Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, and Moshe Tennenholtz Stanford University.
Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry Authors: C. Corbett, C. S. Tang Presenter: T.J. Hu.
Decentralization and Collusion
Sep. 8, 2014 Lirong Xia Introduction to MD (mooncake design or mechanism design)
Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Differential Privacy (and you). Aaron Roth DIMACS Workshop on Differential Privacy October 24.
Online Mechanisms Seminar on game theory, David C Parkes. Presentation by Alon Baram.
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions Written by: Presented by: Ron Holzman Rica Gonen Noa Kfir-Dahav Dov Monderer Moshe Tennenholtz.
Chapter 16 Negotiation 1.Costly Agreements 2.Ultimatum game with Incomplete Information 3.Counteroffers with Incomplete Information 4.The revelation principle.
Agent Technology for e-Commerce Chapter 10: Mechanism Design Maria Fasli .
An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments Vincent Conitzer and Tuomas Sandholm Computer Science Department Carnegie.
Truthful Randomized Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions Speaker: Michael Schapira Joint work with Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan Hebrew University.
1 Secure Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment Vinayak Deshpande Krannert School of Management Purdue University Collaborators: Mikhail.