Post on 19-May-2015
Concepts and the Varieties of Content
Angela Mendelovici
PhilSoc, RSSS ANU, August 12, 2008
John is a modal realist.
John is a modal realist.
believes that possible worlds exist in the same
way that the actual world exists.
Q: Does MODAL REALIST represent all that all along?
A: Yes and no
1. A theory of concepts that can account for such phenomena
2. Making sense of other notions of content in light of this theory of concepts
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
4Preliminaries
Plan
Mental representation is a phenomenon to be explained.
5
What is mental representation?
Preliminaries
Content:
What a state “says”
Vehicle:
The state itself that does the representing (brain state, functional state, symbol in LOT, etc.)
Concept:
The vehicles of representation often used in thought (e.g. CAT, CUP,PHILSOC), perhaps also used in perception or imagination
6
Content versus vehicle (Dretske)
Preliminaries
cat
The content we intuitively take a representation to have
May be informed by
Introspection
A folk theory of mind
Something else
Some combination of the above
7
Intuitive content
Preliminaries
General idea: Some types of representation represent only in virtue of their relations to other types of representation (e.g. linguistic representation in terms of mental representation)
Original representations: The primary bearers of representational properties
Derived representations: Representations that derive their representational properties from
their relations to originally representational representations
E.g. “cat”
Grice, Searle
8
Original vs. derived representation
Preliminaries
1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking
b. The need for unpacking
2. Varieties of contenta. Total content
b. Intuitive content
c. Other types of content
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
9Intuitive content is partly derived content
Outline
1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking
b. The need for unpacking
2. Varieties of contenta. Total content
b. Intuitive content
c. Other types of content
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
10The Efficient Concept view
Outline
Two claims:
[Distinct Representations (DR)] (Many) concepts are distinct
representations from representations of their intuitive contents.
[Distinct Original Contents (DOC)] (Many) concepts do not (originally)
represent their intuitive contents.
In particular, (many) concepts (originally) represent less and involve fewer or smaller vehicles of representation than their intuitive contents.
11
The Efficient Concept view
The Efficient Concept view
bachelor
unmarried man
The Efficient Concept View
unpacking
12The Efficient Concept view
Three models of concepts
unmarried man
MolecularismRejects (DR) and (DOC)
unmarried man
unmarried man
The Complex Content ViewAccepts (DR) and rejects (DOC)
bachelor
unmarried man
The Efficient Concept ViewAccepts (DR) and (DOC)
unpacking
1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking
b. The need for unpacking
2. Varieties of contenta. Total content
b. Intuitive content
c. Other types of content
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
13The Efficient Concept view
Outline
14The Efficient Concept view
Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking
unmarried man
unmarried man
unmarried man
The Complex Content ViewAccepts (DR) and rejects (DOC)
bachelor
unmarried man
The Efficient Concept ViewAccepts (DR) and (DOC)
unpacking
MolecularismRejects (DR) and (DOC)
[PhilosophersHARD]
The first philosopher believes that possible worlds
exist in the same way that the actual world exists, the
second philosopher believes that the right act is the
one that maximizes utility, and the third philosopher
believes that the content of a mental state is at least
partly determined by facts about the subject’s
environment.
[PhilosophersEASY]
The first philosopher is a modal realist, the second
philosopher is an act utilitarian, and the third
philosopher is an externalist about mental content.
Same intuitive content
But (PhilosophersHARD) was more difficult to entertain than (PhilosophersEASY).
Difficulty:
An intuitive notion
I expect you can find experimental measures
17
Hard versus easy thoughts
The Efficient Concept view
Ways of getting at the difference in difficulty:
(A) Compare difficulty of entertaining both thoughts for you now
(B) Compare your case to that of an undergraduate freshman
• It is easier for you to entertain a thought with the intuitive content of (PhilosophersHARD)/(PhilosophersEASY) than for the undergrad to do the same thing.
(C) Compare yourself now with a past time-slice of yourself
18
Hard versus easy thoughts
The Efficient Concept view
There’s converging evidence for this sort of distinction from memory research on chunking.
19The Efficient Concept view
Converging evidence
7 9 3 5 6 2 3 4 8 2
79 35 62 34 82
The recoding of a larger number of items (chunk targets) into a smaller number of items (chunks)
Short-term memory (STM) is limited by the number of chunks stored.
Chunks: 79 35 62 34 82
Chunk targets: 7 9 3 5 6 2 3 4 8 2
22
Chunking (Miller 1956)
The Efficient Concept view
Chunk concepts are concepts representing chunks.
Chunks are contents.
Chunks unpack into their targets.
23
Chunking (Miller 1956)
The Efficient Concept view
Chunking can be hierarchical.
A chunk concept might have targets that are themselves chunks.
24
Chunking (Miller 1956)
The Efficient Concept view
25
Evidence for chunking (De Groot 1966, Chase and Simon 1973)
The Efficient Concept view
26
Evidence for chunking (De Groot 1966, Chase and Simon 1973)
The Efficient Concept view
27
Evidence for chunking (De Groot 1966, Chase and Simon 1973)
The Efficient Concept view
28
Evidence for chunking (De Groot 1966, Chase and Simon 1973)
The Efficient Concept view
Best explained by chunking
Experts have chunk concepts in long-term memory corresponding to multiple-piece configurations.
Chess masters have about 50,000 chunks (Simon and Gilmartin1973).
A lot of our concepts bear the hallmark of chunking: they help us overcome short-term memory limitations.
You can remember more of the footy game if you have lots of footy concepts.
29
Chunking and concepts
The Efficient Concept view
Chunk concepts are used in both thought and STM.
Chunking allows you to entertain easier thoughts.
Two effects of concept acquisition:
The ability to entertain easier thoughts
STM benefits
30The Efficient Concept view
Chunking and hard/easy thoughts
Why is it easier to entertain thoughts involving chunk concepts than thoughts involving their target concepts?
31The Efficient Concept view
Question
32
The Efficient Concept view explains this
The Efficient Concept view
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
In entertaining the easy (chunked) thought, you’re thinking less
Less content, fewer representational vehicles
Thinking less is easier than thinking more
33
The Efficient Concept view explains this
The Efficient Concept view
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
In entertaining the easy (chunked) thought, you’re thinking less
Less content, fewer representational vehicles
Thinking less is easier than thinking more
34
The Efficient Concept view explains this
The Efficient Concept view
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
In entertaining the easy (chunked) thought, you’re thinking less
Less content, fewer representational vehicles
Thinking less is easier than thinking more
In entertaining the easy (chunked) thought, you’re involving fewer representations
35
The Complex Content view can say something similar
The Efficient Concept view
possible worlds exist in the same way that
the actual world exists
possible worlds
existence actuality …
In entertaining the easy (chunked) thought, you’re involving fewer representations
36
The Complex Content view can say something similar
The Efficient Concept view
possible worlds exist in the same way that
the actual world exists
possible worlds
existence actuality …
In entertaining the easy (chunked) thought, you’re involving fewer representations
37
The Complex Content view can say something similar
The Efficient Concept view
possible worlds exist in the same way that
the actual world exists
possible worlds
existence actuality …
Easy thoughts and hard thoughts involve the samerepresentational vehicles and the same original contents
38
Trouble for Molecularism
The Efficient Concept view
possible worlds
existence actuality …
Easy thoughts and hard thoughts involve the samerepresentational vehicles and the same original contents
39
Trouble for Molecularism
The Efficient Concept view
possible worlds
existence actuality …
Deny that (PhilosophersHARD) and (PhilosophersEASY) induce thoughts in us that differ in difficulty.
Instead, the perceived difference in difficulty has something to do with the more or less complex linguistic processing required to get from the sentence to the thought.
What about spontaneously generated thoughts?
40The Efficient Concept view
Possible alternative explanation of phenomena for the Molecularist
What about the undergrad/previous self cases?
Concept acquisition involves a reorganization of constituent concepts such that they token more easily together.
41
Possible alternative explanation of phenomena for the Molecularist
The Efficient Concept view
possible worlds
existence actuality …
What about the undergrad/previous self cases?
Concept acquisition involves a reorganization of constituent concepts such that they token more easily together.
42
Possible alternative explanation of phenomena for the Molecularist
The Efficient Concept view
possible worlds
existence actuality …
Tokening representations involves activating neurons.
There are metabolic constraints on how many neurons can be active at a given time (Lennie 2003).
Setting aside absolute constraints, activating neurons is costly.
So we should expect brain to strive towards minimization of activation, where possible.
Tokening fewer concepts is one way to do this.
Molecularist’s explanation does not have this virtue.
43
Some indirect support for preferred explanation
The Efficient Concept view
But there’s more…
44The Efficient Concept view
[Modal Realist]
John is a modal realist.
[Vegetarian]
John is a vegetarian.
The thought invoked by (Modal Realist) has more intuitive content than the thought invoked by (Vegetarian).
But they’re roughly equally easy to entertain (for us).
45
A related phenomenon
The Efficient Concept view
[Modal Realist]
John is a modal realist.
[Vegetarian]
John is a vegetarian.
Explanation: The thoughts induced by (Modal Realist) and (Vegetarian) involve roughly the same number and/or size of representational vehicles (and perhaps have roughly the same amount of original content).
46
A related phenomenon
The Efficient Concept view
47
John vegetarian
eat meat
The Efficient Concept View:
Johnmodal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
Johndoesn’t
eat meat
eat meat
The Complex Content View:
Johnpossible worlds exist
in the same way actual world exists
possible worlds
existence actuality …
48
John vegetarian
eat meat
The Efficient Concept View:
Johnmodal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
Johndoesn’t
eat meat
eat meat
The Complex Content View:
Johnpossible worlds exist
in the same way actual world exists
possible worlds
existence actuality …
According to Molecularism, the thought induced by (Modal Realist) contains more representational vehicles than the one induced by (Vegetarian).
Whatever else we say about what determines difficulty, it’s very plausible that how much is represented (i.e. how many representations and/or original contents are involved) plays a significant role in determining difficulty.
So then the thought induced by (Modal Realist) should be harder to entertain than that induced by (Vegetarian).
But it’s not.
49
Pressure on Molecularism
The Efficient Concept view
possible worlds
existence actuality …JohnJohn eat meat
50
John vegetarian
eat meat
The Efficient Concept View:
Johnmodal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
Molecularism:
John eat meatpossible worlds
existence actuality …John
51
John vegetarian
eat meat
The Efficient Concept View:
Johnmodal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
Molecularism:
John eat meat
…
existence actuality …John
… …
…
……
… …
Chunk concepts are used in thought and in memory.
So we might want to offer a explanation of the STM benefits of chunking that’s continuous with the explanation of the harder/easier thought distinction.
The Efficient Concept view and the Complex Content view can do this: In remembering chunked thoughts, you’re remembering less (fewer
representations involved, perhaps fewer original contents).
The Molecularist cannot offer this type of explanation. This casts doubt on whatever explanation he wants to give of the STM benefits of chunking.
52The Efficient Concept view
Explaining the STM benefits of chunking
1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking
b. The need for unpacking
2. Varieties of contenta. Total content
b. Intuitive content
c. Other types of content
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
53Intuitive content is partly derived content
Outline
54The Efficient Concept view
The need for unpacking
unmarried man
unmarried man
unmarried man
bachelor
unmarried man
The Efficient Concept ViewAccepts (DR) and (DOC)
unpacking
The Complex Content ViewAccepts (DR)
Rejects (DOC)
MolecularismRejects (DR) and (DOC)
Accepts (Distinct Representations)
Rejects (Distinct Original Contents)
Concepts are distinct representations from the representations of their intuitive contents, but their content is just their intuitive content.
Fodor holds a version of this view.
55
The Complex Content view
The Efficient Concept view
unmarried man
unmarried man
The facts about tables supervene on the
physical facts.
What’s supervenience?
It takes time and effort to answer.
You’re unpacking.
Unpacking is required for
Retrieval/introspection of intuitive content.
Use of intuitive content for further thought or behavior.
58
The need for unpacking
The Efficient Concept view
Case 1:
You and I are comparing notes on who’s a modal realist.
Case 2:
You and I are arguing about whether or not modal realism is true.
In case 2 but perhaps not in case 1, we have to unpack our concepts of modal realism.
59
Not all uses of chunk concepts require unpacking
The Efficient Concept view
The need for unpacking suggests that the intuitive content of chunk concepts was not available prior to unpacking.
Otherwise, we would expect it to do some of the work for which unpacking is required.
60
This supports (Distinct Original Contents)
The Efficient Concept view
Project: Assign (original) contents to mental representations.
What do we assign to SUPERVENIENCE?
Some considerations:
Introspective availability
Functional/behavioral role
Unpacking is needed for introspection of intuitive content and certain behaviors/inferences.
61
Another way to put the point
The Efficient Concept view
So it’s unnecessary to say that BACHELOR has content unmarried man, since those contents are already had by other concepts (UNMARRIED and MAN).
Need to unpack to use those contents anyways.
Attributing that content to BACHELOR is redundant.
62
Unnecessarily redundant
The Efficient Concept view
unmarried man
unmarried man
The Complex Content View
bachelor
unmarried man
The Efficient Concept View
So it’s unnecessary to say that BACHELOR has content unmarried man, since those contents are already had by other concepts (UNMARRIED and MAN).
Need to unpack to use those contents anyways.
Attributing that content to BACHELOR is redundant.
63
Unnecessarily redundant
The Efficient Concept view
unmarried man
unmarried man
The Complex Content View
bachelor
unmarried man
The Efficient Concept View
There are other ways to assign content:
Based on causal co-variation/nomic dependence
But a causal theory still…
Doesn’t explain the need for unpacking
Attributes isolated contents
Attributes redundant contents
64
Objection
The Efficient Concept view
unmarried man
unmarried man
The Complex Content View
1. Hard versus easy thoughts and the STM benefits of chunking
3. The need for unpacking
65
Two supporting phenomena
The Efficient Concept view
bachelor
unmarried man
The Efficient Concept View
Not everything retrievable through unpacking
Not nothing either
66The Efficient Concept view
What’s the original content?
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
Some options:
A very vague content (e.g. some philosophical view)
Parts of the target content (e.g. some view having to do with possible worlds)
New primitive content (e.g. (primitive) modal realism)
Some combination of the above
67The Efficient Concept view
What’s the original content?
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking
b. The need for unpacking
2. Varieties of contenta. Total content
b. Intuitive content
c. Other types of content
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
68Varieties of content
Outline
Chunk concepts are used instead of their targets for certain purposes.
69Varieties of content
Derived mental representation
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
You use your chunk concept/icon instead of its targets for certain purposes.
For other purposes, you can unpack more information.
But the chunk concept/icon represents the unpackableinformation before you unpack it.
74Varieties of content
Analogy
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
You use your chunk concept/icon instead of its targets for certain purposes.
For other purposes, you can unpack more information.
But the chunk concept/icon represents the unpackableinformation before you unpack it.
75Varieties of content
Analogy
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
You use your chunk concept/icon instead of its targets for certain purposes.
For other purposes, you can unpack more information.
But the chunk concept/icon represents the unpackableinformation before you unpack it.
76Varieties of content
Analogy
modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
You use your chunk concept/icon instead of its targets for certain purposes.
For other purposes, you can unpack more information.
But the chunk concept/icon represents the unpackableinformation before you unpack it.
77Varieties of content
Analogy
We need a way to distinguish more content that is a further cashing out of some other content from more content that’s unrelated to the other content or related in the wrong way.
78Varieties of content
When does more content count as derived content?
Bachelors….
Unmarried!
Kangaroos…
They’re usually under 40…
Certain further thoughts come as or present themselves asfurther cashings out of previous thoughts.
79
The phenomenology of unpacking
Varieties of content
That’s what I was
thinking all along!
Presenting as a further cashing out is a matter of original content.
Why think that?
We can tell whether one content comes as a further cashing out of another.
Original content and phenomenal character are the best candidates for something mental and introspectively accessible.
80
The phenomenology of unpacking
Varieties of content
The content that can potentially come as a further cashing out of the original content
83
Unrestricted total content (first pass)
Varieties of content
Different ways of filling in C will yield different notions of total content.
84
Total content schema 1
Varieties of content
A mental representation with original content X has total content Y (for a subject S)
iff in circumstances C, Y is disposed to present itself as a
cashing out of X (to S).
In sufficiently distant circumstances, lots could come as a further cashing out of some content.
Drugs
More theoretical knowledge
85Varieties of content
Why restrict the appropriate circumstances?
electron
negative charge
fairies
C: Normal circumstances
C: Sufficiently nearby circumstances
C: Circumstances I count as authoritative
Etc…
86
Total content schema 1
Varieties of content
A mental representation with original content X has (partial) total content Y (for a subject S)
iff in circumstances C, Y is disposed to present itself as a
cashing out of X (to S).
Sometimes further thoughts specify what it would take to be a further cashing out of the original content.
87
There’s more
Varieties of content
I don’t know what exactly
modal realism is, but I know
it’s that extremely
counterintuitive view David
Lewis developed.
All the content that can potentially come as a further cashing out of the original content
and
all the content that can potentially specify what it would take to be a further cashing out of the original content
88
Unrestricted total content (second and final pass)
Varieties of content
We might want to keep contributions to total content of type (i) and (ii) apart. Then we might want to talk of two types of total content.
89
Total content schema 2
Varieties of content
A mental representation with original content X has (partial) total content Y (for a subject S) iff in circumstances C,
(i) Y is disposed to present itself as a cashing out of X (to S), or
(ii) Y is disposed to present itself as a condition on what it would take to be a cashing out of X (to S).
90
Total content schema 3
Varieties of content
Different ways of filling in C get us different notions of total content.
If we fill in C such that it does not differ between intrinsic duplicates, we get something that looks like the first dimension of 2-D semantics (Chalmers, Jackson).
A subject S’s mental representation with original content X
(i) has (partial) total contenti Y iff in circumstances C,Y is disposed to present itself as a cashing out of X (to S),
and
(ii) has (partial) total contentii Z iff in circumstances C, Z is disposed to present itself as a condition on what it would take to be a
cashing out of X (to S).
91
Total content schema 3
Varieties of content
We might also fill in C such that it includes circumstances the subject will find herself in in the near future. Then C might differ for intrinsic duplicates.
Can include circumstances involving interaction with artifacts. This gets us an “extended mind” notion of content (Clarke and Chalmers).
A subject S’s mental representation with original content X
(i) has (partial) total contenti Y iff in circumstances C,Y is disposed to present itself as a cashing out of X (to S),
and
(ii) has (partial) total contentii Z iff in circumstances C, Z is disposed to present itself as a condition on what it would take to be a
cashing out of X (to S).
92
Total content schema 3
Varieties of content
No right notion of total content.
A subject S’s mental representation with original content X
(i) has (partial) total contenti Y iff in circumstances C,Y is disposed to present itself as a cashing out of X (to S),
and
(ii) has (partial) total contentii Z iff in circumstances C, Z is disposed to present itself as a condition on what it would take to be a
cashing out of X (to S).
1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking
b. The need for unpacking
2. Varieties of contenta. Total content
b. Intuitive content
c. Other types of content
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
93Varieties of content
Outline
Folk psychology attributes beliefs, desires, and other contentful states.
The content it attributes is not (merely) original content.
So why is it so good at predicting behavior?
94
Challenge from the success of folk psychology
Varieties of content
The intuitive concept of content tracks (correlates with) something that is fairly closely related to original content.
The extra ingredients that the notion of intuitive content tracks (apart from original content) do not hinder folk psychology’s predictive accuracy and may even enhance it for certain purposes.
95Varieties of content
Strategy
96
Extra ingredient #1: Total content
Varieties of content
Fill in C with conceptual analysis.
A subject S’s mental representation with original content X
(i) has (partial) total contenti Y iff in circumstances C,Y is disposed to present itself as a cashing out of X (to S),
and
(ii) has (partial) total contentii Z iff in circumstances C, Z is disposed to present itself as a condition on what it would take to be a
cashing out of X (to S).
Arguably, we think and speak as though objects (and/or properties, events, states of affairs, etc.) were literally part of our thoughts.
We think we’re having a thought about this screen. This very one. Really. This one here.
97Varieties of content
“Object” or “object-dependent” contents
Usually, it’s the ones that the subject actually manages to refer to.
Otherwise, it’s unclear how object contents could allow you to accurately predict behavior.
98Varieties of content
Which objects?
b
a
Fred desires to climb .b
[I want to climb that tree
over there in front of
me… that is causing my
visual experience…]total
Usually, it’s the ones that the subject actually manages to refer to.
Otherwise, it’s unclear how object contents could allow you to accurately predict behavior.
99Varieties of content
Which objects?
a
b
Fred desires to climb .b
Any story of content will need to offer a story of reference and truth-conditions.
Reference might be relative to a center, subject, or time and place (as in 2-D semantics), or
Reference might involve direct reference to a center, subject, or time and place (Searle, Ishmael)
The intuitive notion of content partly tracks the referents of a concept’s total contents.
100Varieties of content
Extra ingredient #2: Reference of total content
101
Intuitive content
Referents of total
contents
Potential cashings
out
Potential conditions
on cashingsout
Original
content
It’s ok that intuitive content partly tracks total content:
Whenever a subject needs some further information, it can be readily unpacked. So it’s ok if we attribute all that content to her all along. For most purposes, we don’t need to keep track of her moment-to-moment occurrent thoughts (and we can’t do that anyways).
102Varieties of content
Folk psychology is all right
John believes that the right act is the one that
maximizes happiness and minimizes suffering.
Blah blah blah. [This is so boring. And so
incompatible with my act
utilitarianism.]original
John believes that the right act is the one that
maximizes happiness and minimizes suffering.
But won’t that end up
harming more people than
it helps?
Questions?...
Yes, Mr. Doe?
It’s ok that intuitive content tracks referents:
We sometimes want to make predictions about successful behaviors, not just behaviors (Williamson and others). Whether or not a behavior is successful can depend on whether or the total content of the mental states giving rise to it (e.g. beliefs) succeed in referring.
Whether or not a behavior is successful also affects subsequentbehavior.
105Varieties of content
Folk psychology is all right
Fred desires that glass of water ( ).
FRIDGE
[Want glass of
water]original
FRIDGE
[Want glass of
water]original[Want myself to have the
glass of watery stuff in
front of me and to the left
that is causing my visual
experience.]total
Fred desires that glass of water ( ).
FRIDGE
Fred desires that glass of water ( ).
FRIDGE
Fred desires that glass of water ( ).
FRIDGE
Fred desires that glass of water ( ).
This isn’t a conceptual analysis of the intuitive notion of content.
This isn’t a cognitive story about what we do when we attribute contentful states to ourselves and others. (See Koralus and others)
This is a story about what the intuitive notion of content tracks and why that’s not such a bad thing to be tracking if we’re interested in predicting certain sorts of behaviors given limited knowledge.
111Varieties of content
What this is and isn’t
Folk psychology does not track original content.
Folk psychology tracks a complex combination of original content, total content, and referents.
Folk psychology is not wholly divorced from psychological reality. (Good)
But intuitive content is not original content. Intuitive content is not the metaphysically interesting notion of content.
112Varieties of content
The status of folk psychology
1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking
b. The need for unpacking
2. Varieties of contenta. Total content
b. Intuitive content
c. Other types of content
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
113Varieties of content
Outline
We can do the same to construct other notions of content.
These other notions might match the notions of content used in other areas (personal-level psychology, political philosophy, action theory, epistemology, etc.).
That would be good news. It would lend psychological reality to those notions of content.
114
Pluralism about non-original content
Varieties of content
1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts and chunking
b. The need for unpacking
2. Varieties of contenta. Total content
b. Intuitive content
c. Other types of content
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
115Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
Outline
Internalist intuition
What I’m thinking depends on what’s going on in me.
Destruction (brain lesions have effect on mental states, “world lesions” do not)
Psychologists think externalism is crazy.
This conclusion [that beliefs are not in the mind] may be acceptable to philosophers… but I think that psychologists are liable to take it as a reductio ad absurdum. (Johnson-Laird, 1982, p. 62)
Externalist intuition
Twin Earth (Putnam), arthritis/tharthritis (Burge)
116Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
Conflicting intuitions
I have arthritis
in my thigh. I have arthritis in
my thigh.
I have arthritis
in my thigh. I have tharthritis
in my thigh.
“Arthritis” is used to denote an
inflammation of the joints or
thighs (tharthritis).
“Arthritis” is used to denote an
inflammation of the joints.
Alf Twin Alf
Internalist intuition
What I’m thinking depends on what’s going on in me.
Destruction (brain lesions have effect on mental states, “world lesions” do not)
Psychologists think externalism is crazy.
True of original content
Externalist intuition
Twin Earth (Putnam), arthritis/tharthritis (Burge)
True of intuitive content
118Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
The intuitions can be made compatible
Two ways to get externalism:
Referents of total content can differ between intrinsic duplicates.
Appropriate circumstances for total content can differ between intrinsic duplicates.
119
Externalism about intuitive content
Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
Intuitive content
Referents of total
contents
Potential cashings
out
Potential conditions
on cashingsout
Original
content
I have arthritis
in my thigh.
I have arthritis
in my thigh.
First way: Total content has different referents so intuitive content
can differ (2-D semantics way)
[I have arthritis in
my thigh.]original
[I have arthritis in
my thigh.]original
[I have that disease
normally called “arthritis”
in my community in my
thigh.]total
[I have arthritis
in my
thigh.]intuitive
[I have tharthritis
in my thigh.]intuitive
“Arthritis” is used to denote an
inflammation of the joints or
thighs (tharthritis).
“Arthritis” is used to denote an
inflammation of the joints.
Alf Twin Alf
[I have that disease
normally called “arthritis”
in my community in my
thigh.]total
121
Second way: Appropriate circumstances can differ between intrinsic duplicates
Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
C: Circumstances in which subject has a (local) dictionary handyC: Circumstances in which subject has (his own) mother handyC: Circumstances in which subject has mastered his own languageEtc…
A subject S’s mental representation with original content X
(i) has (partial) total contenti Y iff in circumstances C,Y is disposed to present itself as a cashing out of X (to S),
and
(ii) has (partial) total contentii Z iff in circumstances C, Z is disposed to present itself as a condition on what it would take to be a
cashing out of X (to S).
I have arthritis
in my thigh.
I have arthritis
in my thigh.
Second way: Appropriate circumstances include those in which subject
has a (local) dictionary available.
[I have arthritis in
my thigh.]original
[I have arthritis in
my thigh.]original
[I have an
inflammation of the
joints (arthritis) in my
thigh.]total
[I have an
inflammation of
the joints or thighs
(tharthritis) in my
thigh.]total
“Arthritis” is used to denote an
inflammation of the joints or
thighs (tharthritis).
“Arthritis” is used to denote an
inflammation of the joints.
Alf Twin Alf
We can be externalists about intuitive content while remaining internalists about original content.
Respects both externalist and internalist intuitions.
123Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
Externalism about intuitive content
The Efficient Concept view is the right view of concepts.
Different notions of total content are different idealizations of unpacked content.
Diverse notions of content can be related to what’s really going on in the head.
Distinguishing between original content and intuitive content allows us to reconcile internalist and externalist intuitions.
124Conclusion
Conclusion bachelor
unmarried man
The End
Preliminaries/definitions
1. The Efficient Concept viewa. Hard versus easy thoughts
a. Chunking
b. The need for unpacking
2. Varieties of content (DC)a. Total content
a. TC schema 1, 2, 3
b. Intuitive contenta. Extra ingredient #1: Total content
b. Extra ingredient #2: “Object” content
c. Funnel
c. Other types of content
126Outline
Outline
3. Reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions
a. Way #1
b. Way #2
4. Extras
a. Traffic controller example
b. The OC of chunk concepts diagram
c. Pluralism diagram
d. Fodor on analytic/synthetic
e. Heidi
f. George example
g. Object contents – mental models story
h. PIT
Dasein
Being-in-the-world
Facticity
…
Différence
…
Extras
Heidi the Heideggerian
Back
- Oxygen truck
- Driver: John Doe
- Oxygen truck
- Driver: John Doe
- Oxygen truck
- Driver: John Doe
- Hydrogen truck
- Driver: Jane Smith
- Oxygen truck
- Driver: John Doe
- Hydrogen truck
- Driver: Jane Smith
Traffic controller case:
You use the red rectangle instead of the full description of the vehicle for certain purposes (detecting crashes).
For other purposes, you need to retrieve more information.
But the red rectangle in some sense represents the full description.
Analogy
- Oxygen truck
- Driver: John Doe
Extras
Traffic controller case:
You use the red rectangle instead of the full description of the vehicle for certain purposes (detecting crashes).
For other purposes, you need to retrieve more information.
But the red rectangle in some sense represents the full description.
Analogy
- Oxygen truck
- Driver: John Doe
Extras
Traffic controller case:
You use the red rectangle instead of the full description of the vehicle for certain purposes (detecting crashes).
For other purposes, you need to retrieve more information.
But the red rectangle in some sense represents the full description.
Analogy
- Oxygen truck
- Driver: John Doe
Extras
Traffic controller case:
You use the red rectangle instead of the full description of the vehicle for certain purposes (detecting crashes).
For other purposes, you need to retrieve more information.
But the red rectangle in some sense represents the full description.
Analogy
- Oxygen truck
- Driver: John Doe
Extras
Back
The original content of chunk concepts
Extras
Intuitive
ContentIntuitive ContentIntuitive Content
Original
Content
Original
Content
Original
Content
(a) Original content is a
proper subset of
intuitive content
(b) Original content is
entirely distinct from
intuitive content
(c) Part of original
content is a proper
subset of intuitive
content
Back
Pluralism about non-original content
Extras
Unrestricted
Total
Content
Intuitive
Content
Decision
Theory
Content
Psychological
Content
Back
Fodor argues against conceptual role semantics by arguing that there’s no principled way to distinguish content-endowing connections from non-content-endowing connections.
This may still be a problem for conceptual role semantics.
But it isn’t a problem for us.
Smelly doesn’t come as a further cashing out of bachelor.
Analytic/synthetic distinction(s)
Extras
bachelor
unmarried smelly
Back
Extras
Example
George
college student
belief …modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
college learning
Extras
Example
George
college student
belief …modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
college learning
Extras
Example
George
college student
belief …modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
college learning
Extras
Example
George
college student
belief …modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
college learning
Extras
Example
George
college student
belief …modal realism
possible worlds
existence actuality …
college learning
Back
Extras
What’s really going on? (Koralus)
Mental model
think
Extras
Do they match up?
Mental model
think
[ ]total
Back
Hard to specify
Fleeting
We don’t have words for it (all our content-related terms refer to intuitive contents).
Extras
What is original content anyway?
Bad candidate:
Full-fledged external world properties, relations, and objects
These things are too determinate
Content might not be rich enough to determinately pick out properties etc. prior to unpacking.
Better candidate:
Modifications of the subject
This would be a type of adverbialism
Extras
What is original content anyway?
Act-object views:
Representation consists in a relation between a subject and something else (objects, property instances, universals, events, etc.).
Adverbialism:
Representation does not consist in a relation; it is a monadic property.
Extras
Adverbialism
It’s like something to think thoughts.
But what it’s like does not correlate well with the thought’s intuitive content.
This might explain some of the disagreement over the phenomenology of thought.
Extras
One possibility: phenomenal character
Phenomenal character modifications are the relevant modifications for content.
The requisite correlation between phenomenal character and content holds in perception (Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Jackson 2005).
Your phenomenal states are assessable for accuracy (Siewert 1998).
Extras
One possibility: phenomenal character
When you have enough phenomenal character, you get something with truth conditions.
Thought has some phenomenal character. Unpacking yields more… and more… and more…
So maybe this isn’t so crazy.
The point
Extras
Back