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Original:English No.:ICC01/0501/08

Date:20April2009

PRETRIALCHAMBERII

Before: JudgeEkaterinaTrendafilova,PresidingJudge

JudgeHansPeterKaul

JudgeFumikoSaiga

SITUATIONINTHECENTRALAFRICANREPUBLIC

INTHECASEOF

THEPROSECUTOR

v.JEANPIERREBEMBAGOMBO

PublicDocument

AMICUSCURIAEOBSERVATIONSONSUPERIORRESPONSIBILITY

SUBMITTEDPURSUANTTORULE103OFTHERULESOFPROCEDUREAND

EVIDENCE

Source: AmnestyInternational

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Documenttobenotifiedinaccordancewithregulation31oftheRegulationsoftheCourtto:

TheOfficeoftheProsecutor

MsFatouBensouda,DeputyProsecutor

MsPetraKneuer,SeniorTrialLawyer

CounselfortheDefence

MrNkwebeLiriss

MrKarimA.A.Khan

MrAimKiloloMusamba

MrPierreLegros

LegalRepresentativesofVictims

MsMarieEdithDouzimaLawson

LegalRepresentativesofApplicants

UnrepresentedVictims UnrepresentedApplicantsfor

Participation/Reparation

TheOfficeofPublicCounselfor

Victims

Ms.PaolinaMassidda

TheOfficeofPublicCounselforthe

Defence

StatesRepresentatives

REGISTRY

AmicusCuriae

Registrar

MsSilvanaArbia

DefenceSupportSection

VictimsandWitnessesUnit DetentionSection

VictimsParticipationandReparations

Section

Other

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I. INTRODUCTION1. Theeffectiveexerciseofcommandisanessentialtoolinensuringthatcrimesunderinternationallawarepreventedand,iftheynonethelessoccur,arepunished:

Sincecommandersarethecriticalpathtoenabling[an]organizationtofight

collectivelytheylogicallymustbethecriticalpathtocontrollingandfocusingthe

violencewhichtheyaloneareresponsibleforreleasingontothebattlefield.1 The

applicationandinterpretationofthedoctrineofsuperiorresponsibilityisthusof

paramountimportancetomilitarycommandersandothersuperiors;2tothosewho

canbeaffectedbysuchsuperiorsexercise,orfailuretoexercise,theircommandor

authorityappropriately;andtotheinternationalcommunityasawhole.

2. ThiscasepresentstheInternationalCriminalCourt(theCourt)withitsfirstopportunitytoanalysethescopeandcontentofthedoctrineofsuperior

responsibilityunderArticle28oftheRomeStatute(theStatute). Itraisesspecific

questionsthatcouldhaveasignificanteffectonthemannerinwhichthedoctrineis

understoodandimplementedworldwide. Inlightoftheseconsiderations,on6April

2009,AmnestyInternationalsoughtleavefromthePreTrialChamber,underRule

103(1)oftheRulesofProcedureandEvidence,tosubmitobservationsasamicuscuriaeoncertainissuesrelatedtosuperiorresponsibility.3 Pursuanttothedecision

dated9April2009grantingthisapplication,4AmnestyInternationalherebysubmits

observationson:(i)thementalelementapplicabletomilitarycommandersabsent

actualknowledge;(ii)criminalresponsibilityforthefailuretosubmitamatterto

1 MichaelA.NewtonandCaseyKuhlman,WhyWarlordsEvadetheLawofCommandResponsibility:A

PleaforaMoreAppropriateConceptionofEffectiveControlat48(draftarticlependingpublication,onfile

withamicuscuriae).MichaelNewtonisProfessorofthePracticeofLawatVanderbiltUniversityLaw

School. Heisaretiredmilitaryattorney,andwasamemberoftheU.S.delegationthatnegotiatedtheElementsofCrimes,whichassisttheCourtintheinterpretationandapplicationofthecrimeswithin

itsjurisdiction.2 Unlessotherwisespecified,thetermssuperior(s)andsuperiorresponsibilityrefertoboth

militaryandciviliansuperiors,whilethetermcommander(s)refersonlytomilitarysuperiors.3 ApplicationForLeavetoSubmitAmicusCuriaeObservationsPursuanttoRule103oftheRulesof

ProcedureandEvidence,6April2009,ICC01/0501/08399.4 DecisiononApplicationforLeavetoSubmitAmicusCuriaeObservationsPursuanttoRule103of

theRulesofProcedureandEvidence,9April2009,ICC01/0501/08401.

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competentauthoritiesasappliedtononstateactors;and(iii)whethercausationisan

elementofsuperiorresponsibility.5

II. MENTALELEMENTAPPLICABLETOMILITARYCOMMANDERSABSENT

ACTUAL

KNOWLEDGE

3. ThementalstatessufficienttogroundcriminalresponsibilityformilitarycommandersunderArticle28(a)(i)representanexpressandintendedpolicychoice

ofthedraftersoftheStatutetostrengthencommandersobligationsbeyondthose

undercustomaryinternationallaw. Asexplainedbelow,absentactualknowledge,6

customaryinternationallawimposescriminalresponsibilityonasuperioronlyifhe

orsheisonnoticeofsubordinatescrimes,whileArticle28(a)(i)extendscriminal

responsibilitytoamilitarycommanderwhoshouldhaveknownofsubordinates

crimes. Consequently,Article28(a)(i)replacesthepassivenoticestandardunder

customaryinternationallawwithamoreactivedutytotakestepsthatwillallow

commanderstoknowofcrimescommittedbytheirsubordinates.

A. CustomaryInternationalLawImposesCriminalResponsibilityIfaSuperiorisonNoticeofCrimes,ButDoes

NotImposeanActiveDutytoSeekInformation

4.

Internationallegal

instruments

codifying

the

doctrine

of

superior

responsibilityrecognisebothactualknowledgeandconstructiveknowledgeas

satisfyingthementalelementrequirementofthisformofresponsibilityand,forthe

latter,articulateanoticestandard. Article86(2)ofAdditionalProtocolItothe

GenevaConventionsof1949(AdditionalProtocolI)thefirstcomprehensive

codificationofthesuperiorresponsibilitydoctrineprovidesthatsuperiorsarenot

absolvedofresponsibilityiftheyknew,orhadinformationwhichshouldhave

5 AmnestyInternationalwishestothanktheinternationallawexpertswhoprovidedadviceduring

thedraftingofthisbrief,includingCharlesGarraway(inhispersonalcapacity),MichaelA.Newton

andPatriciaViseurSellers.6 BothArticle28andcustomaryinternationallawimposecriminalresponsibilityonsuperiorsfor

thecrimesoftheirsubordinateswherethesuperiorhadactualknowledgeofthecrime. SeeProsecutor

v.Delali,Muci,Deli,andLando,CaseNo.IT9621T,Judgment,16Nov.1998(elebiiTrial

Judgment),383;Prosecutorv.Muci,Deli,andLando,CaseNo.IT9621A,Judgment,20Feb.2001

(elebiiAppealJudgment),222,239; Prosecutorv.Sesay,Kallon,andGbao,CaseNo.SCSL0415

T,Judgment,2Mar.2009(RUFTrialJudgment),282,309.

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enabledthemtoconcludeinthecircumstancesatthetimethatasubordinatewas

committingorgoingtocommitabreachoftheGenevaConventionsorAdditional

ProtocolI.7 Similarly,draftArticle6oftheInternationalLawCommissions(ILC)

DraftCodeofCrimesagainstthePeaceandSecurityofMankindprovidesthat

superiorsarenotrelievedofresponsibilityiftheykneworhadreasontoknow,in

thecircumstancesatthetimethatasubordinatewascommittingorwasgoingto

commitacrime.8 ThestatutesoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformer

Yugoslavia(ICTY),theInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda(ICTR),and

theSpecialCourtforSierraLeone(SCSL)eachprovidethatasuperiorisnot

relievedofcriminalresponsibilityif[he]kneworhadreasontoknowofthe

subordinatescrimes.9 ThestudybytheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross

(ICRC)alsostatesthatasamatterofcustomaryinternationallaw,thementalelement

forsuperiorresponsibilityisknowledgeorreasontoknow.10

5. Despiteearliercaselawsuggestingapositiveobligationonmilitarycommanderstoobtaininformationirrespectiveofnotice,11contemporary

internationalcriminaltribunalshavelimitedconstructiveknowledgetoamore

7 ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12August1949,andRelatingtotheProtection

ofVictimsofInternationalArmedConflicts,Art.86(2),1125U.N.T.S.3,enteredintoforce7Dec.1978(AdditionalProtocolI).8 DraftCodeofCrimesAgainstthePeaceandSecurityofMankind,Art.6,inReportofthe

InternationalLawCommissionontheWorkofItsFortyeighthSession,UNDoc.A/51/10(1996)(ILC

DraftCode). TheILCDraftCodeseekstocodifyinternationalcrimespursuanttoG.A.Res.174(II)

(21Nov.1947).9 StatuteoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheProsecutionofPersonsResponsiblefor

SeriousViolationsofInternationalHumanitarianLawCommittedintheTerritoryoftheformer

Yugoslaviasince1991,(1993)32ILM1159,asamendedbySecurityCouncilResolution1660of28Feb.

2006(ICTYStatute),Art.7(3);StatuteoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwanda,(1994)33

ILM1602,asamendedbySecurityCouncilResolution1534of26Mar.2004(ICTRStatute),Art.6(3);

StatuteoftheSpecialCourtforSierraLeone,2178UNTS138,U.N.Doc.S/2002/246,16Jan.2002,

AppendixII(SCSLStatute),Art.6(3). Theseprovisionshavebeenheldtoreflectcustomary

internationallaw. SeeelebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,241;Prosecutorv.Bagilishema,CaseNo.

ICTR951AT,7June2001(BagilishemaTrialJudgement),37.10 JeanMarieHenckaertsandLouiseDoswaldBeck,InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,

CustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw,Vol.I(Rules)558,r153(2005)(ICRCStudy).11 SeeTrialofWilhelmListandOthers(CaseNo.47),UnitedNationsWarCrimesCommission,Law

ReportsofTrialsofWarCriminals(1949),Vol.VIII,p.71(Ifhefailstorequireandobtaincomplete

information,thederelictionofdutyrestsuponhimandheisinnopositiontopleadhisown

derelictionasadefence.).

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restrictivenoticestandard. Intheelebiicase,theAppealsChamberoftheICTY

consideredthedutiesimposedonsuperiorsundercustomaryinternationallawinthe

courseofitsinterpretationandapplicationofArticle7(3).12 Itheldthatitwas

consistentwithcustomaryinternationallawforasuperiortobefoundcriminally

responsible,intheabsenceofactualknowledge,onlyifinformationwasavailableto

himwhichwouldhaveputhimonnoticeofoffencescommittedbysubordinates.13

Itreachedthisconclusionafterconsideringtheinstrumentscodifyingthedoctrineof

superiorresponsibilityreferredtoabove,aswellasthepostWorldWarII

jurisprudenceonsuperiorresponsibilityandtheFieldManualoftheUnitedStates

DepartmentoftheArmy.14 SubsequentjudgmentsattheICTY,theICTR,andthe

SCSLhaveconsistentlyadoptedandappliedtheelebiistandard.15

6. Theadhoctribunalshavefoundthat,undercustomaryinternationallaw,asuperiorhasnogeneraldutytoactivelyseekandobtaininformationabouthisorher

subordinatespossiblecriminalconduct.16 Thetribunalshavethusrefusedto

recognisesuperiorresponsibilitywhereasuperiorhasmerelybeennegligentin

failingtoacquireknowledgeofhisorhersubordinatescriminalconduct.17

12 elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,221,22839.13 Ibid,241.14 Ibid,22839.15 See,e.g.,Prosecutorv.Blaki,CaseNo.IT9514A,Judgment,29July2004(Blaki Appeal

Judgment),62;Prosecutorv.Strugar,CaseNo.IT0142A,Judgment,17July2008(StrugarAppeal

Judgment),29798;Prosecutorv.Bagilishema,CaseNo.ICTR951AA,Judgment,3July2002

(BagilishemaAppealJudgment),42;Prosecutorv.FofanaandKondewa,CaseNo.SCSL0414T,

Judgment,2Aug.2007(CDFTrialJudgment),233.16 Prosecutorv.Kordi and erkez,CaseNo.IT9514/2T,Judgment,26Feb.2001(Kordi and erkez

TrialJudgment),435(thereisnogeneraldutytoknowincustomaryinternationallawforeither

militaryorciviliansuperiors);RUFTrialJudgment,supranote6,312([A]superiorcannotbeheld

liableforhavingfailedinhisdutytoobtainsuchinformationinthefirstplace.).17 elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,226(findingnoliabilityundercustomaryinternational

lawforfailingtoacquireknowledgeaboutthecriminalactsofsubordinates);BagilishemaAppeal

Judgment,supranote15,3237(findingthatthetestforcriminalnegligenceasadvancedbythe

TrialChambercannotbethesameasthehadreasontoknowtestintermsofArticle6(3)ofthe

Statute);Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,6163(rejectingcriminalnegligencestandard);

Prosecutorv.Brima,Kamara,andKanu,CaseNo.SCSL0416T,Judgment,20June2007,796([S]olely

negligentignoranceisinsufficienttoattributeimputedknowledge.);CDFTrialJudgment,supra

note15,245(asuperiormaynotbeheldliableforfailingtoacquireinformationinthefirstplace).

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B. Article28DepartsfromCustomaryInternationalLawByIncorporatingaNegligenceStandardforMilitaryCommanders

7. Inpointedcontrasttocustomaryinternationallawasreflectedinthejurisprudenceoftheadhoctribunals,Article28(a)(i)imposescriminalresponsibility

onamilitarycommanderifheorsheshouldhaveknownthattheforceswere

committingorabouttocommitsuchcrimes. Article28(a)(i)mustbeinterpretedin

accordancewiththeordinarymeaningofitstermsincontextandinlightofthe

objectandpurposeoftheStatute.18 Theordinarymeaningofthephraseshould

haveknownisnotrestrictedtocircumstanceswhereacommanderisonnotice,

becauseitindicatesanunmetobligationtoobtaininformation.

8.

Furthermore,

an

explicit

object

of

the

Statute

is

to

contribute

to

the

preventionof[seriousinternational]crimes.19 Becauseoftheirpositionandpowers,

militarycommandersareuniquelyplacedtopreventcrimes. Ifcommandersare

subjecttoactiveobligationstoensuretheyremaininformedoftheconductoftheir

subordinates,thereisagreaterlikelihoodthattheywillpreventfuturecrimesor

repressthemmoreswiftly.20 Thenoticestandardassumeswithoutexpresslysaying

thatcommandandcontrolstructuresareinplacethatwillensureinformation

reachesthesuperiors. Incontrast,theshouldhaveknownstandardimpels

commanderstoensurethatsuchmechanismsareinfactinplaceandarefunctioning

correctly. Accordingly,itfurtherstheobjectandpurposeoftheStatutetointerpret

Article28(a)(i)asimposingmoreheighteneddutiesuponcommanderstokeep

18 ViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,23May1969,enteredintoforce27Jan.1980,U.N.Doc.

A/Conf.39/27(1969),1155U.N.T.S.331(VCLT),Art.31;SituationintheDemocraticRepublicofthe

Congo,CaseNo.ICC01/04168,JudgmentontheProsecutorsApplicationforExtraordinaryReview

ofPreTrialChamberIs31March2006DecisionDenyingLeavetoAppeal,13July2006,33(The

interpretationoftreaties,andtheRomeStatuteisnoexception,isgovernedbytheViennaConvention

ontheLawofTreaties(23May1969),specificallytheprovisionsofarticles31and32.).19 RomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt,17July1998,enteredintoforce1July2002,U.N.

Doc.A/CONF.183/9,37ILM1002(1998),2187UNTS90(Statute),preamble.20 SeeNewtonandKuhlman,supranote1,at48([I]nternationallawentrustscommandersasthe

primaryenforcementmechanismforthelawsandcustomsofwar,soanycommanderinany

conflictunderanyformoforganizationwhofieldsafightingforceassumestheriskofcriminalityifhe

doesnotproperlyemplacemechanismstoensurecompliancewiththelawsandcustomsof

warfare.).

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informedoftheactivitiesoftheirsubordinates.

9. Forthesereasons,Article28(a)(i),properlyinterpreted,coverscircumstancesofnotice,butalsoextendssuperiorresponsibilitytoacategoryofcasesnot

criminalisedby

customary

international

law

where

acommanders

absence

of

knowledgeisduetohisorherfailingsinkeepinginformedoftheconductof

subordinates.21 Indeed,notlessthanayearaftertheadoptionoftheStatute,the

ICTRnotedtheimpositionbywayofArticle28ofamoreactivedutyuponthe

[military]superiortoinformhimselfoftheactivitiesofhissubordinates.22 Inshort,

Article28(a)(i)imposescriminalresponsibilityforaformofnegligence.

10. Thetravauxprparatoiresconfirmthisinterpretation.23 DespitetheuseofthehadreasontoknowstandardinthestatutesoftheICTYandICTR,earlydraftsof

theStatuteincorporatedashouldhaveknownstandardforallsuperiors.24 Asa

resultofconcernsoverapplyingtheshouldhaveknownstandardtocivilian

superiors,thedelegationoftheUnitedStatestotheRomeConferenceproposedan

amendmentprovidingfordifferentiatedmentalstandardsformilitaryandcivilian

superiors. Inintroducingitsproposal,therepresentativeoftheUnitedStatesstated

that

[a]n

important

feature

in

military

command

responsibility

and

one

that

was

uniqueinacriminalcontextwastheexistenceofnegligenceasacriterionofcriminal

responsibility.25 TheUnitedStatesrepresentativestatedthatthenegligence

standardwasnotappropriateinaciviliancontextandwasbasicallycontrarytothe

21 SeeKaiAmbos,SuperiorResponsibility,in1TheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt:

ACommentary823,869(AntonioCasseseetal.eds.,2003)(concludingthatsuperiorsareresponsible

for...effectivereportingsystem[s]within[their]command);WilliamJ.Fenrick,Article28:

ResponsibilityofCommandersandOtherSuperiors,inCommentaryontheRomeStatuteofthe

InternationalCriminalCourt515,519(OttoTriffterered.,1999).22 Prosecutorv.KayishemaandRuzindana,CaseNo.ICTR951T,Judgment,21May1999,227.23 VCLT,supranote18,Art.32.24 See,e.g.,PreparatoryComm.ontheEstablishmentofanIntl.Crim.Ct.,WorkingGrouponGen.

PrinciplesofCrim.LawandPenalties,ChairmansText,ArticleC:CommandResponsibility,

A/AC.249/1997/WG.2/CRP.3(18Feb.1997).25 U.N.DiplomaticConferenceofPlenipotentiariesontheEstablishmentofanIntlCrim.Ct.,

SummaryRecordsofthe1stMeetingoftheCommitteeoftheWhole,U.N.Doc.A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1(20

Nov.1998)(RomeConferenceSummaryRecords),67.

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usualprinciplesofcriminallawresponsibility.26 However,thenegligencestandard

foramilitarycommanderappearedtobejustifiedbythefactthathewasincharge

ofaninherentlylethalforce.27 Therewaswidespreadsupportfortheproposal,and

nodelegationtookissuewiththeUnitedStatesscharacterisationoftheshouldhave

knownstandardasanegligencestandard.28 Thedraftersthereforedeliberately

departedfromthehadreasontoknowformulationofthestatutesoftheadhoc

tribunals,andintentionallyincorporatedanegligencestandardforthemental

elementofsuperiorresponsibilityformilitarycommanders.

11. Anegligencestandarddoesnotimposestrictliabilityoncommandersforthecrimesoftheirsubordinates. Acommanderthathastakensufficientstepsto

guaranteehisorherknowledgebut,notwithstandingthesesteps,didnotlearnof

crimes,shouldnotbeconvicted. Thesestepswouldincludeinstititutinganeffective

andefficientreportingsystemthatensuresinformationabouttheconductof

subordinatesisconveyedtothesuperiorpromptlyandaccurately. Ultimately,the

specificstepsthatareasonablecommandermusttakewillnecessarilydependonthe

circumstancesofacase. Therefore,AmnestyInternationaldoesnotattemptto

proposeinthisbriefthedetailedcriteriafordeterminingwhatlevelandformsof

negligencebyamilitarycommanderarecapturedbyArticle28(a)(i).However,the

organisationmayseekonanotheroccasiontoassisttheCourtindevelopingthe

specificdetailofthesemoreactivedutiesasitappliestheArticle28(a)(i)standard.

C. CircumstancesSatisfyingTheHadReasonToKnowStandard12. AlthoughcustomaryinternationallawimposesadifferentmentalelementstandardforsuperiorresponsibilitythanArticle28(a)(i),thejurisprudenceof

internationalcriminaltribunalsapplyingthatstandardisnonethelessinstructive. As

Article28(a)(i)extendstheobligationsimposeduponcommanders,thetypesof

circumstancesthatsatisfythecustomaryinternationallawstandardwillalsosatisfy

26 Ibid,68.27 Ibid,67.28 Ibid,6982.

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therequirementsofArticle28(a)(i).

13. Underthehadreasontoknowstandard,informationputtingasuperioronnoticeneednotbespecific.29 Inaddition,itneednotcompeltheconclusionofthe

commissionof

crimes.

30Itneed

only

be

sufficiently

alarming

to

justify

further

inquiry,31orsufficientlyalarmingtoputasuperioronnoticeoftheriskthat

crimesmightsubsequentlybecarriedoutbyhissubordinates.32 Inaddition,a

superiormaynotremainwillfullyblindtoinformationthatisavailabletohimor

her.33

14. Thejurisprudenceindicatesthatasuperiorsknowledgeofpastcrimescommittedbysubordinatesthathavegoneunpunishedmayputhimorheronnotice

oftheriskoffuturecrimes. TheICTYAppealsChamberhasmadethefollowing

statementinanumberofcases,whichhasbeenexplicitlyendorsedbytheSCSL:

[W]hileasuperiorsknowledgeofandfailuretopunishhis

subordinatespastoffencesisinsufficient,initself,toconcludethat

thesuperiorknewthatsimilarfutureoffenceswouldbecommitted

bythesamegroupofsubordinates,thismay,dependingonthe

circumstancesofthecase,neverthelessconstitutesufficiently

alarminginformationtojustifyfurtherinquiry....34

15. InStrugar,theICTYAppealsChamber,applyingthemorerestrictivecustomaryinternationallawstandard,rejectedtheProsecutionssubmissionthat

noticeofpriorcommissionofcrimesis,perse,noticeofanunacceptableriskof

29 elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,238;BagilishemaAppealJudgement,supranote15,42;

Prosecutorv.Milutinovi,CaseNo.IT0587T,Judgment,26Feb.2009,120.30 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,393;Prosecutorv.Strugar,CaseNo.IT0142T,Judgment,

31Jan.2005(StrugarTrialJudgment),369;Prosecutorv.Limajetal.,CaseNo.IT0366T,Judgment,

30Nov.2005(LimajTrialJudgment),525.31 Prosecutorv.Hadihasanovi andKubura,IT0147A,Judgment,22Apr.2008(Hadihasanovi andKuburaAppealJudgment),28;seealsoProsecutorv.Krnojelac,CaseNo.IT9725A,Judgment,17

Sept.2003(KrnojelacAppealJudgment),59.32 StrugarAppealJudgment,supranote15,304.33 Prosecutorv.Halilovi,CaseNo.IT0148T,Judgment,16Nov.2005(Halilovi TrialJudgment),

69(citingelebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,387).34 StrugarAppealJudgment,supranote15,301; Hadihasanovi andKuburaAppealJudgment,supra

note31,30;KrnojelacAppealJudgment,supranote31,169;RUFTrialJudgment,supranote6,

311.

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similarfuturecrimes.35Nonetheless,itstressedthatwhereasuperiorfailstopunish

crimesofwhichheorshehasactualknowledge,thisislikelytoincreasetheriskof

newcrimesbeingcommitted.36 Strugarsconvictionsaroseoutoftheshellingofthe

OldTownofDubrovnik. Onthespecificfactsofthecase,Strugarwasfoundtohave

orderedtheattackonSr (apositionaboveDubrovnik),andtohaveknownthat

(i)previousmilitaryactionintheareainvolvedunauthorizedshellingoftheOld

TownofDubrovnik,(ii)hissubordinateshadsubstantialartillerycapacity,

(iii)existingordersprohibitingtheshellingoftheOldTownhadnotproved

effective,and(iv)therehadbeennopunishmentofpreviousactsofshellingofthe

OldTown.37 Inlightofthesefacts,theAppealsChamberfoundthattheAccused

wasalertedoftheriskthatsimilaractsofunlawfulshelling[likethosethathad

occurredpreviously]oftheOldTownmightbecommittedbyhissubordinates.38

16. Indeterminingwhetherasuperiorhasreasontoknow,thejurisprudenceindicatesthattheinformationthesuperiorhasmustbeviewedasawhole. In

Krnojelac,theICTYAppealsChamberoverturnedtheTrialChambersfindingthat

therewasnotsufficientevidencethattheAccused(aprisonwarden)knew,orhad

reasontoknow,thatdetaineeswerebeingtortured.39 TheAppealsChamberfound

thattheevidence,takenasawhole,wassufficientlyalarmingtoputtheAccusedon

noticeoftheriskthattorturewas,orwouldbe,carriedout. Thisevidenceincluded

proofthatindividualsweredetainedbecauseoftheirethnicity;Krnojelacs

knowledgethatMuslimdetaineeswerebeingbeatenandmistreated,becauseitwas

apparentphysicallyandhehadpersonallywitnessedabeating;hiswitnessing

detaineesbeingtoldtheywouldbepunishedasaresultofanescape;andhis

supervisoryrole,

which

involved

going

to

the

prison

every

day

of

the

working

week.

Similarly,withrespecttomurdersthattookplaceattheprison,thefacts,takenasa

35 StrugarAppealJudgment,supranote15,286.36 Ibid,301.37 Ibid,305.38 Ibid,306.39 KrnojelacAppealJudgment,supranote31,169.

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wholewerefoundtoconstitutealarminginformationwhichshouldhaveprompted

theAccusedtoopenaninvestigation.40

17. ICTYjudgmentshavecitedwithapprovalthefactorsidentifiedintheICRCCommentary

to

Article

86(2)

of

Additional

Protocol

Ias

information

placing

a

superioronnotice.41 Thesefactorsincludereportsaddressedtothesuperior,the

tacticalsituation,theleveloftrainingandinstructionofsubordinateofficersand

theirtroops(includingoninternationalhumanitarianlaw),andtheircharacter

traits.42 ICTYChambershavealsocitedtheindiciaidentifiedbytheUnitedNations

CommissionofExpertsinitsFinalReport43onthearmedconflictinformer

Yugoslavia.44 Theseindiciaincludethenumber,type,andscopeoftheillegalacts45

andthetimeduringwhichtheyoccurred;46thenumberandtypeoftroopsinvolved;47

thelogisticsinvolved;thegeographicallocation48andthewidespreadoccurrenceof

theacts;thetacticaltempoofoperations;themodusoperandiofsimilarillegalacts;the

officersandstaffinvolved;49andthelocationofthecommanderatthetime.50 Reports

40 Ibid,166,167,169,170,175.41 Prosecutorv.Hadihasanovi andKubura,CaseNo.IT0147T,Judgment,15Mar.2006

(Hadihasanovi andKuburaTrialJudgment),99;Hadihasanovi andKuburaAppealJudgment,

supranote31,28n.75.42 CommentaryontheAdditionalProtocolsof8June1977totheGenevaConventionsof12August

1949,3545(YvesSandozetal.eds.,1987)(ICRCCommentaryontheAdditionalProtocols).43 FinalReportoftheCommissionofExpertsEstablishedPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution

780,58(1992),annexedtoU.N.Doc.S/1994/674(27May1994)(listingallrelevantindices).44 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,386;Prosecutorv.Gali,CaseNo.IT9829T,Judgmentand

Opinion,5Dec.2003(Gali TrialJudgment),174;Prosecutorv.Gali,CaseNo.IT9829A,

Judgment,30Nov.2006,183.45 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,770(findingthatcrimesweresofrequentandnotorious

thatthereisnowaythatMr.Muci[]couldnothaveknownorheardaboutthem.);RUFTrial

Judgment,supranote6,2148(commissionofcrimeofforcedmarriagewaswidespreadinthe

relevantdistrictandthroughoutthecountry;inthesecircumstances,commanderhadreasontoknow

ofthefighterswhocommittedthiscrimeintherelevantlocation).46 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,769(determiningthattheaccusedspolicyofabsenting

himselffromthecampwhiletheabuseswereoccurringimputedknowledgeofthecriminalactions

ofhissubordinates);seealsoBagilishemaAppealJudgment,supranote15,30.47 Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,618(imputingknowledgeofmistreatmentofdetainees

toanaccusedwhoseunitswereundermannedyettrenchescontinuedtobedug).48 SeeBagilishemaAppealJudgment,supranote15,30.49 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,770(criminaltendenciesofsubordinateknownto

superior).

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byinternationalorhumanrightsorganizations,orbythemedia,mayalsobeusedto

provethatasuperiorwasonnoticeofthecommissionofcrimes.51

III. DUTYTOSUBMITTHEMATTERTOCOMPETENTAUTHORITIESFORINVESTIGATION

AND

PROSECUTION

18. Undercustomaryinternationallaw,superiorshaveadutytoensurethatsubordinatesarepunishedfortheircrimes.52 Thisobligationappliestoallsuperiors

possessingtheabilitytoaffecttheconductofasubordinate,regardlessofmilitaryor

civilianstatus.53 Thespecificactionsrequiredofasuperiorinordertodischargethe

dutytopunishdependuponhisorherdejureordefactocapabilities54andmustbe

determinedonacasebycasebasis.55 Consequently,ifasuperiordoesnothavethe

legalauthoritytopunishasubordinateforthecrime,heorshemustsubmitthe

mattertoanauthoritycompetenttodoso.56

50 FinalReportoftheCommissionofExpertsEstablishedPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution

780,58(1992),annexedtoU.N.Doc.S/1994/674(27May1994)(listingallrelevantfactors).51 Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,618(includingasoneofsixfactorsestablishing

constructiveknowledgethat(v)thepracticewaswidelyknowntoandreportedbyinteraliathe

ICRC,theECMM,andUNPROFORrepresentatives; (citationsomitted));Gali TrialJudgment,supra

note44,704(findinginviewofthecircumstanceswhichprevailedduringtheconflict,thenotoriety

ofcertainoftheincidentsscheduledintheIndictmentandthesystematiccharacterofthesecriminalactswhichextendedoveraprolongedperiodoftime,inconjunctionwiththemediacoverageof

whichtheSRKCorpscommandwasaware,renderstheAccusedsprofessedignoranceuntenable.).52 SeeStrugarTrialJudgment,supranote30,357(Theprincipleofindividualcriminal

responsibilityofsuperiorsforfailuretopreventortopunishcrimescommittedbysubordinatesisan

establishedprincipleofinternationalcriminallaw....);accordLimajTrialJudgment,supranote30,

519.53 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,377.54 Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,417([TheAppealsChamber]generallyconcurswith

theelebiiTrialChamberwhichheld:[i]tmust,however,berecognisedthatinternationallawcannot

obligeasuperiortoperformtheimpossible.Hence,asuperiormayonlybeheldcriminally

responsibleforfailingtotakesuchmeasuresthatarewithinhispowers.(quotingelebiiTrial

Judgment,supranote6,395)).55 Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,72;seealsoHaliloviTrialJudgment,supranote33,74.56 See,e.g.,ICRCCommentaryontheAdditionalProtocols,supranote42,3562(observingthatthe

obligationsofasuperioratanylevelincludeproposingasanctiontoasuperiorwhohas

disciplinarypower,orinthecaseofsomeonewhoholdssuchpowerhimselfexercisingit,within

thelimitsofhiscompetence,andfinally,remittingthecasetothejudicialauthoritywherenecessary

withsuchfactualevidenceasitwaspossibletofind);LimajTrialJudgment,supranote30,529(The

obligationonthepartofthesuperioristotakeactivestepstoensurethattheperpetratorswillbe

punished.);Kordi and erkezTrialJudgment,supranote16,446(Thedutytopunishincludesat

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19. ThisunderstandingofthepracticalrequirementsofthedutytopunishisreflectedinArticle28oftheStatute. Inresponsetoconcernsexpressedduringthe

draftingprocessthatciviliansuperiors,inparticular,arenotalwaysthemselvesina

positiontoprosecute,57Article28doesnotexplicitlyrefertoanobligationto

punishsubordinates;instead,itinvokesthesuperiorsdutytosubmita

subordinatescrimestothecompetentauthoritiesforinvestigationandprosecution.

TheStatutethusrecognisesthat,evenifasuperiordoesnotpossesstheauthorityto

investigateandpunishcrimeswithintheCourtsjurisdiction,heorshemust

neverthelesstakeallnecessaryandreasonablemeasurestoensurethat

subordinateswhocommitsuchcrimesdonotescapepenalsanction.58

20. Inadditiontothisdutytosubmit,Article28alsoreflectsthesuperiorsindependentobligationsunderinternationallawtopreventandrepressthecriminal

conductofsubordinates. UndertheStatuteandcustomaryinternationallaw,the

dutiestoprevent,repress,andsubmitapplytosuperiorsaffiliatedwithstateand

nonstategroups.59 Asexplainedbelow,inapplyingArticle28tosuperiorsaffiliated

withnonstateactors,thefollowingprinciplesshouldbeobserved:(1)superiors

affiliatedwithnonstategroupshaveadutytosubmitmattersinvolving

internationalcrimescommittedbysubordinatestocompetentstateorinternational

authoritiesforinvestigationandprosecution,andmaynotdischargethisduty

leastanobligationtoinvestigatepossiblecrimes,toestablishthefacts,andifthesuperiorhasno

powertosanction,toreportthemtothecompetentauthorities.).57 RoyS.Lee,TheInternationalCriminalCourt:TheMakingoftheRomeStatute,Issues,Negotiations,

Results204(1999);seealsoAmbos,supranote21,at862(explainingthatthedutytosubmit

formulationfillsagapinthatitformulatesaspecificdutyforthosesuperiorswhohavethemselves

nodisciplinarypowerstorepressacrime.).58 Statute,Art.28(a)(ii),(b)(iii);seealsoRobertaArnoldandOttoTriffterer,Article28:Responsibility

ofCommandersandOtherSuperiors,inCommentaryontheRomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminal

Court795,838(OttoTriffterered.,2ded.2008)([W]heredisciplinarymeasuresappeartobe

insufficientlyseveretopunishthecrimethathasbeencommittedthisshallalwaysbethecasewith

regardtothecrimesoutlawedbytheICCStatute[thesuperior]shallsubmitthecasetothe

competentauthorities,whoshallthendelegatethecasetothemilitaryjustice.).59 SeeStatute,Art.28(a)(ii),(b)(iii);RUFTrialJudgment,supranote6,648&pp.67787(convicting

accusedSesayandKallononbasisofsuperiorresponsibilityforcrimescommittedbythe

RevolutionaryUnitedFront,describedasaguerrillaarmyandanirregularforce).

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throughinternaldisciplinarymeasuresorprosecutions;and(2)submissionofa

mattertothecompetentauthoritiesdoesnotabsolveasuperiorofresponsibilityfora

priorfailuretopreventorrepress.

A. SuperiorsAffiliatedWithNonStateGroupsMustSubmitReportsofInternationalCrimesCommittedbySubordinates

toCompetentStateorInternationalAuthorities

21. UnderArticle28,superiorsmaybeheldcriminallyresponsibleiftheyfailtosubmitreportsofsubordinatescrimestothecompetentauthoritiesforthepurposes

ofinvestigationandprosecution.60 ThecrimeswithintheCourtsjurisdictionare

themostseriouscrimesofconcerntotheinternationalcommunity.61Whilethe

obligationtorepresssuchcrimesmayincludetheapplicationofappropriate

disciplinaryorremedialmeasuresontheaccusedperpetrators,thosemeasures

cannotsatisfytheindependentobligationtoinitiateaninvestigativeand

prosecutorialprocessthatcanresultincriminalsanction.62

22. TheStatuterequirestheChambertointerpretandapplythelawinamannerconsistentwithinternationallyrecognizedhumanrights.63 Thus,ininterpreting

thetermcompetentauthorities,64theChambershouldhaveregardtointernational

60 Statute,Art.28(a)(ii),(b)(iii).61 Id.,preamble.62 See,e.g.,Hadihasanovi andKuburaTrialJudgment,supranote41,1777(concludingthata

disciplinarysanctionofaperiodofdetentionnotexceeding60daysforcrimesofmurderand

mistreatmentofprisonersofwarisnotsufficientpunishmentoftheperpetratorsofthosecrimes).

Cf. AmnestyInternational,InternationalLawCommission:TheObligationtoExtraditeorProsecute

(AutDedereAutJudicare),AIIndexNo.IOR40/001/2009(3Feb.2009)(discussingtheobligationof

statestoeitherprosecuteindividualsresponsiblefor,interalia,warcrimes,crimesagainsthumanity,

orgenocide,orextraditethemtocompetentauthoritiesforprosecution).63 Statute,Art.21(3).64 Thedraftinghistorydoesnotaddressthemeaningofcompetentauthorities.RomeConference

SummaryRecords,supranote25,6783(discussingsuperiorresponsibility,butomittingtoaddress

themeaningofcompetentauthorities). NoneoftheleadingcommentariesontheRomeStatute

provideguidanceastothecorrectinterpretationofcompetentauthorities. See,e.g.,Lee,supra

note57,at202204;Ambos,supranote21,at862;M.CherifBassiouni,TheLegislativeHistoryofthe

InternationalCriminalCourt210214(2005).However,thistermechoestherequirementinArticle7(1)

oftheConventionagainstTorturetosubmitthecasetoitscompetentauthoritiesforthepurposeof

prosecution. ConventionagainstTortureandOtherCruel,InhumanorDegradingTreatmentor

Punishment,Art.7(1),G.A.Res.39/46,annex,39U.N.GAORSupp.No.51at197,U.N.Doc.A/39/51

(1984),1465U.N.T.S.85,enteredintoforce26June1987. ThetermsofArticle28makeitclearthatthe

authoritiesmustbeabletoinvestigateandprosecutethesubordinate.

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humanrightslaw,whichrequiresthatindividualssuspectedofacrimebegivena

fairandpublichearingbyacompetent,independentandimpartialtribunal

establishedbylaw.65 Thetermestablishedbylawisinterpretedstrictlytomean

onlybyaparliamentarystatuteorequivalentunwrittennormofcommonlaw.66

23. Superiorsofnonstategroupsmayfaceparticulardifficultiesinsubmittingmatterstothecompetentauthorities. Submissionbyasuperiorofamatterfor

eventualtrialbyajudicialbodyofhisorherownnonstategroupwouldnot

normallysatisfythedutytosubmittocompetentauthorities,assuchbodiesare

notestablishedbyparliamentarystatuteoranequivalentsourceoflaw,67andmay

failtocomplywithfairtrialprinciples.Infact,inthecontextofanarmedconflict,

trialsthatarenotconductedbyaregularlyconstitutedcourt,affordingallthe

judicialguaranteeswhicharerecognizedasindispensiblebycivilizedpeoples,are

consideredawarcrime.68

65 InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,Art.14(1),G.A.res.2200A(XXI),21U.N.

GAORSupp.(No.16)at52,U.N.Doc.A/6316(1966),999U.N.T.S.171,enteredintoforce23Mar.1976.

SeealsoAmericanConventiononHumanRights,Art.8,O.A.S.TreatySeriesNo.36,1144U.N.T.S.123,

enteredintoforce18July1978;AmericanDeclarationoftheRightsandDutiesofMan,Art.XXVI,O.A.S.

Res.XXX,adoptedbytheNinthInternationalConferenceofAmericanStates(1948),reprintedinBasic

DocumentsPertainingtoHumanRightsintheInterAmericanSystem,OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6rev.1

at17(1992);EuropeanConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedoms,

Art.6(1),213U.N.T.S.222,enteredintoforce3Sept.1953,asamendedbyProtocolsNos.3,5,and8which

enteredintoforceon21September1970,20December1971and1January1990respectively. See

generallyAmnestyInternational,FairTrialsManual,AIIndexNo.:POL30/002/1998(Dec.1,1998).66 ManfredNowak,U.N.CovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights:CCPRCommentary319(2005);seealso

Zandv.Austria,App.No.7360/76,15Eur.CommnH.R.Dec.&Rep.70,69(1979)(holdingthe

objectandpurposeoftheclauseinArt.6(1)[isthat]...thejudicialorganization...mustnotdepend

onthediscretionoftheExecutive,butthatitshouldberegulatedbylawemanatingfrom

Parliament.),accordComev.Belgium,App.Nos.32492/96etal.,Eur.Ct.H.R.Judgmentof22June

2000,98.67 SeeJonathanSomer,JungleJustice:PassingSentenceontheEqualityofBelligerentsinNonInternational

ArmedConflict,89IntlRev.oftheRedCross655,664665(2007)(Totheextentthattheregularly

constitutedrequirementofIHLincorporatestheestablishedbylawcriterionasunderstoodby

humanrightslaw,anarmedoppositiongroupmaybebarredfrompassingsentences.). Insomerare

cases,however,therebelgroupmaybeabletosatisfytheserequirements. Forexample,therebelshad

astateandlocalcourtsystemduringtheAmericanCivilWar. SeeCharlesE.George,TheSupreme

CourtoftheConfederateStatesofAmerica,6Virg.L.Reg.n.s.592,599(19201921).68 SeeStatute,Art.8(2)(c)(iv)(establishingjurisdictionoverseriousviolationsofCommonArticle3,

includingtheprohibitioninCommonArticle3(1)(d)of[t]hepassingofsentencesandthecarryingout

ofexecutionswithoutpreviousjudgmentpronouncedbyaregularlyconstitutedcourt,affordingall

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24. Thoughunabletorefersuchmattersforinternalprosecution,superiorsofnonstategroupsneverthelesshaveothermeansbywhichtheycanmeettheir

internationalobligations. Itmaybepossible,forexample,forsuperiorstosubmit

reportsofsubordinatescrimestothecompetentauthoritieswithinthestatewhere

thecrimeswerecommitted. Nonstategroupsoftenbutnotalwaysopposethe

authoritiesofthestatewithinwhichtheyoperate,sosubmissionofreportstothe

establishedgovernmentmayprovepoliticallyunfeasible,andtheriskthatcourts

wouldnotbeimpartialduringthearmedconflictmaydiscouragesuchsubmission.69

Insuchcases,superiorsmaydischargethedutybymakinggoodfaitheffortsto

submitreportsofcrimestotheauthoritiesofotherstatesandtoprosecutorsof

internationalcriminaltribunalswithjurisdictionrequestinginvestigationand

prosecution.

25. Referraltoforeignandinternationalauthoritiesprovidesaneffectivealternativemeansforsuperiorstoensureprosecutionoftheirsubordinates. An

overwhelmingmajorityofstatesareabletoexerciseuniversaljurisdictionover

conductconstitutingoneormorecrimeswithintheCourtsjurisdiction,70andan

increasingnumberofstatesarewillingandabletoinvestigateandprosecutealleged

offenders.71 Furthermore,prosecutorsofinternationaltribunalsincludingthis

thejudicialguaranteeswhicharerecognizedasindispensiblebycivilizedpeoples). Seealso

AdditionalProtocolI,supranote7,Art. 75(4)(thebodyadjudicatingcasesrelatedtothearmed

conflictmustbeanimpartialandregularlyconstitutedcourtrespectingthegenerallyrecognized

principlesofregularjudicialprocedure);ProtocolAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsof12

August1949,andrelatingtotheProtectionofVictimsofNonInternationalArmedConflict,Art.6(2),

1125U.N.T.S.609,enteredintoforce7Dec.1978(AdditionalProtocolII)(Nosentenceshallbe

passedandnopenalty...executed...exceptpursuanttoaconvictionpronouncedbyacourtoffering

theessentialguaranteesofindependenceandimpartiality.).69 See,e.g.,Somer,supranote67,at655,685(recognisingthatarmedoppositiongroupsuperiorswill

mostlikelynotbewillingtodischargetheirdutybyengagingthegovernmentparty).70 SeegenerallyAmnestyInternational,UniversalJurisdiction:TheDutyofStatestoEnactand

ImplementLegislation,AIIndexNo.IOR53/002/200153/018/2001(Sep.1,2001)(discussingstate

practicein125states). Thisstudyisbeingupdatedin192comprehensivepapersoneachU.N.

memberstate.Eachofthesedocumentsisavailableontheorganizationswebsite

(http://www.amnesty.org/).71 SincetheSecondWorldWar,criminalinvestigationsorprosecutionsbasedonuniversal

jurisdictionhavebeenconductedbythecourtsofAustralia,Austria,Belgium,Canada,Denmark,

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Courthavediscretiontoinitiatepropriomotuinvestigationsandprosecutions

withintheirrespectivejurisdictions.72

26. Arequirementthatsuperiorsmakegoodfaitheffortstoreferreportedcrimesto

competent

authorities

for

investigation

and

prosecution

best

implements

the

principlesandpracticalgoalsofthesuperiorresponsibilitydoctrine:itholds

superiorstotherequirementthattheytakeallnecessaryandreasonablemeasures

torespondtocriminalconduct,whileretainingaflexibilitythatpermitsChambersto

determine,onacasebycasebasis,whetherthestepstakenbyanaccusedwere

sufficienttodischargetheduty. Inmakingthisdetermination,theChambershould

takeintoaccount,amongotherthings,(a)whetherthesuperiorhasprovidedall

informationinhisorherpossession;and(b)whetherheorshehascooperatedfully

intheinvestigation. Incasesofsubmissiontoforeignorinternationalauthorities,the

Chambershouldhaveregardtowhetherthesuperiorhasmadeallreasonableefforts

torequestinvestigationandprosecution,suchassubmittingthemattertostatesthat

areabletoexerciseuniversaljurisdictionandtointernationalcriminaltribunalswith

jurisdiction.

B. SubmissionofMattertoCompetentAuthoritiesDoesNotAbsolveSuperiorofResponsibilityforFailuretoPreventorRepress

27. Thejurisprudenceoftheadhocinternationalcriminaltribunalshasconsistentlyconfirmedthat,undercustomaryinternationallaw,thedutytoprevent

andthedutytopunisharenotalternatives:[T]heobligationtopreventorpunish

doesnotprovidetheaccusedwithtwoalternativeandequallysatisfyingoptions,73

Finland,France,Germany,Israel,Netherlands,Norway,Spain,Sweden,Switzerland,theUnited

KingdomandtheUnitedStatesofAmerica.Moreover,statesarebeginningtomovetoashared

responsibilitymodelforinvestigationandprosecution,basedonuniversaljurisdictionofcrimes

underinternationallaw,astheyanswertheSecurityCouncilscallstoacceptcasestransferredfrom

theICTYandICTR,aswellaswithregardtoothercrimes,suchastheroutinetransferofpiracy

suspectscapturedonthehighseasbynavalforcestoKenyafortrial.72 See,e.g.,Statute,Art.15(1).73 Prosecutorv.Blaki,CaseNo.IT9514T,Judgment,3Mar.2000,336;accord,e.g.,Kordi and

erkezTrialJudgment,supranote16,444;BagilishemaTrialJudgment,supranote9,49;StrugarTrial

Judgment,supranote30,373;LimajTrialJudgment,supranote30,527. SeealsoWilliamA.Schabas,

TheUNInternationalCriminalTribunals:TheFormerYugoslavia,RwandaandSierraLeone322(2006).

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becausethedutytopreventcrimesandthedutytopunishtheperpetratorsare

distinctandseparateresponsibilitiesunderinternationallaw.74 Thus,asuperior

maynotescaperesponsibilityforanearlierfailuretopreventorhaltcriminal

conductbylaterpunishingorreferringthematter.

28. InlightofthedirectioninArticle21oftheStatutetoapplytherulesandprinciplesofinternationallaw,Article28shouldbeinterpretedinaccordancewith

customaryinternationallaw,sothatthedutiesreflectedinsubparagraphs(a)(ii)and

(b)(iii)areacknowledgedasseparateandindependentobligationsimposedon

superiors. Thatis,thetermorinthephrasefailedto...preventorrepresstheir

[thecrimes]commissionortosubmitthemattertothecompetentauthorities75does

notpresentasuperiorwithalistofoptions,butratherreflectsthefullrangeofhisor

herdutiesinrespectofsubordinatecriminalconduct.76

29. Asaresult,theChambershouldconcludethatiftheotherelementsofsuperiorresponsibilityaresatisfied,asuperiorssubmissionofsubordinatesalleged

crimestocompetentauthoritiesdoesnotabsolvehimorherofresponsibilityfora

failuretopreventorrepressthosecrimes.

IV. CAUSATIONISNOTANELEMENTOFSUPERIORRESPONSIBILITY30. Undercustomaryinternationallaw,superiorresponsibilityrequires:(i)asuperiorsubordinaterelationship;(ii)thesuperiorsknowledgeofthecrimes

committedbythesubordinate;and(iii)thesubsequentfailurebythesuperiortohalt,

preventorpunishthecrime.77 Absentfromthisthreeelementtestisany

requirementthatthesuperiorsfailuretoactdirectlycausedthesubordinates

74 Prosecutorv.Halilovi,CaseNo.IT0148PT,DecisiononProsecutorsMotionSeekingLeavetoAmendtheIndictment,17December2004(HaliloviDecisiononAmendmentofIndictment),31;

accord,e.g.,BagilishemaTrialJudgment,supranote9,49;StrugarTrialJudgment,supranote30,373.75 Statute,Article28(a)(ii),(b)(iii)(emphasisadded).76 SeeHaliloviDecisiononAmendmentofIndictment,supranote74,3132(observingthatthe

orisdisjunctiveandreflectsseparateduties);Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,7885;

AlexanderZaharandGranSluiter,InternationalCriminalLaw269(2008).77 See,e.g.,elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,346;AntonioCassese,InternationalCriminalLaw

24749(2008)(identifyingthecumulativeconditionsforsuperiorresponsibility).

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crime.78 Instead,thelinkbetweenthesuperiorsfailureandtheunderlyingcrimeis

capturedthroughtherequirementofeffectivecontrolthematerialabilityofthe

superiortoaffectthesubordinatesconductratherthanthroughaseparate

causationelement.79

31. Inspiteofthisestablisheddoctrine,Article28hasbeenunderstoodbysometoimposeanewcausationrequirement.80 Tothecontrary,anexaminationoftheterms

oftheArticleinlightoftheircontext,theStatutesobjectandpurpose,andthe

draftinghistory,demonstratesthattheprovisionwasnotintendedtodepartfrom

customaryinternationallawbyrequiring,asaseparateelement,proofthatthe

superiorsfailingscausedthesubordinatescrimes. Inthealternative,evenifArticle

28werereadasrequiringproofofcausation,thatcausationrequirementwouldbe

properlyinterpretedassatisfiedbyevidencethatthesuperiorsfailingsincreasedthe

riskthatsubordinateswouldcommitcrimes.

A. CausationIsNotRequiredUnderCustomaryInternationalLaw32. Noneoftheinternationallegalinstrumentsreflectingcustomaryinternationallawontheelementsofsuperiorresponsibilityincludesarequirementthatthe

superiorsomissioncausedtheunderlyingcrimesinquestion.

33. ThelanguageofArticle86(2)ofAdditionalProtocolIdoesnotrequireacausallinkbetweenthesuperiorsfailuretoactandthesubordinatescrimes:

Thefactthatabreach...wascommittedbyasubordinatedoesnot

absolvehissuperiorsfrompenalordisciplinaryresponsibility...if

78 See,e.g.,elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,398. Seealsoinfranote90andaccompanyingtext.79 Cassese,supranote77,at24142(2008)(asthedoctrinehasbeenrefinedbytheadhoc

jurisprudence,thecriminalliabilityofthesuperior[i]sincreasinglyseenasaconsequenceofhisown

culpability,notnecessarilylinkedbymeansofacausalnexustotheresponsibilityofthe

subordinates);seealsoGideonBoas,JamesL.Bischoff,andNatalieL.Reid,1InternationalCriminal

LawPractitionerLibrary:FormsofResponsibilityinInternationalCriminalLaw(2007)at178,232.80 See,e.g.,Ambos,supranote21,at860(statingthatArticle28impliesacausalrelationship

betweenthesuperiorsfailureandthesubordinatescommissionofcrimes);OttoTriffterer,

Causality,ASeparateElementoftheDoctrineofSuperiorResponsibilityasExpressedinArticle28

RomeStatute?,15LeidenJ.IntlL.179,197(2002)(describingcausationasaconstituentelementof

Article28);MarkOsiel,TheBanalityoftheGood:AligningIncentivesagainstMassAtrocity,

105Colum.L.Rev.1751,1779n.123(2005).

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theyknew,orhadinformationwhichshouldhaveenabledthemto

conclude...thathewascommittingorwasgoingtocommitsucha

breachandiftheydidnottakeallfeasiblemeasureswithintheir

powertopreventorrepressthebreach.81

34. Whileatleastonecommentatorhasclaimedthatthislanguagereflectsacausalconnectionbetweenthesuperiorsomissionandthesubordinatescrime,82

thereisnosupportforthatinterpretationinthetext. Indeed,asinternational

judgmentsinterpretingthisprovisionmakeclear,theissueisnotoneofcausation,

butratherofeffectiveauthorityandcontrol,socriminalresponsibilityisimposednot

onlyonthesuperiorwhocouldhavepreventedthecrime,butalsoonthesuperior

whofailedtostoporpunishit.83

35. TheprovisionsonsuperiorresponsibilityintheStatutesoftheadhocinternationalcriminaltribunalsreflectthecustomarythreeprongtest,84andlike

Article86(2),containnoseparatecausationrequirement.85 Similarly,theconstituting

documentsofboththeSCSLandtheExtraordinaryChambersintheCourtsof

Cambodiadonotidentifycausationasanelementofsuperiorresponsibility.86Nor

doesthemostrecentILCDraftCodeofCrimesAgainstthePeaceandSecurityof

81 AdditionalProtocolI,supranote7,Art.86(2). Seealso,e.g.,ICRCCommentaryontheAdditional

Protocols,supranote42,3543(citingonlytheelementsofthecustomarythreeprongtestandnot

includingcausation).82 SeeTriffterer,supranote80,at184(Article86(2)establishesacausalconnectionbetweenthe

omissionofthesuperiorandthecrimecommittedbyhisorhersubordinatebecauseitimpliesthat

ifasuperiorhadusedhispower,hewouldhaveoratleastcouldhavepreventedtheattemptedor

completecrime).83 See,e.g.,elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,340,378;elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,

25556.84 Seesupranote77.85 ICTYStatute,supranote9,Art.7(3);ICTRStatute,supranote9, Art.6(3). Insupportofthis

reading,see elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,398;butseeTriffterer,supranote80,at185(finding

nocausalconnectionwithrespecttotheobligationtopunish,butassertingthatonemustexistforthe

obligationtoprevent).86 SCSLStatute,supranote9,Art.6(3);LawontheEstablishmentoftheExtraordinaryChambersin

theCourtsofCambodiafortheProsecutionofCrimesCommittedDuringthePeriodofDemocratic

Kampuchea,asamendedon27Oct.2004,Doc.No.NS/RKM/1004/006,unofficialtranslationbythe

CouncilofJuristsandtheSecretariatoftheTaskForce,revisedon26August2007,Art.29.

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Mankind.87

36. Thejurisprudenceoftheadhocinternationalcriminaltribunalsconfirmsthatcustomaryinternationallawdoesnotrequireproofofcausationinordertoimpose

individualliability

on

asuperior.

The

Trial

Chamber

in

elebii

concluded

that

causationhasnottraditionallybeenpostulatedasaconditiosinequanonforthe

impositionofcriminalliabilityonsuperiors.88 ThatChamberobservedthatArt.7(3)

andcustomaryinternationallawbothprovideforliabilityforasuperiorsfailureto

punishapastcrimewhichcouldneverhavebeencausedbythelaterfailureto

punishandconcludedthatthisdemonstratestheabsenceofarequirementof

causalityasaseparateelementofthedoctrineofsuperiorresponsibility.89

Furthermore,theTrialChamberfoundnosupportfortheexistenceofa

requirementofproofofcausationasaseparateelementofsuperiorresponsibility,

eitherintheexistingbodyofcaselaw,theformulationoftheprincipleinexisting

treatylaw,or,withoneexception,intheabundantliteratureonthissubject.90It

refusedaccordinglytoconsidercausationasaseparateelementofthedoctrine.

37. TheICTYTrialandAppealsChambershaverepeatedlyfollowedelebiibyholding

that

the

prosecution

need

not

prove

that

the

superiors

omissions

caused

the

subordinatescommissionofthecrimes.91 Thesejudgments,alongwiththe

internationallegalinstrumentsalreadydiscussed,providecompellingevidencethat

87 ILCDraftCode,supranote8,Art.6.88 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,398.89 Ibid,400;seealsoBoas,Bischoff,andReid,supranote79,at261(Iftheeffectivecontroltest

meantthatasuperiorcouldonlybeheldliableforafailuretopunishcrimesthatoccurredbecauseof

apriorfailuretocontrolhisorhersubordinates,therangeofpunishableomissionscouldbe

dramaticallyconstrained,apossibilitythathasnotbeenborneoutbytheactualpracticeofthose

tribunals.).90 elebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,398. TheTrialChamberrejectedearliercontraryanalysis

byM.CherifBassiouni. Ibid,n.428. SeeM.CherifBassiouni,CrimesAgainstHumanityinInternational

CriminalLaw42223(2ded.1999)(assertingthat[t]heessentialelementincasesofcommand

responsibility,particularlywithrespecttothoseinthehigherechelonsinthechainofcommandis

thatofcausation,butcitingnoauthority).91 See,e.g.,Blaki AppealJudgment,supranote15,at77;Prosecutorv.Ori,CaseNo.IT0368,

Judgment,30June2006(Ori TrialJudgment),338;Prosecutorv.Ori,CaseNo.IT0368A,

Judgment,3July2008(OriAppealJudgment),PartiallyDissentingOpinionandDeclarationof

JudgeLiuDaqun,32;Hadihasanovi andKuburaAppealJudgment,supranote31,40.

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customaryinternationallawdoesnotrequirecausationtobeprovenasaseparate

elementofsuperiorresponsibility.

B. CausationIsNotRequiredUnderArticle2838. Asatreatyprovision,theinterpretationofArticle28isgovernedbyarticles31to33oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties(VCLT).92 Inaddition,

Article21oftheStatutedirectsChamberstoapply,whereappropriate,othertreaties,

principlesandrulesofinternationallaw,andgeneralprinciplesoflawderivedfrom

nationallaws.93 InordertodeterminewhetherArticle28includesacausation

requirement,theChambershouldthusconsidertheplaintextincontextandinlight

ofthetreatysobjectandpurpose.94 Ifthetextisambiguous,theChambermaythen

considerthe

travaux

prparatoires

of

the

treaty,

95and

any

guidance

provided

by

conventionalorcustomaryinternationallaw,generalprinciplesoflaw,anda

comparisonofthesixauthenticlanguageversionsoftheStatute.96 Applicationof

theseinterpretativestepsconfirmsthatArticle28doesnotrequireproofthatthe

superiorsomissionscausedthesubordinatescommissionofthecrimes.

1. ViewedincontextandinlightoftheStatutesobjectandpurpose,theplaintextofArticle28doesnotrequirecausation.

39.Article

28

of

the

Statute

provides

in

its

relevant

parts

that

a

superior

shall

be

criminallyresponsibleforcrimeswithinthejurisdictionoftheCourtcommittedby

subordinatesasaresultofhisorherfailuretoexercisecontrolproperlyoversuch

subordinates,wheretheknowledgerequirementissatisfiedandthesuperiorfailed

topreventorrepress[thecrimes]commissionortosubmitthemattertothe

92 Seesupranote18.93 Article21oftheStatuteliststhesourcesofinternationallawtowhichtheCourtmayrefer.While

aChambermustapplytheStatuteinthefirstplace,Art.21(1)(a),itmayalsohaveresortto

applicabletreatiesandtheprinciplesandrulesofinternationallaw,Art.21(1)(b),andtogeneralprinciplesoflawderivedfromnationallawsoflegalsystemsoftheworld,Art.21(1)(c);inall

cases,[t]heapplicationandinterpretationoflawpursuanttothisarticlemustbeconsistentwith

internationallyrecognizedhumanrights.Art.21(3).94 VCLT,supranote18,Art.31.95 Ifconfirmationisrequiredortheconclusionreachedbasedupontextualinterpretationis

ambiguousorabsurd,recoursemaybehadtosupplementaryaids,includingthepreparatorywork

ofthetreatyandthecircumstancesofitsconclusion. VCLT,supranote18,Art.32.96 VCLT,supranote18,Art.33.

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competentauthoritiesforinvestigationandprosecution. Theplainreadingofthis

provisionisthattheclauseasaresultofhisorherfailuretoexercisecontrol

properlyreferstothesuperiorscriminalresponsibility,whichisengagedbyhisor

herknowingornegligentomissions.

40. AnalternativeinterpretationofArticle28assertedbysomeisthattheclausebeginningasaresultofreferstothesubordinatescrimes,andthusrequiresa

causalnexusbetweenthesuperiorsomissionandthecrimes.97 Thisattemptto

introduceadistinctcausationrequirementmustberejectedasdiscordantinthe

contextoftheStatute. First,itwouldrenderobsoletethedistinctdutytosubmitfor

investigationandprosecution,becauseitwouldcreateanillogicalindeed,

impossibleburdenontheProsecutiontoprovethatasuperiorcausedthecrimeby

laterfailingtosubmitthatcrimeforinvestigationafteritwascommitted.98 Second,it

wouldignoretheStatutesrecognitionthatsuperiorresponsibilityisdifferentin

characterfromthemodesofliabilityprovidedforinArticle25,whichcaptureforms

ofparticipationinacrime. Superiorresponsibility,incontrast,ispremisedonthe

existenceofaparticularrelationshipwiththosewhoparticipatedinacrime,andis

onlyinvokedwhenalltheelementsofthecrimearesatisfiedbytheconductof

others.99 Requiringsatisfactionoftheadditionalelementofcausationwouldbe

tantamounttochang[ing]thebasisofcommandresponsibilityforfailuretoprevent

orpunishtotheextentthatitwouldpracticallyrequireinvolvementonthepartof

97 See,e.g.,Ambos,supranote21,at860(statingthatArticle28impliesacausalrelationship

betweenthesuperiorsfailureandthesubordinatescommissionofcrimes);Triffterer,supranote80,

at197(describingcausationasaconstituentelementofArticle28);Osiel,supranote80.98 AccordelebiiTrialJudgment,supranote6,400(Theveryexistenceoftheprincipleofsuperior

responsibilityforfailuretopunish,therefore,recognisedunderArticle7(3)andcustomarylaw,

demonstratestheabsenceofarequirementofcausalityasaseparateelementofthedoctrineof

superiorresponsibility.).99 SeeBoas,Bischoff,andReid,supranote79,at330n.327([A]naccusedheldliableundersuperior

responsibilityneednothaveparticipatedinthecrimeinanyway,andmayhavehadnoconnectionto

thecriminalconductsavehisfailuretoprevent,intervenetostop,orpunishit.);GunalMettraux,

TheLawofCommandResponsibility(2009),at79([S]uperiorresponsibilitypresupposesthata

[completed]crimehasactuallybeencommittedbyasubordinate.).

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No.ICC01/0501/08 25/30 20April2009

thecommanderinthecrimehissubordinatescommitted,100andsuperior

responsibilitywouldceasetohaveanypracticalreachbeyondArticle25smodesof

criminalliabilitypremiseduponparticipation.

41.Moreover,

the

plain

reading

cited

above

ismore

consistent

with

the

object

and

purposeoftheStatutethantheproposedalternativeinterpretation. Superior

responsibilityispremisedontherecognitionthatpersonsinpositionsofcommand

andauthorityarebestplacedtopreventorrepresscriminalconduct,andisthus

crucialtotherealisationoftheStatutesgoalsofanendtoimpunityandprevention

ofthemostseriousinternationalcrimes.101 Thispurposeisbestservedbyimposing

criminalresponsibilityonsuperiorswhofailintheirdutiestoreducetheincidenceor

riskofsuchcrimes,notonlythosewhosefailurecausedthecrimes.102

2. AllothermeansofinterpretationcompeltheconclusionthatArticle28doesnotrequirecausation.

42. ApplicationofthesubsidiarymeansofinterpretationandotherguidancesetforthinArticles32and33oftheVCLTandArticle21oftheStatuteconfirmsthat

Article28cannotbereadtorequirecausation. First,theplainreadingdiscussed

aboveplacesArticle28inaccordwithexistinginternationallawandgeneral

principlesoflawasreflectedinnationallegislationasofthedraftingoftheStatute.103

Asdiscussedabove,neithertreatiesnorcustomrequiresproofofcausationasa

separateelement,104andpriortotheStatute,themilitaryandciviliancriminallawsof

100 HaliloviTrialJudgment,supranote33,78(rejectinganycausallink).AccordOriTrial

Judgment,supranote91,338(Ifproofofcausationwererequired,theborderlinebetweenArticle

7(3)...andArticle7(1)oftheStatutewouldbetransgressedand,thus,superiorcriminal

responsibilitywouldbecomesuperfluous.).101 Statute,preamble.102 Theabsenceofacausationrequirementfullycomplieswiththeprincipleofguilt,becausea

convictioncannotbesecuredwithoutproofofthespecialrelationshipbetweenthosewhoparticipate

inthecrimeandthesuperiorchargedwithsupervisoryduties. Individualresponsibilityfora

superior,aswithotherformsofliability,istriggeredbyhisorherownconduct,andthelinkbetween

theindividualaccusedandthecrimeiscapturedbytherequirementofeffectiveauthorityandcontrol.

SeeNatalieL.Reid,BridgingtheConceptualChasm:SuperiorResponsibilityastheMissingLink

BetweenStateandIndividualResponsibilityunderInternationalLaw,18LeidenJ.IntlL.795,82224.

103 SeeStatute,Art.21.104 Seediscussion,supra,atsectionIV.A.

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No.ICC01/0501/08 26/30 20April2009

overtwentynationssurveyedbytheICRC105didnotexpresslyrequirethatthe

superiorsfailuretoacthavecausedthesubordinatescrimesinorderfor

responsibilitytoarise.106

43.

Second,the

travauxprparatoires

of

the

Statute

support

the

absence

of

a

causationrequirementasthemostplausiblereading. Althoughthephraseasa

resultofhadbeenincludedintheproposedtextbeginningwithanearlydraft,107the

Statutesdraftinghistoryrevealsnoexpressintentiononthepartofthedraftersto

introduceanewrequirementofproofofcausationintothedoctrineofsuperior

responsibility.108 Ofthetwopossibleinterpretationsofthephrasediscussedabovein

paragraphs39to40,thefirstcomportswiththecontemporaryunderstandingof

superiorresponsibility,whilethesecondwouldmarkadramaticdeparturefrom

establisheddoctrine. Giventhelackofdeliberationonthecausationissue,109itis

doubtfulthatthisphrasingwasintendedbythedrafterstodivergesosharplyfrom

105 JeanMarieHenckaertsandLouiseDoswaldBeck,InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,

CustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw,Vol.II(Practice)37453751(2005)(providingexcerptsofthe

nationallegislationof24statesonsuperiorresponsibility,includingArgentina,France,Germany,

Rwanda,SpainandtheU.S.,withonlyoneCanadacontaininglanguagerequiringacausalnexus).106 ManyStatesPartiestotheRomeStatutehaveorareintheprocessofadoptinglegislation

incorporatingverbatimitsprovisions(includingArticle28)inordertofulfiltheircomplementarity

obligationsrecognizedinthePreambleandtodevelopalegalbasisforcooperationwiththeCourt.

See,e.g.,InternationalCriminalCourtAct2001,c.17, 65(1),(2)(U.K.);CrimesAgainstHumanity

andWarCrimesAct2000,c.21,5(Canada);InternationalCriminalCourt(Consequential

Amendments)Act2002268.115(Australia). Itremainstobeseenhownationalcourtsinterpret

Article28withrespecttocausation. ButseeVlkerstrafgesetzbuch[CodeofCrimesAgainst

InternationalLaw],26June2002,4(Germany)(notrequiringproofofcausationforimpositionof

criminalliabilitypursuanttodoctrineofcommandresponsibility).107 TheclausebeginningasaresultoforiginatedindraftArticleCofthe1996Preparatory

CommitteeandremainedunrevisedthroughouttheRomeStatutesevolution. SeeGeneralPrinciples

ofCriminalLaw,in2TheLegislativeHistoryoftheInternationalCriminalCourt182,21014(M.Cherif

Bassiounied.,2005).108 TheOfficialRecordsoftheRomeConferencerevealthatdelegatesdidnotdiscussthe

introductionofcausationasadistinctelementofthesuperiorresponsibilitydoctrine. Rome

ConferenceSummaryRecords,supranote25,6783(indiscussingtheU.S.proposal,thedelegates

focusedtheirdiscussionsontheextensionofthedoctrinetociviliansuperiorsanddidnotaddressthe

causationissue).109 Theleadingcommentaryonthenegotiationsdoesnotidentifycausationasanareaofcontention.

SeePerSarland,InternationalCriminalLawPrinciples,inTheInternationalCriminalCourt:The

MakingoftheRomeStatuteIssues,Negotiations,Results189,20204(RoyS.Lee,ed.,1999)(identifying

contentiousissuesrelatingtothedoctrineofsuperiorresponsibilitytobeitsapplicabilitytocivilian

superiors;anditsstatusasanadditionalformofliability).

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No.ICC01/0501/08 27/30 20April2009

establishedcustomaryinternationallaw.

44. Finally,totheextentthattheChamberconsidersthatanambiguityremainsaftertheapplicationofArticles31and32oftheVCLTtotheinterpretationof

Article28

of

the

Statute,

itshould

adopt

the

reading

that

best

reconciles

the

different

versionsoftheArticleinitssixequallyauthentictexts.110WhiletheArabic,Russian,

andSpanishversionsofArticle28alluseaphraseequivalenttoasaresultofhisor

herfailuretoexercisecontrol,andarethusconsistentwiththeEnglishtext,neither

theFrenchnortheChineseversionscontainanylanguagethatcouldbereadto

suggestacausationrequirement. TheFrenchtextusesthephraselorsquilouelle

napasexerclecontrle,whichtranslatestowhenheorshedidnotexercise

control,111andtheChineseversionreferstotheimpositionofcriminalresponsibility

ifamilitarycommanderfailstoexercisepropercontrol.112 TheChambershould

thusadoptthereadingthatreconcilestheFrenchandChinesetextwiththeother

authoritativeversionsoftheArticlebyholdingthatcriminalresponsibilityunder

Article28isimposedonasuperiorasaresultofthefailuretoexercisecontrol,and

doesnotrequirethatthecrimesbecommittedasaresultofthatfailure.

C. IntheAlternative,Article28RequiresOnlyThattheSuperiorsFailuresIncreasedtheRiskoftheSubordinatesCrimes.

45. Inthealternative,iftheChamberweretointerpretArticle28asdepartingfrompreexistinginternationallawbyrequiringproofofcausation,thetextdoesnot

110 SeeStatuteArt.128;VCLT,supranote18,Art.33(4)([W]henacomparisonoftheauthentictexts

disclosesadifferenceofmeaningwhichtheapplicationofarticles31and32doesnotremove,the

meaningwhichbestreconcilesthetexts,havingregardtotheobjectandpurposeofthetreaty,shallbe

adopted.).111 TheFrenchtextprovides,inrelevantpart:Unchefmilitaireouunepersonnefaisant

effectivementfonctiondechefmilitaireestpnalementresponsabledescrimesrelevantdelacomptencede

laCourcommispardesforcesplacessoussoncommandementetsoncontrleeffectifs,ousoussonautoritetsoncontrleeffectifs,selonlecas,lorsquilouellenapasexerclecontrlequiconvenaitsurces

forces(emphasisadded).

112 (emphasisadded). TherelevantpartoftheChinese

versionofArticle28isbesttranslatedtoEnglishasfollows:Ifamilitarycommanderorperson

effectivelyactingasamilitarycommanderfailstoexercisepropercontrolovertheforcesunderhisor

hereffectivecommandandcontrol,oreffectiveauthorityandcontrolasthecasemaybe,underthe

followingcircumstances,suchcommanderorpersonshallbecriminallyresponsibleforthecrimes

committedbysuchforcesthatcomewithinthejurisdictionoftheCourt.

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No.ICC01/0501/08 28/30 20April2009

provideanystandardbywhichtojudgetherequisiteproximitybetweenthe

superiorsomissionandthesubordinatescrime.113 Giventhislacuna,the

appropriatecausationstandardwouldhavetobedeterminedinlightoftheStatutes

contextandobjectandpurpose. Fortworeasons,thepropercausationrequirement

mustbelowerthanabutforstandard. First,butforcausationwouldrenderthe

superiornodifferentfromanordinaryperpetrator,becauseitwouldmakehisorher

omissionanintegralelementofthecrime.114 Second,asuperiorsindividualexercise,

orfailuretoexercise,effectivecontrolcanaffecttheriskofcrimesduringhostilities

farbeyondthescopeofthatindividualsdirectactions. Inordertoholdaccountable

thosepersonsinpositionsofauthoritywhoarebestplacedtopreventorrepress

crimes,thedoctrineshouldprovideliabilitywherethesuperiorsfailureshave

increasedtheriskforcrimeandthatriskwasrealised. Forthesereasons,ifthePre

TrialChamberweretoconcludethatArticle28includesacausationelement,it

shouldrequiretheprosecutiontoproveonlythatthesuperiorsfailureincrease[d]

theriskthatthesubordinatescommitcertaincrimes.115

46. Underthisincreasedriskstandard,thecausationrequirementwouldbesatisfiedbypresentingproofofeither(i)aspecific,isolatedomissionrelatedtothe

crimeinquestion;or(ii)ageneral,continuingseriesofomissionstoexercisecontrol

properly. Incontext,practicalconsiderationsruleoutahigherstandard.116 Asan

exampleofaspecificomission,asuperiormayfailtotakesomeactionthat

unquestionablywouldhavepreventedaparticularsubordinatescrimeofwhichhe

wasaware. Inthisinstance,thecausallinkisstrongestbetweentheomissionandthe

crime,asthesuperiorclearlyhadtheabilitytopreventcommissionandfailedtodo

113 Triffterer,supranote80,at196(Itdoesnotdefinehowtightorloosetheconnectionbetweenthefailureanditsresulthastobe.).114 Seesupra40(discussingtheStatutesrecognitionoftheuniquenatureofsuperiorresponsibility).115 Ambos,supranote21,at860. SeealsoVolkerNerlich,Symposium:SuperiorResponsibilityUnder

Article28ICCStatuteForWhatExactlyIstheSuperiorHeldResponsible?,5J.IntlCrim.Just.655,

673(2007)([I]tsufficesthatthesuperiorsfailuretoexercisecontrolproperlyincreasedtheriskthat

thebasecrimewascommitted.).116 Triffterer,supranote80,at197(2002)(thenexusisnotoneofstrictcausalityaccordingtothelaws

ofnaturalsciences).

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No.ICC01/0501/08 29/30 20April2009

so. However,theincreasedriskstandardwouldalsobesatisfiedbyevidenceofa

generalomission. Asanexampleofageneralomission,asuperiormayroutinely

omittocontrolhissubordinatesproperly(by,forexample,turningablindeyeor

failingtoeducatethemininternationalhumanrightsorhumanitarianlaw). The

prosecutionmayallegethatthesuperiorsgeneralfailuretocontrolhissubordinates

createdanatmosphereofimpunity,increasingthelikelihoodofcommissionof

crimes. Althoughthecausalrelationshipappearsweaker,astheelebiiAppeals

Chamberacknowledged,ageneral,ongoingfailuretoexercisethedutiestoprevent

orpunish,maybeofsignificantlygreatergravitythanisolatedincidents,because

ofitsimpliciteffectofencouragingsubordinatestobelievethattheycancommit

furthercrimeswithimpunity.117

47. Ifproofofcausationisrequired,thentheStatutesobjectandpurposebestisaccomplishedbyrequiringtheprosecutiontoproveonlythesuperiorsgeneral

failuretoproperlycontrolhissubordinates. Becauseinternationallawcharges

superiorswithaffirmativedutiestoimpart,enforceandabidebyinternational

humanitarianlaw,holdingthemcriminallyresponsibleinconnectionwithcrimes

committedbytheirsubordinatesshouldnotbelimitedtothoseinstanceswherea

directcausallinkcanbeproven. Toeffectivelyimplementinternationallawand

curtailthecommissionofcrimes,theStatuteshouldbeinterpretedtorecognizethat

anatmosphereofimpunityandlawlessnesscreatedbyafailureofcommandisan

importantcausalfactorofcrimes. Inordertoholdresponsiblemilitaryorcivilian

superiorswhofailtoexercisetheirsupervisoryauthority,thedoctrineshouldnot

requiremoreproofofcausationthanthatthesuperiorsfailureshaveincreasedtherisk

thatcrimes

may

be

committed.

117 elebiiAppealJudgment,supranote6,739.

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V. CONCLUSION48. Forthesereasons,theChambershouldconcludethat(i)Article28incorporatesanegligencestandardformilitarycommanders;(ii)superiorsaffiliated

withnon

state

groups

have

aduty

to

submit

matters

involving

subordinates

crimes

tocompetentstateorinternationalauthoritiesforinvestigationandprosecution,but

suchsubmissiondoesnotabsolveasuperiorofresponsibilityforapriorfailureto

preventorrepress;and(iii)causationisnotanelementofsuperiorresponsibility.

Respectfullysubmitted,

MsWidneyBrown MrDonaldFrancisDonovan MrRoyS.Schndorf

MrChristopherKeithHall MsNatalieL.Reid CounselfortheApplicant

AmnestyInternational Debevoise&PlimptonLLP

CounselfortheApplicant

DatedthistwentiethdayofApril2009

AtLondon,UnitedKingdom,NewYork,USAandAseret,Israel

ICC-01/05-01/08-406 20-04-2009 30/30

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