On Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Online Scheduling V. Auletta, R. De Prisco, P.P. and G. Persiano Università di Salerno.
Private capacities in mechanism design Vincenzo Auletta Paolo Penna Giuseppe Persiano Università di Salerno, Italy.
Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders Speaker: Shahar Dobzinski Based on joint works with Noam Nisan & Michael Schapira.
Multiagent Systems1 Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions Daniel Lehman, Liadan Ita OCallaghan and Yoav Shoham @ Journal of.
Real-Time Competitive Environments: Truthful Mechanisms for Allocating a Single Processor to Sporadic Tasks Anwar Mohammadi, Nathan Fisher, and Daniel.
Eric Shou Stat/CSE 598B. What is Game Theory? Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is often used in the context of economics. Studies strategic.
Mechanisms with Verification Carmine Ventre Teesside University.
Strongly Polynomial-Time Truthful Mechanisms in One Shot Paolo Penna 1, Guido Proietti 2, Peter Widmayer 3 1 Università di Salerno 2 Università de l’Aquila.
Online Mechanism Design (Randomized Rounding on the Fly) Piotr Krysta, University of Liverpool, UK Berthold Vöcking, RWTH Aachen University, Germany.
Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions Speaker: Michael Schapira Joint work with Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan Hebrew University.
Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions Speaker: Shahar Dobzinski Joint work with Noam Nisan and Michael Schapira.
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling Jon Feldman S. Muthukrishnan Eddie Nikolova Martin P á l.