A UnifiedApproach to Conceptualizing People in Psychotherapy · Journal of Unified Psychotherapy...

Journal of Unified Psychotherapy and Clinical Science Volume 1, Number 1 • 2012

Henriques and Stout 37

[P]sychotherapists behave like members ofcompeting tribes, with different esoteric lan-guages and rituals. Unification assumes thatwe all work in the same realm with the sameprocesses regardless of the subsystem or spe-cific domain we emphasize and specialize in.A unified model encourages us all to be awareof the larger picture and even if domain-spe-cific treatment is undertaken, an understand-ing of the system and interconnections ofdomains and processes keep us alert to otherpossibilities for further developments.

Magnavita (2008, p. 273)

A conference presentation at the 2010 meet-ing of the Society for the Exploration of

Psychotherapy Integration in Florence, Italyvividly affirmed the need for a more unifiedapproach toward conceptualizing people inpsychotherapy. The presentation consisted ofDrs. Leslie Greenberg and Paul Wachtel ana-lyzing a videotape series of cognitive behav-ioral therapy for perfectionism conducted byDr. Martin Antony (Wachtel & Greenberg,2010). The patient was a motivated, attractiveyoung woman completing a graduate degreein psychology who strove for perfection inmany areas of her life. She was extremely fo-cused on organizing, planning, and succeed-ing at everything she did. She also hadoccasional panic attacks and issues concern-ing her body image.

A Unified Approach to ConceptualizingPeople in Psychotherapy

Gregg Henriques,1 Ph.D. Jason Stout, Psy.D.James Madison University James Madison University

ABSTRACT

In line with the central thrust of Anchin and Magnavita’s (2008) claim that uni-fication is the next wave in psychotherapy, this article advances the argument byarticulating a unified approach to conceptualizing people in psychotherapy that co-herently integrates a biopsychosocial view with modern research in personalityand the major perspectives in individual psychotherapy (i.e., behavioral, cognitive,psychodynamic and humanistic).

1Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Gregg Henriques, Ph.D., Department ofGraduate Psychology, James Madison University, MSC 7401, 800 S. Main St., Harrisonburg, VA 22807.E-mail: [email protected]



What was striking about the presentation washow Dr. Antony focused almost exclusivelyon daily activities and habits and herthoughts associated with them. In contrast,her emotions, relationship processes andinternal working models, and the way she de-fended against uncomfortable images, feel-ings, or impulses were essentially ignored. Forexample, at one point in the first session, Dr.Antony inquired about the woman’s eatingpatterns and, with tears welling up in hereyes, she hesitantly reported that she purgedabout once a day. Dr. Antony made little ac-knowledgement of her feelings or of herpained experience sharing this information.Not surprisingly, Drs. Wachtel and Greenbergsharply criticized the way these elements wereignored in the therapy. Indeed, at one point,Dr. Greenberg commented that he did notbelieve that cognitive behavioral therapiestreated the whole person. It is likely, however,that a cognitive behavioral therapist might re-tort that Emotion Focused Therapy (e.g.,Greenberg, 2002), similarly does not focus onthe whole person but only the emotional part.Or perhaps the individual would question theassertion by arguing that no system focusedon the whole person in the manner thatGreenberg implied.

In this paper we introduce an approach to con-ceptualizing the whole person based on a newunified theory of psychology that works to as-similate and integrate key insights from thevarious approaches to psychotherapy into a co-herent whole (Henriques, 2003; 2004; 2008).In the psychotherapy integration literature, as-similative integration is a term coined byMesser (2001) and describes a perspective thatallows one to incorporate key insights fromother approaches into one’s own primary ther-apeutic outlook. The current perspective worksvia assimilative integration; however, insteadof operating from an existing paradigm like

psychodynamic theory or behavioral science,it introduces a new unified theory of psychol-ogy that can assimilate and integrate the vari-ous findings and key insights from each of themajor perspectives in psychological theory andpractice. This paper is divided up into twoparts, the first of which provides the readerwith a brief overview of the unified theory, andthe second offers a unified approach to concep-tualizing based on the broad framework pro-vided by the unified theory.

Part I: The Four Pieces that Make Up theUnified TheoryThe unified theory (Henriques, in press) con-sists of four pieces that interlock to form anew way to view psychology as a whole. Theyare: 1) The Tree of Knowledge System, whichprovides a map of cosmic evolution as consist-ing of four dimensions of complexity (Matter,Life, Mind, and Culture); 2) Behavioral Invest-ment Theory, which consolidates manyexisting ideas in the cognitive, behavioral,evolutionary, and neurosciences to offer acoherent natural scientific account of animalbehavior in general; 3) The Influence Matrix,which is an extension of Behavioral Invest-ment Theory to the relational domain and ar-gues that humans have motives for power,love, and freedom that emerge out of an ini-tial bed of dependency; and 4) The Justifica-tion Hypothesis, which is a framework forunderstanding of the evolution of humanself-consciousness and human culture. Webriefly describe each of these pieces below,and in the second part of the paper we articu-late how they fit together and lead to a uni-fied approach to conceptualizing people inpsychotherapy that incorporates the biopsy-chosocial view, modern personality research,and key insights from each of the major par-adigms in psychotherapy.



The Tree of Knowledge SystemThe first piece of the unified theory is the Treeof Knowledge (ToK) System (Henriques, 2003;2008), which offers a novel depiction of emer-gent evolution (Figure 1). As is illustrated, theToK System makes the ontological claim thatthere are four distinguishable dimensions ofcomplexity. Virtually all other broad modelsdepict the hierarchy of nature as a single di-

mension of complexity that stretches fromsubatomic particles to molecules to organismsto human societies (e.g., Wilson, 1998). Thedepiction of four different dimensions ofcomplexity is the needed change in perspec-tive that allows one to see how scientific the-ories can be organized and how psychology inparticular can be defined (Henriques, 2004).Why, according to the ToK System, are theredifferent dimensions of complexity in addi-tion to different levels of analysis? The reasonis because each dimension of complexityemerges as a function of different systems ofinformation processing: Genetic informationprocessing gives rise to the dimension of Life,neuronal information processing gives rise tothe dimension of Mind, and symbolic infor-mation processing gives rise to the dimensionof Culture.

These dimensions of complexity are differentdimensions of causality, which is a rather pro-

found philosophical argument. Consider, forexample, that Descartes’ philosophical analy-sis is famous for its dualism. Matter and mindwere conceived by Descartes as separatespheres of substance and cause. Of course,modern scientific views have argued for amonistic position. Mind must be some formof matter because the problem of nonmaterialcausality is philosophically insurmountable.However, this raises the issue of reductionism.Are minds and societies just complicatedphysical processes?

The issue of reductionism has been one of themost hotly debated issues in the philosophyof science, and with its pictographic represen-tation the ToK System offers a new vantagepoint to explore this complicated concept. Touse a common aphorism, in the case of reduc-tionism and the ToK System a picture is wortha thousand words. Much of the debate con-cerning reductionism can be framed by con-sidering the concept from two opposing,perhaps even “fear driven” points of view. Thefirst point of view, frequently expressed phys-ical reductionists (e.g., Churchland, 1986) isthe notion that all phenomena are material.The fear here is that failure to accept thispoint leads to an unworkable dualism (Baren-dregt & Hans van Rappard, 2004). The secondand opposing viewpoint protests that mentaland social events are not “just” materialprocesses and that a reductionistic material-ism is greedily reductionistic (Dennett, 1995).The ToK System validates both perspectivesand simultaneously debunks the fears of thenatural scientists who worry that the socialsciences will exist in a free float, while at thesame time it addresses the fears of psycholo-gists and social scientists in that it preservesthe integrity of their dimensions of analysis.In other words, the ToK System offers a con-silient frame from which to view the world si-multaneously from bottom-up and top-down

Figure 1. The Tree of Knowledge System.



perspectives. The ToK System is monistic inthe sense that the higher dimensions of com-plexity supervene on the lower dimensions.Everything that is biological is also physical,everything that is psychological is biological,and so forth, and Energy is the ultimate com-mon denominator. However, the ToK Systemis not greedily reductionistic. As is clearly de-picted in the diagram, everything is not justenergy and matter. Instead there are four the-oretically separable classes of objects andcauses: 1) the physical; 2) the biological; 3)the psychological and 4) the sociocultural.

How is the ToK System relevant to the psy-chotherapist? Consider that virtually everystudent of psychotherapy learns to use thebiopsychosocial model as a broad heuristictool for conceptualizing the various aspects oftheir patients’ functioning. This model is auseful heuristic that allows a clinician toquickly identify and organize relevant infor-mation to the client’s overall functioning andsystemic issues (Engel, 1977). However, thegeneric biopsychosocial model has a numberof inadequacies, including generalizations thatmay be too broad, a lack of resolution regard-ing problems of reduction and emergence, andthe absence of explanations for how and whycertain domains of human functioning areseparate from others. In contrast, the ToK Sys-tem offers a new view of the biopsychosocialmodel that helps to amend these deficiencies.First, it begins by segmenting reality into di-mensions of complexity— Matter, Life, Mindand Culture—which results in a Physico-Bio-Psycho-Social view of human functioning(Henriques, 2003). The explicit differentiationof the physical from the biological speaks tothe new way that the ToK System organizes re-ality and how it offers a new way to under-stand issues of reductionism and emergence.

Consider, for example, that most would as-sume that the physical is included in the bio-

logical. However, according to the ontologicalmap provided by the ToK System, nature con-sists of four separate dimensions of complex-ity, and it is as relevant and important toseparate the physical from the biological (see,e.g., Kincaid, 1990) as it is to separate the bi-ological from the psychological and the psy-chological from the social. So how would weapply the lens of the ToK System to humanbehavior? Looking at human behavior via theprism of the ToK, it is divided into four di-mensions of complexity. Each dimension ofcomplexity can be further divided into fourlevels of 1) part; 2) whole; 3) group; and 4)macro-level system. As Henriques (2008)notes, the ToK System is unique in dividingnature into both levels and dimensions. Thefundamental parts of the physical dimensionare the particles elucidated by the StandardModel of Elementary Particle Physics, thewholes are the atoms in the Periodic Table,the groups are molecules and the system refersto physical objects in the environment. How-ever, although we can analyze a human asconsisting of physical objects like atoms andphysical forces like electromagnetism andgravity, because humans are biological entitiesthe complexity of human behavior cannot befully explained or reduced to these forces. Thebiological dimension includes the gene as thefundamental part, the cell as the whole, mul-ticellular organ systems as the group, and theecology as the system. However, although wecan analyze humans as biological objects, be-cause humans are psychological entities,human behavior cannot be fully explained orreduced to biological processes. The psycho-logical dimension includes the neural impulseexchanged in neural networks as the funda-mental part, the animal acting in context asthe whole, animal groups as the group, andanimal societies in ecology as the system.However, although we can analyze humans aspsychological objects, because humans are



also cultural entities, human behavior cannotbe reduced to the psychological dimension.The sociocultural dimension includes thesign-symbol as its fundamental informationalpart, the human self-consciousness system asits whole, human groups as the group, andhuman societies in a multinational context asthe system.

The separate dimensions of complexity in theToK diagram are intimately connected to twoof the three other pieces that make up theunified theory, Behavioral Investment Theoryand the Justification Hypothesis. These ideasare what are known as “joint points” in theToK System. Joint points are the links betweenthe dimensions of complexity (Henriques,2003). They provide the theoretical frame-work that explains how the higher dimensionevolved out of the lower dimension. From thevantage point provided by the ToK System,the modern evolutionary synthesis is the jointpoint between Matter and Life because it is bi-ology’s unified framework and provides thebasic frame for understanding the evolutionof biological complexity (Mayr & Provine,1998). Using the ToK diagram, we can thenask: Are there joint points between Life andMind and between Mind and Culture? Theshort answer is yes, and Behavioral Invest-ment Theory and the Justification Hypothesisare the respective theories.

Behavioral Investment TheoryBehavioral Investment Theory (BIT) is thejoint point between Life and Mind and pro-vides the framework for understanding theevolution of mental behavior, which is the be-havior of the animal as a whole, mediated bythe nervous system (Henriques, 2004). Thebasic idea of BIT is that the nervous systemhas evolved into an energy management andinvestment value system that computes in-creasingly complex and flexible behaviors. For

example, crows on the west coast of Canadafeed on whelks, which are a type of shellfish.The crows crack the shells of the whelks bypicking them up and dropping them onto therocks below. BIT makes the general predictionthat animals will tend to spend the leastamount of behavioral energy necessary pre-dicted to achieve the motivated outcome (cf.La Cerra & Bingham, 2003), which in this caseis a cracked shell that provides access to food.Researchers calculated the amount of energyrequired by the crows to lift the whelk to thepoint that optimizes the likelihood that theshell would break. If the crow does not lift thewhelk high enough it will require severaldrops, yet flying it higher would result in theunnecessary expenditure of energy. The calcu-lations found that the optimal expenditure ofbehavioral energy would be achieved by fly-ing the shellfish to approximately five metersand this was in fact very close to the heightsthe birds actually dropped the whelks from(McFarland, 1985).

BIT consists of six fundamental principles thatare generally well known in animal behavioralscience but are often not put together in away that is effectively communicated to pro-fessional psychologists (Henriques, in press).They are as follows:

1) The Principle of Energy Economics isthe fact that animals must, on the whole, ac-quire more workable energy from their be-havioral investments than those behaviorscost; otherwise their complex arrangementswill breakdown and eventually they will die.

2) The Evolutionary Principle is that inher-ited tendencies toward the behavioral ex-penditure of energy should be a functionof ancestral inclusive fitness.

3) The Principle of Behavioral Genetics isthe notion that genetic differences resultin differences in behavioral investmentsystems.


4) The Computational Control Principle isthe idea that the nervous system is theorgan of behavior and it functions as aninformation processing system.

5) The Learning Principle is the notion thatbehavioral investments that effectivelymove the animal toward animal-environ-ment relationships that positively covariedwith ancestral inclusive fitness are selectedfor (i.e., are reinforced), whereas behavioralinvestments that fail to do so are extin-guished. The learning principle incorpo-rates both associative and operantconditioning processes.

6) The Principle of Development states thatthere are various genetically and hormon-ally regulated life history stages that requiredifferent behavioral investment strategies.

BIT consolidates existing theoretical perspec-tives and, in conjunction with the holisticvision afforded by the unified theory, allowsfor previously separate lines of thoughtand research to be coherently integrated (Hen-riques, 2003). Specifically, BIT allows for the as-similation and integration of major perspectivesinmind, brain, and behavior, including: 1) evo-lutionary biology and genetics; 2) neuroscience;3) behavioral science; 4) computational/cogni-tive science; and 5) developmental and dy-namic systems theory. And, with its focus oninvestment and cost-benefit analysis, it alsoprovides a framework for understanding animaland human behavior that is very congruentwith economics. For example, Herb Gintis(2009), an economist who specializes in evolu-tionary biology and game theory, has arguedthat the central unifying principle underlyingthe behavioral sciences is the view that themind is a decisionmaking organ that calculatescosts and benefits to arrive at choices, suggest-ing that the principle has broad applicationacross a wide variety of different disciplines.

There are several ways that BIT is valuable to

the clinician. First, it provides a conception ofanimal and human behavior as working to con-trol the flow of resources, and this can guide cli-nicians in their functional understanding ofmental behavior. Second, via the six principles,BIT grounds the clinician in basic brain and be-havioral sciences and foundational conceptslike associative and operant conditioning.Third, BIT provides a useful lens to look at cer-tain disorders. For example, Henriques (2000)argued why depression could be effectively con-sidered a state of behavioral shutdown via thelens of BIT. Specifically, BIT suggests that de-pression arises out of an evolved tendency todecrease behavioral expenditure in response tofailing to chronically effectively control theflow of resources (i.e., in situations of prolongeddanger, stress, or consistent failure to achieveone’s goals it is best to shutdown rather thatfruitlessly expend energy). Henriques (in press)further explained how this conception clarifiedwhen and how it was appropriate to considerdepression as a normal reaction, a psychologi-cal disorder, and a biological disease. Fourth,BIT and the Justification Hypothesis (describedbelow) give rise to a model of human con-sciousness that is very congruent with modernpsychodynamic and experiential perspectives.Finally, the lens of BIT can be applied to humansocial motivation and emotion in a productiveway, and this is the focus of the third piece ofthe unified theory.

Figure 2. The Influence Matrix.




The Influence MatrixThe Influence Matrix (IM) is an extension ofBIT to human social motivation and emotion,whichmeans that it incorporates the principlesof energy economics, evolution, behavioralgenetics, computational control, learning,and development. The IM is also representedin a diagram (Figure 2), one that maps the ar-chitecture underlying the way humansprocess social information, develop socialgoals, and are guided by emotions in navigat-ing the social environment.

Looking at the diagram, the motivations areinside the circle, whereas the emotions arelisted on the outside. Starting with the moti-vations, notice the two boxes inside the circle,one toward the upper right and the other to-ward the lower left, labeled high and low in-fluence respectively. These boxes representcore motivational templates that function asreference ideals. The first foundational as-sumption of the IM is that social influence,defined as the capacity to get other individu-als to act in accordance with one’s interests, isa resource all humans are motivated to ac-quire. That is, like nutritious food, social in-fluence reflects a basic, primary need anddesire. It is, of course, not the only founda-tional motivation humans have, but it istheorized to be a central one. The secondfoundational assumption is that there arethree conceptually distinct dimensions under-lying the computation of high social influencein adults, Power (dominance–submission),Love (affiliation–hostility), and Freedom (au-tonomy–dependence). According to the IM,higher levels of social influence are associatedwith higher levels of power and affiliation anda healthy balance between autonomy and de-pendency. In contrast, lower levels of socialinfluence are associated with hostile and sub-missive orientations and relative extremes ofindependence or dependence.

The IM posits that human relational processescan be conceptualized as a form of social ex-change, whereby people are negotiating theacquisition of social influence with one an-other. To effectively negotiate such exchanges,individuals have motivational and emotionalstructures that allow for the representationone’s self-interests and the interests of impor-tant others. Dominance, autonomy, and hos-tility, along with the emotions of pride, anger,and hate orient an individual toward promot-ing one’s own self-interests. In contrast, thepoles of affiliation, submission, and depend-ency, along with the emotions of shame,guilt, and love orient the individual towardthe importance and validity of others’ inter-ests relative to one’s own. The IM posits thatin the course of engaging in social exchange,individuals will represent both their own in-terests and the interests of others. If the ex-change is mutually beneficial, both partieswill experience an increase in their sense ofsocial influence. However, if there is conflict,both sides of the self-other dialectic becomeactivated. Consequently, interpersonal con-flict often produces a state of intrapsychicconflict, whereby individuals experience in-clinations both to challenge and defy basedon self interests and accommodate and deferbased the other’s interests. Of course, there aresome individuals that tend to almost exclu-sively emphasize self-interests and becomedominant, hostile, prideful and angry,whereas other individuals become submissive,dependent, guilty and shameful.

The IM is a useful guide for clinicians becauseit helps them to assimilate and integratemany lines of theory and research in socialand interpersonal psychology. Montazeri(2009) reviewed how the model was congru-ent with many lines of research including psy-chodynamic relational perspectives such as



those advocated for by Karen Horney, Inter-personal Circumplex Models, attachment the-ory, parenting styles, sociometer theory,agency and communion, and trait theory.Stout (2010) argued that the model also linedup well with two integrative approaches inpsychotherapy, Wachtel’s (1993) cyclical psy-chodynamics and Young’s (2005) schema fo-cused therapy. The IM also directly connectsto the fourth piece of the unified theory,which links language-based beliefs to socialmotivations and the social context.

The Justification HypothesisThe Justification Hypothesis (JH) is the jointpoint between Mind and Culture on the ToKSystem, and provides a framework for under-standing the nature of human self-conscious-ness and the evolution of human culture. TheJH interprets both human self-consciousnessand culture as justification systems. Justifica-tions are the linguistic reasons we use to legit-imize our claims and actions, and justificationsystems are interlocking networks of specificjustifications that legitimize a particularversion of reality (Shealy, 2005). Using thelens of the JH, we argue that processes ofjustification are ubiquitous in human affairs.Arguments, debates, moral dictates, rationali-zations, and excuses, as well as many of themore core beliefs about the self, all involvethe process of explaining why one’s claims,thoughts, or actions are warranted. In virtu-ally every form of social exchange, from war-fare to politics to family struggles to science,humans are constantly justifying their behav-iors to themselves and to others. Moreover,justification processes are a uniquely humanphenomenon. Other animals communicate,struggle for dominance, and form alliances.But they don’t justify why they do what theydo. We are the justifying animal.

The JH consists of three basic postulates (Hen-riques, 2003). The first is that the evolution of

language created a new and unique adaptiveproblem for our hominid ancestors, namelythe problem of social justification, which isthe fact that the evolution of language re-sulted in humans becoming the first animalin evolutionary history that had to justifywhy they did what they did. Effectively justi-fying one’s actions is obviously crucial now,as can be seen in the research examining theway explanatory styles impact other people’sattitudes and behaviors (Antaki, 1994). Andbecause humans have always been intenselysocial creatures, there is every reason to be-lieve that it was an essential problem to solvein our ancestral past (Barkow, 1992).

The second postulate of the JH is the claimthat the human self-consciousness systemfunctions as a justification system that con-structs narratives for why one does what onedoes in a manner that takes into accountone’s social context and relative degree of so-cial influence, and filters out unacceptable im-ages and feelings. Henriques (2003; in press)has reviewed a large body of work in cogni-tive, social, developmental and neuropsychol-ogy, cognitive dissonance, self-serving biases,implicit and explicit attitudes, reason giving,and the nature of self-knowledge and showedthat language-based beliefs are in fact organ-ized in a manner that tends to facilitate socialjustification. For example, people tend to altertheir beliefs to maintain a narrative of them-selves as effective, helpful and intelligent,people will consciously maintain socially ac-ceptable nonprejudicial attitudes, yet demon-strate subconscious biases against minorities,and people will tend to explain actions thatresult in favorable outcomes in terms of sta-ble, internal causes, whereas actions that re-sult in unfavorable outcomes are explained interms of transient, external causes.

The third postulate is that the JH provides thebasic framework for understanding cultural



levels of analyses. This is because the conceptof large-scale justification systems providingthe rules and patterns for acceptable behav-iors is consonant with modern conceptions ofculture (e.g., Shaffer, 2008). From this vantagepoint, laws, moral dictates, and even religiousand philosophical beliefs are all seen as justi-fication systems writ large that offer the indi-vidual roadmaps on what behaviors aresocially acceptable. These large-scale culturaljustification systems offer beliefs and valuesabout what is morally right and wrong andmake claims about how one should organizetheir personal and public lives accordingly(Henriques, in press).

A Tripartite Model of Human Consciousness.Especially relevant to the clinician is the viewof adult human consciousness that emergesfrom the unified theory. Specifically, the logicof BIT and the JH ultimately give rise to atripartite model of human consciousness thatconsists of: 1) an experiential consciousnesssystem; 2) a private self-consciousness system;and 3) a public self-consciousness system. Tounderstand why, the first point to be made isthat the unified theory strongly supports a twodomain view of the human mind, whichmaintains that human mental architecturethat consists of two kinds of information pro-cessing systems. The first system, as framed byBIT, is a nonverbal, perceptual-motivational-emotional, parallel neuro-information process-ing behavioral guidance system that computesresource availability and organizes action. Thesecond system, framed by the JH, is uniquelyhuman and is a verbal (i.e., symbolic-syntacti-cal), reflective, logical-analytic, sequential in-formation processing system. Importantlyfrom the perspective of integrating psycholog-ical theories, dual processing models of thehumanmind are found in work in psychother-apy (e.g., Greenberg, 2002), neuropsychology(e.g., Kolb &Wishaw, 2003), cognitive psychol-

ogy (e.g., Stanovich, 2004), and social psychol-ogy (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999). In fact, sofundamental is this general conception of twobroad mental domains that it has been pro-posed as the basis for a central dogma inhuman psychology (Cook, 1989).

Because consciousness is a particular form ofcognitive process (Henriques, in press) and be-cause humans have two distinct cognitive pro-cessing systems, it follows that humans havetwo different forms of consciousness (cf. Orien-stein, 1972). Many have indeed argued thatthere are two broad categories of mental expe-rience, domains that can be referred to as sen-tience and self-consciousness (e.g., Pinker,1997). Sentience is the term used to describenonverbal conscious experiences, such as feel-ing pain, seeing red, being hungry, or imagin-ing an event. In contrast, self-consciousnessrefers to the language-based, self-reflectivethought. Whereas the former involves experi-encing (e.g., feeling hungry), the latter involvesself-awareness andmeaningmaking about thatexperiencing (“Here I am, feeling hungry, andwishing that I could get home for dinner”).

Epstein (1994) proposed a two domain modelof the humanmind and consciousness that in-tegrates psychodynamic theory with cognitivescience in a way that is very congruent withthe perspective offered here. He articulatedwhy viewing human mental processes as con-sisting of an experiential and a rational-ana-lytic mode of information processingorganized a vast array of empirical data. A gapin Epstein’s innovative model—filled in by theJH—is a conceptual frame explaining why theso-called rational mind evolved in humans andwhy it exhibits the design features it does. Ep-stein explicitly stated his model was congruentwith a modern psychodynamic perspective inthat the experiential mode would influence theoperations of the rational mode in ways that



the individual was often unaware. The JH en-riches this picture significantly because it char-acterizes the second domain as a justificationsystem that inhibits and filters out nonverbalthoughts, images, and impulses that are so-cially unacceptable and allows justifiable ac-tions to be expressed. Another extension ofEpstein’s model derives from the JH is that, be-cause the JH emphasizes the important role ofsocial justification, it leads to insights aboutthe difference between the private and publicself-consciousness system.

Figure 3 depicts three broad domains ofhuman consciousness derived from the uni-fied theory: 1) the Experiential Self; 2) the Pri-vate Self-Consciousness System (the Private

Self for short); and 3) the Public Self. The ex-periential self refers to the sentient aspects ofconsciousness, and it is made up of the qualiaor the “raw feels” of conscious experience.These experiences can be generally classifiedinto sensations and perceptions (e.g., seeingred, touching a rock), motivational urges (e.g.,hunger, sexual desire), and feelings and emo-tions (e.g., sadness, joy, anger), as well asimagined objects and occurrences. The twoother domains of human consciousness rep-resent the two separable domains of justifica-

tion, the private and the public. The privateself is the center of self-reflective awareness inadults and is made up most immediately ofthe internal dialogue that weaves a narrativeof what is happening and why. It is a secondorder awareness system, one that translatesand feeds back onto the experiential system.Early in the developmental sequence, the pri-vate and public justification systems are notclearly separated. As language develops, spe-cific actions are either inhibited or allowed de-pending on the strength of the rule, themagnitude of the impulse, and the develop-ment of executive functioning. However, theprivate justification system emerges as speechand dialogue is internalized and in later child-hood and certainly by early adolescence thereis a distinct, private self-consciousness systemthat becomes the seat of reflective self-aware-ness in adults.

The public self is a mixture of how we wantto be seen and how we imagine we are seenby others, although both may be quite differ-ent than how one’s image is actually receivedby others. A number of seminal theorists haveemphasized the importance of and dynamictension between the public and private iden-tity and researchers have demonstrated thevalidity of separating the private from publicforms of self-consciousness (e.g., Fenigstein,2009). The microsociology of Erving Goffman(1959) makes a strong case in favor of the im-portance of the public persona in a way that isvery consistent with the JH (see Shaffer,2005). In The Presentation of Self in EverydayLife, Goffman describes face-to-face interac-tions and examined such processes throughthe lens of stage acting. He articulated how in-terpersonal interactions could be considered“performances” as actors learned to managetheir impressions to others in both the struc-tured and improvised roles of everyday life.Specifically, Goffman suggested that actors

Figure 3. The Tripartite Model of Human Consciousness.



work to convey a positive, predictable impres-sion, so as to be perceived as justifiable in theeyes of the audience.

Above the two figures is labeled “The Contextof Justification”, which refers to the networkof symbolically based beliefs and values thatprovide the interacting members a sharedframe of reference for their interaction. Thereligious, legal, and normative systems of so-cial convention all provide the larger contextin which the specific actions and scripts oflocal individuals are played out. Actions arealso labeled in the figure, and are fairlystraight forward. These are the set of observ-able behaviors that the individuals engage in,and are explicitly defined as the functionalchanges between the individual and the envi-ronment (as opposed to changes within theindividual).

Inside each of the individuals in the figure aretwo filters, labeled the Freudian and theRogerian. The Freudian filter exists betweenthe experiential self and the private self andrefers to the process by which unjustifiable orpainful images and impulses are filtered outand/or are reinterpreted to be consistent withthe individual’s conscious justification sys-tem. It is called the ‘Freudian’ filter becausethe dynamic relationship between self-con-scious thoughts and subconscious feelingswas (and still is) a central focus in both classi-cal psychoanalysis and modern psychody-namic theory (McCullough Valliant, 1997).

We call the filtering that takes place betweenthe private and the public self the Rogerian fil-ter because, in relationship to early psychoan-alytic thinking, Rogers shifted the focus fromdeep and largely nonconscious intrapsychicprocesses to more conscious thought and ex-periences and here-and-now interpersonalprocesses. He also emphasized that the root of

much psychopathology was in how judgmen-tal others would stunt the development ofone’s “true self”. This is because, fearing judg-ment, individuals filter out their true desiresand put on a mask—a “social self”—often toappease influential others (and, often, to de-ceive others). Person centered therapy is basedon the premise that through forming a rela-tionship with an empathetic, nonjudgmentalother, individuals will stop the problematicstunting caused by the private to public filter-ing process, reinvest in their true sense of self,and return to a path of growth and fulfillment.

Why are certain impulses filtered? Accordingto the JH, the reason is to maintain a consis-tent, relatively stable justification narrative ofthe self and to maintain a justifiable image inthe eyes of others (Henriques, 2003). Swanson(1988) made exactly this point, explicitly ar-guing we should think of all ego defenses as“justifications that people make to themselvesand others—justifications so designed thatthe defender, not just other people, can acceptthem” (p. 159). The formulation remains ahallmark feature of modern psychodynamicmodels and is also present in general modelsof personality (e.g., Mayer, 2004), social psy-chological research on cognitive dissonance(e.g., Tarvis & Aronson, 2007) and psy-chopathology (e.g., Wachtel, 1993).

An example of research into repression serveswell to highlight both Freudian and Rogerianfiltering processes and the dynamic interplaybetween the experiential self, the private self,and the public self. To explore the dynamicsof sexual guilt, Morokoff (1985) divided a sam-ple of women into “high sexual guilt” and“low sexual guilt” groups and had themwatchan erotic film for twelve minutes. Eachwoman’s arousal was measured physiologi-cally, and they were also given self-reports. Theresults indicated that the high guilt women



experienced more physiological arousal but re-ported less arousal than the low guilt women,and this was interpreted as evidence of repres-sion. The data from the physiological measureoffered evidence that a subconscious portionof their experiential minds responded to theexplicit material with relatively high levels ofsexual arousal, and yet they ostensibly did nothave self-conscious access to such arousal, pre-sumably because their identity judged sucharousal to be unjustifiable. If this was the case,this would be the Freudian filter at work. Ofcourse, it could be that the women con-sciously recognized their arousal but did notwant to publicly share that with the experi-menter and thus intentionally minimizedtheir self-reported arousal due to social de-mand characteristics. If so, this would be anexample of the Rogerian filter at work.

Conclusion of Part IIt can be readily argued that the reason psy-chotherapy has not been unified is becausethe field of psychology remains pre-paradig-matic with no overarching set of ideas thatcan effectively combine key insights and em-pirical findings in a way that leads to a usefuland comprehensive picture of the humancondition. The unified theory seeks to changethe status quo and offers four new ideas thattogether allow for a new view of both the fieldof psychology and the human conditionmore generally (Henriques, in press). In thenext section of this paper, we apply the uni-fied theory to the development of a unifiedapproach to conceptualizing people in psy-chotherapy.

Part II: The Unified Component SystemsApproach to ConceptualizingMagnavita (2008) argued that the pathway tounification is through the identification ofvarious systems that range from the neurobi-ological through the intrapsychic to the soci-

ocultural and that this should be combinedwith the recognition that various interven-tions target specific subsystems of this wholeto effect change. Magnavita (2005) identifiedthe intrapsychic level as being mediated byneurobiological processes and consisting ofbroad, interconnected domains or systemsthat are frequently the focus of intervention.He identified four intrapsychic subsystems,which included: 1) the attachment system,with refers to the constellation of relationalneeds and internal working models; 2) the af-fective system, which refers to the emotionalfeeling states of the individual; 3) the defen-sive system, which refers to the ways in whichindividuals consciously or unconsciouslystructure their internal experience to main-tain equilibrium and comfort; and 4) the cog-nitive system, which refers to the schema orinformation processing templates that indi-viduals have for making sense of the world.As we will see, the current approach overlapslargely with Magnavita’s formulation.

Figure 4 provides a map of the unified com-ponent systems based on the unified theory,and it is a formulation that shares many sim-ilarities with Magnavita’s (2005) unified com-ponent system approach. Starting with theleft side of the figure, the biological, psycho-logical, and social contexts are delineated. Thearrows are drawn in a manner to indicate the

Figure 4. The Unified Component Systems Approach toConceptualizing People in Psychotherapy.



time trajectory and the relationship betweenthe contextual levels and the psychologicallevel of analysis, which is the focus of the di-agram. Thus the biological context representsa “bottom up” conceptualization, where asthe learning and developmental context arehorizontal (i.e., at the psychological level),and the sociocultural context is “top down”in the sense that one considers the society orsocial context as the whole and moves down-ward to the individual.

The circle in the middle of the diagram repre-sents the individual in question and extend-ing outward are the five intrapsychic systemsthat are derived from the unified theory,along with brief definitions describing theirkey elements. Consistent with modern per-sonality research, these systems can be con-sidered characteristic adaptational systems,which are differentiated from personalitytraits (e.g., Singer, 2005). Whereas traits arethe most stable dimensions of personality,characteristic adaptations are mid-level per-sonality units that “include motives, goals,plans, strivings, strategies, values, virtues,schemas, self-images, mental representationsof significant others, developmental tasks,and many other aspects of human individu-ality that speak to motivational, social–cogni-tive, and developmental concerns” (McAdams& Pals, 2006, p. 208). It was the trait re-searchers Costa and McCrae (1994) who intro-duced the term characteristic adaptations, aterm they chose because such aspects of thepersonality system help the individual fit intothe ever-changing social environment andmake up the unique core of the individual. Al-though McAdams and Pals (2006) note that“there exists no definitive, Big Five–like list ofthese kinds of constructs” (p. 208), we offerjust such a formulation here, specifying fivesystems of adaptation that, although interre-lated, can be conceptually differentiated. BothSinger (2005) and Magnavita (2005) have

pointed out that there is currently a substan-tial gap between modern personality theoryand psychotherapy that needs to be filled in,and we want to highlight the fact that notonly does the approach taken here integratethe various psychotherapy paradigms, but italso jives well with modern, broad proposalsin personality research by articulating a newframework for understanding characteristicadaptations (see also Mayer, 2004).

On the right side of the diagram is a placeholder to put the individual in a specific cur-rent and future environmental context thatconsists of both valued affordances (resourcesin the environment the individual might useto grow and develop or meet importantneeds) and stressors. Below we briefly describeeach component of the diagram (three con-texts and five systems) and connect it to con-ceptualizing individuals in the context ofpsychotherapy.

The Three ContextsThe Biological Context. The biological contextrefers to three broad domains: 1) the evolu-tionary history of the species; 2) the uniquegenetic make-up of the individual; and 3) thecurrent functioning of the individual’s physi-ology and anatomy. Evolutionary biology andpsychology provide the lenses to consider thefirst element. As represented clearly by BIT, weneed to understand the shared evolutionaryhistory of the species and the phylogeneticforces that have shaped the basic human psy-chological architecture during the environmentof evolutionary adaptation (Barkow, 1992). Wemust also keep inmind that behavioral geneticsresearch has demonstrated that virtually allmajor categories of mental behavioral disposi-tions (e.g., psychological traits, intelligence,tendencies toward psychopathology like schiz-ophrenia and depression) have a genetic com-ponent (e.g., Kendler & Prescott, 2006).Finally, all psychological processes are medi-



ated by physiological processes, and medicine(especially neurology, endocrinology, andbiopsychiatry) provide the lens to considerthe impact of physiological functioning onhuman mental behavior.

From the vantage point of conceptualizing apatient presenting in psychotherapy, the bio-logical context is crucial. Family histories ofillness and temperamental tendencies are use-ful to place traits and dispositions toward psy-chopathology in a behavioral genetic context.And allergic reactions, infections, hormonalfluctuations, diseases, and side effects frommedications can all have a substantial impacton psychological functioning. It is, of course,the medical professions that have the primarycharge to assess biological functioning and in-tervene when necessary, and if possible, it isalways a good idea to have a medical consultwhen conducting psychotherapy, especially ifthere are any unusual or unexpected symp-toms, symptoms that do not change with en-vironment, or symptoms that are not readilyunderstandable given the psychological con-ceptualization of the individual.

The Learning and Developmental Context.Men-tal behavior (Henriques, 2004) evolvesthrough time and one can only understandthe current response tendencies by placingthem in a temporal context. According to theprinciples of BIT, we need to consider thelearning history, specifically what patterns ofinvestment have been selected for and whathave been selected against, along with the lifehistory stage or developmental context the in-dividual is in. Noted on the diagram are thedistal elements, which refers to the earlylearning and development that laid the foun-dation for growth (e.g., the attachment his-tory), and the proximal, which are the recentevents (e.g., break up, failure to get intoschool) contributing to current functioning.

In terms of conceptualizing people, it iscrucial to think about reinforcement and pun-ishment histories, models, and past environ-mental affordances and stressors. In regards todistal learning and development, early pat-terns of attachment, parental discipline, andemotional expressiveness, domains of successor failure (such as academics or sports), earlypeer relations, formative memories fromchildhood and adolescence, as well as majortraumatic events are crucial to consider. Interms of development stages, we find ErikErikson’s psychosocial developmental stagemodel to be particularly useful not so muchin terms of the specific stages and timeframes,but as a heuristic for the kinds of developmen-tal tasks individuals are likely to be facing. Forexample, as clinicians who regularly treat col-lege students in psychotherapy know, issuespertaining to the development of identity andintimacy are frequently paramount.

The Sociocultural Context. The socioculturalcontext refers to the societal and relationalcontext in which the individual is embeddedand, following Bronfrenbrenner (1979), wecan consider the socioecological spheres rang-ing from the broadest macro-level contextwhere customs, values, roles, and norms func-tion as the large-scale justification systemsthat coordinate the population, to the moreintermediate range of community level influ-ences, such as local cultural tones and socioe-conomic status, to finally the micro-levelrelational environment consisting of the in-dividual’s family and friends.

In conceptualizing individuals, the macro-level cultural context is crucial for under-standing individual identities, values, andexistential narratives (cf., McAdams & Pals,2006). Notions about healing, rites and tradi-tions, and elements like collectivist versus in-dividualistic cultural orientations are crucial



to take into consideration when framing thepsychotherapeutic enterprise, which thera-pists should be aware was born in a Westernindividualistic culture and often carries as-sumptions associated with that worldview. Inaddition, human identities are very muchformed from the dialectical tensions betweenself and society, and it is crucial to understandwhich beliefs about purpose, meaning,change, and destiny that are swirling aroundin the social sphere have or have not been in-ternalized by the individual. In regards to themeso-level sphere, issues of class, social status,and quality of the living community (e.g.,noise, traffic, safety, daily hassles) are enor-mously relevant for psychological function-ing. Finally, as will be made directly apparentwhen we explore the nature of the character-istic adaptational systems, it is difficult tooverstate the impact of the immediate rela-tional world (Wachtel, 2008) on psychologicaldevelopment.

The Five CharacteristicAdaptational SystemsThe Habit System. Like many perspectives (e.g.,MacClean, 1993; Minsky, 2006), the unifiedtheory posits that the human nervous systemis a layered system of computational control,evolving from a base of simpler more auto-matic sensory motor processes to behaviorsthat are guided by motivation and emotion,and then higher thought. In this light, thehabit system corresponds to the basic levels ofmental processes and consists of sensori-motor patterns and reflexes, fixed action pat-terns, and procedural memories that can beproduced without any conscious awareness.Habitual responses are automatically initiatedupon the presence of specific environmentalcues and are shaped based on associations andconsequences. The relatively automatic andrigid nature of habits has remained a centralassumption in several contemporary areas of

research analyses of human as well as animalbehavior, and naturalistic studies of humanbehavior show habits tend to be tied to thecontext cues contiguous with prior perform-ance and that they are implemented relativelyindependently of people’s conscious goals andintentions (Neal & Wood, 2009). Whereasconsciousness is activated in response to un-expected changes, routine actions converselybecome engrained in the habit system, andone can informally characterize the habit sys-tem as that which involves doing withoutthinking.

In terms of conceptualizing people, the con-cept of habit is, of course, central to the be-haviorists, and in that regard, the lens of thehabit system corresponds to looking at anindividual’s daily routines, general activitylevels, patterns of eating, sleeping, substanceuse, sexual activity and exercise, and stimulior triggers that evoke particular kinds ofresponse patterns. The habit system is partic-ularly important to consider when conceptu-alizing addictive behavior patterns (e.g.,drinking, smoking, or gambling) that a clientor patient wants to alter. Indeed, many, if notmost of the actions that people consciouslywish they did not engage in will have a stronghabitual component to them. In addition, be-cause of its direct connection to and elicita-tion by environmental stimuli, thinkingabout the habit system opens up ways tothink about how to potentially restructure theenvironment that might minimize the trigger-ing of bad habits and identify stimuli thatmight foster the selection of more adaptive re-sponse tendencies.

The Experiential System. The experiential sys-tem refers to the nonverbal feelings, images,and sensory aspects of mental life. Examplesof experiential phenomena include seeingred, being hungry, and feeling angry. The uni-



fied theory posits that such first person men-tal experiences are a form of cognitive processand are emergent phenomena that arise fromwaves of neural information processing, al-though how exactly such neurocognitiveprocesses give rise to sentience, or even whichanimals are sentient, remain unansweredquestions. The unified theory posits that theexperiential system in mammals operates on acomputational control formulation wherebyobjects and events are perceptually catego-rized and made meaningful and then refer-enced against motivational goal templateswhich then result in action orienting affectiveresponse tendencies (cf. La Cerra & Bingham,2003). This formulation connects the experi-encing mind to operant behavioral principles(cf. Staats, 1996). For example, hunger acti-vates a template to approach food. The indi-vidual will then search the perceptual fieldand if food is perceived and a pathway toacquire it realized, the individual will feel pos-itive, energizing affect. If, however, the path-way is blocked, the emotional response is oneof frustration. In addition, the experientialsystem also includes imagination, fantasy,and remembered images, as it includes the ca-pacity to simulate objects, events, and actions.

Not surprisingly, the experiential approachesto psychotherapy emphasize the functioningof the experiential system in relationship toone’s overall emotional health. And becauseemotions play a key organizing role in the ex-periential system, it is probably most useful tofocus first on emotions when analyzing thefunctioning of the experiential system. Green-berg (2002) provides very clear guidance forthinking about the nature of emotional expe-rience and what emotional experiences tendto be adaptive and which are maladaptive.Questions for the psychotherapist to considerwhen conceptualizing about the experientialsystem include: What is the range of emo-tional expression and experiencing? Are there

emotional states that dominate an individ-ual’s experience, as is the case in depressiveand anxiety disorders? Are certain emotionsare restricted, warded off, over-regulated, orinhibited? What are primary and adaptiveemotional responses and which are secondaryand maladaptive? Other questions pertain tothe cohesion and sensibility of the individ-ual’s experiential world. Are images or feelingstates constantly vying for conscious atten-tion in conflicted ways? Are aspects of one’sexperiential system split-off, disconnected, orrepressed in some way? In addition to empha-sizing emotions, consideration of images, fan-tasies, and felt experiences within the body isimportant to get a full picture of an individ-ual’s experiential system.

The Relational System. The relational system isa specific aspect of the experiential system butit is so important to human psychologicalfunctioning that it needs particular specifica-tion. The relational system refers to the socialmotivations and feelings states, along with in-ternal working models and self-other schemathat guide people in their social exchangesand relationships. The IM is the frameworkemployed to understand the relational char-acteristic adaptational system, and includeshistories of attachments and important rejec-tions, levels of social influence, agentic orcommunal orientations, social motivationssuch as power, love, and freedom, how self-other representations are coded, and how(real or perceived) changes in important rela-tionships are associated with particular kindsof affective responses.

As Wachtel (2008) notes, psychodynamic the-ory and therapy has taken a relational turn inthe past several decades and virtually all psy-chodynamic perspectives now emphasize thecentral role relationships play in mentalhealth. The IM provides a systematic way toconceptualize people’s relational system. The



first basic principle is to analyze an individ-ual’s social influence, which refers to the ca-pacity to influence important others inaccordance with one’s interests. This is notmeant in a Machiavellian sense of consciouslymanipulating others but instead is consideredmore in terms of the fundamental indicatorsof social influence, such as the amount of ad-miration, love, and respect, or positive relativeto negative attention received from others.The amount of influence is then consideredin an absolute sense (How do others view thisperson?) and in a relative sense, in relation-ship to important others (Do they have moreor less influence than their friends or familymembers?), and in relationship to the individ-ual’s past (Have they recently lost or gainedsocial influence?). In many instances, psy-chotherapy is initiated primarily because ofrecent changes in social influence, such as thebreak up and loss of a romantic relationship,humiliation at failing at school or in one’s job,or the sense that one is not respected or val-ued either by one’s family or society at large.

Second, the lens afforded by the IM also raisesthe question of where the individual tendsto fall on the dimensions of agency andcommunion in most circumstances. Are theyself-focused, tending to emphasize power, au-tonomy and self-reliance, or are they morecommunal, relationship centered and adoptmore of a go along to get along stance? Third,we can more specifically look at their motivesfor power and love, and freedom and depend-ency, the extent to which needs are being metor not in these domains and the extent towhich there is conflict between them. Fourth,we can then ask what are the individual’s fearsregarding loss of social influence and how doesthe individual tend to react to real or imaginedloss of social influence (i.e., Do they tend to bemore submissive and self-critical or are theyhostile and blaming?). Of course, current pat-

terns emerge in part based on schema formedin early childhood, thus it is frequently usefulto draw connections between past and presentrelational patterns (Wachtel, 1993).

The Defensive System. The defensive systemrefers to the ways in which individuals man-age their actions, feelings and thoughts, andshift the focus of conscious attention to main-tain a state of psychic equilibrium. In moreeveryday terms, the defensive system can bethought of in terms of how people cope withdistressing thoughts and experiences. Inmany regards, the defensive system is themost diffuse of the characteristic adaptationalsystems, in the sense that it doesn’t directlycorrespond to a specific domain of mind orconsciousness. Instead, it refers more to theinterrelationships between the domains andthe strategies utilized to maintain mental har-mony and coherence. This is not to say thatthe defensive system cannot be identified orstudied. Psychodynamically oriented clini-cians and theorists have long documentedmechanisms of defensive process. And theFreudian and Rogerian filters provide a frame-work within the unified theory to understandhow people repress and avoid of threateningmaterial emerging from the experientialsystem into self-consciousness and work tomaintain particular social images. Closelyrelated to psychodynamic conceptions of de-fense, social psychologists have experimen-tally examined defensive processes under theguise of cognitive dissonance, and have docu-mented the enormous tendencies to arrangeone’s beliefs and actions in such a way as tomaintain a justifiable narrative of the self(Tarvis & Aronson, 2007).

When conceptualizing people in psychother-apy, the nature of their defensive system iscrucial in understanding the nature of psy-chopathology and the kinds of changes that



are possible and those that will be very resist-ant to change (McCullough-Valliant, 1997).Many different kinds of defense mechanismshave been catalogued and are indicative ofvarious levels of psychological functioningthat have clear treatment implications (e.g.,McWilliams, 1994). Many psychological prob-lems can be understood as arising from mal-adaptive defenses, whereby individualsperceive something—often particular feelings,images or memories—as threatening and de-velop ways of avoiding such experiences, butthis paradoxically ends up creating moreproblems (see Wachtel, 1993).

The Justification System. The justification sys-tem refers to the language-based beliefs andvalues that an individual uses to legitimize ac-tions and develop a meaningful worldview.Especially from the vantage point of psy-chotherapy, we can think about the justifica-tion system from two lenses. One is the morecognitive psychotherapy view that empha-sizes the interpretations people make and theexpectations they have of their environmentand their ability to influence it. These are thesemantic elements were characterized by Beck(1976) as automatic thoughts, which are theimmediate self-talk an individual engages induring an activity or moment of reflection.Some important constructs in the social cog-nitive literature relating to these kinds of jus-tifications include pessimism and optimism,self-efficacy, and an internal versus externallocus of control.

The other lens that is useful is the broader anddeeper lens of existential perspectives articu-lated by Victor Frankl and more recently nar-rative therapists who focus on the guidingjustification narratives that people tell regard-ing who they are, what their purpose is, andwhy they are doing what they are doing in anautobiographical way. This is the level of iden-tity and life narrative that is so central to per-

sonality that McAdams and Pals (2006) char-acterize it as a fully separate component ofpersonality.

In many ways, the justification system is themost important component to conceptualiz-ing adults in psychotherapy. One reason forthis is because in the vast majority of cases ofadult psychotherapy, the justification systemis the most direct window into the personalitystructure and circumstance of the patient orclient. That is, although as therapists we ob-serve appearance and mannerisms of our pa-tients in the consulting room, we usually getto observe only a very small slice of the pa-tient’s behavioral repertoire. And although wecan certainly obtain clues and patients canverbally share their experiential world, we cannever know that subjective experience di-rectly. Thus, as therapists, what we have directaccess to is the justification narrative given bypatients of the problems they are facing. It isusually from that narrative that we must drawinferences about the patient’s habits, experi-ences, relationships, and defenses. Consider,for example, the information conveyed if aperson upon entering therapy is asked whatbrings him in and he answers, “Nothing isgoing my way. It doesn’t matter what I do,fate clearly has dictated that I am destined tobe one of the losers in life. I tried as hard as Icould at my job, but was let go anyway. Andeven though I have not complained about it,my partner claiming I ammoping around andis now threatening to separate from me. It islike I have a big ‘L’ tattooed on my forehead.”As therapists, we can quickly identify key as-pects of his justification system, such as hisexternal locus of control, low self-efficacy, anda pessimistic worldview. However, in just thisshort narrative we can reasonably wonder ifhe has limited mastery and pleasure in hisdaily activities, that his experiential world isdominated by images and related feelingstates of threat, loss, and failure, that interper-



sonally he is likely to be both rejection sensi-tive, resentful and submissive to authority,and that he will likely be defensive, dismis-sive, and resistant to change.

Cognitive psychotherapy provides a usefullens to think about the nature of private self-talk and how the semantic meaning an indi-vidual constructs about themselves andevents in the world can impact subsequentfeelings and actions. Of course, the centralguiding principle in cognitive therapy is ana-lyzing those justifications for the degree towhich they are accurate and helpful. One ofBeck’s lasting insights is that catastrophic au-tomatic thoughts and negative biases in rea-soning are part of the mental cycles that drivepeople toward anxious and depressed moods,although there are more dynamic relationsand reciprocal feedback loops than traditionalcognitive psychotherapy suggested. At struc-turally deeper levels, it is crucial to considerthe depth and breadth of the individuals’ jus-tification system to consider elements like egofunctioning, religious, spiritual, or existentialnarratives and crises, and to reflect on the in-dividuals’ normative ideals and how they ac-tually experience themselves or the worldaround them.

Of course, as therapists, even we don’t get fullaccess to the justification system, only to theportion of the justification system that is notprivately filtered by the client. This is in largepart why the quality of the therapeutic rela-tionship is so important. The better the rela-tionship and the more accurate the empathy,the less the filtering between the public andthe private justification systems there will be.It is in the crucial of a strong therapeutic hold-ing environment can the filters be removedan authentic dialogue about what the clienttruly believes can occur.

Far more could be said about each of these

characteristic adaptational systems. Indeed,the argument put forth here is that entire par-adigms of psychotherapy have been builtthrough focusing primarily on one or anothercharacteristic adaptational system. This wasmade strikingly apparent in the SEPI presenta-tion alluded to at the outset of this paper.From the vantage point offered here, Dr.Antony, a CBT therapist, focused primarily onhabits and justifications. In contrast, by virtueof their respective training in psychodynamicand experiential approaches, Drs. Wachteland Greenberg honed in on the relational, de-fensive, and experiential elements of her pres-entation. We are arguing here that a unifiedapproach to conceptualization can be devel-oped based on a unified theory of psychologythat is congruent with a broad biopsychoso-cial view, corresponds well with modern per-sonality theory, and incorporates key insightsfrom the major psychotherapy paradigms. Tofurther facilitate this linkage, Figure 5 mapsthe unified component systems approachboth to the four pieces that make up the uni-fied theory and the four major approaches toindividual psychotherapy. We hope the link-ages between the psychotherapy paradigmsand the five characteristic adaptational sys-tems are particularly clear. Specifically, the be-

Figure 5.Mapping the Unified Theory and MajorParadigms to the Component Systems.



havioral paradigm corresponds with the habitsystem, the experiential paradigm (especiallyEmotion Focused Therapy) corresponds to theexperiential system, the psychodynamic par-adigm corresponds to both the relational anddefensive systems, and the cognitive para-digm corresponds to the justification system.

We hope that the relationship between theunified theory and the unified componentsystems view is also relatively clear. The ToKSystem provides the broad, overarchingframe, clearly delineating what is meant bythe (physical) biopsychosocial context. BITprovides the conceptual linkages between thebiological context and the habit and experi-ential systems. The IM, as an extension of BIT,maps out the relational system. The JH linkslinguistic reasoning both with to social moti-vations mapped out by the IM and the largersociocultural context.

Limitations and Future DirectionsGiven the aforementioned arguments and de-lineation of the four pieces of the unified the-ory, four dimensions of complexity, threebroad contexts, and five characteristic adap-tational systems, not to mention sub-princi-ples and corollary arguments from each of thebroad claims made, what is a clinician or anapplied researcher to do? A skeptic of the pres-ent effort will likely point out that there aretoo many broad constructs introduced thatmust be grappled with. And when we con-sider their interactions, the implications areoverwhelming. In addition, where are the ex-periments justifying the utility of the currentapproach? This concern was raised in re-sponse to an early article on the unified the-ory. The post-Skinnerian psychologist StevenHayes wrote:

[L]ook at the present effort and ask, “What ef-fective action can now be taken? Toward whatgoals?” Henriques does not present actual data

showing that thinking of the world this way isuseful in a practical or empirical sense. The onlygoals that are mentioned are essentially coher-ence goals. Thus, no new treatments are de-scribed, and no new experiments are laid out. Ifthis analysis is practically useful why can’t it beshown in a real, practical way? (Hayes, 2004,p. 1232)

There are two criticisms of the current ap-proach here that need to be unpacked, bothof which have some degree of legitimacy, butnevertheless do not invalidate the current ap-proach. The first issue pertains to the com-plexity of the unified theory. To the newlyinitiated, the large number of different ideaswhich need to be learned and the applicationof them in context can be daunting. The com-plexity makes pedagogy difficult, and it isadmittedly challenging to learn the compre-hensiveness and the nuances of the unifiedtheory in the context of one or even severalarticles on it. Of course, this is less a specificcriticism of the unified theory than is the na-ture of newly learning a complicated system.Whether one was tackling modern physics orpsychoanalysis or anyone one of a number ofcomplicated systems of science or philosophy,effort is needed for acquisition of the material.One other note along these lines is that, in ad-dition to the problem of pedagogy, the num-ber of parts seems on the surface to violate theprinciple of parsimony. This criticism is morebased on appearances than a deep under-standing of the unified theory. In actual fact,the unified theory is incredibly parsimonious,positing that the universe consists of fiveessences (Energy, Matter, Life, Mind, and Cul-ture) linked by four theoretical joint points(Quantum Gravity, the Modern EvolutionarySynthesis, Behavioral Investment Theory, andthe Justification Hypothesis). According to theunified theory, this basic core structure pro-vides the framework for unifying all scientificknowledge (Henriques, 2003).



The second issue pertains to practicality andempirical validity. In terms of practicality, webelieve those who are looking for a basic con-ceptual scheme for delineating the major do-mains a psychotherapist must consider whentreating an individual will findmuch use in theapproach offered here. However, psychologistsare taught, with good justification, to followthe data. And, yet, if we apply that criterion tothe current proposal, where are the studies doc-umenting that those who adopt a unified ap-proach to conceptualizing are more efficientand effective at conducting psychotherapy?Without such evidence, the skeptic may inter-pret the current scheme as simply asking toomuch and offering too little guidance for theclinician to make use of it in assessment or on-going treatment. The degree to which this ar-gument is compelling is likely to be a functionof the dispositional attitudes of the psycholo-gist and her overall view of the field.

Machado, Lourenco, and Silva (2000) arguethat one of psychology’s great problems overthe past 50 years has been dominated by at-tention to fact gathering at the expense oftheoretical and conceptual analyses. These au-thors argue that, in their zeal to be scientific,psychologists have overemphasized the valuedata has in the absence of effective conceptualand theoretical frameworks. As a conse-quence, the discipline is producing oceans ofinformation but little wisdom because thereis lacking a big picture view that places psy-chological knowledge in a coherent contextthat allows for genuine understanding. It isthis gap that the unified theory seeks to fill,and it is a gap that cannot be filled within thenarrow confines of a research lab. Thus, wesuppose that those clinicians and academicswho do aspire toward coherence goals willgravitate toward the unified theory at thisstage, whereas those who are skeptical offrameworks without specified predictions andoutcomes will remain unimpressed.

The unified theory is now at a stage where theconceptual and theoretical frameworks havebeen laid out. We recognize that if the unifiedtheory is to have a large and sustainable im-pact on the field, the concepts and formula-tions articulated here will have to lead torigorous data-based research projects. Severalresearch projects are currently underway inthat regard, examining well-being, psy-chotherapy outcomes with both outpatientsand severely mentally ill, along with cross-cul-tural research in personality.

ConclusionThis article began with the differences inviewpoints that Drs. Greenberg and Wachtelhad with the cognitive behavioral approachtaken by Dr. Antony. In line with the differ-ences observed there, Norcross (2005) arguedthat fundamental differences in epistemologyand ontology and the lack of a common lan-guage and background of understanding weremajor obstacles to achieving a more integra-tive or unified view. We believe that a unifiedframework is possible and have articulated anapproach to conceptualizing people in psy-chotherapy that is derived from the unifiedtheory (Henriques, in press) and Magnavita’s(2008) unified component systems approachthat consists of three broad contexts and fivecharacteristic adaptational systems. It is a for-mulation that we argue is consistent withmodern research in personality and integratesthe viewpoints and insights of the major par-adigms in individual psychotherapy. As such,we believe it represents an important step for-ward on the way to a unified psychotherapy.

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