Unintentional vs. intentional impacts
No impact strategy
Attacker’s strategy maximizing the
expected damage
Basic Definitions
lowest-level part of system, which is characterized by its inherent value, availability and performance distribution
collection of elements with the same functionality connected in parallel in reliability logic-diagram sense
quantitative measure of task performing intensity of element or system (capacity, productivity, processing speed, task completion time etc.)
Basic Definitionstechnical or organizational measure aimed at reduction of destruction probability of a group of system elements in the case of attack
action aimed at preventing simultaneous destruction of several elements in the case of single attack (can be performed by spatial dispersion, by encapsulating different elements into different protective casings, by using different power sources etc.)
group of system elements separated from other elements (and possibly protected) so that a single external impact destroying elements belonging to a certain group cannot destroy elements
from other groups
object that imitates protected group of system elements, but does not contain any element (the total damage caused by the destruction of any false target is much lower than the damage
caused by the destruction of any protection group)
Defense strategyDamageSeparation
Protection
Destruction probability
False targets
Impact probability
Disinformationpp
gg
vv
Defense Strategy
F
nM
mnnm ΦΦ
1,
|)|,( nmnmn bo dF
|)|,(),,(1 1
nm
N
n
nM
mnmnodFFO
Defense Strategy Cost
Expected damage model
Cumulative performance of the
group
Attack probabilityProtection vulnerability
System performance
reduction
Equipment losses
Expected damage
Failures
ppvvgg
Functional losses
S
sss Wgc,,qW,,,C
1),()()( γβαγβα
Expected Damage Cost
ss g,,q ,)( γβα
Wg
WgW,gc
s
ss ,
,0)(
WggW
WgW,gc
ss
ss
),(
,0)(
Unsupplied demand
Loss of demand
).()()()(11
,W,,ChHvHFF,,DnmΦknknm
nM
mnmnnm
N
nFF γβαγ,βα
Expected Damage Cost
Destruction of false targets
System destruction
Protections and infrastructure
Elements Functional losses
min})())((arg{* ,F,,D,F,O,F, γβαγβ*γ*β
Optimal defense strategy
*))(1())(( O,F,O,F,O γβγβ Limited defense budget
)())(( ,F,O,F,O γβγβ Unlimited defense budget
Single attack strategy
Perfect knowledge about the system
No knowledge about the system
p=p=11/N/N
p=p=11
pp
Imperfect knowledge about the system
pppp
pi=1
Multiple attack strategyUnlimited resource
p=p=11
pppp
pp
Limited resource + perfect knowledge about the system
p=p=11
Limited resource + imperfect knowledge about the system
pi>1
Attacker’s Strategy
Single Attack
.111
F
nM
mnm
N
nF
Perfect attacker’s knowledge about the system
max})),(({arg),(
);,(,0
1,1
γβα ,,mnDmn
mnF
nMmNn
Multiple Attacks
.111
FnM
mnm
N
nF
}),(,0
;),(,1{)(,0
mn
mn
nm
nmF
max}))((arg{ γβ,,D
.)),((11 1
EmnN
n
nM
m
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