Commitment to Equity: A Primer Nora Lusg · 2019-11-07 · Teams and references by country: (in...

CommitmenttoEquity:APrimerNoraLus5g

TulaneUniversity,CGD,IAD

TheWorldBankWashington,DC,February1,2016

Outline

•  WhatistheCommitmenttoEquityIns2tuteandwhatdoesitdo?

•  Methodologicalhighlights•  Countrycoverage•  CEQAssessments:AQuickGlanceatResults•  Futurework

WHATISTHECOMMITMENTTOEQUITYINSTITUTE?

CommitmenttoEquityIns5tute(CEQI)

•  Research-basedpolicytools•  DataCenter•  Advisoryandtrainingservices•  Bridgestopolicy

Ø GrantfromBill&MelindaGatesFounda2onUS4.9millionfor5yrs

CEQAssessment:Tools§  Handbook:Lus2gandHiggins,currentversionSept2013,

updatedFeb2016;includessampleStatacode§  CEQHandbook2016(forthcoming)

Lus2g,Nora,editor.CommitmenttoEquityHandbook:Es4ma4ngtheRedistribu4veImpactofFiscalPolicy,TulaneUniversityandtheWorldBank

§  MasterWorkbook:ExcelSpreadsheettopresentbackgroundinforma2on,assump2onsandresults.(MWB2016Betaversion)

§  Diagnos5cQues5onnaire:=>availableonwebsite§  AdoStataFiles:(MWB2016Betaversion)

Mainmessages1.  Analyzingthetaxsidewithoutthe

spendingside,orviceversa,isnotveryusefulØ Taxescanbeunequalizingbutspendingsoequalizingthattheunequalizingeffectoftaxesismorethancompensated

Ø Taxescanberegressivebutwhencombinedwithtransfersmakethesystemmoreequalizingthanwithouttheregressivetaxes

Ø Transferscanbeequalizingbutwhencombinedwithtaxes,post-fiscpovertycanbehigher

6Lambert,2001;Lus2getal.,forthcoming

Mainmessages

2.  Analyzingtheimpactoninequalityonlycanbemisleading

Ø Fiscalsystemscanbeequalizingbutpovertyincreasing

7Lus2g,forthcoming

Mainmessages

3.  Analyzingtheimpactontradi2onalpovertyindicatorscanbemisleading

Ø Fiscalsystemscanshowareduc2oninpovertyandyetasubstan2alshareofthepoorcouldhavebeenimpoverishedbythecombinedeffectoftaxesandtransfers

8HigginsandLus2g(2015)

METHODOLOGICALHIGHLIGHTS

CEQAssessment:Method

§  Reliesonstate-of-thearttaxandbenefitincidenceanalysis•  Ongoingconsulta2onwithexpertstoimproveeconomicincidencees2mates

§  Usesconven2onalandnewlydevelopedindicatorstoassessprogressivity,pro-poornessandeffec2venessoftaxesandtransfers

§  Allowstoiden2fythecontribu2onofindividualfiscalinterven2onstoequityandpovertyreduc2onobjec2ves

10Lus2g&Higgins(2013)

CEQAssessment:FiscalIncidenceAnalysis

Yh=Ih-∑iTiSih+∑jBjSjh

Incomea[ertaxes

andtransfers

Incomebeforetaxesandtransfers

Taxes Transfers

Shareoftaxipaidbyunit

Shareoftransferj

receivedbyunith

CEQAssessment:FiscalInterven5ons•  Currentlyincluded:–  Directtaxes–  Directcashtransfers–  Non-cashdirecttransferssuchasschooluniformsandbreakfast

–  Contribu2onstopensionsandsocialinsurancesystems–  Indirecttaxesonconsump2on–  Indirectsubsidies–  In-kindtransferssuchasspendingoneduca2onandhealth

•  Workingon:–  Corporatetaxes–  Housingsubsidies

MARKETINCOME

DISPOSABLEINCOME

PLUSDIRECTTRANSFERSMINUSDIRECTTAXES

PLUSINDIRECTSUBSIDIESMINUSINDIRECTTAXES

POST-FISCALorCONSUMABLEINCOME

PLUSMONETIZEDVALUEOFPUBLICSERVICES:EDUCATION&HEALTH

FINALINCOME

CEQAssessment:IncomeConcepts

FiscalIncidenceinCEQAssessments§  Accoun2ngapproach•  nobehavioralresponses•  nogeneralequilibriumeffectsand•  nointertemporaleffects•  butitincorporatesassump2onstoobtaineconomicincidence(notstatutory)

§  Point-in-2me§  Mainlyaverageincidence;afewcaseswithmarginal

incidence

FiscalIncidenceinCEQAssessments

§  Comprehensivestandardfiscalincidenceanalysisofcurrentsystems:directpersonalandindirecttaxes(nocorporatetaxes);cashandin-kindtransfers(publicservices);indirectsubsidies

§  Harmonizeddefini2onsandmethodologicalapproachestofacilitatecross-countrycomparisons

§  Usesincome/consump2onpercapitaasthewelfareindicator§  Allocatorsvary=>fulltransparencyinthemethodusedfor

eachcategory,taxshiiingassump2ons,taxevasion§  Secondarysourcesareusedtoaminimum

Alloca5onMethods§  DirectIden2fica2oninmicrodata

§  However,resultsmustbechecked:howrealis2carethey?

§  Ifinforma2onnotdirectlyavailableinmicrodata,then:§  Simula2on§  Imputa2on§  Inference§  Predic2on§  AlternateSurvey§  SecondarySources

TaxShi[ingAssump5ons•  Economicburdenofdirectpersonalincometaxesis

bornebytherecipientofincome•  Burdenofpayrollandsocialsecuritytaxesisassumedto

fallen2relyonworkers•  Consump2ontaxesareassumedtobeshiiedforwardto

consumers.•  Theseassump2onsarestrongbecausetheyimplythat

laborsupplyisperfectlyinelas2candthatconsumershaveperfectlyinelas2cdemand

•  Inprac2ce,theyprovideareasonableapproxima2on(withimportantexcep2onssuchaswhenexaminingeffectofVATreforms),andtheyarecommonlyused

TaxEvasionAssump5ons:CaseSpecific§  Incometaxesandcontribu2onstoSS:

§  Individualswhodonotpar2cipateinthecontributorysocialsecuritysystemareassumednottopaythem

§  Consump2ontaxes

§  Placeofpurchase:informalmarketsareassumednottochargethem

§  Somecountryteamsassumedsmalltownsinruralareasdonottopaythem

Mone5zingin-kindtransfers§  Incidenceofpublicspendingoneduca2onandhealthfollowedso-

called“benefitorexpenditureincidence”orthe“governmentcost”approach.

§  Inessence,weuseperbeneficiaryinputcostsobtainedfromadministra2vedataasthemeasureofaveragebenefits.

§  Thisapproachamountstoaskingthefollowingques2on:Ø  Howmuchwouldtheincomeofahouseholdhavetobe

increasedifithadtopayforthefreeorsubsidizedpublicserviceatthefullcosttothegovernment?

TreatmentofContributorySocialInsurancePensions

•  Deferredincomeinactuariallyfairsystems:pensionsincludedinmarketincomeandcontribu2onstreatedasmandatorysavings

•  Governmenttransfer:pensionsincludedamongdirecttransfersandcontribu2onstreatedasadirecttax

ScenariosandRobustnessChecks§  Benchmarkscenario§  Sensi2vityto:•  Changingtheoriginalincomebywhichhhareranked:e.g.,marketincomepluscontributorypensionsanddisposableincome

•  Usingconsump2onvs.income•  Percapitavs.equivalizedincomeorconsump2on•  Differentassump2onsonscaling-downorup•  Differentassump2onsontake-upoftransfersandtaxshiiingandevasion

•  Alterna2vevalua2onsofin-kindservices•  Othersensi2vityscenarios:country-specific

COUNTRYCOVERAGE

www.commitmentoequity.org

ColorKey

Argentina Georgia Nicaragua Vietnam Green:FinishedArmenia Ghana Pakistan Zambia Orange:Finishedwithinnext6monthsBolivia Greece Paraguay White:EarlystagesBrazil Guatemala Peru Grey:PossibleCambodia Honduras PolandChile India RussiaChina Indonesia SouthAfricaColombia Iran SriLankaComoros IvoryCoast TanzaniaCostaRica Jordan TogoDomRep KyrgyzRepublicTunisiaEcuador Mali UgandaEgypt Mexico UnitedStatesElSalvador MozambiqueUruguayEthiopia Namibia Venezuela

CEQCountries(47)

FISCALPOLICY,INEQUALITYANDPOVERTYINMIDDLEINCOMECOUNTRIES:BRAZIL,CHILE,COLOMBIA,INDONESIA,MEXICO,PERUANDSOUTHAFRICA

Basedon:•  Lus2g,Nora.2015b.

InequalityandFiscalRedistribu4oninMiddleIncomeCountries:Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Indonesia,Mexico,PeruandSouthAfrica.EvidencefromtheCommitmenttoEquityProject(CEQ).CEQWorkingPaperNo.31,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue.

•  IndonesiaandSouthAfrica,partofcollabora2veprojectwithGabrielaInchauste,WorldBank.Willbepublishedin:Inchauste,GabrielaandNoraLus2g(Eds.),TheDistribu4onalImpactofFiscalPolicy:ExperiencefromDevelopingCountries.WorldBank,Washington,D.C

Teamsandreferencesbycountry:

(inparenthesis:surveyyear;C=consump5on&I=income)

1.   Bolivia(2009;I):PazArauco,Verónica,GeorgeGrayMolina,WilsonJiménezPozo,andErnestoYáñezAguilar.2014.“ExplainingLowRedistribu2veImpactinBolivia.”InLus2g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScos.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu4veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa4nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(September22,2014)

2.   Brazil(2009;I):Higgins,SeanandClaudineyPereira.2014.“TheEffectsofBrazil’sTaxa2onandSocialSpendingontheDistribu2onofHouseholdIncome.”InLus2g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScos.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu4veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa4nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(November4,2014)

3.   Chile(2009,I):Ruiz-Tagle,JaimeandDanteContreras.2014.CEQMasterworkbook,TulaneUniversity(August27,2014)

4.   Colombia(2010,I):Melendez,MarcelaandNoraLus2g.2014.CEQMasterworkbook,TulaneUniversity(November21,2014)

5.   CostaRica(2010;I):Sauma,JuanandDiegoTrejos.2014.SocialPublicSpending,Taxes,Redistribu4onofIncome,andPovertyinCosta.CEQWorkingPaperNo.18,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue,January.(February2014)

7.   Ecuador:LlerenaPinto,FreddyPaul,MaríaChris2naLlerenaPinto,RobertoCarlosSaáDaza,andMaríaAndreaLlerenaPinto.2015.SocialSpending,TaxesandIncomeRedistribu4oninEcuador.CEQWorkingPaperNo.28,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue,February.

8.   ElSalvador(2011;I):Beneke,Margarita,NoraLus2gyJoséAndrésOliva.2015.ElimpactodelosimpuestosyelgastosocialenladesigualdadylapobrezaenElSalvador.CEQWorkingPaperNo.26,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue,February.(March11,2014)

9.   Guatemala(2011;I):Cabrera,Maynor,NoraLus2gandHilcíasMorán.2014.FiscalPolicy,InequalityandtheEthnicDivideinGuatemala.CEQWorkingPaperNo.20,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue,October.(April13,2014)

10.   Indonesia(2012;C):Avar,Rythia,JonJellemaandMashewWai-Poi.2014.CEQMasterWorkbook,TulaneUniversityandTheWorldBank(February18,2014)

11.   Mexico(2010;I):Scos,John.2014.“Redistribu2veImpactandEfficiencyofMexico’sFiscalSystem.”InLus2g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScos.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu4veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa4nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(September2013)

13.   Peru(2009;I):Jaramillo,Miguel.2014.“TheIncidenceofSocialSpendingandTaxesinPeru.”InLus2g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScos.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu4veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa4nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(May1,2013)

14.   SouthAfrica(2010;I):Inchauste,Gabriela,NoraLus2g,MashekwaMaboshe,CatrionaPurfieldandIngridWollard.2015.TheDistribu4onalImpactofFiscalPolicyinSouthAfrica.PolicyResearchWorkingPaper7194,TheWorldBank,February.(May5,2014)

15.   UnitedStates(2011;I):Higgins,Sean,NoraLus2g,WhitneyRubleandTimothySmeeding(forthcoming)ComparingtheIncidenceofTaxesandSocialSpendinginBrazilandtheUnitedStates,ReviewofIncomeandWealth

16.   Uruguay(2009;I):Bucheli,Marisa,NoraLus2g,MáximoRossi,andFlorenciaAmábile.2014.“SocialSpending,TaxesandIncomeRedistribu2oninUruguay.”InLus2g,Nora,CarolaPessinoandJohnScos.2014.Editors.TheRedistribu4veImpactofTaxesandSocialSpendinginLa4nAmerica.SpecialIssue.PublicFinanceReview,May,Volume42,Issue3.(August18,2014)

HouseholdSurveysUsedinCountryStudies

1.   Armenia:IntegratedLivingCondi2onsSurvey,2011(I)2.   Bolivia:EncuestadeHogares,2009(I)3.   Brazil:PesquisadeOrçamentosFamiliares,2009(I)4.   Chile:EncuestadeCaracterizaciónSocial(CASEN),2009(I)5.   Colombia:EncuestadeCalidaddeVida,2010(I)6.   CostaRica:EncuestaNacionaldeHogares,2010(I)7.   Ecuador:EncuestaNacionaldeIngresosyGastosdelosHogaresUrbanoyRural,2011-2012(I)8.   ElSalvador:EncuestaDeHogaresDePropositosMul2ples,2011(I)9.  Ethiopia:EthiopiaHouseholdConsump2onExpeditureSurveyandEthiopiaWelfareMonitoringsurvey,2011

(C)10.   Guatemala:EncuestaNacionaldeIngresosyGastosFamiliares,2010(I)11.   Indonesia:SurveiSosial-EkonomiNasional,2012(C)12.   Mexico:EncuestaNacionaldeIngresoyGastodelosHogares,2010(I)13.   Peru:EncuestaNacionaldeHogares,2009(I)14.   SouthAfrica:IncomeandExpenditureSurveyandNa2onalIncomeDynamicsStudy,2010-2011(I)15.   Uruguay:EncuestaCon2nuadeHogares,2009(I)

Note:Thelesers"I"and"C"indicatethatthestudyusedincomeorconsump2ondata,respec2vely.30

SIZEANDCOMPOSITIONOFGOVERNMENTSOCIALSPENDINGANDREVENUES

Figure 1: Size and composition of government budgets (circa 2010)

Panel a: Composition of Social Spending as a Share of GDP

02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,00014,00016,00018,00020,000

nesia*(201

Peru(200

Chile**(200

Colombia(20

Mexico(20

Africa***(201

Brazil(20

(rankedNbyNsocialNspending/GDP)

DirectNTransfers Education Health ContributoryNPensions OtherNSocialNSpending GNINperNcapitaN(2011NPPP)

Panel b: Composition of Total Government Revenues as a Share of GDP

02,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,00014,00016,00018,00020,000

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%Indo

nesia*(2012)

Colombia(2010

Chile**(2009)

Mexico(20

Peru(200

Africa***(201

Brazil(2009

(rankedJbyJtotalJgovernmentJrevenue/GDP)

DirectJTaxes IndirectJandJOtherJTaxes SocialJSecurityJContributions

OtherJRevenues GNIJperJcapitaJ(2011JPPP)

URY$AMR$

MEX$PER$

COL$CHL$

0$ 2000$ 4000$ 6000$ 8000$ 10000$ 12000$ 14000$ 16000$ 18000$ 20000$

GNI/Capita$(2011$PPP)�

Primary'and'Social'Spending/GDP'vs'GNI/capita�

Primary$Spending/GDP$ Social$Spending/GDP$Source:Lus2g(2015a)

FISCALPOLICYANDINEQUALITY

MARKETINCOME

DISPOSABLEINCOME

PLUSDIRECTTRANSFERSMINUSDIRECTTAXES

PLUSINDIRECTSUBSIDIESMINUSINDIRECTTAXES

POST-FISCALorCONSUMABLEINCOME

PLUSMONETIZEDVALUEOFPUBLICSERVICES:EDUCATION&HEALTH

FINALINCOME

CEQAssessment:IncomeConcepts

FiscalRedistribu5on:Brazil,Chile,Colombia,Indonesia,MexicoandSouthAfrica

Market%Income% Disposable%Income%

Post<fiscal%Income% Final%Income%

Brazil%(2009)% Chile%(2009)% Colombia%(2010)%Indonesia%(2012)% Mexico%(2010)% Peru%(2009)%South%Africa%(2010)%

GiniCoefficient,circa2010

Source:Lus2g(2015a)

Redistributive Effect: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, EU and the United States

(Change in Gini Points: Market to Disposable Income; circa 2010)

0.0000

0.1000

0.2000

0.3000

0.4000

0.5000

0.6000

0.7000

0.8000

0.0000

0.0500

0.1000

0.1500

0.2000

Market'Incom

e'Gini

Redistrib

utive'Effect:'M

arket'to'Disposab

Pension1as1Market1Income Pension1as1Transfer

Market1Income1Gini,1Pensions1Mkt1Inc Market1Income1Gini,1Pensions1as1Transf

Table&4:&Marginal&Contribution&of&Taxes&and&Transfers&(circa&2010)(Pensions&as&Market&Income)

Brazil Chile* Colombia Indonesia** Mexico& Peru& SA*** Average

Marginal&Contributions

From&Market&to&Disposable&Income

Redistributive&Effect 0.0453 0.0340 0.0075 0.0044 0.0236 0.0099 0.0788 0.0291

Direct2taxes 0.0148 0.0154 0.0018 6 0.0131 0.0055 0.0269 0.0129

Direct2transfers 0.0320 0.0190 0.0057 0.0044 0.0109 0.0045 0.0593 0.0194

From&Market&&to&PostLfiscal&Income

Redistributive&Effect 0.0446 0.0370 0.0073 0.0061 0.0308 0.0151 0.0789 0.0314

Direct2taxes 0.0171 0.0179 0.0019 6 0.0140 0.0060 0.0311 0.0147

Direct2transfers 0.0382 0.0220 0.0057 0.0043 0.0113 0.0048 0.0711 0.0225

Indirect2taxes 60.0014 0.0027 60.0017 60.0028 0.0027 0.0052 0.0000 0.0007

Indirect2subsidies 0.0008 0.0004 0.0015 0.0052 0.0047 6 6 0.0025

Kakwani

Direct2taxes 0.1738 0.3481 0.1373 0.0000 0.2411 0.3853 0.1109 0.1995

Direct2transfers2 0.5310 0.9064 0.9233 0.6248 0.7931 0.9612 1.0165 0.8223

Indirect2taxes 60.0536 60.0172 60.1986 60.0513 0.0129 0.0527 60.0788 60.0477

Indirect2subsidies 0.8295 0.7978 0.5034 0.0645 0.2457 0.0000 0.0000 0.3487

Figure 4. Redistribution and social spending, 2010

0.0000

0.0200

0.0400

0.0600

0.0800

0.1000

0.1200

0.1400

0.1600

0.1800

0.2000

0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 25.0% 30.0%

RestributiveCEffect

SocialCSpending

40Source:Lus2g(2015b

A. Redistribution and market income inequality

0.0000

0.0200

0.0400

0.0600

0.0800

0.1000

0.1200

0.1400

0.1600

0.1800

0.2000

0.3800 0.4300 0.4800 0.5300 0.5800 0.6300 0.6800 0.7300 0.7800 0.8300

Redistrib

uiveDEffe

GiniDMarketDIncome41

Source:Lus2g(2015b

FISCALPOLICYANDPOVERTYREDUCTION

Fiscal Policy and Poverty Reduction (circa 2010) (Change in Headcount Ratio from Market to Post-fiscal Income for Pensions in Market

Income and Pensions in Transfers; in %) a

!35.0%

!30.0%

!25.0%

!20.0%

!15.0%

!10.0%

Brazil/(2009) Colombia(2010)

Indonesia*(2012)

Peru/(2009) Mexico/(2010) South/Africa**(2010)

Chile***(2009)

Pensions/as/Market/Income Pensions/as/Transfer

WHOPAYSFORWHATTHEGOVERNMENTSPENDS?

Net Payers to the Fiscal System (circa 2010) Panel a: Pensions as Market Income

Brazil(2009)

SouthAfrica***(2010)

Peru(2009)

Mexico(2010)

Colombia(2010)

Chile**(2009)

Indonesia*(2012)

NetBReceiversNetBPayers

y<1.25 1.25<=y<2.5 2.5<=y<4 4<=y<10 10<=y<50 y>=50

45Source:Lus2g(2015b)

FISCALPOLICY,INEQUALITYANDPOVERTYINAFRICANCOUNTRIES:ETHIOPIA,GHANAANDTANZANIA

URY$AMR$

MEX$PER$

COL$CHL$

0$ 2000$ 4000$ 6000$ 8000$ 10000$ 12000$ 14000$ 16000$ 18000$ 20000$

GNI/Capita$(2011$PPP)�

Primary'and'Social'Spending/GDP'vs'GNI/capita�

Primary$Spending/GDP$ Social$Spending/GDP$Source:Lus2g(2015a)

CEQAssessmentforEthiopia(WorldBank,2014,Ch.5)

Pro-poornessofEduca5onSpending

Pro$poor&CC&is&negative

Same&per&capita&for&all;&CC&=0

Progressive&CC&positive&but&lower&than&market&income&Gini

Regressive&CC&positive&AND&higher&than&market&income&Gini

Armenia&(2011) + + +Bolivia&(2009) + + +Brazil&(2009) + + +&Chile&(2009) + + +Colombia&(2010) + + +El&Salvador&(2011) + + +*Ethiopia&(2011) + + +Guatemala&(2010) + + +Indonesia&(2012) + + +Mexico&(2010) + + +Peru&(2009) + + +South&Africa&(2010) + + +Uruguay&(2009) + + +*

Primary Secondary Tertiary

Source:Lus2g(2015a)

Pro-poornessofHealthSpending

Armenia&(2011) +Bolivia&(2009) +Brazil&(2009) +&Chile&(2009) +Colombia&(2010) +El&Salvador&(2011) +Ethiopia&(2011) +Guatemala&(2010) +Indonesia&(2012) +Mexico&(2010) +Peru&(2009) +South&Africa&(2010) +Uruguay&(2009) +

Health

Source:Lus2g(2015a)

51HigginsandLus2g(2015)

FiscalImpoverishment($1.25ppp2005,frommarkettoconsumableincome)

MarketIncomeHeadcou

changein

poverty

MarketIncomeGini

Reynolds-

Smolensky

changein

inequality

FIheadcount(amongwhole

popula5on)

FIheadcountamongpostfiscpoor

FIperimpoverisedas

prop'nofincome

Porvertywentup

ordown?

Unambiguouslyprogressive?

Inequalitywentupordown?

Brazil 0.066 -0.022 0.575 0.045 -0.035 0.007 0.160 0.088DOWN YES DOWNEthiopia 0.319 0.023 0.322 0.023 -0.020 0.729 0.832 0.054UP YES DOWNGhana 0.060 0.007 0.437 0.016 -0.014 0.051 0.766 0.053UP YES DOWNIndonesia 0.120 -0.015 0.398 0.011 -0.008 0.041 0.392 0.037DOWN YES DOWNMexico 0.049 -0.016 0.544 0.038 -0.025 0.008 0.237 0.148DOWN YES DOWNPeru 0.044 -0.007 0.459 0.009 -0.008 0.008 0.218 0.185DOWN YES DOWNSouthAfrica 0.370 -0.158 0.771 0.083 -0.077 0.059 0.088 0.274DOWN YES DOWNTanzania 0.437 0.079 0.382 0.041 -0.038 0.509 0.986 0.085UP YES DOWN

FiscalImpoverishment($1.25ppp2005,frommarkettofinalincome)

MarketIncomeHeadcou

changein

poverty

Marketincome

+pensionsGini

Reynolds-

Smolensky

changein

inequality

FIheadcou

nt(amongwholepopula5

FIheadcou

ntamongpostfiscpoor

FIperimpoverisedas

prop'nofincome

Porvertywentupordown?

Unambiguouslyprogressive?

Inequalitywentupordown?

Ethiopia 0.319 -0.020 0.322 0.031 -0.023 0.445 0.403 0.037DOWN YES DOWN

Ghana 0.060 -0.030 0.437 0.045 -0.035 0.010 0.333 0.055DOWN YES DOWN

Tanzania 0.437 -0.019 0.382 0.063 -0.051 0.175 0.418 0.064DOWN YES DOWN

POLICYSIMULATIONS:GHANAANDTANZANIA

Basedon:•  Younger,Stephen,EricOsei-Assibey,andFelixOppong.2015.Fiscal

IncidenceinGhana.CEQWorkingPaperNo.35,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue,December.[Innon-pecuniarycollabora5onwithWorldBank]

•  Younger,Stephen,FloraMyamba,andKennethMdadila.2016.FiscalIncidenceinTanzania.CEQWorkingPaperNo.36,CenterforInter-AmericanPolicyandResearchandDepartmentofEconomics,TulaneUniversityandInter-AmericanDialogue,Forthcoming.

Ghana:Simula5onResultsforElimina5ngElectricitySubsidies

Ghana:Simula5onResultsforElimina5ngFuelSubsidies

Tanzania:Simula5onResultsforElimina5ngElectricitySubsidies

Tanzania:SimulatedEffectsofIncreasingCCTCoverage

TermsofEngagementPARTNERSHIPS&COLLABORATION

CEQAssessments&WorldBank•  FiscalincidenceanalysisinPovertyAssessments,PERs,SCD,andso

onallowtheBanktoassesshowmuchthefiscalsysteminspecificcountriesishelpingachieveitstwingoals,andiden2fyareasforpolicyac2onthatcouldenhancethepoten2aloffiscalpolicyasaninstrumenttoachievetheequitygoals.–  Forexample,ifbasicgoodsareheavilytaxed,wecanan2cipatethat

thepoorandthebosom40percentmightgethurtinanontrivialway.•  Inthecontextoflendingprogramsthatinvolveausteritymeasures

orreformstothetaxand/ortransferssystems,fiscalincidenceanalysiscouldhelpminimizethenega2veeffectsonthepoorandthebosom40percent.–  HowdoestheWBaddressthischallengecurrentlyintheabsenceof

fiscalincidenceresults?–  FiscalincidenceanalysiscouldhelptheWBopera2onalizetheshared

prosperitytalk

CEQIcanoffer:Collabora5veEffortsinResearch&

Development(CEQHandbook2020)

Ø Educa2onandhealthbenefitsØ Incorpora2ngtopincomesØ Gender-sensi2veincidenceanalysisØ CorporateandcapitalincometaxesØ BehavioralresponsesØ Policysimula2ontools

Inexchange,thepartneringGovernment,Mul5lateralOrganiza5onorResearcherwould:

•  Supplytheadministra2vedata(unlessspecifiedotherwise).

•  PermissiontoincluderesultsinCEQI'sDataCenteraierallclearancesatpartnerorganiza2onhavebeencompleted.

•  Permissiontociteresultsinpaperswithappropriatecita2onoforiginalauthorsandacknowledgmentofpartnerorganiza2on.

•  Acknowledgethecontribu2onoftheCEQIfollowingagreeduponprotocol/s.

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