34
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SWAZ1
LABOITK MARKET IfMMI - 19tiU
In the growing body of l i t e r a t u r e on African labour history of
the past decade . Swaziland has figured ha rd ly at a l l . The reason.
no doubt , l i es in the numbers . No more than 4 per cent - often less
- of mine labour in the Wi twate rs rand ' s catchment a rea was of
Swazi o r i g i n . Nor did the Swazi d is t inguish themselves in other
ways - a s expert shaft s i n k e r s , for ins tance , or as t roublemakers.
It is the purpose of th is paper to shed some light on the Swazi
labour market and i ts development, and to show t h a t , numbers
a s i d e , i ts study can yield some useful f ind ings . This is especially
t rue of the post-World War 1 twentieth cen tu ry , when loca l ly , in
response to cap i t a l pene t ra t ion , a competitive market for Swazi
labour was crea ted which no government or monopoly was able to
regu la te to i t s sa t i s fac t ion . It was a market in which wage
s t ruc tu res and working condit ions became b a r g a i n a b l e items in the
a t t r ac t ion of l abour , employers ' efforts notwi ths tanding , and
con t ra ry to the colonial s t a t e ' s ear ly des ign .
A fur ther aim of th is paper is to suggest that the re la t ive
35
neglect of research in Swaziland stems from i ts simple ca tegor
isation as one of the BLS Terr i tor ies - an oversimplification that
has led to some mistaken assumptions and inapp rop r i a t e compar i
sons. What has been overlooked is the significance of set t ler cap i ta l
• penetration da t ing back to mineral -era South Africa, which has
largely determined the cha rac te r of the labour market from the
earliest d a y s , making Swaziland more reminiscent of Char les van
Onselen's Rhodesia than of i ts des ignated s i s te r s t a t e s , Lesotho and
Botswana.
A detai led study of the Swazi labour market merits at tent ion
for several r ea sons . F i r s t , there is no c l ea re r example of a
calculated and meticulously planned s t r a t egy for land depr ivat ion
and surplus extract ion aimed at p ro le ta r ian iza t ion by a colonial
state in ear ly 20th century Africa. That it did not succeed as
planned had as much to do with the changing na tu re of European
settlement and cap i t a l penetra t ion as anything e l se .
Second, African labour his tory is replete with examples of work
forces coerced into labour ing for wages and under condit ions
decreed by cap i t a l and enforced by the s t a t e . Recent research has
focussed on the emergence of worker consciousness a t t endant to
class formation, and pa t t e rns of res i s tance that followed. In
Swaziland the case was qui te different . There, competition for
labour between local and foreign c a p i t a l , and within the country
between British and South African c a p i t a l , c rea ted a market which
the Swazi played with increas ing shrewdness for bet ter wages and
conditions. This phenomenon was most notable dur ing the post-war
labour shor tages of the la te 1940's and ea r ly 1950*s, but its roots
stretch back to the turn of the cen tu ry . It meant, among other
things, tha t the development of worker consciousness and res is tance
patterns emerging in pos t -war Swaziland reflected the position of
relative leverage enjoyed by the labour force. And one r ea l ly
needs, f ina l ly , to view the development of Swazi cash cropping and
cattle marketing aga ins t the backdrop of the changing forces
driving the labour market .
What l i t e r a tu re there is on Swazi labour his tory revolves
36
almost en t i re ly around the period 1888-1930, when the land was
concessioned away by a beguiled king Mbandzeni, the concessions
(some over lapp ing four deep) were confirmed, d isputed, and
confirmed aga in ( tha t time for good) by the British colonial state;
and the Swazi were expelled from two-thirds of the i r lands in 1914.
A ser ies of d i s se r t a t ions t race these developments. Phi l ip Bonner's
d i sse r ta t ion gives the definitive in terpre ta t ion of the concessions.
(1) Two other unpublished works, by Balam Nyeko and Francis
Mashasha, c a r r y elements of the story up to the Great Depression.
(2) Jonathan Crush deals with the ear ly phase of European
settlement and cap i t a l penetrat ion in a mas te r ' s thes i s , port ions of
which have been publ i shed . (3) Martin F ransman ' s disser tat ion
t races the themes of c lass formation, worker consciousness, and
res i s tance throughout the t rans- independence period. (4) Literature
is being produced by anthropologis t s , sociologists and economists
which deals mainly with the effects of labour migrancy on recent
social change in Swaziland. (5)
Research for th is pape r , as yet incomplete, draws from the
l i t e r a tu re mentioned and from arch iva l sources in Swaziland and
South Africa. The most notable of these include the Swaziland
National Archives at Lobamba, the a rch ives of the Native Recruiting
Corporation (hereaf ter , NRC) at the TEBA offices in Si teki , and the
Allister Miller pape r s at the Killie Campbell Library in Durban.
European se t t le r influence and capi ta l penetrat ion may be said
to have commenced in the ea r ly 1980's, when gold was discovered in
northwest Swazi land. This led to an immediate inflow of conces
s ion-seekers , l a rge ly Br i t i sh . It was they who dealt so c lever ly and
decis ively with Mbandzeni, in the absence of effective adminis t r
a t ive control of Swaziland by e i ther the British or the Transvaal
governments . During the k i n g ' s final years (1887-1889) the
concessions were gran ted promiscuously - so much so that two
commissions were es tabl i shed to verify and to sort them out, one in
1890, and the second (and c ruc i a l ) one in 1904, after the
establ ishment of British colonial r u l e . Martin Fransman categorises
the European concess ionar ies into three types :
37
1) Mining a n d (to a l e s se r ex t en t ) mercan t i l e a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l
i n t e r e s t s , main ly B r i t i s h .
2) Graz ing a n d (to a l e s se r ex t en t ) fa rming i n t e r e s t s , mostly
Afrikaner of T r a n s v a a l o r i g i n s .
3) Concession a n d l and s p e c u l a t o r s , of both n a t i o n a l i t i e s .
Fransman a n d Jona than Crush desc r ibe in a d m i r a b l e fashion
the a c t i v i t i e s and Report (1907) of the Concessions Commission,
which a w a r d e d t w o - t h i r d s of the l and to the c o n c e s s i o n a i r e s , a n d
there is no need to r e - cove r t h a t g r o u n d h e r e . (7) Two or th ree
points may be added for i n t e r e s t ' s s a k e . F i r s t , the Concess ions
Commission was staffed a n d c h a r g e d so as to p rede te rmine the
outcome. The Commission had been e s t a b l i s h e d in 1904 by the Br i t i sh
High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner , whose intent was to "dea l
with Swaz i l and a s n e a r l y a s pos s ib l e on the same l i n e s a s an
ord inary d i s t r i c t of the T r a n s v a a l " . (8)
Milner c o n s e q u e n t l y p l a c e d , a s head of the Commission,
Johannes Smuts, the R e g i s t r a r of Deeds of the T r a n s v a a l . (9) A
second Commission member was W.H. Gi l f i l l an , Su rveyor -Genera l of
the T r a n s v a a l ; and a t h i r d , J . C . Krough, who, a s spec ia l
Commissioner for Swazi land when it h a d been unde r T r a n s v a a l
adminis t ra t ion (1884-1889), had imposed a t a x on the Swazi so
burdensome a s to accomplish his object of " i n d u c ( i n g ) the n a t i v e s to
work". (10) Smuts himself, who had served as Br i t i sh Consul in
Swaziland d u r i n g those same y e a r s , had advoca t ed a " g e n t l e
compulsion or i ncen t ive (to l a b o u r ) such for i n s t a n c e a s the
admirable Glen Grey Act of the Cape Colony, ( a s ) in the best
in teres ts of the n a t i v e s t hemse lves" . (11)
Thus it should come a s no s u p r i s e t ha t the f i r s t ou t l i ne of the
Commission's " f i n d i n g s " l a t e r announced in the 1907 Land Proc lam
ation, had been d e s p a t c h e d over two y e a r s beforehand by the new
British High Commissioner, Lord Se lborne , to the Colonial Office
(12).
A major cons ide r a t i on in f loa t ing the 1907 Proc lamat ion seems
to have been, as Crush summar i ze s , a fear of Swazi r i s i n g ,
possibly j o in ing with the Zu lu , if the l and e x p r o p r i a t i o n were
38
overly cruel in timing or degree . So, Selborne reported to the
Colonial Secretary , the Swazi would be granted just enough land to
ward off "serious t rouble"; (13) and the actual expulsion of the
Swazi would be delayed for five y e a r s , so that " their imagination
would not be confronted with the sudden loss of r igh t s over great
t r a c t s of Swazi land". ( K ) The Colonial Secretary himself (Lord
Elgin) furthered the ruse by a s su r ing the Swazi protest deputation
despatched to London by the Queen Regent that enough of the
Government-withheld Crown Lands would be forthcoming to the Swazi
so that "it is not too much to say that half the land will be in
(Swazi) occupat ion" . (15)
A second point concerns the nature of the capi ta l penetrat ion,
to whose in te res t s the Government was responding . Swazi land 's
economic potential was considered, unt i l roughly the time of the
First World War, to have been in minerals (p r inc ipa l ly gold and
t i n ) ; and the extract ion of minerals was almost to ta l ly under the
control of British c a p i t a l . A close look at the delineation of the
post - 1907 land settlement shows a massive bias in favor of those
mining in t e r e s t s . Afrikaner g r az ing and farming cap i t a l was
provided for, to be su re , and a fair amount of the bet ter farmland
fell into the Native Areas. But the requirements of mining - which
was both a l abour - in tens ive and water - in tens ive unde r t ak ing , were
provided for before a l l e l se .
Labour was provided for by ensur ing that the Native Areas
(numbering 32 in a l l ) would not support their human and cat t le
populat ion for more than a few years at best , and not at a l l in a
few c a s e s . It was Allister Miller, an or ig ina l concessionaire ,
adv i se r to Mbandzeni, en terpreneur nonpare i l , publ i sher of the
Times of Swazi land, and t rus ted confidante of both Selborne and
Milner before him, who had a r t i cu la t ed the European se t t le r case
for Swazi p ro l e t a r i an i za t i on . "We hope", he wrote to Selborne in
1906, " that the nat ive settlement will be so devised that it will
pave the way to (European) tenure and respons ib i l i ty and the
denat ional iza t ion of the Swazis " "If these people a re to be
saved" , he went on, "it is my opinion that they must be forced
39
from the exclusiveness of t r i b a l l i f e . . . . (which) is enabl ing
the idler to l ive in id leness" "We believe that if the na t ive is
provided with sufficient land to meet the requirements of the
present and next generat ion he will be amply accomodated". (16)
Mil le r ' s p lan , as ca r r i ed out, proved even more effective than
devised in d r iv ing the Swazi to l abour . George Grey, selected by
Selborne to del ineate the Native Areas, outl ined his intent to the
High Commissioner in drawing the boundar i e s . Gold and t in , and
the water to mine them, were left in British hands . The most
desirable g raz ing (sweet ve ld , g razab le the year around) went to
the British as wel l . What was more, huge t r ac t s of the finest
grazing and farmland were held out from the settlement as "Crown
Lands" - for future European settlement and cont ro l . (17)
"We have been thrown back from our ga rdens amongst s tones , "
(18) the chiefs complained, but poor qua l i ty of the land was only
compounded by i ts insufficiency. Everyone knew tha t , in Allister
Miller's words, "nat ive . . . . communes are doubling their populat ion
every 25 y e a r s " . (19) Grey ' s del ineat ion provided for only enough
land, at those ra tes of growth, to l as t unt i l 1921. What is more.
Grey was assuming in his ca lcu la t ions a " typ ica l " Swazi family of
seven persons possessing five head of c a t t l e . But the l a t t e r figure
was a massive underes t imate , stemming from the ca t t le pandemic of
the previous decade , which had killed off no 'less than 90 per cent
of the Swazi h e r d s .
So by the time of the Pirn Report (1932), the Native Areas had
become overpopulated, and were subject to "serious overstocking
and erosion", with a ca t t le count not 5/7ths of the human
population, but 2\ times as g r e a t . (20) By World War I I , British
medical officers were repor t ing the greates t r a t e s of child
malnutrition and a t tendant d isease in those same a r e a s - the Native
Areas s i tuated in the south and west of the count ry . (21) Those
same a r e a s would become the grea tes t genera tors of labour
outmigration in subsequent y e a r s .
Water was secured, a l so , to European mining and ( l a te r )
farming interes ts at the expense of the Native Areas, by provision
40
of the Swaziland Water Proclamation (No, 11 of 1910), both for
current use and future growth. By the mid 1920's the European
Advisory Council (a set t ler lobbying group) was complaining of a
"p reca r ious" water s i tuat ion in the south - the same region of the
grea tes t Native Area underdevelopment. A 1927 Government report
a s se r t ed : (22)
"Many of the water courses in Swaziland which formerly
were perennia l a re now dry except in the wet season, and
many streams cease to flow except in the summer months".
Consequently, on July 1, 1914, the Swazi were expelled from
the lands which they had h i s to r ica l ly claimed as t he i r s . Perhaps an
eighth of them - 20,000 by one estimate - remained on the lands of
the new European owners , as t e n a n t s . (23) The remainder were
removed to the Native Areas which, by des ign , would not support
them for very long, if at a l l . All were taxed at the highest ra tes of
any "na t ive" populat ion in Southern Africa. (24) Thus were the
foundations of the labour market la id by the colonial s t a t e .
Let us now turn to the development of that market . Earliest
records indica te some Swazi workseekers at Kimberley as ea r ly as
the 1880's - how many we do not know. Most e a r l y (1890's)
outmigrat ion was a good deal more localized - to the gold and tin
mines in northwestern Swaziland, and across the border to the
Barberton gold mines, as well as the first of the market farms in
the eas tern Transvaa l and nor thern Natal . The first significant
Swazi numbers migrated to the r and mines after 1902, in o rder , it
is sa id , to earn the money to replenish cat t le herds decimated by
r inderpes t and East Coast Fever dur ing the preceding decade . (25)
Certain features d i s t ingu ish the ear ly migra t ions , which would
remain re l a t ive ly constant throughout the twentieth cen tu ry . First
was the pa t t e rn of government inducement / coercion which
const i tuted a p r inc ipa l "push factor" to outmigrat ion. F. Enraght—
Moony in his f irst report as Special Commissioner for Swaziland
(1903) remarked on the reluctance of the Swazi to enter the "labour
marke ts" , and on the "efforts . . . . b e i n g made to overcome t h i s " .
That heavy taxa t ion was one of the measures was evident from the
Al
relentless government response to Swazi complaints over t axe s : there
was plenty of work in the mines. (26) And in spi te of Lord E l g i n ' s
assurances, no Crown Lands became ava i l ab l e to rel ieve Swazi
overcrowding in the Native Areas, save one parcel of 14,000 morgen,
sold in 1914 to heip soften the blow of a new tax i nc r ea se . (27) (No
significant sa les of Crown Lands to the Swazi nation occurred until
the World War II e r a ) .
A second feature was the pa t te rn of response to these p ressures
by the Swazi monarchy itself: the encouragement of migrancy, and
even par t i c ipa t ion in i ts recrui tment . Most often th i s seems to have
been done in order to finance the purchas ing back of concessioned
lands, but tha t was not a lways the ca se .
In 1899 King Bhunu awarded J .J . Grobler a 15 year concession
granting him the exclusive r ight to recrui t labour in Swazi land.
(28) In 1905, 1907, 1909 and 1914, the Queen Regent (Labotsibeni)
and her son, Prince Malunge, encouraged men to "go out" to the
mines in order to earn the money to repurchase expropr ia ted l a n d s .
Levies were var iously set at £3 and £5 per head - the l a t t e r
figure amounting to one qua r t e r of an annua l mine wage. (29) There
was also a contract a l legedly signed by the Queen Regent 's
advisor, Josiah Vil ikazi , to supply 5,000 men to Witwatersrand
mines for a capi ta t ion fee of £2 per head , to ra i se revenue for some
litigation in connection with a cancelled royal concession. (30) And
there was an alleged agreement between Malunge and Swaziland
Tin, Ltd. (1906), whereby the prince was to supply 500 labourers to
ihe company for a fee of 10/- per head . (31) Records indicate that
royal involvement in support of labour recrui t ing continued unt i l at
least the late 1940's, when the Paramount Chief was s t i l l ca l l ing
meetings to ass i s t Native Recruiting Corporation (hereaf ter , NRC)
activities, no doubt in the belief that such support benefitted the
society as a whole. (32)
A th i rd constant was the competition between local and foreign
(South African) cap i ta l for Swazi l abour . Some time before he was
replaced as High Commissioner (1905), Milner met with represen t
atives of the Swaziland Chamber of Mines and Indus t ry , notably
42
Allister Miller and David Forbes. Among the topics discussed were
methods by which to retain labour within the Swaziland borders
(The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association - "Wenela" - having
placed an agent in Mbabane as ear ly as 1903). Miller wanted a tax
rebate g ran ted to labour which stayed in the country , to alleviate
the short supply of labour which "began to fall off in 1898".
Presumably the 1907 Proclamation and the subsequent Swazi
expulsion obviated the need for t h a t . (33)
The labour which Miller, Forbes and Milner had in mind was
o r ig ina l ly dest ined for the local mines - t in at Havelock and gold
a t Forbes Reef; but as hopes for big mineral s t r ikes receded by the
time of World War I, British cap i t a l in teres ts shifted to farming ano
ca t t l e r a n c h i n g . The Swaziland Corporation, headed by Miller,
es tab l i shed Ubombo Ranches in the eas t , and implemented the
Mushroom Land Settlement Scheme which (along with the post-war
Returned Sold ie r ' s Settlement Scheme) was designed to populate the
concessions and Crown Lands with a "des i rab le c l a s s " ( i . e . British,
not Afrikaner) of se t t l e r .
The colonial s ta te fully cooperated in that effort. Given tht
condit ions crea ted by the land pa r t i t i on , there ought to have been
plenty of l a b o u r . In 1914, se t t ler - farmers entered into written or
informal cont rac t s with those Swazi who after July 1 were to become
disowned, to remain on the land in return for l abour . Atypical
arrangement called for 6 months ' labour for each adult male at 10/-
per month. Transvaa l farmers holding graz ing concessions in
Swaziland commonly required the labour to be performed on their
farms in the Union. An occasional farmer required a male or two
per family to contract themselves to the rand mines, with the
cap i t a t ion fee (commonly £2 per head) rever t ing to him. Those
refusing the terms, or who were not required as farm labour , were
removed to the Native Areas, by s ta te force if necessary , thus in
theory becoming ava i l ab l e for local mine work. (34)
It was a tidy scheme - what Selborne had referred to as
"farming kaf f i r s" (35) - perfectly suited for what the Swaziland
Corporation had in mind for i ts vast farm hold ings , cotton
41}
production a n d , l a t e r , tobacco. But theory and prac t ice did not
coincide, for aggress ive labour recru i te rs from the Witwatersrand
(dominated by British capi ta l as well) moved in a n d , unopposed by
the Government, soaked up a v a i l a b l e labour- "A ba t ta l ion of labour
recruiters from South Africa has i n v a d e d , " complained a f rus t ra ted
Allister Miller in 1910, "and disorganised the local labour s u p p l y " .
(36) Various remedies - short of r a i s i n g wages - were proposed by
local c a p i t a l , some of which they persuaded the colonial s ta te to
adopt. Farmers insis ted on writ ten cont rac t s with t e n a n t s , which
placed the l a t t e r under provisions of the Master and Servants Law
(Transvaal Law No. 13 of 1880, in force in Swaziland unt i l 1961),
which provided for ha r sh penal t ies for in f rac t ions . Farmers
proposed tha t the Government r equ i re 2 months ' notice before a
squatter could re l inguish t e n a n c y . (37) A measure was adopted
preventing a t tes ta t ion for labour outside Swaziland of any male
whose tax receipt was endorsed a s employed by a local e n t e r p r i s e .
(38) Petitions were made - and rejected - which would have reduced
taxes paid by local farm labour , and (since farms and mines were
resorting increas ingly to the employment of child labour ) denying
travelling passes to workseekers under age 18. (39) Ultimately local
capital turned for i ts solution to importing labour itself -
Mozambican labour ( "c landes t ines" ) , which poured across the border
seeking better condi t ions . "We do not an t ic ipa te any difficulty in
getting raw hands to pick cot ton", reported the Swaziland
Corporation to i ts shareholders in 1907; " . . . t h e r e will be an
inexhaustible supply as women from Portuguese Tongaland would
readily cross over the border to pa r t i c ipa te in the p i ck ing" . The
Mozambique Labour Convention of 1909 theoret ical ly had made the
recruitment of any but Witwatersrand-dest ined mine labour i l l ega l .
but under the colonial s t a t e ' s blind eye ihe flow of c l a n d e s t i n e
never abated until the 1960's in Swaziland. (40)
The Swaziland government responded only selectively tc :occ-.l
capital's demands for l abpur , because it was answerable to the
needs of South African cap i t a l as well . Wenela, es tabl i shed tc
recruit " t rop ica l" labour in Mozambique and the te r r i tor ies north of
44
22° south, operated in Swaziland from at least 1913. The Native
Recruiting Corporation (NRC), incorporated in 1912 to recruit in
South Africa and in the British High Commission Terr i tor ies , leased
i ts first t rac t of l and for a rec ru i t ing office in Mbabane in 1913.
(41) By the 1920's the NRC operat ion became well established, its
h e a d q u a r t e r s at Stegi adminis ter ing the ac t iv i t i es of a dozen or some
storeowners / recru i te rs in or near the Native Areas , who woried
for cap i ta t ion fees and who in turn employed "nat ive runners"to
frequent the ca t t le d ips and beer dr inks looking for likely
prospec ts . Recruiters and runners worked p a r t i c u l a r l y the oust of
underdeveloped Native Areas in Swaziland where the labour outflow
was a lways the g r ea t e s t , in south and west, and also the growing
populat ion centers of Mbabane and Bremersdorp ( la te r Manzini).
Stegi was , in add i t ion , responsible for recru i te rs in northern
Natal (Maputa and lngwavuma) and the eastern Transvaa l (Piet
Retief). It was a lso the h e a d q u a r t e r s for the Wenela operation in
southern Mozambique, providing an a l t e rna t ive to the heavy flowof
l abour through the main a t tes ta t ion point at Ressano Garcia . Stegi
"output" from all these sources , the exact composition of which
awai t s further research , averaged between 3,500 and 6,500 recruits
annua l ly up unt i l World War I I . (42)
Pressure to cease the flow of c landes t ines to local farms and
indus t r i es came not so much from the Government after the 1920'sas
it did from the NRC/Wenela headqua r t e r s at Stegi . That office
ul t imately entered an arrangement with the colonial s ta te whereby
the c landes t ines were rounded u p , and ei ther repa t r ia ted or
del ivered to the NRC for a t tes ta t ion to the Witwatersrand. (43) That
p rac t i s e was in fact a v a r i a n t of one used t r ad i t iona l ly by the
s ta te to funnel labour to the NRC elsewhere in Swaziland, which
involved periodic police sweeps for tax defau l te r s , who were
brought before magis t ra tes and given the choice of a ja i l sentence
(hence convict l abour ) or a NRC con t r ac t . (44) It became standard
p rac t i ce , in fact , for NRC rec ru i t e r s to frequent tax collection
camps, where they paid men 's taxes and / or fines as a recruiting
device, (45)
45
In th is manner a c lass of migrant labour was produced in
Swaziland, men s igning on for s ix , e igh t , a dozen or more 6-month
mine tours in a ca ree r , before " r e t i r i ng" to labour less dangerous
and demanding, and closer to home, on p l an ta t ions or (after 1938)
the new asbestos mine at Havelock. (46) Swazi homesteads on farms
or in Native Areas were preserved intact by means of de legat ing one
or two sons to a mine ca ree r , leaving the family predominantly
agr icu l tura l (though less p roduc t ive ) .
If one looks at the total market numbers in Swaziland just
before the Second World War, a p ic ture emerges which i s
substant ia l ly different from the one which perceives the Swazi as
only 3 to 4 per cent of the rand mine ros te r s . In 1936 the NRC sent
7,852 Swazi labourers to the mines. Another 4,824 Native Trave l l ing
Passes (NTP's) were issued to those "seeking work on own accord" -
contracts and a choice of mines. (47) Another 3,711 NTP's were
issued to "v is i t ing and p r i v a t e " , a category for the most par t
seeking work on farms and in watt le p lan ta t ions in the eas tern
Transvaal , as domestics, or as cane cut ters in Nata l . The total
(which does not include the unknown hundreds - t housands ,
possibly - who slipped across the border i l l ega l ly r a t h e r than pay
the one - sh i l l ing NTP fee) amounts to 67 per cent of the male
working population which left the country to seek work that y e a r .
(48) By 1939, the yea r of the war , another 6,300 men were employed
in-country by local c a p i t a l . It i s therefore no mystery why
Swaziland, a surp lus food producer unt i l the ca t t le pandemics of
the mid-1890's, became a chronic g ra in importer dur ing the
twentieth cen tu ry . (49)
World War II brought subs t an t i a l changes to the Swaziland
labour market . A contingent of Swazi went off to war , near ly 4,000
strong, as the African Pioneer Corps. (50) That did not reduce the
numbers going off to the mines, which, from NRC f igures , averaged
upwards of 10,000 to i4,000 dur ing those y e a r s . The f igures were
reflective of two fac tors : Swazi loyal ty to the Allied cause , no
doubt; and a 24 per cent increase in wages on the Witwatersrand
during the war y e a r s . In fact , the g rea t worry in the High
46
Commission Terr i tor ies was that the Pioneer Corps was siphoning off
not mine labour as much as food producers . (51) That it affected
farm labour in Swaziland there was no doubt; the Swaziland
Farmers ' Association, c i t ing a c r ipp l ing labour shor tage , tried to
induce the Government to res t r ic t al l recru i t ing l icenses, and to
stop labour outmigration except to the gold mines, pet i t ions which
were denied. It may have been at this point that the tried and true
se t t le r - farmer pa t t e rn of res t r ic t ing labour mobility r a t h e r than
r a i s i n g farm wages broke down, although there is no way of
knowing for s u r e . (52)
Whatever the specific of t h a t , three developments set the
post-war labour market in Swaziland a p a r t from the ea r l i e r period:
the development of wage competition resul t ing from massive capital
penetra t ion; the growth of worker consciousness; and the beginnings
of labour r e s i s t ance .
In i t i a l l y , as in the previous e ra , the new cap i t a l was
predominantly Br i t i sh . An ambitious i r r iga t ion scheme was capital
ized by the Colonial ( l a te r Common-wealth) Development Corporation
(hereaf ter , CDC), which added s u g a r , c i t r u s , and (eventua l ly) rice
to the cul t ivat ion of cotton and tobacco as important irr igated
c r o p s . The CDC and Barclays Bank underwrote the first commercial
timber schemes in the nor th , la ter to be bought out by the
Anglo-American Corporat ion. (53) During the 1960's and 1970's,
South African, J apanese , Taiwanese and American cap i t a l added
mining, food process ing , l ight manufactur ing, and re ta i l industr
ies . All transformed the pol i t ical economy of Swaziland, and
reshaped i ts labour market .
Wages had been successfully excluded from the a rena of labour
competition in Swazi land. Farm wages, 20 / - per month maximum in
1917, rose to 3 0 / - per month in the 1920's, only to fall back during
the Depression. (54) The Witwatersrand mines had ac tua l ly reduced
wages between the wars , from £36 per annum to £33 per annum,
subs t i tu t ing something far more effective in lur ing r e c r u i t s : the
" a d v a n c e " . (55) Introduced into Swaziland by 1923, the advance
provided work-seekers £5 cash to pay t axes , f ines , debts to
47
storekeepers (many of whom doubled as r e c r u i t e r s ) , and family
expenses, the money to be repaid dur ing the contracted mine work.
It was an enormously effective rec ru i t ing tool, enough so tha t the
local farmers attempted to have it outlawed. (56) Only in 1939 was
rand mine compensation adjusted in any fashion - tha t being when
the Chamber of Mines commenced paying r a i l fares for r e c r u i t e r s , in
response to pressure from the In te rna t iona l Labour Organ i sa t ion .
(57) The NRC d id , however, offer handsome incent ives to i ts
recrui ters (30 / - per recru i t in ear ly d a y s , up to a maximum of
£2.5.0 per head after the w a r ) , and recru i te rs in turn pa id
capi ta t ion fees to the i r runners ave rag ing 5 / - per r ec ru i t . (58)
The subs tan t i a l NRC output thus generated (16,000, including
Mozambicans via Stegi in 1954) was compounded, in i ts p ressure on
the local labour supply , by the increas ing demands of local
indust ry , and by corresponding requirements from an expanding
South African i n d u s t r y . Recruit ing for South African coal mines,
begun as a war measure, was ins t i tu t ional ized with the pos t -war
establishment of two recru i t ing o rgan iza t ions , Anglo-American
(Witbank Col ler ies) , and the Natal Coal Owners' Labour Organ i s
ation (NCOLA). (59) The burgeoning Transvaa l wattle i n d u s t r i e s ,
and the s isal and sugar p lan ta t ions at Pongola and to the South in
Natal, scooped up even more surp lus labour . (60) In Swazi land,
timber became voracious in i ts labour requirements - Peak Timbers
alone p lan t ing 60,000 acres of trees and bui ld ing 750 miles of roads
during the la te 1940's and ear ly 1950's. (61) I r r iga t ion cana l s and
construction projects added to the demand.
The resu l t ing pic ture of the labour scene that emerges belies
the t r ad i t iona l image of a compliant "na t ive" labour force
responding to the dic ta tes of colonial c a p i t a l . Company vehicles
from timber and suga r es ta tes toured the (southern) lowveld region
- where " su rp lus" population remained most concentrated - engaging
labour and re tu rn ing it on weekends. The Transvaa l wattle indust ry
began to pay advances , and the NRC recru i te rs at Piet Retief began
embussing r ec ru i t s in order to escape the "wattle estate g a u n t l e t . "
The NCOLA used miner ' s ph th i s i s as an a rgu ing point aga ins t the
48
•
NRC. Usutu forests , caught up in i ts own p lan t ing scheme,
peti t ioned the NRC to send over its re jec t s . Local indus t r ies began
paying capi ta t ion fees to Swazi s torehands - 10/- twice what the
NRC paid i t s runners - to produce r e c r u i t s . They also took to
paying the fines of c landest ines ar res ted a t the Mozambique border
and hi r ing them on. Labour competition by 1952 had become, in NRC
Superintendant Whitt le 's words, "phenomenal". (62)
The Swazi response to these new conditions was to become very
selective in the i r choice of employment. What became most apparent
to rec ru i t e r s was a strong local desire to labour close to home - a
wi l l ingness , even, to accept lower wages if necessary to do so.
Local indus t ry complied. Timber buil t new q u a r t e r s for its labour
which, in Whitt le 's opinion, were "cer ta in ly bet ter than tha t which
the raw Swazi is accustomed to at home". One timber concern began
bui ld ing accomodations for workers ' families on s i t e , most of them
added recrea t ional fac i l i t ies and improved the qual i ty of the food;
al l of them bussed workers home on weekends. (63) Local
i ndus t r i e s , an exaspera ted Superintendant Whittle informed his
super io r s , were underworking and "overpay( ing) the i r Natives".
"The Swazi", he complained, "is most independent - he has plenty
to choose from and sel ls his labour where and when he wishes".
(64)
In i t i a l l y , se t t ler farmers responded to th is new evidence of
worker consciousness in the tr ied and true manner, br inging
pressure to bea r on the colonial s t a te , and on " the i r" l aboure rs .
They petit ioned the Government to cancel l icenses of a l l r ec ru i t e r s ,
local and South African, except essent ia l gold mine represen ta t ives .
They urged i t to enforce that section of the Master and Servants
Law which made offering higher wages and benefits a criminal
offence. (65) To labour they showed the mailed f is t . They warned
the i r farmworkers that if they took up mining employment, their
families would be "victimised" in the i r absence . They mis-endorsed
pa s se s , p revent ing the i r - men from being at tested at the border .
They shangha ied h i tchhikers by d a y , and they crossed borders and
"poached" labour in the dead of n i g h t . (66)
49
St i l l , labour made itself scarce to undes i r ab le employment.
"The Natives" Whittle reported to Johannesburg , "select the type of
employment they fancy at times to sui t the i r convenience". (67)
Farmers took to frequenting cat t le dips with the i r automobiles,
•offering to employ labour and re turn the men home, sometimes
t ranspor t ing ent i re families to and from work each d a y . (68)
Local indus t ry was able to br ing more effective pressure to
bear on the colonial s ta te by v i r tue of i ts dominance of the
European Advisory Council (since 1922 a powerful influence on the
colonial government) , and the Chamber of Commerce and i n d u s t r i e s .
In 1949 it persuaded the s ta te to decree a policy of different ial
advances : local indus t ry was permitted to offer £5 ; "outside"
indust r ies ( including the NRC and Anglo-American / NCOLA) were
allowed to advance only £3- I t was enough to d r ive out the coal
r ec ru i t e r s , even tua l ly , but NRC output dropped not at a l l . The
reason was wages; for the first time since the war the Chamber of
Mines ra i sed i ts basic wage 12/6- to £4 per month, a full 10 per
cent. (69)
So began a sp i ra l of wage increases in every indus t ry
operating and / or recrui t ing in Swaziland, that lasted from 1949
until well into the 1970's. Timber wages rose from 2 / 3 - per day in
1947 to £1/10- per day in 1976. The basic wage on the
Witwatersrand dur ing the same period rose from 5 / - per day to
£1/5- d a i l y . In 1953 the NRC introduced a bonus scheme to
compensate runners for increased output , and it lowered the
contract length of a mine tour to 6 months. (70) Local indus t ry
responded with increased pay and shor ter (as l i t t l e a s 2 month)
contracts , using the old lure of the la rge advance differential over
the NRC to full a d v a n t a g e . "These short contrac ts with big
advances", Whittle reported with a d i scern ib le sense of pa in , "a re
tying up a lot of a v a i l a b l e l abour" . (71)
The answer was to make other labour a v a i l a b l e . To ease the
cr is is , local indus t ry turned more and more to imported l abour , and
to the employment of women and c h i l d r e n . There a r e only h in t s of
the numbers involved. Havelock mines were employing Mozambicans
50
and Nyasans as from 70 to 80 per cent of their labour force by the
late 1940's. In the mid-1960's , there were at least '5,000
Mozambicans employed in Swaziland, mostly as cane cut ters and
farm laboure r s , performing work which the Swazi men shunned. (72)
Peak Timbers dur ing its p l an t ing and road bui ld ing years used
women and ch i ldren as 60 per cent of i ts work force - without whom *
it could not have car r ied out its program. (73) It is important to bear in mind tha t what colonial officials and
r ec ru i t e r s were seeing dur ing those years as Swazi laz iness and
sloth w a s , in fact , the beginnings of a sense of discrimination with
which a workforce, becoming conscious of i tself and of i ts new
opt ions, was making i ts selections of employment. "It often happens
that a new place of employment a t t r ac t s labour" , Whittle explained
:o Johannesburg , "as the Native l ikes to ' t r y it out ' to see how it
compares with mining work and p a y , e t c . " Usutu Forests was a
perennia l bridesmaid to the NRC in the recrui t ing bus iness because
timber work was unpleasant in cold, wet weather , and because it
acquired a reputa t ion for low pay and poor l iving condi t ions . The
Company, Whittle wrote, "only obtained the ' l e f t -overs ' from the
N.R.C Men go to Usutu, and when they find that there is only
forest work ( ins tead of mill work) , they dese r t " . (74)
Swazi workers also figured out how to play the "advance game"
deft ly, by sol ici t ing the £5 advance from one timber company after
ano ther , deser t ing after a d a y ' s work at each , working the sugar
es ta tes on the lowveld in the same manner before skipping off to
Johannesburg with the NRC. Companies were so desperate for labour
they would not su r render the malefactors when identif ied; that
became the task of the Swaziland and the South African Police. (75)
One other aspect of labour market consciousness bears
mentioning h e r e , al though the w r i t e r ' s research for it remains
ske tchy . Swazi workers , l ike other workforces through Southern
Africa (consistent with the design of mining c a p i t a l ) , re ta ined the i r
roles as homesteaders as a source of supplementary income. The
t r ad i t i ona l ca t t l e economy was made more l iquid after 1945 when the
Government es tab l i shed a ser ies of ca t t l e auct ions throughout the
51
country . The Swazi became more adept at what they had a lways
been proficient in , the management of ca t t le as an investment .
There came to be a connection between the marketing of ca t t le and
job seeking, the de ta i l s of which requi re fur ther r esea rch ; but
cat t le appea r to have become a source of income which became a
conscious a l t e r n a t i v e to unacceptable work condi t ions . Prudent
investment in , and shrewd marketing of cat t le provided the
wherewithal for, among other u n d e r t a k i n g s , avoiding work which
was considered unremunera t ive , unp leasan t , demeaning, or dange r
ous. Ini t ia l research indica tes a negat ive correlat ion between ca t t l e
prices and NRC output . Cer ta inly the recru i te rs were convinced of
tha t . This is a l l the more in t r iguing because there does not seem to
be a correlat ion of any s ignif icance between, s ay , crop fa i lure or
droughts , and NRC ou tpu t .
The beginnings of labour res is tance in Swaziland can thus be
seen in the ways in which the workforce played the market
conditions, for the best rewards in wages and condi t ions .
withholding the i r labour a l together if necessary , other means of
support being a v a i l a b l e . But the acute labour shor tage which gave
these re la t ive advan tages to Swazi workmen lasted only unt i l the
early 1960's. Slackening of the labour market , a resul t of
population growth and a levell ing off of cap i ta l investment, led
companies at that time to withdraw concessions previously granted
in order to a t t r ac t labour , and to enforce more s t r i c t ly the exis t ing
regulat ions . Timber companies cracked down on absenteeism, while
the NRC reverted to the unpopular 9-month con t rac t .
The Swazi labourer responded to these developments by
unionizing ( loca l ly , where he could) , and by s tag ing a ser ies oi
strikes and job actions throughout 1963 and 1964. The most notable Bend
unrest occurred a t the B i g / s u g a r complex, serious enough that a
British army contingent was flown in to restore order , remaining in
Swaziland until 1968. Although the s t a t e , backed by the monarchy,
suppressed unionism thereaf ter , overt labour res is tance continued
on for another two y e a r s , and continued less d iscern ib ly well after
52
independence in 1968. (7&)
Conclusion
What s t r ikes the researcher in the study of the Swazi labour
market , in cont ras t to, say , the Basotho exper ience, is the galvanic
effect which free market forces can have on worker consciousness
and percept ive response . On the subject of labour h i s to ry , it is
almost as if there were two Swazilands pre -and post-1945. Before
the war , the removal of the Swazi from the means of production,
and the extract ion of their surp lus at the hands of set t ler capital
in league with the colonial s t a t e , reads like a textbook example of
how it is correct ly done. Royalty and chiefs , p ro tes t ing , are
suppressed , deceived, even humiliated, while the i r control over the
p r e - i ndus t r i a l economy and society is careful ly preserved by the
s t a t e . Peasan t s , thus impoverished, labour for set t ler farmers on
set t ler terms, or go off to the mines under mineowners' conditions.
What competition there develops between local and Transvaa l mining
cap i t a l i s adjudicated by the colonial s ta te for the benefit of all -
save the Swazi l abou re r .
Post-1945* massive capi ta l penetrat ion replaced this relatively
comfortable accomodation with conditions of ha r sh competition for
labour gone sca rce , which the worker, once a l e r t ed , pa r l ayed with
shrewdness and ski l l to his own benefi t . Only when labour once
aga in became plentiful in the ear ly 1960's did labour manipulation
of the market (a form of res is tance) turn into more discernible
pa t t e rns of opposi t ion, unionization and s t r i k e s . The degree to
which local indus t ry turned to female and child l abour , and foreign
(notably Mozambican* workers , is one indicat ion of the vola t i l i ty of
the market of which the Swazi took a d v a n t a g e .
Furthermore, one gets the feeling (though th is r equ i res further
research) t ha t worker consciousness produced by these conditions
was but one dimension of family consciousness . Family surv iva l was
subjected to many h r*a t s in twent ie th-century Swaziland, both
n a t u r a l and man-made, iiic a r r a y of defenses which the family
53
e r e c t e d , t h e s o l u t i o n s i t c h o s e , i n v o l v e d d e c i s i o n s o n w o r k , c r o p s ,
c a t t l e , c o n f l i c t i n g l o y a l t i e s , a n d a h o s t of o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
F a m i l y s u r v i v a l i n t h e 1 9 5 0 ' s m a y h a v e d i c t a t e d , for e x a m p l e , t h a t
t he f a t h e r r e m a i n e d b e h i n d o n t h e h o m e s t e a d t o m a x i m i z e c r o p
p r o d u c t i v i t y w h i l e t h e w i f e a n d c h i l d r e n w e n t off t o U s u t u t o p l a n t
t r e e s - H o m e s t e a d p r o d u c t i v i t y w a s a f a r g r e a t e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n a m o n g
the S w a z i t h a n c o l o n i a l o f f i c i a l s g a v e t h e m c r e d i t f o r : w i t n e s s t h e
l e g e n d a r y d r o u g h t of 1964, w h i c h t h e NRC c o n f i d e n t l y e x p e c t e d t o
g e n e r a t e a h e a v y o u t p u t ' . E x a c t l y t h e o p p o s i t e h a p p e n e d : t h e
9 -mon th c o n t r a c t s o t h r e a t e n e d S w a z i p r o d u c t i v i t y t h a t men s t a y e d
home , p l o u g h e d g r e a t e r a c r e a g e s , a n d s o l d off t h e i r c a t t l e in o r d e r
to s u r v i v e . ( 7 7 )
R e s e a r c h on f a m i l y h i s t o r y w i l l p r o v i d e u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n
a b o u t how a s e m i - p r o l e t a r i a n i z e d s o c i e t y r e s p o n d e d t o t h e c h a l
l e n g e s a n d t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s p r o v i d e d b y t h e p o s t - 1 9 4 5 l a b o u r
m a r k e t c o n d i t i o n s , w h a t f a m i l y p r i o r i t i e s w e r e , a n d how t h e y w e r e
met . T h e r e i s n e e d for f u r t h e r r e s e a r c h a l s o on w h a t f a c t o r s
g e n e r a t e d w h a t t y p e s of w o r k s e e k i n g . T h a t w i l l r e q u i r e e x t e n s i v e
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n a n d a n a l y s i s of d a t a , b u t h o p e f u l l y we c a n t h e r e b y
a r r i v e a t some h e l p f u l c o n c l u s i o n s o n c o r r e l a t i o n s a m o n g s t a g r i c u l t
u r a l p r o d u c t i v i t y , l a b o u r o u t p u t , a n d s o c i a l c h a n g e , i n a p o s t - w a r
S o u t h e r n A f r i c a n l a b o u r m a r k e t w h e r e e l e m e n t s of c h o i c e a c t u a l l y
e x i s t e d - a n d , for a w h i l e , f l o u r i s h e d .
Footnotes
1 Philip L. Bonner. Kjngs^ Commoners and Concessionaires. Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. I9S2.
2 Francis J. Mashasha. "The Road to Colonialism: Concessions a rd the Collapse of Swazi Independence. 1875-1926", unpublished PH.D. dissertation. Oxford University. 1977: Balam Nyeko. "The
Swazi Leadership's Response to Colonial Rule. 1902-1900." unpublished Pi .D. dissertat ion. Makerere University- 1977-
3 J.S, Crush. "The Spatial Impress of Capital anc" the Colonial Stair in Swaziland." unpublished M.A. thesis, La-urier University. 1978: J.S. Crush. "Thi Colonial Division of Space: The Significance of the Swaziland I.ard Parti t ion". International Journal of Afi ican Historical Studies. XIII. 1 U980). 7rap;'"JT£«~£Tush; "The'GonesTs of tTolcniaT "Tard Poiicv in Swaziland". The South African Geogra-pj iu-aj joutnal . L X l I . ' l (1980). 73-86: J7S. C"rus"nT~*TTn~e~~Parameters of Drpt r.c'encc in Southern Africa: A Case Study of Swaziland". J u'"na_!_ of Southern African Affairs, VI. 1 (1979). 55-66: J .S. CrusfT. "Settler Estate Production. Monopoly Control and the Imperial Response: The Case of the Swaziland Corporation Ltd.". African Economic History. Fall 1979. 183-198.
54
2 Uari ln j . F ransman. "The Plat*? and Development in Swazi land. ^60 -1977 . " unpubl ished PH.D. d i s s e r t a t i on . Universi ty of Sussex. 197$,
3 Fion de V l e t t e r , "Migrant Labour in Swazi land: C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . A ' l i i udes . and Policy Impl ica t ions" . In te rna t iona l Labour Organ-
Findings of a Socio-Economic Survey Undertaken Jointly by the United States Agency for In te rna t iona l Development (USAID) and the Univers i ty College of Swazi land" , 1981, mimeo; S.G. Heilbronn, "KaTer Laws. Prior Rights and Government Apportionment in Swazi land . Southern Africa". 1981, mimeo; A.R.C. Low, "Migration and Agr icu l tura l Development in Swazi land" , 1L0, Migration for Employment Project , i977. mimeo; Beth D. Rosen-Prinz and Fred"^ erick ~~A~~' Pr inz . ""''Migrant Labour and Rural Homesteads: An Inves t iga t ion Into the Sociological Dimensions of the Migrant Labour System in Swaziland"* ILO, Migration, for Employment Project• 1978. mimeo.
6 ; ' . ] . Fransman, "The Colonial State and the Land Question in Swazi land. 1903-1907", ICS Seminar p a p e r . SSA/77/9, Universi ty of London. 1977. p . 2 .
7 Cf. f n s . 2-6 above . 8 Milner to Enraght-Mocny (Resident Magis t ra te for Swaz i l and ) , 18
September 190£, J62.'0£, Swaziland National Archives (hereaf te r , SNA'.
9 RCS 3*9/19, SNA 10 Telegram (Confidential J. Smuts to Milner, 5 August 1898. S U D.
SNA 11 Smuts to Lord Bishop. L November 1897. S 14 F2. SNA. 12 Selborne to -ord Lyit leton, Colonial Secre ta ry , 10 July 1905.
J138/05. SNA 13 Selborne to Lord Elgin, Colonial Secre ta ry , 29 October 1906.
J220/06. SNA 14 I b i d . ; Crush . "Genesis of Colonial Land Pol icy ," p . 78. SNA. 15 "TTTrTutes, Meeting of the Swazi Chiefs with the Earl of Elgin,
London. 21 November 1907, J45/07. SNA 16 Miller to D. Malcom, P r iva t e Secretary to Selborne, 21 December
1906 MS Mil 1.08.16 (MS 429), Miller P a p e r s , Killie Campbell** L ibra ry (he rea f t e r , KCL).
17 Grey to Selborne (Conf ident ia l ) , 7 December 1908, D09/2 SNA. 18 Minutes, Meeting of the Resident Commissioner (hereaf te r . RC) s
with the Queen Regent and Chiefs, 26 August 1913. RCS 478/13.SNA.
19 Miller to Malcom, 21 December 1906, o p . c i t . 20 Sir A. Pirn, "Report of the Commission Appointed By the Secretary
of State for Dominion Affairs to Inquire Into the Position of Swaziland from the Financia l and Economic Points of View", London. HMSO, 1932.
21 B.T. Squ i r e s , M.D., "Report on the Nutri t ional Status of Swazi Ch i ld ren" , 1945; Dr. S. Selby, "Report on the Nutri t ional Condition of Swazi Ch i ld r en" , 19*5. File 986, SNA,
22 Hei lbronn, "Water Laws", p p . 4 -5 ; Miller P a p e r s , MS Mil 1 08 2 (MSS 184F and 404B). KCL. By 1927 water was being d iver ted far more for i r r i g a t e d farming than for mining pu rposes .
23 Lord Har lech, High Commissioner (hereaf te r , HC). to C .L . Bruton, RC. (Secre t ) , 20 J a n u a r y 1942, RCS 434/41. SNA.
24 Selborne to E lg in . 14 May 1906, J /06, SNA. 25 "Report on Swazi land" , 18 September 1903. J50/1904. SNA:
in te rv iew, Maboya Fakudze , Lobamba, Swazi land. 2 November 1980.
26 Enraght-Moony to Queen Regent. 28 April 1903: "Let ( the) young men go out to l abour for money". J82/03 SNA; Milner to Queen Regent, 13 July J904: " *" South Africa . . . . t h e r e ( i s ) a lways p lenty of good work and good wages for n a t i v e s " . J138/05. SNA.
27 HC to RC, 2 April 1914, RCS 434/14.SNA. One morgen equa ls
55
approximate ly two a c r e s . 28 3 May 1899. S 7 A, SNA. The concession was l a t e r dec lared by the
Government to have been automat ica l ly terminated upon the k i n g ' s d e a t h .
29 Enraght-Moony to R.T. Coryndon, 24 October 1905, J294705; Enraght-N'^ony to Rodwell. Imperial Secre ta ry , 18 J a n u a r y 1907, J13/07; R.T. Coryndon. RC. to Rodwell. 3 July 1909. D09/88: Assistant Commissioner (hereaf te r , AC), Hla t iku lu . to Government Sec re ta ry , Mbabane. 29 April 1914, RCS 371/14, SNA.
30 Correspondence and Telegrams (Confidential) between HC and RC, J a n u a r y 1907. J13/07. SNA.
31 Correspondence between D. Honey, RC. and Swaziland Tin, L td . . J a n u a r y - February 1915. RCS 100/15. SNA.
<2 F.A.L. V'hittle. District Super in tendent , NRC, to C.R. Latimer. Acting Government Sec re ta ry , 16 August 1918, RCS 404/42,SNA.
33 Meeting notes , handwr i t t en , J152/06; Enraght-Moony. "Notes or. Swazi land" , 18 September 1903. J50-04, SNA.
3i AC, Hla t iku lu . to Government Secre ta ry , 29 April 1914. RCS 371 /U; AC, Peak District to Government Secre ta ry , o November 1914. RCS 854/14; RC to HC, 19 June 1915, RCS 277/15; Government Secre tar \ to AC ' s . 28 Mav 1915. RCS 328/15, SNA.
35 Selborne to Elgin, 29 October 1906, J220/06, SNA. 36 Crush, "Swaziland Corporat ion" , 187. 37 Petition of Hlat ikhulu Fa rmers ' Association. October 1924, RCS
474/24; Honey to Pr ince Arthur of Connaught . HC. 20 J a n u a r y 1921, RCS 564/18, SNA. The High Commissioner refused the 2 months' notice provis ion . Pr isoners convicted under the Master and Servants Law provided free labour to build r o a d s , b r i d g e s , and other publ ic works - in effect a form of s t a t e subs idy to the set t ler popula t ion .
38 Miller to Government Sec re ta ry , 14 September 1915: Government Secretary to Miller, 25 September 1915. RCS 514/15. SNA.
39 Petition of Hlatikulu Farmers ' Association, September 1917. RC5 489/17; Petition of Hlat ikulu Farmers ' Association. 23 J a n u a r y 1919. RCS 92/19; Meeting. High Commissioner with Chiefs, Mbabane
12 March 1923. RCS 70-23. SNA. £0 Crush, "Swaziland Corporat ion, "188-189; Government Secre tarv to
AC's. 10 December 1928. File 1437, SNA. £1 RCS 669/13. SNA. £2 Ruth First e t . a l . . The Mozatabican Miner: A Study in. t h e . Export
of Labour <f977). t ab l e between p p . 24 and 25. £3 File 1437, SNA. U Meeting of Senior Officials Mbabane, 29 July 1923. RCS 682-32.
SNA. 45 Swaziland Annual Report. 1913-1914; Monthly Report . Mbabane.
April 1949- Native Recruit ing Corporation P a p e r s . Si teki , Swaziland (hereaf ter . NRC).
46 In 1932 the mine contract adminis tered by the RCS was increased to 9 months, which proved immediately and un ive r sa l l y unpopular with the Swazi worker because it cut into the a g r i c u l t u r a l season, and hence reduced homestead produc t iv i ty . Thus more and more Swazi opted to "go out" under the Assisted Voluntary Scheme (AVS; system, whereby a workseeker t ravel led to Johannesburg at h i s own expense , i n i t i a l l y , but under a 6-month, or a 4-month cont rac t , and sought out h i s own work from mines with opening? there .
47 Cf. fn. 46 above . 48 Swaziland Annual Report. 1936; Swaziland Census, 1936. The
Census category of "Mature males, 15-50 years '" was adjusted to th~e more t r ad i t iona l age 18-45 definition of a "working male populat ion" in order to a r r i v e a t th i s pe rcen tage .
£9 Pirn Report (1932); Swaziland Annual Report, 1939. By 1939 the asbes tos mine at Havelock was employing 2 000. half of whom were said to be Shancaan "c l andes t i ne s " . "Labour at H.ivelock Mine".
56
i7 October 193S- Box 741a-770b. SNA. 50 File 304 11 S i l l . SNA: I.S.M. Matsobuia. A History of Swaziland
U972*. p . 105-107. 51 "Output" f igures from NRC s t a t i s t i c s . Tho Employment Bureau of
Africa iTEBA* office. Mbabane. Agon! for ihe High Commission Terr i tor ies to the Government Secre tary . Maseru, Basuioland, 27 April 1942. RCS 416/42, SNA: Francis Wilson. Labour in the .South African Gold Mines 1911 - 1969 11972). p- 46. As Wilson poin ts ou t . in real terms, there was no wage increase al a l l .
32 Meeting oT~ the Swaziland Farmers ' Association with the RC, 16 October" 1940. RCS 93/40; Special Meeting of ihe Swaziland Farmer*' Associat ion. 19 July 1941. RCS 404/42, SNA.
53 In terv iew. Robert P . Stevens . Piggs Peak, Swazi land, i5 June 19? 1.
5i HC's Visit to Swazi land. September 1917. RCS 489/17 and 493/17: RC to HC. 15 Juno 1923. RCS 440/23: Meeting of Chiefs, 30 March 1932. RCS 73/32. SNA.
55 AC Hlatikulu to Government Secre ta ry . 11 September 1917. RCS 493'17: Agent fci' the High Commission Terr i tor ies Co Government Sec re ta ry . Maseru, Basute land, 1 September 1942. RCS 512/42, SNA.
56 Honey to Cannaugh t . 15 June 1923, RCS 440/23: Meeting of European Advisory Council with RC, 30 September 1923, RCS 645/23. SNA.
57 W.H. Clark (HO to C.L. Bruton (RC). 8 December 1939. RCS 433/37. SNA.
5S "Labour Conditions in Swazi land" , 30 April 1954 and 21 January 1955. File 5^4; '"Labour Condit ions", 4 May 1949. File 919. SNA. Beginning in the l a te 19^0's, the NRC moved away from the cap i t a t ion fee system toward a force of s a l a r i e d professional r e c r u i t e r s , p a r t i a l l y to reduce cos ts , and p a r t i a l l y to stop abuses by the t r a d e r s / r e c r u i t e r s , which were being scru t in ised by the 1LO. Interview with F .A.L. Whittle, Johannesburg , South Africa, 23 June 1981.
59 NRC Output d a t a . TEBA offices, Mbabane; Monthly Reports, Piel Retief, June 1948 and December 1950, NRC.
60 Annual Report, District Super in tendent (F .A.L . Whit t le) , 1950, NRC.
61 In te rv iew, Robert P. Stevens, Piggs Peak, Swaziland, 15 June 1981.
62 Monthly Reports : Mbabane, November 1948; Piet Retief, J anuary 1950; Mbabane , December 1950; District Super in tendan t , June 1951 and September 1952, NRC.
63 Monthly Reports : District Super in tendan t , February 1951; Mbabane, March 1951, NRC.
64 Monthly Reports: District Super in tendant , J a n u a r y and March 1953, NRC.
65 Special Meeting of the Stegi Farmers ' Association, 11 March 1946, File 919. SNA.
67 Monthly Report, District Super in tendant , May 1954, NRC. 68 Monthly Reports : Piet Retief, April 1953; District Super in tendan t ,
June 1954. NRC. 69 Whittle to Government Secre ta ry , 12 May 1949, File 1735, SNA;
Monthly Report , District Super in tendan t , October 1949, NRC. 70 Monthly Reports : District Super in tendant , August 1947, July 1952,
J a n u a r y 1953: Bremersdorp, April 1953; Mbabane, May 1976, NRC. The NRC adjusted i ts contrac t length as much a s i ts wages offered, in order to effect e l a s t i c i ty of labour supply on Ihe r a n d . It re in t roduced the 9-month contrac t in 1961; reduced it to 6 months in 1965; and re - lengthened it a g a i n to 9 months in 1971.
71 Monthly Report , District Super in tendan t , June 1957, NRC. 72 "Foreign Natives in Swazi land" . 1949. File 1437; "Foreign Labour
in Swazi land" , 14 June 1965, Secretar ia t Box 597, SNA. 73 In te rv iew, Robert P . Stevens . Piggs Peak, Swaziland, 15 June
1981.
57
1L Monthly Reports, District Super in tendant , October I960 and July 1961, NRC.
75 Monthly Reports: Mbabane, March, April and August I960; District Super in tendan t , June I960. NRC. These and other ac t i v i t i e s cons t i tu te what Robin Cohen ca tegor izes as "amplifying social d i s tance and c rea t ing a work -cu l tu re" , aspects of h i s "hidden forms of worker consc iousness" , Robin Cohen, "Resis tance and Hidden Forms of Consciousness Amongst African Workers". Review of African Poli t ical Economy, 19 (September - December 1980),
76 Fur ther research will e s t ab l i sh the r e l a t ionsh ip between f luc tua t ions in the labour market and the levels of l abour r e s i s t encc . The Government i nqu i ry into the causes of the Big Bend d i s tu rbances affords some ins ight into the o r ig in s of th i s ag i t a t ion , but labour res i s t ance in Swaziland, as th i s paper at tempts to make c l e a r , can be traced back a lot fu r the r . Cf. especia l ly Fransman, "The State and Development in Swazi land" , chapte r 4; Swaziland Government t Confidential Report of the Committee of Enquiry In to Unrest i ^ Swaziland, jr^th" june-!Tt"H"" July I9b3i Mbabane, "HS6i5; Swaziland " Government, Bfg~ Bend ?tri1<c~:~fhc. Report of the Commission of Enquiry , Mbabane, T^KJT
77 "Monthly Reports , District Super in tendan t , May and June 1964, NRC*
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