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The First (and Only) Year of the May 3 ConstitutionAuthor(s): Daniel StoneSource: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 35, No. 1/2 (March-June 1993), pp. 69-86Published by: Canadian Association of SlavistsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40869459 .

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Daniel Stone

The First (and Only) Year of the May 3 Constitution

Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, a young deputy elected to parliament in 1788, dashed off his political comedy, "The Deputy's Return" for the 1790 Fall election campaign. Already well-known as an advocate of radical social and political reform, Niemcewicz depicted the romance of a hero from a reform-minded noble family of modest means with a heroine from a much richer, politically conservative, noble family. The prospective father-in-law, Starosta Gadulski (Sir Chatterbox) agreed to the young couple's engagement, after considerable discussion about Poland's future direction, on condition that his future grandson receive a traditional education.1 The magnate had come to see that old-fashioned values could be maintained in a reformed system, while the son-in-law accepted the continuation of tradition within reform. Niemcewicz intended his comedy "to ridicule all... outmoded prejudices" of traditional patriotism, but, like other reformers, he enthusiastically endorsed the compromise solution to Poland's problems that was soon embodied in the Constitution of May 3, 1791 and the supplementary legislation passed in succeeding months.

The compromise nature of the May 3 constitution has often been obscured in Polish popular rhetoric since the constitution offered a valuable symbol for developing patriotic and democratic traditions throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Historians have long understood the constitution's imperfections, but the reasons for its limitations have escaped analysis until recent decades. Although that analysis is not yet complete, enough new archival research has appeared to provide a revised account of the May 3 system as it actually functioned in its only year of existence before Polish opponents destroyed it by inviting Russian military intervention. Without the partitions, that system would have governed Poland for at least one generation.

Analysis of the May 3, 1791 Constitution occupies a central place within Polish political and historical consciousness, together with the causes of the Polish Partitions in general, as the French Revolution plays a central place in French consciousness. May 3 celebrations became an annual political ritual in Polish emigré communities in the nineteenth century and continue to the present

1 Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, Pamiçtniki czasów tnoic/i, Jan Dihm, ed. vol. 1 (Warsaw: PIW, 1957) 323; Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, Powrót posta, llth edition (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1973) 46, 51, 98, 107.

Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes Vol. XXXV, Nos. 1-2, March-June 1993



70 DANIELSTONE

day. Independent Poland celebrated May 3 as a national holiday between the two world wars and celebrates it officially in post-communist Poland. The Communist regime replaced May 3 with May 1 as a holiday while recognizing, often reluctantly, the importance of the constitution to national development.2

The terms of reference for understanding the constitution of May 3 were set

by the classical debate of nineteenth century Polish historiography that pitted "pessimists," or "realists," against "optimists," or "romantics."3 The former condemned the Polish nobility for selfishly undermining the pre-partition Polish state through their support of anarchic "Golden Liberties" such as the Liberum Veto and elective kingship, and championed strong central governments; they were suspicious of national insurrections, which were likely to be unrealistic. A

"pessimist" and conservative monarchist of the late nineteenth century, Waleryan Kalinka, took advantage of newly-accessible documents that private collectors had gathered from the archive of the last Polish king, Stanislaw August Poniatowski, to write his monumental history of the Four Year Diet. Kalinka

praised the achievements of that Diet, especially the May 3 Constitution, while

criticizing the deputies for achieving only partial reform. He wished that Poles had granted the Polish King full executive and legislative authority.

In contrast, the "optimists," or "romantics," described the vitality of the Polish nation and interpreted reforms, such as the May 3, 1791 constitution, as

proof of the validity of Polish national traditions; they enthusiastically supported the insurrectionary tradition. Wtadystaw Smolenski and Tadeusz Korzon

portrayed the constitution as the culmination of several decades of educational, cultural, and economic reform and celebrated its importance for Poland's

emergence as a modem nation. Robert H. Lord, American historian and Polish

expert at the Paris Peace Conference, claimed that the May 3 constitution proved Poland's right to exist as a modern nation because it ended several centuries of

anarchy. The noted nationalist historian of the interwar period, Wladystaw Konopczynski, cutting partially free from the classical debate, praised the

deputies to the Four Year Diet for subordinating their particular interests to the

Nation, by drafting and enacting the May 3 constitution.'

2 Jerzy Kowecki, "Trzeci Maja od Polski Ludowej do Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Rekonesans," Sejm Czteroletni i jego tradycje, Jerzy Kowecki ed. (Warsaw: PWN, 1991) 301-329; Konstytucja 3 Maja w tradycji i kulturze polskiej, Alina Barszewska- Krupa ed. (Lodz: Wydawnictwo Lódzkie, 1991); and Stanislaw Dziçciolowski, Konstytucja 3 Maja w tradycji polskiej (Warsaw: Epoka, 1991). 3 Andrzej Zahorski, Spór o Stanisiawa Augusta (Warsaw: PIW, 1988) 193-246 gives an exceptionally detailed historiographical account. 4 Waleryan Kalinka, Sejm Czteroletni, 3rd ed., vol. 3 (Krakow, 1896) 48-51 ff. 5 Wladyslaw Smoleñski, Dzieje narodu polskiego (Warsaw, 1919) 355-365; Robert H. Lord, The Second Partition of Poland (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1915) 201;



THE FIRST (AND ONLY) YEAR OF THE MAY 3 CONSTITUTION 7 1

In the first major post-World War II analysis of the May 3 constitution, which remains the most thorough study of the subject to date, Bogustaw Lesnodorski showed, after examining the previously neglected Potocki family archive, how political and ideological compromise had produced a constitution that was, as a result, full of contradictions. He restated the traditional belief that the May 3 Constitution provided a significant step forward in Polish history arguing, on Marxist grounds, that its strengths lay in abolishing the oligarchical domination by magnates, arousing social ferment among the lower classes, and

initiating the transition towards capitalism. This early work reflected the Stalinist context of the book's publication in 1951, particularly in its

exaggerated conclusions which Lesnodorski, "the most objective ... of the

young Marxists," later repudiated.6 The late Emanuel Rostworowski, writing after the collapse of Polish

Stalinism in 1956, ignored Marxist terminology when he praised the May 3 Constitution for opening the door to further political and social change. His research was particularly noteworthy for developing in detail, with additional sources, Lesnodorski's observations regarding the republican contribution to

drafting the constitution.7 Another contemporary specialist, Jerzy Michalski, summed up prevailing views of the May 3 Constitution when he declared that it

"finally liquidated Polish anarchy, transforming it into libertarian government, and, in the conception of its authors and many supporters, opened the door to economic and social transformation." Michalski also noted that, during the Partition Era, the Constitution took on special significance as "a symbol of

uncompromising drive of Poles to full independence and sovereignty" that went

beyond a scientific analysis of its contents.8

Despite the extensive historiography on the May 3 constitution, relatively little scholarly literature has explored how the May 3 constitution actually operated. Wtadystaw Smolenski looked towards the origins of the Second

Tadeusz Korzon, Wewnçtrzne dzieje Polski za Stanistawa Augusta, 2nd edition, vol. 5 (Warsaw, 1897) 4; Korzon, Odrodzenie w upadku. Wybór pism history cznych, ed. M.H. Serejski and A.F. Grabski (Warsaw: PIW, 1975), 326-8; Wladyslaw Konopczynski, Dzieje Polski nowozytnej vol. 2 (Warsaw: Gebethner i Wolff, 1936) 385-6. 6 Zahorski, Spór 394-6; Boguslaw Lesnodorski, Dzieio Sejmu Czteroletniego (1788-1792). Studium historyczno-prawne (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1951) 301-16, 464-8. 7 Emanuel Rostworowski, Ostatni król Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1964) 229-30 and Legendy i fakty XV1Ì1 wieku (Warsaw: PWN, 1963) 265-406. 8 Jerzy Michalski, Konstytucja 3 Maja (Warsaw: Zamek Krolewski, 1985) 59-63.



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Partition when he completed Kalinka's unfinished magnum opus from his liberal point of view. Two contemporary historians discussed the period at some length: Emanuel Rostworowski in his general study of the last King of Poland and his pamphlet on Poland's year of constitutional monarchy, as well as Jerzy Lojek in his far less successful book on the origins and overthrow of the May 3 Constitution, primarily a foreign policy study. A few substantial monographs describe the functioning of the new regime itself, most notably, studies of the Central Police Institutions, parliament (sejm), provincial assemblies (sejmiki), the cabinet (straz), and several studies of social and economic topics relating specifically to the year following passage of the May 3 constitution or including significant material concerning that year.9 Some source publications address the period.10

As a result, it is now possible to describe the constitutional and political system that lasted from May 3, 1791 to June 1792 as an era of its own and see what kind of political system Poland would have lived under had the partitions not altered her destiny. While important in themselves, issues such as the implications of the May 3 Constitution for the future and the history of the Second Partition tend to obscure what happened between the enactment of the

May 3 constitution and the Russian invasion the following year. Analysis of the constitution as passed on May 3, 1791 ignores the alterations in the constitution introduced by enabling legislation and ignores how it actually functioned in practice. Concentration on the origins of the Second Partition ignores the social and administrative realities that gave life to the constitution.

9 Wladyslaw Smolerîski, Ostatm rok Sejtnit Wielkiego, 2nd edition (Krakow, 1897); Rostworowski, Ostatni' Andrzej Zahorski, Centralne instytucje policy jne w Polsce w dobie rozbiorów (Warsaw: PWN, 1959); Krystyna Zierikowska, Slawetni i urodzeni. Ruch polity czny mieszczanstwa w dobie Sejmu Czteroletniego (Warsaw: PWN, 1976); Andrzej Stróynowski, Reforma krolewszczyzn na Sejmie Czteroletnim (Lódz: Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. 1979); Józef Wojakowski, S traz pr aw (Warsaw: Warsaw UP, 1982); Artur Eisenbach, Z dziejów ludnosci zydowskiej w Polsce w XVIII i XIX wieku (Warsaw: PIW, 1983), 11-93; Rostworowski, Maj 1791-May 1792; Rok monarchii konstytucyjtiej (Warsaw: Zamek Królewski, 1985); Jerzy Lojek, Geneza i oba lerne Konstytucji 3 Maja (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie, 1986); Adam Lityñski, Sejmiki ziemskie 1764-1793. Dzieje reformy (Katowice: Uniwersytet Slaski, 1988). 10 Waleryan Kaiinka. Ostatnie lata panowania Stanislawa Augusta (Poznan, 1868) 2 volumes; Eugene Mottaz, Stanislas Poniatowski et Maurice Glayre. Correspondance relative aux partages de la Pologne (Paris, 1897); Mater iaíy do dziejów Sejmu Czteroletniego (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1961-1969) vols. 4-6; Rok nadziei, rok klçski; Korespondencja Stanislawa Augusta Poniatowskiego z poslem polskim w Petersburgu, Jerzy Lojek ed., (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1964); Konstytucja 3 maja 1791, Jerzy Kowecki, éd. (Warsaw: PWN, 1981); Girolamo Lucchesini, Listy do Fryderyka Wilhelma //, Henryk Kocój, ed. (Warsaw: Pax, 1988).



THE FIRST (AND ONLY) YEAR OF THE MAY 3 CONSTITUTION 73

Proposals for reform of the Polish Republic started in the seventeenth century, almost as soon as decline set in.11 In 1764, the Czartoryskis mounted the most successful campaign of any Polish political faction to establish effective national government, but they soon split with their nephew, Stanislaw August Poniatowski, whom they had put on the throne, and joined their conservative former rivals in opposition. In 1788, this noble Opposition won control of parliament and replaced the royalist Permanent Council as the national executive with Military, Diplomatic, and Treasury Commissions elected by and from parliament. Parliament taxed previously exempt groups such as noble landowners and the Church in order to build, for the first time in more than a century, an army that might defend the country against invasion. Parliament underscored its new authority by granting itself the title "najjasniejszy" previously reserved for the King.

The leader of a new constitutional commission, Ignacy Potocki, drafted plans for reform that would have greatly increased the power of parliament and decreased the slender powers of the king. His major departures from republican tradition at this time were to break a cardinal law of Polish Golden Liberties by proposing to change the elective monarchy into an hereditary monarchy in order to end the domestic struggles surrounding royal elections, which often drew military intervention from Poland's neighbours. Furthermore, Potocki proposed to abolish the disastrous liberum veto without, however, adopting rule by a simple majority of parliamentary deputies; two-thirds and three-quarters majorities would be required for many important decisions. He aimed to make parliament even more responsible to provincial nobles by binding parliamentary deputies to vote according to instructions adopted by noble assemblies (sejmiki) in the provinces, giving these assemblies the power to elect senators, and putting the election of executive offices into either provincial assemblies or parliament.12

Potocki's reformist activity on the National Education Commission during the 1780s foreshadowed his innovative political proposals and exposed the fundamental gulf separating the progressive and traditional wings of the "Patriotic" opposition. Frustrated by the conservatism of other "Patriots," yet still alienated from Poniatowski, noble reformers led by Ignacy Potocki, his brother, Stanislaw Kostka Potocki, and his cousin, Prince Adam Kazimierz Czartoryski, pinned their hopes on the 1790 elections to fill parliament's

11 Henryk Olszewski, Sejm Rzeczypospolitej epoki oligarchii, 1652-1763 (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, 1966) 326-342; Historia sejmu polskiego, Jerzy Michalski, ed., vol. 1 (Warsaw: PWN, 1984) 274- 283, 343-349 ff. 12 Rostworowski, Ostai ni 158-92



74 DANIELSTONE

benches with reform-minded deputies who carried suitable instructions from their constituents.

The results of the November 1790 provincial elections dashed Potocki's hopes and those of other enlightened republicans. More than 90% of provincial assemblies rejected their advice and supported the traditional elective kingship, although most recognized the dangers of foreign invasion during an interregnum and agreed to elect a successor during the lifetime of the childless King Stanislaw August. The most discouraging feature of the provincial elections was the widespread popular demand to dismantle the enlightened National Education Commission and return the schools to monastic orders, especially the Jesuits, even though the Pope had abolished the order in 1774. Improving the status and power of the burghers also proved unpopular.13

Shocked to find themselves isolated in their desire for reform, progressive patriots allied themselves with their original enemy, King Stanislaw August Poniatowski. Potocki and Poniatowski discussed constitutional reform from December 1790 to March 1791, when they finished a draft constitution, helped by the King's secretary, Abbé Scipione Piattoli, and Father Hugo Kott^taj, an educator and publicist. The authors delayed enactment of the new constitution until they could mobilize enough support to assure its passage.14

Passing a law on provincial assemblies on March 24, 1791 provided the first step towards enacting comprehensive reform. The law aimed to reduce the power of the great magnates, who had frustrated reform for decades, by disen- franchising about 400,000 property-less nobles who depended heavily on magnate neighbours for prestige and support.15 Even though the measure succeeded, it is difficult to applaud the exclusion of the poorest voters as a solution for political problems. In addition, poor nobles were very patriotic and, although the matter has not been researched, probably took a significant role in maintaining Polish national identity throughout the partition era, once the abolition of the May 3 Constitution implicitly restored their noble status.

As a second step, the progressive coalition replaced these "barefoot nobles" as citizens with the property-owning burghers of legally incoiporated cities by enacting the reform act of April 18, 1791 (later incoiporated into the May 3 Constitution) granting them more complete self-government, limited parliamentary representation, and easier ennoblement. About 250,000 traditionally passive burghers (only 50,000 or so enjoyed voting rights, however) could now be counted on to offer their political and financial support to the Polish state. The

!3 Historia sejmu polskiego vol. 1: 389-402; Kaiinka, Ostatme vol.1: 163-67. 14 Rostworowski, Legendy 289-354. 15 Lityñski 104-10.




city fathers' ability to mobilize mass support for demonstrations on May 3, 1791 aided the new regime greatly.

Since the reformers felt themselves to be in the minority, they enacted the constitution by means that were semi-legal, at best. The end of the Easter recess in early May offered the best time for a constitutional coup because most

deputies took their time returning to Warsaw. Poniatowski and Potocki quietly urged their supporters to hurry back to the capital. Some sixty conspirators kept remarkably quiet but the secret eventually leaked out and the leaders advanced the

original target date to the now-famous May 3. Parliament adopted the new constitution by an unrecorded voice vote after committing serious violations of

parliamentary procedure. Proponents ignored the requirements for reading and

considering bills over a three day period and, in addition, Poniatowski violated his coronation oath to uphold the old constitution. Hundreds of soldiers were stationed around the Royal Palace where parliament met; thousands of burghers gathered as well, to demonstrate their support for progressive deputies and their

hostility for conservatives. Quite a few deputies muted their opposition to the constitution or even supported it for fear that Warsaw's Third Estate would imitate French Revolutionary violence if their designs were frustrated.16

The May 3 Constitution abolished the antiquated Golden Liberties of liberum veto and the elective kingship that had condemned the Polish

government to impotence throughout most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and enacted a more integrated system of government. Like the contemporary American, British and French constitutions, the Polish constitution provided a mixed form, reflecting the mixed authorship of the document as well as contemporary philosophy. King Stanislaw August Poniatowski 's participation ensured that the king would gain new powers. The constitution made the monarchy hereditary, the king became the head of a government composed of ministers whom he appointed, and the king appoint senators, as well.17

The work of the committed republican, Ignacy Potocki, was reflected in the checks that surrounded royal authority and the oligarchical senate. Provincial assemblies of nobles elected the lower house that reigned supreme in the legislative sphere as the king lacked any kind of veto and the senate could only cast a suspensive veto. Parliament gained an important role in the executive sphere through the provision that the king could take no action without the approval of at least one minister (regardless of portfolio) and the provision that

16 Mottaz 256-7; Boguslaw Lesnodorski, Polscy Jakobini (Warsaw: Ksi^zka i Wiedza, 1960), 372-3. 17 Rostworowski, Ostatili 204-18.



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individual ministers could be removed by a two-thirds vote of non-confidence in

parliament. Deputies formed executive commissions to administer education, finance, police, and military affairs under the direction of royal ministers who did not sit in the cabinet. In addition, provincial nobles managed rural and urban administration directly.

By abolishing the liberum veto and the right to form confederations, the

May 3 system moved considerably beyond the limitations of Noble Democracy. The Constitution reached out to enfranchise the Polish Third Estate and draw some burgher "plenipotentiaries" into parliament for the first time since the sixteenth century. Furthermore, the noble and burgher estates started to mingle. Burghers gained the right to purchase landed estates, while nobles who held urban properties became municipal citizens subject to city laws and courts, in

theory, if not always in practice. Burghers also gained equality with nobles in

personal liberty (civil rights) and access to previously restricted military, civil, and ecclesiastical offices. Parliament ennobled three hundred burghers in 1790; the 1791 constitution provided for automatic ennoblement of certain classes of

burghers as well as an additional ennoblement of thirty burghers annually. Its authors considered the May 3 Constitution to be only the first step

towards full economic and social reconstruction of the country. Parliament

passed considerable legislation creating the rules and regulations for numerous executive commissions. It enacted legislation for the sale of Crown lands both to build up the State Treasury and to make more land available to poorer land owners. The situation of the large Jewish population was debated and, while Jews were not emancipated in this first year, at least the Central Police Commission undertook to protect them against harassment by public bodies

(such as municipalities) and private individuals. Future reform efforts were guaranteed the creation of a "Society of Friends of

the Constitution" which welded parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians, nobles and burghers, into a political party dedicated to supporting and extending the reforms. As in the French Revolutionary clubs and modern political parties, members pledged themselves to support positions adopted by majority vote.18

The constitution had serious limitations, however. The constitution did

practically nothing for the peasants who formed the large majority of the Polish

population. It left feudal tenure intact, although it encouraged nobles to negotiate rental contracts with the peasants and offered peasants access to national courts to

uphold those contracts. Urban reform primarily benefitted a small group of

property-owning burghers in royal cities, although even these beneficiaries

18 Jerzy Kowecki, "Od klubów do stronnictwa politycznego w Warszawie stanislawowskiej," Rocznik Warszawski vol. 19 (1987) 43-70.




achieved something less than equal citizenship, as urban parliamentary "plenipotentiaries" could only address narrowly-defined municipal concerns and had to remain silent during debates on other issues. The mass of property-less burghers in royal cities gained few rights. Furthermore, more than half the Christian third estate, burghers who lived in "private" cities on noble and clerical estates, were entirely excluded from the urban reform bill. The emergence of powerful Third Estate on the French model was limited still further by the failure to enfranchise the Jews, who made up more than half of Poland's urban population. Worse, city plenipotentiaries led parliament in shouting down the Jewish reform bill, making passage unlikely for the foreseeable future.19

The new form of government remained confused, even if it represented a vast improvement over anarchic past structures. Instead of producing a clear division of powers befitting the Age of Enlightenment, the May 3 constitution created a disordered state- a constitutional crisis waiting to happen. It is easy to see how executive authority could have broken down if deputies, senators, ministers, and the king pulled in different directions. The result could easily have been anarchy once again. True, no hetmán could set his own policy as in the old Rzeczpospo- lita, but parliamentary factions could easily paralyse the operations of the commissions or use their new-found constitutional power to vote the king's ministers out of office. Without the development of a party system like England's, the regime might well have degenerated swiftly into chaos. One thing seems certain. Efforts to pass further reforms would only have aggravated the tense situation and would have required further extra-parliamentary pressure.

Executive authority remained weak, even while the constitution strengthened the king's powers. Domestic executive authority generally rested in the hands of education, police, war, and treasury commissions which were elected by parliament and operated independently of cabinet. The cabinet (Straz praw, or "Guardian of the Laws") lacked policy-making authority and mainly executed the commissions' orders. It worked effectively on this limited basis, as a recent monograph shows. Parliament also intervened directly through the placement of its marshal on the cabinet.20

The ineffectual way in which the crucial foreign policy portfolio was handled illustrates the confusion of the new system. The achievements of the Four Year Diet, including enactment of the May 3 constitution, stemmed, in

19 Krystyna Zieríkowska, "Obywatele czy mieszkancy? Nieudana pròba reformy statusu Zydów polskich w czasie Sejmu Czteroletniego," Sejm Czteroletm i jego tradycje 152-67; Eisenbach, Z dziejów 79-92; Daniel Stone, "Jews and the Urban Question in Late Eighteenth Century Poland," Slavic Review 50:3 (Fall 1991), 531- 42. 20 Wojakowski 162-238; Lojek 160-3.



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part, from throwing off the stultifying Russian alliance and replacing it with a Prussian alliance. The parliamentary Opposition engineered this switch in 1789 over Poniatowski's protests. After May 3, 1791, however, conduct of foreign policy reverted to the king. Ignacy Potocki petulantly avoided involvement in foreign policy after the Polish parliament blocked the territorial exchange scheme in 1790 that he believed essential to maintain the Prussian alliance. He rejected the position of foreign minister in the cabinet as did Adam Kazimierz Czartoryski, although the latter agreed to serve as extraordinary envoy to Berlin, Dresden, and Vienna to support the constitution. The King may well have manipulated his allies to appoint Joachim Chreptowicz, a royalist and advocate of the Russian alliance, as foreign minister. Poniatowski and Chreptowicz pursued a pro-Russian orientation, even while the official state policy, devised earlier by Ignacy Potocki, was based on an anti-Russian alliance with Prussia. The new government failed to act quickly and decisively to ward off Russian hostility and find new allies.21

Parliament governed the country and the King dominated parliament as head of the largest parliamentary party - not because of his constitutional prerogatives. The two roles were related, of course. Poniatowski had used his

prestige and patronage powers ceaselessly since assuming the throne in 1764 to build a parliamentary following that was now supplemented by the substantial progressive republican grouping headed by Ignacy Potocki. Koft^taj developed his own power base inside and outside parliament as leader of the radical intelligentsia and burghers, although his power was much less than that of the other two and he depended heavily upon them, especially Poniatowski. Parliament itself functioned relatively smoothly although its debates continued to be chaotic and long-winded, partly because Stanislaw Matachowski, Marshal (Speaker) of the Sejm, shared his colleagues' poor sense of parliamentary procedure.22

Support for the new constitution depended primarily on the decisiveness of the reformers, since the number of supporters and opponents in parliament was very similar. The Constitution ran into most opposition because it sharpened the ancient conflict between Royalism and Republicanism by creating a hereditary throne and giving the King apparent, although not real, control over the

21 Potocki and the "Patriotic Party" advocated relinquishing Gdansk (Danzig) to Prussia in exchange for support in regaining Galicia from Austria. Later, they foresaw Prussian help in regaining parts of Belarus and Ukraine from Russia. Mottaz 265-66; tojek, Geneza 169-74ff; Kaiinka, Ostatme vol. 2:288-89; Wojakowski 97-110; Historia dyplomacji polskiej, Zbigniew Wójcik, ed., vol. 2 (Warsaw: PWN, 1982): 643-64. 22 Historia sejmu polskiego vol. 1:404.




executive. On May 3, Deputy Jan Suchorzewski dramatically (or farcically) crawled towards the throne and begged that he be killed before liberty was overthrown. Count Stanislaw Szczçsny Potocki, an extreme republican who wished to abolish the Crown altogether, concluded that "the king had struck a blow destroying the Republic and our liberty," making him "no longer the head of a republic but the sovereign lord of a new monarchy." Similarly, an

important oppositional pamphlet written by Dyzma Boncza Tomaszewski, which even received some praise from adherents of the new constitution, concluded that the constitution had created an autocratic executive and cited instances of alleged interference with free speech. He argued that the senate veto had given the king (who appointed senators) too much control over legislation and that the abolition of the confederations had made absolutism possible. Other

pamphleteers concurred.24 Because of the Easter recess, only 182 of the 359 deputies to the lower

chamber (sejm) attended the May 3 session. (Rather than dissolve the parliament that had sat since 1788 after the normal two year term, elections were held in 1790 and a second complement of deputies added to the first.) It is impossible to determine exact numbers of proponents and opponents. Russian Ambassador Iakov Bulgakov thought that only ninety of the 501 deputies and senators could be counted on to support the Constitution. In his opinion, the same number

opposed the constitution, 39 of them on principle and 5 1 following Russian orders; opportunists might also be found among the constitution's supporters, presumably. Other contemporaries counted 80 supporters of the constitution in

parliament on May 3 and 70 opponents. The contemporary historian, Emanuel Rostworowski, identified 84

supporters and 30 opponents by name, but still estimated that on May 3 the constitution would have carried by a vote of 1 10 to 72, had votes been counted. Jerzy Kowecki studied petitions and proclamations signed in the first week of May 1791 (particularly on May 5 and May 7, hence after the new constitution had been enacted) and found that 169 deputies favoured the Constitution while 77 opposed it; he could not establish 113 deputies' views. Deputies elected in November 1790 favoured the constitution by a slightly wider margin than those elected in 1788.25

23 Quoted in Rostworowski, Ostami 271; Kazimierz Bartoszewicz, Konsîytucja 3 Maja. Kromka dui kwietniowych i majowyc/i w roku 1791 (1906: Warsaw: Epoka 1989) 55-115 provides a detailed account of the events of May 3. 24 Smoleríski, Ostami 268-9; see also 74-75, 151-54. 25 Jerzy Kowecki, "Poslowie debiutanci na Sejmie Czteroletnim," Wiek XVIII. Polska i swiat (Warsaw: PIW, 1974) 209; Kowecki, "Relacja o przewrocie trzeciomajowym czy dokument akcji prokonstytucyjnej?" Francja-Polska XVII-XIX



80 DANIELSTONE

It is quite possible that opponents would have voted down the May 3 constitution, if the reformers had introduced it properly in a well-attended session; it might have passed by a narrow margin. After all, why should proponents have risked alienating public opinion by staging a coup if they had had the votes to enact the constitution legally? Poniatowski's and Potocki's decision not to invite the 177 absentees (49.3% of deputies) implies that many would have opposed the constitution or would have maintained a guarded neutrality. In addition, a few cautious deputies supported the constitution in the first week of May (especially May 3) only because demonstrators surrounding the Royal Palace intimidated them.

The conservative mood of the country was obvious and the progressive coalition found it necessary to take it into account while passing new legislation bringing the May 3 Constitution to life. The new parliament took more steps backward than forward, even though the authors of the Constitution had hoped to extend the progressive changes introduced on May 3. A new law setting out the powers and procedures of the parliament incoiporated old elements, modifying the May 3 constitution. In particular, it gave parliament additional executive authority by allowing it to make recommendations to the cabinet and to executive commissions, to overturn their decisions, and to act on complaints by individual citizens. Although the May 3 Constitution abolished the liberum veto, parliament rejected rule by simple majority and required a two-thirds vote to enact political and criminal legislation as well as to approve alliances, act on military affairs and approve regular taxes. A three-quarter majority was needed to

approve permanent taxes. Parliament compromised the responsibility of its actions by requiring that a binding, secret vote follow the normal voice vote; in the past the secret vote frequently overturned the results of the voice vote. Senators were to be nominated by noble provincial assemblies, not by the King as required in the constitution.26

Parliament's conservative mood affected the conditions for selling the extensive royal estates (starostwa) in order to raise money for the army. The authors of the measure, Hugo Kott^taj and Father Micha* Ossowski, aimed to strengthen the position of middling nobles by making it easy for them to buy land. The plan cut at the magnates, who had leased estates for decades at bargain prices, but their energetic lobby for concessions bore fruit in the bill that passed in April 1792. Although it retained much of its original form, the amended bill

w. (Warsaw: PWN, 1983), 81-97; Rostworowski, Ostatni 233; Lojek 262; Smolenski, Ostami 49. 26 Historia sejmu polskiego, vol. 1:409-10; Wojakowski 70-73.



THE FIRST (AND ONLY) YEAR OF THE MAY 3 CONSTITUTION 8 1

ignored past exploitation by leaseholders and set very high initial payments for sales of vacant lands.27 The fate of the Jewish reform bill also illustrates the conservative mood of parliament. Opposition deputies and burgher plenipotentiaries blocked passage of the watered down version introduced by Poniatowski, Potocki, and KoH^taj on the very last day that parliament sat in June 1792.28

Legislation also reduced the social benefit of the urban reform bill.29 Noble properties within city boundaries retained much of their former independence from municipal jurisdiction despite the May 3 constitution. Several suburban centres, notably New Warsaw (Nowe Miasto) and Praga, petitioned parliament to block incorporation into neighbouring cities; there was not enough time to answer the petitions. The cabinet usually acceded to noble demands although it drew the line at certain excesses.

The actions of the Central Police Commission, one of the four great executive commissions created by the May 3 Constitution, demonstrates the persistence of noble attitudes that overrode the spirit, and sometimes the letter, of the constitution. Non-resident noble visitors gained exemption from the jurisdiction of municipal courts. Similarly, rural government authorities, which remained in noble hands, frequently challenged cities for control of suburban areas. The Central Police Commission maintained the rights of noble governors (starostowie) over cities and protected noble properties within city boundaries (jurydyki). It took a traditionally noble position in opposing the efforts of municipal guilds to maintain their monopolies and, not surprisingly, offered their Jewish competitors some protection. Like other commissions, the Police Commission was chaired by a cabinet minister but was otherwise independent of the central government. Despite these traditional tendencies, the Commission created at least the beginnings of a modem police network. Through hiring many workers in both modest and substantial positions, the Commission offered substantial patronage possibilities to Poniatowski, who filled the apparatus with undistinguished nobles friendly to the constitution. The King in Cabinet also appointed royal "intendants" to supervise the activities of the local police agencies; the intendants lacked the power to control them.

The reformist government took effective military steps to support the constitution, in addition to making concessions. A great achievement of the Four Year Diet was to increase the army from about 25,000 men in 1788 to 56,000 in 1791, and 65,000 in 1792, thanks to the willingness of Polish nobles

27 Stróynowski 69-74ff.; Kalinka, Ostatine vol. 2:283, 289. 28 Artur Eisenbach, Z dziejów 89. & Zahorski, Centraine 88, 94, 110-13, 115, 130-31, 140, 144, 148, 158-60, 163-64; Wojakowski 162-65.



82 DANIELSTONE

to impose taxes on themselves; however, half the army still consisted of ill-

equipped and ill-disciplined National Cavalry.30 The governing alliance took

political control out of the hands of previously independent ministers

(hetmanowie) who strongly opposed the constitution and placed it with the

Military Commission and the king; Branicki's appointment as Minister of War in the new cabinet was largely honourary. While still inadequate to repel a Russian invasion, the army could maintain domestic peace. Polish detachments were stationed near Warsaw and in the provinces, especially in the Ukraine where

magnate opposition was strongest and where magnates employed substantial

private armies. The growing concentration of Russian troops on their side of the border served as a pretext for moving Polish troops up.31

The government used the army to free political activity from the threat of

military intervention, not to force opponents to support the constitutional authorities. Even the Opposition acknowledged that "there was not a single foreign or Polish soldier at the provincial assemblies" of 1792. Furthermore, the authorities passed, but never invoked, harsh civil penalties against individual dissent in May-June 1791. Opposition magnates, who had used their private armies to dominate provincial assemblies throughout early modem times, were

stymied.32 Elections posed an important test for the new regime. The government

intended to legitimize its power by holding parliamentary elections in early July 1791, but it worried about public opinion and postponed them until February 1792.33 In January, Prussian ambassador Girolamo Lucchesini reported that the new regime still feared

the bitterness of leaseholders (starostowie) deprived of their authority, the intrigues of judges affected by reform, and the activities of opponents of the Constitution. These opponents get more sure of themselves every day and publicize their intention to do something about it

with the help of the neighbouring powers that opposed Poland's making the throne hereditary. Nevertheless, the King and his supporters held the upper hand and opponents of the constitution complained that "they remain in isolation because quite a large army lies under the complete control over the King." Lucchesini suspected that even Catherine II could not overturn the new constitution without military intervention.34

30 Leonard Ratajczyk, Wojsko i obronnosc Rzeczypospolitej 1 788-1 792 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1975) 116, 135. 31 Lucchesini 96; Kaiinka, Ostatme vol. 2: 277, 285, 296. 32 Smolerìski, Ostatiti 65-7, 295. 33 Smoleñski, Ostatiti 260. 34 Lucchesini 60-1, 88.




Despite these concerns, the February elections passed peaceably, resulting in a progressive victory. The new regime owed its success to its moderate policies, its friendliness to opponents, its systematic campaign of wooing opponents through granting orders, decorations and offices, and its use of the army to prevent counter-measures. Poniatowski reportedly spent the large sum of 180,000 ducats (czerwone zlote) on expenses. Most provincial assemblies passed resolutions pledging allegiance to the May 3 constitution and, equally important, no province came out against it or against the hereditary throne, the constitution's most controversial provision. Even the centre of opposition, Vol- hynia, contented itself by ignoring this important matter in its printed resolutions. From the formal point of view, the elections also went smoothly despite technical hitches which prolonged many electoral assemblies unreasonably.35

Having established its right to exist, the May 3 regime enjoyed clear sailing, at least domestically, to its anniversary celebration in May 3, 1792 when fireworks and speeches by public figures enhanced elaborate festivities throughout the country. The Pope put his stamp of approval on the régime by switching St. Stanislaw day from May 8 to May 3. The government did not take success for granted, however. It stationed 7,000 soldiers in and around Warsaw alone, to ensure that everything went smoothly.36

The February elections and the May celebrations are generally taken to show nearly unanimous national support for the May 3 regime but this support is exaggerated. The events were carefully planned and stage-managed for maximum effect. The lack of spontaneous support does not show that the new régime was disliked to the public. Rather, it indicates an achievement that is equally as impressive as mass support - namely, a regime that had consolidated its power and was ready to rule constitutionally, without invoking the harsh laws that it had passed to suppress dissent.

Had the nobles changed their minds? Probably not very much. Some came to accept the new regime because Poniatowski went out of his way to allay fears and court their favour. Hetmán Jacek Matachowski, the brother of Marshal Stanislaw Matachowski, opposed the enactment of the May 3 Constitution as did Chancellor Joachim Chreptowicz, but Poniatowski gained their support by putting them in the cabinet. The argument that his actions were helping the Russians persuaded Count Józef Czartoryski, the leader of the conservative but patriotic Volhynia nobility, to stop opposing the May 3 Constitution.

35 Smolenski, Ostatili 259-300; Rostworowski, Ostami 245-46; Kalinka, Ostatnie vol. 2:332; Lucchesini 93-96; Lityñski 132-39. 3° Lucchesini 117.



84 DANIELSTONE

The majority of the provincial nobility probably did not know whether to approve or disapprove the constitution and waited for guidance, particularly from its traditional leaders, the local aristocracy. Poniatowski counted on their confusion and apathy to prevent opposition to the new constitution from developing. As he mused, "You know that most men are less eager to abolish something that has already been done, no matter how much they dislike it, than to prevent it."37 He knew that grumbling was widespread but opponents could not act without leadership. Traditional Opposition leaders mostly joined the King, or sat quietly on their estates. Some malcontents went abroad because they saw that the new regime had consolidated its support and could not be stopped. In addition, ideological extremism made some fear that theoretical royal despotism would be real. Polish tradition allowed them to approach foreigners to help them regain their position. Two of the most important conservative leaders of the Patriotic Party, Count Szczçsny Potocki and Hetmán Seweryn Rzewuski, happened to be abroad on May 3 and decided not to return. They conspired with Count Grigorii Potemkin, the commander of Russian armies in the Ukraine, to overturn the new constitution and, after his death, they turned to Catherine II, herself. Hetmán Franciszek Ksawery Branicki remained in Warsaw where he schemed against the new regime while feigning reconciliation. Branicki worked with Russian ambassador Bulgakov until he gained royal permission to leave Warsaw to go to Potemkin in Jassy and then to Petersburg.

Had opponents remained in Warsaw and formed a parliamentary party, they could have elected themselves to key positions in the executive or paralysed the

operations of parliament, but the Polish tradition of early modem times leaned more towards extra-parliamentary action. One of Poland's Golden Liberties had been the right to rebel legally, through the formation of noble associations, called "confederations"; royal government, too, could sponsor or join confederations in order to assume extraordinary powers. Such confederations had controlled parliament in 1764, 1767, 1772-5, 1776, and 1788-91, suspending the liberum veto. Other confederations, such as Bar Confederation of 1768-1772, took up arms to defeat the government. Tragically, Poles often requested foreign military intervention to support their factions and, equally tragically, the neighbouring powers sometimes sent armies without being asked. One such confederation overthrew the May 3 Constitution. After signing the infamous Targowica Confederation in April 1792, purportedly on Szczçsny Potocki's estates but really in St. Petersburg, a handful of Polish nobles invited a large Russian army to put them in power and overturn to the May 3 Constitution.

37 Mottaz 266-67.




The functioning of the May 3 Constitution in its first and only year of existence warrants much of the praise which has been heaped upon it for the last two hundred years. It broke decisively with the inefficient and often unjust Noble Democracy that developed over several centuries and had completely outlived its usefulness. While moving in new directions, the new government maintained many of the best traditions of the outworn system, democracy and civil rights. Poniatowski, Potocki, and Koit^taj as well as the "Friends of the May 3 Constitution" hoped to continue reform. They advanced plans were enfranchise the majority of the Christian burghers not yet touched by the urban reform bill and to grant civil rights, if not political citizenship, to the Jews. Serious thought was given to peasant reform, although enfranchising the peasant majority seemed Utopian, even in the age of the French Revolution. On the negative side, excluding the poor nobility was harsh, if well-intentioned.

Nevertheless, as most historians have noted in their qualifying statements, the new constitution was seriously flawed in conception and execution. Awkward compromises left both the spirit and the letter of the constitution unclear. Denounced as royalist, the constitution really strengthened the hand of parliament, particularly with the enabling legislation passed in 1791-92. Parliament gained an important share of the executive authority by controlling the vital governing commissions and made its presence felt within the cabinet. Further reform was impossible at this time. The mass of provincial nobles needed time to catch its breath and assimilate what had been accomplished before moving on. Had the regime survived until the mandatory constitutional review in 1816, additional progress would undoubtedly have been made.

It is important to see the May 3 regime for what it was: the product of a specific political compromise. From this perspective, the Constitution represented an even greater achievement but was much more fragile than has generally been acknowledged. While strong enough to enact the constitution, the reform movement was still weak and had not yet won over the majority of politically active citizens. The (at best) semi-legal enactment of the May 3 constitution and the subsequent year of constitutional experiences reveals that much of the nation still clung to what Niemcewicz called "outmoded prejudices." Left to itself, the majority of Polish nobles might have rejected the Constitution on May 3; they remained cool to it after its enactment, even if they accepted the fait accompli.

But the May 3 constitution not only produced the constitutional and ideological compromises, it also produced the governing coalition that made the system work. The progressive elite, headed by King Stanislaw August Poniatowski, Count Ignacy Potocki and Vice-Chancellor Hugo Koii^taj, went ahead despite their lack of overwhelming popular support and set up a viable



86 DANIELSTONE

reformist government that would have survived for at least a generation had Russia not invaded. After a somewhat undemocratic enactment of the May 3 constitution, they governed democratically, allowing opponents to speak and act

freely. Had the alliance between the King and the progressive republicans broken down, the Constitution would have failed. But they kept together and worked in

harmony, at least for the first (and only) year of the May 3 Constitution.

