ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 1
- Flora Pidoux
This year has been crucial for NATO and
the European Union. Both organizations have
elected their new leaders, paving the way for
a new era. Jens Stoltenberg has become the
new Secretary General of NATO and will
have to deal with ongoing crises like Ukraine,
as well as make sure the new direction
developed during the Wales Summit will be
transformed into concrete action.
On the EU side, Federica Morgherini
replaced Catherine Ashton as High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy. She will have to increase the
credibility and visibility of the EU, making
the Commission a respected actor that counts
on the world stage.
The two organizations will have to work
together as they are implicated in the same
dossiers. The challenge is to offer a common
solution, to avoid the duplication of means
that serve the same end. Both institutions
possess unique and complimentary tools. The
EU is a political organization with economic
and diplomatic means of pressure, and NATO
holds military capabilities. Together, the two
alliances hold a powerful combination of soft
and hard power. It is up to the new leadership
to use these capabilities in the smartest way in
order to achieve their common end goals.
(Source: http://www.acus.org )
NATO-EU Cooperation
Volume 4 - Issue 12 December 2014
Contents:
The EU-NATO Relationship – With New Leadership To
New Impetus?
Ms. Andreeva offers a detailed overview of the cooperation between the Euro-
pean Union and NATO, the obstacles to an effective partnership between the
two organizations as well as the need for the EU to strengthen its security poli-
cies.
The NATO-EU Partnership : Opening A New Chapter After The
Ukraine Crisis
Ms. Zyga’s article focuses on the impact recent crises, and especially the one in
Ukraine, have on the NATO-EU partnership. New threats and challenges de-
mand new forms of cooperation and strategic redefinition.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 2
a political arrangement to define the areas of coopera-
tion, the technicalities and strategies of both organisa-
tions in tackling pending security issues, such as the
increasingly uncertain relations with Russia, terrorism,
non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and
general crisis management.
A consolidated EU-NATO relationship would mean
combining military with civilian resources, strategic
thinking with soft power. Together the two organisa-
tions would establish a highly effective security actor,
able to tackle any crisis management task that arises,
not to mention a global actor with a strong internation-
al voice. Attempts to cooperate have been made and
structures have even been put in place to that end. So
what stands in the way? The answer lies in the political
will of the members involved. The fact that most posi-
tions are not shared by all members and in all situations
only makes the challenges to more intricate NATO-EU
relations harder. The lack of common strategic thinking
between the two entities, albeit more to the detriment
of the EU than NATO, mostly affects the international
community that is in need of a strong multi-lateral cri-
sis manager.
Background
The EU-NATO relationship could be broadly divid-
ed into four distinct phases. First, the Cold-War stage
of relations was a non-existent one – the then-
European Coal and Steel Community was limited to
economic cooperation, while defence and military is-
sues were a NATO-only prerogative. Second, the post-
Cold-War stage saw attempts of both organisations to
By Christine Andreeva
T he NATO-EU Declaration on European
Security and Defence Policy from 2002
asserts that the relationship between
the two organisations should be based on “effective
mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and trans-
parency” and on “coherent, transparent and mutually
reinforcing development of the military capability
requirements common to the two organisa-
tions” (NATO, 2002). Instead, the EU-NATO rela-
tionship seems to be one of “unstrategic partners” –
characterised by “political impasses, inherent incon-
sistencies, persistent contradictions and underlying
inter-organisational rivalries” (Koops 2010.). The
deficiency of consensus and political will among the
members of both organisations, the insufficiency of
defence spending and the lack of a clear definition of
the role that each is set to play in the global security
environment, are among the main factors behind
these dynamics. In addition, an EU apprehensive of
the US driving all defence-related decision-making,
and a NATO, whose American leadership and non-
EU members dread an emancipated European securi-
ty, make for the absence of strategic thinking in col-
lective security today.
The dialogue between the two entities’ governing
bodies has been omitted on several important occa-
sions and the sharing of capabilities is arguably not a
reality anymore – the non-conclusion of the Berlin
Plus Reverse is merely overshadowed by the fact that
the actual Berlin Plus agreements have not been ap-
plied for a decade. There is an overwhelming need for
The EU-NATO Relationship – With New Leadership To New Impetus?
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 3
adapt to the new geopolitical realities and security chal-
lenges in Europe and its wider neighbourhood. Third
phase was characterized by ambiguity, as what then be-
came the EU, expressed for the first time ambitions in the
field of foreign policy and security. Despite the positive
development of setting up the Berlin Plus agreements,
the lack of clear definition of the EU-NATO relationship
and, more importantly the lack of delineation of responsi-
bilities, caused confusions and duplications, resulting in a
zero-sum game in terms of power balance between the
two (Koops 2010). Similarly,
the shift of the EU away from
NATO and towards the UN as
a security actor, contributed to
further tension in the relation-
ship.
The fourth and ongoing
stage, although seeing more
interactions between the two, also suffers from an obscu-
rity and underlying competition between the EU and
NATO. This has been partly due to the attempts on the
part of the EU to emancipate from NATO as a security
actor, while also owing to the US pivot to Asia and away
from Europe and NATO. The complex geopolitical de-
velopments of the past decade, including the recently de-
teriorated relations with Russia, only complicate the sta-
tus quo even further. The NATO-EU relations are more
than ever in dire need of a re-definition – the security
tasks in Europe and its strategic areas of interest necessi-
tate a clear delineation among the security actors con-
cerned.
NATO has had a fundamental effect on the EU. In the
infant phase of the EU’s CFSP and CSDP, their institu-
tional setup was partly modelled after the Alliance’s own:
the Political and Security Committee of the EU is identi-
cal to the North Atlantic Council, while the European
Union Military Committee and Military Staff are
equivalent to the NATO Military Committee and In-
ternational Military Staff. More importantly however,
NATO laid the basis of a common military culture in
Europe, based on a multilateral cooperation between
participants. The CSDP has since mirrored NATO ac-
tivities and procedures, and has applied lessons learned
from NATO missions. Both have been instrumental in
EU’s attempt of emancipation from NATO, which
reveals the EU’s self-interested approach in this rela-
tionship, arguably in viola-
tion of its own understand-
ing of the principle of effec-
tive multilateralism and
“mutually reinforcing strate-
gic partnership” (Koops
2010; EU, European Securi-
ty Strategy, 2003). Even
more importantly, it shows a lack of strategic thinking
on the EU’s part.
The impact the EU has had on NATO is however
more an intangible one. Although NATO has on more
than one occasion followed suit to EU initiatives, such
as the European Rapid Reaction Force (translated into
a NATO Response Force) and the EU Commission’s
proposal on a Maritime Directive (followed by a
NATO Maritime Security Strategy), still the most im-
portant process to have been duplicated on the part of
NATO is the Eastern European Enlargement. Being
entirely beneficial for the development and democratic
transitions to Central and Eastern European Countries,
it has helped NATO find purpose in the context of ex-
istential questions being posed over it – it developed a
role of a normative agent in terms of the stabilisation
and democratisation of developing countries. (ibid.)
Together the two organisations would es-tablish a highly effective security
actor, able to tackle any crisis
management task that arises, not to men-tion a global actor with a strong
international voice.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 4
Berlin Plus
The Berlin Plus Agreements, or the Combined
Joint Force Mechanism, based on “divisible, but
not divided” forces meant that several NATO
structures could be staffed with EU personnel to
be used for crises where NATO was not involved.
The drawback for the EU was that the first choice
remained in NATO’s hands – the Alliance is the
first to decide whether it would get involved in a
crisis or not and only in the latter case could the
EU take action and
use NATO’s capa-
bilities, including
military resources,
thus avoiding un-
necessary duplica-
tions. Ultimately,
however the EU
thought to have
developed enough
of its CSDP to not
need NATO’s as-
sistance for all its
crisis management
initiatives, thus seeing Berlin Plus as an impedi-
ment to its development as a security actor.
One missed opportunity for the EU to impact
NATO was in its only area of comparative ad-
vantage over the Alliance: that of civilian capabili-
ties and post-conflict reconstruction. The proposal
of a Berlin Plus Reverse would have involved pre-
cisely what its name suggests – the EU sharing its
resources in the realm of civilian crisis manage-
ment with NATO. The proposal met strong oppo-
sition, which, understanding the underlying rival-
ries between the two entities is not that difficult to
comprehend. On the EU side, there was the dread of
NATO acquiring also a civilian angle to crisis manage-
ment which would pre-empt the EU’s distinct role as
a crisis manager. From NATO’s point of view, such
an agreement would establish dependence of the Alli-
ance on CSDP capabilities, albeit civilian ones.
Issues Hampering A Closer “Strategic
Partnership”
Lack Of Definition And Delineation Of Re-
sponsibilities
Perhaps one of the
most profound un-
derlying issues in
the EU-NATO rela-
tionship is the in-
herent lack of defi-
nition of both or-
ganisations as secu-
rity actors. Already
at the dawn of the
Cold War, NATO’s
raison d’être was be-
ing questioned, however in the brink of the interven-
tion in the Balkan wars it regained some meaning, as
was the case later with ISAF in Afghanistan. Yet, as
the last troops are now about to be withdrawn from
the latter, it is time for NATO to find a new purpose
to justify its existence in the post-Afghanistan era.
Conversely the EU, or rather CSDP, as a relatively
infant and inexperienced security actor, suffers not
only from overwhelming shortage of military capabili-
ties, but also from a lack of common strategic vision
for its existence, mostly due to the heterogenic per-
ceptions and attitudes by its Member States. The long
-lasting stalemate of EU-NATO relations is mostly to
Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General and Federica Morgherini, High Repre-
sentative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-
President of the European Commission meet at the European External Action Summit on
November 4th, 2014 (source: NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 5
same attitudes and dynamics are present on EU level
as well – if anything the Union has been even more
ambivalent, conveying often inconsistent messages. In
the context of this crisis, the EU and NATO will need
to work closer together and define a common posi-
tion towards Russia, or else the “strategic partnership”
will indeed be in peril.
More importantly, the lack of delineationin securi-
ty tasks and crisis management undertakings between
the EU and NATO causes even deeper ambiguity.
Both entities pursue almost identical interests and
carry out “similar, albeit uncoordinated initia-
tives” (Koops 2010). This is on one side a factor for
intensive “mutually reinforcing” cooperation, while
on the other hand creates the risk of rivalry and re-
sulting duplications. Still, geopolitically, the interests
of the EU and NATO do not completely overlap –
e.g. while it would be difficult to commit European
states to interventions outside of the Neighbourhood,
it is hardly difficult to imagine that an EU-led plat-
form would make a much better interlocutor with
MENA countries than a US-led NATO platform.
It would be easier to attribute to the EU a more
civilian/normative power, while NATO remains re-
sponsible for collective defence through hard power.
Since the two organisations have different goals and
approaches in security and crisis management, it
should be easy to identify the more appropriate chan-
nel for action in a given crisis, provided that relations
are sufficiently well-defined and a clear delineation of
responsibilities are put in place. Yet this would be an
ideal, ergo unfeasible scenario, as both the EU and
NATO have rather ambitious aspirations for their
global roles as security providers.
the detriment of the EU, as it is a relatively new secu-
rity provider, composed of undecided partners, many
of which still prefer to allocate the bulk of their ef-
fort, both in terms of commitment and capabilities,
to NATO, as opposed to the CSDP. That deadlock in
the EU security structures however, makes the CSDP
an unreliable partner, reluctant to take charge in cir-
cumstances requiring partner-convergence in crisis
response. Therefore, the self-determination of CSDP
might actually come from task allocation talks with
NATO. With 22 overlapping members, it would
seem simple and self-evident that the tasks in security
provision need to be defined between the two. In-
stead of repeating the same mantra of a “strategic re-
lationship”, which is continuously being reflected up-
on, the two organisations should actually sit together
and define that relationship.
The unfortunate crisis in Ukraine and deteriorat-
ing relations with Russia offer only two potential op-
portunities – that of the EU asserting itself as a global
actor (as the situation is one that very much concerns
Europe itself); and of NATO reaffirming its raison
d’être in its post-Afghanistan era. Instead, the very
different and non-consolidated positions that the EU
and NATO convey only contribute to further ambi-
guity of not only Europe, but also the Western world
as a side in this dormant conflict. While NATO has
attempted to be assertive in its position towards Rus-
sia, no conclusive position has been articulated –
commitment has been expressed towards Central and
Eastern European Countries, yet no concrete action
has been taken to that end, which offers reason for
frustration to those member states. This is partly due
to the ambivalent reactions towards Russia expressed
by some of the Western European States, fearing that
any decisive reaction, especially the deployment of
forces, would escalate the situation excessively. The
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 6
The EU As A Security Actor?
As was pointed out above, the European Union
is still a rather infant global actor. Several futile
attempts to bring more focus to foreign and securi-
ty policy at EU level have resulted in frustration of
those looking for further integration in this do-
main, which subsequently lead to regional and bi-
lateral deals on defence throughout Europe (e.g.
the Franco-British military cooperation, the Nor-
dic Defence Cooperation, defence cooperation in
the Visegrad group, etc.). Yet, what is considera-
bly worse is that the EU suffers an overwhelming
expectations-capability gap, which makes the Un-
ion seem less and less as an adequate and reliable
security actor. The EU should rather reconsider its
role in crisis management and focus on civilian and
civ-mil missions, while building up capabilities.
Though, for the EU to transform into a military actor,
it would have to establish permanent forces, a military
academy and official headquarters, for which the
CSDP is not ready at this point in time.
Even further, contributing to the absence of coor-
dinated and sufficiently institutionalised exchange be-
tween the two organisations is the nonexistence of a
congregated European voice in foreign relations.
While in other international organisations the EU is
represented by the converged and convincing voice of
the Commission, this is not the case with NATO.
Even with the overlap of 22 members between the
two entities, those members have not yet managed to
consolidate their positions and preferences on the way
to handle security and defence issues, causing incon-
sistencies in their positions expressed not only in the
framework of the EU and NATO themselves, but also
internationally. Hence, the proposals of establishing a
Working Together for Peace and Security— International Organizations Membership Overlap
(Source: NATO)
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 7
European pillar in NATO have been strongly opposed
not only by the US, but also indeed by several EU
member states. Such an initiative being materialised
would not only mean that there would be a stronger
European influence on NATO activities, certainly to
the detriment of non-EU NATO members (thus vio-
lating the third of the three D’s – non-discrimination
of such members), but it would also pose an existen-
tialist question over NATO. (Koops 2010)
The claims made by the new leadership of more
focused and strategic thinking in foreign and security
policy is nothing unheard of in the past decade, yet
one might argue that now is the time for the EU to
start pulling its own weight in terms of defence in its
neighbourhood, which should involve a clearer and
more effective cooperation with NATO. Alternative-
ly, if these claims turn into empty promises with no
real effect, it might be that the Union becomes
trapped in its image of being nothing but an economic
entity.
Balancing Out American NATO Leadership
And European Global Governance Ambitions
The attempted emancipation of EU’s security ac-
tivities from NATO was one of the unspoken factors
that contributed to the tensions between the two or-
ganisations. Even though the CSDP formation was
largely influenced by the US in an attempt to push
Europe into pulling its own weight in terms of securi-
ty of the continent, the actual EU initiatives to build
its own capabilities and image as a defence and mili-
tary actor were hardly appreciated in Washington.
From the EU’s point of view, however, delegating
all security tasks to a US-led NATO is hardly ideal –
this was arguably the main reason for establishing the
CSDP. Nonetheless, with the US pivoting to strategic
interests in the Asia-Pacific and away from Europe,
the American leadership of NATO is less and less a
relevant concept, as the US has become uninterested
in being involved in conflicts in the European Neigh-
bourhood and the Middle East.
Heterogeneity Of Positions And Lack Of Com-
mon Threat Perception
When it comes to the appropriateness of channels
of security provision, the heterogeneity of opinions
among the overlapping members of the two entities is
largely the cause for inconsistencies in the positions
and activities of both organisations. To further com-
plicate matters, there is no shared perception of
threats, which makes it close to impossible to reach
consensus on common action in the unanimity-based
decision-making bodies of both organisations. An
overarching definition of a common threat must be
defined at both EU and NATO levels, as the under-
standings of such are widely divergent across member
states.
Low Defence Spending And Lack Of Pooling
And Sharing/Smart Defence
On both EU and NATO turf there is significant
shortage of military and defence spending. The only
NATO members to spend above 2% of GDP on the
Alliance’s defence are the US, the UK, Greece and
Estonia, while the situation is even more discouraging
on the EU level.
What further deteriorates the situation is the lack
of political will to share resources through Pooling
and Sharing (in EU jargon) or Smart Defence (in
NATO terms). Several member states of both organi-
sations perceive such close cooperation as giving up
control over military capabilities and having no say in
the approach to various crises. The inability to consol-
idate the European defence industry and to a degree
the European armed forces, combined with continued
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 8
low defence spending, will in time damage the Euro-
pean technological and military base to such an extent
that it would no longer be competitive in global
terms. (Dempsey 2014)
Another problem that arises in this context is du-
plication. While NATO has much more military re-
sources, the EU has a comparable advantage in civilian
capabilities, which should provide a perfect setting for
successful cooperation, it has happened that both or-
ganisations operate within the same crisis, yet para-
doxically instead of coordinating their activities, they
duplicated in some and left other uncovered (i.e.
AMIS Darfur/ EUFOR Chad).
If the EU NATO member states could collectively
come up with at least some 40% of NATO defence
spending, then that would at least partly alleviate
American frustrations over continuously being the
ones to cover the bulk of the expenses in interven-
tions and crisis management. It would also grant Eu-
ropeans the right to dictate more assertively NATO’s
strategic interests, thus rendering them more autono-
mous in security terms and not less as is the common
misconception.
Cyprus Issue
The unsettled issues and tensions between Cyprus
and Turkey over the latter’s occupation of Northern
Cyprus have been hampering effective EU-NATO
high level consultations for more than a decade. Cy-
prus vetoes Turkey’s participation in the European
Defence Agency (EDA) and other EU defence struc-
tures, while Turkey responds by hindering Cyprus’
use of NATO facilities and its participation in the
Partnership for Peace (PFP). As a consequence, high-
level meetings between the EU and NATO on PSC-
NAC level are being obstructed. In fact, an argument
might be made that Turkey should be entitled to some
form of membership to the EDA, as it took part of the
structures of the Western European Union, including
the Western European Armaments Group – WEAG,
which was eventually transformed into the EDA , thus
leaving Turkey out of the structures.
Recommendations And Prospects
Should the EU and NATO decide to move forward
with their relationship and face global challenges
through a comprehensive approach, they will have to
consider a renewal of the commitments made under
Berlin Plus – if the EU was to assume leadership of
any large military mission, it would need to have
more military and intelligence resources at disposal.
Alternatively, the two platforms may decide to allo-
cate tasks , the EU covering civilian, assistance, train-
ing and border control operations, while NATO re-
serves the exclusive right to intervene in any large
military operations agreed upon by the partners.
It has become clear that the US is no longer inter-
ested in maintaining the security of Europe’s Neigh-
bourhood, meaning that either through its EU-based
organisation, the CSDP, or through cooperation with
its international partners, Europe will have to find a
way to take care of its own Neighbourhood. This will
require a hands-on approach, and in the face of a mul-
titude of issues and crises in the East and South, it will
also require a stronger security and defence focus,
through allocating increased budgetary resources to
defence and military capabilities. The perception of
security and defence in Europe needs to be reformed
– rather than perceiving a strong defence policy as the
first step to warfare, Europeans should realize that in
the face of growing insecurity on the international
scene, it is only smart to step up and make sure that
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 9
the continent is completely prepared for any scenario that
might be; even if it is simply for the sake of deterrence.
On a more technical note, it seems like granting Tur-
key some form of EDA membership, even with condi-
tions, might alleviate the political tension in the Greece-
Cyprus-Turkey triangle which currently renders common
EU-NATO endeavours, to a large degree, unproductive.
Furthermore, the election of Cypriot President Nicos
Anastasiades may make the Cypriot reunification cause
somewhat more attainable (Engelen 2014). Although it is
certainly not the only impediment before effective EU-
NATO cooperation, it would most definitely remove
another barrier to formal political consultation between
the two entities.
Reportedly the EU and
NATO coordinate relatively
well on a technical level on the
ground, which would imply
that the “strategic partnership”
is more difficult on a political
and strategic level than it is in
practice. It seems logical then
that a clear definition and de-
lineation of responsibilities needs to be elaborated at least
on paper for the clearer cooperation between the two
security actors.
The search for a post-Afghanistan narrative for NATO
will become all the more challenging the longer it lasts
and will be all the more costly to NATO’s relevance as a
global actor. Arguably, the Ukraine crisis has not rede-
fined NATO’s raison d’être, due to the failure in address-
ing Russia unanimously and convincingly. The Alliance
needs to re-establish a sense of solidarity and consensus
across its members, which should begin from the clear
definition of a common threat perception, to be comple-
mented by situation and capability analysis whenever a
situation is indeed determined to represent a common
threat (Dempsey 2014).
On the EU side, at this point, there are two feasible
scenarios for the advancement of defence coordination.
If NATO develops more as a global organisation, thus
engaging a number of countries outside Europe and
North America, who share the same values of democ-
racy and peacekeeping, there could indeed be a Euro-
pean pillar established, which would allow for a more
consolidated position coming from those countries.
Alternatively, through Permanent Structured Coopera-
tion, or another security platform, the fast-track EU
countries in the field of defence, could cooperate to
the end of developing common capabilities so that they
can tackle security challeng-
es independently, without
over-relying on or duplicat-
ing NATO tasks, albeit still
remaining at the Alliance’s
disposal for joint action.
That would, however, cre-
ate a multi-track Europe in
the field of defence, which
will contribute to deepening divisions and tensions be-
tween member states.
The two organisations are in dire need of new stra-
tegic leadership to provide them with a new vision and
sense of commitment. Recently, as there has been
change of leadership in both EU and NATO, a number
of bilateral meetings have already been carried out be-
tween the two leaders with promises of further coop-
eration in the context of the increasingly complicated
security environment in Europe and the wider neigh-
bourhood. Only time will tell if those promises are to
be realized, but as the EU’s new High Representative
has expressed the ambition to undertake a different
It has become clear that the US is no long-er interested in maintaining the security of Europe’s Neighbourhood, meaning that either through its EU-based organisation, the CSDP, or through cooperation with its
international partners, Europe will have to find a way to take care of its own Neigh-
bourhood.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 10
approach in the field of foreign and security policies,
altogether with a new view on Neighbourhood policy
(including the drafting of a new European Security
Strategy by June 2015), it seems like now is the time
for the organisations to define their approach towards
each other.
Conclusion
NATO and the CSDP need to complement each
other in the circumstances of growing insecurity, es-
pecially in the European Neighbourhood. The argu-
ment of a zero-sum relationship between the two has
no substance to it, as they each have what the other
one needs. With the US gradually becoming disen-
chanted with NATO engagement, it follows that the
organisation will lose in strategic leadership, and its
geopolitical interests might lose clarity and focus. The
EU, through its defence platform CSDP, has in fact
the opposite – the areas of interest are largely clear to
all partners, and the steps to undertake for further
strengthening the platform are mostly clear, yet there
is an overwhelming lack of political will and more
importantly a colossal shortage of military capabilities
- something that is much less manifested in NATO.
The repetitive resort to coalitions of the willing in
the presence of two self-declared security actors is a
very negative signal of the state of collective security
in Europe and its allies. The lack of political will to
reach consensus on most pressing and strategic issues
conveys a message of disunity and implies the fragility
of international commitments, which might even
come to be redundant if these attitudes were to con-
tinue. It appears that the “mutually reinforcing” rela-
tionship between NATO and the EU is more a chal-
lenge than a given, yet both entities need to be up to
the task, especially when Europe’s security is at stake.
Christine Andreeva concluded a Master’s Degree
on European Integration and Development with the
Institute for European Studies (in cooperation with
Vrije Universiteit Brussel). Ms Andreeva’s interests
lie in the field of the EU’s external relations, with a
particular focus on European defence and she has con-
tributed several articles to this domain. Ms Andreeva
has completed two internships at the European insti-
tutions and is currently working at the office of Mr.
Georgi Pirinski, MEP.
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About the author
Bibliography
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 11
By Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga
O fficial texts and communiqués describe
the EU-NATO relationship as a genuine
strategic partnership. Allied Heads of
State and Government reaffirmed the EU’s importance as
a partner for NATO at the Alliance’s recent Wales Sum-
mit and underlined that “The two organizations share
common values and strategic interests. In a spirit of full
mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and
respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of
both NATO and the EU, and as agreed by the two organi-
zations, we will continue to work side-by-side in crisis
management operations, broaden political consultations,
and promote complementarity of the two organizations
to enhance common security and stability.” In Wales,
NATO leaders also recognized that the current strategic
environment has highlighted the need for further
strengthening strategic partnership between NATO and
the EU For their part, at the Defense Council of Decem-
ber 2013, EU Leaders agreed that “the Common Security
and Defence Policy (CSDP) will continue to develop in
full complementarity with NATO in the agreed frame-
work of the strategic partnership between the EU and
NATO and in compliance with the decision-making au-
tonomy and procedures of each.” Not long after assuming
their posts, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
and EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security
Policy Federica Morgherini noted the importance of the
NATO-EU partnership at a joint press point in early No-
vember. In the words of NATO’s new Secretary General,
“The EU is an essential and a strong partner of NATO.
We share the same values, we share many common mem-
bers, and we also share common challenges. To the
East, and to the South”.
In practice, NATO and the EU do work together
on issues of common interest; they hold political con-
sultations, cooperate in the Balkans and Afghanistan as
well as on capabilities through their Smart Defense and
Pooling and Sharing initiatives, and they are fighting
piracy off the coast of the African Horn. However,
despite the rhetoric of cooperation and the practical
achievements, the EU-NATO partnership has not
reached its full potential.
Recent security developments, particularly the bla-
tant invasion of Ukraine, the prolonged civil war in
Syria and now the terror threat of ISIS in Iraq (and be-
yond) demonstrate the need for stronger cooperation
between NATO and the EU. The Ukraine crisis, in
particular, has brought security to the forefront of the
strategic discussion both for NATO and the EU. It
marked NATO’s return to its roots, that is to say the
renewed centrality of Article 5 and Collective Defense
over its other two core tasks, cooperative security and
crisis management. The crisis also brought violent con-
flict right into EU’s backyard and forced the EU to re-
assess its policies.
These developments have once again underscored
the mission and purpose of NATO and the EU. Simul-
taneously, they are also evidence of the effects of leav-
ing a leadership vacuum in addressing global conflicts
and they underscore the need for strong transatlantic
cooperation as the world continues to look to the West
for leadership in addressing global concerns. In today’s
security landscape, strengthening cooperation be-
The NATO-EU Partnership : Opening A New Chapter After The Ukraine Crisis
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 12
tween NATO and the EU is a strategic imperative.
Why Work Together?
There are compelling reasons for NATO and the
EU to work more closely. First, member states of the
two institutions face the same threats. The EU’s Eu-
ropean Security Strategy and NATO’s Strategic Con-
cept identify a strikingly similar threat of security
challenges. Second, today, and following subsequent
enlargement rounds from both NATO and the EU,
the membership overlap of NATO and the EU is sig-
nificant; both institutions seek to safeguard the securi-
ty interests of 22 common member states. Third, the
rapidly changing security environment calls for great-
er cooperation between the EU and NATO. The new
challenges are diverse, un-
predictable, and intercon-
nected. Security threats such
as global terrorism and Is-
lamic extremism, cyber war-
fare, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
problems related to energy security, climate change,
illegal movements of capital, and maritime piracy-
challenges that were once labeled emerging- are today
part and parcel of our security landscape. Further, the
nature of combat has changed. Hybrid warfare is in-
creasing, as exemplified by Russia’s use of the “little
green men” in Ukraine. These wide-ranging challeng-
es are difficult to counter with traditional military
strategy. A comprehensive approach -a civil-military
approach- to tackle them is necessary. In the words of
former NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop
Scheffer, “There is no stronger civil player than the
European Union. And there is no stronger military
alliance than NATO”.
What is more, the challenging security context in
which the two institutions operate is at present
marked by the crisis in Ukraine, in light of which,
reinforcing EU-NATO ties has gained new urgency.
The Ukraine crisis constitutes the most serious shock
to the European security system since the end of the
Cold War took place. Russia’s annexation of Crimea
signaled a shift away from the fundamental premise
upon which Euro-Atlantic security has been based.
The West no longer sees Russia as a partner. Rather,
Russia is viewed as a potential adversary. Russia’s ac-
tions in Ukraine pose a challenge to European securi-
ty, to the vision of a Europe “whole, free and at
peace” and to the global order. NATO allies and EU
member states remain committed to this vision. So
far, the two institutions have managed to take a uni-
fied stance vis-à-vis Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
Acting in unison with
each other is required not
only in the face of ongo-
ing pressure from Russia
(and ISIS), but in order to
effectively manage future crises as well.
The declining defense budgets across Europe due
to the financial crisis should also be added to the list of
reasons favoring cooperation between the two institu-
tions. Stagnating or shrinking defense budgets dictate
for greater cooperation and avoidance of unnecessary
duplication efforts. Member states of NATO and the
EU cannot afford to waste precious resources on
overlapping responsibilities.
Finally, the fact that the United States is refocusing
its foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region at a
time when the EU is encircled by crises should also
serve as incentive for closer cooperation. The US re-
balancing has sparked calls from both the US and Eu-
ropean countries for Europe to start paying more at-
tention to its security and defense needs, and rightful-
ly so. The operations in Mali and Libya exposed sig-
Russia’s actions in Ukraine pose a chal-lenge to European security, to the vision of a Europe “whole, free and at peace” and to
the global order.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 13
nificant shortfalls in a range of European capabilities and
highlighted the limits of Europe's military power. The EU
should take its own security in its own hands. An EU that
is stronger militarily would certainly be beneficial for
NATO as U.S. political priorities have changed.
Undoubtedly, closer cooperation between NATO and
the EU is more needed than ever. The two institutions
should capitalize on the current momentum created by
security developments in their strategic landscape and
strengthen the quality of their relations. The recent
change of leadership in NATO and the EU also provides
new impetus for cooperation over European security be-
tween the two. Europe’s newly elected President of the
European Council, Donald Tusk, is an Atlanticist and be-
lieves in EU integration, especially for security reasons.
New NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has
stressed the need for increased collaboration right from
the beginning of his tenure, stating that he will personally
“strive for an even closer cooperation between NATO
and the European Union” especially as they cover much of
the “same geographical area.” For her part, the new EU
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Poli-
cy Federica Morgherini has also signaled her intention for
closer EU-NATO ties by stating that “cooperation should
improve” at a press conference right on her second day in
office. The political will seems to be there.
Obstacles To Demonstrating The Partnership’s
Full Potential
The participation problem is probably cited by analysts
as the single largest obstacle for closer relations between
NATO and the EU, such as the example of Turkey who
blocks the admission of Cyprus into NATO.
Furthermore, differing memberships of NATO and
the EU also hamper cooperation between the two organi-
zations, mostly in practical terms, such as the exchange of
information or the format meetings should
have. Simultaneously, neutral member states of the EU
continue to be wary of close co-operation between the
EU and NATO.
Dividing lines among EU member states with re-
gards to the role the EU should play in foreign and se-
curity policy also create problems in the NATO-EU
relationship. Some EU nations view the EU-NATO
partnership as a zero sum game. Atlanticist countries
within the EU are strong advocates of a strong NATO,
and view the development of the CSDP with skepti-
cism as they fear that the CSDP will weaken NATO
and the transatlantic bond it represents. Others argue
that the EU needs to stop being a “military worm” and
serve as a credible security provider for its member
states. Further, some European member countries see
NATO as a US dominated institution which is used to
serve American interests which are not always aligned
with European ones. As such, these member states
want the EU to develop an independent military arm
and a more autonomous defense identity.
The fact that the CSDP itself constitutes a work in
progress, as EU member states have different security
goals, different geographic focuses, different percep-
tions of whether EU needs a stronger military arm or
not, different approaches to the use of force has also
had an impact on the development of EU-NATO ties.
Finally, inter-institutional competition is also per-
ceived as an obstacle to improving relations between
the two institutions. According to this argument, the
EU considers itself a superior institution whose mem-
bers genuinely invest in integration and represents the
future while NATO is seen as being a relic of the past.
The Road Ahead
In order for NATO and the EU to achieve the stra
tegic partnership the 21st century needs, the two insti-
tutions need to work on a new roadmap for coopera-
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 14
tion. NATO and the EU could start with a joint
review to identify common threats and set their
level of ambition regarding cooperation in mutu-
ally agreed areas. After that, the two organizations
should proceed with identifying those areas where
they offer complementary institutional skill sets.
This requires a frank review of capabilities,
wherein each organization is willing to engage in
an open discussion about their respective
strengths and weaknesses. This in turn will ensure
that the strengths of each institution will be opti-
mized for a comprehensive approach to security
and defense cooperation, capitalizing on the
unique political, civil, and military capabilities of
the two.
A comprehensive strategic dialogue regarding
the threats and challenges facing the two institu-
tions today is also very much needed. A step to
achieve this would be through strengthening the
links between the EU’s Situation Center and
NATO’s Situation Center. NATO and the EU
should also work together on monitoring and as-
sessing strategic security developments and infor-
mation sharing to raise strategic awareness on is-
sues such as cyber security, energy security and
terrorism.
Prior to that, and at a time when destabiliza-
tion hovers around Europe’s periphery, the EU
should update its Security Strategy of 2003 to take
into account recent strategic developments and
risks, identify its strategic objectives and priori-
ties, formulate its strategic vision and set its level
of ambition as a security provider. For its part,
NATO must find the right balance between its
three core tasks: At Wales, Allied leaders agreed
that NATO will in part shift its attention to terri-
torial defense in response to the Ukraine crisis.
Yet, in today’s unpredictable security environment
where security challenges transcend geography
NATO cannot afford to become inward-focused.
NATO must be adaptive to the evolving security envi-
ronment, and this can only be accomplished by work-
ing with and engaging partner countries to counter
new and diverse threats. In addition to increasing co-
operative security, NATO should not shy away from
preparing to confront the next crisis. The Alliance has
both the means and institutional knowledge to re-
spond effectively in a crisis. Both of these capabilities
must continue to be cultivated, with increased train-
ing, planning, and cooperation.
Particularly in light of the crisis in Ukraine, the EU
and NATO should increase political consultations re-
garding recent developments in the post-Soviet space,
a region of strategic uncertainty. As Russia is pursuing
post-Soviet integration in Eurasia, other countries,
particularly those of South Caucasus and Central Asia
might be used as power play between the two sides.
These countries are vulnerable to Russia’s manipula-
tion who wants to regain predominance over the for-
mer Soviet space through means like military pres-
ence and manipulation of ethnic conflicts. The EU and
NATO could devise a concerted approach vis-à-vis
the region to shape the future orientation of these
countries and help them build resilience against po-
tential hybrid warfare with an emphasis on security
sector reforms.
In the operational domain, NATO and the EU al-
ready closely cooperate in maritime operations off the
Gulf of Aden. EU Atalanta and NATO Ocean Shield
operate side by side, which allows for the develop-
ment of a strategic culture between the two institu-
tions. Both NATO and the EU will continue to be
actively involved in this domain for the foreseeable
future, and strengthening cooperation in the field of
planning and training is required.
Atlantic Voices, Volume 4, Issue 12 15
When it comes to capabilities, more coordination
on policy planning and capability development is nec-
essary. In the area of rapid Reaction Force Planning,
joint exercises to develop interoperability and con-
structive cooperation between EU battle groups and
NATO’s Response Force should take place.
Conclusion
The crisis in Ukraine greatly demonstrates the fra-
gility and volatility of today’s strategic landscape in
which threats increase in number and complexity,
asymmetric challenges emerge and the risk of sym-
metric threats is growing. At the same time, the de-
velopments in Ukraine pose a fundamental challenge
to the post-Cold War order in Europe and bring the
change of borders by force and territorial conflict
back to Europe.
Enhanced trans-Atlantic security cooperation is
requisite to tackle today’s challenges which can
emerge not only from our increasingly insecure and
unstable neighborhood but also stem from beyond
NATO’s or EU’s borders. In the security environ-
ment of the 21st century just military forces do not
suffice. The case for a comprehensive approach, a
combination of all relevant military and civilian assets
is now stronger than ever. In this ever-changing
world, the transatlantic relationship constitutes a
source of stability and deepened security cooperation
is critical if the West is to maintain the ability to be
both reactive and proactive in responding to global
threats. The EU and NATO represent two sides of
the same strategic coin and the developments in
Ukraine should serve as a catalyst for the two organi-
zations to strengthen their cooperation.
In an era of tight defence budgets, an arc of uncer-
tainty and instability in our neighborhood and the
challenge posed by a newly assertive Russia, there is
new impetus for stronger cooperation between
NATO and the EU. It is now time to harness the two
institutions’ relative strengths in a pragmatic way to
address the security challenges facing their members.
Ioanna-Nikoletta Zyga works as a foreign policy
advisor at the European Parliament. She has previou-
sly worked at the Cooperation and Regional Security
Division of NATO's International Military Staff
NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 19-20 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf, 28. NATO, “Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales,” 5 September 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease. European Council, European Council Conclusions, 18 September 2013, ) https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140214.pdf, 2. NATO, Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg upon arrival at European Union Foreign Affairs Council, 18 November 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_114859.htm. NATO, NATO Secretary General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, “NATO and the EU: Time for a New Chapter,” 29 January 2007, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2007/s070129b.html. NATO, “Press conference by incoming NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,” 2 October 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_113488.htm?selectedLocale=en. Andrew Rettman, “Who is Tusk and what does he mean for the EU,” http://euobserver.com/institutional/125427, EU observer, 01 September 2014. EEAS, “Remarks by High Representative Federica Moghe-rini following her meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,” 5 November 2014, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2014/141105_03_en.htm.
About the author
Bibliography
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