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TheVelaIncident:AProductofPoliticalandNuclearCooperationBetweenIsraelandSouthAfricaByDanielAlsterThispaperwaswrittenforHistory396:GlobalNuclearProliferation,taughtbyProfessorGabrielleHechtinFall2008.

OnSeptember22,1979,Americansatellitesobserveda“doubleflash”

indicativeofanuclearweaponstestinthesouthIndianOcean.The“VelaIncident,”

so‐namedafterthesatellitethatdetectedtheflash,wasimmediatelydescribedby

nuclearexpertsasajointIsraeli‐SouthAfricannucleartest.1However,alackof

indisputablephysicalevidenceverifyingthenuclearityoftheevent,coupledwith

thevigorousdenialsoftheIsraeliandSouthAfricangovernments,haslimitedan

adequatescholarlyanalysisofthelikelihoodofIsraeli‐SouthAfricancooperationin

theVelaIncident.ThisessaydoesnotseektoprovethattheVelaIncidentwas

definitivelyanuclearexplosion.Instead,itinvestigatesthelikelihoodofIsraeliand

SouthAfricaninvolvementintheVelaIncidentbyoutliningthestates’growing

politicalandnuclearcooperationinthefifteenyearsprecedingtheevent.

Myargumentispresentedinthreeparts.First,evidencedemonstrativeofthe

increasinglyintimaterelationshipbetweenthegovernmentsofIsraelandSouth

AfricawillprovideafoundationforacircumstantialargumentoutliningwhyIsrael

andSouthAfricalikelycooperatedtoexplodeanuclearbomb.Second,Ianalyzethe

developmentofIsrael‘spolicyof“nuclearopacity”andSouthAfrica’spolicyof

“nuclearambiguity.”Third,Iexaminehowtheascendancyofthesepoliciesof

opacityandambiguity—coupledwithamutualrespectforthenormagainstnuclear

1Richelsen,Jeffrey."TheVelaIncident:NuclearTestorMeteoroid."NationalSecurityArchiveElectronicBriefingBook190(May5,2006).

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testing—determinedbothstates’insistenceonaclandestine,ratherthanovert,

nucleartest.

PartI:Alliance

The1960sweremarkedbyacoolrelationshipbetweenIsraelandSouth

AfricaasIsraelattemptedtoobtainsupportfromtheemergingpost‐colonialAfrican

states.Israel’sAfricanpolicyduringthedecadewassuccessful,asmanyAfrican

statesrefusedtosupportanti‐IsraelUnitedNationsResolutions.2In1961Israel

supportedthefirstUNresolutionadvocatingsanctionsagainstapartheidSouth

Africa,aresolutionthatdidnotevenenjoythesupportoftheWest.3TheSouth

AfricangovernmentthoughtIsrael’sAfricanpolicyhypocritical,since,asPrime

MinisterVerwoerdstated,“Israel,likeSouthAfrica,isanapartheidstate.”4

VerwoerdsawSouthAfrica‘sisolationinAfricaasanalogoustoIsrael’sisolation

withintheArabworld.Thisstrainedrelationshipdidnotlastlong.

WhiletheSixDayWarof1967markedawarmingintherelationship

betweenIsraelandSouthAfrica,TheOctoberWarof1973(YomKippurWar)was

thetransformativeeventinthedevelopmentoftheIsraeli‐SouthAfricanalliance.

TheSixDayWarpopularizedIsrael’simageamongstSouthAfricanleadersbecause

theIsraelivictorydemonstratedthemannerinwhichasmaller,besiegedstatecould

emergevictorious.5IntheOctoberWar,manyAfricannationsbrokediplomaticties

2Joseph,BenjaminM.BesiegedBedfellows:IsraelandtheLandofApartheid.(NewYork,NY:GreenwoodP,1988)14.3Ibid124Ibid5Joseph12

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withIsraelwhenitcrossedintoEgypt.6Seeminglyabandonedbyitsformerallies,

IsraelrespondedtofriendlySouthAfricanovertures.SouthAfricaincludedIsraelin

itsso‐called“pariahstrategy,”7inwhichSouthAfricaattemptedtodiversifyreliance

ontheWestbyreachingouttootherostracizednations.However,despiteSouth

AfricanattemptstoestablishanideologicalalliancewiththeIsraelis,thereal

backboneoftherelationshipwasmaterial.

ThecrucialfactorinstrengtheningpoliticaltiesbetweenIsraelandSouth

Africainthe1970swasmilitarycooperation.Thiscooperationincludedcommercial

tradeofmilitarymaterials,aswellasofficervisitsandjointmilitaryadvising.Both

stateswereobsessedwiththeprocurementofmilitarymaterials.Israelconstantly

hadtorenegotiatearmsdealswithallies,andFrancecutoffmilitaryaidin1968.

UnitedStatesmilitaryaidwasusuallycontingentoncertainpoliticalcompromises.8

Similarly,SouthAfricawasatwarinAngolaandfelt(likeIsrael)thatamilitary

defeatcouldspelltheendofthestate.

WhiletheextenttowhichSouthAfricanandIsraelileadersviewed

themselvesasmarginalizedontheinternationalpoliticalstageisacomplicated

subject,theleadersofbothstatesundoubtedlysharedasimilarsenseofisolation.

WhileonecancertainlymaketheargumentthatneitherSouthAfricanorIsraeltruly

neededeachotherformilitarysurvival;nonetheless,bothstatesviewedmilitary

cooperationasmutuallybeneficial.IsraelandSouthAfricamightnothaveneeded

eachother,buttheyhadnoreasonnottofullyexploitsuchaproductivemilitary

6Ibid227Moore,J.D.L.SouthAfricaandNuclearProliferation:SouthAfrica'snuclearcapabilitiesandintentionsinthecontextofinternationalnonproliferationpolicies.(Hampshire:MacMillan,1987)124.

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alliance.

Inthe1970s,everyIsraeliDefenseMinisteralongwithnumerousother

officersvisitedSouthAfricatodiscussarmssalesandotherendeavors.9Headsof

stateexchangedvisitsandalwaysmadesuretopraisetheclosetiesbetweentheir

respectivestates.From1963to1977,manystatesparticipatedinavoluntaryarms

embargoagainstSouthAfrica,thoughIsraelandwesternstateslikeFranceand

Germanyignoredtheeffort.10In1977,however,theUNstrengthenedthe

internationalembargosignificantly.TheIsraeliPrimeMinisterimmediately

announcedthatIsraelwouldnot“leaveher(SouthAfrica)tothemercyoffate,”and

theimportanceofmilitarycooperationbetweenthetwostatesbecameevenmore

significant.TheIsraeli‐SouthAfricanalliancecontinuedunabatedandinvolved

cooperationinmilitarystrategyontheactualbattlefield,asinNamibia,whereover

200IsraeliofficersprovidedstrategicadvicetoSouthAfricanunitswhilehundreds

ofSouthAfricanmilitarypersonneltrainedinIsrael.11

TheInternationalPoliticalResponsetoIsraeliSouthAfricanRelations

Theincreasingpolitical,military,andeconomictiesbetweenSouthAfrica

andIsraelsoonmadetherelationshipsubjectofinternationalcriticismandoutrage.

TheUNcondemnationsoftherelationshipinthemid‐1970sdidnotmention

nuclearcooperation,mostlikelybecauseinternationalactorswerenotawareof

suchcooperation.IntheGeneralAssembly’syearlycondemnationofrelations

8Ingeneral,IsraeldemandedstrongersecurityguaranteeswhiletheUnitedStatesattemptedtopacifyIsraeltoavoidaconflictwiththeUSSRintheMiddleEast.9Joseph44

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betweenIsraelandSouthAfrica,theresolutionshighlightedcooperationin

“political,military,economic,andotherfields.”12Theinternationalcommunity

attemptedtoisolateSouthAfricatoforcetheeliminationofapartheid,sothe

publicizedrelationshipbetweenSouthAfricaandIsraelbecamethesubjectof

increasedcallsforIsraeltoterminatethisrelationship.OnlyinDecember1979did

theUNresolutionsaddcollaborationinthe“nuclearfield”toitslist.13Ironically,

SouthAfrica’s“PariahStrategy”hadmadeIsraelevenmoreofaninternational

outcast.

Itisimportant,however,nottooverestimatetheeffectoftheseUN

resolutions,oroverstatethesupposedisolationofSouthAfrica.Despite

internationalresolutionscondemningSouthAfrica,manywesternnations

continuedtotradewiththecountryunabated.Germancompanieseventraded

sensitivenucleartechnologiestoSouthAfrica,legally.14Furthermore,thecountry

enjoyedsubstantialsupportintheInternationalAtomicEnergyAssociationuntil

1977,whenitwasoustedfromtheBoardofGovernors(againstobjectionsfromthe

UnitedStates,UnitedKingdomandotherwesternallies).15Fordecades,SouthAfrica

10Ibid.11Joseph4712UnitedNations.GeneralAssembly.Resolution32/105D.1977.www.un.org/documents13UnitedNations.GeneralAssembly.Resolution34/93P.Dec.1979.www.un.org/documents.In1980and1981resolutions,theUNonlylisted“nuclearandmilitarycollaboration”ratherthantheprevious“political,nuclear,economic,andotherfields”.14AfricanNationalCongress,TheNuclearConspiracy:FRGcollaboratestoStrengthenApartheid(Bonn:PDW‐Verlag,1975).TheinvestigatoryreportshowshowGermancompaniessuppliedtheSouthAfricannuclearindustrywithnuclearmaterials,withthecomplicityoftheGermangovernment.Germanywasnotuniqueinitswillingnesstoputcommercialinterestsabovewishesoftheanti‐apartheidmovement.15Hecht,Gabrielle.“NegotiatingGlobalNuclearities:Apartheid,Decolonization,andtheColdWarinthemakingoftheIAEA,”inJohnKrigeandKai‐HenrikBarth,eds.,GlobalPowerKnowledge:Science,Technology,andInternationalAffairs,inOsiris21(July2006):48.Hechtexamineshowtheideaof“nuclearity”isnegotiable.Forexample,SouthAfricaattemptedtoincreaseitspowerintheIAEAby

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wasaleaderintheIAEA—anorganizationofcrucialimportancefornuclearpolitics‐

despitemanystates’effortstomarginalizethecountryininternationalpolitics.

SouthAfricamaintainedanelevatedpositionintheIAEAthroughanefforttodefine

thenatureof“nuclearity”andcontinuouslyarguedthatthepoliticalmustbe

separatedfromthetechnological.16Nevertheless,thefactthatthecountryenjoyed

significantsupportintheIAEAevenin1977underminesthenotionthatworld

actorscommittedthemselvestoreallyisolatingSouthAfrica.

Ithereforenoteacontradictionbetweeninternationalcondemnationofthe

SouthAfricangovernment(andIsraelicooperation),andtherealitythatmanyof

thesesamestatescontinuedtotradewithSouthAfricathroughoutthe1970s.

DespitetheineffectivenessofinternationaleffortstoisolateSouthAfricamaterially,

theeffectthesecondemnationshadontheSouthAfricangovernmentwouldhave

seriousimplicationswhentheSouthAfricansandIsraelisagreedona“clandestine

nucleartest.”

ANuclearPartnership

ThereisnowayofknowingthedateatwhichIsrael’smilitarypartnership

withSouthAfricaturnedintoanintimatenuclearpartnership.Whileorganizations

suchastheIAEAdocumentedtradeofnuclearmaterialsbetweenthetwocountries,

scholarshavenotuncoveredevidenceastowhenIsraelandSouthAfricadecidedto

pursueajointnucleartest.SomesuggestthatIsraelparticipatedinthe1977South

arguingthatacountry’srawuraniumresourcesoughttoaddtoitslevelofnuclearity,inthesamewayasanenrichmentfacilitywould.WhileIdiscussnuclearnormsinthethirdsection,Hecht’sanalysisisusefulformeherebecauseitshowshowSouthAfricamanagedtomaintainaleadingrole

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AfricanKalahariTest,whichnevertookplaceafterSovietsatellitesdetectedthetest

site.WhileIdividetheconventionalrelationshipfromthenuclearrelationship,it

seemsmorelikelythattheconventionalrelationshipsimplyprogressedintoa

nuclearrelationship.

IsraelandSouthAfricawereidealcandidatesforanuclearpartnership.In

short,SouthAfricacouldprovideuraniumandalargegeographicareafornuclear

testing,whileIsraelcouldprovidenuclearknow‐howandexpertise.Intheearly

1960sSouthAfricainformedothermembersoftheWesternSuppliersGroupof

uraniumsalestoIsrael.After1968,however,thesystemfailedandIsraeliimportsof

nuclearmaterialsfromSouthAfricacouldnolongerbemonitored.17Asthe

internationalcommunityincreaseditseffortstoisolateSouthAfricawithin

internationalorganizationssuchastheIAEAandtheUN,itbecamehardertotrace

SouthAfrica’snuclearexports.Also,duringthe1960’sSouthAfricadidnotrequire

thatcustomersinformthegovernmentwhentheyusedmaterialforspent‐fuel

reprocessing.18IsraelhadsophisticatedtechnologicalexpertisethatSouthAfrica

needed.In1977SouthAfricaobtained30gramsofIsraelitritium,whichwas

apparentlyusedinasecrettrialforuseinnuclearbombs.19

Butunliketheconventionalweaponstrade,IsraelandSouthAfricahadnever

beencaughtinconspiringtoproducenuclearweapons.Anargumentforweapons

cooperationreliesonacircumstantialargument,thoughconventionalmilitaryand

intheIAEAinthemidstofgrowinginternationalpoliticalpressure.16Ibid27.17Moore7718Ibid79.19Liberman,Peter“TheRiseandFalloftheSouthAfricanBomb,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.26,no.2(Fall2001):45‐86.

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nuclearmaterialstradebetweenthetwocountriesiswelldocumented.

Nevertheless,IcandrawonimportantviewpointsoftheAmericanintelligence

communityregardingthisrelationship.

Aninvaluabledocumentoutliningthepossibilityofsuchanuclearalliance

wasproducedbytheCIAinthemonthsaftertheVelaIncident.Thereportassumed

thattheVelaIncidentwasanuclearexplosion,andaimedtoidentifywhatstates

mightbeinvolvedinthetest.20Assuch,thedocumentisreflectiveoftheUnited

Statesintelligencecommunity’sconclusionsregardingSouthAfricanandIsraeli

involvementintheVelaIncident.

ThereportstatedthatIsraeland/orSouthAfricaweretheonlystatesthat

wouldhavebeenlikelyparticipantsintheVelaIncident.Theauthordiscardedthe

ideathatthetestwasasoloIsraeliundertakingbecausetheclosepolitical

relationshipbetweenthetwocountrieswouldpreventIsraelfromtryingtoplace

theblameonSouthAfrica.Thedocumentalsoconcludedthatbothcountrieswould

havehadampleincentivetotestnuclearweaponsfortechnicalreasons,butthat

secrecywouldhavebeenofutmostconcern.Over60percentofthesectionoutlining

SouthAfricanandIsraelinuclearcollaborationisredacted.Interestingly,these

redactionsinthesectionoutliningSouthAfrican‐Israelinuclearcollaborationare

significantlymorenumerousthanredactionsintheindividualsectionsoutlining

individualtestsbybothcountries.

TheCIAremainedinterestedintheSouthAfrican‐Israelinuclearrelationship

intheyearsfollowingtheVelaIncident.A1983CIAreporttitled“NewInformation

20The22September1979Event.Rep.No.TheDirectorofCentralIntelligence,CentralIntelligence

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onSouthAfrica’sNuclearProgramandSouthAfrican‐IsraeliNuclearandMilitary

Collaboration”alsodescribesthelonghistoryofscientificexchangesbetweenthe

twocountriesandthatSouthAfricasuppliedIsraelwithnaturaluraniumrodsfrom

1972through1975.WhilemuchofthediscussionofSouthAfrican‐Israeli

collaborationisredacted,itisnoteworthythatfouryearsaftertheVelaIncident,the

CIAstillthoughtthecountrieswereengaged—andhadbeenengaged—insignificant

nuclearcollaboration.Thereisevenapossibilitythatsomeoftheredactedtext

describesunknowninformationregardingcooperationintheVelaIncident.21

PartII:OpacityandAmbiguity

Differentiatingbetweentheconceptsof“nuclearambiguity”and“nuclear

opacity”iscriticaltounderstandingtheextremesecrecyoftheSouthAfricanand

Israelinuclearprograms.WhileIsraelpassedthroughaperiodof“nuclear

ambiguity”beforeitstransitionto“nuclearopacity”,SouthAfricaretainedapolicy

of“nuclearambiguity.”ThoughAvnerCohenusedthesetermstodescribeperiodsof

Israelinuclearpolicy,thetermsarealsousefulincontrastingIsrael’spolicieswith

thoseofSouthAfrica.

Onceweunderstandtheimplicationsbothtermshadoneachstate’snuclear

programs,wewillbeabletounderstandwhybothcountrieswouldhaveinsistedon

aclandestinenucleartest.Inotherwords,Iarguethatthesepolicies—once

Agency.January1980.21NewInformationonSouthAfrica'sNuclearProgramandSouthAfrican‐IsraeliNuclearandMilitaryCooperation.Rep.No.DirectorateofIntelligence,CentralIntelligenceAgency.March1983.Onenoteworthyaspectofthereportisthelocationoftheredactedsection.Thereportstates,“eachsidecouldcontributetothenuclearweaponsprogramoftheother”(3).Fourlinesareredacted,followedby,“Nonetheless,wehavenoconfirmedreportsofequipmentortechnologytransfer…”Itseemsat

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developed—werenotcharacteristicsoftheSouthAfricanandIsraelinuclear

programsbutcomplexstrategiesthatcametodefinebothstates’nuclearpolicies.

TheDevelopmentofSouthAfricanNuclearAmbiguity

Cohenuses“nuclearambiguity”intwoways.Inthefirst,“thereisagenuine

uncertainty,thatislackofsufficientknowledgeastothetechnicalnuclearstatusof

thecountryunderstudy.”22Thesecondusage“referstoanambivalence—political,

military,orevenculturalinorigin—onthepartofthesuspectcountry’sleadership

concerningnuclearweapons.”23Thefirstusageof“nuclearambiguity”impliesthat

statesdonotunderstandaparticularnation’snuclearcapabilitiesbecauseofalack

oftransparency.Thesecondusageofthetermimpliesthatthespecifiedcountry’s

leadershiplacksanuclearweaponsprogramstrategy.SouthAfrica’snuclear

programdemonstratedbothimplicationsof“nuclearambiguity.”

SimilartotheIsraelinuclearprogram,theSouthAfricanprogramlackeda

coherentstrategyfromthebeginning.24OneSouthAfricanscientistlaterrecalled

thatheandotherscientistswereconcernedthatthislackofstrategycouldleadto

SouthAfricanleadersmaking“anirrationaldecisionsimplybecausetheyhaven’t

gottimetoreallyconsider.”25UnderstandingtheSouthAfricanleadership’s

motivationforestablishinganuclearweaponsprogramhasbeentheobjectofmuch

speculationanddebate.Nevertheless,itdoesappearthattheleadershipwas

adamantaboutoneaspectoftheprogram:thatitremainsecret.

leastplausiblethattheVelaIncidentisdescribedintheredactedouttext.22Cohen,Avner.IsraelandtheBomb.(NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1998)2.23Ibid3.

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Thefirstuseoftheterm,“ambiguity”examinestheVelaIncidentwithinthe

contextofinternationalpolitics.Simplyput,theWestfailedtocomprehendboththe

existenceandcapabilitiesofaSouthAfricannuclearweaponsprogram.26TheCIA

couldnotdiscerntheSouthAfricanmethodofuraniumenrichment,theveracityof

IAEAreportsindicatingthequantityoffissilematerialproduced,andtheadvanced

degreeoftheSouthAfricannuclearprogrameveninthe1980s.27WhiletheUnited

StatesintelligencecommunitymighthavesuspectedaSouthAfricannuclear

weaponsprogramandinvolvementintheVelaIncident,documentsrevealasense

ofconfusionandbewilderment.SouthAfricahadeveryintentionofmaintainingthis

ambiguityandmaintainedlevelsofsecrecythatweremanifestedintheVela

Incident.

TheDevelopmentofIsraeliNuclearOpacity

Cohendefinesnuclearopacityasa“situationwhereastate’snuclear

capabilityhasnotbeenacknowledgedbutisfirmlyrecognizedinawaythatmakesa

differenceinothernation’sperceptions,strategies,andactions.”28Israeldeniesthat

ithasnuclearweapons,butthewidespreadbeliefandevidenceofIsrael’snuclear

capabilityhasshapedthewayinwhichfriendlyandrivalstatesalikehavetreated

Israel.

Israelmovedfromapositionofnuclearambiguitytonuclearopacityinthe

24Liberman5525Ibid.26,“U.S.IntelligenceandtheSouthAfricanBomb”,NationalSecurityArchive,EBB181,<www.gwu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB181/index.htm>27Ibid.28Cohen,Introduction

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fallof1968.Thecatalystforthistransformationwasaseriesofcriticalnegotiations

betweenAmericanandIsraelileadersregardingwhetherornotIsraelwouldsign

theNuclearNon‐ProliferationTreaty(NPT).PresidentJohnsonandmembersofthe

StateDepartmentbelievedinnon‐proliferationasastrategyandhopedthattheNPT

wouldresultinamorestableMiddleEast.29ThestakeswereraisedwhenAssistant

SecretaryofDefensePaulWarnkeattemptedtolinkthesaleof50Phantomfighter

jetstoIsrael’sparticipationintheNPT.30Israelseeminglydidnotfullyunderstand

theimplicationsofthetreaty,andwhentoldthatroutineIAEAinspectionswouldbe

involved,seniormembersoftheIsraelinuclearestablishmentwereastounded.31

IsraeldemandedsignificantsecurityassurancesfromtheUnitedStatesin

exchangeforsigningtheNPT.Oneoftheseincludedademandforaformal

guaranteeofAmericannuclearprotection,apricetoohighfortheUnitedStates.

Israelipolicymakersapparentlytooksometimebeforecomingtotheconclusion

thatsigningtheNPTunderminedthecountry’spositionofnuclearambiguity.32The

NPTposedadirectthreattothesecrecyoftheIsraeliprogram.Israelheldfirm,and

thesaleofthePhantomstoIsraelwascompleted.Anewconsensusemerged

betweentheUnitedStatesandIsrael:theUnitedStateswouldnotpressureIsrael

intosigningtheNPTaslongasIsraelmaintaineditspromisethatitwould“notbe

thefirsttointroducenuclearweaponsintotheArab‐Israeliarea.”33

Israel’s“non‐introduction”pledgeexemplifiedthemannerinwhichthe

countryexploitedexistingnuclearnormstoestablishastrategyofnuclearopacity.

29Cohen31630Ibid31931Ibid300

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DuringthenegotiationsregardingIsraelandtheNPT,WarnkeaskedAmbassador

RabinofIsraelwhatIsraelmeantbyitsnon‐introductionpledge.Aftermuch

prodding,Rabinstated,“allnuclearpowers...havetestednuclearweapons.Doyou

reallybelieveintroductioncomesbeforetesting?”34Israelarguedthatpossessingan

operationalnuclearweapondidnotconstitute“introduction.”Anormhadbeen

establishedthatstatesonly“gonuclear”whentheyhavepubliclytestedanuclear

explosion.35Israelwasabletousethisnormtoitsadvantage.WhenWarne

commentedtoRabinthat“inyourview,anunadvertised,untestednucleardeviseis

notanuclearweapon,”Rabinrespondedthathewascorrect.By1970,theCIA

informedCongressthatIsraelpossessednuclearweapons.WhileIsraeldeniedtheir

existence,theworldnowbelievedthatIsraelpossessednuclearweapons.Israel

thusfinishedthetransformationfromnuclearambiguitytonuclearopacity.

PartIII:AClandestineTest

ThissectionfirstpresentshowsecurityconcernsmighthaveledIsraeland

SouthAfricatoperformaclandestineratherthanovertnucleartest.Second,Ishow

howapplyingthissecurityargumenttoIsraelandSouthAfricaiserroneous.Third,I

describetheriseofthenormagainstnucleartesting.Fourth,IshowhowIsrael’s

policyofnuclearopacityandSouthAfrica’spolicyofnuclearambiguity—coupled

withbothstates’respectforthenormagainstnucleartesting—providesabetter

32Ibid30333Ibid32034Cohen31735NinaTannenwald,“StigmatizingtheBomb:OriginsoftheNuclearTaboo,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.29,No.4(Spring2005):5‐49.Thenormagainsttestingnuclearweaponscanbeunderstoodasanextensionofthe“nucleartaboo.”

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explanationforthedecisiontoconductaclandestinetest.

TheSecurityArgument

SouthAfricakeptitsnuclearprogramsecretwhileitexistedandstillremains

protectiveofthisinformation.Israelalsocastitsprograminsecrecy,andIsraelisare

prohibitedfromdiscussingtheirstate’snuclearcapabilitiestoday.36Oneexplanation

forthisextremesecrecyisthesecurityargument:nuclearmattersaresoessentialto

nationalsecuritythattheyoughttobeshroudedinextremesecrecy.Canthe

securityargumentexplaintheSouthAfricanandIsraelidecisiontoperforma

clandestine,ratherthanovertnucleartest?

Atfirstglance,Israelseemstobolsterthesecurityargument.Israelpursueda

strategyofnuclearambiguityandthennuclearopacitybecauseitdidnotwant

enemystatesintheMiddleEasttodeveloptheirownnuclearprograms.Israelfelt

thatapublicIsraelinuclearprogramwouldputArabstatessuchasEgyptandSyria

intoasecuritysituationthatcouldprovoketheleadersofbothstatestopursuetheir

ownnuclearprograms.Furthermore,Arableadersunderstoodthepoliticalpressure

theywouldfacetoinitiateanuclearprogramifIsrael’salreadysuspectedprogram

becamepublicrecord.Theytoohadavestedinterest,atleastinthe1970s,that

Israelnotacknowledgeitsnuclearcapabilities.37Accordingtothissecurity

argument,Israelhadtoconductaclandestinenucleartestbecausemakingits

programpublicwouldcreatenewnuclearpowersintheMiddleEast,and

36Cohen341.Cohendiscussesthe“KdushatHabitachon”termusedtodescribethetabooagainstdiscussingnuclearmattersamongstIsraelis.“Kdushat”isliterallythesametermusedwithinbiblicaltextstosignifysanctity.“Habitachon”translatestosecurity.

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compromiseIsraelinuclearhegemony.

ExplainingSouthAfrica’sdecisionforaclandestinetestwiththesecurity

argumentisalsopersuasive.PeterLibermandemonstrateshowthesecurity

argumentcannotaccountfortheSouthAfricandecisiontodevelopalatentnuclear

weaponscapability.38Intheearlytomid1970s,SouthAfricawasnotthreatenedby

anyofitsneighbors.Heargues,however,thatsecurityconcernsbestaccountforthe

SouthAfricandecisiontoweaponize,statingthat“thesignificanceandquickened

paceofmilitarizeddecisionsfrom1977to1979isconsistentwithasecurity

explanation.”39LibermannotesthatthedecisiontoopentheKalaharitestsite

resultedfromconcernovertheescalatingAngolanconflict.Apparently,P.W.Botha

thoughtthataSouthAfricannucleartestwouldcause“theYankstocomerunning”

totheaidofSouthAfrica.40IfthesecuritythreatexplainsSouthAfrica’sdecisionto

weaponize,canitalsoexplainthedecisiontoconductaclandestine,ratherthan

overt,nucleartest?Libermandoesnotaskthisquestion.

TheSecurityArgumentDisproved

TheIsraelinuclearweaponsstrategyinwarsagainstArabstatesin1967and

1973underminesthesecurityargument.Israellikelypossessedafunctionalnuclear

weaponin1967,anddefinitelyhadthecapabilitytodeploynuclearweaponsin

1973.Moreover,in1973Israelwasonthevergeofdefeat,andonlyturnedthetide

ofthewaronceavitalAmericanarmsshipmentarrived.Therefore,thesecurity

37Cohen321.38Liberman,Peter“TheRiseandFalloftheSouthAfricanBomb,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.26,no.2(Fall2001):45‐86.

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argumentwouldhavedictatedeitheranuclearstrike,oratleastthethreatofa

nuclearstrike.AvnerCohen,however,hasshownthattheIsraelisviewednuclear

weaponsasusableonlyinthelastresort.HecallstheIsraeliattitudetonuclear

weaponsusagea“doublesenseofprohibition.”41Thefirstprohibitionresultedfrom

thegrowinguseofnuclearweaponsinafirst‐strike(the“nucleartaboo”),andthe

secondprohibitionresultedfromIsrael’scultureofnuclearopacity.42Thesetwo

prohibitionsmandatedthatIsraeloptforaclandestinetestin1979.

WhilethesecurityargumentmightaccountfortheSouthAfricandecisionto

weaponize,itcannotaccountforthespecificdecisiontoconductaclandestine

nucleartestwithIsrael.IfSouthAfricafeltthatitssecuritysituationwas

threatened,thecountrywouldhaveeveryincentivetoconductanoverttest.This

couldinfluenceSouthAfrica’senemies,orperhaps,asBothaincorrectlyassumedin

1977,winUnitedStatessupport.ThesecurityargumentmightfitSouthAfrica’s

decisiontoweaponize,butcertainlynotitsdecisiontoconductaclandestinetest.

IntheircritiqueofLiberman’sarticle,HelenPurkittandStephenBurgess

proposethatSouthAfricamovedtowardsasecretnuclearweaponsprogram

becauseofcriticismbytheUnitedStatesandothersofIndia’s1974“peaceful

nuclearexplosion,”andbecauseofSouthAfrican‐Israelinuclearcooperation.43

PurkittandBurgess,therefore,arguethatinternationaloutrageoverIndia’s

violationofthenormagainstnucleartesting,aswellasIsraeliinfluence,mandated

39Liberman4940Liberman60.41Cohen,Avner.IsraelandtheBomb.(NewYork:ColumbiaUP,1998)Chapter9.42Ibid.43Purkitt,HelenE.andBurgess,StephenS,“Correspondence:SouthAfrica’sNuclearDecisions,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.27,no.1(Summer2002):188.

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theprogram’ssecrecy.IfPurkittandBurgess’argumentsareshiftedfromthe

program’ssecrecyingeneralandappliedtothe1979test,theyalsounderminethe

notionthatSouthAfricaconductedaclandestinenucleartestoutofaconcernforits

security.IbelievethatPurkittandBurgess’reasoningforthesecrecyofSouth

Africa’sprogramingeneralcanextendtothespecificdecisiontoconducta

clandestinenucleartestin1979.

TheNormAgainstNuclearTesting

Beginninginthemid‐1950s,anormagainsttestingnuclearweapons

developedalongsidethedevelopmentofa“taboo”44againstthefirstuseofnuclear

weapons.NinaTanenwalddefineda“norm”as“astandardofrightorwrong,a

prescriptionorproscriptionforbehavior“foragivenidentity.”45Shecalledthe

tabooagainstfirstuseofnuclearweaponsa“defactonormativeprohibition”46

becauseinternationallawdoesnotprohibittheuseofnuclearweapons,andthefive

declarednuclearstatesareallowedtopossesstheseweapons.47

Thedevelopmentofanormagainstnucleartesting(Iarguethatitisanorm,

notataboo)48complementedthecreationofthistabooagainstfirst‐useofnuclear

44Tannenwald,Nina,“StigmatizingtheBomb:OriginsoftheNuclearTaboo,”InternationalSecurity,Vol.29,No.4(Spring2005):8.45ibid.46Ibid.47Tanenwald948Tanenwaldstatesthat“therearetwoelementstoataboo:itsobjectivecharacteristicsanditsintersubjective,phenomenologicalaspect,thatis,themeaningithasforpeople…Further,itisalsoa‘brightline’norm:oncethethresholdhasbeencrossed,oneisimmediatelyinanewworldwithalltheunimaginableconsequencestofollow”.Tanenwald’s“brightline”aspectofataboomakesnucleartestingincongruentwiththeidea.Therehavebeenhundredsofnucleartestsconductedsince1954.Whilethevastmajorityofthesetestsweredonebytherecognizednuclearpowers,otherstateslikeChina,India,andPakistanhavealsoperformednucleartests.Thenormhasheld,however,andwedonotfindourselvesinthe“newworld”thatmightdevelopshouldastateviolatethefirst‐usetaboo.

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weapons.IsraelandSouthAfricawereconcernedwithanucleartest,so

understandingthenormagainsttestingasacorollaryofthetabooagainstfirst‐use

illuminatesinternationalpoliticalunderstandingsofnucleartestingintheyears

precedingtheVelaIncident.DidanormagainstnucleartestingexistbySeptember

1979?WereIsraelandSouthAfricaboundbythisnorm?

Thedevelopmentofanormagainstnucleartestingfirstgainedmomentum

aftera1954UShydrogenbombtestoverthepacific.49Unexpectedfalloutfromthe

explosionsickenedanumberofJapanesefishermenontheLuckyDragon,andPrime

MinisterJawaharlalNehruofIndiasubsequentlycalledforabanofnucleartesting.50

Forthenextfortyyears,theinternationalcommunityengagedinattemptsto

produceagreementonpartialbansontesting.

In1963,thePartialTestBanTreatybannednucleartestsunderwater,inthe

atmosphere,orinspace.In1968,thenuclearnon‐proliferationtreatyindirectly

forbadeparticipatingcountriesfromnucleartesting(asidefromthe5declared

powers)becauseitprohibitedthemanufactureofanucleardevice.Furthermore,

throughoutthe1950s‐1970smanycountriesmadestatementsandendorsedUN

measurescondemningnuclearweaponstests.Forexample,a1962UNresolution

that“condemnsallnuclearweaponstests”enjoyedwidespreadpopularity(theU.S.,

USSR,andotherWesternstatesabstainedfromvoting,)andwhenChinatesteda

49Bunn,George."TheStatusofNormsAgainstNuclearTesting."TheNonproliferationReviewwinter(1999):20‐32.GeorgeBunn,thefirstgeneralcounseloftheUSArmsControlandDisarmamentAgencyanalyzedthestatusofnormsagainstnucleartestinginthewakeofthe1998testsbyIndiaandPakisitan.Hisanalysisilluminateshowanormagainstnucleartestingdevelopedfrom1954tothepresentday,andhowthisnormoftenappliestostatesthatarenotlegallyboundbyinternationaltreatiesorlawsagainstnucleartesting.Hecallsthisphenomenonanexampleofa“politicallybinding”norm(21).

19

nuclearweaponin1964manystatescondemnedthetest.51

Ironically,the1974Indiannucleartestdemonstratedthestrengthofthe

normagainstnucleartesting.OnMay18,1974,Indiaexplodeditsfirstnuclear

bomb,theSmilingBuddha.WhileIndia’sactionmightseemtoweakenanargument

outliningthestrengthofthenormagainstnucleartesting,themannerinwhich

Indiajustifiedthetestwasstrikinginitsdeferencetothisnorm.Indiainsistedthatit

hadperformeda“peacefulnuclearexplosion,”andthattheUNshouldnotcondemn

Indiasincethetestwasforpeacefulpurposes.52India,despitenotevensigningthe

NPT,feltthatithadtodefenditsactionssinceitviolatedaninternationalnorm

againstnucleartesting.ThedeferenceIndiapaidtothisnormwasdemonstrated

whenIndiaannouncedin1978thatitwouldnolongertestweaponsevenfor

peacefulpurposes.Indiadidnottestanotherweaponuntil1998.53

IsraelandSouthAfricaratifiedthePartialTestBanTreatyin1963,but

neithercountrysignedtheNPTbeforetheVelaIncident.SouthAfricafinallysigned

andratifiedtheNPTin1991,andIsraelisstillnotamember.EventhoughIsrael

andSouthAfricadidnotsigntheNPT,onecanarguethatbothcountrieswerestill

“politicallybound”54tothetreaty.WhilethePartialTestBanTreatyprohibitedboth

countriesfromconductinganucleartest,theNPTspecificallyprohibitscountries

fromdiscretelycollaboratingtospreadnucleartechnologyandknow‐how.And

IsraelandSouthAfricawereengagedinexactlythisactivityintheyearsleadingup

totheVelaIncident.Nevertheless,IsraelandSouthAfricawereinfluencedbythe

50Ibid23.51Ibid2352Ibid23.

20

NPTtosuchadegreethattheydidnotwanttopublicizethedetailsoftheirnuclear

partnership.Thisexemplifiesthemannerinwhichanon‐legalnormcanbejustas

effectiveasalegallybindingnormininfluencingacountry’sbehavior.

Opacity,Ambiguity,andtheNormAgainstNuclearTesting

By1979,IsraelandSouthAfricahadformedwell‐developedstrategiesof

nuclearopacityandnuclearambiguity.Furthermore,bothcountriesunderstoodthe

strengthofthenormagainstnucleartesting,aswellasthenegativeconsequencesa

violationofthisnormcouldbring.Theideathatthesetwofactorscontributedtothe

secrecyofbothcountries’nuclearprogramsisnotmyown;AvnerCohenargues

boththesepoints,whilePurkittandBurgessdemonstratehowtheanti‐testingnorm

contributedtothesecretnatureoftheSouthAfricanprogram.Myanalysisfurthers

thesehistorians’arguments,however,byarguingthatthesetworeasonsalsoapply

totheSouthAfricanandIsraelidecisiontojointlyconductaclandestinetestin

1979.

AvnerCohenproposedthatIsraelkeptitsnuclearprogramsecretbecauseof

respectforthenormagainstnucleartestingandbecauseofitspolicyofnuclear

opacity.Thesesametworeasonsaccountforthedecisiontoperformaclandestine

nucleartestin1979.IsraelhaddevelopedanunderstandingwithboththeUnited

StatesanditsArabneighborsthatitwouldnot“introduce”nuclearweaponsintothe

MiddleEast.After1970,Israelwasknowntopossessnuclearweapons.Israel,

however,decidedforaclandestinenucleartestin1979becauseanoverttestwould

53Ibid.

21

haveunderminedthecountry’spolicyofnuclearopacity.Furthermore,Israel

understoodthestrengthofthenormagainstnucleartesting,andtheconsequencesa

testwouldhavehadonitsinternationalpoliticalrelationships.

Similarly,IdrawonPurkittandBurgess’argumentthatthesecrecyofthe

SouthAfricanprogramwasaresultofboththenormagainstnucleartestingand

Israeliinfluence.TheyarerighttopointoutthatiftheVelaIncidentwasajoint

decision,IsraelorSouthAfricacouldhavepersuadedtheotherforaclandestine

test.Iadditionallyargue,however,thatSouthAfrica’spolicyofnuclearambiguity

influencedthedecisiontoconductaclandestinenucleartest.

OneseeminglyobviouspointthatPurkittandBurgessfailtomake,while

consistentwiththeirargument,istheconnectionbetweentheKalahariTestandthe

VelaIncident.SouthAfricadidnotneedtolookatthefalloutfromIndia’sPNEin

1974whenitwasdecidingwhethertoperformanovertorclandestinetestin1979.

SouthAfrica’sleadershadalreadybeenhumiliatedbythepoliticaloutragecaused

byatemporaryexitfromtheirprogram’ssecrecy,theKalahariTest.In1977,South

Africanleadersapparentlydecidedtoconductanovertnucleartest,andthen

changedtheirmindswhentheybecamesubjectofnumerousinternational

condemnations.Inotherwords,theytemporarilymovedtowardsanovertnuclear

strategy,beforeretreatingbacktothestrategyofnuclearambiguity.SouthAfrica’s

decisionforaclandestinetestin1979demonstratedthisretreatbacktoapolicyof

nuclearambiguity.

54Seefootnote49.

22

Conclusion:

PartIofthispapershowedhowagrowingmilitaryandpoliticalalliance

betweenIsraelandSouthAfricalikelyledtoanintimatenuclearpartnership.PartII

describedthedevelopmentofIsraelinuclearopacityandSouthAfricannuclear

ambiguity.PartIIIarguedthatthesepoliciesofopacityandambiguity—coupled

withIsraeliandSouthAfricandeferenceforthenormagainstnucleartesting—led

toaclandestine,ratherthanovert,nucleartest.

Whilehistorianshavedocumentedtheconstructionofagrowingpolitical,

military,andscientificrelationshipbetweenIsraelandSouthAfrica,onecannotdate

themomentatwhichIsraelandSouthAfricadecidedtoconductajointnucleartest.

Thislackofdirectevidenceimplicatingbothstateshaspreventedmanyscholars

fromaddressingtheVelaIncidentwithinthehistoricalcontextofbothstates’

nuclearprograms.

Ifoneallowsforacircumstantialargument,however,thedecisionbyboth

statestoperformaclandestinenucleartestfitsrightintothehistoricalnarrativeof

bothnuclearprograms.Notonlydidamilitaryandpoliticalalliancebetweenthe

twostatesallowfornuclearcollaboration,butthedecisiontoconductaclandestine

testseemstofollownaturallyfromIsraelandSouthAfrica’srespectivestrategiesof

opacityandambiguityaswellastheirdeferencetothenormagainstnucleartesting.

Viewedinthismanner,theambiguousVelaIncidentactuallyincreasesour

understandingofbothnations’nuclearprograms.

23

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