
in Egypt. “I know that you have made a decision to run for president” Putin on that
occasion said. “That’s a very responsible decision: to undertake such a mission for the
fate of the Egyptian people. On my own part, and on behalf of the Russian people, I
wish you success.”1
1 Spencer R., Vladimir Putin backs Egypt army chief Abdulfattah al-Sisi for president, The Telegraph, February 3rd, 2014. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/10635530/Vladimir-Putin-backs-Egypt-army-chief-Abdulfattah-al-Sisi-for-president.html.
April 2015
15 The Legacy of Arab Springs
Conclusion
The volatility of the MENA region in many ways pinpoints a broader set of
modifications concerning the international political scenario. In the long-run, the
underway transformation affecting Arab countries will spillover in the relations
between international and regional power.
Most of the challenges posed by the uprisings are undermining the already weak
credibility of the Western actors as democracy promoters. Further, Western powers
have to cope with the domestic reluctance in a period when public support for
international commitment is fading away.
The results of the Arab Spring are definitely disappointing from a democratization
perspective. Yet, it proved the wish of millions of people in the MENA region for
democracy and freedom.
The lack of consistent strategies of external actors in reacting to the events validates
the preeminence of domestic factors in shaping the events and processes.
The external support could succeed in its endeavor to influence the transition only
by adapting policies to the peculiar circumstances of each state, by upholding
domestically steered processes, by addressing the needs and demands of stakeholders
outside the political and economic centres in an area where the rural population
represents an important share of the total population and where significant cleavages
between the centre and the periphery endure.
However, the need to balance the desire for stability, on the one hand, and
normative principles, on the other, keeps on shaping the responses of the Western
external actors.
Security concerns finally prevailed bringing the external actors’ goals into alignment.
The first aim became to hold the position in the Mediterranean by getting rid of all the
potential security threats.
April 2015
16 The strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the European Union
The strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the European
Union
By Pilar Buzzetti
The overall EU geopolitical interest in the MENA region is well known, not least since the
proximity of the region exposes the EU to Middle Eastern instability. Many documents, such as the
2003 European Security Strategy, have reiterated the EU’s interest in stable and well-governed states
in the Middle East, regional security cooperation and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons1. In
addition, the presence of migrant communities in Europe means that MENA challenges resonate in
more intense ways than in some other external actors, like the US. For example, counter-terrorism
and counter-radicalization are both domestic and foreign policy priorities. The EU also depends on the
region for a significant share of its energy needs. All this makes the MENA region hugely important
for the EU.
As the process of deepening and enlarging made the Union’s external relations more
central to EU policy-making, transformations taking place in the MENA region and its
proximity contributed to raise the interest of the EU policy- making community
towards the region beyond traditional bilateral relations.
The political issues in the wider Mediterranean region have always been high in the
ranking of the agenda of external affairs of the EU. Especially the Arab-Israeli conflict
is a major issue where the EU has attempted to play a role in its resolution, as peace in
the area is considered vital for the relations of the EU with its Mediterranean neighbors.
With the Lisbon Treaty and the reinforcement of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), the EU is given the chance to play a more effective role on the
international scene arena and have a stronger impact. Examples of the EU’s common
foreign policies towards its southern neighbors are the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy.
As the EU intended to strengthen its relations with the countries of its southern
neighborhood, in November 1995 it introduced the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,
1 European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better world, December 12th, 2003.
April 2015
17 The Legacy of Arab Springs
or Barcelona Process. It represented the EU’s desire to have a more comprehensive
policy towards the broader Mediterranean region through multilateral trade and
cooperation agreements. More precisely, it refers to a more comprehensive and more
institutionalized partnership2. It can be divided into three areas of interest: the
economic, the political and the social basket. It is important to mention that the EMP
introduced a new agenda in the relations between the EU and Middle Eastern
countries. The EU aimed through this process to a cooperation that for the first time
would be based on the promotion of democracy and human rights.
The EMP was a very ambitious initiative but it did not manage to live up to the
expectations up to the point that by 2005 it was considered a failure3, as it did not
achieve the goals it aimed for. What was intended to be a partnership between two
blocs of states, ended up as a partnership between the EU and each Mediterranean
Country individually. Due to this failure, in 2003-2004, the EU decided to enhance the
EMP through the introduction of a new tool: the European Neighborhood Policy
(ENP), a foreign relations instrument of the EU to promote security and prosperity.
Whereas the goals of the ENP are similar to the ones of the EMP, what differs is that
the ENP
decreases the
multilateral
partnership and it
gives way to a
unilateral
policymaking4.
ENP focuses
more on the
bilateral relations
of the EU with
each country,
which are
represented by
the Action Plans:
association
agreements
between the EU
2 Council of the European Union, Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27-28 November 1995. 3 Saleh M. Nsouli, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Ten years on: reassessing readiness and prospects, June 23th, 2006. 4 Egmont Paper, An Arab springboard for EU policy making?, January 2012.
Sketch of possible infrastructure for a sustainable supply of power to Europe, the
Middle East and North Africa (EU-MENA) proposed by TREC)
April 2015
18 The strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the European Union
and each ENP partner that set the framework of the reforms that need to be made in
the political and economic sphere.
The European Neighborhood Policy has been criticized for many reasons, mainly
for promoting the European interests instead of the European values, and the
economic cooperation instead of the support for democracy and human rights.
In July 2008, thanks to the initiative of French President Nicholas Sarkozy, the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was re-launched under the name of Union for the
Mediterranean (UfM). The UfM is the southern regional cooperation branch of the
ENP and it aims at economic integration and democratic reforms of the countries in
the southern neighborhood of the EU.
The initiative, first conceived as an alternative to the Barcelona Process and the
ENP, evolved to complement the already existing initiatives and in the end,
incorporated the “Barcelona acquis” as a new phase of the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership.
The EU’s reaction to the Arab spring
The EU reacted quickly to the Arab uprisings. Through a sequence of documents,
it launched a completely new policy approach, which put the issue of democratization
in the Arab countries on top of the agenda. It also re-emphasized a set of policy
measures first formulated into the framework of the EMP, but more or less abandoned
after the introduction of the ENP. Already in March 2011, the European Commission
together with the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,
Catherine Ashton, presented a Joint Communication named “A partnership for
democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”. In the
introduction to this new document,
they emphasized: “we believe that
now is the time for a qualitative step
forward in the relations between the
EU and its Southern neighbors”5.
The document presented
substantive policy proposals in five
headings, which refer to democracy
and institution building, mobility
and migration issues, economic
5 Joint Communication, A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the southern Mediterranean, 8 March 2011.
April 2015
19 The Legacy of Arab Springs
development, trade and investment, as well as sectorial cooperation. The document
pinpoints the EU’s immediate responses to the events, which included humanitarian
aid, facilitation of consular cooperation and evacuation, FRONTEX joint operations,
High-level visits by EU representatives to the region and support for democratic
transitions and border management. Not long after the first proposal for a new policy
approach, the Commission and the HR presented a second communication in May
2011, “A new response to a changing neighborhood”, specifying the need for a review
of the ENP. The new approach promoted by the EU is supposed to be founded on
the principles of differentiation, joint ownership, mutual accountability and shared
commitment to the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law6.
The EU announced, through these communications, its intention to support the
changes that the Arab Spring would bring, as they are in line with the values and
principles that the EU treasures. The EU, therefore, decided to take an active role
despite the implications and difficulties that are involved in the transition from
authoritarian regimes to democracy in the Arab world. The most spectacular innovation
refers to the adoption of a differentiated approach. It also defines for the first time
rules and procedures for applying negative conditionality: “where a partner country
fails to observe the principles of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms”7. Although this differentiated approach was already
introduced in 2005 with the establishment of the ENP, it was never really implemented.
The EU is based on the values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, good
governance, social justice and it has traditionally helped countries move from autocracy
to democracy. It puts as well particular emphasis on the role of civil society, as non-
government organizations and civil society organizations can contribute to the
acceleration of the reforms needed. The ENP had then adopted a positive
conditionality based on the
grants offered to the
neighborhood countries along
with negative conditionality
while imposing sanctions on
states that violate human
rights and democracy,
stressing also the importance
of coordination between the
EU and its members
6 Joint Communication, A new response to a changing neighborhood, May 25th, 2011. 7 Ibidem.
April 2015
20 The strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the European Union
regarding the aids that are offered to these countries.
In addition, in September 2011 the EU adopted the SPRING Programme, a
complementary programme to the renewed policies introduced by the joint
communications of March and May 2011. The initial goal of this programme was to
provide support, according to the needs of each country and assist them on their
transition to democracy and the challenges they face on the economic and social
sphere8. The EU demonstrated its wish to play an active role in the transition to
democracy of its southern neighbors by enhancing the already existing partnerships
and suggesting a number of ways to help smooth the reforms needed.
Moreover, the EU seemed willing to become more involved in the internal political
systems of its southern neighbors by providing a stronger support to governmental and
non-governmental actors. In this regard, the EU promised to shift away from business
as usual to ensure that support for human rights and democracy will be central to its
policy towards the southern neighborhood. For this purpose, the EU has created two
new tools: a Civil Society Facility and an Endowment for Democracy. On aid and
investment, more money has been made available to support reforms in the Southern
Mediterranean. Finally, the EU took a more flexible approach to migration aimed at
promoting a greater movement of skills and labor between both sides of the
Mediterranean. However, concerns among European member states about the likely
impact of migratory inflows have been hindering the evolution of negotiations on
mobility partnerships between the EU and the MENA.
EU’s stance on the developments of the Arab spring was not received without
criticism. EU’s response revealed once again the existing intra-EU divisions and made
clear the lack of unity there is among the governments of the different EU member
states.
Its impact on EU’s policies and the prospects for a revitalization of the
relationship
The EU’s attitude towards the MENA has been strongly shaped by its quest for
European security and regional stability9. Regional conflict combined with rising
radicalism in the Arab world were explicitly mentioned in the 2008 Report on the
Implementation of the European Security Strategy as factors leading to instability. The
upheavals in the Arab region therefore underlined the need for the EU to revisit its
role as a promoter of human rights, democracy, rule of law, socio-economic equality,
and its contribution to reforming institutions in partner countries. The EU made
8 European Commission Press Release, EU Response to the Arab Spring: the Spring Programme, September 27th, 2011 9 European Security Strategy, A secure Europe in a better world, op. cit.
April 2015
21 The Legacy of Arab Springs
convenient use of the strategic revision of its ENP framework to stress the importance
of human rights and democracy in its neighborhood policies. In fact, the new ENP
approach is more explicitly based on mutual accountability, enhanced commitment to
the universal values of human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and as such builds on
the normative approach the EU has taken for years10. More emphasis is put on
comprehensive implementation. It does so by differentiating levels of assistance,
depending on progress made in building and consolidating human rights. In this
respect, the ENP explicitly aims to address criticism that, although human rights
principles have been integrated into ENP action plans and association agreements, they
are not matched by sufficient and effective instruments adapted to the local context
and needs of the countries and regions concerned11.
In conclusion, it is doubtful whether these renewed ENP framework will have a
significant impact in the Arab region. Despite new rhetoric, in human rights and
democratization policies, the EU has not been distancing itself from old politics and
attitudes. Although it seems to have accepted the idea that no actual tool exists to open
up societies and enhance democratization from the outside, more can be achieved than
what is the case today.
It has become clear, though, that the EU is now assuming an active role in
addressing the needs of the people of the MENA. The EU has chosen to answer the
variety of challenges by adapting its existing instruments. The lack of critical creative
10 Joint Communication, A new response to a changing neighborhood, op. cit. 11 Van Vooren Bart (2012), EU External relations law and the European Neighborhood Policy: a paradigm for coherence, Routledge.
April 2015
22 The strategic importance of the Mediterranean region for the European Union
thinking about an EU strategy in the MENA hinders the more profound and much
needed regeneration of EU attitudes. High stakes are nevertheless involved: if the EU
fails in the region, this will have an impact on economic, human development, political,
and even geo-strategically conditions. Progress has been made in the EU’s structural
cooperation with states – multilaterally and bilaterally – as well as non-state actors. The
EU also deepened its relations with the Arab League and envisions further cooperation.
It has been announced that in addition to joint crisis-management, collaboration will
also be set up on economic and political themes in the longer term.
The Arab uprisings provided unique opportunities to revise the EU’s relations with
countries in transition in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Caught by surprise at
first, the EU has now embraced security, economic, socioeconomic, political, social,
and diplomatic challenges. The exact impact of the instruments created or modified is
hard to measure, especially since the
region is still in the middle of one of the
greatest changes it has seen in 50 years.
The use of different policy
instruments did not result in the
ambitious creation of a comprehensive
strategy, partly because the EU has not
been successful in prioritizing the
interests it has pursued12. Ultimately,
the EU’s quest for stability in the
MENA region is still reflected in all its
instruments, notwithstanding the reorientation of its programmes towards the
engagement of civil society and the support of democratic aspirations of the people of
the region.
The evolution of Europe’s policies towards the Mediterranean region range from
matters of economic incentives to issues of security, such as controlled immigration,
environmental protection and energy security. Throughout the past twenty years or so,
the EU has played a passive role in the region regarding taking a stance against
authoritarian regimes counter to its main tenets, being the overarching themes of
democracy and human rights that lay in the EU’s framework. It is clear that the
oppressive nature of governments found in the countries involved in the Arab Spring
led to their ultimate demise, with the actions of the people speaking for themselves.
The EU’s choice to look past human rights violations has led to the continuation of
12 Nathalie Tocci (2014), The Neighborhood Policy is dead. What’s next for European Foreign Policy along its arc of instability?, IAI Working Papers, November.
April 2015
23 The Legacy of Arab Springs
the conditions that led these uprisings. Though in the past the EU might have had less
of a role in actually instituting these themes beyond paper, its prospects in promoting
these ideals in practice in a post-Arab Spring Mediterranean are much greater.
Furthermore, though the Arab Spring took the EU by surprise, there is much potential
to interact with the Arab world and the post-revolution Mediterranean partners.
Though much of the development of these reformed societies rests in the hand of civil
society, the EU has the unique opportunity to aid in this development in a political and
economic realm. With the amount of progress made in these countries recuperating
from the revolution, the EU can help and support in building a region with democratic
values and sound human rights practices, which will help to uphold the pillar on which
the EU has built most of its policy: regional stability.
April 2015
24 Security and Terrorisms: before and after the Arab Spring
Security and Terrorisms: before and after the Arab Spring
By Antonio De Bonis
President George W. Bush, who was asked by American people for revenge against an undefinable
enemy – religious terrorism - after the tragic events of 9/11, with a perfect American speech declared
that war was over: mission accomplished! The war of the Iraqi battlefields and of Saddam Hussein as
the primary (and easiest) target was, indeed, over, and the victory achieved through the dynamics of a
classic war fought by modern troops. However, what did it happen next? The failure of state building
policies in Iraq and of the use of democracy as a peace building tool appears very clear given the dramatic
situation in North Africa and the Middle East.
Mission Accomplished, 1st May 2003.
In January 2014, James R. Clapper, the National Intelligence director, declared in
his Statement for the record: : "...instability in the Middle East and North Africa has
accelerated the decentralization of the movement (terrorism) which is increasingly
influenced by local and regional issues...". Nothing had change since 2001 and Islamic
terrorism is increasingly more efficient and insidious, getting more and more dangerous
for the Western world as time goes by.
Clapper claims the instability of societies from the Fertile Crescent to the Atlantis
mountains to be the factor that can bring about the growth and the spread of Islamic
terrorism influenced by local dynamics. Instability is the key to the very existence of
the theoretic, pragmatic and strategic modern jihad according to the Syrian apologist
Mustafa Setmariam Nasr, born and raised in Spain and better known as Abu Mussal al-
Suri.
However, in his speech about one year ago, Clapper did not mention at all the
Islamic State of Iraq and Levante, which remained understated among other radical
groups. After one year, the impossible had become possible, against all analytical
projections. IS is at the moment the crucial factor to be considered in order to
understand what happened before and after the Arab Spring and the climate of
international insecurity which stems from its very existence and action.
April 2015
25 The Legacy of Arab Springs
Jihad evolution: from organization to network.
Nizam, la tanzim: system, not organization. This is the formula where the new
jihadist strategy is grounded. In its pamphlet, “Call for a global Islamic resistance,” al-
Suri claims the need for an operative system, something like a protocol, available for
anyone interested in joining the global jihad, whether alone or within a group of true
companions, instead of an operative organization. The rest of the pamphlet explains
the four guiding lines that represent the foundation of the new jihad:
– Spontaneity;
– situationist outlook;
– decentralization;
– autonomy;
An epochal changing, a strategic revolution which emerges from the acceptance of
the failure of the Bin-Laden-Zawahiri approach and sees in the future a radical fight:
tazim, la tanzim, indeed.
In particular, what more interest us is the situationist outlook, which involves the
exploitation of instability in the Islamic world, whether it is found or provoked through
destabilizing terroristic attacks. In other words, jihadists need to capitalize on local
problems of the Islamic population, presenting themselves as the only valid alternative
to nationalism, as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon.
After this general reflection on the dangers brought about by a new typology of
Islamic war, we need to address its concrete evolution inside a geographical theatre
very closed to our borders, the Maghreb region.
Al-Suri's situationist outlook: exploitation or creation of the ideal
conditions for a local jihad
In order to understand how the situationist
outlook can be exploited, we need to make
room for sociological and anthropological
explanations. Human history is characterized by
certain constants which cyclically repeat
themselves and some of them systemically
determine the evolution of human
communities. Among these constants, on that
has maintained intact its power to change
April 2015
26 Security and Terrorisms: before and after the Arab Spring
realities is immigration. This key factor is the root of both legal movements and trade
of goods, and an equally remunerative illegal flux of exchange. It is in this context that
flourishes the modern network of smugglers, linked to each other by tribal ties. Tribes
are very strong centres of political power that cannot be outstepped to rule in these
regions. Without the backing up of local tribes it is almost impossible to obtain local
communities' support. Tribes are able to exercise their power across wide and scarcely
populated territories through a network of clans and families, which generate forms of
power that are not always homogeneous but definitely binding. From a sociological
and anthropological point of view these are the people best suited to survive in such
challenging environments, while learning to be strong and proudly hold out against
external subordination. Tribes are always master of their own lands and national
governments need to collaborate with them as the only way to gain consensus due to
the fact the any form of assimilation is impracticable. The entire African continent is
historically shot through by migration
waves and contraband networks
which create the informal market.
Muammar Gaddafi was a strong
supporter of the role of contraband in
the continent, and especially in Libya,
as a crucial economic activity for the
population. It is certainly true that
contraband shapes the lives of many
if not every African man, thanks to
the wide and articulated network of
illegal trafficking of all sorts, from
human trafficking to drugs, from
arms to cigarettes and diamonds to every kind of goods.
The streets where caravans and the other means of transport travel across the
country, and most of all the tribal organizations, are the primary actors of this
primordial type of market. Therefore, who manages to control them controls the
market itself. Criminal organizations, which often intertwine or even overlap with the
tribal organizations, are active throughout the entire continent and manage illegal
traffics with the blessing of national authorities, through a network of informal
relations that flourish upon corruption. This is the main cause of the cyclical revolts
that invest African countries generating the instability that al-Suri described as the ideal
precondition for the penetration of the jihad.
The Maghreb region represents, for obvious geographical reasons, the match point
of both legal and illegal trade across the continent. Western colonialism, its military
Abu Musab al-Suri
April 2015
27 The Legacy of Arab Springs
face during the 19th century and the economic one during the second half of the 20th
century, did not help African people to emerge from the situation of underdevelopment
that still characterize their everyday lives. This, paired with the continuous population
growth, makes up for an explosive mix easily to be exploited by radical movements.
Until the outbreak of the so called Arab Spring, with an unfortunate combination
of questions of all sorts (while in Prague it was national self-determination at stake, in
Maghreb it is the very existence of the people to be in danger) criminal networks did
their job through their usual means. It is undeniable how globalization has changed
these networks as well, allowing criminal organizations to be in direct contact with their
international counterparts and multiplying their ability to provoke harm.
The relationship of interest between organized crime and phenomena of
terrorism and insurgency.
The whole area of Sahel-Sahara is crossed by smuggled products headed up north,
going in the opposite direction in comparison to weapons and subsidiaries goods. In
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria up to the Egyptian border criminal organizations have the
complete control over the many routes of transit. Sometimes due to the fostering of
governments, such the Gaddafi one which allowed the illegal trafficking of some
Tuareg tribes or more often due to the easy corruption of public officers in order to
facilitate the movement of these goods. In other words, the smuggling of illegal goods
is flourishing and is generating an enormous economic flow which is enriching local
lords, criminal networks, public officers and of course the people in charge. Something
has changed, but not for the better. We need to address this problem by talking about
Syria where the internal chaos is having a crucial role in the evolution of the Islamic
State which, after following the same path of the Assad’s regime, has begun to entertain
numerous relationships with tribes’ leaders involved in smuggling and thus is obtaining
the right support in exchange for the insurance of being left alone. Al-Suri himself
encouraged this kind of relationship with the organized crime which he thought of as
indispensable for the control over the territory, for economic help and to establish new
international relationships. The same situation has taken place in Somalia, Nigeria, Mali,
Libya, Algeria and Tunisia only to name a few. The Somali Shabaab thanks to the use
of the harbours in the Indian ocean, especially the one in Chisimaio, have enriched
their finances with the smuggling of coal towards the Arabic peninsula, with that of
elephants’ fangs from Kenya or even with the blackmailing of Somali pirates that act
in their territory of control. In Nigeria Boko haram deals, in the territories under his
domain, with the smuggling of goods headed north and has declared his affiliations
with the Islamic State. The news is that, whereas in the past organized crime that had
control over the smuggling of illegal goods within the continent acted for its own good
April 2015
28 Security and Terrorisms: before and after the Arab Spring
by establishing relationships with public officers that tolerated these activities in order
to have an economic gain, now due to the increasing pressure generated by the
dissatisfaction of the lower class and the parallel increase in the African populations
organized crime prefers to be allied with insurgent movements that apparently give
more hopes for the future. Organized crime acts, under a criminology perspective, as a
normal economic business and tends to invest in relationships that will be profitable in
the future. Thus the entire situation is highly explosive, to say the least. It’s the same
way in which the mafia has operated since the beginning, by combining the interests of
politics and the economy and their own. The Mafia model, given its easy
reproducibility, is not typically Italian. But that’s a story for another time. Back to
business, in what measure have these new relationships shaped this scenery? Criminals
and insurgents have found reciprocally profitable to close deals with one another, given
the matching of their interests. In some cases it was such a tight match that no
differences are detectable between these two categories and are to be considerable as a
whole. The primal goal is economic. For organized crime it is about the accumulation
of capital to reinvest in new and even more profitable illegal activities, whereas for the
insurgents it is about fund raising finalized to their affirmation and political
legitimation. In this regard it is imperative for both to gain some kind of control over
the territory because for criminals it means dealing the routes of trafficking whereas for
insurgent it is about involving the local populations, the administration and the
management of primary activities. This whole thing requires many economic resources
from the Islamic State within the caliphate. The control over the commercial routes in
Africa and Maghreb goes through a series of passages across multiple borders of
different States, both thanks to corruption of custom officers and the physical control
of unofficial passages. By reading this hypothetical informal geographic map of the
April 2015
29 The Legacy of Arab Springs
different interests present in Maghreb you’d easily find out about the importance of
peripheral areas between Libya and Egypt, mostly for the management of migrants
directed towards Libya from the Arabic peninsula, and vice-versa, for the flux of
cigarettes headed in the opposite directions. Or about the importance of the Libyan-
Algerian and Libyan-Tunisian borders where Tripolitania is one of the most important
intersection for the different commercial routes. Who is in charge of these important
areas of transit is also in charge of a big economic gain. In Libya, today, different armed
groups, of various features, fight each other for the control over this areas. Who is in
charge manages to have the right relationships with the local organized crime, to thus
gain political power thanks to the control of the territory. Many examples would be
explanatory enough but the most emblematic one would be the one regarding the Zitan
militias who after losing the battle against the forces of Misurata for the control over
the airport of Tripoli, important economic intersection, started revolving around south
by occupying the territories near the city of Gadames (500 km from Oasi and 568 km
southwest of Tripoli. Crossing Azizia, Bir Ghnem, Giosc, Tigi, Nalut, Sinauen, Bir
Zograr up to where the borders of Libya, Tunisia and south Algeria converge), fighting
off the Tuareg tribes, once supported by the regime, in order to substitute them as the
new illegal traffickers of the entire area. Furthermore, Sheba and Kufra are the main
Libyan cities through which the whole illegal smuggling from the entire continent goes
by. They constitute two key points along the human trafficking route and are controlled
by a bunch of local communities made of Berber tribes and Arab ones that are not
prone to recognising one another. Since 2012, right after the fall of the regime, cities
have been the stage of violent fights between local tribes, that of Tubu and Awlad
Sulayman in particular, for the affirmation of their local supremacy. These fights soon
began to move from Sheba to Kufra and demonstrated that the stakes are high and
revolve around different interests and that old equilibriums need to be dealt with again.
April 2015
30 Security and Terrorisms: before and after the Arab Spring
Conclusions
This particular argument concerns us very much seeing that migrants that land on
our coasts come from those two cities. The DA’s office of Palermo has recently issued
three different international warrants to arrest the people involved in the recent
shipwrecks near the island of Lampedusa. During the investigation a phone call was
intercepted and it clearly testifies the involvement of the Libyan organized crime. In
particular that of a group of militants commanded by someone that seems pleased by
the millions of dollars the organization is gaining thanks to the human trafficking rings.
This phone call describes the perverse and dangerous relationship that entails the
typical form of organized crimes and the armed militias out of control in Libya. Some
of which are already supporters of the Islamic State. In conclusion, answering the
question on top, in regards to the situation ex ante in where the regimes were in fact
able to control organized crimes, now it is not the case anymore. Big local and
transnational criminal networks are looking for new partners reliable enough to
organize illegal activities together. Now, if armed militias, even while bearing the flag
of the Islamic State, will be able to present themselves as a serious partner for the
organized crime, then the decision to collaborate or not will define the final outcome.
April 2015
31 The Legacy of Arab Springs
The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, schools of Islamic
fundamentalism
By Federica Fanuli
The Arab Spring has led to a historic turning point in many Muslim countries of North Africa.
The dissolution of corrupt and dictatorial regimes – Mubarak in Egypt, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Gaddafi
in Libya – is a process that, if the West supports the struggle for achieving freedom and democracy, on
the contrary, confirms the assertion of political leaders of Islamic fundamentalism. Democratically
elections held in Egypt ratified the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ennahdha party in Tunisia
and its ambiguous affinity to Salafism. To understand the reasons for this political success, we have
retraced the History of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafism and analyzed their involvement in
the Arab political scene.
The Muslim Brotherhood, the History of the Movement in the pre-
revolutionary
In 1927, the young Egyptian Hassan al-Banna,
completed his studies at the Islamic Al Azhar
University, left Cairo and moved to Ismailia, a
port controlled by the Anglo-French Suez Canal
Company. Hassan wanted taught grammar, but in
a short time he founded the Muslim Brotherhood
(MB, the symbol in the picture). The Movement
began as armed wing against the British rule. It
did not tolerate the influence the West was having
on Egyptian costumes. Its actions started to intensify. The goal was to Islamize the
society and to impose Shari’a. The group’s leader, Hassan was a skilful orator and his
doctrine, a combination of Islam, Egyptian nationalism and attention to the working
classes, worked well. The electorate of the lower middle class was soon conquered.
From a religious and social organization, the Muslim Brotherhood became a political
party. Relations with the government were highly charged, but al-Banna did not sever
ties. The exclusion of the Movement from the Egyptian political life could have limited
April 2015
32 The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, schools of Islamic fundamentalism
the activities of propaganda and education promoted by the militants. Anyway, in 1948,
the Brotherhood responded to the various attempts by the government to dissolve the
group killing the Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi al-Nuqrāshī.
The organization acquired thickness. The purpose of playing a major role in the
Egyptian political scene seemed to materialize when, after the creation of the Republic1,
the movement coupled with the Free Officers, military and nationalist leaders.
However, relations between the Brotherhood and the military degenerated. MB had
supported the Army in the coup that deposed King Farouk and overturned the English
monarchy. Do ut des, the Brothers planned the establishment of the Islamic State, led
by the Islamic party. On the contrary, the Colonel Nasser, who came to power after
the coup, was working for a secular State. The rivalry was growing and competition
policy too. In 1954, the Colonel escaped an assassination attempt and accused Islamic
activists, including the successor of Hassan, Sayyid Qutb, who would have inspired the
ideological basis of Qutbism. It is one of the various schools of thought developed
inside the Muslim Brotherhood. This current interprets the Quran in political and
revolutionary way. Unlike the extreme fringe, the Brothers who adhered to Qutbism
ideology2 rejected the violence. In the ‘60s, the Salafism and Qutbism replaced the
reformist and traditionalist current. The first has dominated the Twentieth Century,
refused the Turath3 and called for a return to the Quran and the Sunnah. On the contrary,
1 Since 1923 the country’s political life witnessed liberal pluralism, but the British intervention in the affairs of the country and the spread of corruption led to unstable conditions that reached its apex in 1952, when the Revolution of July 23rd, 1952, led by General Mohammed Naguib and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser started. Egypt declared the Republic, on June 18th, 1953. Cfr. http://www.mfa.gov.eg/English/InsideEgypt/History/Pages/default.aspx. 2 The Qutbism inspired Sunni Islamic extremist groups, including al-Qaeda and Hamas, creature of the Brotherhood. 3 The Turath is a textual series of the Arabic and Islamic tradition. Cfr. http://daralturath.co.za/Site/.
April 2015
33 The Legacy of Arab Springs
the second school was based on the Turath and promoted the concept of the balanced
identity theory, according to which each person belonged to different areas, from the
school of Law and Theology to the order, the birthplace, the job and so on. Overall,
the backbone of the Muslim Brotherhood was made up of members of the professional
middle class. Gradually businessmen accessed to the party and farmers and workers as
well. A pluralist group which pursued different socio-economic interests. It was a dual
role played by the organization. The Brotherhood worked actively as a party and as a
social movement. It was active in many fields of Egyptian society and this duality
nourished an inherent contradiction. On the one hand, the political understanding with
the opposition threatened the existence of the group. On the other hand, the
maintenance of social activities required the approval of the opposition. An
incompatibility of tasks that caused tensions, especially in the late 1980, when the
movement decided to participate in parliamentary election, but the group remained
cohesive.
The Brotherhood had a pyramidal hierarchy – a centralization of decision-making
and decentralized implementation inside the various operative circles – which allowed
it to alleviate the threats of the government and Islam was the totalizing system. The
Brothers accepted democracy, political pluralism and granted support to resistance
movements, struggling foreign occupation. All public and shared values, that permitted
Brothers to succeed in carving out a role in the society. A position strengthened after
the end of social-nationalism of the President Nasser. On 15 May 1971, during the
Revolution of the Readjustment4, the new President Sadat authorized the release of
some of the members of the Brotherhood, in prison since 1965. Islam was the political
identity of the government. Sharia is one of the sources of the Law. The Movement
warmly embraced the official openings of the President, but it was the foreign policy
to weigh on the “ Believer President”5. In 1979, the peace treaty between Israel and
Egypt was interpreted as a deviation from Islam, an unacceptable aberration for the
most extremist currents. In fact, in 1981, members of a new fundamentalist force killed
Sadat. As an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was founded al-Jihad faction that
operated in secrecy and did not renounce the armed struggle. Since 1981, the President
Hosni Mubarak has tightened or loosened the grip on the MB, on the basis of the
political needs. Attempts to contain the Muslim Brotherhood have been vain. At the
collapse of the regime, the Brotherhood was the main opposition force and the best
political organized group.
4 An economic reform and structural adjustment program inaugurated in Egypt. 5 Calling himself the Believer President, Sadat introduced sharia law in the constitution, lifted restrictions on Muslim fundamentalist organizations, and permitted the proliferation of the mosques, which escaped the state supervision and control.
April 2015
34 The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, schools of Islamic fundamentalism
The fall of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring
In January 2011, a non-religious youth movement protest against the regime of
Mubarak overwhelmed Egypt. It was the wind that blew from the Arab Spring of
Tunisia. The marches forced Mubarak to step down, paving the way for the rise of the
Muslim Brotherhood policy. The adhesion of the Brothers to the demonstrations has
given impetus to the revolution, increasing the level of social expectations and causing
the crash of the Mubarak regime.
The group founded the Justice and Liberty Party and the elections got more than a
third of the votes. The electoral machine of Brotherhood took nearly 6 million votes
in the first round and more than 13 in the second to the candidate President, Mohamed
Morsi. In June 2012, Morsi was the first elected President of the Egyptian History.
Finally reached power, the Brotherhood has paid the inexperience of government; the
Brothers were not able to govern. It appeared the inability to meet social requirements,
slogans of the Arab Spring. The Muslim Brotherhood had built its reputation on
providing social services, from the delivery of health care to the construction of
mosques, educational institutions and charitable organizations, which have earned
votes distributing human needs among the lower classes. Social actions, called
humanitarian jihad, had made MB the winning party. Also Morsi has shown little
April 2015
35 The Legacy of Arab Springs
inclination to lead the government, poor ability to push for democratic reforms of the
state apparatus, inherited from Mubarak. Egyptians did not know they would be come
back to Tahrir Square to call for the resignation of the first elected President, reluctant
to the democratic process.
The fall of President Morsi is the political failure of the Muslim Brotherhood. The
institutions needed of a political leadership that guided the transition of the country
towards change. The Muslim Brotherhood has not been able to offer alternatives. The
group has forgotten its origins. A movement started against the British occupation of
Egypt, which now has taken the opposite direction: the consolidation of power to
accelerate the process of Islamic transition. The Islamic State as solution that would
have to solve the economic, political and social problem of Egypt. Moreover, the
mistake of the Muslim Brotherhood was to underestimate the strength of the people,
who had given them power, failing to interpret their wills, allowing the military
apparatus to become the great actor of the Egyptian political life once again.
The Salafism
It is the fourth school of thought of the Muslim Brotherhood. The term Salafi
comes from Salafiyyun, which means ancestors, the first three generations of Muslims,
considered the most believers. The priority is the application of Sharia and the
transformation of Egypt into an Islamic State. Until the fall of President Mubarak, the
Salafis did not participate in the political life in Egypt, they condemned democracy and
election, considering them misconceptions. Unlike Egypt, there are not many sources
that prove the existence of Salafism in Tunisia. It seems to be an exported product, but
that has taken root in the social fabric enough to become fundamental part. The Arab
Spring has raised again the distinction between Scientific Salafism, philosophical,
academic, acting within the political system, and the Salafism Jihadism, violent, direct to
impose the Islamic State. In both versions, the Tunisian Salafism is opposed to the
Ennahdha Party, inspired in moderate Islam, which accepts democratic government.
In 1986, militants emerged from the movement and flowed into the Tunisian
Islamic Front (TIF). The group dismembered because of harsh political repression.
Many of those who had acceded to the Front occupied the prisons or were marginalized
by society and the others fled and developed a deep Salafi net abroad. It has been a
contamination of experiences that have trained young Tunisians, who have had a
confrontation with the Salafis escaped to fight the Jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and
Chechnya, in order to crystallize the Salafi presence in Tunisia and struggle the regime
of President Ben Ali. In 2006, Lassaad Sessi found the jihadist group Jund Asad ibn al-
Furat, predecessor of the Salafist current that operates within the Ansar Ash-Sharia
April 2015
36 The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, schools of Islamic fundamentalism
Party, created after the revolution. Thus, the link between religious radicalism and
Jihadism has formed the Tunisian Salafism. Among the distortions about Salafism,
emerges the fusion of the Salafism with the Wahhabism6. The connection to
Wahhabism, with its direct association to the national interests of the Saudi Arabia, is
the accusation of the rivals, especially where the growing Salafi minority could be a
threat. As matter of the fact, even if they are religious scholars, their recent authority
comes from their political positions. Firstly, they are lined up against Bashar al-Assad
in Syria. Moreover, they are fighting in Libyan crisis and they are supervising Iran,
Shiite, in Yemen civil war to try to have much more influence in the Arab Sunni, such
as in Sudan, in Egypt and Lebanon.
The rise of the Salafist phenomenon
After the fall of the Ben Ali regime, the elections of the Constituent Assembly have
seen the triumph of the Ennahdha, Tunisian experiment of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Since the 1980, this Party has been the main form of opposition to power. Despite his
leader, Mohamed Ghannouchi, rejected violence and declared his faith in a pluralistic
democratic system, the party had been frequently subject to coercion, before President
Habib Bourguiba and then Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. At the first elections in the history
of Tunisia Ennahdha won the 40% of the seats and a wide representation in
Constituent Assembly, which would have had the assignment to choose the interim
government and write a new Constitution. One of the most important events in the
post-Arab Spring have been the release of political prisoners. Thus, the release of
Salafis, the return of the jihadist exiles and the new recruits are all aspects that favour
the political rise of Salafism. An unexpected political phenomenon which becomes an
important player on the political scene in Tunisia. In 2011, Abu ‘Ayyad al-Tunisi7
founded the group Ansar Ash-Sharia, a Salafi-jihadist movement. The goal of the Party
was the creation of the Islamic state and the application of Islamic Law in all the range
of life. The group rejected democracy, a principle absolutely unrelated to Islam. It was
characterized by social assistance, the distribution of basic needs destined to the
poorest families in the country. As the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, so Ansar al-
Sharia in Tunisia aimed to fill the social gaps, created by the new political system, and
lead the country towards the straight path of Islam. There are other Salafist movements,
although not openly jihadist. Even if it is hardly possible now to identify the Scientific
or Jihadist current, because they use a dual and parallel mode of action. The groups
operate in Tunisia and promote actions in the rest of the Muslim world. In March 2012,
6 Wahhabism has been Saudi Arabia's dominant faith. It is an austere form of Islam founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab that insists on a literal interpretation of the Quran. 7 Abu 'Ayyad al-Tunisi had fought in Afghanistan during the battle of Tora Bora and was arrested in 2003 in Turkey, then he had been extradited to Tunisia charges of international terrorism.
April 2015
37 The Legacy of Arab Springs
the national authorities legalized the first
official Salafist party in Tunisia, Jabhat al-
Islah or Reform Tunisian Islamic Front (the
symbol in the picture). Reformism and
democratic participation in the elections
of 2013 placed the Front inside the
scientific school; foundation is both the
State and the Islamic Sharia. During his
tenure, Ennahdha Party has worked to
promote the politics integration of Salafis, because cooptation could be an electoral
benefit, paying attention to not be so close to Salafist positions and risk to lose the
consensus of the Left, the moderate and non-Islamic voters. The murders of the main
representatives of the National Democratic Union Party, Chokri Belaid and Mohamed
Brahmi, have revealed a deep social malaise, incited by the violence of the Salafists and
jihadists. The Left has accused these groups of belonging to the moderate Islamic party
in office, Ennahdha, which has denied any connection with or to control Salafi. The
increase of Salafi violence has alarmed the country. The protests against the
government lead President Ali Larayedh to resign. In that vacuum of power, violence
was out of control. Thus, even in the case of Tunisia, the Islamic party fails. Ennahdha,
guilty of indulgence towards the jihadi-Salafi movement has not been able to lead the
country towards the economic and social improvement, it was not able to pick up the
legacy of the Jasmine Revolution and Salafists have become more pronounced.
Conclusions
After decades of regime, the political Islam, which had managed to win over the
reins of power in some Muslim countries, has become a victim of the constitutional
process, initiated by itself. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Ennhada Party,
in a condition of ambiguity with Salafi-Jihadism, have failed their government
experience. The main schools of Islamic fundamentalism have disregarded the
expectations of the their people, whose consensus had rewarded them after the riots
of 2011, losing the spirit of the Arab Spring. In Tunisia, the secular middle class town,
heir of a political history marked by westernization wanted by President Bourguiba,
forced Ennhadha to retreat. Although it can be said that Tunisia is the only State that
has passed the movements of the Arab Spring, two factors cannot be excluded. Firstly,
the attack of the Bardo Museum has still exposed the country to the violence of the
Salafists and jihadists, who could operate in synergy with the militia of ISIS in Libya,
considering the deep Salafi net extended to Syria. The second element reinforces the
suspicion that Salafism, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood, is following its upward flight.
April 2015
38 The Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism, schools of Islamic fundamentalism
High number of Tunisian fighters have gone to Iraq and Syria. There is no doubt that
the rise of Salafism poses serious challenges for the democratic transition in Tunisia.
Worse fate was reserved for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The Islamic movement
was banned from power and from public life, was declared a terrorist group and a death
sentence weighs on the head of its leader, the Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie8.
However, it seems that the hegemonic ambitions of some Arab countries are playing
on the Muslim Brotherhood’s destiny. In Yemen, Egyptian Brotherhood’s position is
in line with Yemen’s Brotherhood, which rejects the Houthis and their ally Saleh. This
is the same position of Saudi Arabia. As matter of the fact, the Saudi kingdom has three
regional priorities: Iran, the Islamic State and Yemen. Ryadh needs Brotherhood’s
support to solve all of these problems. Thus, the Saudi Arabia could back pro-
Brotherhood groups to counter the rise of the Houthis, supported by Iran, such as
against ISIS in Libya, in Iraq or with the Free Syrian Army against al-Assad’s regime. It
could be a new chance for Muslim Brotherhood to come up from this actual condition
of weakness.
8 Egyptian court has confirmed the death sentence given to Mohamed Badie, leader of the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and 13 other members of the group for “inciting chaos and violence” in a process for organizing riots in 2013. Cfr. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/egypt-confirms-death-sentence-brotherhood-leaders-150411125719555.html.
April 2015
39 The Legacy of Arab Springs
The role of civil society: what animated them; what animate them now,
and how they perceive the change.
By Beatrice Casella
The Arab Spring still lives inside all the civil societies who have fought firmly to defend their rights.
It can be connoted like an immense and resilient revolution that shook the Arab world. It has altered
the geopolitical balances and has changed the social and economic assets of the Arab civilizations. This
strong rebellion occurred mainly in four countries of North Africa stressing the common reason for
which the civil societies protested: the freedom.
The Arab Springs include several protests that hit the Arab world, particularly North
Africa, in 2010. They occurred against a number of reasons like corruption, lack of
freedoms, and violation of human rights. Growth of food prices and malnutrition are
other crucial reasons that caused the strong discontent of civil societies.
In fact, the last conditions affected large sections of the population almost leading
to a crisis comparable to the one during the global food crisis (2007-2008)1.
Growth of food prices and hunger are considered some of the main reasons which
caused a strong discontent among civil societies.
The principle subjects of these acts were the Arab civil societies who began to show
signs of dissatisfaction towards the existing regimes. In particular, the first strong signs
of rebellion put in practice by the
civil society, began in Tunisia
during the month of December.
It happened when a street
vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set
himself on fire to protest against
the policy that led to his goods
being taken into custody.
1 Abdolreza Abbassian, chief economist at the FAO.
April 2015
40 The role of civil society: what animated them; what animate them now, and how they perceive the change.
Bouazizi was a Tunisian activist who became a symbol not only for popular
uprisings that shook the Republic of Tunisia from 2010 to 2011, but also for all the
resentment of disenchantment, pain and misery of civil society against the authoritarian
regimes of the Arab states.
In addition to Tunisia, the other countries most affected by the bloody riots were
Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Analyzing their political leaders, we realize that all had, at that
time, a dictatorship that did not guarantee a fair social and economic development of
their civilizations.
Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali was the second president of the Republic of Tunisia
from 7 November 1987 to 14 January 2011. He was the successor of Habib Bourguiba,
which has carried on his inclination toward dictatorship. In fact, if on one hand the
World Economic Forum recognized the merit of having given to the country a high
economic competitiveness, on the other hand many non-governmental organizations
and media have regularly criticized his political corruption, violation of human rights
and attacks on press freedom.
Muhammad Hosni Sayyid Mubarak Ibrāhīm, (also known as Hosni Mubarak),
was the fourth Egyptian President from 14 October 1981 to 11 February 2011. He had
a brilliant military career which he applied at the political level to give severe and
April 2015
41 The Legacy of Arab Springs
oppressive orders to the Egyptian society. Mubarak limited the freedom of the press
and was strongly accused by the organization Transparency International (TI) due to
the fact that Egypt became one of the most corrupt countries in the world. In fact,
according to the index of political corruption, the Arab Republic of Egypt is in the 70th
place out of 159 nations.
Muammar Gaddafi was, for many years, the highest authority of Libya holding
the position of Guide and Commander of the Revolution of the Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1969-2011), Prime Minister (1970-1972), and President of the
African Union (2009 -2010). Gaddafi was harshly criticized for having established a
bloody dictatorship. Currently, however, there are many different opinions about the
real positivity of his death which occurred on October 20, 2011. Gaddafi appeared to
be a kind of glue between all Libyan tribes.
Bassar Hafiz al-Asad is the Syrian President since July 2000. After several
attempts to better govern a complicated country like Syria from a geographical, social
and economic point of view, he failed because he was not able to not include the Syrian
Arab Republic in the black list of the US "rogue states”2. In doing so, the President
destroyed the fragile equilibriums already created by the Arab Springs. The events
began in Syria on March 15, 2011 with the first public demonstrations; riots which
eventually turned into a real civil war in 2012.
These denote to be four strong regimes that affected the welfare system creating
strong unrest and internal imbalances. They formed a vicious cycle of repression and
discontent without an end.
Therefore, the deterioration of the socio-economic status, along with a regression
on the political front, have helped to exacerbate the frustration and resentment among
the population, giving rise to a large popular mobilization of spontaneous character3.
As of 29 December 2010, the riots are still ongoing. Tunisia undertook to guarantee
the freedom of the press without convincing its own citizens already tired. So, the
demonstrations continued.
On the eve of the Arab Springs, the four countries, although with different intensity
and manner, were crossed by a widespread protest movement, especially for social
motives.
2 G. Mazzocco (2013), Chi è Bashar al-Assad, l’oftalmologo diventato dittatore, September 2nd. Cfr. http://www.polisblog.it/post/148811/chi-e-bashar-al-assad-loftalmologo-diventato-dittatore. 3 Paciello M. C. (2011), La primavera araba: sfide e opportunità economiche e sociali, IAI- Istituto Affari Internazionali, December. Cfr. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1115.pdf.
April 2015
42 The role of civil society: what animated them; what animate them now, and how they perceive the change.
The authoritarian contexts have influenced significantly the dynamics and mode of
action of civil societies. Since the mid-eighties, the regimes have preferred to keep them
under control through a variety of repressive strategies. All these factors generated
highly fragmented civil societies unable to form a common front against the regimes in
office.
Hence, in the last twenty years, a complex system of restrictions and coercion has
accompanied the evolution of civil societies in the Middle East. This has surely created
weakness at the social and economic levels by limiting the ability of civil society to
promote a real and profound change for themselves. Despite all the difficulties, the
civil societies did not remain inert.
In the last decade, forms of political and social protests multiplied. There was also
the participation of women and young people; new forms of youth activism took part
out of college campuses. These are currently the most effective. Unlike in the past,
however, they use extensively the new technologies, such as Facebook, websites and
blogs. Thus, they can better
organize protests, share opinions,
and circulate materials on the
various violations and
oppressions implemented cruelly
by the states.
Civil societies challenge the
reform of political systems,
competitive and transparent
elections, and the removal of all
restrictions imposed on freedoms of associations and press. Consequently, the wave
of protests that have taken place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, did not emerge
from nowhere, but were deeply rooted in socio-economic and political imbalances.
The problem is the creation of a vicious circle: a sharp deterioration of the socio-
economic situation has been accompanied by a hardening of repression and
authoritarianism. The result is a feeling of frustration and exasperation that spread
progressively, expressing itself in many clashes.
Moreover, there is another problem which is unclear, but remains at the base: at the
outbreak of the protests, the Arab populations were already at the limit of strength for
the reality in which they were living. A durable malaise remained closed for too long,
for too many years. Like all the great disasters and major political and social problems,
nothing has been said and prevented. If National Institutions and NGO which
operating in those countries were able to understand the tricky socio-political dynamics,
April 2015
43 The Legacy of Arab Springs
maybe nothing would happened. For instance, probably the number of deaths in Syria
would not be so high4.
At the same time, it is right to recognize the great man's limits, especially in countries
with a particular political-institutional asset like Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya.
Moreover, it is essential to underline the persistence of the dictatorial governments to
give and ensure initially an apparent positive image of the context.
It is difficult to find a conclusion for this complicated context. It is sure that the
Arab Springs caused a deep crisis of the welfare system but, at basis of the problem,
the policies of the countries were unsuccessful and ineffective.
In addition, the civil societies are still suffering from numerous internal weaknesses
such as the inability to mobilize a broad consensus among the population and the lack
of internal democracy5.
Henceforward, a tangible political change is an indispensable condition to demolish
imbalances and find a new development strategy that guarantees not only the
improvement of welfare, but also the creation of a shared and transparent process
capable of involving both the political and social forces.
4 UN News Center (2013), Data suggests Syria death toll could be more than 60,000, says UN human rights office, January 2nd, Cfr. http://www.unric.org/it/attualita/28651-siria-piu-di-60000-morti-secondo-il-bilancio-dellalto-commissariato-dellonu-per-i-diritti-umani-i. Now the number of causalities of Syrian Civil War is about 200.000 but we don’t know the exact amount of death toll in Syria. A. Taylor (2014), 200,000 dead? Why Syria’s rising death toll is so divisive, The Washington Post, December 3rd. Cfr. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/03/200000-dead-why-syrias-rising-death-toll-is-so-divisive/. 5 Istituto Affari Internazionali, La primavera araba: sfide e opportunità economiche e sociali, op. cit.
April 2015
44 Conclusions
Conclusions
According to the previous chapters of this dossier, the dynamics within the Arab
world changed rapidly starting from 2010. The MENA region experienced a period of
unexpected political upheaval, social unrest and demonstrations that rapidly brought
to change the whole balance of power with repercussions at the regional and global
level. This willing of political change, simplistically defined Arab Spring, spread across
Middle East and North Africa. It has been initially considered a positive change towards
democracy and many scholars compared this process to the fall of the communist
regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, when in a short period of time many different states
geographically concentrated in Eastern Europe faced revolutionary developments.
The uprisings were determined by many different factors, including the discontent
over low living standards, unemployment, increase in youth population without
concrete working possibilities, and the crisis of ideological values related to the
dictatorships. In 2011/2012 the authoritarian regimes that exacerbated social inequality
and hampered the economic growth in North Africa and Middle East were overthrown
by the rise of protests that were mainly spontaneous and not linked to a particular
ideological or political current spread across the region.
Despite the initial purpose of the uprisings, initially caused by t Tunisia is the only
State in the Region that carried out a successful process of democratic transition with
the adoption of a new constitution as well as free and fair parliamentary and presidential
elections in 2014. In Egypt the Islamist Mohammed Morsi elected in 2012 was ousted
by the military forces leaded by the new president Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, while Libya and
Syria are experiencing a period of vulnerability and civil wars. In addiction, Algeria
presents a very complex situation whose outcome could destabilize the whole region.
The National Liberation Front (NLF), is living a strong internal crisis. The subtle
manner wherein it had usually appealed to negotiation and compromises in the past let
to stabilize the relationship between different internal currents, however it is possible
to envisage the probable shift of the political landscape once the political elite will have
to decide over the succession of Bouteflika. The party could not survive and a future
division is possible, therefore the West has to consider these particular dynamics due
to Algeria’s principal role in counter-terrorism and security within the region.
Indeed, the security vacuum is one of the most urgent aspects to face. One of the
Arab Springs’ outcomes has been the rise of a vibrant Salafi movement in the Region.
It cannot be considered a united and identified group, as it differs in terms of identity,
April 2015
45 The Legacy of Arab Springs
origin and objectives, with moderate groups being involved in formal politics and
radical group spreading terror and instability through violent attacks, not least the attack
of the Bardo Museum. Economic fragility, regional disparities and unemployment are
important factors that lead thousands of young people to join the extremist side
becoming foreign fighters. In addiction, whether before the Arab Spring, criminal
networks found compromises with authoritarian regimes that tolerated or sometimes
exploited their activities, after the territorial collapse experienced by many North
African States it has become possible for these networks to collaborate with extremist
groups in order to secure their control over strategic areas and pursue their illicit
objectives, determining an increase in illegal trade and human trafficking.
Undoubtedly, the extreme political volatility in the MENA region determined
important changes in the international scenario. The Western understanding of the
MENA region prior to 2010 was focused on supporting authoritarian regimes in order
to maintain security and stability across the Mediterranean. The Arab uprisings forced
the international community to questioning both the previous support for authoritarian
regimes and the measures adopted during the uprisings across the region, whose
inefficiency further weakened the credibility of Western powers as democracy
promoters. In particular, the EU’s response brought to light, once again, significant
intra-EU divisions in terms of foreign policies and the lack of unity among the
European governments, while the US pursued a very inconsistent and incoherent
foreign policy, failing to formulate effective strategies to address the regional
challenges. Western actors must rethink their action across the area, in order to
implement more efficient strategies to support human rights and democratization
policies. The Arab uprisings demonstrated the inutility of attempts aiming at
influencing the transitional process from the outside: to effectively influence the
transition is necessary to adopt ad hoc policies on the basis of national dynamics and
needs. In particular, the elaboration of a strategy to face the terrorist menace and the
wave of instability caused by criminal networks and organizations is a determinant
aspect to ensure stabilization. ISIS represents an immediate and significant threat not
only to the surrounding region, but also to the United States, Europe, and global
security with its thousands of foreign fighters and its abundance of economic and
military resources.
In a globalized world, such menace can only be addressed through international
cooperation and national action: it is important not to consider only the military side
of the strategy, but focusing also on strengthening ties with key countries in the region,
enforcing political dialogues aimed at developing shared plans to ensure the stability in
the whole region. Fighting against radicalization requires a process of law enforcement,
rule of law, criminal justice, security sector reform, as well as border control and all
April 2015
46 Conclusions
these elements can be obtained only through the establishment of transnational support
for those countries whose population in 2010 decided to react in order to change the
economic and political situation in Middle East and North Africa. Without the
participation of national authorities and citizens and their enforcement in terms of
economic growth and political stability it will be impossible for the international
community to face the extremist threat and concretely contribute to the stabilization
of the MENA region, with terrible consequences at the global level.
Althea Cenciarelli
Vice-CEO and Co-Founder of Mediterranean Affairs
April 2015
47 The Legacy of Arab Springs
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April 2015
49 The Legacy of Arab Springs
Authors
Casella Beatrice. Bachelor’s Degree in Economics of International Cooperation
and Development with a thesis about the Infant Mortality Rate in Tanzania. Currently,
she is working for an international company that deals with social finance, social
innovation and third sector. She is finishing the Master’s Degree in International
Relations at Luiss Guido Carli and her final topic will regard the diplomacy of global
health with a case study of AIDS in Kenya. She worked for a research concerning the
unaccompanied minors. Her area of focus are global health, childhood, and
immigration.
De Bonis Antonio. Master’s degree in
Intelligence, security and crisis areas, Master’s
degree in Criminology. CEO of
www.geocrime.org. In service in the Carabinieri since 1981, He holds the role of
Intelligence Analyst dealing with endogenous and exogenous organized crime with
transnational interests. External expert consultant for Europol the European Police
Office. Professor of the “Geopolitical effects of crime” module of the Master’s course
in Geopolitics “Chaos & Powers” organized by the Italian Geopolitics journal Limes
and by the SIOI (Italian society for International Organization).
Fanuli Federica. Master’s Degree in Political Science, European Studies and
International Relations at University of Salento. Contributor Editor of “Rassegna
Stampa Militare”. Contributor of “The Sunday Sentinel”. Contributor Editor of Ce.S.I.
(Italian Centre for International Studies). Editorial Board Member of “Taranto in
Diretta”. Editorial Board Member of Mediterranean Affairs.
Pilar Buzzetti. MA in International Relations at the Luiss Guido Carli University
of Rome; she is currently attending a Master Course in Diplomatic Studies at the SIOI
Institute of Rome. During her studies, she started her research work for Eurasia,
focusing on Defense and Security issues. She works as a Junior Analyst for ASRIE
Association focusing on the MENA Region.
Quattrocchi Gabriele. M.A. student at the University of Catania where he is
currently attending a Master’s degree program in Global Politics and Euro-
Mediterranean Relations. During his Master's studies, he is collaborating with journals
and newspapers. He obtained a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations and
Political Sciences at the University of Messina. His areas of focus are European politics,
EU foreign policy, Euro-Mediterranean relations and international relations. Co-
Founder of Mediterranean Affairs.
April 2015
50 Authors
Ed. Mediterranean Affairs®.
www.mediterraneanaffairs.com
info. admin@mediterraneanaffairs.com