Case studies of social and institutional vulnerability: La Boca Neighborhood and Avellaneda...

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“Case studies of social and institutional vulnerability:

La Boca Neighborhood and Avellaneda Municipality”

Dra. Claudia E. Natenzon, Dra. Natalia Marlenko, Lic. Silvia G. González, Lic. Diego Ríos,

Lic. Elvira Gentile, Lic. Julieta Barrenechea,Lic. Sebastián Ludueña & Ms. María Cecilia Boudín

- PIRNA , FFyL , UBA -

AIACC LA26: AIACC LA26: Buenos Aires, 24-27 August 2004 Buenos Aires, 24-27 August 2004

Second AIACC Regional Workshop for Latin America and the CaribbeanSecond AIACC Regional Workshop for Latin America and the Caribbean

Outlook

Conceptual framework: social vulnerability

Study area: population and assets in scenarios

La Boca Neighborhood

Avellaneda Municipality

Some conclusions

Conceptual Framework: Social Vulnerability, Environmental Risk and Disasters

The SV – Social Vulnerability is one of the four dimensions of the environmental risk. Other dimensions are hazard, exposition and uncertainty.

It is defined by social, economical, cultural and institutional conditions of a society, previous of a disaster event, that put this society in conditions to suffer or avoid damages (of different kinds: economical, physiological, on health, etc.).

SV will determine the levels of difficulties and capacities of each social group to recover by itself after the stress and the impacts.

SV: Issues Researched

Elaboration of a social vulnerability index (SVI) for the study area.

Identification of people (number) that could be affected in a direct way.

Analysis of land use and inventory of assets/infrastructure that could be directly affected.

Case studies: La Boca/ Avellaneda.

AIACC Project LA 26

Affected population by scenarios

Population by census radius in the Municipalities of the study area (coastal municipalities between Tigre and Partido de la Costa)

Dates. CNPyV 1991 and 2001

Three scenarios: 2004, 2030 and 2070Six recurrences (1, 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100 years)

Example: Scenario 2070, recurrence 100

Scenario 2070, recurrence 100: AMBA and Gran La Plata

Assets:

•Administrative offices

•Social security

•Health centers (public, private)

•Educational centers (public, private)

•Security offices (police stations, etc)

•Industries

•Circulation and transport

•Recreational areas (parks, clubs, etc)

•Residential areas

Scenario 2070-100

Affected assets by scenarios. Study area (total)

Affected assets – Scenario 2070

Study area (total)

Population and assets

Scenario 2070

Recurrences

100 50 20 10 5 1

Population 866.207 671.881 563.336 463.853 344.700 113.855

Administrative (public) offices 125 97 81 67 50 16

Social security offices 17 13 11 9 7 2

Health centers (private, public) 205 159 133 110 82 27

Education centers (private, public) 928 720 604 497 369 122

Security offices (police station, etc) 92 71 60 49 37 12

Industries 1046 811 680 560 416 137

Recreational areas (parks, clubs) 306 237 199 164 122 40

Circulation and transport 41 32 27 21 16 5

Residential areas 22 17 14 12 9 3

Case studies localization

Case studies localization

La Boca Neighborhood (1)Some characteristics:Some characteristics:

One of the oldest city’s neighborhood, it was born as harbor in a marshy area. Since its beginnings, it has always been a marginal area, although the current urban renewal projects. Total population (DGE, 2001): 39.396 inhabitants. Area : 3,3 km2. (1,29% of CABA) Density: 11.938 inhab/km2

(1,65% of CABA). Main hazard: floods by “sudestadas” and intense rainfall.

La Boca Neighborhood (2)Afectable area and population (under 5 meters): 100 % of the neighborhood.

CABA La Boca

Demographic subindex

4 4

Conditions of life subindex

1 4

Productive subindex

1 n/d

SVI – IVS 2 n/d

Source: INDEC, 1991; CNE 1994.

INSTITUTIONS (CABA’S GOVERNMENT)

Prevention Response Rehabilitation

Subsecretaría de Logística y Emergencias, Dirección de Emergencias Sociales y Defensa Civil (DESyDC)

Secretaría de Obras y

Servicios Públicos, Dirección de Hidráulica

Sistema de Atención

Médica de Emergencia

Secretaría de Salud

Subsecretaría de Logística y Emergencias, Cuerpo de Emergencias en la Vía Pública (CEVIP)

Secretaría de Obras y Servicios Públicos

La Boca Neighborhood (3)

La Boca Neighborhood (4)

Policy / action

Kind of measurement Current Conditions

StructuralNon structural

Projected In elaboration In process

Plan de control de inundaciones - Defensa costera

Plan de control de inundaciones - Sustitución del drenaje pluvial

Plan Maestro Hidráulico

Sistema de alerta por sudestadas y tormentas severas

Plan Maestro Metropolitano de Defensa Civil

In green: for La Boca only – In light blue: for CABA with La Boca component.

La Boca Neighborhood (5)

Some limitations of the disaster management:

A false feeling of security settles down from the building of defense engineering works (“hidden” risk).

There are communicational disadjustments among the involved institutions themselves, and between them and the population.

There are registered distrustfulness / rivalry attitudes among institutions.

Both, the urban and the floods management, are unarticulated.

In the projected works (coastal defense) the sea level rise

hypothesis is not considered.

La Boca Neighborhood (6)

Positive aspects:

New non structural interventions are being developed.

There is a strong social participative tradition in the neighborhood, with a particular cultural profile.

There are recent institutional changes in the Municipal organigram: Urban Planning and Public Works are under the same office.

Avellaneda Municipality (1)

Some characteristics:

One of the oldest population centers near the city of Buenos Aires, located on a flooding area.

It has an industrial profile from its beginning as a town (1840).

High levels of urbanization (> 90%, from 1940). Total population (CNPHyV, 2001): 328.980 Area: 55 km2. Population density: 5.993 inhabitants/km2. Main hazards: floods and contamination.

Avellaneda Municipality (2)

Total Population

(inhabitants,

CNPHyV 2001)

Affectable population

Absolute values

Relative values

328.980 237.845 72,3%

Affectable Area (under 5 meters): 60%

Avellaneda Municipality (3)

SVI figure: 2 (low)

Sub Index:- Demographic: 3 (high)- Conditions of life: 3 (high) - Productive: 1 (very low)

Source: CNPyV 1991, Anuario Bonaerense 1993, CNE 1994

Avellaneda Municipality (4)

The main institution in charge of disaster's management is the Civil Defense Municipality Board - Junta Municipal de Defensa Civil (JMDC), integrated by:

Mayor (as President); Director of Civil Defense (as Secretary); Government Secretaries –of Health, Social Action, etc.-

(as vocals); Voluntary Fire Brigade (as vocal); Naval Prefecture of Dock Sud (as vocal); Red Cross -Villa Domínico office- (as vocal); and Social Entities’ Leaders, such as Boy Scouts (non

permanent vocals).

Avellaneda Municipality (4)

Limitations in the flood disasters management:

Lack of continuity in the Civil Defense policies. For example, the Director office, main coordinator of the JMDC, is political and is renewed with each government every four years, or less;

In reality, neither the vocals nor the other representantives of the civil society participate in the JMDC. The decisions on this subject are only in the Civil Defense Director’s hands;

There is no enough risk and disaster communication from Civil Defense to the inhabitants.

There are registered distrustfulness / rivalry attitudes among institutions.

Avellaneda Municipality (4)

Positive aspects:

Since December 2003, the new Municipal Authorities have designed a new Civil Defense Director. He has a deeper knowledge on disaster management (Chairman of the Volunteer Firemen Federation of Buenos Aires Province);

There is a more intensive coordination by the emergency institutions (Volunteer Firemen, Red Cross and Navy Police) through periodical disaster simulations;

There is highly trained and experienced personnel in some of the institutions;

National Institutions

DC : Defensa Civil (Civil Defense)

SIFEM: Sistema Federal de Emergencia (Emergency Federal System)

1996 (Menem)

Presidencia

Ministerio de Defensa Ministerio de Interior Ministerio de Justicia

Jefatura de Gabinete

DefensaCivil

1999/2001 (Menem/De La Rua)

Presidencia

Ministerio de Defensa Ministerio de Interior Ministerio de Justicia

Jefatura de Gabinete

DefensaCivil

SIFEM

Feb.2002 (Duhalde)

Presidencia

Ministerio de Defensa Ministerio de Interior Ministerio de Justicia

Jefatura de Gabinete

DefensaCivil

SIFEM

Jul.2002 (Duhalde)

Presidencia

Ministerio de Defensa Ministerio de Interior Ministerio de Justicia

Jefatura de Gabinete

DefensaCivilSIFEM

Last weekend, 2004 (Kirchner)

Presidencia

Ministerio de Defensa Ministerio de Interior Ministerio de Justicia

Jefatura de Gabinete

DefensaCivilSIFEM

Some conclusions

In the future, both the inhabitants quantity and the area that could be affected are important.

Floods are a problem nowadays.

There have been successful works as the coastal defenses in La Boca against the “sudestada”. Nevertheless, there are still some areas that continue being flooded.

Some conclusions

An important group of historic neighbors has developed some alternative daily strategies (cultural aspects) that reduce the social vulnerability: • existence of informal warning, self assistance and

evacuation networks, among the neighbors; • choice of adequate building systems;• high sense of belonging and identification with their

place;• experience on what to do in face of floods, etc.

Some conclusions

The public measures for “floods management" are apart from the global urban environmental policies.

This fragmentation of policies and measurements increases the social vulnerability and generates high degrees of uncertainty, that amplifies the damages of each disaster.

Some conclusionsThere are formal obstacles among

institutions: • lack of communication, coordination and

articulation;

• scarce planning;

• the successful programs and projects have no continuity with each change of government.

Thus, the institutions and their policies are not sustainable in time.

Some conclusions

The institutions management style, typical of the national culture, is not adequate for long term processes.

Up to now, both the executed, in execution an projected mitigation plans, and the communication processes to the public do not consider the changes implied by the sea level rise.

Thank you!